Brookings: Topics - United Nations

Mukhisa Kituyi to Head the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Thu, 16 May 2013 11:26:00 -0400

The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has appointed Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi to be the next secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). An UNCTAD press release on May 16, 2013 stated that Dr. Kituyi will serve a four-year term beginning September 1, 2013. Dr. Kituyi has held several senior positions including Kenya’s minister of trade from 2003-2008. He is currently a nonresident fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution and was a resident scholar in 2011. Dr. Kituyi is well versed in the global trading system and, in the past, was considered a potential candidate to head organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and UNCTAD, but instead opted to join politics. A dynamic politician and intellectual, Dr. Kituyi is an excellent choice to head UNCTAD.

For AGI, the appointment of Dr. Kituyi is significant not only because he is one of our fellows but also because AGI has been emphasizing the need to increase informed African voices in global governance. We believe that African interests are not effectively represented in major global institutions, and this deficiency has contributed to the broader marginalization of the continent in global affairs. Dr. Kituyi should be an effective voice in representing Africa and other developing countries. And, as I know him, I believe this is one informed voice that the international community is unlikely to ignore.

But it will not be a smooth ride for the new secretary-general; a host of challenges await him in Geneva. First, more than in most global organizations, UNCTAD requires effective management and intellectual leadership. An internal report published last year—the Joint Inspection Unit Report—showed that UNCTAD has been suffering from a lack of effective governance. It is important that Dr. Kituyi focus on raising the bar in terms of professionalism at UNCTAD. This task will require looking into the recruitment and promotion of employees strictly based on merit. Dr. Kituyi will need to carefully evaluate personnel issues and provide the necessary motivation to ensure that the organization delivers on its mandate. Most importantly, he will have to steer the organization towards more transparency, rewarding performance instead of simple loyalty to senior management. The new secretary-general will also need to offer the intellectual leadership necessary to guide the institution through a time of major global economic change and a shifting of economic power to the South. He must therefore lead intellectually in offering alternative ideas to those emerging from traditional development institutions.

An even a more daunting challenge that the new secretary-general will face is to ensure that UNCTAD remains relevant and credible. Over the past few years, questions have been raised as to what should be the institution’s focus. Some have gone to the extent of insisting that UNCTAD should not be involved in macroeconomic and financial areas. But as its name suggests, UNCTAD was created to deal with issues relating to trade and development with a particular emphasis in developing countries. There is no doubt, therefore, that macroeconomics and finance squarely fit in the institution’s mandate. Indeed, UNCTAD used to be the forum where these issues would be negotiated in order to ensure some balance in the global economy. However, since the creation of the WTO, UNCTAD has experienced a progressive erosion of its voice. It will be the responsibility of Dr. Kituyi to reverse this trend so that UNCTAD can play its rightful role in the global economic policy scene. The new secretary-general must also position UNCTAD to better address the imbalance and unfairness in the multilateral trading rules that have shaped globalization. In UNCTAD, it is often the case that developing countries feel bullied by their developed country partners. It will be imperative for Dr. Kituyi to identify the best way to navigate issues that have come to divide developed and developing regions.

The secretary-general must also position UNCTAD so as to assist developing countries in seizing the opportunities presented by the global economy. With all the changes taking place in the world, UNCTAD has to focus on how developing countries can reap the benefits and minimize the negative effects arising from trade and globalization. This focus requires that UNCTAD take on the hard topics that are of particular interest to developing countries, including investment policy, trade in services and commodities—which it has always done—but it should also come out clearly on what path developing countries should follow. Likewise, we are likely to see an acceleration of regional trade arrangements. Most challenging are agreements involving Northern and Southern partners who cannot be considered equal partners when they negotiate. The jurisprudence on the rules governing such agreements is not commonly agreed upon. Hence, there is a need for UNCTAD to demonstrate, based on evidence, how to ensure that balanced development is achievable, especially in respect to North-South agreements.

With an incoming director general at the WTO and Dr. Kituyi at UNCTAD, the global environment offers an opportunity for the two institutions that drive trade and development to establish the missing dialogue. For this to happen, UNCTAD needs to be credible when articulating its voice in this changing global economy. This is the greatest challenge that Dr. Kituyi faces.

Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Image Source: © Ronen Zvulun / Reuters

Internal Displacement and Development Agendas: A Roundtable Discussion with Sadako Ogata

Tue, 14 May 2013 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 14, 2013
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

St. Louis Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Around the world today, there are more than 15.5 million refugees and over 28.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by conflict, in addition to some 32.4 million displaced in 2012 from their homes due to natural disasters. These displacement crises are not simply humanitarian concerns, but fundamental development challenges. Forced migration flows are rooted in development failures, and can undermine the pursuit of development goals at local, national and regional levels.

Linking humanitarian responses to displacement with longer-term development support and planning is not a new concern. Beginning in 1999, for example, the “Brookings Process” – under the leadership of Sadako Ogata and James Wolfensohn – sought to bridge humanitarian relief and development assistance in post-conflict situations. But the challenge remains unresolved, and has acquired new urgency as displacement situations are becoming more protracted, and situations such as the Syrian crisis show no signs of resolution.

The Brookings Global Economy and Development Program and the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a roundtable on these issues on May 14, 2013 with Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, former Director of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, and Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Megan Bradley, Fellow with the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, facilitated the roundtable, which followed Chatham House rules.

The roundtable addressed several key topics including:

The relevance of the concept of human security to addressing displacement and development challenges
Displacement as a development challenge in fragile states
Protracted displacement
Contrasts in the approaches and processes adopted by humanitarian and development actors

The event report provides a brief overview of the discussion.

Event Materials

Brookings IDP Roundtable with Sadako Ogata May 14 2013

Participants

Panelists

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia

Syria, Chemical Weapons, And The Intervention Question

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with NPR’s On Point program, Shadi Hamid calls for American intervention in Syria on the basis of humanitarian grounds, as well as rising levels of anti-American sentiment and radicalization on the ground. Hamid says a lot of damage has already been done with regard to radicalization in Syria and that the country’s future is bleak. Despite this reality, Hamid concludes it remains important for the United States to intervene.

The Assad regime will fall regardless of American intervention, Hamid says. The questions, then, are how long the United States waits to intervene and how many people die in the process. On this basis, Hamid supports a military intervention which doesn’t involve putting boots on the ground, but rather uses surgical air strikes and safe zones to diminish the regime’s ability to kill its own people. Hamid says to alternately depend on channels such as the United Nations or wait for a verification process regarding the regime’s use of chemical weapons will take time and delay action, thereby exacerbating existing problems, whether inside Syria or involving anti-American sentiment in the region.

Hamid says the idea that the international community can nurture a perfect Syrian opposition before committing to military action is misguided. He says the fighting forces in Syria are not primarily secularist, and more accurately reflect varying shades of Islamism. Hamid points out extremists tend to gain prominence during situations of war because they generally have better access to weapons and support, and that in Syria these extremists have already come to the fore.

Considering radicalization and rising levels of anti-American sentiment inside Syria, Hamid notes there is an issue of American credibility at stake not just in Syria but in the broader region. Hamid says American intervention in Syria will show the United States sides with the Syrian people and will make a difference in the longer-term of American-Middle Eastern relations. Hamid suggests the world, including Syrians, still look to the United States for moral and political leadership.

Hamid says the American public is historically receptive to foreign policy action in light of humanitarian crises. If the Obama administration wanted to explain the Syrian case clearly, Hamid suggests there would likely be public willingness for American engagement. However, Hamid also says the Obama administration has demonstrated it does not want to get involved in Syria and has a lot of wiggle room to avoid following up on prior-delineated “red lines” on the use of chemical weapons.

Listen to the full On Point program »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: NPR

Is Obama’s Red Line a Green Light?

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime was finally blown open last week. In a letter to U.S. lawmakers, the White House stated that U.S. intelligence agencies believed "with varying degrees of confidence" that Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on a "small scale." The letter followed others sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by Britain and France alleging the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and similar assessments by Israeli military intelligence in the last few weeks.

Still, President Barack Obama's administration sounded a cautious note. Asked whether Assad crossed the "red line" Obama drew last year that could spur American intervention, a U.S. official replied, "we're not there yet." The White House continues to contend that the evidence is not "airtight," and that it needs further corroboration. In meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on Friday, Obama stated that "there are a range of questions around how, when, where these weapons may have been used."

While these are important questions, especially a decade after the intelligence failure in Iraq, the evidence already gathered by Western countries from inside Syria provides significant evidence of chemical-weapons use by the Assad regime. Here is what I have learned about the regime's use -- and logic for the use -- of chemical weapons over the past six months.

The Assad regime's scientists have been experimenting for more than a year with mixtures of toxic and poisonous gasses that could be used to "cleanse areas" of what it calls "terrorists" -- the rebel forces it is fighting. Its security and military apparatus has sought to devise methods to use artillery shells or aircraft to deliver chemical weapons in "localized ways" -- in areas of one or one and a half square kilometers.

