Brookings: Topics - Venezuela

Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Venezuela’s new president Nicolas Maduro takes office under a cloud of controversy and with significant challenges to address. His razor thin victory over the opposition has spawned questions and protests. Still, Maduro will assume leadership of the country once headed by the late Hugo Chavez. These are challenging times in Venezuela; its economy is weak, its national debt is high and the populace is in doubt. Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Negroponte says Venezuela is a country in turmoil.

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Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Maduro as President of Venezuela: What to Expect

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 15:27:00 -0400

On April 15, the Comisión Nacional Electoral (CNE) confirmed Nicolás Maduro as the next president of Venezuela, following the death of Hugo Chavez on March 5 and presidential election on April 14. The Organization of American States and the U.S. government have both asked for a 100-percent recount “necessary to ensure than all Venezuelans have confidence in the results” (as White House Press Secretary Jay Carney explained). However, this is unlikely to occur.

What happens next and what should we expect from President Nicolas Maduro? The opposition, led by Governor of Miranda state Henrique Capriles Radonski, called for a recount and gathered his supporters to bang their pots and pans during the night of Monday April 15 in protest the CNE’s definitive result. The cazerolazos (pot bangers) would let Venezuelans and citizens throughout the hemisphere know of their call for a recount through non-violent protest. Thousands responded, reflective of the 49.07% of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition party, Mesa Unidad Democrática (MUD); they lost by only 262,000 out of 14.9 million votes. There are 3,200 formal claims of electoral fraud, as well as countless claims of intimidation, but they are unlikely to change the CNE’s decision because 4 out of the 5 commissioners were appointed by Hugo Chavez and are members of his political party, the PSUV.

Beyond pot banging, it is unlikely that the opposition’s protest will turn violent or endure. Maduro will be sworn into office on April 19 and will have to confront serious problems. Inflation has increased from 20 percent year-on-year in December 2012 to 23 percent in February 2013. Furthermore, the currency is overvalued, despite a recent 32 percent devaluation and stable oil prices. Consequently, slower economic performance is expected in the 2013-2014 period. Nevertheless, Maduro is expected to continue social spending for housing, education and health in order to demonstrate that Chavismo, the philosophy of the late Hugo Chavez, is not dead. Scotiabank has also warned its customers that interventionist public policies will continue. In the last year these policies resulted in shortages of basic foods and medicines for all Venezuelans.

With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB), Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. “empire.”

Maduro’s supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuela’s debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is critical.

Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since 2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuela’s oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Sun Hongbo from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences saw great benefit to China from a “strategic partnership based on long term complementarity.” The CNPC relies upon 800,000 bpd which Venezuela promised in 2007 as collateral for its $14 billion loan under the China Venezuela Joint Fund. We should therefore anticipate increased Chinese influence within Venezuela, as well as demands for greater efficiency both within PDVSA and the delivery of social services. However, payment on the Chinese loans implies lesser revenues from oil sales on the open market. Therefore, Maduro may seek to reduce the amount of subsidized oil that Venezuela provides the Caribbean nations and Nicaragua. Cuba will be an exception with its reliance on 90,000 bpd.

Given the reliance on China to keep the Venezuelan economy afloat, what else might we expect? Politically, the poor showing of the PSUV in this April election reflects the diminution of the Chavez’ aura. Maduro waged his campaign as “son of Chavez,” but it was not good enough to ensure a clear victory. He is now alone to run the country, but he has competitors. According to the Venezuelan constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, should have assumed office pending elections when Hugo Chavez failed to assume office on the constitutionally determined date of January 10. The Supreme Court decided in favor of continuity backing Vice President Nicolas Maduro, but Diosdado now claims through his Twitter account that he would have been more successful in last Sunday’s presidential election. The rivalry between the two men will become more evident throughout the six-year term that Maduro begins this week.

What does this mean for Venezuela? Maduro’s authority to lead the country will be contested. Based on the 3,200 claims of electoral fraud, his legitimacy as president has already been challenged. Without the compelling charisma that Hugo Chavez exuded and without plentiful resources, Maduro will come to rely on authoritarian means. Opposition political figures and student leaders may find themselves in pre-trial detention for varying lengths sufficient to scare them from open protest. Current criminal inmates of Venezuelan jails are reputed to be violent, using rape and threats of murder to control the penitentiaries. Most political opponents will probably choose to shut up or seek exile rather than face jail terms.

Under these circumstances, what should the U.S. government do? I anticipate that President Obama will recognize Maduro as president in the near future, and cannot prevent growing Chinese influence. However, Washington should not accept the abuse of human rights and the denial of the rule of law. Together with the democratic countries in the hemisphere, it should use the weight of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its effective court system to protect Venezuelan citizens and prevent the consolidation of authoritarian rule in the hemisphere.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

In Venezuela, Will 'Chavismo' Last Without Hugo Chavez?

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:54:00 -0400

Editor's note: In a collection of opinions by several experts in a PBS Newshour article on “Chavismo” after President Hugo Chavez’s death, Diana Negroponte looks at the responsibility Vice President Maduro has inherited and the future of U.S. relations with Venezuela.

"Chavismo" is based on the theory that an intrinsic relationship exists between the state and the citizen through the person of Hugo Chavez: he is both state and citizen. The state remains dedicated to advance the interests of its citizens and citizens commit to advancing the interests of the state. With the death of Hugo Chavez, who can provide the means to ensure this interlocking relationship between state and citizen?

Vice President Maduro inherited Chavez's mantle and he understands the philosophy of Chavismo. With plentiful resources, Maduro could continue the intrinsic relationship. But without those resources -- current economic problems will decrease disposable state expenditures -- Maduro will have to borrow money. Who will bankroll him?

The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) seeks to maintain the flow of Venezuelan crude and the stability of the Venezuelan government. Would the CNPC be willing to renegotiate its loans to ensure that both continued oil production and political stability continue? Probably. However, CNPC may impose limitations on Maduro's use of that "borrowed money". Maduro will have to accept a degree of austerity and further Chinese management and manpower in the Chinese housing, agriculture and energy projects. The nature of this "new reality" may be difficult for the Venezuelans to accept.

We should, therefore, expect Maduro to face growing domestic restlessness as he fails to deliver the promises of Chavismo. Maduro will seek to shift the blame onto others, including the United States. I anticipate deteriorating relations with Washington and raucous calls for the Bolivarian Alliance, known by its Spanish acronym ALBA, to intensify its anti-Yankee rhetoric. U.S. companies may find increasing restrictions on their activities, if not court cases such as the Chevron case in Ecuador. In the end, without sufficient resources ALBA will wither and Maduro will be a one-term president.

Read the full article »

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Publication: PBS Newshour

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:20:00 -0400

A high wire act played out over a 12-hour session of the General Assembly last week at the Organization of American States (OAS): Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out unless their demands were met. Considerable tensions existed within the Hall of the Americas as the foreign ministers witnessed another threat to the organization’s integrity. This time, the contest was over the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Since 1959, the IACHR has taken up and defended the rights of children, of women, of indigenous communities, of sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberty, afro-descendents, people with disabilities, migrants, defenders of human rights: in short, people in vulnerable situations. The IAHCR and its judicial arm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have continued to denounce and sanction violations of human rights. Throughout the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian military dictatorships of the 1970s and early 1980s, the commission and the court played key roles in making visible the victims of abuse. Despite perennial criticisms of the OAS for its failure to defend democratic institutions, the IACHR and the court are considered to be the main collective achievements in defending the rights of individual citizens in the Western Hemisphere.

On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the United States suffered critical attacks, the OAS General Assembly reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed on this historic day in U.S. history. In its Article 8 it gave the right to “any person who consider that his or her human rights have been violated may lodge a complaint or petition before the inter-American system for protection and promotion of human rights.” Individual citizens were recognized as legitimate actors in the consolidation of democracy.

