Brookings: Topics - U.S. Foreign Policy

Obama’s National Security Speech and Pakistan

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 22 May 2013 10:22:00 -0400

On Thursday, President Obama plans to deliver a speech on national security and counterterrorism issues. The speech comes at a particularly awkward time in Pakistan, the epicenter of the global jihad for more than a decade. Nawaz Sharif has just been elected for an unprecedented third term in a nation extremely unhappy with America's counterterrorism policies, especially the drone war fought in its skies from bases in Afghanistan.

President Obama faces the challenge of defending his policies and explaining why they are needed. He must do this without further alienating an angry Pakistan and its newly elected civilian government which is struggling to find its own way to deal with the terror Frankenstein that threatens the world and Pakistan itself. It may be mission impossible. Despite years of drone attacks and the death of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan remains the base for the top three most wanted terrorists on the U.S. Most Wanted list: al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri, Taliban chief Mullah Omar and Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT) boss Hafez Saeed.

In fact, Omar and Saeed enjoy the patronship and protection of Pakistan's army. More global terror plots have originated in Pakistan than anywhere else since 9/11. Without the drones, there would be little or no pressure on the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. Despite over $25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT. Obama recognized that fact when he sent the SEALs to kill bin Laden without telling any Pakistani official that we had found him hiding inside the highly secure Pakistani city of Abbottabad.

But Pakistan is also a victim of the terror monster it has coddled for decades. Over 45,000 Pakistanis have died in terror-related violence since 9/11, and dozens more died in the election campaign just ended. Sharif has pledged to seek a political solution to the violence. He has campaigned against the drones and faces a national consensus that wants them to end. His main opponent Imran Khan promised to shoot them down if elected (probably with American supplied F-16s).

Obama significantly expanded drone attacks in 2009 and many dangerous terrorists have been eliminated by them. The price has been to further alienate the Pakistani people. His speech this Thursday is not likely to please many in Pakistan. The already very difficult U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship is at a crucial juncture with the first ever transition from one elected Pakistani civilian government to another in the country's history after a full term in office. Reconciling our counter-terror mission with our interest in promoting democracy in Pakistan will not be easy. If it is impossible, then the fate of U.S. relations with the most dangerous country in the world is headed toward an even more deadly outcome.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Lessons from America’s First War with Iran

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 22 May 2013 13:35:00 -0400

President Barack Obama has committed the United States to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran seems determined to acquire them. As the United States and Iran approach confrontation and possible war to halt Tehran’s nuclear program, it is useful to remember that America has already fought one war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the late 1980s, President Ronald Reagan intervened in the Iran- Iraq War in support of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein, ultimately leading to an Iraqi victory. The United States engaged in an undeclared yet bloody naval and air war, while Iraq fought a brutal land war against Iran. The lessons of the first war with Iran should be carefully considered before the United States embarks hastily on a second.

In hindsight, the central lesson of the war in the 1980s is that it is easy to start a conflict with Iran and very difficult to end it. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not easy to intimidate and is likely to retaliate asymmetrically. Another key lesson is to beware the advice of your allies, both Arabs and Israelis, who are prone to give irresponsible recommendations on how to deal with Tehran.

The Toll of the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War was devastating. It was one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars since the Korean War ended in 1953. A half million lives were lost, and perhaps another million were injured. The economic cost of the war exceeded one trillion dollars.1 Yet, the battle lines at the end of the war were almost exactly where they had been at the beginning of hostilities. It was also the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale.

Although the war ended in 1988, it led to numerous aftershocks that rippled throughout the region including the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the liberation of Kuwait a year later, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The bloody U.S. war that President Obama recently ended in Iraq was the finale in this march of folly. The seeds of multigenerational tragedy were planted in the Iran-Iraq War. The world will live with its consequences for decades, if not longer.

There were no “good guys” in the Iran-Iraq War, only two brutal dictatorships. Saddam Hussein was a megalomaniac who built enormous, ugly monuments to his ambitions and dreamed of becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, controlling the world’s oil supplies, and destroying Israel. At the end of the first Gulf War in 1988, Hussein waged genocide against his own Kurdish population. Ayatollah Khomeini created a theocracy in Iran which imprisoned and executed thousands of its own citizens, forced tens of thousands into exile, and even took American diplomats hostage.

U.S. Policy During the War

America had no natural partners in the Iran-Iraq War, but its interests dictated that the United States allow neither Saddam nor Khomeini to dominate the region and the world’s energy supply. For most of the war, it was Iran that appeared on the verge of victory, so Washington had little choice but to support Iraq.

For those who aspire to a national security policy built on the principles of the United Nations Charter or a moral high ground, Iran-Iraq was an immoral swamp. For American policymakers in the 1980s, there was a simple difference. When the war began, Iran held dozens of American diplomats hostage and even tortured some. Only after 444 days in captivity did Iran let the American hostages go. In contrast to Khomeini, many Americans hoped that the Iraqi leader was somehow redeemable and could be worked with as a difficult but manageable partner. We realize now that this was a mirage, but in the 1980s it was still a hope. Thus, America tilted toward Iraq, hoping it would hold back the “medieval fanatics” to the east from gaining control of the world’s oil reserves.

But “our side” kept breaking the rules. First, Iraq was the aggressor in September 1980. Certainly Iraq had been provoked by Iranian actions along the border, but the main act of aggression was carried out by the Iraqi army in the form of a massive attack. As long as Iraq held Iranian territory, Washington did not call for the restoration of the status quo ante as would be the norm for most international conflicts; only when the tables turned did the United States call for respect for the international border. Then Iraq began using chemical weapons—first, in a piecemeal and largely ineffectual fashion, but by the war’s end, on an industrial scale and with decisive effect. The threat of Iraqi chemical warheads on long range missiles cleared Tehran of many of its inhabitants in 1988, and Saddam began using chemical warheads to systematically kill his own people. Rather than fall silent, the guns of war merely changed theaters with the 1988 cease-fire, as the Anfal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds began, an act of pure genocide by the government that the United States had supported during the war.

The conflict was not President Ronald Reagan’s finest hour. At first he tilted toward Iraq, sending the CIA to Baghdad with critical intelligence in 1982 to thwart Iran’s war plans. It worked. Then Reagan tilted toward Iran, sending sophisticated arms to Tehran in an effort to get American hostages in Lebanon freed. It didn’t work. A few hostages were released but more hostages were taken. Then Reagan tilted back toward Iraq and Washington’s undeclared war followed in 1987 and 1988. The principal architect of the policy was Reagan’s Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey, who died before the Iran scandal forced his resignation and possible indictment.

Lessons for Today

So what are the lessons of this war for America today? The first lesson is that we should expect to be blamed for all that goes wrong. Both Iraqis and Iranians came to believe the United States was manipulating each of them during the war. Ironically, and perhaps naively, the United States tried to reach out to both belligerents through the course of the war— in great secrecy both times—to try to build a strategic partnership. The disastrous arms-for-hostages policy, which came to be known as the Iran- Contra affair, convinced Iraqis rightly that the United States was trying to play both sides of the conflict. The result was that when the war ended, the Iraqi regime and most Iraqis regarded the United States as a threat, despite Washington’s support during the war. That support had taken the form of critical intelligence assistance to Baghdad, considerable diplomatic cover, and largesse from our Arab allies who loaned tens of billions of dollars to Baghdad to sustain Iraq’s war effort.

