Brookings: Topics - Ukraine

Ukraine at a Crossroads with Europe?

Steven Pifer — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 11:43:00 -0400

The Kyiv Security Forum, held in the Ukrainian capital on April 18-19, brought together Ukrainians, Europeans and Americans to discuss the current challenges facing Ukraine. Much of the discussion centered on Ukraine’s relationship with the European Union, in particular on whether Kyiv will make sufficient progress in meeting EU conditions to permit signature in November of an EU-Ukraine association agreement.

Several speakers asserted that Ukraine is at a crossroads with Europe. “Ukraine is at a crossroads” has been written or said so many times over the past 20 years that it has become something of a cliché. This time, however, it may be for real. The choices that Kyiv makes in the next weeks and months will determine whether Ukraine moves closer to Europe or whether the EU-Ukraine relationship gets stuck on hold.

EU and Ukrainian negotiators concluded the association agreement at the end of 2011. It would significantly deepen Ukraine’s links with the European Union. Among other things, it includes a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement that would open up large segments of the EU’s economy to Ukrainian exports. It is a big deal.

Although the association agreement was initialed in early 2012, it has since sat in limbo. The European Union has declined to sign given growing concerns over the past two years about negative developments regarding democracy within Ukraine.

EU officials have asked Kyiv to make progress on three conditions—implementation of its general reform agenda, reform of its electoral law, and an end to selective prosecution—in order to permit signature of the agreement at the EU Eastern Partnership summit in November. These conditions were reaffirmed at an EU-Ukraine summit in February, which called for “concrete progress” by May.

Many regard the third condition as the most critical. More than a dozen senior members of the opposition have been sent to jail since President Victor Yanukovych took office in 2010. Most attention focuses on the case of former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. She was convicted in 2011 for signing a gas contract with Russia in a trial that received broad criticism in the West. The near unanimous view in European capitals and Washington holds that Tymoshenko is a victim of selective prosecution. On the day her conviction was announced, even Moscow joined in the barrage of condemnation of the verdict.

In the seven weeks since the EU-Ukraine summit, there has been good news and bad news. The good news: Yanukovych pardoned Yuriy Lutsenko, a leading opposition leader, along with one other opposition member.

The bad news: Serhiy Vlasenko, Tymoshenko’s lawyer, was stripped of his membership in the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) on grounds that he could not hold his Rada seat and continue his legal work. Critics cite this as another selective application of the rules, as many Rada members, including in the pro-government Regions Party, hold outside jobs that would appear to contravene the rule. And more bad news: the Prosecutor General is pursing another case against Tymoshenko, alleging her involvement in the 1996 murder of businessman Yevhen Shcherban. Given the many questions about how the 2011 trial was conducted, few analysts have confidence that this legal process will be objective.

At the Kyiv Security Forum, several speakers made clear the key importance that Europe attaches to what happens to Tymoshenko. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Vice President of the European People’s Party—the European Parliamentary party with which Tymoshenko’s party is affiliated—took a stark position: Tymoshenko had to be released, or there would be no signature in November, and Ukraine would miss its window of opportunity with the European Union. EU Ambassador to Ukraine Jan Tombinski cautioned that Kyiv had to understand that the European Union only accepted democratic states that abided by the rule of law. European Parliament member Pawel Robert-Kowal warned that, even if the association agreement were signed, Ukraine had to demonstrate real progress, as the agreement would face the challenge of ratification by 27 individual EU member states.

During and on the margins of the conference, some Ukrainians expressed optimism that the Ukrainian government would take a positive step regarding Tymoshenko. Others doubted that Yanukovych would take any action on his archrival. Some expected the Ukrainian government to try to do the minimum necessary in order to argue that it had met the EU conditions and assert that freeing Lutsenko, but not Tymoshenko, should prove sufficient progress on the condition of selective prosecution.

Right now, EU member states appear to be split. Some, primarily in Central Europe and the Baltic region, do not want to delay signature of the association agreement over Tymoshenko. They fear that Ukraine might otherwise drift into Russia’s orbit.

Other EU member states, apparently now in the majority, believe Kyiv must do more to show its commitment to European democratic values. France and Germany lead this group. The fate of Tymoshenko has become a domestic issue in Germany, and Chancellor Angela Merkel said on April 17 that, “if the Yuliya Tymoshenko case is not settled, the association agreement cannot be signed.” Ukrainian diplomats understand that Berlin presents the toughest case to win over.

Although the European Union and Ukraine have agreed that concrete progress should be made by May, that might not prove a hard deadline for an EU decision on whether or not to sign the association agreement in November. Some in Kyiv believe a final EU decision could wait until later in the year, perhaps as late as October.

The question remains, regardless of when the European Union decides: will Ukraine do enough to secure signature? That may turn on Tymoshenko’s fate—and how badly Yanukovych wants the association agreement.

Neither Brussels nor Kyiv appear to have a Plan B in case the association agreement is not signed. In late March, Tombinski warned that, if the agreement were not signed in November, the press of other EU business in 2014 and the Ukrainian presidential election in 2015 would put Ukraine and the association agreement on the back-burner until late 2015. Another European diplomat recently suggested the delay would last until 2016.

Ukrainians do not want to think about what happens if the association agreement is not signed. But they expect a failure to sign to be warmly welcomed in Moscow, to be followed by a greater Russian push to draw Ukraine into the Customs Union that currently includes Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Yanukovych thus far has resisted joining the Customs Union. Doing so would be incompatible with a free trade agreement with the European Union and would essentially kill the association agreement—which is almost certainly Moscow’s objective.

So, Ukraine may indeed be facing a critical crossroads. It is one where the key choices are as much about Yanukovych’s domestic policy—how democracy will develop and how the opposition is treated—as they are about foreign policy. If Yanukovych makes the right choices, he will take an important step in integrating Ukraine into Europe. If he makes the wrong choices, he risks miring the country in a gray zone between Europe and Russia and having to face Moscow’s pressure with a severely weakened hand.

Editor's note: Steven Pifer, a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe and a former ambassador to Ukraine, was in Ukraine April 18-20 to attend the Kyiv Security Forum.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Ukraine is Bluffing over Russia’s Offer

Steven Pifer — Mon, 14 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine’s president, says that deepening his country’s relations with the EU is a priority. Recent comments by his officials hint, however, at a turn towards Russia and the customs union Moscow has formed with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Will these hints become reality? Unlikely. Mr Yanukovich is flirting with joining the customs union as part of an effort to persuade the west to ignore Ukraine’s regression on democracy.

The EU and U.S. should adhere to their values and make clear that respect for democracy and human rights is crucial to better relations between Ukraine and the West.

Ukrainian and EU negotiators agreed the terms of an association agreement in 2011, a significant part of which is a comprehensive free trade arrangement to boost Ukraine’s economic integration with Europe. But the agreement has languished for more than a year, as concerns in Brussels and EU capitals grew over the decline of democracy that has taken place on Mr Yanukovich’s watch. This has included the selective prosecution of former government leaders, such as Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, and election processes that have been criticised by both foreign and domestic observers.

Several EU states have indicated they would block the agreement unless Kiev improves its record on democracy. Similar concerns in Washington have led to a parallel downturn in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Congress has even begun to talk of sanctions against Ukraine.

Read the full article at FT.com » (subscription required)

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The Financial Times

Image Source: © Anatolii Stepanov / Reuters

Ukraine: Digging in Deeper on Tymoshenko

Steven Pifer — Thu, 20 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This article was originally published in Russian by the Korrespondent.

The Ukrainian government is using American lawyers to persuade the West of the legitimacy of the imprisonment of Yuliya Tymoshenko. This will turn out to be a losing game.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Justice’s release of an American law firm’s assessment of the trial of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko suggests the Ukrainian government will continue to argue to Europe and the United States that Tymoshenko is guilty and deserves to be in prison. Such a campaign will cost time, energy and money … and it almost certainly will fail. It will then be even more difficult for official Kyiv to find a face-saving way out of the hole it has dug itself into over Tymoshenko.

When one is in a hole, the first rule is to stop digging. But Kyiv instead may now be digging itself in deeper. The report by the American law firm Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP, publicly released on December 13, paints an unflattering picture of the judicial process against Tymoshenko. Among other things, the firm’s lawyers express concern about Tymoshenko’s incarceration during her trial, the testimony of witnesses when she had no counsel present, and the court’s refusal to call certain defense witnesses. The Ministry of Justice nevertheless apparently welcomes the report’s conclusion that this was not, narrowly defined, a case of selective prosecution.

Tymoshenko was convicted in October 2011 on charges of abusing her office. Those charges stemmed from a contract for the purchase of gas that she concluded with Russia in January 2009.

To the extent that the contract had flaws, the West saw it as a political or commercial mistake, not a criminal matter. One could even say that Tymoshenko paid for this (and other political mistakes) in February 2010, when she lost the presidential election to Victor Yanukovych. Tymoshenko’s trial was widely viewed, both within and outside of Ukraine, as a judicial farce.

The American firm’s report has been received in the West with some skepticism, in part because it was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice and because of questions about who financed the American lawyers’ work. The U.S. Department of State’s spokesperson said: "By confining themselves to simply looking at the paper trial records and ignoring the larger political context in which the trial took place, our concern is that Skadden Arps lawyers were obviously not going to find political motivation if they weren't looking for it. The report also fails to consider the selective nature of the cases [against Tymoshenko and members of her government] …”

Even setting aside these questions, few, if any, in the West will be interested in debating the merits of the case now. They lack the knowledge of Ukrainian law. They will not have access to all the facts in the matter. And they will not hear counter-arguments by Tymoshenko’s defense. So how can they be expected to make any kind of reasonable judgment regarding the trial or the Skadden Arps report? If the Ukrainian government believes that it can now, in effect, succeed in changing the attitude toward the Tymoshenko case in Europe and in Washington, well, lots of luck with that. But that is a serious mistake.

Tymoshenko is not the saint that some of her defenders portray. But the Ukrainian government does not appear able to understand that, in the matter of the former prime minister, it lost the public relations battle long ago. Why? Because everyone saw a madcap effort by the Prosecutor General’s Office to find something—anything—as grounds on which to take Tymoshenko to court. First, there were assertions that she had abused her office by misusing funds that Ukraine received from Japan under the Kyoto Protocol. Then there were claims that she had abused her office by issuing resolutions regarding the purchase of ambulances. When these charges failed to stick, the Prosecutor General’s Office turned to charges regarding the gas contract. On this case, the Prosecutor General’s Office and Ministry of Justice have no credibility with Europe and the United States.

Kyiv will not manage to persuade the West of the legitimacy of its handling of Tymoshenko. If the Ukrainian government now pursues a campaign to try to do so, its relations with the West will remain stuck in a dead end: the European Union will not move forward with the association agreement, including the deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement; Yanukovych will find that he has even fewer meetings with senior Western leaders; and talk will grow in the U.S. Congress about possible sanctions on Ukraine.

Ultimately, official Kyiv will realize that its campaign has failed, after wasting money, energy and time. The government will then have to decide whether to seriously address the issues, such as Tymoshenko’s case, that have caused the downturn in its relations with the West over the past two years. Having dug even deeper into the hole, it will then likely be even more difficult for Kyiv to extract itself, especially without losing face.