It was therefore disturbing when in 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela raised three complaints about the IACHR: the budget should be limited to contributions from member states and not from observer nations and civil society; the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression should receive less funds and no more than the amount granted to other OAS rapporteurs; and, third, the headquarters for the IACHR should move out of Washington, preferably to Argentina.

The demands of Ecuador and Venezuela were discussed for over 22 months and through 37 meetings of IACHR and 29 working groups, the presentation of 98 documents from civil society, five academic meetings, three hemispheric audiences and one Extraordinary Session of the OAS. When the sought-for reforms were raised at the 44th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly last week, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out if their demands were not addressed.

Ecuador and Venezuela – with Bolivian and Nicaraguan support – called to limit the IACHR budget. This was an effort both to limit outside influences on the human rights commission as well as to reduce, even further its effectiveness. Currently, 55 percent of the IACHR’s budget comes from the OAS, the remaining 45 percent comes from member countries, observer nations and civil society. In 2012, the IACHR had an annual budget of $10 million with which to pay rapporteurs, attorneys and staff. With only 34 attorneys for 35 member countries and 31 other staff members, the work of investigating the 448 complaints submitted in 2012 is already inadequate because it enables consideration of only 10 percent of the complaints. Rather than reduce further the IACHR budget, the commission has requested doubling its budget to $20 million in order to hire more attorneys and consider more complaints.

The second complaint was more serious, namely a reduction in the budget for Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. The work of this office is dedicated to preserving “the right to seek, receive, and disseminate information and opinions freely.” (Declaration of Principles on the Right to Freedom of Expression). The call to reduce the budget for this office was a demand to limit, if not curtail its effectiveness. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, the press has been censured, and in certain cases closed, because of stories critical of the government.

The third complaint requesting that the IACHR move out of Washington did not receive the same objection. Both Costa Rica and Peru offered to host the commission, should it have to leave the OAS building and support structure thereof.

It is noteworthy that Mexico, which has received more complaints before the IACHR in the last two years than any other nation within the OAS, rejected the demands of Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia, which during its civil war with the FARC had been the object of criticism from numerous, alleged victims of human rights, also rejected the demands. While Bolivia and Nicaragua joined in the Ecuadoran demand, the Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) did not do so; nor did Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, Canada and the United States. The four ALBA continental nations were marginalized and on this occasion failed to modify the rules and process of the OAS. Only Argentina prevented the walk-out of Ecuador and Venezuela by presenting a motion that enabled the OAS to continue debating the three reforms.

The contest will continue and Ecuador will seek to lead its ALBA allies in rejecting liberal democratic concepts, such as human rights and press freedom. The significance of the 44th Extraordinary General Assemblyof the OAS is that the ALBA countries failed to undermine the democratic principles of the Inter-American system. If anything, the criticism has strengthened the resolve of the Western Hemisphere to retain its ideals and maintain a process by which individuals can bring complaints before an international body that accepts the sovereignty of the people, not the governors.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

Hugo Chavez’s Constitutional Legacy

William Partlett — Thu, 14 Mar 2013 12:57:00 -0400

After his recent death, Hugo Chavez’s legacy is being widely debated. Those on the right see his death as a chance for Venezuelans to emerge from repressive dictatorship – for instance, Republican Senator Marco Rubio has argued that Chavez’s death is an opportunity to “turn the page on one of the darkest periods in its history and embark on a new, albeit difficult, path to restore the rule of law, democratic principles, security and free enterprise system in a nation that deserves so much better than the socialist disaster of the past 14 years.” Those on the left mourn his death. Sean Penn lamented that the “people of the United States lost a friend it never knew it had. And poor people around the world lost a champion."

Less well known, however, is Chavez’s constitutional legacy. Chavez leaves the Venezuelan constitution with a textual basis for populist constitution-making that has been a favored argument of charismatic dictators since the French Revolution.

The Revolutionary Dictatorship of the “People”

This populist constitution-making tradition has its origins in the French Revolution. In 1789, an obscure French clergyman argued that the French people possessed the “constituent power” (pouvoir constituant) to remake the constitutional system. To do this, he argued that an extraordinary body of the people’s elected representatives—a constituent assembly—should establish a new constitutional system of government. This constituent assembly was the ultimate “free radical” of politics: Bearing the limitless power of the “common will of the nation itself,” it—and the leader that controlled it—would be superior to any pre-existing law or institution. In the years that followed, the allure of such concentrated popular power has proven irresistible to aspiring dictators.

In the late 1990s, Hugo Chavez joined this list. Hours after being sworn in as president in 1999, Chavez issued a decree calling for a referendum on a constituent assembly to rewrite the Venezuela constitution. Opponents immediately challenged this decree in court, arguing that existing constitution required the legislature to call such a referendum. The Venezuelan Supreme Court rejected this argument, upholding Chavez’s power to call a referendum because the people’s constituent power is “superior” to the existing constitution. In a subsequent decision, however, the court backed away from this reasoning, holding that if the people approved a constituent assembly, it would be “bound to the spirit of the constitution in force, and therefore is limited by the fundamental principles of the democratic state of law.”

After winning the referendum and successfully gerrymandering a majority in the Constituent Assembly, Chavez ignored this subsequent ruling completely. Calling the vote a “home run with the bases loaded,” Chavez declared the Constituent Assembly to embody the limitless sovereign power of the people. He argued that “neither the president nor Congress nor the Supreme Court, which are the maximum representatives of the constituted powers, can contrive to place themselves above, or put into a subordinate position, a sovereign elected assembly.'' To prove this point, he placed his own presidency at the mercy of the Constituent Assembly, retaking the oath of office after the Constituent Assembly “re-elected” him president. Chavez was now in control of the ultimate “free radical” in Venezuela politics.

The judiciary tried to beat back these claims of ultimate power. Chief justice of the Supreme Court, Cecilia Sosa Gomez, argued that the Constituent Assembly’s responsibility was to draw up a new constitution and not to destroy existing institutions. These arguments, however, were too late. Soon after, the Constituent Assembly considered and approved a “national declaration of emergency” that authorized it to reshape Venezuela’s existing government. The Constituent Assembly fired a number of judges for “corruption” and replaced them with pliant new ones. The assembly next neutered the existing Venezuelan legislature, reducing it to a largely powerless body that rubberstamped the actions of the Constituent Assembly.

Members of the legislature challenged these actions in the Supreme Court. A reshaped Supreme Court accepted Chavez’s argument that the Constituent Assembly stood above above the existing legal order. Chavez’s coup had succeeded. He used his unfettered control over Venezuelan politics to push through a new constitution in December 1999 that strengthened the presidency at the expense of the legislature.

Constitutional Charisma

This constitution is still in force today. Chavez’s revolutionary populist arguments are now part of the text. Article 347 states that “the original constituent power rests with the people of Venezuela” and that this power can be exercised by “calling a National Constituent Assembly for the purpose of transforming the state, creating a new juridical order and drawing up a new constitution.” Article 349 of the constitution explains that “[t]he existing constituted authorities shall not be permitted to obstruct the Constituent Assembly in any way.”

These provisions are an uneasy reminder of the continuing threat of charismatic dictatorship to existing rules and institutions. With the “free radical” of Venezuela politics—the Constituent Assembly—enshrined in the text, Chavez leaves a problematic legacy for those hoping a post-Chavez Venezuela will establish “a government of laws and not men.”

Authors

William Partlett

The Death of Hugo Chavez and What it Means for the Future of Venezuela

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The time is ripe for change in Venezuela, notes Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Negroponte. Following the death of its president, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has two objectives. It must elect new leadership and it must get its economy back on track. Despite its rich oil reserves, Venezuela is mired in a deep economic crisis shaped by its devalued currency and rising inflation. Vice President Nicolas Maduro has alarmed some onlookers with recent questionable tactics.