Iranians call the war the “Imposed War” because they believe the United States subjected them to the conflict and orchestrated the global “tilt” toward Iraq. They note that the United Nations did not condemn Iraq for starting the war. In fact, the UN did not even discuss the war for weeks after it started, and it ultimately considered Iraq to be the aggressor only years later, as part of a deal orchestrated by President George H.W. Bush to free the remaining U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon.

Although the war had tragic consequences for Iran, by portraying the conflict as a “David and Goliath” struggle imposed by the United States and its allies, Iranian leaders managed to consolidate the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Revolution was fairly short in duration and its cost was miniscule in comparison to the Iran-Iraq War. For the generation of Iranians who are now leading their country, including men like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the war was the defining event of their lives and a major force in shaping their worldview. Their anti-Americanism and deep suspicion of the West can be traced directly to their understanding of the Iran-Iraq War. We should thus expect the next war to make Iran more extreme and more determined to get the bomb.

Another lesson of the first war is that Iran will not be easily intimidated by the United States. By 1987, Iran was devastated by the war, many of its cities had been destroyed, its oil exports were minimal. and its economy was shattered. But it did not hesitate to fight the U.S. Navy in the Gulf and to use asymmetric means to retaliate in Lebanon and elsewhere. Even with most of its navy sunk by U.S. Naval forces, Iran kept fighting and the Iranian people continued rallying behind Ayatollah Khomeini.

Iran fought a smart war, avoiding too rapid and too dangerous an escalation. As General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has noted, Iranian behavior is rational, not suicidal.2 Iran will not take steps that endanger the revolution’s survival; the country will look to exploit America’s vulnerabilities in Afghanistan and Bahrain, as well as Israel’s in Lebanon and the Saudis’ in Yemen. In the 1980s, Iran created Hezbollah in Lebanon to attack American, French, and Israeli targets as punishment for American support of Iraq. Hezbollah then tried to assassinate the emir of Kuwait to punish that country for being Iraq’s outlet to the Persian Gulf. In essence, Iran expanded the battlefield of the Iran-Iraq War to other countries where it could exploit security vulnerabilities. We should expect the same in a future war, one for which Iran and Hezbollah have had decades to prepare. Indeed, Iran and Hezbollah are already waging a low intensity terror campaign against Israel from Bulgaria to India, and they have reportedly used cyber warfare against Saudi and Qatari oil companies.3

Another lesson is that ending a future war will be a challenge. In 1988, Iran sued for a cease-fire only after suffering catastrophic defeat on the ground against Iraqi forces and after Saddam Hussein threatened to fire Scud missiles armed with chemical warheads into Iranian cities.4 Iranians feared they would face a second “Hiroshima” if they did not accept a truce; indeed many evacuated Tehran in fear of an Iraqi chemical attack. For Khomeini, accepting the truce was like “drinking poison.”5 No two wars are identical, but history suggests that Iran will not back down easily.

The final lesson is to always scrutinize the advice of allies. Ironically, in the 1980s the closest U.S. partner in the region, Israel, pressed Washington hard and repeatedly to essentially switch sides and offer assistance to Iran. Israeli leaders, generals, and spies were obsessed by the Iraqi threat in the 1980s just as they are preoccupied by the Iranian threat today, and they longed to restore the cozy relationship they had with the Shah in the 1960s and 1970s. Through the Iraq-Iran War, Israel was the only consistent source of spare parts for the Iranian air force’s U.S.-made jets.6 Israeli leaders, notably Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, brought considerable pressure to bear on Washington for an American engagement with Tehran, and Iran-Contra was in many ways their idea. American diplomats and spies deployed abroad were told to turn a blind eye to Israeli arms deals with Tehran, even when it was official U.S. policy (in the Washington euphemism of the day) to “staunch” all avenues by which the Iranians might obtain weapons or other material needed for their war effort.7

America’s Arab allies provided equally bad advice. Egypt’s President Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussein, and Saudi King Fahd all urged support for Saddam and Iraq, while turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against his own people. Egypt sent arms, Jordan sent volunteers, and the Saudis bankrolled Saddam’s war, while telling America that he was a born-again moderate who could be worked with and trusted. It was not to be.

Looking back a quarter century after the war in 1988 is revealing and sobering. America accomplished its immediate goals in the first war: it halted Iran’s advance into Iraq, defended the tankers in the Gulf, and contained the war from spreading into the Arabian Peninsula. Khomeini did not conquer Basra and Baghdad and march on Jerusalem as he dreamed he would. But today, Iran is the dominant foreign power in Baghdad, thanks in large part to another war America fought in the Gulf. President George W. Bush toppled Saddam and ended his brutal dictatorship, but in doing so, Bush opened the door to a Shia majority government which is much friendlier to Tehran than to Riyadh or Amman, or Washington. These are sobering reminders of the unintended consequences of wars.

The first American war with Iran helped make Iran a more radical and extreme country. A second war may well do the same. Thus another war with Iran to stop its nuclear program may ultimately prove to be the catalyst that pushes Iran to acquire a dangerous nuclear weapons arsenal. Rather than stopping proliferation, it could incite it further.

History of course does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Lessons of old wars should be carefully considered before entering new ones. Many Americans have forgotten the lessons of our undeclared war in the 1980s. We have fought so many other wars since: in Iraq (twice), in Afghanistan, and in Libya. While it may be easy for Washington to forget, no Iranian has.

This article was originally published by The Fletcher Forum.

Endnotes
1 Janet Lang et al, Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988 (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), ix.
2 Fareed Zakaria, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: We are of the opinion that the Iranian regime is a ‘rational actor,’” CNN Pressroom, February 21, 2012.
3 Nicole Perlroth, “In Cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back,” New York Times, October 23, 2012.
4 Lang, 169.
5 Lang, 196.
6 Lang, 89.
7 Lang, 90.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Fletcher Forum

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

Barack Obama and China's Xi Jinping to Meet In California

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 21 May 2013 11:37:00 -0400

Yesterday, the White House announced that President Obama will meet with China’s President Xi Jinping on June 7-8 in California. The announcement said that the two will hold “in-depth discussions on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues, . . . review progress and challenges in U.S.-China relations over the past four years and discuss ways to enhance cooperation, while constructively managing our differences, in the years ahead.”

Yet the purpose of this meeting is not to bargain or to solve specific problems, but to set a tone and create a sense of shared fate between the two leaders by allowing Obama and Xi to firmly establish a good personal relationship, a precondition for the successful conduct of their bilateral relations. The two got a start on that task last February, when Xi visited Washington as China’s vice-president. Two days in California allows both more time and an informal environment for each to talk about his domestic challenges and visions for the future, about his country’s role in the international system and how US-China relations fits with all of this.

