Brookings: Topics - Washington, DC Region

The Affordable Care Act and Designing the District of Columbia's Health Benefits Exchange

Alice M. Rivlin — Mon, 13 May 2013 13:59:00 -0400

Before the Health Committee of the District of Columbia Council, Alice Rivlin encourages the Committee to implement the health benefits exchanges of the Affordable Care Act in order to provide universal affordable health care coverage. Explaining that the District has passed tests regarding Medicare and Medicaid, Rivlin describes the District's current health delivery system, explaining the landscape of health care carriers for groups and individuals and recommending that the health exchange become the sole venue for the purchase of individual and small business health insurance.

I am happy to testify on the bill before this Committee, “Better Prices, Better Quality, Better Choices for Health Coverage Amendment Act of 2013,” transmitted by Mayor Vincent C. Gray on behalf of the DC Health Benefit Exchange Authority. I strongly support the bill.

The federal Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, is a major step toward an American health care system that covers almost everyone at sustainable cost. Implementation of the ACA is a long-sought opportunity to solve a disgraceful national problem—the fact that a large and growing share of the population cannot afford health insurance—as well as a chance to improve the quality and value of care delivered. As you know, the legislation was controversial at the national level, but the District welcomed it as an opportunity to realize our community’s goal of affordable health care coverage for all.

The District chose to comply with the ACA by creating its own health benefits exchange rather than letting the federal government do it. The District assembled a highly qualified Health Benefit Exchange Board, which recruited a strong professional staff and has implemented the ACA with energy and dispatch. Recently, the District’s exchange passed Phase Two testing with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. This indicates that the District is expected to be ready to enroll customers on October 1, 2013, and begin coverage on January 1, 2014. We should all be proud of the District for becoming a leader and role model in implementing the ACA, while some States have delayed and are behind schedule.

The exchange will require carriers to compete with one another by displaying qualified plans in transparent form in an electronic market place and allowing consumers to select the best plan for them. Some will receive federal income-tested subsidies to make plans more affordable. This is a win-win: DC residents will receive better health insurance at a lower cost and carriers will sell more insurance policies.

Designing the best exchange for the District has been challenging because DC’s health insurance market is small and highly concentrated. There are only four carriers one of which one controls more than three quarters of the individual and small group markets. The individual market is especially small—in part because of DC’s past success in reducing the number of uninsured residents through generous Medicaid eligibility and the creation of the Alliance. The individual market is estimated to fall below the 100,000 participants that the Urban Institute and others estimate to be the minimum size of the risk pool needed for an exchange to operate efficiently. In view of the small size and high concentration of the market, the DC Health Benefit Authority recommended, and the Council supported, merging the individual and small group markets after a transition period. Merging the markets recognizes that separate exchanges for the individual and small group markets would have too few carriers and too few enrollees to achieve the stability and efficiency that can be achieved in a merged market.

Now the Council is considering whether to make the exchange the sole venue for the purchase of individual and small business health insurance in the District. We believe that this measure will maximize competition, transparency, and the insurance choices available to consumers. Conversely, retaining a separate market outside the exchange will reduce the risk pool below critical size and invite carriers to attempt to attract younger, healthier individuals and employer groups outside the exchange, leaving higher risks in the exchange. In a small market with a dominant insurer, it is essential that the exchange risk pool be as inclusive as possible, both to stabilize the exchange—which is the only source of federal subsidies for District residents with modest incomes—and to maximize transparency and competition.

These design decisions are difficult, but, on balance, it seems wise to require that all DC individual and small business plans be purchased on the exchange with a single risk pool, to allow carriers to offer as many different plans as they want on the exchange, and to work hard to make the exchange as transparent and user friendly as possible. Moreover, the Board’s transition plan carefully balances the goal of full and speedy implementation with the needs of individuals and small business. The transition plan will allow small businesses to enter the health exchange over a two-year transition period, permitting small businesses to wait until the market settles should they feel the need.

Over the past couple of decades DC has gone from a city with a shamefully inadequate health system to a leader in provision of affordable health coverage and improving access to good quality care. We can all take pride in the steps DC has made to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the ACA to move to universal affordable coverage by acting quickly to implement it competently and expeditiously.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

Authors

Alice M. Rivlin

Publication: The Health Committee of the DC Council

Image Source: © Joshua Roberts / Reuters

Metropolitan Washington: A New Immigrant Gateway

Audrey Singer — Tue, 02 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an introductory chapter to Hispanic Migration and Urban Development: Studies from Washington, DC (Emerald Group Publishing, 2012), Audrey Singer describes the ascent of metropolitan Washington from an area with low levels of immigration to a major U.S. destination.

ABSTRACT

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to describe the ascent of Metropolitan Washington from an area with low levels of immigration area to a major U.S. destination.

Methodology/approach: Drawing on a growing body of research on immigration to Washington, D.C. and data from the American Community Survey (ACS), trends are examined in detail to illustrate how this immigrant gateway fits into the national historical picture.

Findings: The findings analyze the historical comparative settlement patterns of immigrants to the United States to demonstrate how Washington has emerged as the 7th largest immigrant gateway. It further analyzes metropolitan level data on country of origin and residence to show the diversity of the immigrant population and their disbursal to suburban areas from the central core over the past four decades.

Social implications: The paper also highlights some conflict in new suburban destinations within metropolitan Washington that experienced fast and recent growth. But immigrant incorporation has worked well in the past and Washington can continue to work to be a model of immigrant integration as local organizations, governments, and communities continue to confront the challenges of immigration in productive and sustainable ways.

Originality/value of paper: This paper combines the historical settlement of immigrants across America with and in depth examination of one of the newest and largest immigrant gateways, the U.S. capitol region, Washington, D.C.

Download the full chapter » (PDF)

Downloads

Download the chapter

Authors

Audrey Singer

Publication: Emerald Group Publishing

Sequestration Shock: Smart D.C. Metro Will Figure It Out

Mark Muro and Jessica Lee — Tue, 12 Mar 2013 13:00:00 -0400

Washington Post economic correspondent Jim Tankersley had a smart piece last week that brought home the potential economic implications of the sequester’s across-the-board federal spending cuts for the Washington, D.C. region.

Employing numbers crunched by my group at the Metropolitan Policy Program, Tankersley noted that of the 3.1 million people employed in the Washington area, nearly 450,000 work for the federal government or the military.

That means that fully 14 percent of the region’s workers work directly for the federal government—at a time when no other large U.S. metro area has more than 3 percent federal employment. The thrust being that the region’s economy is grossly over-reliant on the federal government, especially since these numbers leave out the additional hundreds of thousands of federal contract workers.

The implication of Tankersley’s piece: A decade of expanding federal largesse that protected the region from the worst effects of the financial crisis has now left the region vulnerable. The scary part: With sequestration, a deflation of the federal spending bubble could have implications for the greater Washington economy not unlike those of the mid-decade auto-industry crisis for Detroit or the housing crash for Las Vegas.

And yet, while all of that sounds distressing, we are not so worried. For one thing, while the region will be hit inordinately, the federal pullback likely will not be abrupt. It appears to be more of a slowdown than a crackup.

But beyond that, Washington possesses the ultimate counter to adversity: It is loaded with smart people—and smart people tend to figure things out.

In this regard, D.C. boosters are right that the region boasts one of the greatest concentrations of technical and knowledge workers in the country. Almost 47 percent of workers in the D.C. metro possess a bachelor’s degree or higher, while roughly 32 percent of adults in the United States do. This is important because people with higher levels of education tend to be more adaptable to the vagaries of the labor market, more able to translate their existing skills to new pursuits, and more entrepreneurial.

