Brookings: Topics - Turkey

A Statesman’s Forum with H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey

Fri, 17 May 2013 10:30:00 -0400

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May 17, 2013
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

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On May 17, the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings hosted a Stateman's Forum with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In his remarks, Mr. Erdoğan reflected on three terms of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leadership during a period of rapid evolution for Turkey and its role in the world.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Prime Minister of Turkey in March 2003, following the electoral success in 2002 of the AK Party. In the 2007and 2011 elections, the AK Party was returned to power with landslide victories in Turkey's parliamentary elections, making Mr. Erdoğan the longest-serving prime minister in Turkish history. Previously, Mr. Erdoğan served as Mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1997. He was educated at Marmara University.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott introduced Mr. Erdoğan. At the conclusion of the Prime Minister's remarks, Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci moderated a discussion.

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Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's U.S. Agenda

Kemal Kirişci — Thu, 16 May 2013 10:46:00 -0400

Editor's note: On May 17, 2013 Brookings hosted Prime Minister Erdogan for an event on U.S.-Turkish relations.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is visiting Washington this week and will meet with President Obama today. This is his first visit to the United States since December 2009. But the world and the Middle East have changed dramatically since then. Thus, the agenda for Erdogan’s talks with Obama will be a very crowded one. Four topics in particular are likely to stand out.

1. The Situation in Syria

Erdogan arrives in Washington at a time when there is growing pressure on the Obama administration to change its course on Syria. Secretary of State John Kerry has already taken some steps to increase nonlethal support for the opposition in Syria while putting growing pressure on the moderate opposition to tighten their ranks and distance themselves from radical Islamist groups. These measures are unlikely to satisfy Erdogan. He has long been a vocal critic of the international community, the United Nations Security Council and the United States for idly “watching the tragedy” unfolding in Syria.

He is likely to remind Obama quite loudly that the butchery of civilians by the Assad regime has reached levels that makes it unethical not to respond to and that, as the car bombs that exploded in Turkish border town of Reyhanli last weekend demonstrate, Turkish national security is being directly affected. He will also offer facts and figures to show how the humanitarian situation is fast deteriorating and becoming untenable with an ever expanding flow of refugees and displaced people. He will not miss the opportunity to share with Obama the evidence collected from refugees arriving in Turkish hospitals that the Syrian regime is using chemical weapons. Erdogan may go as far as to push Obama to support the idea of creating a no-fly zone along the Turkish border.

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Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Pragmatism May Drive Israeli-Turkish Ties

Kemal Kirişci — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israeli-Turkish relations are likely to feature prominently during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Washington, DC. Turkish and Israeli officials are engaged in talks to work out Israeli compensation to the families killed and injured during the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. These talks are part of a U.S.-brokered rapprochement between the two countries, which began with an official apology by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Erdoğan in late March for “any mistakes that might have led to the loss of life or injury” aboard the Mavi Marmara. This hasn’t been an easy exercise; a major challenge for Turkey comes from finding a balance between the domestic debate over the lifting of the blockade of Gaza and Turkey’s own compensation issues for the Kurdish population on the one hand and Turkey’s pressing national security needs against the deteriorating situation in Syria on the other.

The families of the Mavi Marmara victims have repeatedly objected to compensation talks until the Gaza Strip blockade is lifted. The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH), the Turkish NGO which organized the Mavi Marmara trip, and the hard-core Islamists who partly constitute the electoral basis of Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) also publicly support their position. Recently, they held a major public meeting promoting the idea of “first lifting the blockade” and took a critical view of Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç’s involvement in compensation talks with Israel. Interestingly, Erdoğan chose to remain silent on the issue and allow Arınç to face the criticism on his own. Arınç’s position and Erdoğan’s silence should be viewed in the context of Turkey’s own domestic compensation issues.

As much as the Turkish government in recent times has been trying to address the Kurdish problem and reach a political solution, the three decades’ old conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has taken a heavy toll on civilians. It has led to the injury and death of many civilians, loss and destruction of property, and the internal displacement of over 1 million civilians. Long discussions related to compensation for these individuals finally culminated in the Turkish government’s passing of a compensation law in 2004. The law aimed to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and compensate them for their losses. Yet, critics of the implementation of this law say it falls short of sufficiently compensating the economic losses and emotional pain IDPs have suffered. Furthermore, critics cite high rejection rates among those applying for compensation and a failure to formally recognize victims and acknowledge any wrongdoings toward the individuals as shortfalls of the compensation law.

A more recent example is the Uludere incident where 34 civilians of Kurdish ethnicity were mistaken for PKK terrorists and killed in an airstrike by the Turkish military in the southeastern corner of Turkey in December 2011. Although the Turkish government has offered close to $70,000 in compensation for each victim, families of the victims have refused to accept the offer until a full investigation takes place, those responsible for the attack are brought to justice, and an official apology is issued by the Turkish state. Such an apology has not so far been issued, prompting criticism in Turkish media outlets over the importance placed on an Israeli apology for the victims of the Mavi Marmara while the victims of Uludere wait for an apology and compensation from the Turkish government.

As compensation talks with Israel continue, the real challenge will lie in the Turkish government’s ability to soften the position of the İHH, hard-liners within AK Party and the victims’ families toward the Gaza blockade while keeping an eye on Turkey’s immediate geopolitical interests. Shifts in the balance of power in the region brought about by the Arab Awakening and most recently the Syrian crisis is pushing Turkey to re-evaluate its position toward Israel. Pragmatism on the part of Turkey and Israel in resolving their differences will be of greater benefit to addressing the growing security and humanitarian challenges resulting from the Syrian crisis as well as improving the welfare of the Palestinians in Gaza than if negotiations between the two countries failed. As Prime Minister Erdoğan prepares for his visit to Washington, DC, this week, the carnage provoked by two car bombs that exploded in the Turkish border town of Reyhanlı on Saturday will surely be a stark reminder of the need for this kind of pragmatism. U.S. President Barack Obama should seize the occasion of the visit to promote such pragmatism but also be willing to listen to Erdoğan’s deep-seated and genuine frustration with the situation in Syria. An empathetic ear on the part of Obama may go a long way in not only helping to improve Israeli-Turkish relations, a major U.S. objective, but also start cooperating in concrete terms to address an ever-expanding Syrian crisis.

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: Hurriyet Daily News

Image Source: © Murad Sezer / Reuters

Emerging Nations and the Evolving Global Economy

Thu, 02 May 2013 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 2, 2013
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

On May 2, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted Kaushik Basu for the ninth annual Sakıp Sabancı Lecture. In his address, Basu discussed the persisting global economic crisis and the policy challenges facing emerging countries.