Such an interchange is particularly important because each president sits atop a complex and sprawling governmental system that is not easy to monitor or control. This is one of the reasons for recent frictions between the two countries. Their California encounter meeting provides Xi and Obama the opportunity to identify and enlarge the areas of overlap in the interests of their two countries, and then, when they return to their capitals, to set priorities in their systems accordingly. Having seen the value of creating this opportunity, they should seize it.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

America and Iran: Wrestling with Ghosts

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 20 May 2013 20:56:00 -0400

One of the very few feel-good stories in the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations came to an unexpectedly abrupt end last week, when Iranian authorities cut short a series of wrestling exhibition matches in the United States. The first round, held in New York last Wednesday, drew large, boisterous crowds and buoyant media coverage, helping to animate a three-nation campaign (with Russia) to sustain wrestling as an Olympic sport and raise funds for youth wrestling programs. No sooner had the applause in New York died down, however, than Tehran opted to ditch a planned Los Angeles stop on the tour, and the Iranian wrestlers quickly returned to Tehran on Saturday.

So far, the rationale for the decision seems vague, and there are discrepancies between the statement of the exhibition’s American sponsor, USA Wrestling, and the official Iranian press agency's rendition. News reports referenced Iranian concerns about security provisions, and rumors circulated of anticipated protests by members of the large Iranian diaspora living in Southern California. Whatever the explanation, the hasty truncation of the American-Iranian wrestling tour is unfortunate but not entirely unexpected. For all sunny sentiments associated with cultural diplomacy, managing the political and logistical complexities of people-to-people exchanges between such longstanding adversaries can be fraught with potential minefields.

I should know; as a graduate student in the late 1990s, I participated in several of the first academic exchange programs between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I experienced first-hand the excitement as well as the issues that go along with such efforts. Thanks to funding from both governments and the coordination and contacts of the American Institute for Iranian Studies, I was able to study Persian at the Dehkhoda Institute in Tehran, travel widely throughout the country, and conduct research for my doctoral dissertation on Iran's Foundation for the Oppressed and other parastatal organizations. Fumbling my way around a country that I had studied extensively but never visited was an amazing experience. Iranians treated me and my fellow American interlopers with the hospitality for which the country rightly used to be legendary and the curiosity that inevitably accompanies three decades of official estrangement.

However, I also came to appreciate how precarious these enterprises can be. The problem with people-to-people diplomacy is, well, the people. Amateur ambassadors can be mighty difficult to manage, particularly with the limited oversight of what are ultimately low-priority programs. Inserting a gaggle of grad students, or wrestlers or any of the other professional groups that have sought to overcome official estrangement through bilateral exchanges, creates endless opportunities for normal human interactions to explode into diplomatic incidents. I'll never forget the combination of exhaustion and anxiety on the face of the one of the many Iranian handlers when a few Americans unexpectedly found ourselves in the midst of a gun battle between police and drug runners in the southeastern city of Kerman. We had arrived in Iran just as the regime unleashed its repression of the July 1999 student protests, and now this real-time brush with the country's low-intensity drug war was just the kind of mess that could cost our minder his job and his future. "I am having a nervous breakdown," he confessed as he alternated between tea and chain smoking.

I suspect that there are a number of program officers within the State Department who can sympathize. During the Bush Administration's second term, then-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns spurred a good-faith effort to expand educational and cultural exchanges with Iran. Artists, doctors, athletes and scientists from Iran crisscrossed America, sharing expertise and experience in subjects as diverse as earthquake science and engineering and AIDS treatment and education. Publicly, the programs often appeared to be blazingly successful in their stated goal of enhancing mutual understanding between Americans and Iranians. Behind the scenes, however, the story was often more complicated, thanks to Tehran’s paranoid conviction that these innocuous opportunities were the leading edge of a Washington-sponsored ‘soft revolution.’ A number of Iranians who participated in these exchanges found their passports seized or their professional advancement threatened; some feared returning home, and several were ultimately imprisoned after permitting their stories to be featured prominently in a major American newspaper.

I believe deeply in the mission and purpose of people-to-people exchanges. What little I understand about contemporary Iranian politics is grounded in the months I spent there over the course of 1998 and 1999, as well as the skills, contacts, and subsequent opportunities to visit Iran that I acquired as a direct result of that early immersion. Surely, the benefits for my fellow American participants— as well as the hundreds of Iranians who have been able to interact with their professional counterparts in the United States— have been at least as meaningful.

Still, people-to-people diplomacy is no substitute for official diplomacy, and it frequently offers as much complication as illumination. Back in 1999, my fretful Iranian minder won an early reprieve when our exchange program was unexpectedly curtailed upon the order of the State Department. A call from the Swiss ambassador, whose embassy serves as the protecting power of Americans in the absence of official relations, initiated a flurry of bureaucratic maneuvers to hasten our departure, and a few days later we were gone. I subsequently heard a range of rumors explaining the episode, including one focused around the efforts of the Clinton administration to establish back-channel cooperation with then-President Mohammad Khatami on counterterrorism efforts. Whatever the truth, nothing ever came of that initiative, and fourteen years later, the wrestlers' unfortunately early exit underscores the steep obstacles that remain in bridging the American-Iranian divide.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

John Kerry’s Indian Image: Moving American Policymakers Beyond "Pro" and "Anti" India

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 17 May 2013 15:17:00 -0400

Later this summer, US Secretary of State John Kerry will visit India for the US-India Strategic Dialogue. Before and during his visit, many observers in India will likely try to assess whether Kerry is "pro-" or "anti-" India. This is not surprising. In the narrative of US-India relations, there has always been a hall of fame and a hall of shame. Praise was heaped upon "heroes" — such as President John F. Kennedy and US ambassadors to India Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Blackwill — for being pro-India. President Richard Nixon and secretaries of state John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger found themselves on the anti-India "villains" list. More recently, Kerry and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel have been labelled anti-India or pro-Pakistan. However, this focus on whether policymakers are pro- or anti-India is limiting at best and harmful at worst. It can lead to an exaggerated view of the extent of the impact of one individual's personal bias and obscure more complex motivations and drivers of policymaking.

Conclusions about policymakers' biases have often been based on one or more statements made or one or two high-profile decisions taken. It is crucial, however, to focus on individuals' track records. Take Nixon. He has often been tagged as anti-India. In the early-to-mid 1950s, when he was vice-president, Nixon indeed had little patience for non-alignment and was a proponent of military aid to Pakistan. By 1957, however, he was internally arguing for greater economic aid to India. He made his view public too, asserting that "what happens in India... could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin."

In 1967, long before people were talking about the next century being an Asian century, Nixon also laid out the importance of Asia and how that continent's future would largely be shaped by four "giants" — China, India, Japan and the US. Writing at a time when there was much pessimism in the US about India and the Indira Gandhi government, Nixon noted with sympathy that India's "present leaders at least are trying... in exceedingly difficult circumstances" to move forward and doing so in a democratic context. Once in power, his administration did make the infamous one-time exception to provide military assistance to Pakistan, but he vetoed recommendations for a larger, more sustained package.