True, too much of this talent is now tied up in the government sector, as the Post’s Steven Pearlstein complains, where the staid ethos of agency life and government contracting is “almost antithetical” to the entrepreneurial culture of the private sector. And yet, the region has changed a lot in the last decade, with the emergence of a new urban character comprising a huge part of that change. As Pearlstein notes, Washington has gradually become a cool place for smart, well-educated young people to live. As it happens, that turns out to be a vital ingredient for spawning successful new companies, particularly in tech-heavy fields such as “big data,” social media, cloud technology, and app design. That’s why it’s a big deal that new energy and people are beginning to flow through the nascent innovation districts that are emerging on U Street NW, H Street NE, and along the Rosslyn-Ballston corridor. These relatively affordable yet hip neighborhoods are where the future is being figured out.

And so, while sequestration portends dislocation, and while it would have been best if the region’s leaders had sought to “diversify” the economy before now, diversification may well already be happening organically.

Times may get tougher, but the greater the stress, the more likely it is that the many smart people in this region will sort things out and invent a new Washington.

Authors

Mark Muro
Jessica Lee

When Kerry Stormed D.C.

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: Marvin Kalb writes about his time as a CBS correspondent covering the April 22, 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in which John Kerry gave testimony regarding the Vietnam War. This feature was adapted from Kalb's book The Road to War: Presidential Commitments, Honored and Betrayed.

During the Vietnam War, there were many memorable hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but none resonated with the raw power and eloquence of John Kerry’s on April 22, 1971. It was a time of crisis in America—a war seemingly without end for a goal still without clarity, in a country split not only on the war but also on a host of emotional political, cultural and social issues.

When Kerry entered room 4221 of what is now called the Dirksen Senate Office Building, its impressive walls covered with maps and books and with nineteen senators seated behind a huge U-shaped table, he did more than add instant credibility to the dovish cry for Congress finally to do something about ending the war, even going so far as to advocate cutting off funding; he personalized the war that for so many others still seemed a puzzling, costly embarrassment in an unfamiliar corner of the world.

Kerry was a 1966 Yale graduate who had volunteered for duty in Vietnam, where he served honorably, winning two medals for courage and three Purple Hearts. “I believed very strongly in the code of service to one’s country,” he said. By that time, 56,193 Americans had died in and around Vietnam, and campuses were ablaze with antiwar rallies. Many students escaped military service by joining the National Guard or fleeing to Canada.

Dressed in green army fatigues, with four rows of ribbons over his left pocket, the twenty-seven-year-old survivor of dangerous Swift Boat missions leveled a blistering attack on American policy in Vietnam, his New England accent adding a dimension of authenticity to the sharpness of his critique. When he finished his testimony an hour later, he had become, in the words of one supporter, an “instant celebrity . . . with major national recognition.”

Speaking on behalf of more than a hundred veterans jammed into the Senate chamber and more than a thousand others camped outside to demonstrate against the war, Kerry demanded an “immediate withdrawal from South Vietnam.” He came to Congress, and not the president, he said, because “this body can be responsive to the will of the people, and . . . the will of the people says that we should be out of Vietnam now.”

If Kerry had simply expressed this demand, and not amplified it with reports of American atrocities, he likely would have avoided the devastating criticism that hounded him throughout his political career—criticism that eventually morphed into charges of treason and treachery, deception and lies, cowardice and even more lies, undercutting his presidential drive in 2004.

Read the entire feature on The National Interest website»

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Publication: The National Interest

Metropolitan Washington: A New Immigrant Gateway

Audrey Singer — Wed, 05 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

On December 5, 2012, Audrey Singer presented at the Smithsonian Latino Center's event titled Immigration, Ethnic Economies, and Civic Engagement: Understanding the Latino Experience in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Region.

At the event, Singer placed in the national context recent research from her chapter in the book titled Hispanic Migration and Urban Development: Studies from Washington, DC (Emerald Group Publishing, 2012).

Download the presentation » (PDF)

Downloads

Download the presentation

Authors

Audrey Singer

Connecting to Opportunity: Access to Jobs via Transit in the Washington, D.C. Region

Martha Ross and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka — Thu, 08 Nov 2012 13:00:00 -0500

Metropolitan transportation networks are critical for a region's economic competitiveness. Public transit is a key component of the economic and social fabric of metropolitan areas. While commuting to work is only one reason residents may use a transit system, it is a dominant use: Commutes make up the largest share of transit trips nationwide.

Improving transportation connections to employment enhances the efficiency of labor markets for both workers and employers. Years of study, research and practice have tried to address the vexing logistical problems stemming from lack of access to transportation in major metropolitan areas. Today, transportation analysts increasingly consider accessibility to be a better measure of system performance than traditional mobility. It is at least as important for metropolitan residents to be able to access a range of activities, such as jobs, via the transportation system, as it is for systems to simply move vehicles faster and reduce travel times.

The effectiveness of transit depends upon its reach, frequency, and where it goes.

An analysis of the public transit systems serving the Washington, D.C. region finds that:

Nearly 90 percent of residents in the Washington, D.C. region live in neighborhoods with access to transit coverage of some kind, whether bus, Metrorail, or commuter rail.
Due to broad transit coverage and proximity to job centers, job access via transit is strongest in the District, Arlington, and Alexandria, with access rates dropping based on distance from the core.
Transit does a better job providing high-skill residents access to high-skill jobs that it does mid-skill residents to mid skill jobs and low-skill residents to low-skill jobs.
In many cases, housing costs are out of reach for low- and mid-skill workers in areas identified in this report as offering strong transit access to employment.

Download » (PDF)

Downloads

Download the paper

Authors

Martha Ross
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka

Tax Reform, Up Close and Personal

Tracy Gordon — Fri, 10 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

On Monday, I attended my first meeting of the District of Columbia Tax Reform Commission. The independent commission was authorized by the Tax Revision Commission Reestablishment Act of 2011 and is chaired by former DC Mayor Anthony Williams. It includes ten other members appointed by Mayor Vincent Gray and Council Chairman Kwame Brown.

I was appointed to the commission by Mayor Gray and am honored and delighted by the appointment. As someone who has probably thought about taxes more in theory than practice, I am really looking forward to this opportunity to engage in crafting a better tax system – by which I mean one that is simpler, fairer, and more efficient as well as contributing to the district’s economic prosperity and quality of life.

If these goals sound familiar, they should. Presidential candidates and members of Congress tout them whenever they talk about fundamental tax reform, which is often these days as the campaign heats up and the “fiscal cliff” looms.

But policymakers everywhere have struggled with tax reform, and with good reason. As TPC Director Donald Marron pointed out yesterday, tax reform is hard.

Why? Because the characteristics of a good tax system are internally inconsistent. Think of London circa 1990, a very different place from site of today’s Olympics. As vividly captured in Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija’s excellent Taxing Ourselves, on March 31, 1990, rioters set fire to luxury cars and smashed windows. Hundreds of police officers and demonstrators were injured, and hundreds of protestors were arrested.

The reason? A poll tax that would have fallen equally on all residents regardless of income or wealth, replacing a property tax that varied with home values. The poll tax was reviled and eventually repealed. But it had one advantage squarely in its column: it was efficient. As a per capita tax, it could not be avoided by sheltering income, working less, or buying stuff from the Internet. The only way to avoid it was by not being alive (or, less vividly, failing to register with your local elections official). In this case, the certainty in life was death OR taxes.

The problem was that efficiency conflicted with another goal: fairness. Many people think tax burdens should be progressive, or vary with ability to pay. However, this can contradict yet another goal: rewarding effort or economic competitiveness.