The regime's logic was that the relentless bombardment of rebel-controlled areas, including in the neighborhoods around the main cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, had forced most civilians to leave. Civilian casualties, in this warped thinking, could therefore be kept to a minimum if chemical weapons were used in these areas. This was important if the regime was to avoid the attention of the international community, especially the United States, which clearly did not want to intervene in Syria.

I first heard this frightening information in the late summer and fall of last year. It came from a small number of privileged Syrians who often travelled to and from Damascus. I had gotten to know and trust them, especially as their information was often corroborated later by other sources and events. All spoke often to current and former senior security officers and regime personalities from the Assad regime's feared security forces, including the presidential guard, Syrian military intelligence, and Syrian air force intelligence -- people they had known in some cases since childhood.

Listening to them, it was clear to me that the regime had the intention to use these horrendous weapons -- and that it would do so as it came under further pressure in key strategic areas, especially the major cities in the west of the country.

According to my interlocutors, Assad and those closest to him had been emboldened by the international community's weak response to his bloody military campaign. The United Nations claimed in February that the death toll from the fighting in Syria was well over 70,000 people, while, during that same month, a lieutenant from Syrian military intelligence informed one of my Syrian interlocutors that the regime estimated that around 85,000 civilians had been killed, with many more thousands "missing."

Successive statements from Obama and senior U.S. officials, these interlocutors said, had been interpreted by the regime as a "green light" to continue its campaign. The exclusive focus on political and diplomatic solutions, as well as the international community's rising fear of Islamic jihadists, further reinforced the regime's belief that "the U.S. and its Western allies did not mind the current military operations," according to a retired general in Damascus. "Like any war, there are political and diplomatic efforts, while it is the winner that dictates terms in the end."

In the eyes of the regime, therefore, Obama's "red line" prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- first drawn last August, in the midst of an election campaign -- had to be tested.

Read the full article »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Authors

Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Recurring Disasters: Are We Learning Lessons?

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

For the past three years, we’ve compiled an annual review of natural disasters, highlighting not only overall trends for the year but drawing out lessons to prepare for future disasters. Given the fact that the frequency, intensity and unpredictability of natural disasters is expected to increase as a result of climate change, it is more important than ever that we learn from the past.

In looking back at 2012, we were struck by the ‘recurring disasters’ which occurred in different parts of the world. Hurricane Irene hit the northeastern United States in 2011 and then a little over a year later, Hurricane Sandy hit the same area. Typhoon Washi/Sendong in the Philippines was followed a year later by the deadly Typhoon Bopha/Pablo. And Pakistan experienced its third straight year of widespread flooding. When recurring disasters strike the same communities – communities which haven’t yet recovered from the previous disaster – the results can be devastating. The resilience of affected individuals and communities is undermined. Particularly when the communities are poor and marginalized (who tend to be more affected by disasters in any case), it can be hard to muster the energy and the resources to start over again. The devastation caused by recurring disasters in 2012 highlights the need for increased commitment and investment in disaster risk reduction. But we also know that it’s always easier to mobilize support for responding to a disaster than for taking measures to reduce the risk of future ones.

Statistically, 2012 was an ‘average’ year for disasters without the mega-disasters we saw in 2010 (Haiti) or 2011 (Japan). The deadliest disaster of 2012 was Typhoon Bopha/Pablo in the Philippines; the most expensive disaster was Hurricane Sandy in the US and Caribbean; and the disaster which affected the most people was the drought/food crisis in the Sahel region.

In this year’s review, we also looked at the role of regional organizations in disaster risk management – which is part of a larger research project we’re undertaking. Regional organizations seem to be playing an increasingly important role in the complex world of disaster risk management but have received very little attention. Regional organizations, we found, come in many sizes and shapes and they are involved in different kinds of work with disasters. For example, we found that all regions have developed framework agreements on disaster risk reduction or response. In most regions technical cooperation mechanisms – such as early warning systems – have been established. But few regional bodies provide the means for channeling financial assistance after a disaster.

We also looked at one particular type of disaster – wildfires. As evident in Australia, Russia and the United States, wildfires can destroy large swathes of forest. And yet, wildfires are not very significant in the overall scheme of disasters (with only 156 wildfire disasters reported over the past decade resulting in only 0.07 percent of global disaster fatalities.) But the combination of urban sprawl and a hotter and drier climate because of climate change in many parts of the world make it likely that we’ll see more wildfires in the future.

Finally, we looked at the gender dimensions of natural disasters. Natural disasters and climate change often exacerbate existing inequalities and discriminations, including those that are gender-based and can lead to new forms of discrimination. But women are not just victims; they play significant roles in disaster risk management. They are often at the frontline when disasters occur and they bring valuable resources to risk reduction and recovery efforts. When they are able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, their families, and their communities, women have much to offer.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © Lucas Jackson / Reuters

What Future for the Central African Republic?

Julius Agbor and Michael Rettig — Sat, 06 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

On March 24, 2013, a loose coalition of rebel groups known as the “séléka rebels”, ostensibly dissatisfied with the Bangui government’s implementation of the January 2013 ceasefire agreement brokered by the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union and the United Nations, seized power and named Michel Djotodia as interim president of the Central African Republic (C.A.R). While the March 24^th coup d’état in the C.A.R. was not a remarkable event on its own – power has violently changed hands at least four times in the short history of the country, including when the now-deposed President Bozizé seized power in 2003 – the coup nonetheless has some important implications for the country, the Central African region and for the international community.

For the C.A.R., a major implication of the coup is that, going forward, it is less likely that the country will experience political stability and advance towards democracy. Two broad arguments militate in favor of this prediction. First, the legacy of French colonial rule left the C.A.R. with no visionary leadership and an ill-developed institutional and physical infrastructure. The C.A.R. is a very small country– its population is comparable to the state of Alabama. Yet its huge surface area – comparable to that of the state of Texas – is richly endowed in natural resources, notably timber and diamonds, which explains the continued interest of its former colonial master and other foreign nations in the country. Since the colonial period when the C.A.R was called Oubangui-Chari, France’s colonialism (and subsequent neocolonialism) was aimed at extracting the C.A.R.’s resources at the expense of developing the country’s human resources, institutional and physical infrastructure.

For instance, right up to 1971 – almost a decade after independence from France – the C.A.R.’s gross secondary enrollment rate was barely 4 percent; less than 2 percent of the country’s total road network had been paved; and only about one physician per 50,000 people was available. The March coup, like previous ones, was anchored in economic grievances linked to an ineffective governance system inherited from colonial rule and which has been further compounded by international meddling. Furthermore, France’s strategy of super-imposing its military presence in its former colonies (in order to protect its economic interests) has greatly undermined the ability of French-speaking African states to constitute a veritable national army that is capable of defending their territories against internal as well as external aggressors. It is therefore easy to understand France’s frequent military intervention in its former colonies (as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 or recently in Mali), but it is also easy to see why France’s nonintervention in cases like the recent C.A.R. coup is perceived as a betrayal in some quarters. Consequently, France’s colonial rule in the C.A.R., like in most other sub-Saharan African countries, has greatly undermined the development of local leadership capacity both in civilian and military affairs. It is not surprising that the C.A.R. has been home to several mercenaries – some of whom eventually ruled the country – and also to bandits and gangsters of Joseph Kony’s caliber.

The second argument predicting continued instability in the C.A.R. is that the coup leader doesn’t have sufficient incentives to lay down a solid foundation in order for the C.A.R.to transition to democracy. Already, he has dissolved the parliament and constitution and is ruling by decree, and without a strong civil society, organized opposition parties, free press and independent judiciary, there is no counterbalancing power to keep his regime in check. Experience elsewhere in countries where military coups have preceded the development of democratic institutions, notably in Nigeria and Turkey, clearly demonstrates that democracy rarely emerges without established agencies of restraint. Further, the C.A.R.’s military also has little tradition of respecting the primacy of civilian rule. The C.A.R’s first and only democratic transition in the 1990s faced an attempted coup by the ousted dictator shortly after elections, and a successful coup by the country’s military chief another two years later. Furthermore, political transitions that are unaccompanied by rapid and sustained economic growth have seldom been sustainable and often give in to successive internal counter-coups. This prediction is likely self-fulfilling in the C.A.R.’s case, where economic growth is projected to decline this year from 3.8 to 2.5 percent as a result of political instability and the decline in foreign aid and investment by key European donor countries facing austerity at home. In sum, even if Djotodia’s good motives were unquestionable, with no agencies of restraint in place and with the C.A.R.’s economic prospects in decline, it seems unlikely that the groundwork for a stable transition to democracy exists.