The pro/ anti-India narrative also does little to explain change. Why, in 1972-73, did Nixon and Kissinger work to rebuild the relationship with an India they disliked? Or, why did policy towards India change over the course of the Clinton administration with a similar set of policymakers? The narrative also assumes individuals' views stem from an inherent dislike or love for India, rather than circumstances or worldviews. It does not often recognise that individuals can change — and that Indian words and actions can shape views of India. Biographers of Indira Gandhi proclaim, often approvingly, that she treated Nixon badly in 1967, without any consideration of whether that treatment might have affected his views of India and her.

Furthermore, the narrative cannot explain how policymakers can make some statements and decisions that are "pro" India and others that are not. As Rajeev Sharma has noted in the case of Kerry, and Dhruva Jaishankar on Hagel, one can identify instances when these supposedly "not-India-friendly" individuals have supported legislation helpful to India — the India-US nuclear deal, for example.

In narratives of India-US relations, these simplistic conclusions are not restricted to depictions of US policymakers. Nehru is often portrayed as anti-US, even though he was perhaps the first to use the term "natural partners" to describe the bilateral relationship. Others insist on identifying Indira Gandhi as pro-Soviet, ignoring instances such as her resisting for two years her advisers' entreaties to sign an India-Soviet treaty.

This is not to say that personalities don't matter. They do, but their role needs to be put in context. They can facilitate cooperation or exacerbate conflict. They can help determine the policy option chosen. Personal relationships, too, matter. However, personalities are not the only factor — or often the primary one — determining policy and consideration of their role should go beyond discussions of the pro- or anti-Indianness of particular policymakers.

The pro/ anti India narrative often neglects to consider whether and how much the "pro" or "anti" policymaker influences policy broadly, and policy towards in India in particular. Cabinet members' or ambassadors' roles and influence are not the same as those of presidents. Moreover, it sometimes overlooks actors involved in shaping policy and the policy debate outside the White House and state department.

Instead of focusing on whether key policymakers are anti- or pro-India, it would be more worthwhile to assess which individuals are making policy; their role and influence in the policymaking process, especially relative to other policymakers, and their proximity to the president; and the nature of interaction between policymakers. Furthermore, it is crucial to analyse the worldviews of key actors; their perception of US interests and preferred strategy for achieving them; whether they see a role for India in that strategy and, if they do, is it as potential spoiler or supporter. Finally, it is essential to think about what India can do to build enough constituencies for the relationship in the US and ensure its own importance so that bilateral relations do not depend on — and are not thought to revolve around — one or two individuals.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: The Indian Express

Image Source: © B Mathur / Reuters

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's U.S. Agenda

Kemal Kirişci — Thu, 16 May 2013 10:46:00 -0400

Editor's note: On May 17, 2013 Brookings hosted Prime Minister Erdogan for an event on U.S.-Turkish relations.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is visiting Washington this week and will meet with President Obama today. This is his first visit to the United States since December 2009. But the world and the Middle East have changed dramatically since then. Thus, the agenda for Erdogan’s talks with Obama will be a very crowded one. Four topics in particular are likely to stand out.

1. The Situation in Syria

Erdogan arrives in Washington at a time when there is growing pressure on the Obama administration to change its course on Syria. Secretary of State John Kerry has already taken some steps to increase nonlethal support for the opposition in Syria while putting growing pressure on the moderate opposition to tighten their ranks and distance themselves from radical Islamist groups. These measures are unlikely to satisfy Erdogan. He has long been a vocal critic of the international community, the United Nations Security Council and the United States for idly “watching the tragedy” unfolding in Syria.

He is likely to remind Obama quite loudly that the butchery of civilians by the Assad regime has reached levels that makes it unethical not to respond to and that, as the car bombs that exploded in Turkish border town of Reyhanli last weekend demonstrate, Turkish national security is being directly affected. He will also offer facts and figures to show how the humanitarian situation is fast deteriorating and becoming untenable with an ever expanding flow of refugees and displaced people. He will not miss the opportunity to share with Obama the evidence collected from refugees arriving in Turkish hospitals that the Syrian regime is using chemical weapons. Erdogan may go as far as to push Obama to support the idea of creating a no-fly zone along the Turkish border.

Read the full article »

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Comeback Kid

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 14 May 2013 09:12:00 -0400

Nawaz Sharif is the comeback kid of Pakistani politics. With his party’s electoral victory, he is poised to become prime minister for an unprecedented third time. The Sharif odyssey has been remarkable—but now we will see if he can convert his victory into a new beginning for his deeply troubled country and our own tortured relations with it.

The 63-year-old Nawaz Sharif was born into money as the scion of a very wealthy family in Lahore. He entered politics to protect the family’s industry from nationalization. In the 1980s he became a protégé of Pakistan’s third military dictator, Zia ul Huq, and became the dominant politician in the country’s richest and most populous province, the Punjab. In 1990 Sharif was elected prime minister after his great rival, Benazir Bhutto, was booted out by the military.

I first got to know Sharif when I was President George Bush’s Director for South Asia and Persian Gulf Affairs in the White House in the early 1990s. Sharif was America’s partner in trying to wind down the decade-old war in Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed communist government that had outlived the defeat of the Soviet 40th Red Army in 1988, and was still clinging to power in Kabul. Unfortunately, when the communist government finally did collapse in 1992, it only ushered in a vicious civil war among the victorious mujahedin. Pakistan was left to deal with the consequences on its own as America abandoned Afghanistan to its fate. And Sharif lost power in 1993 to Benazir Bhutto.

He was elected back to a second term as prime minister in 1997. A year later he tested Pakistan’s nuclear weapons after India tested its first. As President Clinton’s Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia Affairs, I tried to persuade Sharif not to follow India’s path, but to no avail. In 1999 Sharif’s hand-picked Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, exploded a détente Sharif had arranged with India by starting a war in Kashmir. Normally very shy, Sharif invited himself to the White House on July 4, 1999, to find a way out, and wisely agreed to Clinton’s demand that Pakistan unilaterally abandon the war Musharraf had orchestrated. Sharif’s decision averted a wider—and very possibly nuclear—war.

Sharif fired Musharraf on October 12, 1999, while the general was visiting Sri Lanka. The general refused to step down and instead orchestrated a coup and arrested Sharif. A military court was summoned to try Sharif for treason. Only in Pakistan could a legitimately-elected prime minister be labeled a traitor for firing the country’s top general—a general who Sharif had selected for the job in the first place. Many expected Musharraf to have Sharif executed, just as Zia ul Huq had executed Benazir Bhutto’s father, Zulfikar Bhutto.

Clinton tasked me with saving Sharif’s life. The president believed Sharif did not deserve death, and that it would be a disaster for Pakistan to execute another elected leader after a military coup. I spent a great deal of time arguing for clemency with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. The ambassador was sympathetic to the argument—but I needed more help. The Saudi ambassador to Washington at the time, Prince Bandar, provided the heavy lifting.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also did not want a repeat of the Zia-Zulfi nightmare. Then Crown Prince Abdallah used the Kingdom’s considerable influence in Pakistan to save Sharif. Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s closest ally, and has given more financial aid to Pakistan than to any other country in the world. Abdallah asked Musharraf to let Sharif go into exile in Saudi Arabia. As Musharraf later wrote in his memoirs, it was an offer he could not refuse. After 14 months in prison, Sharif went into exile in the Kingdom in December 2000. Few expected him to ever return home.