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The Death of Hugo Chavez and What it Means for the Future of Venezuela

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Chavez's Death and a Forthcoming Political Battle in Venezuela

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Hugo Chavez's supporters poured into the streets, crying and mourning the loss of a man whom many considered a saint. They may explain the shortages in the stores, the soaring inflation and the failure to deliver government services to Chavez's illness, but the cause of the economic woes began long before December 2012 when Chavez left Venezuela for a hospital in Cuba.

Nicolás Maduro is the chosen heir. As vice president, the constitution empowers him to run the country while elections are organized and held within 30 days. This timeline may well be adjusted; shortening the time to capitalize on the emotional outpouring or lengthening the time due to "turbulencia" (unrest) in the country. Whichever, the opposition party that gathered together for presidential elections in October 2012 will have a hard time winning this election.

Governor Enrique Capriles Radonski is the leader of a coalition, known as MUD (mesa de la unidad democratica). The government's political tactics of last October—limited access to the nationally controlled airways, overwhelming distribution of public goods—will probably be repeated in this forthcoming election. The MUD faces an uphill campaign, and is unlikely to succeed.

However, the economy is in shambles and the blame will be posted firmly on the government's door. Whoever wins the forthcoming presidential election will have to confront an overvalued currency, despite the most recent 32 percent devaluation, the need to reinvest revenues from the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, in maintenance and parts, and 20% inflation. Once the election is over, economic austerity will have to begin. Venezuela's president will have to undertake unpopular, but necessary economic policies. Fortunately, oil continues to flow but much of it is already committed to pay off international creditors. Venezuela may now need the help of the multilateral institutions. Contemptuously treated over the last few years, they are the bankers of last resort.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: Reuters

Chavez Is Dead. Chavismo Lives On.

Ted Piccone — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The death of Hugo Chavez will have little short-term impact on Venezuela's current trajectory of "Boliviarian socialism" or on its relations with the United States. His long illness and resounding re-election victory last October gave his cohorts both the time and the legitimacy to project an image of continuity and stability. This, combined with the ongoing social welfare benefits meted out to Chavez's core followers, will ensure a victory for Chavez's anointed successor, Vice President Nicolás Maduro, in snap elections to be held next month. Maduro will have some serious economic challenges to tackle, including rising food prices, the highest inflation rate in the hemisphere and mounting debt. The recent decision to devalue its currency, however, demonstrates that the Chavistas are willing to make some hard decisions. Those are likely to be put on hold, however, until after the next round of elections.

In foreign policy, Maduro is unlikely to veer from Chavez's tested formula of demonizing the United States, at least rhetorically, a tactic he has already deployed in accusing Washington of somehow instigating Chavez's illness and expelling two U.S. military attachés.

The longstanding close relationship between Chavez and the Castros in Havana is likely to continue under new leadership in Venezuela, at least for the short to medium term. Cuba has carefully inserted itself into the transition planning process in Caracas and both sides benefit from continuity in terms of oil subsidies, medical and education services, security and intelligence cooperation and ideological and anti-U.S. solidarity.

Washington should bide its time and quietly wait out what should be a relatively smooth transition to a post-Chavez leadership and then remount its earlier efforts to turn a page away from the antagonism of the Chavez era toward a more pragmatic relationship of mutual interests. If Maduro concludes, however, that he has more to gain parroting the Chavez line of virulent anti-Americanism, it will be difficult to turn the other cheek for another six years.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

Hugo Chavez's Death an Opportunity for More Pragmatic Relationship with U.S.

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 19:13:00 -0500

The death of Hugo Chavez presents an opportunity for the new Venezuelan leadership to tone down the rhetoric of anti-Americanism and put our bilateral relations on a pragmatic basis.

The U.S. remains the principal purchaser of Venezuelan oil which is refined in Gulf Coast refineries for later export to China and other markets. Food and pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, spare parts and electrical equipment are bought from the U.S. although payment for these goods is delayed and consumers must wait 4 to 5 months for the new inventory to arrive at Venezuelan ports.

Venezuela is in the midst of an economic crisis with shortages of U.S. dollars, a devaluation of 32 percent and the prospect of searing inflation. Furthermore, Venezuela needs foreign direct investment, technical expertise and spare parts from the U.S.

Rather than demonizing Washington, an opportunity exists for Caracas to reframe the relationship to a realistic mode.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Jorge Silva / Reuters

Venezuela's Transition – A "Delicate Condition"

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 15:10:00 -0500

President Hugo Chávez is reported to be in a “delicate condition” following recent surgery to remove cancerous cells. He remains in a Havana hospital, remote from the economic and security problems of Venezuela. In his place, Nicolás Maduro governs the nation as the executive vice president with powers far in excess of those designated to a U.S. vice president. For all intents and purposes, the union leader with strong socialist inclinations has the constitutional power to appoint and dismiss ministers, negotiate with the National Assembly and to preside over the Federal Government Council. Were Chávez to die on, or after January 10 – the constitutionally designated inauguration day – Maduro would assume the office of the president and proceed to hold elections 30 days thereafter. It would appear that a peaceful transition can take place.

A peaceful transition becomes more complicated if Chávez dies before January 10. In that event, according to the constitution, National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello shall assume the presidency and arrange for presidential elections. Cabello has indicated publicly that he is willing to postpone the inauguration, which would extend the time in which he is eligible to inherit the presidential responsibility. With Maduro as Chávez’ chosen successor, and the clear favorite of the Cuban government, there appears little risk of upsetting the pre-determined transition to Maduro. However, Cabello is a master behind-the-scene-player of Chavista factional politics and a former general in the Venezuelan army. He should not be discounted. Furthermore, a former Venezuelan Supreme Court Justice has accused Cabello of masterminding a drug trafficking ring, and he is said to be on the DEA’s watch list.

However, the subsequent presidential elections provide a strong opportunity for the opposition forces, gathered together in the mesa de la unidad (MUD), to win. The MUD’s candidate in the October elections led a well-organized campaign that lost because it could not distribute housing, social services and was limited to three minutes per day of radio/TV time while Chávez monopolized the media with 10 hour per day use of national media. Despite the uneven, if not unfair, campaign terrain, Chávez did less well in 2012 than he did at the previous presidential election. The opposition remained united and stood behind its standard bearer, Henrique Capriles Radonski.

Maduro will be well placed to use the same tactics to win the presidency. He can offer to fulfill Chávez’ promise of 25,000 new homes in Caracas. He can dominate the airwaves and warn the electorate that a vote for the opposition is a vote for upheaval. We should not assume, therefore, that Chávez’ death will result in the death of Chavismo, known by the party’s official name the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV).

Should Capriles and the MUD demonstrate a sustained lead in the polls, the PSUV can call upon its 400,000 militia to provoke disturbances. These young men and women, wearing their signature Chávez red shirts, have been trained to fight against a foreign invasion. An internal electoral campaign is not a foreign invasion, unless rumors of U.S. support for the opposition provoke increased antagonism. Short of taking up arms, the militia can occupy roads and organize counter presidential rallies that result in numerous injuries, if not deaths. They might succeed in creating serious political unrest that justifies the call for “un estado de excepción” (state of exception, a.k.a. state of emergency). In this event, Article 337 of the constitution permits the executive vice president, together with his cabinet, to suspend temporarily citizens rights, with noted exceptions. According to Article 338, in the event of internal or external conflict which might threaten the security of the state, the state of emergency can last for 90 days with a further extension of 90 days. During that time, constitutional guarantees would be suspended.