We have all these challenges and more in DC. There’s the District’s unique status as a state and local government, its special relationship to the federal government (which puts some revenue sources off limits), and its place in a regional economy that also includes heavy hitters like Maryland and Virginia. DC also struggles with providing services to a diverse population with high per capita income but also a high poverty rate.

Still, the last time anyone took a good look at DC’s revenue system was 1998. That’s the same year Google was founded. Mark McGuire was hitting the ball out of the park instead of Bryce Harper. The district was just emerging from insolvency and people and jobs were fleeing the city.

A lot has changed since then. Beyond the effects of a winning baseball team, the local economy rode out the recession better than other regions, thanks in part to a strong federal presence. Of course, that presence also leaves the district vulnerable to federal belt tightening and limits on local fiscal autonomy. So, it’s a good time to take a closer look at DC’s revenue system and see what we can do better.

Authors

Tracy Gordon

Publication: Tax Policy Center

Walk this Way:The Economic Promise of Walkable Places in Metropolitan Washington, D.C.

Christopher B. Leinberger and Mariela Alfonzo — Fri, 25 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

An economic analysis of a sample of neighborhoods in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area using walkability measures finds that:

More walkable places perform better economically. For neighborhoods within metropolitan Washington, as the number of environmental features that facilitate walkability and attract pedestrians increase, so do office, residential, and retail rents, retail revenues, and for-sale residential values.

Walkable places benefit from being near other walkable places. On average, walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington that cluster and form walkable districts exhibit higher rents and home values than stand-alone walkable places.

Residents of more walkable places have lower transportation costs and higher transit access, but also higher housing costs. Residents of more walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington generally spend around 12 percent of their income on transportation and 30 percent on housing. In comparison, residents of places with fewer environmental features that encourage walkability spend around 15 percent on transportation and 18 percent on housing.

Residents of places with poor walkability are generally less affluent and have lower educational attainment than places with good walkability. Places with more walkability features have also become more gentrified over the past decade. However, there is no significant difference in terms of transit access to jobs between poor and good walkable places.

The findings of this study offer useful insights for a diverse set of interests. Lenders, for example, should find cause to integrate walkability into their underwriting standards. Developers and investors should consider walkability when assessing prospects for the region and acquiring property. Local and regional planning agencies should incorporate assessments of walkability into their strategic economic development plans and eliminate barriers to walkable development. Finally, private foundations and government agencies that provide funding to further sustainability practices should consider walkability (especially as it relates to social equity) when allocating funds and incorporate such measures into their accountability standards.

The Great Recession highlighted the need to change the prevailing real estate development paradigm, particularly in housing. High-risk financial products and practices, “teaser” underwriting terms, steadily low-interest rates, and speculation in housing were some of the most significant contributors to the housing bubble and burst that catalyzed the recession. But an oversupply of residential housing also fueled the economic crisis.

However, a closer look at the post-recession housing numbers paints a more nuanced picture. While U.S. home values dropped steadily between 2008 and 2011, distant suburbs experienced the starkest price decreases while more close-in neighborhoods either held steady or in some cases saw price increases. This distinction in housing proximity is particularly important since it appears that the United States may be at the beginning of a structural real estate market shift. Emerging evidence points to a preference for mixed-use, compact, amenity-rich, transit-accessible neighborhoods or walkable places.

Download » (PDF)

Downloads

25 walkable places leinberger

Authors

Christopher B. Leinberger
Mariela Alfonzo

Image Source: Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

What Would You Pay for Clean Water?

Martha Ross — Thu, 24 May 2012 14:01:00 -0400

Clean water is a top health issue for any community, and that includes public and economic health. Keeping water clean requires substantial public infrastructure, which costs money, and cleaning up existing pollution costs even more. But it’s essential if we want to be able to pour ourselves—or our customers—a glass of water, take a shower, or flush a toilet.

A modern society simply cannot function without a safe, dependable water supply.

But many major metropolitan areas, including Washington, D.C., are served by antiquated waste water systems that cannot meet modern demands.

Parts of Washington, D.C. are served by a combined system carrying both storm water and sewage. Some of the pipes in this system date back to the Civil War. A large rainstorm can overwhelm the system, allowing sewage to flow into area waterways leading into the Chesapeake Bay.

To correct this situation, D.C. Water has embarked on the Clean Rivers Project, a federally-mandated $2.6 billion, 20-year project to build huge underground tunnels to store overflow storm water and sewage during rainstorms until it can be treated. A new Brookings paper examines the project and concludes that despite D.C. Water’s smart management, we need a better financing system to ensure its success and spread the cost fairly and efficiently among all the beneficiaries.

D.C. Water is financing the project by issuing long-term bonds backed by revenue from customer fees and charges. The federal government has supported the project, but that support is not predictable. The present approach puts the burden on District property owners based on the “polluter pays” principle, which could be risky, judging by the project’s cost projections. Water and sewer payments will increase sharply, with disproportionate impacts on the lowest-income residents. Rate payers’ will or ability to pay may falter, and the costs of the project may crowd out D.C. Water’s other capital and maintenance investments.

Some would say, this is the District's problem; let them pay to solve it. That approach ignores the fact that water doesn’t recognize political boundaries. Cleaner water flowing from the District means downstream jurisdictions have fewer pollution problems, and it helps improve the health of the Chesapeake Bay, a national priority. The District is home to about 11 percent of the region's population, but the benefits of cleaner water for drinking and recreation from here all the way to the Bay are enjoyed by millions. Meanwhile, surrounding states and local jurisdictions face their own regulatory and budgetary pressures, many also tied to federal mandates, to improve water quality.

Current fragmented efforts do not match the scale of the problem. Water may not be constrained by boundaries, but communities and utilities are. They have no authority beyond their own borders or narrow rate bases, yet they must address water issues that span multiple states and stem from multiple causes, including agricultural runoff, sewage, and stormwater runoff and erosion.

Jurisdictions and regions across the country face the dilemma of developing sustainable financing for sustainable environmental goals. In the D.C. region, there is a better way to pay for clean water. We recommend that D.C. Water and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments convene federal, state and local jurisdictions to sort out a more rational approach to pay for the Clean Rivers Project, which could serve as a national demonstration. Wouldn’t it be nice to see the federal government create a framework supporting regions working together on water quality, resource management, system upgrading, and, of course, financing?

The full paper, "Cleaner Rivers for the National Capital Region: Sharing the Cost", is available here.

Authors

Martha Ross

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

Image Source: ERIC THAYER / Reuters

Cleaner Rivers for the National Capital Region: Sharing the Cost

Carol O'Cleireacain — Wed, 23 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In “Cleaner Rivers for the National Capital Region: Sharing the Cost,” Carol O’Cleireacain discusses the various economic and environmental challenges of the Clean Rivers Project , and explores fair and sustainable options in how D.C. Water can improve the project's financing model while continuing to address the failings of the current combined sewer system, which carries harmful storm water and sewage into the region’s rivers.

“Clean water is non-negotiable and expensive. To ensure the success of the Clean Rivers Project, the region needs a better financing system beyond D.C. Water’s narrow rate base.”

D.C. Water, formerly the D.C. Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), has embarked on a 20-year, $2.6 billion Clean Rivers Project initiative to nearly eliminate sewage discharge into area waterways. Like many cities, Washington is partially served by a combined sewer system (CSS) that carries both storm water and sewage. The District’s CSS is the legacy of the federal government, which built the system and governed the city until limited home rule in 1973. Today, heavy rains that exceed the capacity of the combined system trigger the release of overflow storm water and sewage into area rivers, ultimately flowing into the Chesapeake Bay. The Clean Rivers Project, mandated by a 2005 consent decree with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, will build underground tunnels to store overflow storm water and sewage during rainstorms until it can be sent to a treatment plant.