Now the tables have turned. Sharif has won a massive electoral victory and his long time tormentor, Musharraf, is under arrest in Pakistan after returning from his own exile to run in the elections. Musharraf was ousted by popular pressure in 2008, became a billionaire in exile in London, and then foolishly decided he was Pakistan’s savior this winter and decided to go home to be swept back into power by the people. He miscalculated badly. No one in Pakistan wanted the self-appointed savior, and he is now under house arrest. He faces a number of charges and could be tried for the coup he orchestrated against Sharif. The irony is rich.

But Sharif faces a real challenge over what to do with Musharraf. The general has few supporters even in the army, but the officer corps will be very uncomfortable with the prospect of one of its own serving prison time, or worse. Since many of the senior commanders in the army today, including Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, are former Musharraf protégés who rose with him to power, the question of what to do with Musharraf now is a dangerous challenge. The courts will decide his fate but the next prime minister’s voice will matter.

Deciding how to handle the Musharraf affair is only one of Sharif’s huge challenges. The country is under siege by some of the extremists it nurtured during the wars in Afghanistan. Some 45,000 Pakistanis have died in extremist terrorism since 2001, and violence wracked the election. Sharif has urged a political process to try to end the terror, and has been widely accused of being too soft on the Pakistani Taliban. He has long coddled Pakistan’s most dangerous terrorist group, Lashkar e Tayyiba, which carried out the Mumbai massacre in 2008 and which has its headquarters in Sharif’s home city of Lahore. LeT retains very close links to the army and the intelligence service, the ISI.

Nonetheless, Sharif has also promised to turn a page in Pakistan’s relations with India and has invited Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to his inauguration. As an industrialist billionaire, Sharif knows the Pakistani economy desperately needs more trade and investment from its far more vibrant Indian neighbor. Pakistan’s economy is in shambles, and half the people in the country are under 15 with little hope for a decent education or a good job. Sharif is not obsessed with rivalry with India like his generals; his vision of Pakistan is more about building highways and mass transit than an arms race Pakistan cannot win. In the campaign, he promised that he will build a fast bullet train line linking the port city of Karachi to the northern city of Peshawar. When last in the prime minister’s office, he built a modern highway to link Lahore to Islamabad.

America’s relations with Pakistan are at an all-time low, yet Washington provides huge quantities of military and economic aid to Pakistan: over $25 billion since 2001. We are on opposite sides of the war in Afghanistan where Pakistan and the ISI are the Afghan Taliban’s key ally, even as we depend on Pakistan for the vital supply line that allows us to withdraw our heavy equipment from Afghanistan as we transition out of the country by 2014. Inside Pakistan, our drones fly daily missions looking for al Qaeda— missions Sharif promised to try to halt during the campaign. He did not endorse his rival Imran Khan’s call to shoot down American drones (probably with American-supplied F-16s) but he will face much popular demand to end the drone war.

Two presidents, Bush and Clinton, worked with Sharif with mixed results during his two previous tours as prime minister. Now that the comeback kid of Pakistani politics is on the verge of his third time in the top office, President Barack Obama will need to partner with Sharif. It’s an opportunity Obama needs to make a success.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

Tue, 14 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 14, 2013
9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the past decade, a debate has raged about the future of American power and foreign policy engagement. In his new book, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2013), Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Vali Nasr questions America’s choice to lessen its foreign policy engagement around the world. Nasr argues that after taking office in 2009, the Obama administration let fears of terrorism and political backlash confine its policies to that of the previous administration, instead of seizing the opportunity to fundamentally reshape American foreign policy over the past four years. Meanwhile, China and Russia – rivals to American influence globally – were quietly expanding their influence in places where the U.S. has long held sway. Nasr argues that the Obama administration’s foreign policy decision making could have potentially dangerous outcomes, and, what’s more, sells short America’s power and role in the world.

On May 14, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Vali Nasr for a discussion on the state of U.S. power globally and whether American foreign policy under the Obama administration is in retreat. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan joined the discussion, which was moderated by Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy.

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American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

65 Years After 'Catastrophe,' Palestinians Have Little to Cheer About

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On May 15, the Palestinians will commemorate 65 years of their “Nakba” – “the Catastrophe.” This is how they describe 1948, which saw the destruction of Palestinian society, 750,000 Palestinians forced from their homes, and over 450 Palestinian towns wiped off the map. Today, there are over 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations’ UNRWA. But while 1948 was a terrible trauma for the collective Palestinian memory, the reality is that it was only the beginning of a long journey of displacement, dispossession, and exile. The real Nakba is ongoing, and the Palestinian people live it on a daily basis both inside and outside the Palestinian territories. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry throws himself into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, we have to ask: Will his efforts bring this human tragedy a step closer to the end? Or only make it worse?

On a recent trip to Lebanon, I made sure to visit the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. While under control of the Israeli army that occupied Beirut in 1982, approximately 800 to 3,500 Palestinian refugees were massacred at the hands of Christian militias. In the camps today, the bitter reality of the Palestinian refugees’ life in exile is on full display: an enormous mass grave in the camps’ center holds the victims of 1982 massacre. It is a daily reminder to the refugees of their continuing human tragedy.

The Palestinians in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee camp have hardly been spared the bitterness of displacement and dispossession. Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the estimated 150,000 Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk have reportedly been subjected to terror, horror, and murder of all kinds. Many have fled the camp to become “double refugees” in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Um Mazen, one of these twice-displaced told the Financial Times, “It’s the Nakba of Yarmouk.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, too, have their share of Nakba. An Israeli policy of collective punishment has left 1.7 million Palestinians trapped in a besieged Gaza, the world’s largest prison. In the West Bank, the modern-day Nakba can be seen in continued settler violence, settlement expansion, and a dividing wall that encroaches on Palestinian land and, in many cases, deprives people of their livelihoods. This is in addition, of course, to the many Palestinians of Jerusalem who lost the right to return home after living only a few years abroad.

Against this grim backdrop, Kerry has made a public commitment to bring peace to the region through his intensive personal diplomacy. But while it may be too early to pass judgment on his initiative, the traditional American approach to this conflict has been predictable – and unworkable. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, suggested ending the agony of Palestinians refugees’ exile by sending them to…Chile and Argentina.

As Edward Abington told me, Arafat urged President Bill Clinton to ask Benjamin Netanyahu to stop or at least delay the construction of the Har Homa colony – a colony that threatened the collapse of the entire peace process. Abington – former U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem and the key U.S. contact with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1996 – said that Arafat repeatedly entreated Clinton, but to no avail. Finally, Clinton is said to have passed the request on to newly appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She seemed to done nothing. It was then, Abington said, that Arafat knew he could not count on the Americans to make a real difference.

The Palestinian Nakba is one of the root causes of today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict; if Secretary Kerry is to succeed, he will need to address it. The economic package he plans to introduce would affect the Palestinians in the West Bank. But it would do nothing for the Yarmouk’s double refugees or Shatila – surrounded by death, past and present.