Kaushik Basu is senior vice president (Development Economics) and chief economist of the World Bank. He was until recently the chief economic adviser to the Government of India. Basu’s contributions to economics span development economics, welfare economics, industrial organization and game theory. He has published widely, including 160 papers in refereed journals and scholarly volumes; numerous articles for magazines and newspapers; and several books, including Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics (Princeton University Press and Penguin, 2010).

Brookings President Strobe Talbott and Güler Sabancı, chair of the board of trustees of Sabancı University, provided introductory remarks. Following Basu’s address, students at Sabancı University and a wider overseas audience participated in the event via videoconference, moderated in Washington by Kemal Kirişci, TUSIAD senior fellow and director of the Brookings Turkey Project at Brookings and in Istanbul by Sabanci University Professor İzak Atiyas.

The Sakıp Sabancı Lecture is given annually by a leading international expert or statesman and explores issues important to Turkey and its relations to the U.S. and the world. The event honors the memory of Sakip Sabanci, one of Turkey’s foremost business leaders, a visionary supporter of democratic and economic reforms, and a leading advocate of Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union.

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Emerging Nations and the Evolving Global Economy

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Arab Uprisings and Completing Turkey's Regional Integration: Challenges and Opportunities for US–Turkish Relations

Kemal Kirişci — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 13:33:00 -0400

Abstract:

Today, regional economic integration in the Middle East continues to remain at an unusually low level compared to other regions of the world. This is especially problematic because traditionally, regional integration has long been seen as an effective tool for encouraging regional peace, stability and prosperity, with also the added expectation that economic growth may also help or facilitate transition to democracy. This paper asks the question of whether the Arab uprisings might provide a new environment in which Turkey and the USA, together with the European Union, could cooperate to bring about some degree of regional economic integration. The paper discusses Turkey's increasing economic engagement of its neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War and argues that this experience constitutes a good basis for cooperation, even if there remain a number of challenges stemming from Turkey as well as the Middle East. As much as these challenges may seem insurmountable, initiating a tri-lateral dialogue is of critical importance as the rewards of regional integration in the Middle East in terms of stability, peace and prosperity would be huge and of a ‘win-win’ nature for Turkey, for the EU, for the USA, and of course for the region.

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Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies

Image Source: © Osman Orsal / Reuters

Don't Forget Free Trade with Turkey

Kemal Kirişci — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Last month, both the U.S. and the European Union (EU) took important internal steps to prepare the ground work for negotiations to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. TTIP would create the largest integrated market in the world, bringing together half of the world’s GDP and 30 percent of world trade. If it went beyond eliminating already low-level tariffs and succeeded in aligning regulatory standards on both sides of the Atlantic, it also could generate more than 3 percent GDP growth. Beyond bilateral effects, TTIP could also spill over to global-trading trends and serve as a tool for strengthening the Western economic order. But in its current form TTIP would leave Turkey, currently the sixteenth-largest economy in the world, and a long-standing transatlantic ally, out in the cold.

Turkey has been deeply integrated within the EU’s internal market since the establishment of a customs union in 1996. Turkey is in membership negotiations with the EU and has therefore already adopted a number of the EU’s internal regulations.

But under current rules, Turkey must negotiate its own agreement with countries the EU signs preferential trade agreements with. This puts Turkey at a significant disadvantage, as the EU-Turkey Customs Union is structured to allow these countries to access Turkish markets without having to reciprocate by opening their own markets. As long as these agreements were signed with countries that had smaller economies, the cost to Turkey was negligible. But the EU has recently begun negotiating and signing trade agreements with countries that have relatively large economies and high volumes of foreign trade, including Canada, Japan, India, Korea and Mexico. Most of these countries have exports that compete with Turkish ones. Thus, it’s a “lose-lose” situation: Turkey faces greater competition in the EU as well as in its own domestic market without enjoying preferential access to these other markets.

Along with other grievances, this asymmetry helps to explain Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement in February that Turkey should consider joining the Sino-Russian Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in favor of the EU. Even though he subsequently retracted this position, his economy minister, Zafer Caglayan, argued in early April that the EU Customs Union had become “an agreement of servitude” and that Turkey either had to renegotiate new terms or get out of the deal. Caglayan’s remarks may well be a bluff intended only for domestic consumption.

Nevertheless, the exclusion of Turkey from TTIP would only aggravate current grievances about the Customs Union, ranging from ground transportation quotas (which deny Turkey the possibility of exporting greater volumes of goods) to requiring Turkish businesspeople to obtain visas for travel to the EU while the goods they sell travel freely. To many in Turkey, such practices seem to be barriers that deny Turkey its full export potential to the EU market.

A study by the German IFO Institute lists Turkey among countries that are likely to experience a net loss of welfare from TTIP. Such an outcome would aggravate existing grievances and create additional pressures on Turkey to break away from the EU and the broader Western liberal order— an outcome detrimental to the interests of both the EU and the United States.

Turkey was a participant in the formation of the global economic order at the end of the Second World War and has remained a part of it in spite of occasional ups and downs. The EU’s engagement with Turkey, first through a Customs Union and then through the pre-accession process, has bolstered revolutionary political and economic reforms. This contributed to massive economic growth in Turkey, and it became a source of stability in a region that has long suffered from entrenched conflicts. Now a model for economic and political transformation in its neighborhood, Turkey has become a major player in integrating the Balkans, the southern Caucasus and the Middle East into the world economy.

Yet in the last few years, as accession negotiations with the EU stalled, Turkey has looked for other economic opportunities in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. This period has also seen the quality of Turkish democracy decline alongside setbacks in earlier political reforms, particularly freedom of expression. TTIPing Turkey would reengage it with the West.

The instability in the Middle East, as well as growing recognition in Turkey of the economic and security advantages that come with the West, have been gently pushing Turkey back toward Europe. The EU is reciprocating with efforts to revive the accession process. In addition, the recent apology by Israel to Turkey will help deepen cooperation with the United States. And the truce announced by the leader of the separatist PKK is opening the prospects of finding a political solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, which in turn should help improve the quality of democracy in the country.

While U.S.-EU negotiations on TTIP are going to be challenging, this should not be an excuse for excluding Turkey from the partnership. The EU must rise to the challenge of recognizing Turkey’s concerns. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of relations between the EU and Turkey. But the EU has not shown any concern for the interests of its long-standing partner. The TTIP impact report prepared by the European Commission makes no reference to Turkey or how TTIP would impact on the customs union. At least a member of the European Parliament has asked the European Trade Commissioner to consider this question, which may be a step in the right direction.

The United States also should avoid to the temptation to reap the benefits of access to Turkish markets without opening its own market to Turkey. The benefits of involving Turkey in TTIP far outweigh the costs resulting from the additional burdens of the negotiation process. TTIP would create more jobs for Americans and Europeans, not just Turks.