D.C. Water will finance the Clean Rivers Project by issuing long-term bonds backed primarily by revenue from water usage and a new “impervious area” charge. It is also exploring the extent to which “green infrastructure” can contribute to reduced storm water. The federal government has supported the project, but its contributions are not guaranteed nor have the amounts been predictable. Despite D.C. Water’s active and forward-looking management, the Clean Rivers Project raises multiple concerns. These include the burden it will place on District rate payers; the possibility of crowding out D.C. Water’s other maintenance and improvement projects; whether and how the beneficiaries of cleaner water downstream should contribute to the cost; the project’s interaction with other expensive pollution-reduction mandates in the city and region; the lack of financing forecasts for the second half of the project; and the possibility that D.C. Water ultimately may not be able to afford the project as currently structured.

D.C. Water and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments should convene a regional coalition to discuss options to pay for the Clean Rivers Project in the context of other water quality mandates in the region. The regional coalition should discuss options to expand the project’s payment base to include a broader range of clean water beneficiaries, in addition to calling for the federal government to make regular and predictable contributions towards the Clean Rivers Project.

Downloads

Download the Paper

Authors

Carol O'Cleireacain

Image Source: ERIC THAYER / Reuters

Transitioning DC’s Community College to Independence

Mon, 23 Apr 2012 12:29:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In testimony before the D.C. Council Committee on Housing and Workforce Development, the members of the District of Columbia Community College Transition to Independence Advisory Board discussed steps that the university must take to move the new community college toward independent accreditation.

I. Introduction

Good Morning Chairman Brown. Thank you for providing us an opportunity to testify on issues related to the budget for the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) with a specific focus on how they might affect the newly formed community college. We are the five member District of Columbia Community College Transition to Independence Advisory Board (Advisory Board), appointed by Mayor Gray and Council Chairman Kwame Brown in accordance with the Community College of the District of Columbia Plan for Independence Act of 2011 (Independence Act): Walter Smith, Carrie Thornhill, Alice Rivlin, Joshua Kern and John Hill. That law charges us to develop jointly with the UDC Board of Trustees, the UDC President, and the Community College CEO a plan for the community college to operate independently from the flagship university.

In order to develop this plan, we have engaged subject matter experts in higher education accreditation, higher education financing, and labor law. We also have met with partners and stakeholders including members of UDC’s Board, President Sessoms and his staff, and Community College CEO Jonathan Gueverra and his staff. We are pleased that our partners will also testify today.

We are currently working to finalize the plan, which will recommend a process for moving the community college to academic, operational, and financial independence in accordance with guidelines of the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (Middle States), our region’s higher education accrediting body.[1] The plan recommends a process by which the community college would first become a branch campus of UDC in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 and then move toward separate accreditation. Once the community college achieves separate accreditation, it can become an independent institution or remain part of a university system. Taking the final step to full independence would be up to the Mayor and Council and the Board of UDC, not Middle States.

While this entire process is likely to take three to four years, there are critical steps that UDC and the D.C. Council must take in FY2013 to start moving the community college to independence while also strengthening the flagship university. While we expect our proposal about that process to be explored in some detail in the plan we are helping to develop, our testimony today is focused on four issues particular to the FY2013 budget.

First, we describe the resources we think are necessary in FY2013 for the community college to achieve branch campus status and build the necessary capacity to start moving toward separate accreditation.
Second, we explain why UDC’s financial status must be sound in order for the community college to achieve branch campus status and eventually independence, and why we think UDC’s current financial condition is precarious and unsustainable.
Third, we suggest that UDC’s Board of Trustees, in partnership with elected officials, develop a shared vision of public higher education that is part of a continuum of life-long learning. The priorities identified in this vision should drive the community college’s move to independence as well as the university’s efforts to become sustainable.
And fourth, we describe the major institutional right-sizing effort we think UDC should undertake in FY2013 in order to improve its financial sustainability.

II. The FY2013 Budget should provide the community college with the resources necessary first to achieve branch campus status and then build capacity to start moving toward separate accreditation.

In creating the community college in 2009, UDC recognized that DC needed a community college and that the mission, staffing, and operations of a community college were different from those of a four-year institution. Since then, UDC has implemented several changes to differentiate the community college from the flagship university—the community college has an open admissions policy; a lower tuition rate; its own administration, faculty, and academic staff; and separate facilities.

Yet the community college remains an academic division of UDC. It is included in UDC’s accreditation status, does not have a legal identity outside of the university, and cannot confer its own degrees. It operates under UDC’s labor agreements, but the terms of those agreements do not address the community college’s unique operational, staffing, and financial needs. Though the community college now occupies a separate physical location, UDC provides services to the community college in several key areas, such as academic affairs, financial operations, and student affairs among others. In addition, the community college’s CEO serves at the pleasure of the UDC President, and does not report directly to the Board of Trustees.

The best path to move the community college from its current circumstances to independence is through the Middle States’ accreditation process. This process would allow the community college to achieve separate accreditation without risking its ability either to confer accredited degrees or provide financial aid to students during the transition to independence. The first stage in this process is for the community college to become a branch campus of UDC. Once branch campus status is achieved, UDC and the community college would work toward achieving the requirements for the branch to be separately accredited. It is important to note that, as the accredited institution, UDC must lead this process.

Achieving Branch Campus Status in FY2013

In order to qualify as a branch campus in accordance with Middle States policy, the community college must be geographically separate from the main campus and must have the following three characteristics [2]:

Courses in educational programs leading to a degree, certificate, or other recognized educational credential
Its own faculty and administrative or supervisory organization
Its own budgetary and hiring authority

As it currently stands, the community college is close to satisfying these requirements. It has its own locations separate from UDC’s Van Ness campus, in the former Bertie Backus Middle School, 801 North Capitol, and the Patricia Roberts Harris Building. It offers courses that lead to certificates and associate degrees, as well as an extensive workforce development program. In addition, the community college has its own faculty and administrative organization, and the CEO of CCDC has some hiring authority. To fully satisfy the branch campus requirements, however, the community college will need more organizational capacity and budget autonomy and authority. This can be achieved through the FY2013 budget.

In order to fully achieve branch campus status in FY2013 the Budget Support Act will have to include both line-item budget authority for the community college and sufficient funding to clearly indicate the capacity for separate fiscal operations. Our independent financial experts, Attain, have concluded that the total direct costs of operating the community college and building necessary capacity for branch campus status is $21.48 million: $18.7 million of this amount would cover the community college’s existing direct operating costs; and the remaining $2.7 million would provide additional support for recruiting four department heads, adequate levels of adjunct faculty, and some direct service staff to meet student needs at the community college’s locations. (Please see attached budget for more detail). However, projections anticipate that these total direct costs will be offset by $7 million in tuition revenue raised by the community college in FY2013—making the community college’s net cost $14.48 million. Shared services provided to the community college by UDC are not included in this budget.

To ensure that the community college has the organizational capacity necessary to achieve branch campus status, and can demonstrate authority and capacity for separate fiscal operations, we recommend that the Council direct $14.48 million of UDC’s FY2013 subsidy to the community college as a line-item in the UDC budget. Since this is only the net operating cost, it is critical that community college tuition collected by UDC also be passed through directly to the college.