It is probably in anticipation of continuing socio-political upheavals in the C.A.R. that the international community, notably, the United Nations, the African Union and the ECCAS have vehemently rejected the C.A.R.’s new leadership as well as its three-year transition plan to democracy. In its last summit meeting on the C.A.R. held on April 3, 2013, the ECCAS called for Djotodia’s instant removal and the creation of a five-person executive council that would oversee an 18-month transition to democratic elections. The international community’s rejection of the Séléka coup is commendable as it sets precedence that political power can no longer be accessed through the use of force. Happily, the Séléka leadership has announced its willingness to collaborate with the transition proposals set out by ECCAS. Notwithstanding, if the claims that child soldiers were used in the Séléka rebellion are true, then the Séléka rebel leaders must face trial for violating international conventions. Given the important ramifications that the crisis in the C.A.R. has for the entire Central African region – in terms of the potential of spill-over of rebel coups, influx of refugees to neighboring countries and the hunt for Joseph Kony – a more sophisticated and internationally backed solution for the C.A.R. is warranted. For instance, it might be a sensible option to place the country under a U.N. appointed administrator, as was seen in Cambodia, for a transitional period of three to five years, during which the critical ingredients needed for democracy to thrive (namely, an educated citizenry, independent courts, free press, a disciplined police force and army, vibrant civil society, independent electoral commission, etc.) are put in place. At the end of this transition period, elections could then be held and power transferred from the temporary administrator to a democratically elected C.A.R. government. The weakness of the ECCAS transition plan for the C.A.R. is that it assumes that democracy and economic prosperity would automatically emerge after holding a successful election, but experience doesn’t suggest that is plausible.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Michael Rettig

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

BRICS Leadership Will Be Tested by Syria

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is probably the most serious crisis facing the world today. And yet, the international community is struggling to find a way forward. With more than four million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and three million internally displaced – a conservative UN estimate based on surveys of 6 out of 14 governorates in Syria – the humanitarian response to the plight of civilians so far has been entirely inadequate. A recent UNICEF report highlighted the two million children maimed, orphaned, and suffering from malnutrition as a result of the conflict – an entire generation “scarred for life”. Meanwhile, over one million refugees are seeking asylum in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This number will likely hit the three million mark by the end of 2013 – a ticking bomb for countries based on delicate social, ethnic, and sectarian balance.

Humanitarian access in opposition-held areas, where assistance is most urgently needed, is extremely limited. The humanitarian policy dilemma has shown what a mess we are currently in. Under General Assembly resolution 46/182, the United Nations cannot operate inside rebel-held territory without the explicit consent of the Syrian government. As that government’s authority is waning, however, many wonder whether we should be bound by the sovereignty of a tyrannical regime that continues to aggravate the crisis. Others, meanwhile, are advocating for direct humanitarian cross-border action in coordination with the internationally recognized Syrian National Coalition. With the election of Ghassan Hitto as the interim prime minister of a transitional government in “liberated” areas, this call will no doubt grow louder.

It is time for the international community to overcome this obstacle and allow for a more effective humanitarian response in Syria – whenever and wherever it may be required. One way forward would be for key countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India to support a more aggressive effort to ramp up the UN’s cross-border aid operations inside the country. Such an opportunity presents itself at the forthcoming 2013 BRICS summit in Durban next week. These countries should use their influence to secure a Security Council endorsement of this approach, principally by applying pressure on Russia and China.

Furthermore, they should use their direct channels with Assad to insist that the regime allow for cross-border operations and give full humanitarian access to all areas of the country.

Why the BRICS? Given their rising prominence on the world stage, it’s become clear that these nations play a key role in steering the international response to this crisis. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Assad, travelled to South Africa last week to deliver a message to President Zuma, urging BRICS nations to intervene to stop the violence in Syria and encourage the opening of a dialogue. Three weeks ago, she was in India, doing the same. It goes without saying that such cynical diplomacy on the part of the regime should be met by more purposeful calls to spare the lives of civilians. This is a strategic opportunity for the BRICS to use their influence and play a more decisive, helpful role.

There is no time to lose. To date, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to protect the Syrian population. Even with regard to the funding of UN humanitarian operations, only 20% of the $ 1.5 billion pledged by international donors in Kuwait in January has been honored. International inaction in Syria will leave a lasting legacy of insecurity and suffering, while the spillover effects of this humanitarian crisis will only contribute to the growing instability in Syria’s neighborhood and across the greater region. The BRICS nations, along with the international community, have a responsibility to act now.

Given the state of emergency on the ground, however, humanitarian cross-border access alone may not be sufficient. In order to protect civilians, guarantee the safe passage of relief organizations as well as refugees attempting to leave the country, there is a growing imperative for the establishment of humanitarian corridors and civilian safe areas along the sensitive borders of Syria. Make no mistake, such safe areas will have to be secured and protected by all means possible. Here, there will be much to learn from the UN’s experience in Bosnia in the 1990s – involving an assessment of what went right as well as wrong.

The BRICS and their international partners should be ready to endorse such measures. The situation demands it. Yet at a minimum, they must now demand that Assad allows the UN to cross Syria’s borders to reach civilians in need. The UN has the required institutional knowledge to deliver aid to fragmented areas making it the organization that is best placed to do so in Syria. Enabling the UN to undertake a country-wide response would help prevent the politicization of assistance as well as ensure a coordinated response in crucial sectors such as water, sanitation, infrastructure reconstruction, food assistance and education. The end goal would be to ensure that the UN is able to meet the basic needs of all civilians and upholding fundamental humanitarian principles in this bloody conflict.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Asharq Al-Awsat

North Korea Faces Heightened Human Rights Scrutiny

Roberta Cohen — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On March 21, 2013 the United Nations Human Rights Council, a body of 47 states, adopted by consensus a resolution to establish a commission of inquiry (COI) into North Korea’s “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights.”[1] The commission is to be composed of three experts who will intensively investigate for a period of one year the human rights violations perpetrated by North Korea’s government with a view to ensuring "full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity" [emphasis added].

The establishment of the commission reflects long overdue recognition that a human rights ‘emergency’ exists in North Korea. Commissions of inquiry at the United Nations have mainly been directed at situations like Syria, Darfur or Libya where conflicts, atrocities and destruction are clearly visible and in the headlines. Adding North Korea to the list suggests a new look at what a human rights crisis might be. In contrast to other situations, North Korea has always managed to hide its crimes. Most prison camps are in remote mountain areas, access to the country is barred to human rights groups, and rigid internal controls make it impossible for anyone who does manage to visit to talk with North Koreans about human rights. Indeed, the lack of access and the UN’s inability to form an “independent diagnosis” of the situation has long contributed to the reluctance of its senior officials to speak out strongly about North Korea.[2] Even the US State Department’s human rights report for 2011, published in 2012, contained the caveat that no one can “assess fully human rights conditions or confirm reported abuses” in North Korea.[3]

The change in attitude also reflects an international willingness to move beyond mere censure in addressing North Korea’s human rights violations. For more than eight years, the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council have adopted annual resolutions expressing “very serious concern” at North Korea’s systematic, widespread and grave violations. Now, the international community is viewing North Korea’s violations as possible crimes against humanity for which North Korean leaders could be held accountable. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared for the first time in 2013 that North Korea’s “rampant” violations “may amount to crimes against humanity.”[4] And in his report to the Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, Marzuki Darusman, identified nine specific areas where North Korea might be committing crimes against humanity. These include: food policies leading to starvation; prison camps; arbitrary detention; the use of torture and inhuman treatment; enforced disappearances and abductions; policies of discrimination; and violations of freedom of expression and movement, and of the right to life through executions and extensive use of the death penalty.[5]

According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, crimes against humanity are among the most severe human rights violations, constituting one of the four core international crimes (in addition to war crimes, genocide and the crime of aggression). Murder, enslavement, unlawful imprisonment, torture, sexual violence and disappearance are considered crimes against humanity when they are perpetrated as part of “a widespread or systematic attack” against the civilian population.[6]

Since 2006, non-governmental organizations have argued that North Korea’s human rights violations constitute crimes against humanity.[7] Now for the first time, senior UN officials and many governments are beginning to view North Korea’s violations as possible international crimes as well.

Testimony of Former Prisoners

One reason for the change in attitude is the testimony of prison camp survivors. Among the 25,000 North Koreans who have made their way to South Korea over the past decade, hundreds have been former prisoners and have come forward to give their accounts. Published and well disseminated in the West, they have created a stir. One of the first was The Aquariums of Pyongyang by Kang Chol Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot which described former prisoner Kang’s 10 year experience in a camp.[8] Published in France in 2000, the account is credited with having influenced the French government to press the UN Commission on Human Rights (predecessor to the Human Rights Council) to adopt its first resolution on human rights in North Korea in 2003.[9] The following year, after President Bush read the book and met with Kang, the US gave its strong support to the establishment of a UN special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea.[10]

Drawing on the testimony of prison camp survivors, David Hawk wrote the first in depth study of the prison labor camp system in 2003, Hidden Gulag, published by the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.[11] The updated version in 2012 contained the accounts of 60 former prisoners and prison guards. Most instructive was that the accumulated accounts began to corroborate one another, giving them a ‘factual’ basis even though there was no direct access to the country or its prisons. And the testimonies were reinforced by satellite imagery from Google Earth and by prisoners’ drawings,[12] making them far more difficult to dismiss. As a result,[13] North Korea’s denial of the camps and dismissal of victims’ accounts as the “unfounded” falsehoods of defectors seeking to betray their country increasingly failed to persuade.