Three factors work in favor of stability and against declaring a state of emergency: Cuba’s need to sustain the delivery of 90,000 barrel per day of subsidized oil, the China Development Bank’s interest on continued payments on its $42.6 billion loan to the Venezuelan government, and Washington’s desire to improve relations with Caracas and reintroduce the DEA into Venezuela. For several months, Maduro had discussions with senior officials at the State Department, and there is talk of resuming diplomatic relations at the level of ambassador.

Furthermore, Maduro faces significant economic problems. Severe macroeconomic distortions, an over-valued currency, capital flight and shrinking domestic production require responsible management of the economy and the support of the multilateral lending agencies, as well as the return of private investors. As Foreign Minister, Maduro was exposed to the realities of international pressures, as well as opportunities should he redirect the ship of state towards a stable, balanced and investor friendly management of the Venezuelan economy.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez’s Last Hurrah

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 09:30:00 -0400

Barclays and the respected Venezuelan pollster, Consultores 21, predicted a small but significant victory for the opponent to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez. Both were wrong. At the end of a long night of counting votes, Henrique Capriles, the leader of the opposing coalition, Mesa de la Unidad (MUD) conceded defeat. Whether the president’s victory lay in the voter roll, the electoral machine or the count, Capriles acknowledged Chávez’s victory and moved on to future electoral battles. The debate over the fairness of the election will continue, but a more significant debate is what happens next: How might Chávez govern and for how long?

Chávez faces some structural challenges: Inflation at 25%, stagnant oil production, weak job creation, capital flight, distortive price controls and rising debt must be addressed urgently. The need for fiscal transparency contradicts Chávez’s preference for treating public assets as a political slush fund. Strengthening the independence of the Central Bank collides with the centralization of power in the president’s hands. The national oil company, PDVSA, needs a major corporate revamping, but with a doubling of employees from 2 million to 4 million since 2004, it is being used as an employment agency rather than a for-profit business.

Venezuela also faces some economic challenges. A devaluation of the official Venezuelan currency, the bolivar, is likely with continued currency control measures. Economists predict devaluation of the official rate in January 2013 from 4.3 bolivars to 6.2 bolivars per U.S. dollar. The result will be a serious hike in inflation based on the importation of approximately 75 percent of Venezuelan consumer goods. This will affect the debt-to-GDP ratio which is estimated to reach 52 percent by December 2012, more than doubling the 23 percent rate in 2008. The rating agencies predict a weakening in Venezuela’s B+ credit rating, with Fitch announcing a review for potential downgrade. This will increase the cost of debt repayments, except the fixed 6 percent interest on its $42.5 billion due to the Chinese Development Bank and Para-state enterprises. Bank of America Merrill Lynch anticipates a 3.5 percent reduction in Venezuelan growth next year.

What could Chávez do to strengthen the Venezuelan economy? He could reduce social spending – free government housing, cash stipends for the elderly and pregnant women -- that are calculated at 5 percent of GDP. However, reductions, let alone termination, would undermine his credibility. He could focus on rebuilding the domestic energy sector to avoid rolling blackouts via investment in critical repairs and domestic infrastructure. He could reduce the sale of energy at subsidized prices to his allies in the Bolivarian Alliance, a.k.a ALBA. Chávez could also end his criticism of the private sector and follow Raul Castro’s lead in encouraging small business and the creation of wage-paying jobs.

A renewed mandate might encourage Chávez to engage further with the government of Iran. The presence of Hezbollah and members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in Venezuela is public knowledge. Beyond, enabling Iran to circumvent the UN Security Council’s sanction regime, the presence of technical assistants in state security, intelligence, and energy matters has enabled Tehran to play a peripheral, but influential role in Chávez government. To carry out their work, these advisers acquire Venezuelan identify cards and passports. With these and a revised name, Iranian advisers can seek to circumvent the Department of Homeland Security’s terrorist-suspect data base.

In domestic political terms, Chávez reelection could allow him to be magnanimous and forgive the 6.1 million people, including some government workers, who voted for the opposition. Alternatively, he could retaliate against teachers and others who made their opinions known. He could ignore the critical media, including social media. Or, he could consolidate his authority by further curbs on publishers, independent bloggers and journalists.

This fourth presidential term was made possible due, in part, to the sheer determination of an extraordinary fellow with rare charisma and influence. Assiduously he has sought the loyalty of his vice president, the military high command, central bankers, high court justices and a majority of the legislators. Chávez is emperor and this election victory must be attributed to him and those around him. But the emperor is sick and few believe that he can survive his six-year mandate. Despite the naming of a vice-president, there is no clear successor.

Should Chávez become incapacitated in the next four years, the constitution requires another presidential election. Meantime, elections for governor will be held on December 16 and elections for mayor in April 2013. The constitutional and democratic system provides for several more elections that will test voters’ desire for continuity or change. In October 2012, many voters may have been intimidated into voting for Chávez. In the near future, those same voters will have greater freedom to recognize a sickened emperor and vote their own mind. This election was Chávez's last hurrah!

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Jorge Silva / Reuters

Venezuelans Go to the Polls amidst Fears of Violence

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Wed, 03 Oct 2012 13:00:00 -0400

On October 7, 19 million Venezuelans will vote on whether Hugo Chávez should have a further term after 13 years in power, or whether the opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski, the 40-year-old former governor of Miranda state and former vice president of the lower house, should become president. No other posts are up for election on Sunday. Consequently, this vote becomes a referendum on Chávez’s leadership.

The latest polling has narrowed the gap between Chávez and Capriles. Datanalysis gives Chávez a 10 point lead. As of mid-September, Consultores 21 gives Capriles a two point lead. Other polls continue to put Chávez ahead, but all pollsters share the proportion of undecided voters at approximately 14%. Most of the undecided should be classified as “unwilling to declare” for fear of losing government benefits or a job. The outcome lies with these people, who could provide Capriles with the majority. Only Chávez believes that a clear victory will be his. Most analysts predict a close outcome.

A narrow win by either side risks the loser provoking disturbance. Until September 29, the campaign had been noisy with frequent gunshots, but no deaths. On that day, two of Capriles’s staff and one spectator were shot and died during a rally some 240 kilometers from Caracas. Chávez condemned the violence stating that “It’s not with violence that we are going to face each other. It’s vote against vote.” However, intimidation against Capriles followers is widespread and rumors of mobilization by the Chávez’ militias are current. Restraint is needed in the final days leading up the election.

Conscious that Chávez could declare un estado de excepción (state of emergency) and suspend most civil liberties should disturbances “gravely affect the security of the Nation,” Capriles has called on his followers to exercise restraint. A state of emergency could last up to 90 days, with a further 90-day extension that would prevent Capriles, should he win, from taking the oath of office in mid-January. Restraint may be difficult to sustain when the young, 250,000-strong militia are let loose to celebrate or challenge the outcome.

What role should the U.S. government play? The policy of not saying anything about Chávez in order to reduce the bulls-eye for Chavista anti-imperial rhetoric could continue through the election. However, that would indicate that unfair elections in the hemisphere are acceptable to Washington, or in the alternative that the Obama administration does not care about the Venezuelan election. Secretary Clinton was articulate in support of a democratic outcome to the Honduran political crisis in 2009 and advocated respect for the outcome of the Salvadoran presidential election that same year. The U.S. government should not limit its pronouncement to small countries. Instead, our democratic principles should be advocated broadly. Liberal democracy is built upon free and fair elections, a free press and the rule of law. We should publicly affirm our principles and ask that the Venezuelans be allowed to exercise their civil rights in a peaceful environment, free of intimidation. José Miguel Insulza, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) could do the same based upon the principles of the OAS Charter.