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Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Korrespondent

Image Source: © Anatolii Stepanov / Reuters

The West Now Views Ukraine as a Country that has Gone Off the Democratic Track

Steven Pifer — Sat, 24 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In the aftermath of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections, Steven Pifer tells Tyzhden’ (The Ukrainian Week) that the United States and European countries see Ukraine as moving away from a democratic course. This interview is also available on the Tyzhden’ web site in Ukrainian.

Ukrainian Week: Can you comment on the statement from the US State Department and the reaction of other Western countries regarding the Ukrainian election?

Steven Pifer (SP): If you look at how the US State Department, the EU and most European capitals reacted, it was pretty much a sense of disappointment about this election. It is not so much about what happened on Sunday (October 28, the election day – Ed.) because the voting looked like it went fairly well. It’s what happened before, like the abuse of administrative resources, uneven access to the media, questions about the transparency of the Central Election Commission’s operations. And, of course two of the main opposition leaders, Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko, were in jail. Compared to the presidential election in 2010 or parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007, this election was a significant step backwards.

Ukrainian Week: So, now that election is over and the State Department has commented on it, what’s next?

Pifer: I think we will have to wait and see. The Yanukovych Administration had the chance to run a good election and get good marks. Some were ready to say that would have been enough for us to engage Ukraine in a more positive way. That argument can’t be made now because the election process was not seen as a step forward. I think Washington and other capitals will see this as just another piece of evidence of the Yanukovych Administration moving away from a democratic course. It cannot be good for Ukraine’s relations with the US and Europe.

Ukrainian Week: Could you explain the latest statement from the State Department and the resolution from the US Congress and Senate? What do they mean?

Pifer: Both resolutions reflect what the Congress really thinks about Ukraine. Administration officials have said that they are not considering sanctions against Ukraine at this point. However, the most recent resolution put forward by Senator Richard Durbin and approved by the Senate in September, called for visa sanctions against specific Ukrainians. I know that some in Ukraine said that the process was not correct or that it was not legitimate (among others, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued such a statement – Ed.). The most striking thing about that was that not a single senator spoke out against the resolution — and the US Congress has been very friendly towards Ukraine for the past 20 years. Now no-one is ready to defend the Ukrainian government. That suggests that the Congress now views Ukraine as a country that has gone off the democratic track. That’s a real problem.

Ukrainian Week: What do you mean when you talk about sanctions?

Pifer: I’d like to make it clear that there is a separation between the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people. The resolutions targeted specific individuals who are responsible for the democratic regression that we are witnessing. I think it is still too early to talk about the application of real sanctions by the Congress. What Kyiv should find worrisome is the fact that this conversation was not even being held just a year-and-a-half ago.

Ukrainian Week: Has there been a precedent of applying similar sanctions? The Congress has just passed the Magnitsky Act, but the Senate has not. What does this mean?

Pifer: The House of Representatives voted on November 16 to pass the Magnitsky Act. The Administration had said that it already put a number of people connected to the case on a no-visa list. It did so partly because it would have liked to retain the right to impose this sort of sanction as an administrative decision, rather than as a result of Congressional action. Ten years ago, the US applied visa sanctions against some people from Belarus. So, there have been cases when the US government resorted to this, but it preferred to do so via administrative or executive decisions, rather than through the law. Ukraine is certainly not Belarus so far, but it is moving in that direction. Look at the very negative reaction from Moscow to the talk about applying sanctions in the Magnitsky Act. I think these kinds of sanctions do have an impact. And I think some people in the Congress are ready to use that approach as a potential tool if Ukraine continues to regress from the democratic path.

Ukrainian Week: Besides the election, what else could trigger sanctions?

Pifer: There are many different problems with democracy in Ukraine. One is the conduct of elections – the 2012 parliamentary election and the 2010 local election. In both cases, the processes seemed to be not as good as the presidential election in early 2010 or the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007. Another concern is the way that the Constitutional Court just decided to tear up the Constitution it had been operating under for five years, and change it to grant more power to the President. There is also concern about how the Verkhovna Rada has operated, and the arrests of other members of the previous government that are now in jail. That is something that never happened in Ukraine before. Only under this Administration have you had cases where officials from a previous government that lost went to jail. When it comes to charges against Tymoshenko for abuse of power because she allegedly cut a bad gas deal with Russia, the argument in the West would be that that was a political decision and she should be punished for it politically. And she was when she lost the election in 2010. Nobody in the West sees this as a criminal matter. And, certainly, the way the trial was conducted was seen as a farce in the West. No matter how much we are told that this was under Ukrainian legal procedures, this will not persuade the West. I regret to say all this. In 2010, I was one of the people who said that we ought to give Yanukovych a chance. He was elected in a free and fair process back then. He had an opportunity. But, unfortunately, we’ve been seeing consistent regression on democracy. After Yanukovych became president, there was an assumption in Washington that Ukraine did not want to join NATO. It seemed pretty clear that the Ukrainian population was not interested in joining NATO. And that was fine – that was a decision for Ukraine. I think Washington concluded in 2010 that the best way for Ukraine to draw closer to Europe back then was to get closer to the EU. But this democratic regression is making it harder and harder.

Ukrainian Week: How will Obama’s victory affect US relations with Ukraine? Many experts claim that the White House is ready to view Ukraine as Russia’s sphere of influence as a result of the US-Russia relations reboot.

Pifer: I think the Administration of Barack Obama has been quite critical of Russia. The number of statements made by the White House and the State Department concerning democracy developments in Russia within the past four years has been striking. You will probably find more statements by the Obama Administration than you did from the Bush Administration. Ukraine should not only be considered in the context of relations with Russia. Ukraine may be held to a different standard than Russia, for two reasons. One may seem somewhat unfair. When the US is engaged in negotiations with Russia, there are a lot of other really big issues for the US Government, such as arms control, Iran and Afghanistan. In this sense, democracy in Russia is just one of many issues. There are probably not so many big issues on Washington or Europe’s agenda where Ukraine comes up, so democracy may get more attention. That’s not fair to Ukraine. The other difference - this one fair enough - is that Yanukovych has been saying consistently that he wants to join Europe and see Ukraine as a modern European state. So, Ukraine is held to a different standard than Russia, because Ukraine has articulated the goal of joining Europe. Unfortunately, having set that bar so high, the Ukrainian government is falling short of that standard under President Yanukovych. And it may be bad geopolitically for the West if Ukraine aligns more closely with Russia. But that threat doesn’t have any weight in the US or Europe. Closer integration with Russia may be a lot worse for Ukraine.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The Ukrainian Week

Image Source: © Anatolii Stepanov / Reuters

Ukraine: Facing Critical Challenges

Fri, 28 Sep 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 28, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Ukraine faces critical challenges on a range of questions: shaping foreign and national security policies appropriate for a medium-sized country located between Europe and Russia; developing a strategy and policies to promote energy security and contribute to sustainable economic growth; and designing educational and cultural policies suitable for advancing the country’s European aspirations and its own national identity. The Ukraine 2020 Policy Dialogue—an initiative of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation supported by the Democracy Grants Program of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv—convened four U.S.-Ukrainian task forces earlier this year to discuss these questions and develop policy recommendations for the Ukrainian and U.S. governments.

On September 28, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted a discussion of the recommendations developed by the Policy Dialogue. Panelists included four co-chairs of the Dialogue’s working groups: Edward Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; William Miller of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Robert Nurick of the Atlantic Council; and Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Angela Stent moderated the discussion. Copies of the Policy Dialogue recommendations were available.

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Ukraine: Facing Critical Challenges

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Event Materials

What Ukraine’s New Language Law Means for National Unity

Steven Pifer and Hannah Thoburn — Tue, 21 Aug 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Dyakuyu or Spasibo? The controversy over whether Russian should be recognized as an official language of Ukraine is so heated that it has compelled Ukrainian politicians to tear each other’s clothes, flip parliamentarians over bannisters, and recently provoked the speaker of parliament to tender his resignation

On August 8, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed a new law, “On the principles of language politics,” that allows cities and regions to pass legislation that would give Russian (or any other minority tongue) the status of an official language if 10 percent or more of the population of that region speaks it as a native tongue.

Most Ukrainians speak and understand both Ukrainian and Russian, and it is not uncommon to hear conversations in which one speaker uses Ukrainian and the other answers in Russian. But 20 years after Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union, that old reality is changing. Increasingly, one can meet western Ukrainian youth who speak no Russian and whose second or third languages are English, German, Polish, or French. They gaze longingly at the European Union and have no desire to speak what they regard as the language of their Soviet repressors and occupiers. Their countrymen in the east, however, are not similarly concerned. Officially, 24 percent of Ukrainians, largely those who live in the east and south, report Russian as their native language. However, many Ukrainians who commonly speak Russian recognize the importance of maintaining Ukrainian as the national language.

After much debate, the official status of the Ukrainian language was enshrined in Ukraine’s 1996 constitution. Despite predictions that the young country would split apart along linguistic lines, the consensus for Ukrainian has largely held and the use of Ukrainian has grown. Russian-speaking politicians have strived to learn and speak to the public in Ukrainian. Although he was a native Russian speaker and often made mistakes, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma did just that. So also did former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko.

President Yanukovych initially made the same choice: to sacrifice his personal comfort for the sake of national unity. But as parliamentary elections approach and his Party of Regions continues to struggle in the polls, Yanukovych has decided to keep a campaign promise to his base in the east and advocate for the promotion of Russian to an official language. It is in no way as a pro-Russian decision, but a base political one.

The hard-won status of Ukrainian as the unifying state language is now in danger. On August 13, the southern city of Odesa’s City Council voted to give Russian the status of an official regional language. The city of Kharkiv did the same a week later. Komsomol’skaya Pravda reports that the president’s home city of Donets’k intends to quickly pass similar legislation. Meanwhile, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a Russian-language stronghold whose autonomous status has long allowed the official use of Russian, the Ukrainian-speaking minority has begun to agitate for the designation of Ukrainian as a regional language. They cite Crimean Tatar, a language spoken by the Crimean Tatar minority, whose official status is enshrined in the Crimean Constitution. Ukrainian speakers now demand the same.

Ukrainians on the whole have shown themselves to be remarkably practical about the language question. Generally it only arises as an issue around elections. The unfortunate result of the Yanukovych administration’s support for the language law has exacerbated nationalist tensions and encouraged underlying ethnic and linguistic animosities. The October parliamentary elections, should they be free and fair, will demonstrate the extent to which ordinary Ukrainian citizens are invested in the continued unity and progress of their country. With the new law on languages, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have only deepened the hole that they have dug for themselves and their country with their poor foreign policy choices and jailing of political opponents. Perhaps the language law will help prompt Ukrainian citizens to take steps this October to begin to climb its way out.

Authors

Steven Pifer
Hannah Thoburn

Ukraine's Wishful Thinking about Washington and Energy

Steven Pifer and Edward Chow — Wed, 27 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

When we visited Kyiv earlier in June to take part in the Ukraine 2020 Dialogue with Ukrainian and European experts, we read with interest Yuliya Mostova’s June 1 article entitled “Independent Yanukovych.”