Close economic integration between Turkey and its neighborhood means that a Turkey in TTIP would also benefit countries ranging from Armenia to Ukraine—and even countries like Iraq and Syria, once they achieve some stability. Turkey under TTIP would motivate other countries to join the Western economic order and support the values associated with it. Such an outcome would be win-win for the EU, the United States, Turkey, and a Western economic order under challenge from other parts of the world.

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Journal.

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Murad Sezer / Reuters

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

Martin S. Indyk and Javier Solana — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With a range of critical issues confronting the U.S. and the international community today, Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk discuss some of the most pressing challenges, from the war in Syria to the Euro crisis to Iran’s nuclear program.

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A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

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A World in Turmoil: My Conversation with Javier Solana

Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

There are many tensions and problems facing the world today. Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and I discussed some of the most challenging issues in the current geopolitical landscape, including the Euro crisis, the war in Syria, and Iran's brinksmanship.

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Turkey Gives Politics a Chance

Kemal Kirişci — Thu, 04 Apr 2013 13:56:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Interest.

Late last month, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called to apologize to his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan for the death of Turkish citizens during a military operation against the ship Mavi Marmara in 2010. The call came within a day of Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Öcalan’s declaration of truce and call for “the guns [to] be silenced and politics dominate.”

These two developments are clearly independent of each other. But they point to the possibility of a very different Middle East, one that breaks with the violent conflicts that are spreading across the region, including in Syria, Gaza, Egypt and Iran. One striking common denominator in all these persistent conflicts is the absence of negotiations, let alone negotiated settlements. It is against the background of such a picture that Netanyahu’s apology and Öcalan’s truce acquire significance—and may raise the prospect of an alternative Middle East where conflicting parties become capable again of talking to each other to resolve their differences.

Öcalan’s March 21 announcement came after long months of partly secret negotiations. It promises to transform the long-standing Kurdish problem in Turkey from a stalemate marked by intermittent bouts of violence to a political negotiation.

The violence surrounding the Kurdish question in Turkey has taken more than forty thousand lives since 1984 and has prevented the Kurdish-populated parts of Turkey from participating in its decade-long economic growth. The government’s efforts to suppress Kurdish nationalist manifestations by undermining freedom of expression and association have also raised questions about the quality of Turkish democracy. This in turn has tarnished Turkey’s image as a model for the transformation of the post–Arab Spring world. The emergence of an autonomous Kurdish area in the northeastern corner of Syria dominated by a group with close ties to Öcalan’s PKK has also created an additional security challenge for Turkey, compounded by Turkey's rivalry with Iran over Syria's future.

This picture of deadlock and stalemate over the Kurdish question in Turkey may dramatically change. Öcalan—a convicted terrorist—had long been ignored by the Turkish government and society. The announcement by Öcalan and the support given to this development by the Turkish government amounts to a "paradigm shift," according to a prominent Turkish columnist and expert on the Kurdish question, Cengiz Çandar.

The reforms introduced in the first half of the 2000s granting cultural rights were primarily adopted to meet the European Union’s conditions for starting accession negotiations and did not actively involve representatives of Kurdish political aspirations, let alone Öcalan. The significance of the shift lies in the Turkish government's clear recognition that Öcalan and the Kurds he represents are legitimate partners in the process of resolving the Kurdish problem. The fact that the timing of this announcement coincided with Newroz, the celebration of the spring as a symbol for a new beginning, is important for both sides.

Netanyahu’s apology may seem to have come as a surprise. But the issue itself had long been on the agenda of Israel, Turkey and the United States as a part of their triangular relationship. The Obama administration made repeated behind the scenes efforts to reconcile both sides. Those efforts all fell victim to Prime Minister Netanyahu and his hawkish minister of foreign affairs, Avigdor Lieberman, as well as Erdogan's harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric. Most recently, just before Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Turkey, Erdogan had equated Zionism with racism and called it a crime against humanity, provoking rebukes from the U.S. and Israel.

Yet throughout the three years of tension, both sides managed to leave room for gestures of reconciliation and pragmatism and managed to avoid escalating their differences to the point of breaking relations. In 2010, Erdogan did not hesitate to dispatch airborne firefighters to help Israel extinguish a major forest fire on Mount Carmel. Netanyahu reciprocated the gesture in October 2011 when the heavily Kurdish city of Van was hit by a destructive earthquake.

The pragmatism was reflected in keeping a free-trade agreement—in place since 1996—untouched even as many of the military agreements were discontinued. In spite of the deterioration in diplomatic relations and plummeting Israeli tourism, trade between the two countries continued to grow after the 2010 crisis at a rate even higher than between Turkey and the EU.

The new challenge will be recreating the positive climate that had existed in Israeli-Turkish relations before the crisis. This climate had enabled Turkey to play a mediating role, with concrete results between Israel and Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Erdogan had also used his good offices to promote indirect peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, which had come close to being upgraded to direct talks before they collapsed. Erdogan, provoked by Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, had excoriated Israel's leaders.

The Middle East clearly needs a return to a climate of negotiations. But it’s too early to say whether Israeli-Turkish relations can be revived to the point where Erdogan would again host an Israeli prime minister for a five-hour dinner at his residence. In the words of a Turkish diplomat, the apology will at least scatter away the dark clouds over Israeli-Turkish relations, opening the way for a further growth of economic relations between Israel and Turkey. Businessmen in Turkey had long been discreetly grumbling about the political climate that was preventing economic relations from reaching their full potential.

Cooperation at the political level may come more slowly if not much progress is achieved on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Nevertheless, avenues that might open up with this apology might have positive implications, especially for Egypt, where it could strengthen the hand of pragmatists among the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. Much more importantly, the apology will surely open the way to closer cooperation between the United States and Turkey, which might change the equation in Syria and other regional problems.

A word of caution is also needed. As much as both Netanyahu’s apology and Öcalan’s declaration can be welcomed, the leaders face tough challenges within their constituencies. Erdogan’s supporters will be sensitive towards what happens to the Palestinians. If settlement activity in the West Bank continues and rockets from Gaza provoke an Israeli response, will Erdogan be able to refrain from using flamboyant rhetoric against Israel again? Will Öcalan be able to control the PKK and especially radical elements within it? Will Erdogan and the Turkish political system be able to sustain a political process that would have to reconsider the core values of the Turkish republic and of Turkish national identity?

These are tough questions that demand a strong dose of realism. But in the midst of the violence, instability and conflicts that have engulfed the Middle East, Israelis, Kurds and Turks have found a way to give politics a chance. As Winston Churchill famously noted, "It's better to jaw-jaw than war-war."