A peaceful election is necessary for the Venezuelan people mired in homicide rates that are among the highest in the world. Also, citizens need a peaceful mechanism to resolve their intense political disputes. But this vote is not unique. Despite the fact that it has become a referendum on Hugo Chávez, it forms part of several elections to determine how Venezuelans wish to be governed. Since Chávez was first elected president in 1998, Venezuelans have voted for president four times, national legislature five times, regional elections five times and referendums four times. It took multiple elections to consolidate the dominance of President Chávez and his party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV).

Nevertheless, beginning in 2010 the opposition unified in the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), which was modeled after the Chilean efforts to defeat Pinochet’s dictatorship. They coalesced around a single candidate and succeeded in denying Chávez’s party a two-third majority in the National Assembly, thus denying him ability to pass both organic and enabling legislation. Following this week’s presidential election, voters will elect regional governors on Dec. 13 and mayors on April 14, 2013. Elections for the next National Assembly will take place in September 2015. Meanwhile, should a re-elected president Chávez become disabled within the next four years, Article 233 of the Venezuelan constitution requires that another presidential election take place 30 days after declaring his physical or mental incapacity.

A series of elections may be necessary to restore liberal democracy, a free press and the rule of law in Venezuela. Not everything hinges on the October 7 elections. It is one battle in a prolonged effort to install true democracy in Venezuela. It is important that these electoral battles take place in a relatively stable environment so that voters are not scared away from the polling stations. We wish the Venezuelan people well.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Jorge Silva / Reuters

Venezuela: What Future for Chavismo without Chavez?

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Wed, 25 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This piece first appeared in the Commentary section of GlobalPost

Venezuela’s political future is clouded by unpredictable, interdependent variables. President Hugo Chavez’s health is not the only uncertainty. Venezuelans debate whether their president will leave office before or after the Oct. 7 presidential elections. They ask, if he goes, who in the ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) will fill Chavez’s role? They wonder whether the October vote will be held on time, if at all; whether the opposition candidate can prevail; and whether the Chavistas will respect an opposition victory.

Chavez has attempted to dispel rumors of his demise, but his appearances are infrequent and few believe that his cancer is in remission. Chavez’s physical condition and the future of Venezuelan politics are of considerable concern to hemispheric neighbors and to Venezuelans.

Three scenarios are currently being discussed:

• Chavez, or his successor, secures a credible victory in October, or a subsequent “special election” that the Constitution requires should the president become incapacitated in the first four years of his term in office;

• The opposition wins; or

• Allies of Chavez cling to power by announcing a state of emergency and canceling the elections.

A guessing game emerges: What are the chances for the opposition party’s success? Who might succeed Chavez? The president’s cancer has undermined his aura of invincibility, spurred a power struggle among potential PSUV successors and raised the question whether the opposition party, Coalition for a Democratic Unity (MUD), can remain united, absent Chavez.

MUD has rallied behind Henrique Capriles Radonski, the former governor of Miranda state who gained 64.2 percent support in the presidential primary this past February. He has stressed reconciliation, unity and non-retaliation against Chavez supporters.

However, Capriles’ growing popularity has not peeled off the almost 60 percent of likely voters who favor Chavez. This is because the poor depend upon the "misiones" (welfare programs) and 8 million Venezuelans rely on jobs in the government or in state-owned enterprises.

Anticipating Chavez’s incapacity the PSUV is now probing alternative candidates to become his successor. If Chavez becomes incapacitated over a prolonged period, Vice President Elias Jaua would assume the presidency for 90 days. A simple vote in the National Assembly could extend this period. According to Article 233, were Chavez to be totally incapacitated, or die, Jaua would complete Chavez’s six-year term as president.

Jaua, however, is considered politically weak; others vie to replace him. Brother Adan Chavez is a possible candidate, but the Constitution forbids a family member from succession. Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro and Speaker of the National Assembly Diosdado Cabello are possible inheritors. Chavez also appointed General Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva as defense minister. Both Cabello and Rangel joined Chavez in the 1992 attempted coup d’etat and are known as uncompromisingly adverse toward the opposition.

Opposition leader Capriles has succeeded in holding the MUD together. According to a March Datanalisis poll, Capriles held a favorable 31.4 percent of the vote compared to 44.7 percent for Chavez. A more recent July poll resulted in a similar split. This gives Chavez a comfortable lead. However, beyond Chavez, other potential PSUV candidates all score lower than Capriles at the polls.

It is questionable whether the 113,000 member Venezuelan armed forces would support a Capriles victory. Senior officers have indicated their respect for the Constitution and the legitimate electoral outcome. Furthermore, senior commanding officers are said to be divided in their loyalty to Chavez, making the armed forces an unpredictable factor should the opposition win.

An alternative scenario exists: Were the polls to indicate a likely majority vote for Capriles and the MUD, those close to Chavez could use the Chavista gangs who rule the streets in many parts of Venezuela to provoke widespread unrest. This could also occur after a Capriles victory in October. Both scenarios would justify the declaration of a state of emergency ("estado de conmocion"). In the case of internal conflict, Article 338 of the Venezuelan Constitution allows for the suspension of civil liberties for up to 180 days. This would give sufficient time for a caretaker government to postpone the election.

If Chavez were to win and become incapacitated before inauguration, a new presidential election would need to be held within 30 days. Before the winner of this new election is inaugurated, Speaker Cabello would assume the presidency. Cabello would not have an interest in violence, but rather the stability of the regime and the maintenance of the status quo.

Even if Capriles is permitted to win and assume office, the PSUV will continue to hold a simple majority in the National Assembly until 2016. PSUV legislators would likely vote against Capriles and his MUD party reformers, suggesting stalemate and continued PSUV influence on public affairs.

As presidential candidate, Capriles must calm the provocateurs that seek to justify an estado de conmocion. Were he to win, he might offer an amnesty to those Chavistas who have enriched themselves through legitimate business deals. However, he need not extend amnesty to those who have participated flagrantly in the drug business.

With support from Colombia and Brazil, Capriles must move skillfully and swiftly to assert the rule of law. Capriles will need the support of the international community to assure that his victory at the polls can be guaranteed. A Nicaraguan style government could emerge in which Capriles occupies the presidency while allowing some former officials to retain senior government positions. The tenuous coalition worked for Nicaragua in 1991, and the same could work for Venezuela in 2012.

Chavismo will probably not die, but without its standard bearer, it can wither away so long as selected Chavistas are given space for reconciliation.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Publication: GlobalPost

Image Source: Reuters

The 2012 Venezuelan Elections: Hopes for Legitimacy

Consuelo Amat and Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 09 Mar 2012 15:13:00 -0500

The Venezuelan opposition seems to be learning from past mistakes. By choosing a single candidate to represent a coalition of diverse parties through a popular democratic process, and then publically backing the winner, the opposition has tested their candidate’s electability, lent him legitimacy, and acted upon their professed commitment to inclusion. Henrique Capriles Radonski, a 39-year-old lawyer, governor of the state of Miranda who champions being the candidate of all colors and the colorless, overwhelmingly won the country’s first primary elections with 64% of the vote, or more than 1.8 million ballots. Although there is no question that the opposition has never been closer to defeating President Hugo Chávez in the 13 years that he has been in power, the outcome of the presidential elections is far from certain. But regardless of who gets sworn into office, will Venezuelan democracy, political stability and relative peace prevail on October 7 and beyond?

From the primary elections that took place on February 12, as well as surveys conducted by the Instituto Delphos in Caracas, it is apparent that Henrique Capriles is reading Venezuelans correctly. His conciliatory, pragmatic and non-ideological discourse is bearing fruit, as is his readiness to acknowledge Chávez’s contributions to the poor. As president, Capriles has pledged to continue popular government programs, such as the misiones (i.e. health care, education and other safety nets), a rare position from the part of the Venezuelan opposition. At the same time, the opposition’s platform is built around combating government inefficiency, crime and economic stagflation.