One thesis of the article— (Zerkalo Nedeli: http://zn.ua/POLITICS/semostoyatelnyy_yanukovich-103152.html)— that the presidential administration at Bankova Street has decided to place emphasis on Ukraine’s relationship with the United States, with a focus on energy development and the recent Chevron tender to develop shale gas, in a belief that Washington would somehow ignore the decline of democratic values in Ukraine—struck us as completely disconnected from the realities of U.S. policy.

We have a great deal of respect for Mostova and her astute observations of the Ukrainian scene. But we wonder whether she might have been “spun”—that is, fed a story line—by Bankova insiders who want to persuade her and her readers that Kyiv can maintain a robust relationship with Washington even while Ukraine backslides on democracy and its relations with the European Union and Russia deteriorate. President Viktor Yanukovych clearly is uncomfortable with his current level of isolation from Western leaders. The presidential administration understandably wants to create the illusion that he is not isolated, that he has a strong relationship with Washington and President Barack Obama.

The alternative is that Mostova’s article accurately captures what presidential administration officials truly believe about Washington’s policy. If that is the case, it shows an astounding example of collective wishful thinking on Bankova’s part. From our conversations with U.S. officials, we see a very different picture.

First, Washington is extremely unhappy about the democratic backsliding that has taken place under Mr. Yanukovych, in particular the selective prosecution of opposition leaders such as former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. There is no difference whatsoever between Washington and the European Union, and the Chevron tender does not change this.

Second, in the current circumstances, there is no great interest in Washington in having contact with Yanukovych. Obama held a very short, standing meeting with Yanukovych on the margins of the March nuclear security summit in Seoul, during which the American president raised the need for free and fair Rada elections in October and the treatment of Tymoshenko. There was no meeting between the two in Chicago in May. Hopes that Yanukovych can have a strong, positive relationship with Obama without addressing the democracy and rule of law problems are simply illusory. The United States has no team in the Euro 2012 football championship, but if it did, Obama would not be traveling to Ukraine to watch it play.

Third, while Chevron has won a tender to develop shale gas, many steps remain necessary before an actual contract can be signed. We hope the Chevron (and Shell) investments will succeed, but we also remember the international energy industry’s interest in Ukraine in the late 1990s to participate in the ample geologic opportunities to increase conventional gas production onshore, followed by the interest in 2005-2006 to explore offshore Black Sea resources. How much new production resulted?

The kinds of barriers to these investments over the past 20 years in the non-transparent Ukrainian energy sector—gas price controls at the burner-tip and wellhead, selective access to the market and even data, state assets hijacked for private use, corporate raids on private energy investors, corrupt middlemen in energy trading, ineffective regulation, inefficient state energy companies—remain in spite of campaign promises made in 2009 on energy reforms by the current government.

The Kharkiv agreement in April 2010 failed to stabilize the critical gas relationship with Russia. Our recent conversations with a broad range of Ukrainian colleagues led us to be concerned that investment conditions have deteriorated in the last two years for everyone except for favored insiders.

Given this background, we tend toward cautious optimism for the shale gas (and future offshore) tenders. We suspect the U.S. government does as well. Large energy investment projects take a long time and serious effort to negotiate properly, execute and mature. Governments should invite world-class companies, such as Chevron and Shell, to invest for sound economic reasons, not in an effort to achieve short-term political gain. And Bankova should disabuse itself of any notion that going forward with such investments will buy it a “pass” in Washington on democracy problems.

Authors

Steven Pifer
Edward Chow

Publication: Kyiv Post

Image Source: GLEB GARANICH

Ukraine’s Foreign Policy: Losing its Balance

Steven Pifer — Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Steven Pifer's "Ukraine’s Foreign Policy: Losing its Balance” appears in the May edition of the Ukrainian language journal “National Security and Defense,” published by the Razumkov Center in Kyiv. The English text of his submission follows. The Ukranian version can be found at Razumkov.org.

Introduction

Two years into the presidency of Victor Yanukovych, Kyiv’s foreign policy finds itself in difficult straits. Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and the West in general are deteriorating. To the east, there is no sign that Moscow will pursue anything other than a hard-nosed bargaining approach, which is unlikely to change with Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency.

At the root of the problem lies a combination of democratic regression in Ukraine and two assumptions that President Yanukovych has apparently made regarding foreign policy: first, that Russia, following the April 2010 Kharkiv accords, would adopt a more charitable approach toward Ukraine, and second, that the European Union attaches such geopolitical importance to Ukraine that it would overlook Kyiv’s turn away from democratic values. Both assumptions have turned out to be miscalculations and are leading Ukraine’s foreign policy to lose its balance.

Ukraine’s Foreign Policy and Balance

Developing an independent foreign policy has posed one of the key challenges for Kyiv since Ukraine reemerged as an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian presidents have generally sought to strike a balance in their foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia.

Given the large space that Russia occupies on Ukraine’s border, the long, complex history between the two countries, cultural links between Ukrainians and Russians, and economic ties that have continued since the end of the Soviet era, it is entirely natural that Ukraine seek a stable, constructive relationship with Russia. That is very much in Ukraine’s national interest.

But Russia is not the easiest of neighbors. Ukraine since 1991 has worked to develop relationships with Europe, the United States and institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Many Ukrainians find the economic prosperity and democratic values of Europe attractive. Moreover, Ukrainian presidents have been motivated in part by a calculation that stronger relations with the West would translate into greater freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Russia.

During his first term in office, Leonid Kuchma, the country’s second president, showed himself to be an able practioner of balance. Under his “multi-vector” policy, Ukraine in 1996 secured a strategic relationship with the United States supported by the establishment of the Gore-Kuchma binational commission. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO agreed on a distinctive partnership. To a significant degree, Kuchma pursued these out of concern about Russian policy toward Ukraine, and he used Kyiv’s developing relations with the West to secure improved relations with Moscow. In May 1997, Ukraine and Russia concluded a treaty that contained the unambiguous recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity that Kyiv had long sought, and settled the remaining issues regarding basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. In the 1990s, a balanced foreign policy proved a success for Kuchma and Ukraine.

Yanukovych’s Engagement of Russia

Victor Yanukovych took office as Ukraine’s fourth president in February 2010. He and his senior advisers believed that bilateral relations with Russia had fallen to a dangerous low during the presidency of his predecessor, Victor Yushchenko. Ukrainian officials candidly stated that “normalizing” the relationship with Moscow had to be Yanukovych’s first foreign policy priority.

Yanukovych moved quickly to change domestic and foreign policies that had prompted the harshest Russian complaints. The Ukrainian government deemphasized efforts to promote use of the Ukrainian language, ended the campaign to have the Holodomor recognized as genocide, and toned down its relationship with Georgia. As for relations with NATO, the Yanukovych government made clear that it sought neither membership nor a membership action plan.

Yanukovych met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Kharkiv in April 2010, just two months after taking office. The Ukrainian side agreed to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s basing lease for an additional 25 years to 2042, satisfying a key Russian interest. In return, Russia’s Gazprom agreed to reduce the price that it charged Naftohaz for natural gas by $100 per thousand cubic meters for the remainder of the ten-year gas contract concluded in 2009. Ukrainian officials praised the deal for significantly cutting Ukraine’s energy costs. (Independent energy experts, however, questioned whether Kyiv could have negotiated a better deal, perhaps without having to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s lease. In retrospect, Yanukovych’s team failed to foresee the rise in energy prices that later devalued the discount.)

Seeking Balance

From the beginning of Yanukovych’s presidency, Ukrainian officials indicated that, while their first foreign policy priority would be improving relations with Moscow, Kyiv intended to do so in the context of a policy that pursued balance between Ukraine’s relationship with the West and that with Russia. Senior Ukrainian officials made clear that, while eschewing membership in NATO, they sought a cooperative relationship. They stressed their interest in working with the European Union to conclude an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement (FTA), as the primary vehicle for Ukraine’s integration into Europe.

Several developments in May and June 2010 gave evidence of Kyiv’s desire for balance. The Rada voted by a large majority to approve the annual plan for military exercises in Ukraine, most of which involved joint training with NATO forces. Ukrainian officials rejected the idea of joining a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which they termed to be incompatible with an FTA with the European Union. They said that Kyiv had no interest in joining the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Western diplomats reported that the Ukrainian government was doing its homework to conclude an association agreement, working in a more serious manner than had been the case during Yushchenko’s presidency. Some diplomats opined that Yanukovych, whatever his flaws, liked the thought of being the person who brought Ukraine into Europe.

By summer 2010, reports in Kyiv suggested that senior Ukrainian officials, including at Bankova, had become disenchanted with Russia’s policies. They felt that Moscow had not responded with the kind of forthcoming approach that Kyiv had taken to solving problems in March and April. They questioned, for example, why Russia continued to pursue the South Stream gas pipeline, which would run under the Black Sea and circumvent Ukraine, when the Ukrainian gas transit system had excess capacity. South Stream, if constructed, would only take gas from pipelines flowing through Ukraine.

Yanukovych, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and other senior officials in 2011 increasingly voiced unhappiness with Russia’s position on the gas price. They asserted that the price—even with the discount negotiated the year before in Kharkiv—was too high and unfair. Gazprom, however, showed no sign of compromising. When Naftohaz in late 2011 stated that it would import only 27 billion cubic meters of gas in 2012, Gazprom cited the “take or pay” provision in the contract and said that it obligated Ukraine to take, or in any case pay for, 41.6 billion cubic meters.

Democratic Regression and Deteriorating Relations with Europe

Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 as the result of an electoral process that domestic and Western observers found to be free, fair and competitive. Some observers credited it as the best election process in Ukraine’s history.

By 2011, however, Europe saw democracy in Ukraine as coming under increasing assault, and concern grew about the government’s authoritarian tendencies. Some of the particularly troubling examples: widespread reports of inappropriate activities by the Security Service of Ukraine; the Constitutional Court’s September 2010 decision to invalidate the constitutional changes approved by the Rada in December 2004; nationwide local elections in October 2010 that were seen to have significant flaws; and the arrest and trial of former officials who had served in the previous cabinet, including former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. In January 2011, democratic backsliding resulted in Ukraine becoming the first post-Soviet state to lose its “free” ranking from Freedom House.

These authoritarian trends have stressed Kyiv’s relations with the European Union. The Tymoshenko case came to epitomize the problem of selective application of the law in Ukraine. Following her jailing in August 2011, some EU member-state parliamentary deputies announced that they would oppose ratification of the EU-Ukraine association agreement and FTA unless Tymoshenko was released. On the margins of a September conference in Crimea, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fuele and European Parliament member Elmar Brok met for nearly two hours with Yanukovych and cautioned him on the damage that the Tymoshenko case was doing to EU-Ukrainian relations. Following the meeting, they believed that Yanukovych understood the problem and saw a path forward. As Yanukovych himself noted during the conference, the Rada intended to examine the criminal code with a view to eliminating outdated provisions. Eliminating the provision that provided the basis for the charge against Tymoshenko appeared to offer an elegant solution to her case. At the end of September, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated to Yanukovych that the trials of opposition figures would hinder EU-Ukrainian relations.

The Party of Regions in October, however, chose not to annul the relevant article from the criminal code. Just a few days later, the court convicted Tymoshenko. Brussels and many EU member-states condemned the verdict, and EU officials postponed a planned Yanukovych visit to Brussels. In November, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite and Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski each met with Yanukovych and warned again that Tymoshenko’s imprisonment would undermine EU-Ukraine relations.