Kerry’s major step to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been the adjustment of the 11-year-old Arab Peace Plan to include mutual land swaps. The plan will now accommodate the illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank – including Har Homa. It is absurd that Washington’s position has shifted from freezing settlement activities during the Obama administration’s first term to accommodating those settlements in the second term.

By pressuring the Arabs to accept land swaps even before negotiations begin, Kerry has set up his mediation efforts for failure. He has left no incentive for the Netanyahu government to negotiate; on the contrary, now that the Arabs have in principle accepted land swaps, Netanyahu will likely take advantage of this concession to further intensify settlement activities.

By presenting the land swap to Netanyahu without a firm commitment to stop settlement building, Kerry has sabotaged himself. As he will discover, Netanyahu’s right-wing government is only interested in exploiting every possible opportunity to sabotage peace efforts, building more colonies – and as a result, continuously exacerbating the crisis of America’s image and credibility in the Middle East. To be certain, Netanyahu government has just announced, in response to Kerry’s land swap, the building of 300 units at the heart of the West Bank’s city, Ramallah. This outcome has shown clearly there is nothing innovative about Kerry’s peace plan and that his efforts align perfectly with traditional Washington mediation efforts of appeasing Israeli governments, damaging American image and credibility in the region, and of course making the anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba more painful.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohammed Salem / Reuters

Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Abstract:

This article examines the initial Western response to the Arab Spring. Traditional interests – oil, counterterrorism, containing Iran, and the security of Israel – offer only a limited explanation. Domestic politics and a humanitarian agenda explain some variation, but they too are insufficient. A number of leaders appeared to believe change would happen no matter what, so it was often better to embrace it than fight it. Others desired to showcase a new model, where the United States would not necessarily lead. Western powers also recognized the limits of their power and desired to maintain alliances with conservative countries like Saudi Arabia.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: The Journal of Strategic Studies

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

The Road to War : Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 280pp.

Not since Pearl Harbor in 1941 has an American president gone to Congress to request a declaration of war. Nevertheless, since then, one president after another, from Truman to Obama, has ordered American troops into wars all over the world. Why no declarations of war? Why has it become so comparatively easy for a president to commit the nation to war? What is Congress’s responsibility? Where is the press? In The Road to War, esteemed journalist and author Marvin Kalb explores these crucial and timely questions.

Rather than formally declaring war, presidents have justified their war-making powers by citing predecessors’ “commitments,” private and public. Many have been honored, but some have been betrayed. From Vietnam to Israel, presidential commitments have proven to be tricky and dangerous. For example, presidents pledged the United States to the defense of South Vietnam; yet none saw the need for a formal declaration of war, and few in Congress or the media chose to question the war’s provenance or legitimacy until it was too late. In the end, the U.S. lost 58,000 Americans—and the war.

Given the extraordinarily close U.S.-Israeli relationship, based on secret presidential assurances, it is remarkable but true that a number of Israeli leaders feel that at times they have been betrayed by American presidents. Kalb, while explaining the origin of this sense of betrayal, raises a profoundly important question: Isn’t it time for the United States and Israel to negotiate a mutual defense treaty? Wouldn’t such a treaty help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and provide American reassurance for Israel in the nuclear standoff with Iran?

The word of a president can morph into a national commitment, the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. Therefore, whenever a president “commits” the United States to a policy or course of action, with or increasingly without congressional approval or national debate, it is time to raise the yellow flag--watch out!

Praise for The Road to War:

“Every road to war is ultimately also a tragedy. Kalb’s concluding chapter, however, offers a timely and important ray of hope: a defense treaty between the U.S. and Israel in the context of a fair peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians might avoid not just one but even two wars. President Obama should read this chapter.”
—Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. national security adviser

“Marvin Kalb has written a fine book that should be required reading for everyone who wants to be president because it underlines what every president seems not to know in the beginning—that it is much easier to get into war than to get out of it. Terrific insight, carefully researched and clearly written.”
—Bob Schieffer, CBS News

“Kalb raises important questions about the unchecked power of presidents to take the nation to war. His provocative proposal for a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty will certainly add to the debate about the future of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.”
—Graham Allison, Harvard University

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marvin Kalb

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What Is the Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation?

Andrés Rozental — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The decision by the Peña Nieto administration to channel the U.S.-Mexico security agenda through the Interior Ministry is not designed to negatively affect the close ties established over the past years in intelligence sharing and cooperation. Rather, it is the result of the Mexican government's decision to bring all the official agencies involved with that agenda domestically under a single umbrella.

The previous Public Safety Ministry and Federal Police are now coordinated from the Interior Ministry, so it is logical to have counterpart U.S. agencies use that same channel. There is no reason to believe that this change will negatively affect the bilateral relationship on security or drug trafficking issues since President Obama clearly concurred with this new approach during his visit to Mexico and during conversations with Mexico's president and his cabinet.

Aside from the security agenda, which is still an important element in the relationship, the two presidents indicated that other priorities will characterize the agenda going forward, especially economic ties, business facilitation, border infrastructure and educational exchanges. This is a positive development in my view as it moves the U.S.-Mexico agenda back to the issues that have historically brought our two countries together and de-emphasizes the monothematic nature of the relationship over the past six years.

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Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

United States Policy towards Northeast Asia

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 07 May 2013 14:37:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the April 2013 edition of SERI Quarterly.

With the Obama administration making the transition to its second term, it is appropriate to review its policy goals towards Northeast Asia and whether policy implementation can be sustained. In this essay, I review what senior officials have said on these subjects, and consider the challenge of coping with the rise—or revival—of China, while focusing more sharply on the Korean Peninsula.

Declaratory policy

Three texts reveal how the United States government views its interests and objectives towards Asia. Chronologically, they are: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s October 2011 article in Foreign Policy; President Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament on November 17, 2011; and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon’s remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[1] Five topics merit attention: terminology; the purposes of policy; its scope; the approach to China; and sustainability.

In terminology, two words have gained the greatest currency: “pivot” and “rebalancing.” “Pivot” is a vivid word that plays upon Obama’s love of basketball, it also has a rather absolutist connotation. “Rebalancing,” on the other hand, is more relativistic, both in terms of where America places its priorities geographically and which policy arenas it emphasizes. The word that is least appropriate for Northeast Asia is “return,” which had some currency in the early part of the administration. “Return” may have been accurate for Southeast Asia but not for Northeast Asia.

In terms of the purposes of rebalancing, senior officials spoke in different but substantively convergent ways:

Clinton referred to “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism”; to “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific”; to responding to the wishes of the region itself; and, in effect, the long, benign impact of America’s presence in and posture toward the region (“We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades . . . and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.”)
Obama spoke simply of a “large and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with friends and allies.”
Donilon also implied a “shaping” objective, even though he did not use the word. He said, “We aspire to see a region where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments and universal human rights are upheld.”

[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011 (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm); “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 17, 2011, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament); “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 15, 2012, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery).

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Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Publication: SERI Quarterly

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Mr. Obama, Don’t Draw That Line

Daniel L. Byman — Sat, 04 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

“The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable,” President Obama warned Bashar al-Assad’s government last December. “If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.”

This threat followed the president’s earlier warning that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” This red line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence community assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrians had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.