The book, Escape from Camp 14 by Washington Post reporter Blaine Harden attracted extensive publicity in 2012 and is said to have encouraged officials inside the UN to press for the commission of inquiry. Navi Pillay was reportedly moved when she met with Shin Dong Hyuk, the subject of the book, and another survivor.[14] In simple but powerful prose, the book describes the experiences of Shin who was born in the camps and who has been going from country to country with the book, now translated into a number of languages, to tell what was done to him by the prison camp system.[15]

By speaking out, North Korea’s former prisoners regularly put themselves at risk and also may jeopardize their family members, colleagues and friends left behind. (Both Shin and Kang have enlisted the help of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to assist them in finding out information about their father and sister, respectively.) To reduce the number of North Koreans telling their stories, Pyongyang has been intensely cracking down at its border with China to prevent North Koreans’ departure for the South. The total number of North Koreans who have reached South Korea in 2012 was 1,509, about half the number from the year before.[16] But North Koreans continue to come forward, using their only weapon against the regime—information.

Patience Wears Thin

Another reason for the commission of inquiry is that the international community reached a limit in its patience for tolerating North Korea’s failure to cooperate with the UN in the human rights area. For ten years the High Commissioner for Human Rights has tried to establish a dialogue with the North Korean government and develop technical cooperation agreements—an arrangement the Office has with more than 50 governments. But year after year, Pyongyang failed to cooperate. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon even instructed his Special Envoy to Pyongyang in 2010 to urge North Korea to cooperate with the High Commissioner.[17] But by 2013, High Commissioner Pillay announced, “I don’t think the world should stand by and see this kind of situation, which is not improving at all.”[18] “For years now,” she said, “the Government of DPRK has persistently refused to cooperate with successive Special Rapporteurs…or with my Office.”[19] She waited, she said until after Kim Jong Un took over from his father in 2011, but when no reforms were forthcoming, she decided to take a “firmer step.”[20] UN General Assembly resolutions similarly expressed concern with North Korea’s failure to cooperate with the High Commissioner, the Special Rapporteur and the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of North Korea.[21] The UN, it can be said, reached a tipping point, perhaps abetted by North Korea’s rocket and nuclear tests and continued provocative threats.

Although North Korea has claimed that the commission of inquiry is part of a “political plot” of “hostile forces,[22] it is noteworthy that those in the forefront of the UN system in support of the commission are not Westerners. High Commissioner Pillay, the senior most UN official to publicly call for the commission, is a South African of Indian origin. Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur, who issued the 2012 report which served as the foundation for the call, was the former Attorney General of Indonesia. He built on the work of his predecessor, Thai law Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, in telling the Human Rights Council that “the violations in the DPRK have reached a critical mass,” and that “many, if not all, of the nine patterns of violation, identified in my present report, may amount to crimes against humanity.”[23] Although North Korea calls the material on which the report is based “faked,” [24] the report issued by Darusman is well documented, lawyerly and based on considerable research, as could be seen from the annexes to the text.

Other parts of the UN human rights system have joined in to express support for the commission of inquiry. Drawn from countries like Argentina, Senegal and South Africa, the UN’s independent experts on torture, arbitrary detention, disappearances and extrajudicial executions issued a joint statement together with Darusman endorsing an international inquiry.[25] This joint action on behalf of the commission occurred after the rapporteurs received no response from North Korea to a query they made about the prison labor system.

Most significantly, governmental support has increased for bringing North Koreato account. When the UN General Assembly first adopted a resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation in 2005, 88 states voted for the resolution. By 2011, the number of states supporting the resolution had gone up to 123. In 2012, the 193-member General Assembly adopted the resolution by consensus, that is, without a vote, with states like China, Cuba and Venezuela comprising a minority who disassociated themselves from the text after its adoption. Last year, the Human Rights Council also adopted its annual human rights resolution onNorth Korea by consensus, suggesting the development of a greater unanimity aboutNorth Korea’s human rights record. At this session, the resolution creating a commission of inquiry was adopted by consensus.

Another strong player which North Korea must reckon with is an NGO coalition of more than 40 organizations. In 2011, the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity (ICNK) in North Korea was formed.[26] ICNK has lobbied governments, published opeds, and worked the corridors at the UN to press for the creation of a commission of inquiry. Although NGOs can be competitive and even undercut each other’s work, the more than 40 groups that have banded together have shown remarkable unity and effectiveness. The coalition includes the major international human rights NGOs as well as groups from a variety of Asian and other countries. It is now heavily invested in the success of the commission’s work.

Indeed, a worldwide effort will be needed to help bring forward information to the commission so that it can produce the best and most well documented report. The Council’s resolution calls upon UN specialized agencies, regional bodies, UN rapporteurs, experts and NGOs to cooperate with the commission. But governments should be expected to cooperate as well, in particular to provide relevant information, sometimes on a confidential basis, including satellite information that might be more precise than what is currently available to NGOs.

An Overall Strategy

The commission of inquiry should not be seen as an end in itself but rather as part of a larger strategy to promote human rights inNorth Korea. A strategic plan should be developed and led by the Secretary-General together with the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It should have definite goals like achieving a dialogue with North Korea; disseminating to its schools, government offices and institutions Korean translations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; gaining international access to the penal labor camps; bringing an end to the prison system and forced labor; and allowing freedom of movement for North Koreans across borders. A strategic plan would bring together the myriad UN offices and agencies involved with North Korea, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Program, the International Labor Organization, the UN Department of Public Information, UNESCO, the World Food Program and other humanitarian organizations so that the entire system can be tapped and work together. Humanitarian groups in particular should be consulted about causes of starvation in the country and access to those in need. They should be reminded that “the most vulnerable” in the population include the 100,000 to 200,000 political prisoners held in camps on starvation rations. In sum, a comprehensive strategy needs to be developed.

The New Human Rights Landscape

Admittedly, heightened international scrutiny of North Korea’s human rights record may have little impact on the ground in the short term. It is likely North Korea will continue to defy efforts by the UN to establish dialogue and technical assistance programs. It may even crack down harder against its population and those seeking to flee across the border. But over the longer term, the growing number of states, including those from developing countries, as well as UN officials, experts and NGOs arrayed against North Koreabecause of its human rights record may give some North Koreans pause, especially since efforts will be made by UN officials to identify individuals and institutions to hold accountable in future. Moreover, the states which North Korea might turn to for talks and aid will be influenced as well. The United States, for example, long has separated its human rights concerns from its political and nuclear relationships with North Korea, but it also has felt pressured by the strong publicity coming out about the human rights situation. Glyn Davies, the Special Representative for North Korea Policy told the Senate on March 7, 2013, that “U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights” [emphasis added].[27] This perhaps suggests the beginnings of a more integrated policy on the part of theUS for dealing with North Korea. It is to be hoped that the idea will spread to other countries as well.

Even North Korea’s principal ally China is reported to be growing uncomfortable with the regime’s provocations and excesses. Although China has remained for the most part steadfast in its support of North Korea, North Korean officials can themselves read in the press that questions are arising in China about its policies in support of North Korea.[28] One article even pointed to public concerns in China about its own labor camps and whether they should be closed.[29]

It is not easy to predict when change will come. It was not foreseen that the Berlin Wall would fall when it did, that the Soviet Union would collapse, and that reforms would take place in Arab countries. But bringing down the information wall around North Korea and exposing its crimes against humanity may in time lead to change.

[1] UN Human Rights Council, Resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK (draft on file with author), adopted March 21, 2013.

[2] See Roberta Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea,” prepared for The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights’ book, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Conscience for the World (University of Nottingham, 2013) (forthcoming).

[3] US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: DPRK, “ENDNOTE: NOTE ON SOURCING,” at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eap/186279.htm.

[4] “Pillay urges more attention to human rights abuses in North Korea, calls for international inquiry,” News Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 14, 2013 [henceforth Pillay Statement 2013], at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E.

[5] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Marzuki Darusman, A/HRC/22/57, February 1, 2013, paras. 6, 25, 31.

[6] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimes_against_humanity#International_Criminal_Court. For discussion of crimes against humanity, see David Hawk, Hidden Gulag, second edition, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, pp. 154-167.

[7] See Vaclav Havel, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Elie Wiesel, Failure to Protect: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea,” U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and DLA PIPER, October 30, 2006, pp. ii, 11; see also Hawk, Hidden Gulag, 2012, pp. vii,173-174.

[8] Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (The Perseus Press, 2000) (French) later translated into English (Basic Books).

[9] See Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea.”

[10] Ibid.

[11] See David Hawk, Hidden Gulag, Committee for Human Rights inNorth Korea, 2003.

[12] See Hawk, Hidden Gulag, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

[13] See for example the annual White Paper on North Korean Human Rights, Database Center for North Korean Human Rights; and the Reports on political prisoners’ camps of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea. See also Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports.

[14] See Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea.”

[15] See Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14 (Viking, 2012); and CNN at http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/living/escape-camp-14-book-story.

[16] See Choe Sang-Hun, “Fleeing North Korea Is Becoming Harder,” New York Times, January 5, 2013.

[17] UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Situation of human rights in the DPRK, A/65/391, September 24, 2010, paras. 2, 46, 86.

[18] Tom Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’ to investigate the human rights record,” Reuters, March 11, 2013.

[19] Pillay Statement 2013.

[20] Pillay Statement 2013.