We believe that the community college needs these resources in FY2013 because it is still in a start-up phase and must be given support to grow. However, the community college inherited some of its academic programs directly from UDC without an analysis of market demand or potential for cost savings. For example, some programs appear to have low enrollment and some courses are taught by UDC faculty that have workloads and pay scales more appropriate for a university than a community college. It may therefore be appropriate for the community college CEO, in partnership with the Board of Trustees, to conduct a thorough review of its academic programs in FY2013 in order to identify opportunities for adjustments.

Likewise, the community college’s workforce development and lifelong learning programs will account for approximately $5 million of the community college’s direct costs in FY2013. The cost of these programs, however, has exceeded the revenue they raise (by about $4 million in FY2012) because programs are mostly provided to residents for free or at a highly subsidized rate. As Attain notes, other institutions operate workforce development programs that result in net revenue, thereby supporting affordable degree programs. The District government, in concert with the Board of Trustees and the community college CEO, should decide what role it wants the community college to play in providing workforce development to enhance the employability of D.C. residents and the level at which it wants to subsidize those services.

Helping the Community College Move Beyond Branch Campus Status toward Separate Accreditation

The community college’s progress toward independence in FY2013, however, should not stop once it achieves branch campus status. Rather, separate accreditation should be pursued as soon as possible for the community college to provide it with the greatest opportunity to succeed. The community college and the flagship have diverging missions and different operating needs, and quite often compete for limited resources. Moving quickly toward separate accreditation can help alleviate this competition and tension between the two institutions.

As noted, the move to separate accreditation will likely take 3-4 years. However, the Council and the UDC Board of Trustees can take additional steps in FY2013 to help UDC and the community move further toward its next step—becoming “separately accreditable.”

To become separately accreditable, the community college must at a minimum have substantial financial and administrative independence from the flagship, including matters related to personnel, through policies adopted by the Board of Trustees.[3] Accordingly, we recommend that the D.C. Council direct the Board of Trustees to develop a plan for providing the community college with the following elements:

Periodic reporting of the community college CEO directly to the Board of Trustees regarding the state of the community college to ensure that the Trustees have direct oversight of the community college and its leadership. Until it achieves separate accreditation, the community college CEO will continue to report to the UDC President, who in turn continues to report to the Board of Trustees. However, periodic reporting by the community college CEO to the Board will allow the Board to better fulfill its oversight of the development of the community college.
Independent procurement authority for the community college to contract with external vendors for key services that it currently receives from UDC, but that don’t meet the needs of the community college. Since the additional cost of procuring such services is not included in the community college’s direct budget, the Board must determine how such services for the college would be funded and how UDC would realize cost savings associated with no longer providing certain services to the college.
A mechanism to formally recognize community college faculty and staff as a separate classification of employees within the UDC system so that workloads and pay scales appropriate for a community college can be established and necessary modifications to the UDC labor agreements can be negotiated.
A process for establishing a community college foundation so that it can expand its independent fundraising capacity.

To implement the elements of such a plan, the Board of Trustees may have to pass resolutions or take other actions in accordance with UDC’s governing requirements. Implementing this plan will also require open lines of communication and cooperation between the Board of Trustees, the UDC President, and the community college CEO because decisions about moving the community college to independence will impact the flagship.

III. UDC’s unsustainable financial structure must be addressed in order to successfully move the community college to independence.

UDC’s financial stability is essential to the community college’s success. The community college must depend on UDC’s own accreditation and legal status as it moves through the multi-year process described above. Indeed, Middle States is not likely to approve branch campus status and separate accreditation for the community college if it finds that UDC cannot afford those changes or if it views those changes as a threat to UDC’s own financial viability.

UDC’s Precarious Financial Condition:

Unfortunately, UDC already has significant financial challenges that will become more acute with the separation of the community college. UDC is relatively well-funded with a large public subsidy compared to peer universities. In the 2009-2010 school year, UDC’s appropriation of $16,785 per full-time equivalent (FTE) student was the highest in a group of 17 peer institutions and was more than double the group’s median of $7,500 per FTE.[4] At the same time, UDC’s costs per FTE student are higher than its peers in nearly every category. At $36,684 in 2009-2010, UDC’s total expenditures per FTE student were approximately 60 percent higher than the median expenditures of its peers.[5]

Despite having a relatively generous public appropriation, UDC’s very high costs per student have contributed to operating deficits over the past three years, which were funded through a spend-down of its reserves. UDC’s unrestricted net asset reserves are now less than $12.8 million, $4.8 million of which is restricted to support the new student center.[6] By contrast, a financially healthy institution of UDC’s size would typically have more than $50 million in reserves.[7] The university no longer has enough reserve funds to continue covering operating deficits as it has done in the past. Without substantially changing its cost structure or increasing its revenues, UDC runs the risk of defaulting on operating obligations in FY2013.

While it is true that the drawdown of reserves in FY 2011 and FY 2012 was accelerated by the creation of the community college, UDC’s high operating costs and low and declining enrollment at the flagship mean that its budget is unsustainable with or without the community college. Creation of the community college has underscored UDC’s underlying financial weakness and the need to bring costs in line with reasonable expectations of enrollment.

UDC’s Cost Drivers:

UDC’s high cost structure results in large part from a complicated legacy of historical factors. First, the university’s degree programs, faculty and staff, administrative systems, and facilities are all too large for the size of its current student body. UDC’s student body declined significantly during the District’s financial crisis in the mid-1990s, from roughly 10,000 undergraduates in fall 1994 to its lowest enrollment level of under 4,500 undergraduates in fall 1997.[8] Although UDC’s total undergraduate enrollment (community college and flagship) has increased since then, it has never surpassed 5,400 students.[9] The creation of the community college has also impacted the flagship’s enrollment. Since its establishment, the community college’s student body has grown while the flagship’s declined. In fall 2011, the community college had 2,529 students in academic programs compared to 2,129 in the flagship’s undergraduate program.[10] Additionally, over 2,600 individuals were enrolled in a course or program for general employment assistance, basic skills, or occupational skills training at the community college’s workforce development and lifelong learning program during the 2010-2011 program year.[11]

Second, UDC has high personnel costs. It has a professionally mature faculty with a high salary level relative to peer institutions. Nearly three-quarters of UDC’s faculty are full or associate professors as compared with a 40% average for peer institutions.[12] Salaries for all faculty are 33 percent above the median salary at peer institutions. Pay scales for administrative functions also appear to be high relative to compensation in the broader market. Moreover, some administrative areas seem to be overstaffed, in part because new employees with proficiency in new technologies have been hired while existing employees have been retained. UDC’s ability to adjust personnel costs is in part complicated by existing contracts with faculty and staff unions, which have not changed for years due to protracted collective bargaining. Existing contracts, although expired, continue to govern, and UDC and its unions have been unable to reach agreement on the terms of new contracts. It should be noted, however, that only half of UDC’s full-time faculty and staff belong to unions.

In addition to these legacy costs, recent efforts to transform UDC into a “university system” with a competitive, research-oriented flagship university and a community college are impacting UDC’s cost structure. In FY2010, the community college’s net direct cost was $3.1 million.[13] However, most of the costs experienced that year were already part of UDC’s overall cost structure and were associated with re-assignments of programs, faculty, and staff from university to the community college. In FY2011 and FY2012, the incremental net costs of operating the community college were $6.5 million and $7.8 million respectively. These are additional annual costs associated with starting up the community college; a large portion of these costs are operating costs associated with leases, operations, and maintenance of the community college’s facilities. New investments to transform the flagship, such as enhancements to the athletics program, and the development of a new student center and dormitories that are planned will further increase UDC’s operating costs.