Given the lack of Ukrainian responsiveness to EU concerns regarding Tymoshenko, a number of EU countries reportedly argued in favor of canceling the planned December EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv. As it was, the summit went forward, stripped of any ceremony. European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and EU Commission Head Jose Manuel Barrosso met briefly with Yanukovych, did not sign the association agreement, and told the press that signature would depend on political developments in Ukraine, particularly Tymoshenko’s situation.

The Risk to Kyiv

EU-Ukraine relations developed in a positive and business-like direction during the second half of 2010. That changed in 2011. By March 2012, they were, in the most charitable assessment, at a standstill and, in blunter evaluations, deteriorating. The March 4 New York Times published an article entitled “Ukraine’s Slide” authored by Bildt, British Foreign Minister William Hague, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. The article noted that “developments in Ukraine in the last two years have caused us to question Kyiv’s intentions with respect to the fundamental values that underpin both the [association] agreement and our relations in a broader sense,” and described the basis for “our growing concerns regarding the state of democracy in Ukraine.” Such a letter, signed by five foreign ministers representing a cross section of views within the European Union, should worry Kyiv.

In a March 20 response, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Gryshchenko wrote that “Ukraine is committed to European values.” In an interview published in the April 2 Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Yanukovych asserted that his government would “conduct the necessary reforms to strengthen democracy and the rule of law based on our shared values.” The problem for Yanukovych and his government is that no one in Europe believes this.

Although the association agreement was initialed in a low-key meeting in Brussels on March 30, it faces major hurdles. As Van Rompuy indicated in December, the European Union does not intend to move forward with signature and ratification of the agreement and FTA until political circumstances in Ukraine change. There is no consensus among EU member-states to sign. The association agreement and FTA must be approved by each of the 27 EU member-states, and a number of member-state parliamentarians have made clear that they would oppose ratification until the internal democratic situation in Ukraine improves.

This endangers Yanukovych’s professed goal of having a balanced foreign policy—at a time when the frustration of senior Ukrainian officials with Russia is readily apparent. The two countries’ interests diverge on important issues. Take gas: why should Gazprom agree to cut what it argues is a price established by a valid contract? Instead, reports emerged in March that Gazprom was switching the route of gas in-transit to Europe from the Ukrainian pipeline system to the pipelines through Belarus, over which Gazprom had recently acquired control.

Yanukovych’s Miscalculations

Kyiv has slipped into this uncomfortable position due to two apparent miscalculations by Yanukovych. First, he appears to have assumed that, if he extended the Black Sea Fleet lease and ended Ukrainian policies that troubled Russia, Moscow would reciprocate and offer Kyiv more than just the April 2010 discount on the price of gas. This assumption has turned out to be wrong. The Russians continue to take a hard-nosed bargaining approach with Kyiv and seek things that will be very difficult for Yanukovych to give. Gazprom wants control over the pipeline system that crisscrosses Ukraine, while the Russian government wants Kyiv to join the customs union.

There is little reason to expect Moscow to adopt a softer approach, particularly at a time when the Russians see that Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and the West in general are in trouble. Does anyone believe that negotiations will become easier for Kyiv when Putin—who reportedly does not particularly like Yanukovych—is back in the Russian presidency?

Yanukovych’s second miscalculation relates to how the European Union regards Ukraine. He seems to have believed that Europe would overlook—or at most react passively to—his policies of democratic regression, and he greatly overestimates the geopolitical value that the European Union attaches to Ukraine. He appears to believe that Ukraine matters more to the European Union than the European Union should matter to Ukraine, and that the European Union will turn a blind eye to Ukraine’s democratic backsliding out of fear that, if the European Union does not embrace Ukraine, the country will fall back into Moscow’s orbit.

Yanukovych’s judgment on this also is wrong. He may have made this miscalculation in part due to Western statements rejecting the notion of a Russian sphere of influence. But for EU officials, as well as most member-states, the issue is less about geopolitics than values. Europe is clearly distressed by what is happening in Ukraine, and that extends beyond the treatment of Tymoshenko (who appears likely to face further criminal charges). For many EU member-states, values are the same as EU interests when it comes to Ukraine, because they see a truly democratic Ukrainian state as a better, more stable and more transparent partner. Following the March 30 initialing of the association agreement, Brok stated:

“The association agreement can only be signed and ratified once the Ukrainian government has created the necessary preconditions. This is the policy of all European institutions, and the European Parliament in particular. These preconditions include the compliance with basic rules for democracy and the rule of law. This includes putting an end to the persecution and imprisonment of opposition politicians, which is unacceptable and not in accordance with the rule of law. The opposition must have the right to take part in the election campaign with its leadership, under the same conditions in relation to the electoral law and the media.”

Where there once was consensus in EU councils on working with Ukraine, the country now is increasingly viewed as a nuisance rather than an asset. This comes at an inopportune moment for Kyiv. Perhaps more so than at any time in the past 20 years, problems in the European Union, such as the eurozone crisis, are leading member-states to believe that the EU’s attention must be focused inward. Some member-states do not want to see Ukraine draw closer to the European Union. For those states, democratic regression offers a reason to justify slowing the pace of EU engagement with Kyiv. And Kyiv’s traditional advocates in the European Union—such as Poland, Lithuania and Sweden—show signs of tiring of the effort to support Ukraine.

All of this bodes poorly for Kyiv’s ability to pursue its foreign policy. Instead of striking a balance of solid links with both Europe and Russia, Yanukovych’s policies are producing the opposite.

Some analysts in the West question whether Yanukovych understands this. It is difficult to believe that he does not. EU leaders and senior officials have explained the problem directly to him. Other analysts question whether he cares, suggesting that he is so preoccupied with amassing political and economic power at home that he pays little attention to foreign policy and the costs of democratic backsliding. That does not seem consistent with the image of someone ever eager to meet with EU leaders and Barack Obama. And he may not have the luxury of not caring.

As Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and the broader West deteriorate, Yanukovych will find his isolation growing and Kyiv’s position vis-à-vis Moscow weaker. That will have consequences for what happens in Ukraine, including to the Ukrainian economy, which is accumulating energy debts that may prove difficult to sustain. For example, the European Union and the United States have at times in the past encouraged the International Monetary Fund to take a lenient approach when Kyiv failed to fulfill the conditions of its IMF program. There is little sentiment in the West for that now.

At some point, Yanukovych will have to face the fact that he can have an authoritarian political structure, difficult relations with Europe and the West, and a greatly weakened hand in dealing with Russia, or he can return to a more democratic approach and have a stronger relationship with Europe and the West and a balanced foreign policy. If he believes that he can find a way to have an authoritarian system at home while achieving a balanced foreign policy, he risks making yet another miscalculation.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: National Security and Defense

Image Source: Gleb Garanich / Reuters

Europe’s Three Eastern Questions

Javier Solana — Thu, 07 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Today, the European project is shaking. Of course, I am confident that the eurozone’s ongoing sovereign-debt crisis will be overcome, and that a more integrated and effective Europe will emerge. But, to get to that improved Europe, not only must the sovereign debt crisis be resolved; relations with three major countries to Europe’s east – Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine – will need to be put on more secure footing.

I was of the generation in my country that lived through the transition from dictatorship to democracy four decades ago. For us, the European Union was a dream. Indeed, we used to quote Ortega y Gasset: “If Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution.”

I continue to believe, very deeply, that Europe is the solution, particularly for societies that need to deepen – if not establish – a democratic tradition. Closer relations between Europe and Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine can deliver for them many of the same benefits that we in Spain always associated with Europe.

Read the full article at projectsyndicate.org »

Authors

Javier Solana

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: Fatih Saribas / Reuters

Ukraine, Geopolitics and Miscalculation

Steven Pifer — Fri, 01 Jun 2012 15:10:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Steven Pifer published an op-ed on Ukraine's current foreign policy difficulties in the Russian-language Ukrainian weekly Korrespondent. The English text of his submission follows below, with the Russian-language Korrespondent version, which was published on June 1, below it.

Two years into his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych’s professed foreign policy of balancing Ukraine’s relations with the West and Russia appears to lie in shambles. The European Union has frozen signature of the association agreement and free trade arrangement. He had to cancel his Central European summit in Yalta because most of the invitees declined to attend, and NATO leaders in Chicago displayed little desire for bilateral meetings with him. Meanwhile, Moscow shows no interest in granting Kyiv’s most fervent request—a lower price for natural gas—unless Ukraine surrenders control of its gas transport system or joins the Customs Union, the latter of which would kill the EU free trade arrangement.

The core of the problem lies in the sharp downturn in Ukraine’s relations with Europe. That is bad in and of itself, but it also is a major factor in Moscow’s tough stance toward Kyiv. The Russians calculate that Mr. Yanukovych has backed himself into a corner from which there are no good exits.

Over the past two years, the president repeatedly stated that his priority foreign policy objective was to bring Ukraine closer to, and eventually into, the European Union. But democratic regression and selective prosecution of opposition leaders, such as Yuliya Tymoshenko, have stymied Kyiv’s efforts to improve its ties with Europe and pose an obstacle to Ukraine’s relations with the United States. Mr. Yanukovych miscalculated. He assumed that he could pursue political repression at home and nonetheless enjoy good relations with the West.

Watching this play out over the past year has been like watching a slow motion train-wreck. At several points, Mr. Yanukovych could have changed course. For example, last October he could have had the Party of Regions amend the criminal code to annul the article that was the basis for last summer’s trial of Ms. Tymoshenko. But he chose not to switch course, and Ukraine’s relations with the West have plummeted.

Part of Mr. Yanukovych’s obstinacy may result from an inflated sense of Ukraine’s geopolitical weight. Many in the Ukrainian elite appear to hold the view that Ukraine’s geopolitical importance to Europe and the United States is so crucial—that Ukraine matters so much in a geopolitical tug-of-war between the West and Russia—that the West would ignore democracy problems and embrace Ukraine, for fear that Kyiv otherwise would fall into Moscow’s orbit. Over the past ten years, both as a U.S. government official and as a private citizen, I have had Ukrainians tell me “if the West does this, you will push us into the arms of the Russians.”

That line, and the implicit threat it seems to convey, goes down badly in the West. It suggests a lack of commitment on Ukraine’s part to joining Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. It implies that Ukraine is an object of the foreign policy of others rather than a subject capable of determining its own foreign policy course. Most strikingly, it disregards the fact—fully recognized in Europe and the United States—that falling “into the arms of the Russians” is not in the interests of Ukraine.

The West bears some blame for fueling this sense of geopolitical importance. Most recently, the NATO summit declaration in Chicago, before criticizing domestic problems within Ukraine, stated that “an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.” So one can understand why there is the belief in Kyiv in Ukraine’s central geopolitical importance.

To be sure, in developing the EU’s policy toward Ukraine, some EU member states have been guided by geopolitical considerations. But they now are clearly in the minority. For the large majority of EU member-states, values matter and drive EU interests regarding Ukraine. Those countries see a Ukraine that embraces Europe’s democratic values as a more stable, transparent and predictable partner than one which does not. There is little interest, on the other hand, in engaging closely with a Ukraine that appears headed down the path toward becoming another Belarus rather than another Poland.