The administration’s ultimatum now seems like cheap talk, and it illustrates the risks of carelessly drawing red lines and issuing highly public threats that won’t be enforced.

So far, at least, the Obama administration has put off both consequences and accountability and simply pushed for further investigation. Meanwhile, Mr. Assad has not blinked, and the president’s political opponents, like Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, argue that Iran and North Korea will draw the wrong lessons if the president lets Mr. Assad call his bluff.

Red lines can be attractive tools of foreign policy, deterring foes from ethnic cleansing, genocide or, in the case of Syria, using chemical weapons. Part of the reason to go public, as one administration official put it last year regarding Syria, is to have a “deterrent effect.” By threatening to act in advance of a problem, you stop the problem and don’t have to act. Issuing a red line can also reassure allies or placate domestic critics.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: New York Times

Obama in Costa Rica: Seeking Consensus Among Central America’s Leaders

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 03 May 2013 09:20:00 -0400

Editor’s note: In the second of a three-part series on Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, Diana Negroponte outlines the challenges President Obama will face in seeking consensus among Central America’s leaders. Negroponte reviewed what is at stake for the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship on May 1. She will preview Obama’s visit with Central American business leaders on May 3.

On May 3 and 4, President Obama has two meetings with Central American political and business leaders in San Jose, Costa Rica. The first meeting is with the seven Central American presidents plus President Danilo Medina of the Dominican Republic (DR). Developing consensus among the eight leaders on both the agenda and the desired goals is difficult and a watered down consensus document is likely to emerge, which will disappoint all participants.

The basis for skepticism regarding this meeting is the disparate objectives of the eight leaders. Although the overt purpose is for the Central American and DR leaders to engage with the U.S. president under the auspices of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integración Inter-Americana or SICA), that multilateral organization relies upon the political will of the member states to implement their far reaching plans. Despite its foundation in 1991, SICA faces a continual challenge to harmonize its regional plans. In the absence of a common Central American plan of action to which all nations have committed resources and political will, the individual presidents will seek to pursue their own national goals:

El Salvador will seek faster disbursement of U.S. government funds appropriated under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI);
Guatemala will ask for additional numbers for permanent non-agricultural EB-3 workers;
Honduras seeks additional funds for addressing extreme poverty;
Belize seeks additional funds with which to combat emerging youth gangs, as well as assistance in monitoring its intricate coastline and dense forests;
Nicaragua will focus on investment in its major infrastructure projects;
The Dominican Republic will focus on immigration issues for its citizens within the 2013 Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act (S744)
Panama seeks further training in counteracting money laundering; and
Host Costa Rica will focus on strategic policies for the region, as well as investment in green energy.

All these countries seek to confirm their commercial and political ties with Washington in the face of growing instability in Venezuela. The task is to harmonize these distinct objectives into a single agenda; a most challenging enterprise.

President Obama does not come to this summit empty handed. His government has a successful track record since CARSI was founded in 2008. To date $496.5 million has been appropriated for security and violence prevention projects in Central America. (The Dominican Republic participates in a separate security program for the Caribbean nations.) In FY 2012, the State Department requested $100 million for CARSI, but succeeded in raising that sum to $135 million thanks to the recognition that Central Americas’ problems were serious and impacted the United States. This year, State requested $107.5 million but, after a full review of projects, expects that amount to rise to between $150 and $160 million. In addition, USAID has received $146 million between FY2008 to FY2013, and in FY2012 alone, USAID implemented projects worth $50 million.

The U.S. Congress has agreed with State that Central America is geographically caught in the transshipment corridor between cocaine producers in South America and the North American market. Until such time as the nations of Central American – in particular the three northern nations of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – strengthen their rule of law and law enforcement institutions, they will remain vulnerable to drug traffickers and international criminal organizations. Belize, a nation of 350,000 people is also affected by smugglers who use the coastal bays and forest tracks to transport drugs, people and wildlife to the U.S and European markets.

Beyond overall dollar figures, President Obama must demonstrate the impact of CARSI, as well as USAID projects. Since 2008, USAID has committed $132 million to support justice sector reform, municipal crime prevention and services for at-risk youth. In FY 2012, USAID implemented $46.5 million in projects to support social prevention and citizen security. These included working with local mayors and stakeholders in Central American municipalities to develop their own crime prevention plans. Also, outreach centers have emerged in high-risk communities to provide vocational training for at-risk youth. Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Guillermo Céspedes is working in El Salvador to adapt Los Angeles’ Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) to the context of this and, in future, other countries of the region. The intent is to show a decrease in the number of youth joining the gangs and an increase in the number who stay in school, or join technical training programs. Measuring success can be subjective, but Vanderbilt University’s three-year impact evaluation study has demonstrated -- at its mid-point -- lower crime rates and improved public perception of security in communities receiving USAID programs.

In addition to sharing the positive news of U.S investments in law enforcement and socio-economic projects, Obama will have to listen to complaints. This is a tiresome exercise, but it fulfills the cultural need of national leaders in Central America to articulate their demands before the U.S. president. We must hope that the chair will limit the time allotted to each Central American leader, but Obama must recognize that each leader is writing the headline in his or her national media. Should the meeting be off the record, we can expect less public pontification, but equal quantity of gripe about unmet needs.

So how does President Obama emerge from the meeting with a constructive way forward? He has listened, he will digest and he will seek ways to accommodate through current legislative debate on immigration and maybe on gun control. He can seek to increase CARSI funds from the requested $107.5 million, but he should ask the recipients to share effectively in implementing the projects and measuring impact. He might also ask them to contribute a larger amount of tax revenue to education, skills training and housing programs. The United States can assist the Central American nations in responding to public security threats, but the prime responsibility for strengthening democratic institutions must lie with the nations themselves. The hegemonic age is over and the people of Central America and the DR have the capacity to strengthen the rule of law through regional and national efforts. SICA is the vehicle through which they constructed regional plans. With the roadmap in place, it is now up to each nation to implement the programs.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Bosnia Lends Clue To Syria Strategy

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 03 May 2013 15:04:00 -0400

The recent hullabaloo over Syria's alleged use of chemical weapons is appropriate at one level but surreal at another. When a dictator such as Syrian President Bashar Assad has already killed tens of thousands of his own people with the most brutal and indiscriminate of tactics, the fact that he might have harmed a few dozen more with sarin gas, while horrible, does not radically change the complexion of the conflict.

That President Obama has said Syria's use of chemical weapons would constitute crossing a "red line," means he will have to act. If U.S. intelligence eliminates any remaining doubts about the use of chemical weapons, the United States will probably have to retaliate -- perhaps with cruise missile strikes against whatever Syrian army unit did the deed.

But what about the broader problem? Is the United States, already weary of wars, burdened by debt, and chastised by the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, going to stand aside indefinitely in this war?

Obama's critics want him to "do something." They refer to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, or the more successful Libya intervention of 2011, and demand that the U.S., along with other NATO states and the Arab League, find a way to end the carnage. Arm the rebels, establish a no-fly zone, set up safe areas for internally displaced persons and refugees.

Indeed, I tend to support these kinds of ideas myself, and the president is reportedly considering providing some arms to some of the insurgents more seriously than he did before.