These efforts are aimed at growing the student body in order to match the university’s large programmatic, administrative, and facilities structure. While growth at the community college has occurred and is likely to continue, aggressive growth of the flagship in the near-term will be challenging for three reasons. First, UDC’s enrollment trends over the past 15 years, and in particular declining enrollment at the flagship, does not set a strong precedent for growth. Second, while the District’s total population grew by 5 percent from 2000 to 2010, the number of residents under 18 actually declined over this period, from 114,992 in 2000 to 100,815 in 2010—an indication that UDC’s potential resident student population is shrinking.[14] Third, UDC must compete for students with several universities in the Washington region, as well as with public universities across the country, which D.C. residents can attend at in-state tuition rates due to the federal D.C. Tuition Assistance Grant (TAG) program.

In summary, UDC’s operating deficits, high cost structure, spend-down of its reserves, and unlikely potential for growth in student population at the flagship have together produced an unsustainable situation. And this situation has occurred at a moment when it is critical for UDC to become financially stable in FY2013 in order to move the community college to branch campus status and sustain the flagship. However, we believe UDC’s precarious financial condition offers an opportunity for the Board of Trustees and the District’s leadership to rethink the mission of the city’s public higher education system and better align it with the District’s needs. This re-visioning can help ensure the sustainability of both the community college and the flagship.

IV. UDC’s Board of Trustees, in concert with the District’s leaders, must develop a shared vision of public higher education for the city.

In order to move the community college toward independence while strengthening the flagship, UDC’s Board of Trustees must partner with the District’s elected officials to create a shared vision for public higher education for the city that is focused and realistic. UDC has suffered from mission confusion since its inception in the mid-1970s, when it was established as a consolidation of three different schools with three very different missions. This problem was exacerbated in the mid-1990s, when UDC, under financial duress, was forced to make major cuts even though a guiding plan had not been developed first.

This time, UDC’s right-sizing should be done in accordance with a thoughtful vision for a public education system that meets the current and future needs of our city and its residents. While it is not our task to develop this vision, we believe it should include an independently accredited community college, a law school, and an institutionally smaller but strengthened flagship with the capacity to grow according to demand and District priorities. We recommend that the Board of Trustees and the District‘s elected officials begin setting this vision immediately so that UDC can begin to take actions to right-size the flagship in accordance with priorities and move the community college toward independence in FY2013.

To ensure that this vision gets set and implemented, we recommend that funds provided to UDC by the city in FY2013 be conditioned on the development and implementation of a plan to right-size the university and move the community college to independence. We also believe that a portion of the District’s future higher education subsidies should be conditioned on meeting agreed-upon performance goals that are necessary to transform the District’s public higher education vision into a reality. Many states have higher education performance-based funding strategies that the District can look to, but it must first set priorities for what it wants its higher education system to accomplish.

V. UDC should undergo a major institutional right-sizing effort in FY2013 in order to become financially sustainable.

UDC must develop a plan to right-size the institution so that it: 1) better reflects the size and needs of its student body and the District of Columbia, 2) puts the institution on sound financial footing, and 3) ensures the future of the community college. This plan should be made in accordance with the vision to be developed for public higher education in the District. In fact, it should serve as the blueprint for achieving that vision. We recommend that the plan address how the university will cut costs to live within its means and a timetable for doing so. It’s possible that some of these changes may require short- term investments in order to achieve long-term cost savings. While we have not attempted to develop a complete list of all the elements to be included in such a plan, we believe that the plan should be based on a thorough review that includes the following:

Review academic programs at the flagship relative to market demand and determine how to adjust accordingly. We understand that UDC has reviewed programs and market demand—the findings of that work should be reviewed in the context of the vision for a right-sized UDC.
Review administrative areas to determine whether the staff is the right size, has the right skills, and are paid appropriate wages
Review information technology (IT) services to evaluate whether it would be more efficient for a host to provide infrastructure and core services
Review existing facilities to determine options for cost savings and evaluate whether existing facilities and planned capital projects are appropriate for a right-sized UDC

UDC’s right-sizing plan must also address personnel issues—personnel costs account for about 70 percent of UDC’s total costs and issues of staffing size and pay scale cut across all of the categories listed above. Rightsizing UDC will require the UDC Board, Administration, staff, and labor unions to work in partnership to develop staffing, work rules, and pay scales appropriate for a re-envisioned flagship and a separate community college. This will include reaching new labor agreements that meet these goals. There may be a role for the District’s leadership to play in helping UDC and its unions resolve key issues. To make such a partnership practical and viable, the UDC Board must first develop a plan that provides a clear vision of an attainable future for the university.

Thank you for your time today and your leadership on this critical issue.

[1] Accreditation ensures that educational institutions meet basic quality standards. It is required for students to transfer credits between educational institutions and receive federal financial aid, as well as for the institution to be eligible for federal funding and grants.
[2] Middle States Commission on Higher Education Policy Statement on Substantive Change, Effective November 18, 2010. Available on the web at http://www.msche.org/documents/updated-Substantive-Change-policy-11-18-10.pdf
[3] Middle States Commission on Higher Education Policy Statement on Separately Accreditable Institutions, available on the web at http://www.msche.org/?Nav1=POLICIES&Nav2=INDEX
[4] Attain Consulting’s analysis of data from NCES, IPEDS 2009-2010 GASB Finance File, 2009-2010 Instructional Activity File. Peer universities include Delaware State University, Alabama A&M University, Southern University and A&M College, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Virginia State University, Coppin State University, Fort Valley State University, Lincoln University, University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, Fayetteville State University, Mansfield University of Pennsylvania, Eastern New Mexico University-Main Campus, Francis Marion University, and University of Houston-Victoria. University of the District of Columbia Report: Financial Assessment and Cost Drivers (Forthcoming, Spring 2012).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Attain Consulting’s analysis of UDC 2011/2012 financial data. Attain UDC Report (Forthcoming, Spring 2012).
[7] Ibid.
[8] NCES, IPEDS data center, available on the web at http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/
[9] Ibid.
[10] Presentation on UDC Budget Overview, Prepared for CC Transition Committee. Delivered by Steven Graubert, Managing Director for Finance, UDC, January 23, 2012.
[11] Presentation on Workforce Development and Lifelong Learning Student Data: Program Year 2011 and PY 2012 YTD. Prepared by Kairos Management, January 27, 2011. Program Year (PY) 2011 is from September 1, 2010 through August 31, 2011
[12] Attain Consulting’s analysis of data from NCES, IPEDS 2010-2011 Instructional Staff Salary File. Attain UDC Report (Forthcoming Spring 2012)
[13] All figures related to baseline and incremental costs associated with the community college are based on Attain consulting’s analysis of UDC budget figures. In FY2010, it cost a total of roughly $9.9 million. However, $6.8 million in revenue from the community college and workforce development programs was also raised that fiscal year, leaving the net cost of $3.1 million. Attain UDC Report (Forthcoming, Spring 2012)
[14] U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 and 2000 Censuses. The District’s total population was 601,723 in 2010 and 572,059 in 2000.

Authors

John W. Hill
Joshua M. Kern
Alice M. Rivlin
Walter Smith
Carrie L. Thornhill

Publication: D.C. Council Committee on Housing and Workforce Development

Remembering Air Florida Flight 90

Stephen Hess — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 13:43:00 -0500

Thirty years ago today, Washington, D.C. witnessed one of its biggest air disasters in its history. Air Florida flight 90 crashed into the 14th Street Bridge, killing 78 people. I was interviewing in the Secretary of Transportation’s office at the time, and I recounted the story of our government’s reaction in my book, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices (Brookings Press, 1984). It is a fascinating story of government response to crisis. Would we do better in today’s world of instant communications? But also note public information officials trying to contain misinformation as families wait for news: How would this now replay on cable TV and through social networking? Here is my account.