[21] See UN General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/67/L.50, 9 November 2012. At the Universal Periodic Review of North Korea in 2009-10, governments made 167 recommendations to improve human rights conditions but the North Korean authorities failed to identify one recommendation it would carry out. See “Human Rights Council adopts outcomes of Universal Periodic Review on Bhutan, Dominica and DPRK,” March 18, 2010.

[22] Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’”; and Jennifer M. Freedman, “North Korean Rights Abuses May Be Crimes Against Humanity,” Bloomberg News, March 12, 2013.

[23] “U.N. monitor accuses N.K of crimes against humanity,” The Korea Herald, March 12, 2013.

[24] See Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’”; and Freedman, “North Korean Rights Abuses May Be Crimes Against Humanity.”

[25] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN experts call for an international inquiry into North Korea human rights abuses,” News Release, February 27, 2013.

[26] See http://www.stopnkcrimes.org/about_01.php.

[27] Testimony of Glyn Davies, Special Representative forNorth Korea Policy, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,Washington, DC, March 7, 2013.

[28] See, for example, Deng Yuwen, “China Should abandon North Korea,” Financial Times, February 27, 2013; “‘Give up on Pyongyang,’ says China insider,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 2, 1013; Jane Perlez, “Some Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend,” New York Times, February 17, 2013; Fareed Zakaria, “A high-stakes game,” Washington Post, March 14, 2013; and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Re-think Chinese Policy Toward North Korea,” cited in The Nelson Report, February 13, 2013.

[29] William Wax, “In China, labor camps face an uncertain future,” Washington Post, March 4, 2013.

Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: 38 North

UN Sanctions, North Korean Threats

Richard C. Bush III — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:28:00 -0500

The UN Security Council has unanimously condemned “in the strongest possible terms” North Korea’s February nuclear test (its third). It expanded financial sanctions, mandated close checks of cargo entering and exiting North Korea, and warned of future measure if Pyongyang persists in its provocative behavior.

Are these new sanctions likely to bring about an immediate and positive change in North Korean policy?

Probably not. Economic sanctions usually require a long period of time to “bite,” and they must be fully multilateral in scope. These new sanctions can further constrain the resources available to the resource-poor North Korean regime and thereby its broader policy choices. To have that effect, however, sound implementation is critical. This is particularly true of China, through which much of North Korea’s trade and financial transactions flow.

What is the underlying objective of the sanctions regime?

The goal of this and previous actions is to sharpen the choices of North Korea, to disabuse it of the idea that the international community will both accept it as a state with nuclear weapons and permit international economic activity on a normal basis. Only when it understands that it can only have one or the other will it even consider making a fundamental choice between the two. The transition to a new regime creates, in the medium term, the possibility of such a policy shift. If that does not happen, the international community will have to contain the consequences.

What should we make of North Korea’s threat to attack the United States?

Certainly, those threats cannot be dismissed out of hand. But Pyongyang has issued similar warnings before and not acted upon them. The regime has domestic reasons to make create a crisis atmosphere, and while it glories in shows of bravado and brinksmanship, it is not suicidal. Actually, the greatest danger in the near term is a conventional but limited military action against South Korea. Look for Seoul and Washington to strengthen deterrence against such attack and prepare a proportionate response should deterrence fail.

What is North Korea’s strategy that is driving these actions?

Just as the United States, South Korea and others have sought to sharpen Pyongyang’s choices, so too is North Korea trying to sharpen ours. There is a test of wills at play here. The salutary consequence of the current struggle is that it has led China to seriously question its past “even-handed” policy, which had the effect of indulging North Korea in its provocations.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Bobby Yip / Reuters

Kenyans Head to the Polls - and a New Displacement Crisis?

Megan Bradley — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 11:45:00 -0500

Last night, Kenyans across the country crowded around radios and televisions for the second round of Presidential election debates. With elections less than a week away, tensions are running high. This is no ordinary election. The country’s last elections, in 2007, unleashed a surge of violence that left 1,300 dead and forced 600,000 from their homes – including some of my family friends, who fled the village of Ahero in western Kenya and eventually found shelter in the soccer stadium in Kisumu, Kenya’s third largest city. One of the leading presidential candidates and his running mate have been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against humanity for allegedly orchestrating much of this violence. Our friends have returned to Ahero, but scores of Kenyans will not be able to cast their votes on Monday from their home towns: an estimated 250,000 Kenyans are currently displaced. Some have still not been able to go home – or find a new home – after the last round of election violence. In 2012 alone, over 118,000 people were newly displaced by ethnically and politically charged violence.

On top of all this, in addition to a new president and MPs, Monday’s vote will see Kenyans elect representatives to a host of new positions created under the country’s 2010 Constitution. Chaloka Beyani, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), points out that, “Elections this year are not only about national positions, but also about local ones. Power struggles over political representation at the local level have already resulted in new displacements in some instances.”

In order to ensure that Monday’s vote does not repeat the tragedy of 2007/2008, the government needs to ramp up efforts to prevent and prepare for potential violence and displacement. As the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, has noted, “Instances of localized violence likely to result in the arbitrary displacement of persons in Kenya have steadily increased in the run up to the elections.” To its credit, the government of Kenya has laid the foundation for this prevention work by adopting a new IDP Act in December 2012 and approving a comprehensive IDP policy. According to the Special Rapporteur, “The IDP Act clearly obliges the government and others to guard against violence and prevent internal displacement.”

In addition to its obligation to prevent violence and new waves of displacement, the government of Kenya – and the international community – have a responsibility to hold the architects of the 2007/2008 crisis to account. Whatever the outcome of next week’s elections, this challenge must still be faced. In the meantime, I’ll be thinking of our friends in Ahero, hoping that the next time they visit the Kisumu soccer stadium, it will be to see a match and not to stay the night.

Authors

Megan Bradley

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Own the Goals: What the Millennium Development Goals Have Accomplished

John McArthur — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 14:11:00 -0500

For more than a decade, the Millennium Development Goals -- a set of time-bound targets agreed on by heads of state in 2000 -- have unified, galvanized, and expanded efforts to help the world's poorest people. The overarching vision of cutting the amount of extreme poverty worldwide in half by 2015, anchored in a series of specific goals, has drawn attention and resources to otherwise forgotten issues. The MDGs have mobilized government and business leaders to donate tens of billions of dollars to life-saving tools, such as antiretroviral drugs and modern mosquito nets. The goals have promoted cooperation among public, private, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), providing a common language and bringing together disparate actors. In his 2008 address to the UN General Assembly, the philanthropist Bill Gates called the goals "the best idea for focusing the world on fighting global poverty that I have ever seen."

The goals will expire on December 31, 2015, and the debate over what should come next is now in full swing. This year, a high-level UN panel, co-chaired by British Prime Minister David Cameron, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, will put forward its recommendations for a new agenda. The United States and other members of the UN General Assembly will then consider these recommendations, with growing powers, such as Brazil, China, India, and Nigeria, undoubtedly playing a major role in forging any new agreement. But prior to deciding on a new framework, the world community must evaluate exactly what the MDG effort has achieved so far.

WORKING ON A DREAM

The MDGs are not a monolithic policy following a single trajectory. Ultimately, they are nothing more than goals, established by world leaders and subsequently reaffirmed on multiple occasions. The MDGs were not born with a plan, a budget, or a specific mapping out of responsibilities. Many think of the MDGs as the UN's goals, since the agreements were established at UN summits and UN officials have generally led the follow-up efforts for coordination and reporting. But the reality is much more complicated. No single individual or organization is responsible for achieving the MDGs. Instead, countless public, private, and nonprofit actors-working together and independently, in developed and developing countries -- have furthered the goals. Amid this complexity, the achievements toward reaching the MDGs are all the more impressive. The goals have brought the diffuse international development community closer together.

Before the MDGs were crafted, there was no common framework for promoting global development. After the Cold War ended, many rich countries cut their foreign aid budgets and turned their focus inward, on domestic priorities. In the United States, for example, the foreign aid budget hit an all-time low in 1997, at 0.09 percent of gross national income. Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s, institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) encouraged developed and developing countries to scale back spending on public programs-in the name of government efficiency-as a condition for receiving support.

The results were troubling. Africa suffered a generation of stagnation, with rising poverty and child deaths and drops in life expectancy. Economic crises and the threat of growing inequality plagued Asia and Latin America. The antiglobalization movement gained such force that in November and December 1999, at what has come to be called "the Battle in Seattle," street protesters forced the World Trade Organization to cancel major meetings midstream.

The suspicions on the part of civil society carried over into policy debates. In the late 1990s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development proposed "international development goal" benchmarks for donor efforts. The OECD's proposal was later co-signed by leaders of the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN. In response, Konrad Raiser, then head of the World Council of Churches, hardly a fire-breathing radical, wrote UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to convey astonishment and disappointment that Annan had endorsed a "propaganda exercise for international finance institutions whose policies are widely held to be at the root of many of the most grave social problems facing the poor all over the world."

That proposal never got off the ground, but the international community made other progress in the lead-up to 2000 that helped set the groundwork for the MDGs. Most notably, G-8 leaders took a major step forward when they crafted a debt-cancellation policy at their 1999 summit in Cologne, Germany. Under this new policy, countries could receive debt relief on the condition that they allocated savings to education or health. This helped reorient governments toward spending in social sectors after many years of cutbacks.