Winning the presidential elections will hinge on speaking to those who are unaligned, and critically, enticing them to vote on Election Day. This group comprises 30% of the 18.5 million registered voters—not an insignificant number. Notwithstanding their importance, the “ni-nis” (neither Chávez nor Capriles) have been mischaracterized as apathetic and misinformed. Their defining characteristics are a high level of education and political awareness, as well as a profound sense of disillusionment with all political parties and government institutions. Looking inside the non-aligned group one finds a microcosm of national politics with less dogmatism.

The most positive effect of the primary elections—in which all registered voters were allowed to participate—has been the trust that the process has kindled amongst Venezuelans. Most eligible voters, regardless of political affiliation, think that the primaries were a positive development and that Capriles is a likable candidate. This is good news for democracy and stability.

The weakest link for the Chávez camp remains the President’s deteriorating health. This wildcard—a factor that is utterly unpredictable, marred in speculation and beyond anyone’s control –puts Chavismo on shaky grounds. If Chávez remains active and the formidable campaigner that he is, the opposition will have a very difficult time defeating him. The incumbent has virtually unlimited state revenue and media access. His approval ratings currently hover around 50% and he is just turning to campaign mode at full speed. The strategy of the Oficialismo is predictable and unlikely to shift away from polarization. Indeed, Chávez stands to win from people fearing a transition of power and thinking that Capriles will reverse the socialist revolution. Cracks within the Oficialismo, however, and waning enthusiasm from his core group of supporters are potential consequences of an uncertain future.

Venezuelans now trust the national electoral commission (CNE), thanks in large part to its recognition of past victories by the opposition. This is a hopeful sign that a relatively peaceful electoral season is possible. Involving observers who are impartial and credible to both sides—be they domestic or international actors—would consolidate this confidence. As of now, the CNE has not invited international observer missions, such as from the Carter Center, the OAS or the European Union. UNASUR may be invited as an election observer, but it has minimal experience in this type of endeavor. According to the CNE, international observers would be invited as acompañantes (companions) to domestic monitors. The importance lies in inviting mutually-acceptable elections observers to audit the new electronic voting machines, ensure that the anonymity of voters is preserved, and focus on preventing—or at least denouncing—fraud and intimidation.

Following the elections, the armed forces are going to be decisive in ensuring democracy and stability. Chávez’s armed militias are more than 150,000 strong and make the situation particularly volatile. The international community would do well to encourage the military to respect their supreme duty to protect all Venezuelans and uphold the Constitution. It is also essential for the opposition to continue forging bonds with the armed forces.

It remains to be seen whether Capriles can ride the wave of the primaries and overcome the unequal electoral playing field. The opposition is smart to focus on the paradox in Chávez of creating a socialist and egalitarian community while unrelentingly attacking segments of the population. In the past, Chávez’s divisive discourse coupled with his leadership, charisma, ability to articulate the poor’s grievances and massive handouts proved successful. In 2012, the majority of Venezuelans seek electoral results that are widely accepted as legitimate and a military that stands by its constitutional responsibility to uphold whomever wins at the polls.

Authors

Consuelo Amat
Diana Villiers Negroponte

Venezuela’s Crime Debacle: A Cautionary Tale

Kevin Casas-Zamora — Fri, 03 Feb 2012 15:00:00 -0500

The January 30 kidnapping of Carlos Pujalte, the Mexican Ambassador to Venezuela, and his wife, has cast unflattering light on the South American country’s public safety plight. The couple was freed soon afterwards and is in good condition after experiencing a classic example of what has become a burgeoning industry in Latin America – the “express” kidnapping. In these types of abductions the victim is retained for just enough time to elicit a relatively small ransom or pay a visit to an ATM. This occurrence is neither new nor exceptional in Venezuela. Over the past year several diplomats have suffered a similar fate in Caracas, including the Chilean consul who wound up in a local hospital after being shot by his captors. According to a victimization survey conducted by Venezuela’s National Institute of Statistics, in the year leading up to July 2009, 46 kidnappings took place every day in Venezuela, a much larger figure than that of neighboring Colombia, once the world’s epicenter of the kidnapping business.

The recurring abduction of diplomats –something more frequently associated with war theaters or guerrilla tactics—is a clear symptom of the extraordinary deterioration of public order in Venezuela. No country in Latin America –not even the highly violent nations in Central America’s “Northern Triangle”—has experienced in the past few years an increase in crime rates that nears Venezuela’s. The 4,550 murders recorded in 1998, when President Hugo Chávez took office, skyrocketed to 19,336 by 2011, an astonishing figure that dwarfs the number of murders in the United States and the 27 countries of the European Union combined. Following the steep increase of 2011, which put the homicide rate at 67 per 100,000 people, Venezuela today only trails Honduras and El Salvador. The situation is worse in Caracas, the capital city, which has in all likelihood become the world’s most dangerous city. At approximately 210 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, Caracas’ rate has surpassed that of Mexico’s troubled Ciudad Juárez–Ground Zero of the “War on Drugs”—where the number of murders diminished 38% last year. In comparison, New Orleans, long regarded as the U.S. murder capital, seems positively mellow – its 2011 murder rate was 51.

The Venezuelan security debacle is as tragic as it is enlightening. Above all, it offers a cautionary tale about the limits of easy explanations, prescriptions and predictions when it comes to crime.

Standard narratives about high crime levels in Latin America –particularly of the center-left variety—put income inequality at the heart of the problem and growing human development levels at the core of the solution. This is not concocted out of thin air: We observe a strong and positive relationship between inequality and crime almost everywhere in the world. Yet, income inequality has fallen dramatically in Venezuela in the recent past. The country’s Gini Coefficient—a widely used index to measure inequality by placing countries on a 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality) scale—moved from 0.498 in 1999 to 0.412 in 2008, a drop unparalleled in Latin America. Meanwhile, human development levels have improved consistently and considerably in the country. The UNDP’s Human Development Index (which combines measures of income, health and educational attainment also on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher levels of prosperity being closer to 1) has gone from 0.656 in 2000 to 0.735 in 2011, an increase of 1% per year. No one would guess Venezuela’s crime crisis from looking at these figures.

These numbers should give social scientists and policymakers pause. The truth is that even factors that are related to crime in general may have very limited predictive power in specific circumstances. Explanations to crime tend to be idiosyncratic and linked to complex social dynamics that do not lend themselves to easy or uniform solutions. Moreover, factors associated to crime never act in isolation. Criminal violence is a syndrome in which multiple causes converge and reinforce each other in ways that generate problems greater than the sum of their parts. It is the convergence of multiple factors in a specific context that matters. In the case of Venezuela, some of these factors are very likely attributable to President Chávez’s failings. In a previous article, written just before the 2010 congressional elections, I singled out the collapse of law enforcement institutions, the systematic weakening of local governments, and the country’s increased role in the narcotics trade, partly related to the Venezuelan government’s semi-official policy of sheltering the FARC narco-guerilla army. While I am going to restate those factors here, I will also say that I am under no illusions that it is very difficult to know their precise contribution to the crisis. The enormous complexity of crime as a social phenomenon calls for more than a little intellectual humility, a greater tolerance to untidy explanations, and more sensitivity to local realities. The latter point hints at why the emasculation of local governments –that have a greater chance of decoding those realities—is a grave mistake in the fight against crime, something that the recent Venezuelan experience seems to bear rather well. The message is simple: beware of soapbox preachers –including those clad in academic robes—that offer easy explanations and blanket prescriptions to Latin America’s crime riddle. The case of Venezuela shows that this is very messy.