"It is almost four in the afternoon, January 13, 1982, and it has been snowing hard for several hours. Government workers were told to go home some time ago, and now the city block that is the Department of Transportation building appears almost deserted. I am about to go home too, putting on my overshoes in Linda Gosden's [director of public affairs for the Department of Transportation] office. We have just returned from [Transportation] Secretary Drew Lewis's senior staff meeting, an hour and a half devoted to a review of management priorities for the coming year. Gosden, as she does almost every day, is apologizing for taking me to a meeting that she thinks I must have found very dull. I tell her again that my study will be largely about 'routine'; it is not necessary for me to observe a crisis. 'Perhaps I'll still catch one at State.' A young man bursts into the room. 'There's a report a plane has crashed into the Fourteenth Street bridge.' Gosden starts to run to Lewis's office, perhaps the length of a football field away. My unbuckled snowshoes are flapping around my ankles as I unsuccessfully try to keep up.

"From the cabinet officer's windows we should be able to see the bridge that is the crash scene. We can see only the flashing red lights of emergency vehicles through the snow and darkness. Others also rush to Lewis's office. The television set is on. We keep switching channels, as people do when all stations are covering a crisis and each keeps repeating the same news. Air Florida flight 90 is down in what is apparently the worst disaster in the history of National Airport.

"Gosden organizes a team to monitor the three TV networks and the wires and the relay written summaries to Lewis. All phones are in use. Lewis calls [Defense Secretary] Caspar Weinberger and asks for military helicopters; the request is instantly granted. He then calls the Coast Guard commandant. He wants to know the location of the closest cutter. (It is several hours away in the lower Chesapeake Bay and will start for the site at once.) He calls the chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, the agency responsible for determining the cause of the accident, and offers the facilities of his department, including a hangar at National Airport where the bodies can be taken. An official of Air Florida calls, and Lewis offers help in getting the plane out of the Potomac. David Gergen calls from the White House: with Gosden on an extension they compose a statement that the president might wish to make. Edwin Meese calls. He is worried that an aide may be on the plane. (Lewis's office determines that he is not.) FAA Administrator Lynn Helms is about to board a plane at Dulles Airport; Lewis directs his general counsel, John Fowler, to go to FAA headquarters and keep him informed until Helms can get there. A low-level DOT employee who happens to be on the other side of the river is dispatched to the Marriott Hotel, which the National Transportation Safety Board is using as the crash headquarters.

"Eventually it is too dark and too cold to continue the rescue operation. Work is called off until morning. There are no more calls to make or answer. Bone-weary, we are reluctant to leave, to break a bond that has been created by working together through a crisis. We talk quietly. Some wonder how they will get home. Around ten o'clock, Dick Shoenfeld, Gosden's assistant, drives me to my door, and after six hours I finally take off my flapping galoshes.

"Ted Cron, a former FDA press chief, once told me that the delicate balance in government press operations was to give all the information necessary to protect the public and at the same time try not to frighten people unreasonably. This had seemed to be Gosden's concern. Too many people at too many places in government could have been giving out conflicting and unsubstantiated information. Still breathless from her dash to Lewis's office, her first acts were to call the public affairs officers at the Federal Aviation Administration and National Airport, reminding them that all the facts must be verified before being released. There had already been some confusion on TV about whether the plane's destination was Tampa or White Plains. The primary value of Gosden's monitoring of the media was not to learn information but to check for possible misinformation.

"Gosden also had a hidden agenda. Hardly a person in Lewis's office had not initially feared the crash was a result of an air tower mistake. Lewis had been responsible for firing the striking air controllers; if lives had now been lost because of inexperienced or overworked replacements, public reaction against the Reagan administration would be swift and painful. Based on the information on visibility available to him, Lewis, a licensed pilot, concluded that air controllers were not the cause of the crash. Gosden then began a series of quick calls to the networks, whose prime-time news programs were about to go on the air. She did not rule out an error on the part of an air controller; only the National Transportation Safety Board—not an arm of DOT—can determine the cause of an accident. Rather, Gosden gave reporters information that she hoped would allow them to draw a conclusion that the crash could not be blamed on the people in the control tower.

"I had seen a crisis and government's response. It was at first chaotic. Many of the people who were needed were out of contact, stuck in cars or stranded at distant places. Everyone seemed to be trying to reach the same telephone numbers. Then something special happened. Until lines of authority were sorted out, people took on tasks that were above them or beneath them. Some 'important' people performed menial chores; some 'unimportant' people rose to heights beyond their normal abilities or usual responsibilities. Self-protective mechanisms seemed to evaporate. No one said, 'Put it in writing' or 'According to the regulations . . .' After a crisis of this kind there should be lessons to be learned, new designs for how to better anticipate and prepare, revisions of what has to be done, where, by whom, and in what order. But beyond the need for contingency planning, there is also the lesson of how well many people respond in the face of sudden adversity."

— an excerpt from The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices (Brookings Press, 1984)

Authors

Stephen Hess

Strengthening Educational and Career Pathways for Washington D.C. Youth

Martha Ross — Wed, 05 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0400

In the District of Columbia, far too many young people fail to make a successful transition to adulthood. They drop out of school before earning a high school diploma, a post-secondary degree or training credential with value in the labor market, and ultimately fail to get or keep a good-paying job. The District can do far more to leverage its considerable assets to ensure that youth and young adults stay on track or get back on track to achieve these key educational and employment outcomes.

Current efforts to prepare D.C. youth for careers and post-secondary education are woefully inadequate. While there are pockets of excellence, few programs provide evidence of effectiveness; serious employer involvement remains the exception rather than the rule; partnerships among government agencies, public education (K-12 and post-secondary), and community service providers are often non-existent or ineffective; and information to evaluate and improve programs is usually lacking.

The District and its partners should embrace the following agenda:

Adopt a goal that by 2022, 90 percent of DC youth will earn a post-secondary credential and obain full-time work by the age of 24.
Identify how many young people are now falling out of the educational and training pipeline at different points.
Develop, improve, or expand programs to re-engage them and to support all youth in transitioning successfully to adulthood. Programs should more tightly link secondary and post-secondary education and integrate education, training, work-readiness and youth development principles.
Develop clear engagement points for employers to work with training providers, public schools, post-secondary institutions, unions and community-based groups in order to provide a pipeline of qualified residents to employers who are ready to hire them.
Insist on quality improvement and performance measurement. Use the National Youth Employment Coalition’s Promising and Effective Practices Network as a resource, re-orient the Department of Employment Services’ youth portfolio towards a more balanced approach between summer and year-round programs, and improve oversight on both substance and administrative functions like contracting. Close programs that cannot demonstrate effectiveness.
Dramatically improve the city’s capacity to generate and use data to track the progress of the District’s young people along educational and career pathways and in meeting its goals.

Downloads

Download the Full Paper

Authors

Martha Ross

Creating New Career Pathways for Youth Success in Washington D.C.

Martha Ross — Wed, 05 Oct 2011 16:07:00 -0400

The Washington, D.C. region routinely ranks highly on measures of economic health, even though in these recessionary times, “economic health” sometimes means you’re still suffering, just not as badly as the guy down the road. And averages mask all kinds of disparities. For example, the city at the core of the region has both high average incomes and high poverty rates, and, as you can imagine, these figures do not refer to the same residents.