Before entering war

Even so, Obama is right to be wary of putting U.S. credibility on the line when there is no clear exit strategy. The Syrian insurgency is a motley bunch that includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists. The overthrow of Assad would no more end Syria's war than the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 brought peaceful bliss to Iraq.

We need a debate about the right exit strategy in Syria before we enter into the war. The right model is neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan nor Libya, but the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Two decades ago, we watched similar killings for a couple years in the nation that had broken away from Yugoslavia, until international outrage and battlefield dynamics converged to make a solution possible. We bombed Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian militias, then forced him into a deal that created a "soft partition" of Bosnia.

It wasn't perfect, but 18 years later, Serbs, Muslims and Croats have not gone back to war.

Syria could be harder because the insurgents are so fractured. But by offering the various factions help -- not only now on the battlefield, but also later as they try to rebuild Syria once Assad is gone -- we can establish influence and leverage. This will not be easy and will hardly guarantee a great outcome. But it is far more promising than the trajectory we are on.

With a Bosnia-type approach, Assad's Alawite minority would keep a section of the country, most likely along the coast, where local police would be the main security forces. Assad himself would have to step down and ideally would go into exile. Kurds would keep similar sections of the country in the north. The main central cities would be shared.

Establish basic rights

And, of course, minority rights would be enshrined in the deal. In other words, having different parts of the country run primarily by one group or another would not be an invitation to further ethnic cleansing or killing.

Yes, this plan does imply a number of U.S. peacekeepers on the ground, perhaps comparable in number to the 20,000 who began the job in Bosnia in 1995. The United States should, however, commit to such a deployment only if other countries, including Arab states and Turkey, provide the majority of peacekeepers. In fact, we should seek pledges of international participation before moving to any direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.

With international participation, combined with a fair-minded idea for a peace accord later, Washington and other key capitals might also finally convince Moscow that there is no hope for putting Humpty Dumpty back together again. We need Russia's help to push Assad out and get this kind of settlement.

It is time to get realistic about our options in Syria and to get beyond the impulse just to "do something." We need a comprehensive approach that includes a viable exit strategy. The Bosnia model provides the best first draft for such a plan.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: USA Today

Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 02 May 2013 09:00:00 -0400

President Obama recognizes that security is a pervasive problem in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. But in his April 30 press conference prior to setting out for Mexico, Obama highlighted the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship:

“A lot of the focus is going to be on economics. We’ve spent so much time on security issues between the United States and Mexico that sometimes I think we forget this is a massive trading partner responsible for huge amounts of commerce and huge numbers of jobs on both sides of the border. We want to see how we can deepen that, how we can improve that and maintain that economic dialogue over a long period of time.”

Beyond the statistics of expanding trade, what more should the presidents discuss?

Total two-way trade reached $494 billion in 2012, which according to Mexican Ambassador Medina-Mora means more than $1.3 billion per day; almost $1 million dollars per minute. In absolute terms, Mexico is America’s third largest trading partner, and in 2012 U.S. exports to Mexico were $216.3 billion. According to Medina-Mora this is more than the combination of U.S. exports to all the countries with which the United States has a trade agreement in place – except for Canada. Surprisingly, it is more than U.S. exports to Japan and China combined, that is $180.6 billion.

We agree that exports to Mexico both maintain and create jobs in the United States. The U.S. government estimates that each additional billion dollars in new exports supports more than 6,000 new jobs. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, almost 6 million U.S. jobs rely on trade with Mexico, the consequence of which is the potential creation of 107,000 new U.S. jobs.

Furthermore, individual states benefit from exports to Mexico such as Arizona, California and Texas which hold Mexico as their main export destination. Mexico is also the second destination for exports from 20 other states and is ranked among the top five export destinations for 34 states.

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies.

Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity.

The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

Related to the growth in two-way trade is the need to facilitate movement of trucks across the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite an increased use of pre-clearance procedures, Mexican trucks must line up several kilometers from the border while they wait their turn to reach the fast lane that leads up to and through the U.S. border. Public-private partnerships are needed to construct the access roads some 10 kilometers from the border so that pre-cleared vehicles can move rapidly through the border zone. Currently, GPS vehicle trackers are used to link the sending and receiving manufacturers with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). Before the truck even reaches the border post, CBP will know the content and value of the merchandise, as well as specifications on the cab and its driver. Only if tampering is detected will CBP stop the truck for secondary inspection, otherwise the truck sails through the border and onto its final destination. The Mexican private sector has demonstrated interest in constructing those access roads, but it needs presidential mandates from both governments to support the projects, as well as Mexican government purchase of necessary land.

Increasingly, the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico depend upon each other. There is much for the presidents to discuss and many challenges lie ahead, including productivity and education in both our countries. As President Obama begins his second term, it is constructive for him to put energy and political will into deepening that economic relationship.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Obama's Foreign Policy in his Second Term

Martin S. Indyk — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with ABC Lateline's Tony Jones, Martin Indyk discusses the challenges that President Obama faces in dealing with the chaos in Syria and the rise of Iran. Read an excerpt below.

Tony Jones: Here is our guest, and as I said earlier, Martin Indyk gave a wide-ranging speech at the Lowy Institute today on U.S. President Obama's emerging global strategy and the many challenges he faces.

Second-term presidents look to their legacy, and with the U.S. worn out by failures in the Middle East, the two longest wars in its history, Obama's main game has been the pivot to Asia, in which Australia has a key role to play.

But while pivoting away from the Middle East, the President must still face the rise of Iran and its nuclear weapons program and the prospect that Syria may be degenerating into a failed state. And again, in Syria, the question of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons in this case, could be the game changer.

So what lies ahead for the U.S. President?

Martin Indyk is the vice president and director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He's a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and he joins us now.

Thanks for being here.

Martin Indyk: Nice to see you again, Tony. Thank you.

Jones: Now, you began your speech today by saying that we're in a plastic moment in international affairs. What do you mean by that?

Indyk: Well, there is I think an emerging global order in which rising powers, particularly China and India in this part of the world, are pushing for a role on the international stage and it's a moment in which there's a certain malleability to the shaping of that order in which I think the United States has a critical role to play, just as it did after the Second World War, in supporting a liberal international order, the kind of order that the United States and Australia share in common with so much of the Western world. And that's the challenge for President Obama, because in his next four years, no longer needing to worry about getting re-elected - he cannot run again - he has a chance to bend history in the direction of a more peaceful, more prosperous, more liberal international order.

Jones: Yeah, OK. So you describe Obama's pivot to Asia as the closest thing we may ever see to an Obama Doctrine. It has very big implications for Australia. How radical a shift is it in reality?

Indyk: I think it's more of a recognition that for 10 years, the previous 10 years, the previous decade, the United States has been preoccupied with the war on terrorism and bogged down in these two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and basically has taken its eye off the ball. A lot of other things are going on in other parts of the world, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. And the United States simply wasn't paying attention; it was basically absent from the arena. Now it is paying attention and the President's pivot, as he calls it, to the Asia Pacific region is an indication of a strategic shift because of the recognition of the challenges and opportunities that lie here in this part of the world for the United States.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: ABC Lateline

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia