Brookings: Topics - Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: U.S. Couldn't Nail Down Chemical Weapons Chain of Custody

Noah Shachtman and John Hudson — Fri, 14 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

When the White House first publicly announced in late April its belief that the Assad regime in Syria had used chemical weapons on its own people, it stressed that this was only a strong suspicion -- not a certainty. Yes, they had blood samples that indicated exposure to deadly sarin gas. But they couldn't say for sure who handled those samples in the two weeks it took to get the blood into Western hands. "The physiological examples are compelling but without being able to determine the chain of custody, that's the key to confirming the use," one unnamed U.S. official told the New York Times earlier this week.

That chain of custody still hasn't been nailed down, an American intelligence source tells The Cable. But U.S. spy agencies nonetheless now feel confident that chemical weapons were used in Syria. And that, in turn, prompted the White House to make its more sure-footed announcement Thursday that Assad had, conclusively, gassed his opponents in Syria's civil war.

After an alleged chemical attack on the city of Aleppo in March, the U.S. and United States came into possession of at least three physiological samples that tested positive for indicators of sarin gas. Now, Western intelligence services have at least twice that number of blood, urine, and hair samples coming from a variety of battle zones around the country.

"The big thing that changed is an increase in the number of incidents," the source says. "It's impossible that the opposition is faking the stuff in so many instances in so many locations."

When the samples were combined with information from signals intercepts, overhead surveillance, and human tipsters, the intelligence community felt it had a powerful case. And once the intelligence community made its conclusion, the White House was, in a way, compelled to act.

It wasn't just that President Obama had declared the use of chemical weapons to be a "red line" (although, of course, that was vitally important for all sorts of geopolitical and strategic reasons). An obscure 1991 law, 22 USC 5604, states that the president shall notify Congress within 60 days if the executive branch determines that a foreign government "has used lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals."

Yet the White House's decision to announce the chemical weapons findings -- and the decision to provide "direct military support" to the rebels -- came rather quickly. "We had less than a week to prepare," the source says. "Nothing indicated a decision before this week."

And that quick move to announce may partially explain why the Obama administration's proclamation was so oddly short on specifics. There was that declaration of direct military support. But what shape that support would take, the administration wouldn't say, at least not on the record.

"Can't you even say small arms, RPGs, heavier weapons?" a reporter asked Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, during Friday's press briefing.

He answered: "We're just not going to be able to get into that level of detail about the type of assistance that we provide publicly here."

A State Department briefing with spokeswoman Jen Psaki added little clarity.

"So the United States has agreed to increase its support and aid to Syria, including direct military assistance," said a reporter. "Are you able to help us in any way explain exactly what is meant by that?"

"I cannot," Psaki said.

The CIA, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Pentagon directed all questions to the White House. ("Please feel free to report the CIA declined comment," one spokesman emailed.) The White House, in turn, refused to verify any order for small arms, ammunition, or any other kind of military support for the Syrian opposition.

One reason for the secrecy could be that the shipment of arms to rebels would fall under the CIA's classified purview. (Providing arms to rebel groups within another nation's sovereign borders presents legal issues in the absence of a United Nations Security Council resolution.) But another reason for the veiled statements and the lack of interagency coordination could be that the rollout of the chemical weapons announcement was done in haste.

Regardless, the U.S game plan in Syria has yet to be explained in full by U.S. officials on record. That reveals a conundrum of American security policy in 2013. Our wars are technically fought in secret. Yet they're announced to the world.

Editor's note: This piece was originally published by Foreign Policy magazine.

Authors

Noah Shachtman
John Hudson

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Yuri Gripas / Reuters

Mr. Obama, Don’t Draw That Line

Daniel L. Byman — Sat, 04 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

“The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable,” President Obama warned Bashar al-Assad’s government last December. “If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.”

This threat followed the president’s earlier warning that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” This red line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence community assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrians had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.

The administration’s ultimatum now seems like cheap talk, and it illustrates the risks of carelessly drawing red lines and issuing highly public threats that won’t be enforced.

So far, at least, the Obama administration has put off both consequences and accountability and simply pushed for further investigation. Meanwhile, Mr. Assad has not blinked, and the president’s political opponents, like Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, argue that Iran and North Korea will draw the wrong lessons if the president lets Mr. Assad call his bluff.

Red lines can be attractive tools of foreign policy, deterring foes from ethnic cleansing, genocide or, in the case of Syria, using chemical weapons. Part of the reason to go public, as one administration official put it last year regarding Syria, is to have a “deterrent effect.” By threatening to act in advance of a problem, you stop the problem and don’t have to act. Issuing a red line can also reassure allies or placate domestic critics.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: New York Times

Image Source: © Yazan Homsy / Reuters

Lessons of the Syrian Reactor

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 11:01:00 -0400

The office of the assistant to the president for national-security affairs in the West Wing of the White House is a spacious, well-lit corner room in a building where space is at a premium. It contains not only the national-security adviser’s large desk but also a table for lunch discussions and other small meetings as well as a couch and easy chairs for more relaxed discussions. In April 2007, this commodious setting was the scene of a remarkable meeting. Stephen Hadley, the national-security adviser at the time, welcomed Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad, who came with a special briefing for his American host. Dagan revealed a secret nuclear reactor in the final stages of construction in the Syrian desert, developed with the help of North Korea. Knowledge of this project constituted a stunning intelligence coup for Israel.

Later that year, on September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed Syria’s nuclear facility at Al Kibar along the Euphrates River. The mission emerged from more than two decades of comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis by American and Israeli intelligence services targeting Syria’s development of weapons of mass destruction. It was a dramatic demonstration of intelligence success—all the more so given the ongoing civil war that has devastated Syria since 2011. The world does not need to worry about a Syrian nuclear reactor under threat of capture by Islamic radicals. Israel took that concern off the table.

But the incident also demonstrated that once a policy-intelligence feedback loop becomes dysfunctional, as happened to the George W. Bush administration after it exaggerated and distorted intelligence estimates to justify the Iraq War, there are serious policy implications. Israel wanted America to take out the reactor, but Bush was constrained by an intelligence community unwilling to cooperate with another major military operation based primarily on intelligence data.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Negotiating with Iran: How Best to Reach Success

Mon, 01 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 1, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Negotiators from the P5 plus 1—Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States plus Germany—will sit down with their Iranian counterparts on April 5-6 for another round of talks regarding Iran’s nuclear program. These talks take place as concern grows in the international community that Tehran is nearing the point where it could acquire nuclear weapons capability, and against the backdrop of increasingly biting sanctions on Iran’s financial sector and broader economy.

On April 1, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore what lessons international negotiators should bear in mind when facing the Iranian delegation. Brookings Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana, who led the European Union’s negotiations with Iran in his capacity as EU high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Gary Samore, who as National Security Council coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction had principal responsibility at the White House on the Iranian nuclear question, described their experiences in dealing with Iran’s negotiators and what factors might lead to a successful outcome. Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

Still Peddling Iraq War Myths, Ten Years Later

Paul R. Pillar — Thu, 14 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Interest.

Documentaries, commentaries and forums marking the ten-year anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War have been so numerous that they already have become tiresome, even though the actual anniversary of the invasion is not until next Tuesday. The repetition would nonetheless be worthwhile if it helped to inculcate and to reinforce lessons that might reduce the chance that a debacle comparable to the Iraq War will itself be repeated. Maybe some such positive reinforcement will occur, but a problem is that the anniversary retrospectives also give renewed exposure to those who promoted the war and have a large stake in still promoting the idea that they were not responsible for foisting on the nation an expedition that was so hugely damaging to American interests.

I participated in one anniversary event earlier this week: a loosely structured on-the-record discussion, organized by the Rand Corporation and the publishers of Foreign Policy, involving about twenty people who had something to do with the Iraq War, whether it was starting it, fighting it, or writing about it. The session had the admirable stated purpose of extracting lessons for the future rather than merely repeating old debates from the past. But a clear pattern throughout the event was that ten years have not diluted the house line of those most directly involved in promoting the war, including among others then-deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley and Douglas Feith, who as an undersecretary of defense was one of the most rabid of the war promoters. Not only did they give no hint of acknowledgment that this war of choice (and Hadley refused to accept even that characterization) was one of the worst and most inexcusable blunders in the history of U.S. foreign policy. They also stuck to the line that if there was any mistake in the origin of the war it was solely a matter of “bad intelligence” and that the only “lessons” to be learned were to distrust intelligence more or ask tougher questions about it.

Intelligence did not drive or guide the decision to invade Iraq—not by a long shot, despite the aggressive use by the Bush administration of cherry-picked fragments of intelligence reporting in its public sales campaign for the war. Multiple realities confirm this observation. I have addressed them in detail elsewhere, but it would be useful to mention briefly the main ones.

The neoconservative champions of the war were publicly pushing for the use of military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein even in the 1990s, when they were out of power. One they were in power in the Bush administration, the intelligence community was not saying to them anything about Iraqi weapons programs that was remotely close to an expression of alarm about such programs, much less a reason to go to war. In its public assessments and (as investigative journalists such as Bob Woodward have reported) in closed ones as well, George Tenet and the community barely even mentioned the subject as being worthy of the policy-makers' attention. Consistent with such assessments, Secretary of State Colin Powell was saying publicly in the first year of the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein was well contained and that whatever he might be trying to do with unconventional weapons, he wasn't having much success. It was only after the 9/11 terrorist attack drastically changed the mood of the American public and thereby created for the first time the domestic political base for the neocons to realize their regime-changing dream that the administration turned Iraqi weapons programs into a war-justifying rationale.

In rare unguarded comments, some promoters of the war let slip that this is how they were using the issue. Feith and Paul Wolfowitz each later admitted that the weapons of mass destruction issue was a convenient public selling point, not the reason the war was being launched in the first place.

Policy-makers in the administration showed no interest at all in the intelligence community's judgments about Iraq, regarding weapons programs or anything else, despite the assiduousness with which they exploited the fragments of reporting that could be woven into their public sales campaign. The administration did not ask for the infamously flawed intelligence estimate about Iraqi unconventional weapons programs—Democrats in Congress did.

Even that estimate did not support the war-making case. Among other things it contained the judgment that if Saddam did have any of those feared weapons of mass destruction he was unlikely to use them against U.S. interests or to give them to terrorists—except in the extreme case in which his country was invaded and his regime about to be overthrown. If this judgment had a policy implication it was not to launch the war. The judgment directly contradicted—but did nothing to slow down—the administration's steady stream of scary rhetoric about how in the absence of a war Saddam could give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups.

Even if everything in the intelligence assessments about Iraqi weapons were true, this would not have constituted a case for launching an offensive war any more than it would have with China, North Korea, Pakistan, the Soviet Union or any other country which has developed nuclear weapons. This is indicated by the fact that even many people, both in the United States and abroad, who accepted the belief about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction nonetheless opposed the war.

Intelligence assessments on other aspects of Iraq constituted even less of a case for the war. In fact, some of the most important intelligence judgments were so contrary to the administration's pro-war case that the war promoters, far from being guided by those judgments, put considerable effort into trying to discredit them. (That's what the effort in the vice president's office that led to the criminal case against Lewis Libby was all about.) This was especially true of the intelligence community's judgments about terrorist connections, which contradicted the administration's phantasmagorical assertions about an “alliance” between Saddam's regime and al-Qaeda. It was also true of the community's judgments—which turned out to be much more relevant to the painful experience that the Iraq War became than were any judgments about weapons of mass destruction—about the political, security and economic mess in Iraq that was likely to follow overthrow of the regime.

The story of the United States getting into the Iraq War was, of course, not just one of what led the war's promoters to seek a war but also of how they were able to get enough other Americans to go along for the ride. But despite how much many of those other Americans, including ones in Congress who voted in favor of the war, said they hinged their position on judgments about Iraqi weapons, intelligence did not drive or guide that part of the process either. Only a very few members of Congress bothered even to look at the infamous intelligence estimate on the subject. One of the few who did—Bob Graham, then chairman of the Senate intelligence committee—later said his reading showed to him that the intelligence judgments were not at all the same as what the administration was saying in its sales campaign. That inconsistency was one of the reasons he voted against the war resolution.

One can also do a thought experiment by imagining how events might or might not have been different if the intelligence work on this subject had been absolutely perfect. (That is well beyond the reach of even the most magnificent intelligence service, but it can serve as an imaginary reference point.) “Perfect” in this case could be equated with what was in the exhaustive post-invasion report later compiled based on exploiting all the on-the-ground evidence that had been unavailable to analysts before the war. That product, known as the Duelfer report after the officer who was in charge of most of its preparation, concluded that Saddam intended to reactivate his nuclear and other unconventional weapons programs once he got out from under the already-weakening international sanctions. If prewar intelligence assessments had said the same things as the Duelfer report, the administration would have had to change a few lines in its rhetoric and maybe would have lost a few member's votes in Congress, but otherwise the sales campaign—which was much more about Saddam's intentions and what he “could” do than about extant weapons systems—would have been unchanged. The administration still would have gotten its war. Even Dick Cheney later cited the actual Duelfer report as support for the administration's pro-war case.

And yet, despite the voluminous record that bad intelligence was not why the United States went to war in Iraq, the myth that it was persists partly because the war promoters also keep promoting the myth. The event in which I participated this week demonstrates this hazard of the ten-year anniversary happenings. An early write-up of the event correctly notes that there were “sharp exchanges” on this and other questions, but on this question only quotes the side of the exchange that came from Hadley and Feith.

If one wants to learn valid lessons from what happened ten years ago, the process back then was so pathological that many specific lessons about what to avoid in the future could be extracted. Many of those lessons could be subsumed into one observation: extraordinary as it may seem, there was no policy process at all—no options paper, no meeting in the White House situation room or anything else—that addressed whether going to war against Iraq was a good idea. So it was not only the intelligence community but also other sources of information and insight, inside and outside government, that were shut out from having any impact on the decision to launch the war.

Hadley denied this observation, too, muttering something about needing to keep things close-hold so as not to jeopardize the “diplomatic process.” That just raises another myth—that the administration was trying to solve a problem through diplomacy before resorting to force—that also is belied by a substantial record, leading up to the final days in which the United States kicked international arms inspectors out of Iraq and in effect said “never mind that we didn't get another UN resolution, we're going to war anyway.” What pretended to be interest in diplomacy was a charade intended mainly to placate Powell and the British.

Authors

Paul R. Pillar

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Mohammed Ameen / Reuters

Obama’s Aims to Reduce Nuclear Threat

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Steven Pifer — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Barack Obama will reportedly reiterate his interest in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, though unlikely to announce specifics. The administration is interested in seeking an agreement with Russia, building on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and cutting U.S. strategic nuclear forces by another third in the expectation that Moscow will do the same with its nuclear arsenal.

This would leave each country with roughly 1,000 deployed long-range warheads, plus several thousand more in reserve and in tactical arsenals.

It would be an appropriately modest step toward serious pursuit of Obama’s (and President Ronald Reagan’s) goal of a nuclear-free world. With 1,000 warheads, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would remain more than capable of targeting any reasonable set of military sites abroad. Washington and Moscow would also avoid tempting any medium-size nuclear powers, most notably China, with its 250 or so warheads, to pursue nuclear superpower ranks.

It is sound policy. Dramatic enough to make a major difference in Obama’s foreign policy legacy yet measured enough to sustain U.S. deterrence for Washington and its allies abroad. Still, it will work best if several additional steps are included:

Modest U.S. unilateral cuts are a reasonable way to jump-start the process if Moscow is not immediately amenable to reciprocative measures. But they should be modest and reversible ‑ until we see how Russia reacts. This is not about fear of a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange, but rather about avoiding the possibility that Moscow would become more assertive if it somehow felt empowered by a new position atop the nuclear hierarchy.

Tactical and surplus warheads should be constrained. As a first step, data exchanges and some informal monitoring provisions should be explored. U.S.-Russian arms-control treaties have not previously limited warheads in these inventories. Since they are not normally affixed to big missiles or bombers, they are harder to track. But that is why they must be limited in some way. We will need to improve monitoring methods for these warheads if other countries are to be brought into the nuclear arms-control process in future rounds, since most other nations’ arsenals are dominated by these shorter-range weapons.

Missile defenses need to be part of the process. Since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the George W. Bush administration, there have been no ceilings on any type of missile defenses. There is little point here in trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together. Not only do congressional Republicans strongly oppose any limits on U.S. missile defenses but the technologies are evolving too fast (and are still too immature) for restraints to make much sense. Especially since some missile defense capability is a reasonable desire for those worried about North Korean and Iranian threats. But greater transparency, some degree of actual collaboration between the United States and Russia and, depending on the evolution of not just the technology but also the threat, some greater flexibility regarding U.S. plans to put advanced missile defenses into Europe in the future makes sense. The flexibility should not go so far as to weaken Washi! ngton’s bonds with allies and should not prevent the United States and its allies from protecting themselves. This point needs to be made plainly to Moscow.

Third parties should be asked to promise restraint, too. The other U.N. Security Council Permanent Five nuclear powers ‑ Britain, France and China ‑ as well as Israel, India and Pakistan should promise not to exceed current arsenal sizes, or at least not by much. This need not be a deal breaker if they refuse. But it would be a useful complement that would help ensure that no new nuclear competition is triggered by U.S. and Russian cutbacks, and would help pave the way for future multilateral treaties. To help persuade the other nuclear powers to agree, all countries could be asked to promise not to develop or augment existing nuclear weapons inventories. In other words, language could be proposed that would allow non-nuclear states to make the same pledge, and that would not require countries such as Israel to acknowledge officially that they have nuclear weapons. (Since right now they might not.)

Other arms-control measures could be considered. Top of the list is ratification of the 1990s-era Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States and China, among the world’s declared nuclear powers, have not yet ratified. (The Senate voted it down in 1999.) Another ratification debate is not prudent if it leads to a formal Senate defeat. But this is an opportune moment to remind Americans that our current arsenal is holding up extremely well without testing, and to make the case for formalizing our testing restraint. The last U.S. test was in 1992; no state other than North Korea has tested in the last dozen years.

Obama has rightly seized this nuclear arms-control opportunity. It may or may not make him the president who started the real march toward a nuclear-free planet. Indeed, that may not even be a realistic or desirable goal at this stage.

But his plan should help future presidents and Congresses evaluate the wisdom of such a possible step. Meanwhile, it saves a little money and, more important, helps keeps America and her allies safe.

Authors

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © STR New / Reuters

U.S. Shoots Down Secret Report That Syria Used a Chemical Weapon

Noah Shachtman — Wed, 16 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The State Department is publicly discounting claims made by its own diplomats about a chemical weapons attack in Syria.

On Tuesday, Foreign Policy detailed a secret and previously unknown cable from the U.S. consulate in Istanbul which came to the explosive conclusion that Syrian government forces dropped a hallucinogen known as “Agent 15″ on rebels in the town of Homs on December 23.

But less than a day later, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland has denied the report, saying that the Foreign Policy story ”did not accurately convey the anecdotal information that we had received from a third party regarding an alleged incident in Syria in December.”

“At the time we looked into the allegations that were made and the information that we had received, and we found no credible evidence to corroborate or to confirm that chemical weapons were used,” she added. That’s a major deal, because the international community has repeatedly told the Assad Regime in Syria that the use of chemical weapons is beyond unacceptable. The White House issued a statement along similar lines.

U.S. officials contacted by Danger Room said the information in the cable originated from a contractor hired by the State Department to monitor opposition media coming from Syria. After the attack in Homs, rebel activists posted gut-wrenching videos to YouTube of gasping victims crying out in agony. In the clips, opposition figures claimed that they had been hit with a poison gas — maybe a nerve agent, maybe a hallucinogen.

American experts could find little in the videos that corroborated either chemical weapons story. (For one thing, hallucinogens and nerve agents have almost opposite symptoms and treatment regimes.) In the hours after the attack, U.S. officials expressed skepticism about the rebel claims. The bit about Agent 15 seemed particularly odd; while the U.S. military experimented on its own troops with a similar hallucinogen called BZ, there was yet to be a proven case of the the agent being used in anger on the battlefield. Nevertheless, according to CNN, the State Department did ask “a U.S. partner” to follow up, interviewing Syrian doctors and chemical weapons specialists.

CNN says that the gas was determined to be a “riot control agent” — a broad category of weapons that includes tear gas, pepper spray, and Agent 15. None of these agents are designed to be deadly. But they’re also not designed to be inhaled in large quantities. “Just like with tear gas, if you breathe in an entire canister, that can have a severe effect on your lungs and other organs,” one official tells CNN.

In other words, if a chemical was used in Homs, it wasn’t a weapon of mass destruction.

It almost certainly wasn’t a hallucinogen, either. CNN also interviewed a doctor who said he treated victims in Homs with atropine. If that’s true, it rules out the use of a hallucinogen like Agent 15 or BZ. Both are anticholinergic agents, blocking the neurotransmitters in the parasympathetic nervous system. One would only enhance the effect of the other. CNN says experts concluded that the Homs attack “was later determined not to be Agent 15.”

The issue of chemical weapons continues to loom over the conflict in Syria. The regime’s stockpiles are enormous, and they’ve been shown the willingness to prepare at least some of the agents for a possible attack. But for now, the U.S. government appears to have decided that, whatever happened in Homs, it didn’t cross the chemical “red line” that the President on down had pledged would trigger outside intervention into the civil war.

Update: Dr. James Ketchum, who oversaw the American military’s hallucinogen weapon experiments (and wrote about them in his book Chemical Warfare Secrets Almost Forgotten), doesn’t believe such agents were used in the Homs attack, either.

Ketchum watched the YouTube videos of the aftermath, and doesn’t see the signs of a hallucinogen like Agent 15 or BZ in the victims’ responses. It’s “Definitely not BZ or related anticholinergic,” he writes in an email to Danger Room.

Those recovering from the attack “are all coherent and respond to questions with good attention. Most seem to complain of tightness in the chest and some require oxygen, but none show confusion, abnormal movements or dry mouth. Their pupils are not easy to see. All show anxiety — instead of being drowsy, restless, or non-responsive due to stupor from BZ-like drug,” he adds. “Hours must have passed to get them all in beds and under medical care. BZ would have them in delirium by that time and they would be performing phantom acts (e.g. invisible cigarette being smoked).”

Ketchum wonders if a nerve agent like sarin wasn’t used in Homs — it can produce some delirium during its early stages, and the atropine would’ve worked as a treatment. But U.S. experts quickly ruled out sarin or some other hyper-lethal nerve agent, because the gas had a strong odor (which sarin usually does not) and the victims in Homs manage to inhale a lot of the gas without dying.

So what was that mystery gas in Homs? Raffi Khatchadourian of the New Yorker puts together the clues, and comes up with the most credible suspect yet.

There are similar chemicals out there that cause the same symptoms but are not nearly as potent and do have an odor. They are orgaonphosphate pesticides, which happen to be among the most common pesticides in the world and are also cholinesterase inhibitors. They can cause symptoms identical to their military counterparts, including death, and are treatable with atropine. If the chemical used in Homs was a commercial pesticide, then it appears that someone has manufactured a crude, poor-man’s chemical weapon out of a commonly available item.

Authors

Noah Shachtman

Publication: Danger Room (Wired)

Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms

Fri, 19 Oct 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 19, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Register for the Event
In their new Brookings Focus Book, Brookings Senior Fellows Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon make a strong case for further steps in nuclear arms control, explain in clear and straightforward prose the background to complex arms control issues, and offer practical and realistic proposals for action by the administration in 2013 and beyond.

As the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis approaches, nuclear arms control has received scant attention in the current U.S. presidential campaign. Yet the future of arms control has major implications for U.S. national security, and no matter who is elected on November 6, the next president will have an opportunity to use arms control to enhance domestic and global security. In their new Brookings Focus Book, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Press, 2012), Brookings Senior Fellows Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon make a strong case for further steps in nuclear arms control, explain in clear and straightforward prose the background to complex arms control issues, and offer practical and realistic proposals for action by the administration in 2013 and beyond.

On October 19, the Arms Control Initiative and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore the possibilities for next steps on arms control and place them in a broader foreign policy context. They related the issues to the Pentagon’s budget situation and the longer-term vision of trying to move to a world without nuclear weapons. Pifer and O’Hanlon were joined by Brookings President Strobe Talbott. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

Watch both authors discuss arms control, the priority this issue should take in U.S. national security, and the opportunity to advance American security and prevent the threat of proliferation.

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Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms

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North Korea and the Nuclear Security Summit: Absent but Very Much Present

Jonathan D. Pollack — Sun, 25 Mar 2012 14:47:00 -0400

The second Nuclear Security Summit convenes today in Seoul, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will be conspicuous by its absence. Like Iran, North Korea has been excluded from global deliberations over nuclear safety and the protection of nuclear materials. But out of sight is not out of mind.

On February 29, the U.S. and North Korea announced the first tangible steps to address the long-standing nuclear impasse between Pyongyang and the outside world. The nuclear stalemate has remained essentially unchanged since Pyongyang walked away from the Six Party Talks in late 2008, resumed nuclear weapons development, and openly declared its pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability. Following the February talks in Beijing, Washington pledged to resume food assistance, repeated past assurances of non-hostile intent, and stated it would undertake measures to enhance people to people contact with the North. In return, Pyongyang agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at its Yongbyon nuclear complex.

However, guarded optimism on these parallel commitments proved fleeting. On March 16, North Korea announced plans to launch an earth observation satellite. According to Pyongyang, the planned launch (scheduled for mid-April) would celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean state. It was also expected to consolidate the power of Kim Jong Un, Kim Il Sung's young and untested grandson, who was elevated to supreme leadership in the DPRK following the death of his father last December.

Pyongyang's launch plans blatantly contradicted the understandings reached in Beijing. According to U.S. negotiators, both sides agreed that the pledge to forgo long-range missile tests encompassed satellite launch vehicles as well as rockets with a potential capability to carry a nuclear warhead. The DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs insists there was no such agreement, and argues that satellite launches are its unchallengeable sovereign right. For added measure, Pyongyang's planned launch would openly defy a unanimous UN Security Council resolution of April 2009 that forbade the North from undertaking any rocket tests utilizing ballistic missile technology.

Three days prior to the opening of the Nuclear Security Summit, North Korea upped the ante. It warned that any effort to place the satellite issue on the summit agenda would be tantamount to "a declaration of war against the DPRK." A separate statement warned that North Korea might be compelled "to take the strongest countermeasures which no one can imagine." Pyongyang knows that the summit is focused on securing nuclear materials and preventing their diversion to terrorists and non-state actors, not on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. But Pyongyang's latest moves will be intensively discussed in bilateral meetings during the conference, leaving open how North Korea might choose to respond.

Pyongyang has issued dire warnings on previous occasions, and with more specificity and at more authoritative levels than in its latest statements. However, its two nuclear tests (first in 2006, again in 2009) followed soon after two attempted missile launches, so the threat of unspecified countermeasures needs to be taken seriously. It is too soon to tell whether these latest warnings from Pyongyang prefigure a major escalation of tensions on the peninsula, including a third nuclear test, but these possibilities cannot be lightly discounted.

Ironically, North Korea's decision to announce its plans a month in advance of the actual launch is enabling face to face discussions in Seoul among the leaders of the five states involved in nuclear diplomacy with the DPRK. President Obama's impending talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Medvedev will underscore the North's deepening isolation if (as seems almost certain) it proceeds with the satellite launch. Beijing and Moscow have both signaled obvious displeasure at Pyongyang's plans, though it remains uncertain what either are prepared to do in response.

North Korea retains inherent suspicions whenever it is the subject of high level discussions in its absence. But Pyongyang's frustrations run even deeper. When South Korea was selected to host the second summit, Pyongyang's discontent was visceral, and it has voiced repeated objections ever since. The contrast between the ever growing role of the Republic of Korea in global diplomacy and the widespread reproach generated by the North's actions is palpable.

Pyongyang's deep antipathies toward South Korean President Lee Myung-bak are another factor contributing to the DPRK's open unhappiness about the summit. A successful outcome to the Seoul meeting will attest to South Korea's ever larger international role and to the enhanced stature of President Lee. But Pyongyang perceives a growing possibility that the next ROK president (to be elected in December) will be someone much more to its liking. Should Pyongyang undertake another nuclear test or initiate other threatened actions, these expectations will be seriously undermined, despite the South Korean electorate's shift to the left.

However, the North appears determined to act according to its own policy logic and self-defined interests, irrespective of the potential consequences. It remains mired in its circumstances very much of its own making. All affected powers must carefully deliberate their options, communicate openly with one another, and weigh their possible responses. Seoul is where these discussions must begin, as all ponder what steps the nearby but absent state might yet contemplate.

Authors

Jonathan D. Pollack

Image Source: © Jo Yong hak / Reuters

Iran and International Pressure: An Assessment of Multilateral Efforts to Impede Iran’s Nuclear Program

Tue, 22 Nov 2011 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 22, 2011
9:00 AM - 2:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Even as the international community seeks to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran continues adding to its stocks of enriched uranium, including the type of enriched uranium needed to arm a nuclear weapon. Given that little prospect exists for resumption of the P5+1 discussions with the Iranian government, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors will tackle the Iran issue when it meets on November 17-18 in Vienna. What is the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, and do the Iranians feel pressure from United Nations Security Council mandates and other sanctions? What are the prospects for holding together the coalition that is now working to halt Iran’s nuclear program?

View archived video of the full event on C-SPAN »

On November 22, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, the Center on the United States and Europe and the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a conference to examine the Iranian nuclear program, assess the impact of international sanctions to date and analyze the ability of the international community to sustain unity and pressure on Tehran. The conference concluded with keynote remarks from U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

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Human Rights Issues will not Trump U.S.-China Dialogue

Transcript

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Charles Ferguson

President
Federation of American Scientists

Kevan Harris

Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar
U.S. Institute of Peace

Ray Takeyh

Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

John Parker

Visiting Research Fellow
National Defense University

Francois Rivasseau

Deputy Head of Delegation
European Union Delegation to the United States

Tom Donilon

National Security Advisor
The White House

The Trilateral Process: Washington, Kiev, Moscow and the Fate of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

Mon, 09 May 2011 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 9, 2011
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world—larger than those of Great Britain, France and China combined. Intricate negotiations ensued in bilateral channels, followed in 1993-94 by a trilateral U.S.-Ukrainian-Russian process. That process successfully negotiated the removal of the weapons, with Ukraine receiving security assurances, compensation for the value of the highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear warheads, and assistance in eliminating the nuclear delivery systems and infrastructure that it had inherited.

On May 9, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a panel discussion on the trilateral process, specifically the challenges and key factors that produced a successful outcome. Panelists included Pavel Baev, research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Borys Tarasyuk, Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) deputy and former foreign minister; and Steven Pifer, senior fellow and director of the Arms Control Initiative. Brookings President Strobe Talbott moderated the discussion. The event marked the release of a new Brookings Arms Control series paper "The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons."

After the program, the panelists took audience questions.

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The Trilateral Process: Washington, Kiev, Moscow and the Fate of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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20110509_trilateral_transcript

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Pavel Baev

Research Professor
Peace Research Institute Oslo

Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State

Borys Tarasyuk

Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) Deputy
Former Foreign Minister of Ukraine

The New START Treaty: A Live Web Chat with Steven Pifer

Wed, 08 Dec 2010 12:30:00 -0500

Event Information

December 8, 2010
12:30 PM - 1:00 PM EST

Online Only
The Brookings Institution

Washington, DC

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the nuclear arms reduction treaty agreed to by the U.S. and Russia earlier this year, still awaits Senate ratification. It remains unclear whether New START will be ratified by the end of the lame duck session or whether a vote will be pushed to 2011. This, as proponents argue that failure to ratify the Treaty will undermine the Obama administration’s efforts to press Iran and North Korea to drop their nuclear ambitions.

On Wednesday, December 8, Brookings expert Steven Pifer, author of a new Brookings paper “The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START,” answered your questions in a live chat moderated by POLITICO about what the treaty means to the global community and the importance of taking action soon.

Read the transcript »

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ModeratorPanelists

Seung Min Kim

Assistant Editor
POLITICO

Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran

Tue, 30 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Introduction

What should the United States do about Iran? The question is easily asked, but for nearly 30 years, Washington has had difficulty coming up with a good answer. The Islamic Republic presents a particularly confounding series of challenges for the United States. Many Iranian leaders regard the United States as their greatest enemy for ideological, nationalistic, and/or security reasons, while a great many average Iranians evince the most pro-American feelings of any in the Muslim world. Unlike other states that may also fear or loathe the United States, Iran’s leaders have consistently acted on these beliefs, working assiduously to undermine American interests and influence throughout the Middle East, albeit with greater or lesser degrees of success at different times. Moreover, Iranian foreign policy is frequently driven by internal political considerations that are both difficult to discern by the outside world and even harder to influence. More than once, Iran has followed a course that to outsiders appeared self-defeating but galvanized the Iranian people to make far-reaching sacrifices in the name of seemingly quixotic goals.

Despite these frustrating realities, the United States is not in a position to simply ignore Iran, either. Iran is an important country in a critical part of the world. Although Tehran’s role in creating problems in the Middle East is often exaggerated, it has unquestionably taken advantage of the growing instability there (itself partly a result of American missteps) to make important gains, often at Washington’s expense. Meanwhile, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, properly understood, warned that Tehran was likely to acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons at some point in the next decade.¹

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Pakistan and the Bomb

Bruce Riedel — Sat, 30 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400

The Pakistani army, backed by attack helicopters, is fighting intense gun battles in the Swat valley 60 miles outside the capital of Islamabad with Islamic extremists. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have struck back with suicide bombs in Pakistan’s major cities, including Lahore. A plot in Karachi was foiled but the extremists vow more carnage is imminent.

The battles are the latest in a deadly struggle for the control of Pakistan. Some are hoping this, at last, is the turning point when the army and the Pakistani government will finally defeat the extremists, but history suggests that conclusion is premature. More likely this will be yet another temporary setback for the Islamists to be followed by new advances elsewhere.

The fighting has cast a spotlight on the shaky security of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal—the fastest growing arsenal in the world. Pakistan is finishing construction of several new reactors and is seeking to buy more from China to increase its production of fissile material. The United States has provided Pakistan with over $10 billion in military aid since 2001. No one outside Pakistan can say if some of that money was diverted directly to the nuclear program by the army, but undoubtedly the U.S. assistance indirectly made it easier for the army to use its own funds to accelerate the development of its nuclear weapons.

Today the arsenal is under the control of its military leaders; it is well protected, concealed and dispersed. But if the country fell into the wrong hands—those of the militant Islamic jihadists and al Qaeda—so would the arsenal. The U.S. and the rest of the world would face the worst security threat since the end of the Cold War. Containing this nuclear threat would be difficult, if not impossible.

The danger of Pakistan becoming a jihadist state is real. Just before her murder in December 2007, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said she believed al Qaeda would be marching on Islamabad in two years. A jihadist Pakistan would be a global game changer—the world’s second largest Muslim state with nuclear weapons breeding a hothouse of terrorism.

Yet it’s not inevitable. For the past 60 years, U.S. policy toward the country has been inconsistent and mercurial, rife with double standards with Pakistan’s neighbor India. Increasing calls to “secure” the country’s nuclear weapons by force are far from productive—in fact, it’s making serious work with Pakistan more difficult.

Pakistan is a unique nuclear weapons state. It has been both the recipient of technology transfers from other states and a supplier of technology to still other states. It has been a state sponsor of proliferation and has tolerated private sector proliferation as well. Pakistan has engaged in highly provocative behavior against India, even initiating a limited war, and sponsored terrorist groups that have engaged in mass casualty terrorism inside India’s cities, most recently last November in Mumbai. No other nuclear weapons state has done all of these provocative actions.

The origins of the Pakistani nuclear program lie in the deep national humiliation of the 1971 war with India that led to the partition of the country, the independence of Bangladesh and the destruction of the dream of a single Muslim state for all of south Asia’s Muslim population. The military dictator at the time, Yaqub Khan, presided over the loss of half the nation and the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in Dacca. The Pakistani establishment determined it must develop a nuclear weapon to counter India’s conventional superiority.

The new prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, convened the country’s top 50 scientists secretly in January 1972 and challenged them to build a bomb. He famously said that Pakistanis would sacrifice everything and “eat grass” to get a nuclear deterrent.

The 1974 Indian nuclear explosion only intensified the quest. Mr. Bhutto received an unsolicited letter from a Pakistani who had studied in Louvain, Belgium, Abdul Qadeer Khan, offering to help by stealing sensitive centrifuge technology from his new employers at a nuclear facility in the Netherlands. Over the next few years—with the assistance of the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)—Mr. Khan would steal the key technology to help Pakistan produce fissionable material to make a bomb.

China also helped the nascent Pakistani program overcome technical challenges. According to some accounts by proliferation experts, it allowed Pakistani scientists to participate in Chinese tests to help them learn more about the bomb. Mr. Khan returned to Pakistan and with ISI built a global proliferation enterprise to acquire the technology he and other scientists needed to get Pakistan its bomb.

Mr. Bhutto’s handpicked choice for army chief, Zia ul Huq, overthrew his mentor in 1977, executed him and accelerated work on the project. By the late 1980s Pakistan had made sufficient progress that both General Zia and Mr. Khan hinted publicly that Islamabad had a bomb. According to Mr. Khan’s public account, General Zia also warned Israel not to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the late 1980s or it would destroy Tel Aviv. In 1990 the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan for building the bomb and cut off the supply of F16 jets already paid for by Pakistan.

Pakistan, like the rest of the world, was caught by surprise in May 1998 when India tested its nuclear arsenal. Despite pleas from President Bill Clinton and other world leaders, Pakistan tested its own devices a few weeks after India. Mr. Clinton offered Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif a $6 billion aid program if he would not test. I was part of the team that made the offer in Islamabad. We later learned Mr. Sharif ordered the tests to proceed while we were still visiting. On the eve of the tests Pakistan claimed Israel was about to attack its nuclear facilities so it had to act. Mr. Sharif proudly announced Pakistan had “a newclear vision,” as the deliberately misspelled English phrase read on posters around the country, for the future.

Pakistan would soon demonstrate that the bomb gave its military leadership enhanced confidence to deal with India and to take risks. Less than a year after the tests, the Pakistani army initiated a limited war with India in the mountains of the Hindu Kush by crossing the line of control separating Pakistani and Indian forces in Kashmir. The Kargil War, as it is called, dragged on for several weeks.

In the White House there was growing concern the war would escalate out of control and could even go nuclear. On July 4, 1999, Mr. Clinton and I met with Mr. Sharif alone at Blair House and told him Pakistan was playing with fire. Mr. Sharif agreed to withdraw the army back behind the line of control.

Within months Mr. Sharif’s handpicked army chief, Pervez Musharraf, who had ordered the Kargil War, overthrew Mr. Sharif and sent him into exile. Mr. Musharraf poured resources into the program.

The ISI has longstanding ties to a number of Pakistan-based terrorist groups active in India. In December 2001, one staged an attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi. India blamed Pakistan for the attack and mobilized. Again India and Pakistan appeared on the edge of nuclear disaster. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell needed almost a year to talk the two back from the brink.

Another ISI-backed group, Lashkar e Taiba, was behind the terror attack last November in Mumbai that kept the city in chaos for 60 hours. Again the specter of war between two nuclear weapons states was on the global agenda. Again India showed remarkable restraint in response to provocation from Pakistan, grounded in the reality that New Delhi has no attractive military options for retaliation against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons.

In short, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent has worked to intimidate its opponent and to allow Pakistan to harbor terrorists who attack India and even to initiate limited military operations. What is not clear is how long India will tolerate such behavior. There are many in India who argue Pakistan must be taught a lesson for Mumbai.

Pakistan has also behaved as a major proliferator of nuclear technology. A.Q. Khan’s enterprise has become infamous for providing nuclear material and secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Much of his activity was sanctioned by the Pakistani authorities and was part of complex deals to enhance Pakistan’s own deterrent—for example, by acquiring missile technology from Pyongyang. Some of Mr. Khan’s activities were pursued independently of Pakistan’s government for his own wealth. We will probably never know the exact balance between the state’s interests and Mr. Khan’s on every transaction since Mr. Khan is a national hero to Pakistanis and no government in Islamabad is ever likely to reveal all of the dirty truth. The good news is that since Mr. Khan’s televised “confession” in 2004 there has been little evidence of continued Pakistani technology proliferation activity.

There are, however, persistent reports of some kind of understanding between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamabad to provide nuclear weapons to Riyadh if the Saudis feel threatened by a third party with nuclear weapons. Then Saudi Defense Minister and now also Crown Prince Sultan visited Mr. Khan’s laboratories in a much publicized visit in the late 1990s. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia deny any secret deal, but rumors of one continue to surface as Iran gets closer to developing its own bomb.

Estimates of the size of Pakistan’s arsenal by outside experts in think tanks range from 60 to 100, with more being produced each year. Pakistan can deliver its weapons by both intermediate range missiles and jet aircraft, including its F16s. The bombs and the delivery systems are dispersed around a country twice the size of California, often buried deep underground.

Mr. Musharraf created a Strategic Plans Division under his control to provide security for the arsenal. Its director, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, has lectured across the world on the extensive security layers the SPD has developed both for physical security for facilities and personnel security to prevent unauthorized activity by those overseeing protection. The U.S. has provided expertise to the SPD to help ensure security. For now most experts agree that the necessary security architecture to protect the bomb is in place and the army has control of the weapons securely.

Of course, if the Pakistani state becomes a jihadist state, then the extremists will inherit the arsenal. There would be calls from the outside to “secure” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, but since no outsider knows where most of them are located, these calls would be a hollow threat. Even if force was used to capture some of the weapons, Pakistan would retain most of them and the expertise to build more. Finally, Pakistan would use its weapons to defend itself.

U.S. options would be severely limited by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. We would need to work with India, Afghanistan, China and others to isolate the danger.

Islamabad has refused for decades to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), arguing that India must do so first. After the 1998 tests I joined then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in an intensive diplomatic effort to persuade both India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT. The Pakistanis were the harder sell and we never even came close to an agreement with them. The effort failed entirely when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty in 2000.

Islamabad believes it was deeply unfair for Washington to offer India a civil nuclear deal in 2005 and not give Pakistan the same opportunity. The deal gives India access to advanced nuclear technology in return for international safeguards on some but not all of its reactors. Pakistanis believe the deal with India underscores America’s tilt toward the richer and bigger India and is yet another sign of Washington’s unreliability as an ally. Pakistan’s past proliferation behavior has so far ruled it out for a similar deal.

Last year the new elected civilian leadership boldly proposed that Pakistan adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. The army made it clear that it disagreed with President Asif Zardari and would not accept a no-first-use pledge. The Mumbai attack put all talk of that pledge off the table for now, but it is a good idea that Mr. Zardari should raise again if and when relations with India improve.

U.S. policy toward Pakistan in general and the Pakistani bomb in particular has oscillated wildly over the past 30 years between blind enchantment and unsuccessful isolation. President Ronald Reagan turned a blind eye to the program in the 1980s because he needed General Zia and the ISI to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. President George H. W. Bush sanctioned Pakistan for building the bomb in 1990, and Mr. Clinton added more sanctions after the 1998 tests. Both had no choice as Congress had passed legislation that tied their hands and required mandatory sanctions implementation.

President George W. Bush lifted the sanctions after 9/11 and poured billions into the Pakistani army, much of it unaccounted for, in return for Pakistan’s help again in Afghanistan. On his watch the CIA dismantled much of the A.Q. Khan global network.

President Barack Obama has a full agenda with Pakistan, burdened by the war in Afghanistan, the hunt for al Qaeda and the internal crisis inside Pakistan. But the nuclear issue will not go away. Mr. Obama’s call for a world without nuclear weapons and his pursuit of Senate ratification of the CTBT will inevitably mean arms control will be back on the U.S.-Pakistan agenda.

It is in Pakistan’s interest to get into the arms control debate on its own terms. Islamabad should put the no-first-use pledge back on the table with India, and it should sign the CTBT without demanding Indian adherence first. Pakistan’s arsenal works, and it does not need to test again. If it wants to get into the global arms control architecture and get a deal like the one India has gotten, Pakistan needs to show that the days of A.Q. Khan, Kargil and Mumbai are over for good and that it is addressing all the challenges it faces.

In the meantime Americans should stay away from idle talk by politicians and pundits about “securing” Pakistan’s weapons by force. Such chatter is not only unrealistic but actually counterproductive. It makes the atmosphere for serious work with Pakistan on nuclear security harder, not easier. It gives the jihadists further ammunition for their charge that America secretly plans to disarm the only Muslim state with a bomb in cahoots with India and Israel.

America needs a policy toward Pakistan and its bomb which emphasizes constancy and consistency and an end to double standards with India. Congress should quickly pass the Kerry-Luger bill that triples economic aid without adding crippling conditions. We should provide military aid, like helicopters and night vision devices, that helps fight extremist groups. We should also continue providing expertise in nuclear security and safety to Pakistan—that is in our interest.

Today some in Pakistan recognize at long last the existential threat to their freedoms comes from within, from the jihadists like the Taliban and al Qaeda, not from India. Now is the time to help them and ensure their hand is on the nuclear arsenal.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Wall Street Journal

Quarantine Possibilities for North Korea Shipping

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Thu, 28 May 2009 12:00:00 -0400

In the effort to understand North Korea's decision to test a nuclear weapon this week, several theories have been advanced.