A similar view has taken hold in the United States. When Mr. Yanukovych abandoned pursuit of a closer relationship with NATO, the U.S. government threw its weight behind supporting a closer EU-Ukraine relationship as the best way to draw Ukraine into Europe. Values matter for Washington as well, and the U.S. government will not try to argue to the European Union that it should set those values aside.

If Mr. Yanukovych clings to a hope that the West will ignore the democratic regression and rule of law problems in order to keep Ukraine away from Russia, he will continue to miscalculate. And before telling the West that “if you do this, you will push us into the arms of the Russians,” Kyiv should think carefully. When a man walks into a bank, pulls out a gun, points it at his head, and demands $100,000 or “the hostage gets it,” the threat rarely succeeds.

Мнение: Просчет Януковича

Президент Виктор Янукович переоценивает геополитическое значение Украины. Запад не будет закрывать глаза на репрессии внутри страны ради того, чтобы удержать Киев от сближения с Москвой, пишет в своей колонке Стивен Пайфер, бывший посол США в Украине, в новом номере журнала Корреспондент.

За два года президентства Виктора Януковича исповедуемая им политика балансирования между Западом и Россией потерпела полный крах. Европейский союз заморозил подписание соглашений об ассоциации и Зоне свободной торговли. Янукович был вынужден отменить саммит глав государств Центральной Европы в Ялте, поскольку большинство приглашенных отказались приехать. Лидеры НАТО в Чикаго не выказывают желания проводить двусторонние встречи с украинским лидером. В то же время Москва отказывается снизить цену на газ для Киева до тех пор, пока Украина не передаст ей контроль над своей газотранспортной системой или не присоединится к Таможенному союзу, что закроет путь в Зону свободной торговли с ЕС.

Суть проблемы в том, что отношения Украины с Европой резко пошли на спад. Это, кроме того что плохо само по себе, является главной причиной ужесточения позиции Москвы по отношению к Киеву. Русские сочли, что Янукович загнал себя в тупик, приемлемого выхода из которого просто не существует.

Последние два года Президент то и дело повторял, что приоритетом его внешней политики является сближение Украины с Европой, а в идеале - членство в ЕС. Но сворачивание демократии и преследование лидеров оппозиции, таких как экс-премьер-министр Юлия Тимошенко, сводят на нет попытки Киева сблизиться с Европой и ухудшают отношения с США. Янукович просчитался, полагая, что может проводить репрессии в Украине и сохранять хорошие отношения с Западом.

Наблюдение со стороны за всем происходящим на протяжении последнего года напоминает наблюдение за записью крушения поезда, пущенной в замедленном режиме. Причем в определенные моменты Янукович мог сменить курс. Например, в октябре прошлого года он мог поручить Партии регионов изменить Уголовный кодекс, чтобы декриминализовать статью, по которой была осуждена Тимошенко. Но он решил этого не делать, и отношения Украины с Западом пошли под откос.

Отчасти упрямство Януковича можно объяснить переоценкой геополитического веса Украины. Многие представители местной властной элиты уверены, что геополитическое значение Украины для Европы и США так велико и в игре Запада и России она так много значит, что Запад закроет глаза на проблемы с демократией и примет Украину с распростертыми объятиями, лишь бы не допустить попадания Киева в зону притяжения Москвы. Последние лет десять я только и слышал от украинцев: "Если Запад не примет нас, он отдаст нас прямо в руки России".

Такая линия поведения, а также скрытая угроза, которую она подразумевает, на Западе воспринимается плохо. Для тамошних политиков это знак недостаточной приверженности Украины идее евроинтеграции и вступления в евроатлантическое сообщество. Это означает также, что на внешнеполитической арене Украина играет роль скорее объекта в сфере интересов других государств, чем субъекта, способного самостоятельно определять собственную внешнюю политику. И самое поразительное, что страна совершенно игнорирует очевидную для Европы и США истину: упасть в объятия России не в интересах Украины.

Запад отчасти ответственен за поддержание этого чувства геополитической значимости. Совсем недавно в декларации саммита НАТО в Чикаго шла речь о том, что "независимая, суверенная и стабильная Украина, твердо приверженная демократии и верховенству права, - это ключ к евроатлантической безопасности". Так что можно понять, почему кое-кто в Киеве так уверен в огромном значении Украины для Запада.

Конечно же, некоторые члены Евросоюза в разработке политики ЕС по отношению к Украине исходят из соображений геополитического характера. Но сейчас таковых меньшинство. Для большинства же членов ЕС определяющим фактором в отношении к Украине является ее приверженность демократическим ценностям. Эти страны считают, что демократическая Украина - более надежный, открытый и предсказуемый партнер, чем недемократическая. С другой стороны, им не слишком интересно строить отношения с государством, идущим по пути Беларуси, а не Польши, например.

Похожих взглядов придерживаются и в Соединенных Штатах. Когда Янукович отказался от сближения с НАТО, правительство США изо всех сил поддерживало налаживание более близких отношений Украины с ЕС, видя в этом лучший способ постепенного вовлечения страны в Европу. Но для Вашингтона, так же как и для Евросоюза, важны ценности демократии, и правительство США ни в коем случае не станет убеждать ЕС забыть о них ради Украины.

Если Янукович до сих пор надеется, что Запад будет игнорировать сворачивание демократии и проблемы с верховенством права в Украине, только бы удержать ее от сближения с Россией, то он продолжает заблуждаться. Стоит хорошенько подумать, прежде чем заявлять Западу: "Порицая нас, вы толкаете нас в объятия Москвы". Человеку, заходящему в банк с ружьем и грозящему застрелиться, если кассир не выдаст ему $ 100 тыс., не стоит рассчитывать на успех предприятия.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Korrespondent

Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: A Conversation with Javier Solana

Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 13, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Stability in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, already precarious, is being further strained. The political prospects of several countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia, remain unclear. The region is grappling with the fallout of the economic crisis, and Russia and Turkey, in particular, are threatened by the turmoil in the Arab world.

On April 13, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana for a discussion on how the European Union (EU) and NATO should engage with Europe’s strategic partners in the East and Southeast. As a former secretary general of NATO and secretary-general of the Council of the European Union, Solana offered insight into the prospects for future EU and NATO enlargement, the potential impact of the eurozone crisis on the region and how Europeans should attempt to cooperate with their neighbors in tackling global challenges.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Video

Participants

Panelists

Ukraine’s Drift Away from Europe and the Western Response

Tue, 27 Mar 2012 13:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 27, 2012
1:30 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Two years after Viktor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine, serious questions have arisen about the state of democracy in the country and the economy, particularly in the crucial energy sector. At the same time, the gap between Ukraine and Europe appears to be growing, raising questions about how the United States and Europe should respond.

On March 27, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a discussion on the challenges facing Ukraine, the U.S. and the European Union. In the first panel, Edward Chow, senior fellow with the Center for Strategic & International Studies; Nadia Diuk, vice president at the National Endowment for Democracy; and Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer will discuss current Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy. Brookings Senior Fellow Fiona Hill, director of CUSE, will moderate. In the second panel, Pirkka Tapiola, an officer with the European External Action Service, and Daniel Russell, deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, will discuss the European Union and U.S. policy responses. Senior Fellow Steven Pifer will moderate.

After each panel, participants will take audience questions.

Transcript

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Edward Chow

Senior Fellow
Center for Strategic & International Studies

Nadia Diuk

Vice President, Programs—Africa, Central Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean
National Endowment for Democracy

Daniel Russell

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Pirkka Tapiola

Strategic Planning Division
European External Action Service

Ukraine's Perilous Balancing Act between Russia and the EU

Steven Pifer — Tue, 28 Feb 2012 15:53:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Since Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the primary foreign policy challenge confronting policy makers in Kiev has been to strike the proper balance between Ukraine’s relations with the West and its relations with Russia. Ukrainian presidents over the past 20 years have structured this balance with the purpose of fixing Ukraine’s identity on the European map, ensuring that Ukraine does not end up as a borderland between an enlarging Europe and a recalcitrant Russia, and gaining greater freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. Such a balance has generally served Ukraine well, but maintaining it has always been tricky.

It is becoming even trickier in 2012. President Viktor Yanukovych, who took office in 2010, has overseen a democratic regression in Ukraine that complicates his effort to keep a balance between relations with the West and with Russia. His domestic political agenda, driven by tactical goals and personal animus toward his rival, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, is hindering achievement of his professed strategic goal of drawing Ukraine closer to the European Union. And this comes at a time when Europe and the United States are preoccupied with other questions and have less time and patience for Kiev.

Yanukovych is playing a geopolitical game in which he appears to assume that the West, and the EU in particular, will overlook his democratic backsliding and embrace Ukraine. This miscalculation risks throwing Ukraine’s foreign policy out of balance. It could gravely undermine Kiev’s bargaining position in dealing with a Russia that is prepared to play hardball with its Ukrainian neighbor.

The Overbearing Neighbor

Russia has been, is, and will remain a major factor in Kiev’s foreign policy calculus—as well as a player affecting that calculus. It could hardly be otherwise given Russia’s size and geographic proximity, the historical and cultural links between the two countries, and the economic ties that linger even two decades after the end of the Soviet command economy. Still, as those two decades have shown, Russia can be an overbearing neighbor. Most Ukrainian strategists thus have concluded that Kiev requires strong relations with the West as a counterweight. Moreover, the democratic values and prosperity enjoyed by the EU have long attracted many Ukrainians.

Since the Soviet Union formally disbanded in December 1991, the Russian government has sought to maintain significant influence in the post-Soviet space, in part through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Newly independent Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, adopted a cautious approach toward the CIS, concerned that Russia would use it to undercut Ukraine’s sovereignty. He moved quickly in 1992, for example, to assert control over the armed forces on Ukrainian territory rather than leaving them under a CIS command structure dominated by Moscow.

At the same time, Kravchuk strove to fix a Ukrainian identity within Europe and gain freedom of maneuver in dealing with the Russians. He launched an effort to build links to institutions such as the EU and NATO, as well as strong bilateral relationships with the United States and key European states. In 1994, Ukraine began negotiating an EU partnership and cooperation agreement and became the first post-Soviet state to join NATO’s newly announced Partnership for Peace program.

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Steven Pifer

Publication: Current History

Developments in Ukraine and Implications for U.S. Policy

Steven Pifer — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 16:30:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Steven Pifer outlines the democratic regression that has taken place within Ukraine during the two years of President Yanukovych’s tenure in office and the negative impact that has had on Ukraine’s relations with Europe and the United States. Pifer concludes that U.S. policy, in coordination with that of the European Union, should work to crystallize in Mr. Yanukovych’s mind a choice: he can have a more authoritarian political system, more difficult relations with the West, and a greatly weakened hand in dealing with Russia, or he can return to a more democratic approach and have a stronger relationship with the West and a balanced foreign policy.

Introduction

Madam Chairwoman, Senator Barrasso, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on developments in Ukraine and the implications for U.S. policy and U.S. policy goals in Europe.

When Victor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine in February 2010, his first foreign policy priority was to repair what he regarded to be Ukraine’s badly frayed relationship with Russia. At the same time, his government indicated that Ukraine would seek a balance between its relationship with the West—particularly the European Union—and that with Russia. This seemed a sensible course for Ukraine in its current circumstances.