At the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, which was the largest gathering of world leaders to date, heads of state accepted that they needed to work together to assist the world's poorest people. Looking at the challenges of the new century, all the UN member states agreed on a set of measurable, time-bound targets in the Millennium Declaration. In 2001, these targets were organized into eight MDGs: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and forge global partnerships among different countries and actors to achieve development goals. Each goal was further broken down into more specific targets. For example, the first goal involves cutting in half "between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day."

In practical terms, the MDGs were actually launched in March 2002, at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development, in Monterrey, Mexico. The attendees, including heads of state, finance ministers, and foreign ministers, agreed that developed countries should step in with support mechanisms and adequate financial aid to help poor countries committed to good governance meet the MDG targets. Crucially, leaders set a benchmark for burden sharing when they urged "developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance to developing countries." At the time of the conference, the 22 official OECD donor countries allocated an average of 0.22 percent of GNI to aid. Thus, working toward a 0.7 target implied more than tripling total global support. The Monterrey conference established the MDGs as the first global framework anchored in an explicit, mutually agreed-on partnership between developed and developing countries.

THE GLOBAL CONVERSATION

These historic intergovernmental agreements have inspired much debate. Some NGO leaders, including participants in the annual World Social Forum, distrusted any agreement that involved international financial institutions and was negotiated behind closed doors. Human rights activists were dismayed that the MDGs excluded targets for good governance, which they considered a contributor to development and a key outcome unto itself. Some environmental activists were bothered by the narrow formulation of the targets, which ignored major issues, such as climate change, land degradation, ocean management, and air pollution.

To be sure, the MDG framework is imperfect. Several issues, such as gender equality and environmental sustainability, are defined too narrowly. The education goal is limited to the completion of primary school, overlooking concerns about the quality of learning and secondary school enrollment levels. In addition, some academics, such as the economist William Easterly, argue that the remarkable ambition of the goals is unfair to the poorest countries, which have the furthest to go to meet the targets, and minimizes what progress those countries do achieve. Sure enough, if the child survival goal were to cut mortality by half, instead of by two-thirds, 72 developing countries would already have met the target by 2011. Instead, the two-thirds goal has been achieved by only 20 developing countries so far. In addition, the MDGs' emphasis on human development issues, such as education and health, sometimes downplays the importance of investments in energy and infrastructure that support economic growth and job creation.

Nonetheless, the framework has provided a global rallying point. In 2002, with a mandate from Annan and Mark Malloch Brown, then the administrator of the UN Development Program, the economist Jeffrey Sachs launched the UN Millennium Project, which brought together hundreds of experts from around the world from academia, business, government, and civil-society organizations to construct policy plans for achieving the goals. Sachs also tirelessly lobbied government leaders in both developed and developing countries to expand key programs, especially in health and agriculture, in order to meet the MDG targets.

In the lead-up to the 2005 G-8 summit, in Gleneagles, Scotland, advocacy organizations worldwide championed the MDGs. In developing countries, NGO leaders, such as Amina Mohammed, Kumi Naidoo, and Salil Shetty, encouraged civil-society leaders to hold their governments accountable for meeting the goals. In developed countries, organizations such as ONE, co-founded by the activist Jamie Drummond, the rock star Bono, and others, petitioned politicians and conducted public awareness campaigns to demand that world leaders step up their efforts to meet the targets. At the summit, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, then British chancellor of the exchequer, put the MDGs and foreign aid commitments at the top of the agenda. Leaders at Gleneagles committed to increasing global aid by $50 billion by 2010 and set the groundwork for larger commitments to be made by 2015. However, one powerful player on the world stage, the United States, remained hesitant to embrace the MDG agenda.

PLAYERS ON THE BENCH

U.S. President George W. Bush launched the Millennium Challenge initiative in 2002, promising a 50 percent increase in U.S. foreign aid within three years, with money going to countries committed to good governance. The initiative drew inspiration from the MDGs, as the name suggests, but confusingly, it did not directly link to the targets. Ten months later, in his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush launched the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which has dramatically improved access to AIDS treatment in the developing world. This program was in many ways in line with the MDG effort but did not explicitly link to the goals. Bush even endorsed the UN Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey agreements, but he refused to support the MDGs, largely because his administration viewed them as UN-dictated aid quotas.

Holding a similar view, State Department officials regularly claimed that they supported the targets of the Millennium Declaration but not the MDGs, despite the fact that the MDG targets were drawn directly from the Millennium Declaration. U.S.-UN tensions over the Iraq war were a critical backdrop, with the Bush administration reticent to support a major UN initiative. Washington's aversion was so strong that many U.S. advocacy groups avoided using the term "Millennium Development Goals" for fear of losing influence. When John Bolton became the U.S. ambassador to the UN in August 2005, one of his first actions was to suggest deleting all references to the MDGs in the drafted agreement of the upcoming UN World Summit. The subsequent uproar from other countries and U.S. media outlets forced Washington to modify its position. In his summit speech, Bush finally endorsed the MDGs, using the phrase "Millennium Development Goals" publicly for the first time.

By refusing to directly engage with the MDGs in their early years, the United States missed an opportunity to highlight its contributions to development efforts and foster international goodwill. In the early years of this century, the United States helped revolutionize global health, a central pillar of the MDGs, first through Bush's AIDS initiative and later through efforts on malaria and other deadly diseases. Furthermore, by resisting a project on which most of the world was actively collaborating, Washington missed easy opportunities to build political capital for solving much thornier and divisive international issues.

Diplomatic tensions have subsided under the Obama administration, which has given much stronger rhetorical support to the MDGs and has continued the previous administration's basic development policies, in addition to launching a major initiative to reduce poverty by supporting small farms around the world. Nevertheless, many officials in Washington remain either skeptical or disengaged when it comes to the MDGs, most likely because of a long-standing aversion to fixed foreign aid spending, especially when defined by an international agreement. This fear, however, is baseless. The MDGs do not dictate any aid commitments, and the only related figure, the 0.7 aid target, which countries agreed to work toward in Monterrey in 2002, was endorsed by Bush. It was only later that some countries, such as the United Kingdom, made timetables to meet this aid target.

The World Bank has similarly missed out. Although the bank has championed the framework at senior political levels, it has not adequately facilitated MDG efforts on the ground. Early resistance was in part due to bureaucratic resentment of the UN for its having been given such a prominent role on development issues. In addition, as an institution dominated by economists, the bank is prone to prioritize economic reforms over investment in social sectors. Even more, there is widespread distrust among the bank's staff that donor countries will provide adequate financing for the MDGs. Such concerns are not without merit, as the G-8 ended up falling more than $10 billion short on its Africa pledges for 2010 alone.

Nevertheless, the bank, as a main interlocutor with the developing world, should have helped poor countries assess how they could achieve the MDGs and sounded the alarm about donor financing gaps. Furthermore, the bank has a self-serving reason to get onboard: the MDGs spurred a major budgetary expansion for the International Development Association, the branch of the bank devoted to supporting the poorest countries. Fortunately, the United States and the World Bank are coming around on the MDGs, attracted by the proven success of the framework.

IT'S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL

As of late 2010, five years before the deadline, the world had already met the overarching MDG of cutting extreme poverty by half. The estimated share of the developing-world population living on less than $1.25 per day (the technical MDG measurement of extreme poverty) had dropped from 43 percent in 1990 to roughly 21 percent in 2010. This statistic is somewhat skewed by progress that was under way in China and other Asian countries long before the MDGs were adopted. The framework is not solely responsible for all of the advancements of the past 12 years. Many other forces, such as the expansion of global markets and the creation of groundbreaking health and communications technologies, have helped the developing world. Moreover, the goals relating to hunger, sanitation, and the environment have not been met. Poverty reduction, however, has progressed in every region since 2000. Even excluding China from the global calculation, the world's share of impoverished people fell from 37 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 2008, and forthcoming data should show an even greater drop.

Most important, the MDGs have kick-started progress where it was lacking, especially in Africa, where unprecedented economic growth and poverty reduction are now taking place. From 1981 to 1999, extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 52 percent of the population to 58 percent. But since the launch of the MDGs, it has declined sharply, to 48 percent in 2008. Much of this was likely driven by MDG-backed investments in healthier and better-educated work forces in the region. The global MDG campaign has also prompted support for small subsistence and cash-crop farms, which has boosted growth in many low-income countries, such as Malawi.

Primary education rates have increased around the world, too, with South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa experiencing particularly big jumps in enrollment. Much of this has been the result of funding from MDG-linked initiatives, such as the Global Partnership for Education, launched in 2002 by the World Bank and other development organizations to help poor countries "address the large gaps they face in meeting education MDG 2 and 3, in areas of policy, capacity, data, finance." These same efforts have helped nearly every world region achieve gender parity in classrooms.