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Umit Bektas / Reuters

Obama Helps Restart Talks Between Israel & Turkey

Dan Arbell — Fri, 22 Mar 2013 16:50:00 -0400

Israel apologized to Turkey today for the May 2010 incident on board the Mavi Marmara naval vessel, part of a flotilla to Gaza, in which nine Turks were killed from Israel Defense Forces fire. The apology came during a 30-minute telephone conversation between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, orchestrated by President Barack Obama, who was ending his 3 day visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Erdogan accepted the Israeli apology, and the leaders agreed to begin a normalization process between Israel and Turkey, following the past three years, when relations were practically at a standstill. (Last December, I wrote about the beginnings of a Turkey-Israeli rapprochement, and discussed more of the policy implications here.)

This development allows the two countries to begin a new phase in their relationship, which has known crisis and tension, but also cooperation and a strong strategic partnership.

The U.S. administration played a key role behind the scenes in creating the conditions that paved the way for an Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance. Undoubtedly, a close relationship between Turkey and Israel-- two of America’s greatest allies in the region-- serves United States’ strategic interests globally and regionally. At a time when the Middle East political landscape is changing rapidly, it was imperative to end the long impasse between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Over the past year, Turkey and Israel have also come to realize that repairing their relationship and re-establishing a dialogue is at their best interest, as they face great challenges in their immediate vicinity (first and foremost, the Syrian civil war).

United States officials emphasized that this is the first step in a long process. Nevertheless, the parties will have to make a great effort to overcome years of distrust and suspicion if they want the relationship to work. No one is under the allusion that relations will go back to what they were in the “honeymoon” period of the 1990s but modest improvement can be made. It will not be an easy task, and for that to happen it is essential that the parties not only talk to each other, but also listen to one another and begin to respect each other’s sensitivities. In order for this rapprochement to be successful, United States will have to continue to oversee discussions between Turkey and Israel, and remain heavily engaged in this process.

Authors

Dan Arbell

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Turkey's Kurdish Question: A New Hope?

Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 20, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Turkey's approach to dealing with its Kurdish minority—the Kurdish question—at home and in the region is once again at a critical juncture. From the prospects for a new constitution to Ankara's Syria dilemma, virtually all the pressing issues facing Turkey have a Kurdish dimension. After the failure of the “Oslo process,” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has initiated another round of negotiations, this time called the “Imralı process” and directly involving the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The process has been challenging, but extremely cautious expectations and hopes are growing that the rejuvenated process will not succumb to the fate of the previous efforts at solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

Given past failures at dialogue and at finding a mutually-acceptable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the problem, how might the “Imralı process” prove different? What do the Kurds of Turkey want? Is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ready to meet Kurdish demands? What is Erdoğan’s objective? What are the regional implications? At a time when Syria is in turmoil and Iraqi is facing increasing domestic instability, is a major breakthrough possible?

On March 20, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted a discussion to explore these and other important questions related to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Featured speakers included Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taşpınar, author and journalist Aliza Marcus, and Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute. Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. The event is part of the TUSIAD U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings.

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Turkey's Kurdish Question: A New Hope?

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Can Explosions Be a Blessing in Disguise in Resolving Turkey’s Kurdish Question?

Kemal Kirişci — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 16:00:00 -0400

Two minor explosions Tuesday night in Turkey’s capital city of Ankara come at a critical juncture. The Turkish government has been negotiating with the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, to bring an end to an almost decade long violence. These negotiations are taking place at a time when the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) have seen its support among Kurds diminish considerably. The Kurdish vote had played an important role in helping the AKP come to power back in November 2002. These votes have reacquired importance as the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, contemplates whether to take a new constitution that would replace Turkey’s parliamentary system with a presidential one to a national referendum. The new constitution is expected to redefine Turkish citizenship in more liberal terms to the benefit of Kurds but also enable Erdogan to circumvent a self-imposed ban on serving more than three terms as a member of parliament. The negotiations are also seen as a means of addressing questions about the quality of Turkish democracy and concerns about rising authoritarianism. When these developments are put together with a growing recognition both among Kurds as well as Turks of the need to bring the violence to an end, it may well enhance the likelihood of this round of negotiations achieving where earlier attempts failed.

Öcalan had been leading a separatist insurgency since 1984 with the objective of setting up an independent Kurdish state in parts of Turkey and in neighboring countries populated by Kurds. Syria provided him with sanctuary until 1998, when he was forced out of the country following a threat of Turkish military intervention in Syria. After attempting to seek asylum in a number of countries, Öcalan was eventually caught in Kenya (with CIA assistance) and sentenced to life imprisonment on the island of Imralı near Istanbul. This was followed by a unilaterally declared cease-fire by the PKK and a difficult European Union (EU) led reform process which contributed to the granting of cultural rights to Kurds in Turkey. These rights ranged from the recognition of Kurdish identity, to the right to use the Kurdish language publically and in broadcasting. These were revolutionary developments in a country that had denied and repressed Kurdish identity since the early days the Turkish republic and had seen almost 40,000 people killed by violence since 1984.

The gradual emergence of new leadership from the ranks of the PKK, accompanied by a vacuum created by the U.S. intervention in Iraq led to the return of violence in the summer of 2004. This violence led to the deaths of an ever growing number of young Turkish conscripts, some of them inevitably of Kurdish origin, as well as PKK militants and coincided with a period when Turkey’s relations with the EU weakened. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Turkish government launched a “Kurdish initiative” with the intention of solving the “Kurdish problem” for good. The government did succeed in negotiating the laying down of arms by the PKK and their return to Turkey from northern Iraq where they continue to hold bases to this day. This initial step was meant to start a political process to “solve” the Kurdish problem in Turkey but it went haywire when militants put on a show of force as they entered Turkey from the border post of Habur in the fall of 2009. The pictures from Habur immediately provoked a nationalist backlash and Erdoğan, who had once adopted a reconciliatory discourse on the Kurdish issue chose to revert to a traditional anti-Kurdish populist stance used in the 1980s and 90s prior to the reform process. In sharp contrast to his 2005 position where he publicly acknowledged the sufferings of Kurds at the hands of the Turkish state and promised a political solution, Erdoğan argued there was no longer a Kurdish problem in Turkey. He argued that at most, there were problems experienced by individual citizens of Kurdish ethnicity, and that these problems would be addressed with increased ‘democracy and rule of law’.