The North Korean military probably wanted to test and prove a weapon it had spent years developing and that had performed very poorly in its first test in 2006. Kim Jong-il, probably fading from the scene and hoping for one of his sons to succeed him, wanted to please his country's powerful military at a crucial time in the transition process.

North Korean hard-liners in general, perhaps somewhat worried by President Obama's pledge of openness as well as his international popularity, may have preferred to rekindle tension in the U.S.-North Korean relationship - believing they must portray the United States as a bully when it reacts to North Korean provocations in order to stay on good terms with China and Russia. North Korean leaders also may have been frustrated by Mr. Obama's relative lack of attention to their part of the world to date.

All these theories probably have a kernel of truth. In addition, while North Korea risks some tightening of sanctions as a result of this test, on balance it probably will not pay a huge and enduring price for its provocation. After all, it has tested before and suffered only modest consequences.

Other countries that have tested the bomb have generally been penalized for only a relatively short time as well. This is not good news, of course - but it does suggest there is a certain logic, however unfortunate and however twisted, to North Korean behavior.

In shaping the U.S. and international response, the Obama administration need not worry too much about political criticism at home. Partisans on both sides will attempt to portray the nuclear test as a vindication of their own approach and a referendum on the other side's failed philosophy. But in fact, both sides and all approaches have failed over the past decade or so. The Clinton administration did a good job with the 1994 Agreed Framework, but in its second term, it generally failed to pursue a broader agenda except to send Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to Pyongyang on a visit.

Meanwhile, it appears that during that time, Pyongyang began to develop a secret uranium-enrichment program and also sold nuclear-related technology to Syria. President George W. Bush's hard-line policies, especially during his first term, led to the breakout of North Korea from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its decision to reprocess enough plutonium to build six to eight weapons, roughly quintupling the size of its arsenal. Mr. Bush's new approach in his second term, particularly under chief negotiator Christopher Hill, was more flexible but in the end did not fare very well, as evidenced by where we are today.

Let's face it: It's tough to deal with the North Koreans. Not only is North Korea perhaps the most brutal government on Earth toward its own people, but it also is Machiavellian in its dealings with the outside world.

What North Korea should want, in my view, is to strike a deal in which it surrenders its nuclear capabilities and begins to reform its country as Vietnam has done - in exchange for outside aid, trade and recognition.

However, North Korea cannot bring itself to accept even the modest amount of change and risk that such a policy would require, so its leaders dig in their heels and revert to brinkmanship with the outside world (as well as more abuse of their people).

Ideally, after the inevitable and necessary flurry of international activity to penalize North Korea for its latest transgressions, we will get back to a serious negotiating agenda. The basic bargain noted above should still be our goal. However, it is not the most likely outcome, unfortunately.

From this point onward, much of the purpose of our negotiations regarding North Korea - done with the North or more likely without it, and done with just allies or China and Russia, too - should be to prepare the groundwork for other and even worse scenarios.

Here is one such terrifying concern: a North Korea that, either because of the willful action of the government or the failure and collapse of that government, can no longer be trusted with the security of its nuclear arsenal (still estimated at perhaps six to eight bombs).

We might, for example, discover that North Korea had made contacts with a terrorist organization to explore the possible sale of plutonium (or even an assembled nuclear bomb). This scenario is unlikely - probably less likely, in fact, than a successful negotiation to dismantle the North Korean nuclear arsenal. But it cannot be dismissed.

In this situation, a fairly airtight quarantine of North Korea could be needed for an extended period. In principle, such a quarantine should be feasible, but it will take effort to set up, and some of that effort should happen before the actual crisis.

An examination of trade data suggests that North Korea's shipping with the outside world probably involves fewer than a few dozen ships of cargo a week. In principle, it is certainly possible for a U.S.-led coalition to stop all such vessels, if one is willing to employ force to destroy engines or otherwise disable the ships. It may even be possible, if a major effort is organized, to inspect each of these ships for illicit cargo.

The real hard part of this mission is probably not the military dimension. North Korea has a reasonably long coastline - about 1550 miles. However, reconnaissance aircraft operating off South Korean territory or American aircraft carriers typically can spot vessels dozens if not hundreds of miles away. So continuously maintaining a half-dozen aircraft "orbits" on each side of the country, with fighter escort to protect the reconnaissance planes and fire, if necessary, on any North Korean ships, certainly could be maintained indefinitely.

Planning is required to do this right, but it should be doable. Remember, we are presuming a scenario in which it is feared that North Korea is about to sell nuclear material to a group that might use it against the United States, so a serious U.S.-led response would be expected.

Rather, the hard part of this mission would be the need for international coordination, especially with China. For starters, it would be of paramount importance, of course, not to sink any Chinese ships trying to trade with North Korea.

Then it would be necessary to ask for China's help - and provide any American assistance that might be needed - in better securing the land border between China and North Korea. All sides would have to think through rules of engagement as well as avoid shooting at North Korean assets and hurting innocent people, if possible, but to be sure of stopping nuclear materials from getting beyond North Korean territory if necessary.

None of this is fun to think about. However, North Korea has just made it easier to talk about, diplomatically and strategically, with other key states - and we probably should avail ourselves of the opportunity.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Washington Times

Pakistan's Nuclear Scenarios: The Risks with Bombing

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 06 May 2009 12:00:00 -0400

As the Pakistani military launched a new offensive against the Taliban in the country’s North-West Frontier Province, officials and former officials in Washington continued to discuss what the American response should be to the heightened conflict. Michael O'Hanlon offered his views on the situation.

What could we do if Pakistan collapsed and the security of its roughly 100 nuclear weapons could no longer be vouched for? The answer, in most scenarios, is that we could only usefully do what the Pakistanis themselves (or whatever fraction of their government and military remained intact at the time) might ask us to do. Unilateral American action would probably be too little, too late.

Some might say, aren’t Pakistani nuclear weapons in easily identified sites that we could target with air power or special forces, and destroy, if necessary? Such an option might be worth considering if the alternative were to allow nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of extremists.

But the timing and the logistics would be challenging. We would not want to bomb sites that remained in government hands, even if Pakistani forces seemed to be gradually losing control of the situation. Yet if we waited even an hour or two after the sites were seized, the weapons could already have been removed.

The flight time for American bombers operating from the military base Diego Garcia might be too long, even if the aircraft had been predeployed and authorized to strike the sites. There is also the danger that our weapons would not penetrate the hardened facilities, mostly likely underground. (In theory, U.S. special forces could in theory penetrate almost any site if they could be deployed in adequate numbers to fend off insurgents, and fast enough to beat the insurgents to the bombs. But those assumptions might be dubious.)

Moreover, there could be weapons in sites we don’t know about, since the Pakistanis don’t trust us entirely and the locations of all their weapons are unlikely to be fully known. As American officials have noted, some weapons could be in transit at a given moment, especially if the Pakistanis came to believe that the security of their nuclear bunkers was in jeopardy.

On the other hand, if Pakistan and its leaders were willing to ask for help to create secure perimeters around nuclear sites, the United States could do a lot. Such a joint mission would also be a useful deterrent against possible Indian actions against such sites. I doubt things will get this bad, but if they do, let’s hope Islamabad has the good sense to request our collaboration on the ground.

Read other expert commentary »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The New York Times' "Room For Debate"

No-Drama Obama and the North Koreans

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 12:00:00 -0400

In the expectation that North Korea will soon test a long-range rocket — disguised as a space launch vehicle but more likely an intercontinental ballistic missile that could perhaps carry a nuclear warhead to the United States — certain analysts have suggested a strong response.

Some have argued for shooting down the missile shortly after its launch, a feat the United States might now be capable of, using Navy ships operating east of North Korea, below the expected trajectory of the rocket.

Such a reaction would be a mistake at this juncture. So would less extreme steps, such as an effort to propose a significant tightening of U.N. sanctions against the North Korean regime. The Obama administration, still establishing itself in office and without some of its top Asia hands yet in place, may feel excessive pressure to act tough after such an event, but it should be patient for now.

Begin with the fundamentals. A test of a three-stage missile is unfortunate and highly undesirable. But it is not brutal or tragic or Earth-shattering. Missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction, even if they are often capable of carrying such weapons. Accordingly, no international treaty regime bans such tests or the development and production of these technologies.

As such, the U.N. measures requiring that North Korea avoid such provocations, while legitimate, do not have quite the strong and long-standing foundation of a major treaty. (Recall as well that, while it hardly makes us happy in the process, Iran routinely launches medium-range missiles and we do nothing about it.)

Put a different way, while bad, this test does not even rank among the worst of North Korea’s recent actions. In 2002, it announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and proceeded to tell all international nuclear inspectors to leave the country. It then took spent fuel out of small nuclear reactors and reprocessed that fuel — providing purified plutonium that has probably since been turned into actual warheads. If North Korea built six to eight weapons with this material, as suspected, that would be a huge increase in its arsenal, previously estimated at one to two nuclear warheads dating back to the first Bush administration. It later tested a nuclear device in 2006.

Beyond its nuclear violations, North Korea continues to run a gulag of prisons that house tens of thousands of political prisoners. It mismanages an economy that has resulted in death by starvation or malnutrition of up to a couple of million of its own people in the past 15 years. It continues to refuse to provide more information on additional Japanese citizens whom Tokyo officials suspect have been kidnapped in past decades. It still fields a million-strong army that consumes 30 percent of its gross domestic product — by far the highest proportion in the world by this measure — and necessitates that South Korea, as well as the United States, waste resources maintaining deterrence and vigilance along the demilitarized zone. And it is suspected of helping countries such as Libya and Syria with their own weapons of mass destruction programs.

In dealing with such a brutal regime, “no-drama Obama” should stick with his calm way for now, for several reasons:

President Barack Obama has an opportunity to see if his new multilateralist style can ease tensions with Pyongyang and open up a more constructive period of diplomacy. The odds are against him, but there’s no reason to give up before he and his team can construct an integrated North Korea policy in consultation with key allies and other countries.
American restraint will also deprive North Korean hard-liners of what they probably seek. President Kim Jong Il is probably not healthy, after a stroke or heart attack last summer, and various players within the republic are positioning for advantage in what could soon be a post-Kim North Korea. We don’t want to send a message that we are pushovers, nor do we want to react so strongly that any “moderate” voices within North Korea are unable to make their internal case for testing a new type of relationship with a new American president.
Most of all, being calm and cool now sets us up for the longer term. We may well have to form a strong international coalition to react strongly to a more severe North Korean provocation down the line — be it another nuclear weapons test or a border dispute with South Korea or something even worse. Our ability to persuade countries such as China to go along with a more muscular response that squeezes the North Korean economy will depend in part on being able to argue that we attempted a more positive relationship with Pyongyang but were met by a still-clenched fist.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Politico

Homeland Security Agenda for the Obama Administration

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Mon, 26 Jan 2009 10:36:32 -0500

More than seven years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, where does the United States stand in trying to ensure that such a terrible tragedy - or something even worse - never again befall this country? And what should President Obama's new homeland security team, led by Secretary Janet Napolitano, emphasize in its efforts?

Former President Bush and his associates frequently emphasized, in their last days in office, that they are proud of the fact the United States was not attacked again on their watch after Sept. 11, 2001. Indeed, even for those of us who are critics of much of Mr. Bush's foreign policy, I would argue it is correct to acknowledge substantial progress on the homeland security front - with much better intelligence cooperation domestically and internationally, improved procedures for verifying the movements of people and money, and other important steps having been taken as federal spending on homeland security tripled during Mr. Bush's time in office.

However, for all the progress, the list of enduring vulnerabilities is almost as long. For example, the Border Patrol has been increased from 9,000 to 20,000, but most land borders are still fairly easy to penetrate. Progress is being made toward screening cargo on passenger airlines, but 100 percent screening will not be in place until 2010. And for all the cargo now inspected, most arriving in the country by sea still is not. The screening that is taking place for such cargo may not be an adequate substitute for actual inspection, and will require constant monitoring and improvement.

Standards for reliable identification remain too weak in some states; some drivers' licenses should make better use of biometric indicators and of digitization technologies for verifying proper ownership. The Real ID act will require that they do so soon, for those wishing to use their drivers' licenses as proof of identity to travel on airplanes or enter federal buildings. But not all states may comply fully.

Trains and subways remain inherently soft and unprotected targets in general. Only about half of key transportation assets or systems have developed risk mitigation strategies. Moreover, this figure applies only to planning and not actual implementation. More broadly, only very few cities devote substantial police resources to address terrorism threats.

Hospitals are not ready to treat victims of chemical or biological attack for the most part. While more antidote has been procured for some specific biological threats, methods for developing, producing, stockpiling and above all distributing vaccines against biological agents are wanting to date. The nation's food supply is not particularly well secured. Biological weapons detectors are being developed, but they would usually pick up agent only four hours after dispersal - and as of now even this capability is still in the development and testing stage.

The country's military still has limited capacity for rapid response for domestic emergencies. NORTHCOM (the U.S. Northern Command) does have about 8,000 troops on call to help with emergencies, but they may not have the attributes needed to respond effectively. Procedures for helping the National Guard organize regionally, so neighboring states may help each other more dependably and quickly in major crises, are still informal and fairly weak. National Guard links with NORTHCOM appear better, and more equipment may have been predeployed to states where it is most likely to be needed, but the ability of Guard units to help each other promptly and directly is less developed.

Perhaps the nation's main stadiums and other large public arenas are partially protected against terrorism, the other half are not. Trucks carrying hazardous materials are not amply protected at all stages in their normal operations. Except perhaps in New York, large buildings are generally not being better outfitted with simple counterterror capabilities, even when being refit or built anew - shatterproof glass in ornate lobbies is not used enough, air intakes are still too easily accessible.

Not all hypothetical vulnerabilities must be addressed. Trying to do so could bankrupt the country. In addition, as Brookings Institution scholar Jeremy Shapiro has argued, al Qaeda and affiliates seem to have a strong proclivity for certain types of attacks - principally those involving airplanes and truck bombs - as well as a penchant to attempt only the spectacular against U.S.-based targets. Having "overachieved," so to speak, on Sept. 11, they are reluctant to attempt garden-variety terrorism. They might believe such smaller attacks would fail to live up to the standards and expectations they have created among their followers as well as the American and global publics.

Moreover, while they may still harbor some hopes of being able to attack with weapons of mass destruction, their capacity to do so given the state of the global al Qaeda diaspora and network is extremely limited. On balance, as Mr. Shapiro argues fairly convincingly, they are probably not inclined to attack economic targets such as ports, food distribution systems, and information systems, moderately unlikely to employ Hamas-style low-level attacks, and quite unlikely to have access to weapons of mass destruction (especially the most threatening types).

Even for one taking a somewhat less sanguine view than Mr. Shapiro, practical considerations have to compete with worst-case planning. Many targets are extremely hard to protect, meaning the premium should be on stronger prevention (through intelligence and border controls and the like) rather than site defense or consequence management. And some types of attacks are worse than others, suggesting the country should indeed focus primary attention on catastrophic rather than more modest risks.

This framework for identifying homeland security priorities - focus on preventive efforts, on catastrophic threats, on the types of attacks already preferred (or actively contemplated and planned) by al Qaeda, and also where possible on activities that provide additional benefits beyond the security sphere - was introduced in earlier Brookings work. It guides the recommendations listed below as well:

Airport and airplane security initiatives ("Sniffers," Cargo Inspections, etc.): $350 million.
Border Patrol and related activities: $300 million.
Coast Guard force structure growth: $900 million.
"COPS II" initiative to help local police forces with counterterrorism: $100 million.
Biological detectors and Food and Drug Administration food inspection initiatives: $300 million.
Container cargo inspection improvements: $250 million.
Hazardous cargo inspection/security initiatives: $100 million.
Improved planning capacity at the Homeland Security Department: $100 million.

The net effect of these suggested budgetary changes of just under $2.5 billion a year is a modest investment in our homeland security. Even in these tough times, it is affordable. As budget season opens in Washington, such an agenda should be considered by the new administration and new Congress.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Washington Times

Memo to the President: Restore American Leadership to Address Transnational Threats

Carlos Pascual — Thu, 15 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500

The 21st century will be defined by security threats that transcend borders, from climate change, nuclear proliferation and terrorism to conflict, poverty and economic instability.

The Status Report: Obama's Leadership Abroad

"The administration’s pursuit of nuclear arms reductions has burnished Washington’s non-proliferation credentials, which will be important when the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference is held in May. U.S. officials will be in a much stronger position to press the conference to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and place greater obstacles in the path of nuclear wannabes."

Read more of Steven Pifer's and Strobe Talbott's update to this memo »

To: President-Elect Obama
From: Carlos Pascual, The Brookings Institution
Date: January 15, 2009
Re: Restore American Leadership to Address Transnational Threats

The Situation

The 21st century will be defined by threats unconstrained by borders: the global financial crisis, nuclear proliferation, poverty, terrorism and climate change. No nation, including the United States, can confront these transnational challenges alone. To protect U.S. national security in today’s interconnected world, you and your national security team must revitalize American leadership and build international cooperation and effective partnerships.

The moment is ripe to overhaul the international system. Issues at the top of your foreign policy agenda—the global financial crisis, terrorism and conflict in the broader Middle East and South Asia, the Iranian nuclear threat, energy insecurity and the growing specter of catastrophic climate change—have highlighted global interdependence and weaknesses in the alliances and international institutions that must meet these challenges.

You will encounter soaring international expectations, but also effusive good will that provides a window of time for you to restore America’s global credibility. You will also encounter strong messages from key allies and partners that an early U.S. re-commitment to effective international cooperation, or “multilateralism,” is a top priority. Early signals of this commitment and a focus on global cooperation can extend the period of international optimism and support for your foreign policy.

Your Stance

You have heralded the importance of rebuilding our alliances to meet the common challenges of the 21st century. You have repeatedly emphasized that America is strongest when it acts alongside strong partners. During your campaign, you committed to:

Talk to friends and foes: You spoke of tough, direct diplomacy without preconditions. You underscored that, if America comes to the table to work with global partners, the world will be far more likely to rally behind U.S. leadership.

Arrest Climate Change and Invest in Energy Security: By underscoring stewardship of a “planet in peril,” you have put climate change and energy security at the top of the U.S. agenda.