The greatest MDG successes undoubtedly concern health. The MDGs have invigorated multilateral institutions, such as the GAVI Alliance (formerly called the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), which seeks to achieve MDGs "by focusing on performance, outcomes and results." The goals have also inspired a huge increase in private-sector aid. Ray Chambers, a respected philanthropist and co-founder of a New York private equity firm, first learned of the goals in 2005. Since then, working with Sachs and others, Chambers has coordinated a worldwide coalition of policy, business, and NGO leaders in an effort to help the developing world meet the goal for malarial treatment and prevention. Thanks in part to this global effort, malaria-related mortality has dropped by approximately 25 percent since 2000, with most of those gains probably occurring since 2005. Many pharmaceutical companies have also put forth major efforts to make their medicines more widely available in poor countries, and new initiatives are continuing to take shape. The MDG Health Alliance, founded in 2011, is comprised of business and NGO leaders around the world working toward the MDG health targets, including the elimination of mother-to-child HIV transmission.

The combined results of these campaigns are remarkable. For example, in Senegal, child mortality has plummeted by half since 2000. In Cambodia, it has dropped by 60 percent. Rwanda has recorded a ten percent average annual reduction since 2000, one of the fastest declines in history. Even China has seen a significant decrease in child deaths, possibly because the expanded global emphasis on health has encouraged the country's policymakers to pay more attention to relevant issues. Overall, despite rapid global population growth, there has been a decrease in children dying worldwide before their fifth birthdays, from 11.7 million in 1990 to 9.4 million in 2000 and 6.8 million in 2011.

No issue has been more closely interconnected with the MDGs than the HIV/AIDS treatment campaign. In 2000, nearly 30 million people were infected, the vast majority in Africa, where only approximately 10,000 people were in treatment and over one million people were dying every year from the disease. The next year, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development publicly deemed large-scale AIDS treatment in Africa impossible. Undeterred, Annan launched the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which aims to achieve "long-term outcome and impact results related to the Millennium Development Goals."

Spurred by the launch of the MDGs, Jim Yong Kim, then head of the World Health Organization's HIV/AIDS department, introduced the "3 by 5" initiative in 2003, which aimed to have three million people living with AIDS in the developing world receiving treatment by 2005. By the end of 2005, only 1.3 million people were receiving treatment-fewer than half of the target. But thanks to the interwoven AIDS-MDG campaign, the notion of service delivery targets has sunk in globally, helping expand AIDS treatment by orders of magnitude: also in 2005, the G-8 and the UN General Assembly endorsed a target of universal access to treatment by 2010, backed by major financial commitments. The MDG movement has expanded the world's ambitions in tackling health crises and made extraordinary progress. In 2011, more than eight million people worldwide were receiving AIDS treatment.

NEXT-GENERATION GOALS

The MDGs have proved that with concentration and effort, even the most persistent global problems can be tackled. The post-2015 goals should remain focused on eliminating the multiple dimensions of extreme poverty, but they also need to address emerging global realities. These new challenges include the worsening environmental pressures affecting the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people, the growing number of middle-income countries with tremendous internal poverty challenges, and rapidly spreading noncommunicable diseases.

The new goals also need to be matched with resources. Without the Monterrey agreements of 2002 and the financial commitments made at the Gleneagles summit in 2005, the MDGs might well have faded from the international agenda. It is crucial that the post-2015 negotiations not be left solely to foreign and development ministries. Finance ministries will need an equal say on many of the most central issues and therefore need to be included from the beginning. Other relevant ministries, such as those that deal with health and environmental issues, should be consulted regularly. Additionally, in preparation for 2015, multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and UN agencies, should conduct independent external reviews of their contributions to the MDGs and identify benchmarks for post-2015 success based on the results. And the United States needs to join the international community in making a solid commitment to long-term, goal-oriented foreign aid.

The MDGs have helped mobilize and guide development efforts by emphasizing outcomes. They have encouraged world leaders to tackle multiple dimensions of poverty at the same time and have provided a standard that advocates on the ground can hold their governments to. Even in countries where politicians might not directly credit the MDGs, the global effort has informed local perspectives and priorities. The goals have improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. They have shown how much can be achieved when ambitious and specific targets are matched with rigorous thinking, serious resources, and a collaborative global spirit.

Looking forward, the next generation of goals should maintain the accessible simplicity that has allowed the MDGs to succeed and also facilitate the creation of better accountability mechanisms both within and across governments. In addition, the new goals need to give low- and middle-income countries a greater voice in shaping the agenda. Most important, momentum matters. Just as progress in individual MDG areas has inspired other campaigns, so work done now, in the final stretch, will affect what happens in the future. The results achieved by 2015 will mark an endpoint, but even more, they will provide a springboard for the next generation of goals. There is no time to lose.

Authors

John McArthur

Publication: Foreign Affairs

Try Temporary North Korea Sanctions

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

What to do about North Korea after its third nuclear test on Monday - this one possibly involving a device employing highly enriched uranium rather than plutonium, and perhaps small enough to fit on a missile?

Unfortunately, the international community is at a loss. North Korea is already sanctioned extensively and without China, we cannot tighten the noose a great deal more. China for its part does not wish to increase the economic pressure on Pyongyang much further, fearing that North Korean instability could result. Moreover, North Korea has already shown that when it is sanctioned, it often ups the ante rather than back down.

There is another dilemma: North Korea may be producing highly enriched uranium at a secret site. This could give it the capacity to produce up to several bombs’ worth of U-235 per year, in theory. As Graham Allison of Harvard and others have warned, this could lead to North Korea selling nuclear materials to the highest bidder — something the United States should, as Allison advises, warn North Korea not to do in the strongest possible terms.

And there is one more complication, although this one is of a different sort. It has to do with the longer-term prospects for encouraging North Korean reform. While hope is clearly evaporating that North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-Un, might be more inclined to consider changes at home, and detente with the outside world, than did his father or grandfather, we should want to keep that option alive. After all, Vietnam and China ultimately reformed even while keeping their communist systems. There is a chance that North Korea will too — less out of any softening of the regime’s attitudes than out of economic necessity.

Clearly the new, 30-year old Kim is not showing any reformist inclinations right now. But it is possible that he feels political pressure internally to establish himself with hardliners before he can pivot to a more reasonable line. This may not be the likely future trajectory, yet it cannot be ruled out.

So here’s an idea: any additional U.N. sanctions, above and beyond the base that now exists, could be temporary. They could be constructed in such a way as to sunset automatically in say two years if there is no further nuclear testing in the interim. But they would automatically return if North Korea were to conduct another test, again for two years’ duration—or perhaps for three or four years in that event, to avoid any suggestion that this approach is somehow soft or lenient.

Such an approach might prove more negotiable with Beijing. It could also give Kim Jong Un, the new and young leader, a chance to reassess his belligerent ways — rather than lock ourselves into a permanently hostile dynamic with him.

Any lifting of other, preexisting sanctions, including trade sanctions, would require resolution of the broader nuclear problem. North Korea would have to stop enriching uranium and agree to a long-term plan for gradual de-nuclearization. Indeed, if it did these things while also gradually making other reforms, outside powers could also offer it the prospect of substantial development assistance in the future as well.

We are not at a point where that kind of road map to a grand bargain and fundamentally improved relationship can be realistically pursued. For now, therefore, the goal should be more modest: to provide a firm response to North Korea’s unacceptable behavior, but do it in a way that can engender Chinese participation while not closing off the door to a calmer relationship down the road. Making any additional sanctions temporary could achieve this balance and should be considered.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Politico

The (Tangled) Road Map to September's U.N. General Assembly Meeting on the Post-2015 Development Agenda

Allison Anderson — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 14:25:00 -0500

Preliminary results from a global survey asking people to choose the most important issues for a better world reveals education is at the very top of the list. While the survey’s online response to date has been dominated by respondents from high Human Development Index (HDI) countries, people from over 183 countries – including both low and medium HDI countries – ranked “a good education” as the highest priority, above other issues such as better healthcare, access to clean water and sanitation or better job opportunities. A summary of the findings was presented to the U.N. secretary-general’s High Level Panel last month during their meeting in Monrovia, Liberia. This global My World survey is ongoing, and a second summary of the results will be presented at the next High Level Panel meeting in Bali at the end of March. Ultimately the results will be shared with world leaders in setting the next global development agenda.

But does this global prioritization among citizens guarantee a strong focus on education within the post-2015 development agenda? Not necessarily, since the roadmap to a debate on the agenda in the United Nations General Assembly this September – and beyond that to the eventual agreement on what the agenda will actually include in September 2015 – is much less clear. The United Nations Foundation has produced a useful graphic about this multilayered process:

Looking at this graphic, it becomes apparent that the education community must take a two-track strategy for influencing the post-2015 process:

1) Influencing the education thematic consultations and country consultations around an equitable learning agenda.

The current discussions within the United Nation’s global thematic consultations on education are an important consensus and community-building process for the education community around an equitable learning agenda. From the position papers released by Save the Children, the Basic Education Coalition, The Global Campaign for Education U.S. Chapter, among others, to the consultative discussions and outputs of the Learning Metrics Task Force, it appears that there is broad agreement that, while there has been significant progress over the last decade in getting more children into school, learning levels remain unacceptably low. Too often children leave both primary and secondary levels without acquiring the basic knowledge, skills and competencies they need to lead productive, healthy lives. It is the acquisition of knowledge and skills that promotes employability, productivity and growth, as well as the noneconomic benefits of education. Therefore there is broad support for a post-2015 education goal that focuses on equitable learning for all children and youth.