These remarks led to a sharp decrease in popularity for the prime minister among Kurds and to the founding of the BDP, a Kurdish nationalist political party, which was elected to power at the local and national levels in 2009 and 2011. The rise of the BDP led to the virulent articulation of Kurdish political demands ranging from the use of the Kurdish language in the provision of local government services in Kurdish populated regions of Turkey to the introduction of education in Kurdish. These demands were also accompanied by increased calls for territorial autonomy for the Kurdish inhabited regions of Turkey which was also supported by Öcalan. Together with the explosion in violence, these developments led to the introduction of repressive policies by the Turkish government where an ever growing number of local Kurdish officials, politicians and journalists being imprisoned, deeply tainting Turkey’s democratic credentials. These developments created a very tense situation in Turkey at a time when the Arab Spring had just begun and Turkey was being presented as a model for the Arab world’s transformation by some, while others drew attention to Turkey’s inability to resolve its own Kurdish problem.

The pressure to address the Kurdish problem in Turkey was compounded by a growing level of frustration and fatigue from violence felt across the country as well as a constitution writing process that was going nowhere. It is against this background that the prime minister sought to bring an end to the violence with a cease-fire by authorizing the head of Turkish intelligence to hold secret talks with PKK counterparts in Oslo between 2008 and 2011. Opponents of the prime minister and this scheme, however, leaked records of these talks, provoking an abrupt suspension of the talks. The prime minister, having emerged triumphant from the national elections in the summer of 2011, persevered and in late 2012 he was able to engage the BDP in a similar but more open exercise that came to be known as the “Imralı process” which allowed repeated visits by BDP representatives and Turkish officials to Öcalan. An early attempt to derail talks by assassinating three long standing female PKK militants in Paris in January of 2013 failed as both sides of the process remained committed to it. The two explosions on Tuesday night clearly had the intention of undermining the “Imralı process” but also of preempting Öcalan’s long awaited Newroz announcement on Thursday. The question of who might have mounted these two attacks may very soon be revealed as the perpetrators have been promptly caught.

The fact that these attacks have only caused minor injuries to two individuals and some structural damage to the headquarters of AKP, may turn out to be a blessing in disguise as the initial signs appear to suggest that the “Imralı process’ will not be adversely affected. Actually, it does not look like that these explosions will unravel the negotiations. Instead they will remind the public once more about their revulsion against violence and are likely to reinforce both parties commitment to the process. Right now neither AKP nor BDP want to be seen as the spoiler. However, whether the “Imralı process” will finally lead to a political resolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey beyond just another cease-fire is yet to be seen.

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Image Source: © Stringer Turkey / Reuters

Islam and Secularism in the Arab World: Lessons from Turkey

Thu, 28 Feb 2013 01:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM AST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On February 28, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion focused on the relationship between Islam and the state in the Arab world and the idea of a “Turkish model” for reconciling Islam and secularism. At the event, Ahmet Kuru, a visiting fellow at the BDC, presented his recently published policy briefing, “Muslim politics without an ‘Islamic state’: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a model for Arab Islamists?” In discussion with Kuru was H. A. Hellyer, a nonresident fellow with the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. The event was moderated by BDC Director of Research Shadi Hamid and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business and media communities.

Ahmet Kuru began his presentation by establishing a distinction between what he called “assertive secularism” – as practiced in France or during Turkey’s Kemalist past – and the “passive secularism” embraced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) today. While the former actively seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere, the latter encourages the accommodation of the public visibility of religion. Kuru argued that an “AKP model” – characterized by both the party’s move from Islamism to passive secularism and a shift of state institutions from assertive to passive secularism – provides important and practicable lessons for Arab Islamists today.

This model, he stressed, should not be seen as a perfect blueprint to be imposed from above. Certain aspects of the “model” may appeal to Arab parties more than others, and the exchange of the ideas associated with it may occur in an organic manner through a variety of channels. Kuru added that the AKP model itself is not without its own deficiencies; Arab Islamists should seek to learn from its failures as much as its successes.

At the moment, Kuru said, the Arab world finds itself in a middle ground between the passive secularism of Turkey and the “semi-theocratic semi-republican model of Iran.” While Tunisia looks set to maintain a constitution that refers neither to sharia or secularism, Egypt has taken a step in the Iranian direction by granting al-Azhar a constitutional role in the interpretation of Islamic law. By moving toward Turkey’s model, Kuru argued, Arab states would “allow diverse understandings of sharia to apply in a bottom-up, rather than top-down fashion.”

The second pillar of the “AKP model” refers to its ability to conduct “Muslim politics” – the pursuit policies that reflect Islamic values – without seeking the establishment of an Islamic state. Many Islamic actors in Turkey, Kuru said, see that an “Islamic” state is actually a hindrance to the application of Muslim values. Often, these states’ perceived religious legitimacy makes them less accountable to their people. Furthermore, these critics assert, “Islamic” states often focus on formalistic aspects of Islamic law rather than genuinely promoting the substance of Islamic ethics.

Finally, the AKP’s pragmatism – for instance in its gradualist approach to effecting change or its ability to balance conflicting foreign policy agendas – offer further important lessons for Arab Islamists. Spefically, Kuru asserted, ruling Islamists in Arab countries will find this sort of flexibility useful in their efforts to establish working relationships with Western governments on which they rely for economic and other forms of support.

To be sure, the AKP’s transformation came about as a result of certain constraints and incentives – from the military, Turkish society, and the West – that may not exist in the same way in Arab cases. Still, Kuru argued, other institutional or societal influences may well encourage the embrace of passive secularism in the Arab world. These could include the enduring influence of anti-Islamist security establishments or the presence of indigenous Christian populations in countries such as Egypt.

Hisham Hellyer began by stressing that the appeal of the Turkish model in the Arab world had a lot to with the idea of autonomy, which had also been at the core of uprisings in countries such as Egypt. In that regard, Turkey’s homegrown success in building its own economy – more than the AKP’s approach to religion – was what had initially attracted Arab Islamists, he said. It should not come as surprising, therefore, if Arabs focused on building their own futures reject the idea of an external model being imposed.

In the Arab world today, no “post-uprising ideological formation” has yet solidified, Hellyer said. The model that may emerge, he argued, may well share much with the centrist, “moderate secularism” embraced by the AKP and will “probably owe very little to the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to the Salafi political vision.” Hellyer posited that Libya and Syria – where pious Muslim leaders outside the realm of Islamism hold significant influence – may well be the first to develop this model.

Hellyer agreed with Kuru on the advantages of state-sponsored moderate secularism in countries where there is deep religious belief. While Kuru saw a state role in defining religious law as a blow to democracy, however, Hellyer suggested that it could perhaps be beneficial. He argued that in the contemporary Muslim world, there is a “crisis of religious authority” fueled in part by a proliferation of preachers (for instance in Tunisia and Egypt) who “feel they have the right to issue fatwas and expect people to act upon them.” The establishment of a “quality assurance mechanism” in the form of a role for institutions such as al-Azhar may not be negative development, as long as that role remains consultative rather than coercive.