Expand U.S. Civilian Capacity: You committed to increase our civilian diplomatic and development capacities as essential investments to confront 21st century challenges.

Revitalize Non-Proliferation: You committed to resuscitate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime of eliminating nuclear weapons, guaranteeing access to civilian nuclear power and tightening proliferation controls by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, controlling fissile material and strengthening IAEA scrutiny.

Combat Global Poverty: To meet the Millennium Development Goal of cutting extreme global poverty in half by 2015, you advocated doubling our foreign assistance.

Refocus Counter-Terrorism: You recognized that defeating terrorism begins with law enforcement and intelligence, with military force a last recourse.

Further Recommendations

The international community will look to the United States for leadership throughout the accelerated 2009 agenda—in April at the G20 economic summit and NATO summit, in May at an NPT preparatory conference, in July at the G8 summit and in December at a post-Kyoto climate conference. This requires quickly developing positions on complex issues with major domestic political implications in a complicated legislative environment. Merely coordinating policy across agencies, issues and international players will be extraordinarily difficult.

Use the UN: Deliver a major speech by mid-March outlining your international security agenda, affirming America’s commitment to international cooperation and creating a foundation for obtaining cooperation from others on critical issues. Addressing the General Assembly will signal U.S. support for the UN while fortifying your credibility on UN reform. This speech should emphasize:

Expanding and revitalizing international institutions, including the UN Security Council and the G8, to encompass emerging powers
Investing in poverty eradication during the global economic crisis, to assist vulnerable people in both industrialized and underdeveloped countries
Supporting mandatory restrictions on greenhouse gases recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Strengthening nuclear disarmament, with access to civilian nuclear power and stronger controls on proliferation
Sharing the burdens of addressing pressing and complex global challenges with other leading nations, and
Forging a global framework to sustain peace in the broader Middle East and South Asia.

Expand the G8: Shifting responsibility for addressing the economic crisis to the G20 reflects the reality that the G8 cannot resolve the world’s financial problems. The same is true on climate change, proliferation, transnational terrorism and international conflict. Quickly seek consensus with Italy, the G8 chair, and other major G8 players to welcome China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa into negotiations. Even if, as some argue, the G20 is too unwieldy for all political issues, you can support a new “G13”—with regional observers from the EU, African Union and Arab League—equipped to craft solutions to major transnational problems.

Restructure U.S. Agencies: The Departments of State, Defense and Treasury—and the National Security Council (NSC) and Agency for International Development (AID), among others—were not structured to handle interconnected global issues. Rather than placing climate change, nuclear security, economics and terrorism into separate organizational cones, develop integrated management strategies that capitalize on ways these issues affect each other, and translate them into on-the-ground realities. For example, terrorism strategy should be translated into policies, institutions, capabilities and new practices in Pakistan and Egypt; global and bilateral agendas must intersect.

Effective management requires several enhancements:

The NSC and National Economic Council directorates must contain the skills and expertise to coordinate diverse transnational issues.
Counterparts of the NSC “sherpa” (the president’s lead adviser on the G8) in other agencies must coordinate policies across programs and countries.
Within State, policy development must engage regional bureaus and embassies, including AID missions, to inject foreign realities into a global agenda.
Although structured with a domestic focus, White House coordinating bodies on economics and climate change—issues integral to our relations with Europe, China, and others—must involve foreign policy officials.
Congress must be persuaded that, just as we have invested in the military, now we must double the foreign affairs and foreign assistance budgets to build civilian capacities to address transnational threats to our security.

Use the G20 to Open Markets and Address Poverty: Protectionist policies aggravated the Great Depression. You will need to resist pressures for protectionism, especially due to fears of job displacement to China. There will be pressure for a cross-border carbon tax on Chinese products. That could lead to China curtailing its purchase of, or even selling, U.S. Treasuries. Europe would likely then impose a similar tax against U.S. products.

In preparing for the G20 economic summit, collaborate with British Prime Minister Brown, the World Bank, UN Development Program and non-governmental organizations to shape a stimulus package for the poor. A $50-billion initiative for the world’s poor would go far and could leverage private contributions.

Set Realistic Worldwide Expectations on Climate Change: The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change will produce an agreement in December in Copenhagen only if there is a credible U.S. commitment to restrict greenhouse gas emissions. It remains unclear if the Congress will be ready to support in 2009 legislation that will impose a price on carbon that will increase electricity prices and slow growth in carbon-intensive industries, many already hit by the recession. The worst case is for the United States to make commitments at Copenhagen that cannot pass the Senate, duplicating the Kyoto Protocol disaster. It would be better to re-gauge expectations and reset the calendar for a comprehensive agreement, making Copenhagen a stop in the journey, perhaps agreeing there on technology investments and dissemination. If expectations are to be recast, you must engage other leaders immediately to sustain international cooperation and avoid a fiasco.

Craft a Comprehensive Nuclear Agenda: Nuclear arms reductions with Russia – setting an initial target of 1,000 warheads each—are critical for global security and to get non-nuclear weapons states to cooperate on nonproliferation. Russia is an essential party to offer supplies of nuclear fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel, both critical to a possible package with Iran if it foregoes a weapons enrichment capacity. In turn, an Iran accord will set a new standard for other states seeking civilian nuclear power. The challenge then will be getting all states to accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, along with enhanced inspections and control of fissile materials used for military purposes.

Policy on nuclear security, Russia and Iran should be developed as a single package. You will need to engage personally with Russian leaders. It also would be wise to signal a willingness to engage Iran—in partnership with Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany —regardless of who wins Iran’s election in May, so that President Ahmadinejad cannot claim to hold Iran’s only key to international negotiations.

Use NATO to Consolidate Strategy on Terrorism and South Asia: A NATO failure in Afghanistan would show that the international community cannot save a fledgling democracy struggling with terrorists. Increased security must be part of the equation, but the political challenges are daunting:

Narcotics account for two-fifths of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product and cause massive corruption, especially among the police.
The government is discredited.
No political strategy, beyond hits from predator drones addresses the governance void in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the Taliban can regroup.

Your new special envoy on South Asia must work hand-in-hand with your UN and NATO representatives and advisers on Europe and South Asia to craft a comprehensive political strategy that can win approval at the NATO Summit—and ideally from the new G13, which would add China’s crucial voice to the discussion.

Conclusion

This massive agenda will move ahead relentlessly. The United States can either engage and shape it, or defensively react to events.

International polling demonstrates that others welcome American leadership—if the United States listens and abides by international rules. But, failing to cooperate could encourage other countries to take adverse unilateral actions. Quick, strategic action is imperative.

Required Reading

Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century
Kristin M. Lord, The Brookings Institution, November 2008
Managing Global Insecurity: A Plan for Action
Managing Global Insecurity, The Brookings Institution, November 2008
Create a New Non-Profit to Complement Government Efforts: Mobilize the Private Sector and Make Government Smarter
Background and Recommendations
Winning the Right War
Philip H. Gordon, Survival, Winter 2007-08
Can the War on Terror be Won?
Philip H. Gordon, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007
Managing Civil Violence & Regional Conflict
Managing Global Insecurity, The Brookings Institution, May 2008
Combating International Terrorism
Managing Global Insecurity, The Brookings Institution, May 2008
7 Years to Climate Midnight
Carlos Pascual and Strobe Talbott, The Washington Post, August 28, 2008
Trouble Ahead for the Next U.S. President
Strobe Talbott, Financial Times Magazine, January 04, 2008
United Nations Reform and the U.S.
Tuesday, February 08, 2005
Washington, DC
The United Nations in Iraq
Carlos Pascual, The Brookings Institution, September 2007
Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons
Ivo H. Daalder and Jan Lodal, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008
The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future
Bruce Riedel, September 30, 2008
Engaging the Muslim World: A Communication Strategy to Win the War of Ideas
Hady Amr and Peter W. Singer, Opportunity 08, 2007
Managing Homeland Security: Develop a Threat-Based Strategy
Jeremy Shapiro, Opportunity 08, February 28, 2007
A Legal Framework for Detaining Terrorists: Enact a Law to End the Clash over Rights
Benjamin Wittes and Mark H. Gitenstein, Opportunity 08, November 15, 2007
Stemming Nuclear Proliferation: Prevent and Manage the Rise of New Nuclear Powers
Michael E. O'Hanlon and Stephen P. Cohen, Opportunity 08, February 28, 2007
Public Diplomacy and the New Transatlantic Agenda
Kristin M. Lord, The Brookings Institution, August 15, 2008

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Carlos Pascual

Restore American Leadership to Address Transnational Threats

Thu, 15 Jan 2009 10:30:00 -0500

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January 15, 2009
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

The 21st century will be defined by security threats that transcend borders, from climate change, nuclear proliferation and terrorism to conflict, poverty and economic instability. The greatest test of global leadership will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet the challenge.

On January 15, Carlos Pascual offered his recommendations to President Obama on how to restore credible American leadership; galvanize cooperative action against major global challenges; and revitalize key international institutions. The memo is the eleventh of 12 Brookings memos on the most crucial public policy priorities facing the new president.

Following the presentation of his paper, Pascual moderated a discussion with a distinguished panel including Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Jones, Michael O’Hanlon and Bruce Riedel.

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Memo to the President: Restore American Leadership to Address Transnational Threats

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