Similar reservations apply to predicting the political ramifications of high crime levels. Perhaps the most vexing question about Venezuela’s decade-long crime predicament is why President Chávez has been largely spared from the wrath of citizens over this issue. Let us remember that over the past 10 years the government has launched, literally, tens of plans and strategies to bring crime under control, to little avail. The latest incarnation of such efforts is the creation of the so-called People’s Guard, a military outfit that has been met with the same blend of skepticism, indifference, and resignation as all the previous announcements made by the President on this subject. True, according to Latinobarómetro, a regional opinion poll, 61% of the Venezuelan population thinks that crime is the country’s most important concern, the highest figure in Latin America. But it was already the most important concern, by a long margin, in 2006, right before President Chávez was comfortably reelected. As of this writing Chávez’s approval rating hovers around 60% despite the horrific state of public safety in the country. The Venezuelan experience suggests that the country’s citizens care a lot about crime but end up defining their political preferences according to other motives, mostly related to economic welfare and ideological leanings.

The case of Venezuela may be indicative that the deterioration of citizen security is less politically explosive than often assumed. Despite some survey data that point to the contrary, there is precious little evidence that voters in Latin America are actually willing to trade democracy for greater public security. This is true even in countries with flimsy democratic institutions and absurdly high levels of violence such as those in northern Central America. Furthermore, there is just as little support for the notion that violence-related issues are enough –in and of themselves—to move people to throw incumbents out. Indeed, it is hard to think of a single instance in which the deterioration of public security sealed the fate of an incumbent party in Latin America, a point that Mexico’s ruling Partido Acción Nacional would do well to bear in mind. Rampant though they are it is unlikely that Venezuela’s crime problems will prove President Chávez’s undoing.

Such political inaction in the face of worsening crime points to a mildly depressing, but empirically supported conclusion: when it comes to crime, people adapt. They simply change their behavior, accept a greater encroachment in their civil liberties, and embrace an ever more cavalier attitude towards the rule of law. The real political implications of crime in Latin America are to be found less in potential support for coups or dramatic electoral results than in the 40% of the population that, according to the 2010 Americas Barometer, fully support the idea that authorities are entitled to violate the law to persecute offenders or in the 27% that still harbor a positive opinion about meting out punishment to criminals with their own hands. In the Latin American context this means that more than 100 million citizens are reluctant to accept the most basic principles underpinning not just the rule of law but indeed the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence. This is the real threat. It is a threat not to President Chávez’s rule but to the quality of democratic coexistence in Venezuela and, more generally, Latin America. And the fact that it is less visible makes it all the more ominous.

Authors

Kevin Casas-Zamora

Will Venezuela Be the Next Egypt?

Mauricio Cárdenas — Wed, 09 Feb 2011 14:42:00 -0500

With all eyes on Egypt and the Middle East, we may be forgetting an equally explosive situation in Latin America— Venezuela. Gone are the times of Hugo Chávez seeking to lead the Bolivarian movement and export 21st century socialism. After rounds of setbacks, his regime is just trying to avoid losing the December 2012 presidential elections.

Analysts have already begun planning for the various possible scenarios. What happens if Chávez loses? Would he cede power voluntarily? How much political strength would a government led by the opposition have? The answers to these crucial questions are not exactly encouraging.

Venezuela’s economy is in tatters and its nationalized enterprises are either stalled or operating at mid-speed. Yet, the expropriations continue. Every week, a new sector falls within the government’s sights. The last attack targeted players in the oil industry, who were blamed for their perfunctory exploratory success. There will undoubtedly be new sectors blamed for the failure of Chavez’s revolution. It is only a matter of time for Venezuela’s banking sector to suffer the same fate, considering that banks have been given the impossible task of increasing lending in an economy where the private sector shows little interest in borrowing.

In the political realm, Chávez decided to move forward with the extraordinary capacities granted by him through the Ley Habilitante voted at the 11th hour by the outgoing National Assembly. Chávez will be able to rule by decree until mid-2012 without much regard to the newly-elected National Assembly where the opposition holds slightly over 40 percent of the seats.

The Venezuelan people could use this situation as an opportunity to organize in the name of democracy. For example, student groups in Venezuelan universities protesting for education reform recently placed a lot of pressure on the regime, forcing the government to withdraw a university reform bill. But Chávez has announced that he will declare at least 20 new laws using his special powers. There is a danger that he might increase restrictions on the media and the Internet to further limit the already precarious freedoms of expression in Venezuela.

Despite those political maneuvers the poor economy may ultimately be the downfall of the regime. Stagnant income growth and soaring inflation will force the people of Venezuela to reduce their consumption and spending. Unemployment, inflation and a weaker currency will probably mean less support for the government in the months ahead.

The consensus among analysts is that Chávez and his regime will become more radical and undemocratic in reaction to popular protests. As Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold explain in Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela, Chávez knows how to manipulate institutions in order weaken the system of checks and balances under an aura of legality. He also knows how to use his control of the economy to alienate the private sector. Moreover, Chávez seems to have an innate ability to turn adverse situations into opportunities to consolidate his power, as was the case during the 2002 coup d’état and the 2003 strike that froze oil production and allowed him to seize full control of oil-giant PDVSA.

Chávez has also managed to keep the international community at a distance. Foreign aid from Venezuela granted to the countries of Petrocaribe, a Caribbean basin oil alliance to purchase oil on conditions of preferential payment, is 10 times larger than aid of the United States to these countries. As a result, this guarantees Chávez a veto capacity in inter-American organizations.

Delaying payments to Colombian exporters, and occasionally shutting the border altogether, has also forced Bogotá to tone down its opinions about the regime in Caracas. Oil contracts with large Spanish energy corporations have weakened the ability of the Spanish government to speak with a loud and independent voice regarding the attacks to the Venezuelan democracy.

But there are some positive signs as well. The Organization of American States (OAS) declared that the recent steps taken by the Venezuelan National Assembly violated the Inter-American Democratic Charter. This represents an important change from the past and shows that the international community is willing to act in response to Venezuela. How far can this reaction will go is yet to be seen. Which Latin American countries are going to stand up and ask the OAS for a fuller debate on what’s happening in Venezuela? Regrettably, there are not too many candidates.

Ultimately, the Venezuelan regime is weakened but not defeated. This is why analysts are weary of forming hasty conclusions. The Mesa Unidad will have to form a cohesive bloc in order to defeat Chávez. They will need to choose candidate early on among the several potential people with promise, including Henrique Capriles (governor of Miranda), Pablo Pérez (current governor of Zulia), and the former mayor of Chacao, Leopoldo López, who is still waiting on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision regarding his ban from participating in politics which was arbitrarily imposed by the regime in Caracas.

Even if Chávez were to be defeated in the 2012 presidential elections, he will probably continue to have major power and influence in the National Assembly. This means that the much needed reforms to the Venezuelan economy will take a long time to implement because they will likely be blocked by Chávez followers. A new constitution would probably need to be drafted, adding another round of elections and even more uncertainty.

It is imperative that the United States develop a comprehensive foreign policy strategy toward Venezuela. There has been some speculation by leading members of the U.S. Congress about the possibility of imposing economic sanctions. This will be a grave mistake. By turning Chávez into a hero among his people, Venezuela would become another Cuba at the expense of U.S. influence in the region. Therefore, it is much wiser for the U.S. to let the situation in Venezuela evolve on its own while the political opposition in the country consolidates. Active U.S. intervention would do nothing more than aggravate the problem. Instead, the United States should stand as an advocate for change through support for democracy and not through economic intervention that could further undermine the living standards of Venezuelans.