Hellyer joined Kuru in warning against the idea of an “Islamic state.” He sought to deconstruct the term, saying that in adopting the goal of an “Islamic state,” Islamist movements often failed to acknowledge that the state itself is a modern construct. The idea of a pre-modern “Islamic state” that must be revived, Hellyer insisted, is something of a fallacy, and one that is largely ignored by today’s Islamists. He further questioned Islamists’ claim to a monopoly on interpretations of Islam. Islamism is not simply “political Islam,” he asserted, but is rather the marriage of a “certain reformist approach to Islam” with politics. He pointed out that religious institutions in many Muslim countries “contest the right of Islamist political movements to independently articulate religion.” Hellyer questioned whether Arab Islamists would be able or likely to adopt an AKP model, given the important differences that exist “not only in their political histories, but in their religious approaches.”

Following their presentations, Shadi Hamid questioned both panelists on the applicability of an AKP model in Arab societies that, unlike Turkey, often show strong support for the application of sharia. Perhaps countries such as Egypt – where according to a 2010 Pew poll, as many as 82 percent support the stoning of adulterers and 77 percent favor cutting off the hands of thieves – may actually want to establish Islamic states?

Kuru responded by arguing that the situation in Egypt and Tunisia over the last four months had shown that Islamists’ strategy of appealing solely to their base would backfire. The degree of instability in Egypt had shown that a “more balanced discourse is clearly needed.” Furthermore, he contended, by encouraging more diverse interpretations of sharia, the Muslim Brotherhood would succeed in distinguishing itself positively from its Salafi rivals.

Hellyer argued, meanwhile, that in reading these sorts of polls, there is a need to distinguish between religiosity and religious literacy. While Egypt regularly ranks as the “most religious country in the world,” he said, religious literacy there is “incredibly low.” Where questions pertain to religious identity, Egyptians will largely respond in an emphatic manner. This is not to say, however that they see religion as a political priority. “Inflation, unemployment, and the lack of security” were consistently cited as the top priorities of supporters of all major political parties, he said, while Islamic law “didn’t feature.”

Event Materials

BDC_AKP Model_Kuru

Participants

Moderator

Shadi Hamid

Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Shanghai Blues, the European Union and John Kerry’s Turkey Visit

Kemal Kirişci — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 11:30:00 -0500

Secretary of State John Kerry is visiting Europe and Turkey at a time when EU-Turkish relations are at a stalemate and in desperate need of revival. U.S. efforts will be critical to breaking the stalemate at a time when Turkey out of frustration is actively looking for alternatives including the idea of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The U.S. could highlight the strategic value of Turkey to the West especially in economic terms and introduce the idea of including Turkey in an eventual Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The current picture is in some contrast to Bill Clinton’s visit to Turkey in 1999, where the U.S. played a critical role in contributing to the political process that announced Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership later that year. Subsequently, the engagement of Turkey by the EU culminated in unimaginable political reforms but also economic growth and transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy. However, soon after actual accession negotiations for membership started in 2005, relations began to turn sour between the two sides. Technically, for Turkish accession to be completed, 33 chapters representing the EU acquis, the corpus of EU laws and policies, have to be negotiated and closed. Croatia, which started accession negotiations at the same time as Turkey, completed them in late 2011 and will become a fully-fledged member of the EU in July this year. In Turkey’s case, so far only 13 chapters have been opened while eight chapters were suspended in December 2006 by the European Council. Another nine chapters are being blocked largely by France and Cyprus but also by Germany and Austria. No new chapters from among the three left have been opened since 2010, leaving Turkey’s EU accession process in a complete state of suspension. The causes behind this state of affairs are numerous, ranging from a deadlock over the failure to unite the island of Cyprus under the Annan Plan in 2004, to outright objections in Austria, France and Germany to the very notion of Turkish membership on the grounds that “Turkey is not in Europe”.

This has provoked a deep sense of cynicism, mistrust and resentment on the Turkish side. In an opinion survey published last month by the Istanbul based Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), only 33 per cent of those surveyed thought Turkey should persist with membership in the next five years. It is not surprising that against such a background, an MP from the governing party, who is also a constitutional law professor, chose in protest to declare that the most recent European Commission Progress Report critical of Turkey’s democracy should be thrown in the trash during an October 2012 live TV debate program in full view of the whole country. Similarly, the Minister responsible for relations with the EU argued that since Turkey was now doing so much better economically than the EU, Turkey did not need the EU any more. However, he added, if the economically crippled EU wanted, they could apply to join Turkey as a member. More recently, the Turkish Prime Minister, complaining about the very long years that Turkey has been kept waiting in front of the gates of the EU, exploded and revealed he had asked the Russian president if he could help with Turkey’s admittance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and that he was ready to give up on EU membership. This Shanghai Blues state of mind is particularly understandable considering that September 2013 will mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement between the then EEC and Turkey, which promised membership to Turkey in due course. As much as these reactions curried favor with the public at large, particularly the remarks of the prime minister, they were also received with considerable concern by many businessmen, columnists and experts in Turkey who questioned the wisdom both economically and politically of distancing Turkey from the EU.

What can the Secretary of State do? During his trip across Europe and Turkey, there are a number of arguments that Kerry could bring up to try to break the stalemate in EU-Turkish relations. The first one is the traditional line that the U.S. has used since the issue of Turkey’s EU membership was taken up by the Clinton administration back in the 1990s: Turkey’s strategic importance. This is an argument that many in Europe have traditionally felt uncomfortable with and have even resented the U.S. for bringing it up. Here Kerry would need to tread his line softly not to turn the Shanghai Blues into a big requiem, as a European diplomat recently noted. However, compared to the past the strategic argument has changed in two important ways that might well make it more palatable to European tastes. Firstly, the balance in world affairs has changed tremendously, and not always to the benefit of those who have advocated a liberal economic and political world order. A Turkey that drifts away from the EU and gets closer to the SCO would surely impact this balance, not to the advantage of the West. Secondly, since the 1990s Turkey has become an important economic player precisely at a time when the EU is caught in a deep recession. In 1999, when Turkey was recognized as an EU candidate, its GDP, at just below 250 billion USD, was the 9th largest among EU member countries after Belgium. By 2012, Turkey’s economy had more than tripled to 783 billion USD, surpassing Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden to become the 6th largest economy in the EU. Excluding Poland, Turkey’s economy is now almost larger than all the new member countries’ economies combined. Re-engaging Turkey on the path of membership will undoubtedly benefit the Turkish economy but possibly for the first time in EU-Turkish relations, would also benefit the EU itself. There would also be visible benefits to the EU in terms of employment and expanded Turkish FDI, especially in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, but also in terms of enabling EU companies to reach markets in Turkey’s neighborhood and beyond.