Regrettably, the first two years of President Yanukovych’s tenure in office have seen a significant regression in democratic practices within Ukraine. That is unfortunate for the Ukrainian people, and it is blocking the strengthening of Ukraine’s relations with the European Union and the United States. EU officials have made clear, for example, that the signature of an EU association agreement with Ukraine depends on Kyiv taking certain steps, such as releasing former Prime Minister Tymoshenko from prison.

Mr. Yanukovych’s domestic policies are seriously undermining his ability to balance Ukraine’s relationships between the West and Russia. That will complicate Ukrainian foreign policy, leaving it less connected to Europe and in a weaker position to deal with Russia on issues where Ukrainian and Russian interests do not coincide.

It remains in the U.S. interest that Ukraine develop as a stable, independent, democratic, market-oriented state increasingly integrated into Europe and institutions such as the European Union. That kind of Ukraine promotes the U.S. objective of a wider, more stable and secure Europe. Democratic regression within Ukraine, however, impedes that country’s ability to draw closer to the West.

The U.S. government should continue to underscore to Kyiv U.S. concerns about democratic backsliding and remind the Ukrainian leadership that its internal political policies have a significant impact on its relationships with the United States and Europe; keep the door open for a more positive relationship with Ukraine should Kyiv heed the message on democracy; and coordinate closely with the European Union to maximize the impact of Western policy on decisions by Mr. Yanukovych and the Ukrainian leadership.

While engaging Ukraine at most diplomatic levels, the United States and European Union should continue what appears to be a de facto policy of minimizing high-level contact with Mr. Yanukovych until he alters his internal political policies. The West should seek to crystallize in Mr. Yanukovych’s mind the choice between a more authoritarian political system and a strong relationship with the West, and make clear that he cannot have both.

Ukraine’s Foreign Policy—A History of Balance

Developing an independent foreign policy has posed one of the key challenges for Kyiv since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian presidents have generally sought a balance in their foreign policy relationships between the West and Russia. Europe and the West are attractive to many Ukrainians. Ukraine ought to be able to develop stronger relations with the European and trans-Atlantic communities without rupturing relations with Russia, which are also important to many in Ukraine.

Given the large space that Russia occupies on Ukraine’s border, the long, complex history between the two countries, cultural links between Ukrainians and Russians, and economic ties that have continued since the end of the Soviet era, it is natural that Ukraine seek a stable relationship with Russia. At the same time, Russia is not the easiest of neighbors. Ukrainian presidents thus have sought to develop relationships with the United States, Europe and institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Ukraine’s leaders have been motivated in part by a desire to gain greater freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Russia.

For example, Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, moved immediately after Ukraine regained independence to build strong relationships with the West. When he could not reach agreement with Moscow on the terms for the elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, he involved the United States. The resulting trilateral process successfully brokered a deal in early 1994.

President Leonid Kuchma, who took office in July 1994, established a strategic partnership with the United States, concluded a partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union, and agreed to a distinctive partnership with NATO. As Ukraine’s relations with the West strengthened, Moscow softened its approach toward Kyiv. In May 1997, Ukraine and Russia resolved the long-standing issue of basing rights for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea on terms acceptable to Kyiv, and signed a bilateral treaty that incorporated a clear and unambiguous recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—something Ukrainian officials had sought since 1991.

President Victor Yushchenko assumed office in 2005 following the Orange Revolution. While seeking stable relations with Moscow, he made no secret of his desire to integrate Ukraine fully into institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Kyiv opened negotiation of an association agreement with the European Union and asked for a NATO membership action plan. Other Yushchenko policies—including expanded use of the Ukrainian language, seeking to have the Holodomor recognized as genocide, and support for Georgian President Saakashvili—plus disputes over gas purchase contracts further angered Moscow. Relations between the two countries hit a low point in 2009. But the president failed to build elite or public support for his course; many Ukrainians grew concerned over the downturn in relations with Russia.

Mr. Yanukovych’s Foreign Policy

Victor Yanukovych became Ukraine’s fourth president in February 2010. He believed that “normalizing” relations with Russia should be his first foreign policy priority.

President Yanukovych met with Russian President Medvedev in Kharkiv less than two months after taking office. At the meeting, the Ukrainians agreed to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s basing lease for an additional 25 years. In return, Russia’s Gazprom agreed to reduce the price that it charged Ukraine for natural gas by $100 per thousand cubic meters for the remainder of the multi-year gas contract signed in 2009. Mr. Yanukovych and other Ukrainian officials praised the arrangement for significantly reducing Ukraine’s energy costs, though independent energy experts question whether Kyiv might not have negotiated a better deal, perhaps without having to extend the Black Sea Fleet’s lease. The government rammed the agreement through the Rada (parliament) within just a few days of signature and with no substantial parliamentary discussion, despite opposition by the Rada’s foreign affairs, European integration and national security committees.

At the same time, Kyiv dropped other policies that had generated Russian complaints: it downgraded the program to promote use of the Ukrainian language, ended the campaign to get the Holodomor recognized as genocide, and toned down relations with Georgia. While expressing interest in maintaining cooperative relations with NATO, the Yanukovych government made clear that it sought neither membership nor a membership action plan. With these policies, Kyiv swept the bilateral agenda with Moscow clear of most issues that the Russians had considered problematic.

Even before the Kharkiv meeting, however, Ukrainian officials indicated that, while their first foreign policy priority was repairing the relationship with Russia, Kyiv planned to do so in the context of an overall policy that pursued balance between Ukraine’s relationship with the West and that with Russia. Senior Ukrainian officials made clear that Ukraine remained very interested in concluding an association agreement, which would include a deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement (FTA), and a visa facilitation agreement with the European Union as the vehicles to strengthen Ukraine’s integration into Europe.

Ukrainian officials also indicated that they wanted a robust relationship with the United States. By all accounts, President Yanukovych was delighted with the opportunity that he had for a bilateral meeting with President Obama on the margins of the April 2010 nuclear security summit in Washington.

One could see Kyiv’s outreach to the West and effort to strike a balanced foreign policy in several developments in May and June 2010. The Rada voted overwhelmingly to approve the annual plan for military exercises on Ukrainian territory, most of which involved NATO forces. Ukrainian officials ruled out the possibility of joining a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as that would be incompatible with an FTA with the European Union. Kyiv declined to join the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Moscow billed as a Eurasian counterpart to NATO.

Western diplomats in 2010 also reported that the Ukrainian government was doing its homework to prepare an association agreement and FTA with the European Union in a more serious manner than had been the case during the Yushchenko presidency. A number of Western diplomats expressed the view that President Yanukovych wanted to be seen as the one who “brought Ukraine into Europe.”

Other reports suggested that senior Ukrainian officials were becoming unhappy with Russia’s policies. For example, Ukrainian officials questioned why Moscow continued to pursue the South Stream gas pipeline, which would run along the Black Sea bottom and circumvent Ukraine, when the Ukrainian gas transit system had considerable excess capacity. As the Russians had no new gas to flow into South Stream, the pipeline, if constructed, would only divert gas from pipelines through Ukraine.

Kyiv’s frustrations grew in 2011 as senior Ukrainian officials asserted that the price for Russian gas—even with the Kharkiv discount of $100 per thousand cubic meters—was too high and “unfair.” Gazprom showed no sign of budging. Ukrainian complaints increased at the end of the year, and Kyiv informed Gazprom that it would import only 27 billion cubic meters of gas in 2012. Gazprom officials responded that Ukraine had a “take or pay” contract and was obligated to take—or in any case pay for—41.6 billion cubic meters. These issues are currently unresolved. Press reports in December suggested that the Ukrainians were considering plans that would give Gazprom significant control of the Ukrainian gas pipeline system. Gazprom has long coveted Ukraine’s gas transit infrastructure, but there likely would be significant resistance in Kyiv to ceding control.

Democratic Regression

Mr. Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 as the result of a process that domestic and international observers found to be free, fair and competitive. Ms. Tymoshenko, who lost in the run-off round by about three percent of the vote, briefly challenged the result but offered no compelling evidence of major fraud. Western governments quickly recognized the result, which was Ukraine’s fifth consecutive nationwide election following the Orange Revolution to win plaudits from election observers.

Unfortunately, questions soon arose about the Yanukovych government’s commitment to democratic principles and practices. Over the course of 2010 and 2011, concern grew about the government’s authoritarian tendencies. Some of the most troubling examples:

Widespread reports began to emerge in spring 2010 of inappropriate activities by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), including approaching university officials for information and reporting on students who had taken part in anti-government protests. SBU officers also reportedly approached non-governmental organizations to seek information on their activities.

On September 30, 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine invalidated the changes to the constitution approved by the Rada in December 2004, after the replacement of four judges who opposed the decision by four new judges who supported it. The result was to revert to the constitution that had been in effect prior to the Orange Revolution, which gave the president significantly stronger powers and weakened the authority of the Rada. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) issued a report the following December which raised numerous questions about the Constitutional Court’s action. The report noted “it is clear that a change of the political system of a country based on a ruling of a constitutional court does not enjoy the legitimacy which only the regular constitutional procedure for constitutional amendment and preceding open and inclusive public debate can bring.”

Ukraine held nationwide local elections in October 2010. Observers found significant flaws, and both the European Union and U.S. government expressed concern. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe observer group issued a report in March 2011 noting concern over “a newly adopted local election law which created politically unbalanced electoral commissions, discretionary registration of candidates and overly complicated voting and counting procedures.” The report concluded with the assessment that “overall, the local elections of 31 October 2010 in Ukraine met neither the standards that it wished to see, nor the standards set by the presidential elections [in Ukraine] in January and February 2010.” The conduct of these elections raises concern about the Rada elections to be held in autumn 2012.

Attracting the most attention, former officials who served in the cabinet under Ms. Tymoshenko have been arrested on charges that appear, to most observers, to be politically motivated. Among those arrested have been former Interior Minister Lutsenko, former First Deputy Justice Minister Korniychuk, former Acting Minister of Defense Ivashchenko, former First Deputy Chairman of Naftogaz Ukrainy Didenko, former Head of the State Customs Service of Ukraine Makarenko and former Economy Minister Danylyshyn (Mr. Danylyshyn sought and received political asylum in the Czech Republic). Then there is the case of Ms. Tymoshenko herself. She was charged in December 2010 with abuse of state power stemming from her conclusion of the 2009 gas purchase contract with Russia. Her trial began in June 2011, and she was jailed in August for disrupting courtroom proceedings. In October, she was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison—a verdict immediately condemned by the United States, European Union, most major EU member states and Russia. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in a report issued in January, criticized the charges against former government officials as amounting to “post facto criminalization of normal political decision-making.” Although Ukrainian officials maintain that these arrests were legitimate and do not represent selective prosecutions, no comparable members of the current government have been arrested or charged, despite the general view that corruption has increased significantly under Mr. Yanukovych.

In 2006 Freedom House rated Ukraine as the first post-Soviet state other than a Baltic nation to achieve a “free” ranking. In January 2011, given the democratic problems within Ukraine, it became the first post-Soviet state to lose the “free” ranking when it was found to be only “partly free.” Freedom House reaffirmed that ranking last month.

Democratic Regression and Ukraine’s Relations with the West

The authoritarian tendencies within Ukraine have affected Kyiv’s relations with the West. European and U.S. officials have long expressed concern about democratic regression, including warning senior Ukrainian officials as early as January 2011 not to carry forward the charges against Ms. Tymoshenko, whose case has come to epitomize the problem of selective application of the law within Ukraine.