This week the last of the four education e-discussions on governance and financing within the consultation process was launched, giving education stakeholders the opportunity to weigh in on the following questions:

What kind of strategies, policies and interventions will improve governance in the education sector at the subnational, national, regional and global levels?
Who should be held accountable for ensuring that children receive a good quality education and how?
What are the key challenges in financing education and what are the contributing factors to these challenges?

Recent research into possible post-2015 frameworks by Anda Adams indicates that it is also vital to ensure the importance of an equitable learning agenda is raised in the more than 50 national and 10 thematic consultations being conducted this year on environmental sustainability, growth and employment, governance, health, inequalities, hunger, food and nutrition security, population dynamics, energy, water, and conflict and fragility. While these consultations cannot perfectly include all voices, the use of social media and web portals are part of a concerted United Nations’ strategy to ensure greater inclusivity, open interaction and information exchange across a wide range of stakeholders, which is a major improvement from the consultation process that preceded the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.

In addition to the online thematic and in-person national consultations, from March 18-19 there will be a Global Leadership Meeting on Education on the post-2015 agenda in Dakar. Convened by UNICEF and UNESCO, the agenda and invitation list for this meeting are not yet public. However, there will be at least 50 high-level participants from governments, major civil society and NGO coalitions and networks, U.N. partners and members of the secretary-general’s High Level Panel (HLP) invited to review development priorities emerging from the HLP and implications for education as well as outcomes of the thematic education consultation. Participants will discuss regional priorities and cross-cutting issues in education and develop recommendations around an education goal, including how progress will be measured. Those who do participate should widely consult with their partners to ensure a multitude of voices are heard and are reflected in the meeting’s outcome document. This document will feed into a final summary report of the education consultations and will eventually influence the High Level Panel’s report and the debate on the post-2015 development agenda at U.N. General Assembly meeting.

2) Cultivating equitable learning champions within the high level processes

As is clear from the United Nations Foundation graphic above, the second track that will be important, and more difficult, to influence is the higher-level, less inclusive processes helmed by member states and eminent persons: the secretary-general’s High Level Panel on the post-2015 development process and the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG on SDGs, listed as SDG Working Group in the visual above). Furthermore as the ultimate framework for the post-2015 development agenda will not only emerge from the HLP and OWG, but also from the foreign ministers and heads of state taking part in the discussions at the U.N. General Assembly, these high-level politicians are also strategic targets. The education sector doesn’t yet have enough vocal high-level champions of the equitable learning agenda, and this area should be a focus in the coming months. As HLP members prepare to meet in Bali (March 24-27) and in New York (May, dates TBC), and OWG members begin their deliberations, education and development stakeholders should make a concerted effort to utilize connections to high-level decisions-makers within these bodies to brief them on the importance of an equitable learning agenda to poverty eradication and sustainable development.

The importance of education has been made clear throughout numerous post-2015 entry points thus far, from the High Level Panel meeting in Monrovia last month to the global My World survey. But as the consultation process concludes and the High Level Panel hones its recommendations, the urgency to ensure the right education goal is included becomes paramount. The next few months will mark a turning point in the global community’s engagement in the post-2015 process and the outcomes have the potential to make a cataclysmic difference in the lives on hundreds of millions of children.

Authors

Allison Anderson

Susan Rice and 21st Century Diplomacy

Bruce Jones — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 10:55:00 -0500

Susan Rice’s decision to withdraw her name for consideration for the position of Secretary of State was characteristic: putting country and loyalty to the president first. It’s America’s loss.

For the past two months, Susan Rice has been the subject of a sustained and plainly political attack over her comments about Benghazi. Because I have personal ties to her[1], I felt compelled, uncomfortably, to stay silent. But I can certainly comment on her qualifications to serve this country. For four years, I've had courtside seats as Susan Rice has served her country as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations – an institution I've worked with and watched for nearing two decades.

What’s striking about the debate about Rice’s credentials, is how little of it drew on her work over the past four years. That’s strange, because the who, the what, and the how of her experience at the U.N. is centrally relevant to U.S. foreign policy.

First, the who. America sometimes doesn't pay much attention to the U.N., but the rest of the world does, and they send highly talented people there to fight their corner, often with close ties to their chief executives. To navigate an issue to conclusion at the U.N., you have simultaneously to handle Russia and China, and an array of actors whose influence is rising on the global stage. That doesn't only include the likes of Brazil and India who each had a two-year elected stint on the U.N. Security Council during Rice’s tenure, but also key American partners like South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Singapore, and Australia. Rice used her Africa experience effectively too; Africa matters at the U.N., as they do in a growing number of economic and global negotiations – few Americans would focus on this fact, but Africa’s combined middle class is larger than China’s, and America has critical energy and security interests on the continent. Rice has also forged close and effective relations with core U.S. allies who also invest considerable political capital at the U.N., including Canada, the U.K. and Israel.

Second, the what. Odd as it may seem to some in Washington, many of America’s top security issues flow through or around the U.N. Security Council. That’s especially true where the Security Council has been directly engaged on sanctions or interventions (Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Syria debates). Because Rice was simultaneously a member of President Obama’s national security cabinet, she actively participated in decision-making around these issues, beyond just their Security Council dimension. Then there are also core interests in places where the U.N. has mediation, elections, peacekeeping or humanitarian roles, from Myanmar to Lebanon to Somalia to Afghanistan. And there are the ‘global’ issues: climate change; development; human rights. These issues are growing in significance in U.S. diplomacy, because they matter to the U.S. economy and to U.S. values, and because they matter to U.S. allies as well as the emerging powers – if very differently.

That takes us to the how of the U.N. Now, quite a bit of what the U.N. does, especially at the General Assembly, is simply incomprehensible: interminable debates about issues of modest consequence conducted by countries with no ability to affect the outcome. Rice has wisely stayed away from much of that part of the U.N., and concentrated her efforts in those areas where U.N. decisions do matter or where countries that matter to the U.S. have chosen the U.N. to pursue an important agenda. In those arenas, there’s a lot of talking and meetings involved, along with large doses of patience. That Rice has been able to muster that patience again and again shows how far the reality of her performance is from the caricature of her personality.

There’s a broader point here too, about multilateral engagement. Before he left office, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg concluded that the business of building and management the tools for collective action have gone from a side business to the core of American foreign policy. Diplomats who ply their trade in multilateral arenas like to joke that they play chess while their bilateral colleagues play checkers. For all its warts, the U.N. requires the discipline of corralling and cajoling allies and others into collective action – and pushing hard to get people out of the way when deference to a false consensus would impede results.

The defining element of Rice’s worldview is that America should be able to use its power in all its forms to protect its interests and to defend core values. Pundits have said that she strongly defends the president’s vision, and that’s true; but she’s shaped it as well, bringing him to a more effective vision of how to marry American power to leadership in a changing world. Between her role at the U.N. and in the cabinet Rice has had four years of demonstrating how to marry American diplomacy with the tools of hard power to effect outcomes.

In the debate over her qualifications, the argument that she’s unqualified is trivial, and she’s proven to have the character for modern diplomacy. As a testing ground for the diplomacy of a changing world, it would be hard to design a better four-year tour. I can imagine her in a wide range of other national security and Cabinet positions in the near future. For now she’ll continue to serve in a vital way as ambassador to the U.N., putting country first. Would that her critics had had the character to do the same.

1. Susan Rice is a family friend; a former colleague at Brookings; and my wife has worked for her at USUN for the past four years.

Authors

Bruce Jones

U.S. Must Step Forward to Stabilize Congo

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Tony Gambino — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The troubled country of the Democratic Republic of the Congo again has come into the headlines as a new rebellion in eastern Congo shakes the center of Africa. The present situation has already displaced hundreds of thousands, with unknown numbers dead — and, as before, it could easily widen, threatening the safety of millions and stability across the middle of Africa.

Earlier this month, M23 rebels fighting the Congolese army withdrew from the eastern regional capital city of Goma, which they had seized 10 days earlier. Their withdrawal occurred after intense international activity, negotiations between M23 officials and Congo President Joseph Kabila in Kampala, Uganda, and an agreement signed there on Nov. 24 by the leaders of a regional African organization, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the chairwoman of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, endorsed this agreement. However, the Kampala Accords and ICGLR role are grossly insufficient to respond to the underlying, interlinked crises in Congo and the wider region.

Congo is plagued by three interlocking crises. First, a local crisis in eastern Congo involving multiple groups has turned violent many times since 1991. Second, a national crisis of poor governance and state failure has stymied Congo for decades. Failed national elections in 2011 added an even deeper crisis of political legitimacy. Finally, an international crisis has existed between Congo and Rwanda since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It remains unresolved, with Rwanda’s clear military support to the M23 rebels its most recent manifestation. All three intertwined crises must be tackled and resolved.

Read the full article at politico.com »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Tony Gambino

Publication: POLITICO