In this particular context, it is of paramount importance that Kerry involves Turkey in the discussions concerning the negotiation of an EU-U.S. free trade area which are likely to be high on his agenda. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to help, although seating Turkey as an additional actor at the negotiating table for TTIP would be unrealistic. The U.S., however, could convince the EU to at least recognize Turkey’s grievances concerning free trade agreements such as TTIP, which the EU signs without consulting Turkey. This is critical because the customs union with the EU requires Turkey to take on all the obligations associated with such agreements, without binding third parties to extend any trade privileges to Turkey. Excluding Turkey from TTIP would not only be a sure way to exacerbate the already poor relations between the EU and Turkey, but would risk further nudging Turkey closer to the SCO with all its negative strategic consequences. On the other hand, if Turkey is allowed to participate in TTIP, its economy will grow, which will in turn increase the amount it imports from the EU as well as the U.S. Furthermore, a Turkish economy that continues to grow would also be an economic engine for its surrounding neighborhood. In addition, the more Turkey’s liberal market grows, the greater the demands for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey would be. Engaging Turkey in TTIP would have a positive impact equal to the opening of all the suspended and blocked chapters. It would also significantly heal the deeply entrenched mistrust Turkey has towards the EU, and for that matter the U.S. as well.

Beyond the revised traditional U.S. strategic argument in support of reviving EU-Turkish relations, Kerry should also point out that the manner in which France and a number of EU member countries are unilaterally blocking the opening of negotiations on a number of chapters is undermining both the letter and spirit of pacta sund servanda, a principle central to western liberal values. At a time when much of the emerging world is increasingly facing a choice between those who advocate state capitalism and sovereign democracy on the one hand and the Western market economy and liberal democracy on the other, the EU’s reluctance to live up its own values and discriminate against Turkey on thinly veiled cultural grounds is likely to backfire on the EU. This is especially important in terms of the EU’s credibility with respect to the post-Arab Spring Middle East’s transformation towards adopting more liberal economic and political values.

Finally, while in Turkey, Kerry must remind the Turkish side of the very complex nature of the challenges which face Turkey and its neighborhood and also add that Turkey must avoid policies that play into the hands of “naysayers” in the EU to Turkish accession. Turkey is much more likely to continue to be an inspiring example for economic and political transformation in its neighborhood if it reengages the EU rather than drifts away from it. Kerry can also point out that sheer numbers and economic logic speak for themselves. The economies of the EU and the U.S. put together are at least three times bigger than the economies of SCO member countries. A more important point for Turkey to see is that a Middle East which has just experienced the Arab Spring in the name of greater freedom, prosperity and rule of law, is not going to be impressed by a Turkey that chooses to associate itself with an organization whose members disregard such values. With these arguments, Kerry may be pleasantly surprised to find that he is not alone in Turkey. The painful events of 2012 in Syria, the difficult and increasingly precarious transformation process in Egypt and Tunisia (not to mention Iraq and Afghanistan), has once more reminded many in Turkey that an EU struggling with a recession may still be able to provide a much more stable economic and political security than any other arrangement. There is also growing recognition that some of the challenges of democratic reform Turkey faces have intensified since the weakening of EU-Turkish relations. In fact, when a survey conducted by EDAM asked experts in Turkey if the country should persist with EU membership, 87 percent of the 202 respondents polled said “yes” it should. This may also explain why early in February, both the Turkish President, while hosting his Serbian counterpart, and the Prime Minister, while visiting the Czech Republic, felt the need to unequivocally state that relations with the SCO cannot been seen as an alternative to EU membership. Indeed, by subtly raising his voice to break the EU-Turkish stalemate, Kerry could help to clear the Shanghai Blues state of mind and revitalize a process from which the EU, the U.S., Turkey and Turkey’s neighborhood would benefit. This of course does not mean that Turkey cannot develop economic ties with SCO members.

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists?

Ahmet T. Kuru — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Islamist parties assume power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, many – in both the West and the region – have turned to the experience of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) for lessons on negotiating the relationship between Islam and the state.

The “AKP model,” it is argued, occupies the middle ground between the “assertive secularism” of Turkey’s past, and the marriage of religion and politics seen in countries such as Iran. Given striking differences, however, between Turkey, with its Kemalist past, and the Arab world, where “secularism” itself is sometimes almost taboo, can the AKP’s experience really be an effective model? Will Islamists in deeply conservative Arab countries even see it as desirable?

In a policy briefing from the BDC, Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a Model for Arab Islamists?, Visiting Fellow Ahmet T. Kuru explores the relationship between Islamism and secularism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Kuru writes the continued rise of the AKP and its embrace of a “passive secularism” that effectively advances Islamic values provide an important and potentially attractive example for Arab Islamists. The differences between the Arab and Turkish contexts, he argues, need not inhibit the adoption of certain aspects of the AKP model. Rather, the dividends brought by the AKP’s pragmatism and the party's success in pursuing Muslim politics without seeking an “Islamic” state may yet encourage Arab Islamists to follow a similar path.

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Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Re-Betting on Turkey

Kemal Kirişci — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

During his second term, President Obama has the opportunity to re-invest in the U.S.-Turkish relationship, focusing on a long-time U.S. ally. Kemal Kirişci wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

Why is Turkey an important cornerstone in establishing the liberal global order?
Can Turkey set an example and help spread democratic values to neighboring countries?
How can the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) boost the U.S.-Turkish relationship?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Kemal Kirişci

Turkey is a country that has been a long time ally of the United States with a major stake in the liberal world order. During your first term, you rightly recognized the nation as a Big Bet--paying your first official visit in Europe to Turkey and becoming only the second U.S. president, after Bill Clinton, to address the Turkish Parliament. Turkey was offered a model partnership with the U.S., and great hopes were invested in the relationship. However, reality evolved somewhat differently and a number of Black Swans intervened. The 2010 Turkish vote at the United Nations Security Council against sanctions on Iran accompanied with deteriorating relations with Israel as well as the EU and persistent anti-Americanism among the Turkish public have all led to fears that Turkey is “shifting axis” and being “lost”. Yet, this is only part of the picture.

Your Big Bet on Turkey fostered the development of a close rapport with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and you made the most of this connection by frequently consulting with one another on world and regional affairs. Turkey cooperated closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. Both countries adopted similar approaches towards the Arab Spring even if Erdogan expressed some virulent frustration with the U.S. for not supporting the opposition against the Assad regime in Syria more forcefully and decisively. There were also modest but important gains made in bi-lateral trade that had constantly been falling in relative terms since the end of the Cold War. This was coupled with field oriented pragmatic cooperation to assist reform in the Arab and Muslim world.