Let’s zoom in for a closer focus on a particular subset of Washington, D.C. residents to see how they’re doing: young people. A successful transition to adulthood typically involves the achieving the following educational and employment milestones:

Finishing high school or earning an alternative credential,
Earning a two- or four-year college degree or a certificate with value in the labor market, and
Work experiences (internships, part-time jobs, entry-level jobs) that lead to jobs with good wages and opportunities for advancement

Other researchers have noted the dismal employment outlook nationally for young people, as well as the high school dropout crisis.

Given this backdrop, it’s not surprising that the news regarding young people aged 16 to 24 in the District is not pretty. Nearly 9,000 District low-income young people aged 16 to 24 are not in school and are not working – one in ten of all young people. Unemployment rates among 16 to 19 year olds are at 50 percent. (Scroll down to page 15 for the D.C. numbers.) High school graduation rates are below 50 percent. An analysis of a cohort of public school 9th graders in 2001 found that of every 100 students, 43 graduated from high school within five years, 29 enrolled in post-secondary education within 18 months of graduating high school, and nine earned a post-secondary degree within five years of enrolling in college.

These youth struggle to succeed in high school, post-secondary education, and the labor market. If we don’t create better pathways to adulthood for them, they will become the low-income, low-skilled, and unemployed D.C. residents of the future.

But we don’t have to accept the status quo. I go into more depth in a new paper, Strengthening Educational and Career Pathways for D.C. Youth, but here’s the short version. There’s a lot we can do. Starting with the big picture, let’s acknowledge that there’s dignity in all kinds of learning and working, and get serious about building multiple pathways to high school completion and post-secondary education, instead of focusing only on the college-prep track leading to a four-year degree. Bring employers into high schools through “Career Academies.” Integrate occupational skills with developmental education. Strengthen youth service corps and internship and co-op programs at the secondary and post-secondary levels.

These are big challenges, but if we’re willing to make serious, positive, and necessarily disruptive changes, we can end the cycle of low expectations, low achievement, and limited employment prospects for young people stemming from the current educational and employment landscape.

Authors

Martha Ross

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

Affordable Housing in the District of Columbia — Where are We Now?

Benjamin Orr and Alice M. Rivlin — Wed, 27 Jul 2011 00:00:00 -0400

In 2006, the Comprehensive Housing Strategy Task Force (the Task Force, or CHSTF), co-chaired by Alice M. Rivlin and Adrian Washington, recommended a detailed set of policies to the Mayor and City Council of Washington, D.C. The report, “Homes for an Inclusive City: A Comprehensive Housing Strategy for Washington, D.C.” outlined a 15-year plan to preserve and develop housing in support of a growing, inclusive city of mixed-income neighborhoods.

The Task Force, created in 2003, conducted its research and outreach in 2004 and 2005. Amid a booming housing market, its concerns centered on preserving affordable housing for low-income residents, channeling market forces to create affordable and workforce housing in addition to high-end housing, supporting the development of mixed-income neighborhoods, and reducing the concentration of poverty. Based on the city’s strong housing market and healthy revenue picture at the time, the report recommended doubling annual expenditures on housing, drawing in large part on revenue generated by sales of residential and commercial property.

Since then, the global, national, and local economic picture has dramatically changed. Although the Washington region weathered the housing collapse and recession better than other areas across the country, the economic downturn caused serious distress throughout the city and contributed to Depression-era unemployment rates in some neighborhoods. Property values were relatively stable, yet sales fell dramatically. Tax revenues have plummeted and the city is facing years of budget austerity even as the need for city services increases.

The legislation creating the 2006 Task Force called for the Mayor to provide annual updates on the implementation of the recommendations and for the Council to hold public roundtables to review the reports. In 2007, the Brookings Institution provided the first annual report. There have been no subsequent updates.

This paper is the first comprehensive accounting of the District’s progress toward the CHSTF goals since 2007. It reviews recent housing and economic trends, provides an update on the implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations, offers recommendations for continuing to support affordable housing in a budget-constrained environment, and raises issues for city officials and stakeholders to consider as they continue to grapple with growing an inclusive city.

Downloads

Download the Full Paper

Authors

Benjamin Orr
Alice M. Rivlin

Expanding Health Coverage in the District of Columbia

Randall R. Bovbjerg, Gina M. Lagomarsino, Jack A. Meyer and Barbara A. Ormond — Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:00:00 -0500

In the late 1990s the city of Washington, D.C. faced a crisis in the health delivery system serving its large low-income population. Its public hospital and associated clinics were offering poor quality care at high cost per patient. Low-income residents had poor access to primary or specialty care and relied heavily on emergency departments. Health outcomes were abysmal.

Starting in 1999, the District initiated a series of health reforms to expand access to health care and improve residents’ health. The city closed the public hospital’s inpatient facility, transferred control of the hospital’s emergency department and affiliated clinics to a nonprofit health care provider, and created the DC HealthCare Alliance to pay for health services for uninsured low-income District residents who were not eligible for Medicaid. The District government shifted from directly providing health care to purchasing health care services from private providers.

The closure of D.C. General Hospital was controversial and politically unpopular, but officials determined it was necessary based on the hospital’s out-of-control finances, serious quality problems and low utilization rates. By setting up the DC HealthCare Alliance, the city created an insurance-like program that allowed low-income residents to access primary and specialty services from participating private providers. Enrollment in the Alliance program exceeded 50,000 in 2009. As a result of the Alliance and a generous Medicaid program, the District currently has one of the lowest uninsured rates in the country. The Alliance helped stabilize and strengthen community health centers—both the former public clinics and nonprofit community health centers—since it attached a revenue stream to patients the centers had been serving without reimbursement.

The District’s successes and challenges in redesigning the health care system for low-income residents provide important lessons for other states and localities. To be sure, some of the District’s circumstances were unique: The political opposition to closing the public hospital and the public clinics was neutralized by Congressional pressure for cost containment. Moreover, the reforms were supported by a federally-appointed Control Board, which managed the city’s finances from the mid-1990s until 2001 as the city emerged from insolvency. But the city’s experiences in shifting its role to a purchaser of health care services rather than an operator of a public provider system highlight common opportunities and pitfalls.

Providing access to health services via insurance coverage is a viable option for governments, as an alternative to providing services through a public hospital and associated clinics. The shift to “buying” from “making” health services is a challenge, but a manageable one. Either approach can work well or poorly, depending on choices in design, financing, implementation, and ongoing management.

However, key to the success in “buying” health care is the existence of a functioning health care delivery system—a network of providers (primary care, specialists, diagnosticians, and so on) willing and able to serve low-income patients, and able to communicate with each other and coordinate care. The Alliance had difficulty recruiting providers, especially physicians. Access to primary and specialty care is still inadequate, and the city is still struggling to create an integrated model of care.

Health outcomes are still poor. The District’s health care system is still struggling to improve health outcomes by focusing on chronic diseases, increasing primary care usage and reducing reliance on emergency departments and other hospital-based care.

Moreover, health system redesign does not address the social determinants of health, such as personal behavior, income, education and environmental factors. Improving health outcomes will take not only reforms in health care delivery, but improved education, housing, and job opportunities, as well as changes in diet and exercise and reductions in smoking and substance abuse. Many of these factors are outside the control of the health care system and require major coordinated efforts across multiple agencies.

The key lessons for privatization and coverage expansion alike are that changes in health care financing cannot succeed to their fullest without supportive changes in delivery of care and complementary efforts in public health and other areas that greatly affect health status.

Downloads

Full Paper

Authors

Randall R. Bovbjerg
Gina M. Lagomarsino
Jack A. Meyer
Barbara A. Ormond