Following her jailing in August, some deputies in EU member-state parliaments stated that they would oppose ratification of the association agreement and FTA with Ukraine unless Ms. Tymoshenko was released. This is no surprise. The European Union has long regarded commitment to democratic principles as an important element of the association agreement process. In September 2011, Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Fuele and European Parliament member Brok had a lengthy meeting with President Yanukovych and warned him of the damage that the Tymoshenko case was doing to EU-Ukrainian relations.

The Rada passed up an opportunity to end the case in October when it examined the Criminal Code. Despite suggestions that it might annul the article on which the charge against Ms. Tymoshenko was based, it did not. Days later, the court convicted her. The European Union responded by postponing a planned Yanukovych visit to Brussels.

EU officials continued to state that Ms. Tymoshenko should be released and allowed to return to normal political life. In November meetings with President Yanukovych, Lithuanian President Grybauskaite and Polish President Komorowski reiterated warnings that Ms. Tymoshenko’s imprisonment would damage EU-Ukraine relations and prevent signature of the (now completed) association agreement and FTA at the planned December EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv.

Although a number of European countries reportedly favored canceling the summit, EU President Van Rompuy and EU Commission Head Barrosso went to Kyiv and held a short meeting with President Yanukovych. They signed no agreements and made clear that signature would depend on Ms. Tymoshenko’s situation.

Thus, at the beginning of 2012, EU-Ukraine relations are at a standstill. It is not clear what will happen with the association agreement and FTA, which were to provide the basis for a new stage in the relationship between Brussels and Kyiv.

U.S.-Ukrainian relations are at a quiet point. Washington has few major issues on its bilateral agenda with Kyiv, reflecting the fact that many of the problems that troubled the relationship earlier have been resolved. More broadly, given everything else on the foreign policy agenda, Ukraine barely registers on the radar. Ukrainian officials have over the past 18 months actively sought to arrange meetings for President Yanukovych with President Obama or Vice President Biden, but without success. The lack of enthusiasm to meet with Mr. Yanukovych undoubtedly reflects the U.S. government’s critical attitude toward the democratic developments that have taken place the past two years in Ukraine.

The Risk to Kyiv

Democratic regression most destructively sets back the ability of the Ukrainian people to have a free, fair, robust and competitive political system. It also has a destructive impact on Mr. Yanukovych’s professed foreign policy.

Democratic backsliding puts at risk Ukraine’s relations with the West, in particular with the European Union. As the EU President has indicated, the European Union does not intend to proceed with signature of the association agreement and FTA until political circumstances within Ukraine change. Even were it prepared to do so, the association agreement and FTA must be approved by all 27 EU member states, and a number of deputies in EU member-state parliaments have already stated that they would oppose ratification so long as Ms. Tymoshenko remains in jail.

Moreover, given the current difficulties within the European Union, such as the eurozone crisis, a number of member states believe that the EU’s attention should be focused internally and that the European Union should slow the pace of its engagement with neighboring states, particularly those which say they aspire to become EU members. For those EU member states, democratic regression within Ukraine offers a handy reason to justify slowing down the pace of EU relations with Kyiv. Even Kyiv’s traditional advocates within the European Union—such as Poland, Lithuania and Sweden—appear to be flagging in their support for Ukraine.

Mr. Yanukovych’s internal policies not only pose a major impediment to his goal of drawing closer to the European Union, they also endanger his goal of having a balance between Ukraine’s relations with the West and with Russia. Although Kyiv sought to repair its relations with Moscow in 2010, the two countries’ interests simply diverge on some issues. Take natural gas: a lower price for Ukraine means less revenue for Gazprom. Likewise, construction and operation of the South Stream pipeline would reduce the flow of gas through Ukrainian pipelines. Russian Prime Minister and presumptive President Putin has called for creation of a Eurasian Union to serve as a counterpart to the European Union. It is not exactly clear what the Eurasian Union might be in practice—and few other post-Soviet states have expressed enthusiasm for the idea—but it is almost certain that one of Mr. Putin’s goals is to increase Russian influence in the post-Soviet space.

With weaker relations with the West, Kyiv will find that is has less room for maneuver in its dealings with Moscow. Tough negotiations will likely become even more difficult. Mr. Yanukovych only has to look north to Belarus and what happened to President Lukashenko once he had burned his bridges with the European Union and the United States following the December 2010 crackdown on opposition leaders and demonstrators. Facing a dire economic situation and with no hope for help from the West, Mr. Lukashenko struck a deal with Moscow that secured a lower price for gas and a loan from Russia—at the price of surrendering control of the Belarusian gas pipeline system to Gazprom.

It is not clear why Mr. Yanukovych is putting himself and Ukraine in this position. He has regularly expressed a desire for closer relations with the European Union and a balanced foreign policy. He may be allowing personal hostility toward Ms. Tymoshenko and a desire to sideline her politically to dominate his decisions. Ironically, over the past year, the government’s actions against Ms. Tymoshenko have focused public attention on her, and her poll ratings and those of her party have increased significantly.

Mr. Yanukovych may also calculate that the European Union and the United States will overlook his democratic regression and accept Ukraine without his having to adjust his domestic policies, believing that the West does not want to see Ukraine drift closer to Moscow’s orbit. That would reflect a fair measure of wishful thinking and overestimate the geopolitical importance that the West currently attaches to Ukraine.

U.S. Interests and U.S. Policy

Since the early 1990s, the United States has supported Ukraine’s development as a stable, independent, democratic state, with a robust market economy and growing links to the European and trans-Atlantic communities. Such a Ukraine is in the U.S. interest as it would contribute to the goal of a wider, more stable and secure Europe. It could be—and has been—an important partner in addressing critical questions such as proliferation challenges. The nuclear question, which dominated U.S.-Ukrainian relations in the early 1990s, has been resolved as the nuclear weapons systems that were in Ukraine have been eliminated and Kyiv has agreed to transfer its small stock of highly-enriched uranium.

Over the past two decades, the United States has provided several billion dollars in assistance to Ukraine to promote democratization, economic reform and the elimination of the strategic nuclear systems and infrastructure that Kyiv inherited following the end of the Soviet Union. The United States has led in shaping a strong partnership between NATO and Ukraine and has encouraged the European Union to deepen its relations with Ukraine.

The U.S. interest has not changed. However, the circumstances within Ukraine have, and the Ukrainian government is moving in the wrong direction. On democracy, it is walking back the gains that the Ukrainian people have made over the past 20 years, particularly in the period of 2005-2009. The West cannot and should not ignore that.

The U.S. government’s priority with regard to Ukraine now should be to encourage the Ukrainian government to make the right choices regarding the country’s democratic development. This means releasing Ms. Tymoshenko and allowing her to return to normal political life. But it does not end with Ms. Tymoshenko. The Ukrainian government needs to end its manipulation of the judicial system for political purposes against other members of the opposition. It should rein in agencies such as the Security Service of Ukraine. And it should work with the broad political spectrum to ensure that the upcoming autumn Rada elections are free, fair and competitive.

To promote this objective, the U.S. government should, first of all, continue to underscore to Kyiv U.S. concerns about democratic regression and continue to remind the Ukrainian leadership that its internal political policies have a negative impact on its relationships with the United States and the West. Ambassador John Tefft and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv are working hard to convey this message. Washington should reiterate it as often as possible, including when Senate and Congressional delegations visit Ukraine.

Second, the United States should keep the door open for a more positive relationship with Ukraine should Kyiv heed the message on democracy. A Ukraine that returns to the democratic path should be fully welcome in the European and trans-Atlantic communities.

Third, the United States should coordinate closely with the European Union so as to maximize the impact of Western policy on decisions by Mr. Yanukovych and the Ukrainian leadership. The joint letter sent to President Yanukovych last September by Secretary of State Clinton and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Ashton provides just such an example of coordination between Washington and Brussels. It is especially useful for Washington to coordinate with the European Union now, as the European Union may be better placed to influence thinking in Kyiv.

What do these policies mean in practice? As one example, the Ukrainian leadership greatly desires high-level contact with Washington, which gives it a degree of political legitimacy. Mr. Yanukovych would dearly appreciate an invitation to the White House or the chance to host President Obama in Kyiv. The U.S. government should continue what appears to be a de facto policy of minimizing high-level meetings with Mr. Yanukovych. U.S. officials should inform Ukrainian officials that, as long as Kyiv imprisons opposition leaders and regresses on democracy, no meetings at the highest level will be possible.

As a second example, Ukraine’s credit line with the International Monetary Fund is currently suspended, because Kyiv has failed to meet the conditions of the IMF loan. In the past, the U.S. government has on occasion weighed in with the IMF to support a more lenient approach with Ukraine. Given the democratic regression in Ukraine, now would not be the time for Washington to take such an approach with the IMF.

This approach does not mean freezing ties across the board. Normal diplomatic interaction should continue at most levels. The target should be the most senior leadership in Kyiv, those who are responsible for Ukraine’s democratic regression.

As for assistance programs, the U.S. government should carefully consider its priorities, especially as budget resources for Ukraine will be limited. U.S. assistance should aim to sustain civil society in Ukraine, which has made dramatic gains over the past 20 years. In this context, exchange programs that bring Ukrainians to the United States and Europe can play a major role. The U.S. government should also continue assistance programs to promote energy security, so that Ukraine can become less dependent on imported energy.

It may be time for U.S. and EU officials to consult as to whether it is appropriate to consider lists of Ukrainian individuals who would be denied visas to visit the United States and EU member states. Even the threat of this could send a forceful message to Kyiv and have a powerful effect on President Yanukovych and the elite around him.

This is not a call for the type of isolation that the West has applied to Belarus. Ukraine has not yet regressed to that point. But the United States and European Union should seek effective ways to disabuse Mr. Yanukovych of the notion that he can pursue a more authoritarian course at home without repercussions for Kyiv’s relations with the West.

Crystallizing a Choice

Some Ukrainian officials likely will warn that this kind of approach by the United States and European Union will cause Ukraine’s leadership to turn toward Russia. Western officials should not be taken in by this. If Ukraine truly wants to join Europe, then its leadership must accept the democratic values that prevail in Europe. If the leadership is not prepared to adopt such values, then how can Europe and the West integrate Ukraine?

Moreover, Kyiv does not wish to fall too closely into Moscow’s orbit. Mr. Yanukovych does not want to compromise Ukrainian sovereignty; he wants to be the leader of a fully independent state. The Ukrainian elite and public likewise overwhelmingly support an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state. For the Ukrainian oligarchs—who control so much of the Ukrainian economy—the Russian model holds little appeal.

The overall goal of U.S. and European Union policy thus should be to crystallize in Mr. Yanukovych’s mind the following choice. He can have a more authoritarian political system, more difficult relations with the West, and a greatly weakened hand in dealing with Russia, or he can return to a more democratic approach and have a stronger relationship with the West and a balanced foreign policy. In the end, Mr. Yanukovych has reasons to opt for the latter course. The West should face him with the choice as clearly as possible.

Thank you for your attention.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Ukraine: Balancing Russia, the West and Democracy

Steven Pifer — Mon, 26 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Perhaps the biggest foreign policy challenge that has faced Ukraine’s leadership since the country regained independence in 1991 has been finding a balance between its relations with Russia and its relations with the West.