Authors

Mauricio Cárdenas

Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela

Mon, 24 Jan 2011 09:30:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2011
9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Since Hugo Chávez rose to power in the late 1990s, the political, economic, social and foreign policy transformations in Venezuela set forth by his “Bolivarian Revolution” have elicited heated, polarized debates over the rise and ramifications of chavismo, his leftist ideology. By examining the interplay between oil revenues and Venezuelan institutions, Dragon in the Tropics (Brookings Press, 2011) challenges conventional accounts of the Chávez regime and provides new perspectives on its influence. Drawing on over fifteen years of experience in Venezuela and the region, Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold provide a clear account of Venezuela’s hybrid regime, one that is characterized by an unconcealed militaristic bent, heavy state intervention, and a foreign policy that is aimed at balancing the influence of the United States.

On January 24, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted the launch of Dragon in the Tropics featuring Javier Corrales, co-author of the book and professor of political science at Amherst College. Jorge Castañeda, Global Distinguished Professor at New York University, provided a keynote address putting Venezuela into the larger context of Latin American politics.

Senior Fellow Mauricio Cárdenas, director of the Latin America Initiative, provided introductory remarks. Senior Fellow Kevin Casas-Zamora moderated the discussion. After the program, panelists took audience questions.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Jorge Castañeda

Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies
New York University

Javier Corrales

Associate Professor
Amherst College

The Venezuelan Elections: The Devil Comes to Collect His Due

Kevin Casas-Zamora — Fri, 24 Sep 2010 14:58:00 -0400

If, despite the best efforts of President Hugo Chávez's electoral sorcerers, the Venezuelan opposition captures a significant share of the seats in this Sunday, September 26's legislative elections, there will be no dearth of explanations for the government's debacle. In more ways than one can count, Venezuela is in a dire predicament. Amid daily blackouts and the highest inflation in Latin America, the International Monetary Fund expects the Venezuelan economy to contract yet again in 2010, alone among the region's booming economies. Few narratives, however, will be as compelling as the country's descent into crime hell.

Only a few days ago, Chávez stated unequivocally that "it is not true that Venezuela is one of the most dangerous countries in the world, nor is it true that today there is more violence here than there was 11 years ago." Facts, however, are stubborn things. Since 1999, when Chávez took office, no Latin American country has seen a more acute deterioration in personal safety than Venezuela. The country's homicide rate has gone from 20 per 100,000 people in 1998 to 49 per 100,000 in 2009 -- nine times as high as in the United States. This places Venezuela solidly among the world's most violent countries, alongside chronically bad cases such as Jamaica and Guatemala. In the capital city, Caracas, the rate is 122 per 100,000, a figure comparable only to that of Ciudad Juárez, the Mexican border town where drug traffickers are literally waging a war against the state and one other. Car theft rates, a good barometer of property crime (unlike other crimes, stolen cars are usually reported to the authorities), have also exploded from 69 per 100,000 people in 1998 to 155 in 2009.

No wonder, then, that crime -- according to nearly every opinion poll carried out in the run-up to the election -- tops voters' concerns by a large margin. In August, the Venezuelan Institute for Data Analysis (IVAD) reported that 84 percent of voters mentioned insecurity as a major concern, while less than half that percentage mentioned unemployment, the second most important issue to voters. With the vote just around the corner, the opposition is running neck and neck with Chávez's party and has a fighting chance of capturing a majority of the popular vote, though not of the heavily gerrymandered seats.

The government's anxiety is palpable. Since 2004, it has refused to release official crime figures, leaving the task of compiling them to NGOs. In August, the government-controlled judiciary cautioned El Nacional, an opposition newspaper, against publishing images related to "blood, weapons and terror messages." The warning followed the newspaper's controversial decision to publish a large cover photo of wounded corpses in Caracas's main morgue. True to form, Chávez has oscillated between blaming the remnants of capitalism for the mess and claiming that "the United States has infiltrated Venezuela … to kill, to kidnap people and then to say that Chávez can't [govern effectively]" -- that is, when he's not denying that crime is a problem altogether.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Kevin Casas-Zamora

Publication: Foreign Policy

Venezuela’s Parliamentary Elections: Change Can’t Happen

Mauricio Cárdenas and Javier Corrales — Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:52:00 -0400

On September 26, Venezuela will hold parliamentary elections. Hugo Chávez, whose ruling party and allies hold almost 90 percent of the 167 seats in the National Assembly, is competing against the Mesa de Unidad, a coalition of disparate opposition forces. Under a normal democracy, a defeat for the government would be expected. Private investment and oil production are imploding, GDP has fallen 14 percent since 2008, and inflation runs at 30 percent. And yet, despite this economic mismanagement, the upcoming election may not turn out so badly for the government.

The reason is that Venezuela is not a normal democracy. While elections take place, the government spends most of its time manipulating the law—either breaking it or changing it—with the sole intention of hurting the opposition. The line dividing state and the ruling party spending has been erased: citizens and organizations that are truly loyal to the government get most state jobs, contracts, and subsidies, while overt opponents get nothing. In Venezuela, literally, it does not pay to be in the opposition.

But the government not only breaks the law, it also changes it to its advantage. For this election, a new law was enacted in 2009 that diminished the number of seats that are determined by proportional representation in favor of majorities. What this means is that the ruling party, where it is a majority, has fewer chances of sharing seats with minority parities.

And for those jurisdictions in which the ruling party is a minority, the new law introduced a convenient solution: biased gerrymandering. Districts where the opposition is electorally strong were merged with pro-government districts so as to diminish or eliminate the opposition’s advantage. Evidence of the law’s bias is clear. Gerrymandering was applied to only 9 major federal districts or states: the Capital, Amazonas, Barinas, Carabobo, Lara, Miranda, Zulia and Táchira. Not coincidentally, most of these are areas with large populations, where opposition leaders govern, or where a large proportion of opposition voters live. The result of this new law is predictable: the opposition will win far fewer seats in congress than it would have obtained prior to the law.

The Chávez regime is, if anything, a formidable electoral machine. It has won all except 1 of the 13 elections and referenda since 1999. Defenders claim that the reason for this electoral success is the reduction in poverty. For the 2010 elections, the government will win again, but it will be harder to argue that the reason is improving economic conditions. Public services are in shambles; the country’s crime wave is out of control; unemployment is high, and food shortages continue unabated. The reason for the victory will be this method of governing that legalizes favoritism and changes the rules to the incumbent’s advantage.

While the opposition will certainly obtain fewer seats in parliament than in the popular vote, and consequentely, will fail to end the predominance of the ruling party, there is no question that even this small victory can still be a major victory. The worse mistake made by the opposition, and the reason that it too deserved some blame for the rise of semi-autocracy in Venezuela, was its decision to boycott the 2005 parliamentary elections, giving Chávez total control of the parliament. In semi-autocratic settings, it’s easy to understand this decision to abstain. If voters perceive that the rules of the game are biased, why play the game? But the problem with abstention is that it always favors the other side.

Policy-wise, the elections won’t change much in Venezuela, or in Venezuela’s relations with the United States. The government intends to radicalize further the revolution and has no intention to improve relations with the United States, regardless of what a new parliament may want. Chavez will continue to dominate the Assembly, and if the new Assembly ever causes trouble, he will rely on extra-parliamentary mechanisms to govern its way.

But politically, the election could be a major earthquake. A lot depends on how the opposition reacts to its small victory. If it responds, as in the past, by saying that once again, there was too much effort for nothing; the opposition will succumb to defeatism. If on the other hand the opposition responds by recognizing that the payoff was huge given the odds against it, the political climate of invincibility that has pervaded the government since 2004 will be seriously undermined. Eroding this aura of invincibility is not, in and of itself, a transition to democracy per se. But it could very well be the beginning of serious crack at the top, which is how many transitions to democracy do get started.

Authors

Mauricio Cárdenas
Javier Corrales

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