Over the past 20 years, each Ukrainian president has sought strong ties with Europe and the United States, in part to gain freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis a large and assertive Russian neighbor that appears not yet fully reconciled to the idea of Ukraine as a truly sovereign and independent state.

This challenge now confronts President Victor Yanukovych. He has stressed the utility for Ukraine of an association agreement and comprehensive free trade arrangement with the European Union, which would give Kyiv a solid anchor to Europe. But he is learning—as did his predecessors—that democratic values matter in the West, and they influence how the West engages with Ukraine.

Relations between Ukraine and Russia have a long, complex and sometimes unhappy history. As Kyiv in the early 1990s struggled to build an independent nation, Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma placed priority on building relationships with the West in order to strengthen their hands as they dealt with Moscow on a range of messy post-Soviet “divorce” questions. Building those relationships was made easier, or more difficult, by the state of democracy within Ukraine. For example, democratic slippage during and after the 1999 presidential election contributed to the downturn that brought Ukraine’s relations with the United States and Europe to a nadir in late 2002.

Following the Orange Revolution, Victor Yushchenko’s foreign policy put dramatically more weight on the Western side of the balance, including by making a bid for membership in NATO. That helped to trigger a precipitous decline in Ukrainian-Russian relations. The more democratic, if often chaotic, nature of Yushchenko’s policies at home earned him considerable credit in the West, even if some Europeans worried about the problems that Yushchenko’s policy created between Kyiv and Moscow—and potentially between Europe and Russia.

Following his election in 2010, Yanukovych stated his desire for a balance between the West and Russia while making an improvement in the frayed relationship with Moscow his first foreign policy priority. He extended the Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Crimea, halted pursuit of NATO membership, and dropped policies that had infuriated the Russian leadership, such as seeking to have the Holodomor recognized as genocide.

Over the past year, however, Kyiv has grown increasingly frustrated by what it regards as Moscow’s failure to reciprocate Ukraine’s steps to improve bilateral relations. In 2012, Vladimir Putin will return to the Russian presidency, and he has just unveiled his “big idea” of a Eurasian Union. Yanukovych should understand that the better his relationship with Europe and the more stable the balance between his relationships with the West and Russia, the stronger his position will be in dealing with the Kremlin.

He needs also to understand that democracy affects the balance. The fact that Yanukovych’s election was free, fair and competitive gave him democratic legitimacy, which secured him acceptance and access in the United States and Europe. But his domestic policies since then have produced regression: pressure on the media, inappropriate actions by state agencies such as the Security Service of Ukraine, elections that failed to meet the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the norms that Ukraine achieved in 2006-2010, and arrests of opposition leaders on dubious charges. The trial of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko has crystallized Western concern about Yanukovych’s democratic backslide.

Yanukovych must reconcile his desire to tighten political control, reduce the democratic space for the opposition, and keep Tymoshenko out of the political arena with his desire for closer relations with the European Union. He cannot pursue a more authoritarian course at home and at the same time enjoy strong relations with a West for whom democratic values matter.

A failure to secure a solid relationship with the West will cause disbalance in Ukraine’s foreign policy. That would leave Kyiv more isolated and susceptible to pressure from Moscow. Does Yanukovych want to risk dealing with Putin from a weaker international position? If not, then he needs to correct his domestic political course.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The Ukrainian Weekly

Ukraine: Facing an Unhappy 2012

Steven Pifer — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 16:18:00 -0500

An early December visit to Kyiv produced a glum picture of the challenges that confront Ukrainian foreign policy as 2012 draws near. For most of the 20 years since regaining independence, Ukraine’s leaders have sought to maintain a balance between relations with the West and relations with Russia. That policy has generally served the country well. Many in Kyiv now fear that that balance is about to come undone—with severe consequences for Ukraine.

The balance is in danger because Ukraine’s relations with Europe and the United States verge on a downturn. That results from a combination of developments in Ukraine, Europe and the United States.

Within Ukraine, the tenure of Victor Yanukovych as president has seen a marked democratic regression. The October 2010 local elections, activities by the Security Service of Ukraine and arrests of senior opposition leaders, among other things, have raised broad concerns in the West. Ukraine—the first post-Soviet state other than a Baltic country to win a Freedom House rating of “free”—earlier this year became the first post-Soviet state to lose that rating.

The West has focused recently on the trial, conviction and jailing of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. While many earlier this fall expected Yanukovych to heed European concerns and find a face-saving way to release her, the prevailing view now is that she will remain in prison, especially as the authorities have announced a stream of new charges against her. That will play badly in the West. Indeed, it should worry official Kyiv that the joint statement issued following the November 28 EU-U.S. summit meeting lumped Ukraine in the same paragraph as Belarus.

More broadly, the European Union finds itself preoccupied with the eurozone crisis at a time when a number of EU states, such as Germany, believe that EU enlargement has gone too far, too fast. They question how deeply the European Union should engage with Ukraine. Tymoshenko’s treatment and the broader democratic backslide strengthen those countries’ arguments for taking a cooler approach toward Kyiv. While the planned December 19 EU-Ukraine summit may proceed as scheduled, EU officials are considering ways to make clear their displeasure over Tymoshenko’s treatment.

In Washington, Ukraine barely registers on the radar. The crush of other foreign policy priorities—Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and the pivot toward Asia—explain part of this, and U.S. officials had seen the EU-Ukraine relationship as the best ticket for integrating Ukraine into Europe. Washington will not engage at a senior level absent improvement in the democratic situation there. Among other reasons, with the 2012 election campaign looming, why would the president or vice president want to expose himself to the certain Republican criticism that a meeting with Yanukovych would produce?

All this means that Ukraine’s relations with the West are trending in a negative direction, which will throw the balance between the West and Russia off kilter. Unfortunately for Kyiv, that comes at a time when it will face pressure from Russia.

Yanukovych came to office believing that Ukraine should improve its relations with Russia, and he tried hard in 2010 to address Moscow’s concerns. But senior Ukrainians believe that the Russians have not reciprocated, and difficult issues remain on the bilateral agenda.

Take natural gas, for example. Kyiv seeks to negotiate a reduction in the price it pays Russia’s Gazprom for gas, fearing that price increases in 2012 will hit Ukrainian industry hard. Why Gazprom would agree to cut the price is unclear—unless a price cut could secure a share, perhaps a controlling share, in ownership of the Ukrainian gas pipeline system that Gazprom covets. At the same time, the Russians remain interested in building the South Stream pipeline under the Black Sea, which would divert much of the gas that Russia now transits through Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin, who will return next spring to the Russian presidency, last month sketched out his vision of a Eurasian Union. What such an institution might actually mean in practice remains to be seen, but it certainly suggests that Moscow continues to seek ways to increase influence over its neighbors. Putin stayed fully engaged on foreign policy issues as prime minister, so his resumption of the presidency may not mean strategic changes in Russia’s foreign course, but his style as president will likely entail more hardball politics. That will prove a challenge for Yanukovych.

The bottom line is that, absent a change in its domestic policies, Ukraine’s leadership will find itself having to deal with Moscow with a weakened hand owing to its flagging relationship with the West. The Russians see that and undoubtedly will seek to take full advantage. No wonder that Ukrainian foreign policy officials look forward to 2012 with trepidation. They face a tough year.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Is Yanukovych Turning Ukraine into a Borderland?

Steven Pifer — Fri, 28 Oct 2011 11:06:00 -0400

In the Russian language, Ukraine has two meanings: one, the country of 43 million people that lies on the north coast of the Black Sea, and two, “on the border” or “borderland.” For most of the past 20 years, Kiev’s foreign policy aimed, and largely managed, to fix on Europe’s geopolitical map the first meaning rather than the second. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich is now undoing that.

Ukraine became independent in 1991. In 1994, as Washington contemplated the enlargement of NATO, Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, met Strobe Talbott, the U.S. deputy secretary of state. Tarasyuk noted that NATO’s enlargement to include states such as Poland and Hungary would prompt a negative reaction from Moscow — and also raise a dilemma for Kiev: how could Ukraine avoid becoming a gray zone of insecurity, or a borderland, between an enlarged NATO and Russia?

Talbott agreed that the Ukrainians deserved a good answer to the question, and finding one became a priority task for the Clinton administration’s Europe policymakers. Washington moved to expand its bilateral relationship with Ukraine, establishing in 1996 a strategic partnership and a bilateral commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore and President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine. One year later, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a distinctive partnership and set up the NATO-Ukraine Council to promote stronger links between Kiev and the alliance.

The goal was straightforward: to deepen ties between the West and Ukraine and thereby reassure Kiev that it would not find itself an isolated borderland as the enlargement of NATO and the European Union transformed Europe’s geopolitical landscape. In 2002, Kiev adopted the goal of joining NATO. While Ukraine’s relations with the European Union developed more slowly, they also acquired greater breadth and depth.

Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko made joining the Euro-Atlantic community his primary foreign policy objective and sought a membership action plan with NATO. He was considerably ahead of the Ukrainian public on the question of NATO membership, though Ukrainians strongly supported closer EU links. More critically, Yushchenko failed to address his country’s key domestic problems. A disillusioned Ukrainian electorate turned to Yanukovich in 2010.

On assuming office, Yanukovich stated that his first foreign policy priority would be to repair a badly frayed relationship with Moscow. He also made clear that Ukraine would balance its relationships with Russia and the West. He stressed the importance of deepening Ukraine’s integration with the European Union, most immediately through the negotiation of an association agreement and comprehensive free trade arrangement.

He regularly brushed aside Moscow’s entreaties to join a customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. While some in the West regretted that Kiev no longer sought to join NATO, a closer Ukraine-EU relationship seemed a good answer to the question that Tarasyuk posed in 1994 about keeping Ukraine from becoming a borderland.

This is now in danger. The democratic backsliding that has occurred under Yanukovich, recently epitomized by the trial of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, threatens Ukraine’s links with the West.

EU officials have canceled one planned Yanukovich visit to Brussels. While negotiation of the association and free trade agreements may continue, their completion is in jeopardy. Parliamentarians from EU states say the agreements have zero chance of ratification as long as Tymoshenko remains in prison. As the European Union grapples with the euro-zone crisis, Yanukovich’s democratic backslide offers those Europeans who always were skeptical about EU engagement with Kiev a handy excuse to oppose it. In parallel, Ukraine’s relations with individual Western countries seem headed for a freeze, as Yanukovich is increasingly viewed as another Aleksandr Lukashenko — the Belarus strongman — rather than an aspiring EU leader.

Yanukovich seems to recognize the risks of isolation, especially for his dealings with the Kremlin. Ukrainians voice frustration that although Kiev in 2010 acted to address major Russian concerns, Moscow has done little on issues of importance to Ukraine. The Russian government, for example, continues to pursue a natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea that would take gas that now travels through Ukraine. The deterioration of Ukraine’s relations with the West will likely embolden Moscow to press Kiev harder.

Thus, on its current course, Yanukovich’s domestic repression will leave Ukraine precisely where it did not want to be: in a gray zone between Europe and Russia. Yanukovich may not intend this, but that does not matter. He is making Ukraine into the borderland it had long sought to avoid.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: International Herald Tribune