Recommendation:

Clearly, much more could have been achieved and highlighting a more ambitious agenda for U.S.-Turkish relations for your administration is critical. Turkey itself is still a Big Bet if the global liberal order in Turkey’s neighborhood and Turkey’s own membership to that order is going to be ensured. That would also help keep the multitude of Black Swans from getting in the way of realizing the grander Big Bets or for that matter Turkey itself becoming a Black Swan.

The time to double-down on Turkey is especially ripe, and a delay could be costly. As Turkish President Abdullah Gul reaffirmed in the January-February issue of Foreign Affairs, “from a values point of view we are with the West”. This opportunity coincides with a time when there are increasing signals from Turkey to reinvest into its relations with the West.

Background:

It is often forgotten that Turkey was a participant in the making of the global liberal order at the end of the Second World War, albeit of course a very junior one. Yet, it was this experience that set Turkey on the unusually long path of becoming a multi-party democracy with a liberal market economy. Indeed Turkey’s transformation was a slow and painfully one with lots of ups and downs. All U.S. administrations from Harry Truman onwards played a role in this process but the most critical one was probably the Clinton administrations. They played a particularly central role in nudging Turkish democracy and economy a little closer to European standards and helped Turkey first to sign a customs union with the EU in 1995 and then eventually become a candidate country for EU membership in 1999 followed by the beginning of accession negotiations. These policies were Big Bets that handsomely paid off. Both President George W. Bush in 2004 like his successor in 2009 recognized Turkey’s economic and democratic success and hoped that Turkey could set an example for its neighborhood, particularly for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Actually, some of their hopes can be said to be materializing. Turkey has both economically and politically become deeply integrated with its neighborhood. Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product in 2011 was greater than all of its surrounding eleven neighbors economies put together excluding Iran and Russia. This economy is increasingly becoming an engine of growth for these neighboring countries even if modestly. Turkey’s trade with these countries increased from 10 percent of Turkey’s overall foreign trade in 1991 to 22 percent in 2011 while its trade with the EU and the U.S. has dropped from 50 and 9 percent to 41 and 5 percent respectively. An ever growing number of Turkish companies are investing in most of these countries while Turkey is fast becoming an immigration country and a source of remittances for labor migrants of the region. This kind of economic engagement is having a transformative impact and helping to integrate this neighborhood into the global markets. Turkish government and civil society are also modestly involved in projects and programs assisting political transition and reform. However, Turkey’s both economic and democracy gains remain fragile. Turkey runs an important current accounts deficit and needs to raise its savings levels as well as research and development budgets. The Arab Spring has adversely affected its trade and economic relations with the Middle East. There are also growing concerns about an erosion of the democratic gains achieved in the recent past particularly with respect to freedom of expression and rule of law. The Kurdish question still constitutes a major challenge to long term domestic stability. The constitutional reform process appears to be stuck too.

Conclusion:

At a time when Turkey’s neighborhood is filled with vital challenges, it is of paramount importance that your second administration recognizes the importance of securing Turkey’s commitment to the global liberal order and its potential bearing on the America’s capacity to realize regional foreign policy objectives. There are many ways in which this could be achieved, but the most effective one may well arise from associating Turkey with negotiating a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). This is critical because the free trade agreements that the EU signs with third parties have long been a major source of resentment and grievances for Turkey. This is because the customs union requires that Turkey take on all the obligations associated with such agreements without binding third parties to extend any trade privileges to Turkey. So far the EU has not been very responsive to Turkish calls to rectify this situation.

The U.S. is uniquely positioned to help. Seating Turkey at the negotiating table for TAFTA would be unrealistic. However, the U.S. could convince the EU to at least involve Turkey in a consultation process and ensure that as Turkey opens up its markets to the U.S. Turkish businesses can also enjoy better access to U.S. markets. The logic behind why this would be an effective Big Bet is quite straight forward. The more Turkey can participate in TAFTA, the more its economy would grow. The more it grows, the more it can import U.S. as well as EU goods and services. Furthermore, the more Turkey’s liberal market grows, the greater the demands for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey. In turn, with an economy equaling the 6^th largest in the EU and 15^th largest in the world, Turkey’s economic force would benefit the neighborhood as well. In this way not only would Turkey be tied to the liberal global order, but it would also become an even more effective conduit for disseminating liberal economic and democratic values to a neighborhood still struggling to transition from the legacy of command economies and authoritarian political systems.

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Kemal Kirişci

Turkey is Turning Its Face to the West

Kemal Kirişci — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This interview appeared in the Turkish newspaper Milliyet on February 7, 2013. Read the interview in Turkish on the Milliyet website.

Turkey will be discussed even more often in Washington in the coming months: Brookings Institution has revived its Turkey project and named Kemal Kirisci, an academic and a well-known figure in the Turkish foreign policy analysis establishment as its new director and TUSIAD Senior Fellow. Kemal Kirişci has an ambitious agenda: monthly panels on Turkey, quarterly reports and at least one book project…

Professor Kirişci plans to focus more on economic ties between the two countries as well as on the importance of Turkey’s economic integration with its neighborhood for U.S.-Turkish relations rather than just the strategic and military aspects of this relationship. Professor Kirişci has given his first interview in Washington to Milliyet. We discussed a range of issues such as Turkey-U.S. relations, European Union and the Kurdish problem.

What will be the major issues between Ankara and Washington during the second Obama administration?

Kemal Kirişci: Iran is obviously on the table. Israel will become more important. I imagine that the U.S. will try to reconcile Israel and Turkey in one way or another. On the Syria issue, Turkey will press the U.S. to be more active but I doubt that Washington is willing to do that... Iraq is another issue. Right now Turkey has a terrible relationship with Prime Minister Maliki. So all these issues will be at the top of the list...

Can we assume that the close relationship will endure?

Obama and Erdogan are close. However Prime Minister Erdogan has recently made some sharp statements against President Obama’s Syria policy. These words have, I am sure, been noted here. But I don’t know they will affect the relationship. I think overall the Americans have a desire to want to cautiously deepen and extend the scope of the relationship. I also feel that Turkey is turning to America and to the West once again.

What does that mean?

I think, compared to 2012, we’ll see an improvement in Turkey’s relationship with NATO and even the European Union… The impression I have is that there will be an effort to revive these relationships.

Is the EU still a realistic option for Turkey?

I think so. The political winds are changing quickly in Europe. Besides, Europe now admits that Turkey has achieved unimaginable economic success. They also know that the EU does not have much political strength in the world without Turkey on its side.

You’re painting quite a positive picture…

Yes, but there are problems with its implementation. Because the EU’s own decision making mechanism is problematic.

Turkey is not doing much either…

I think Turkey is making a mistake. Turkey has had a relationship with Europe for over 500 years. I see Turkey as part and parcel of Europe!

How about the fact that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country?

Of course there are some problems related to this… The Ottoman conquest of Istanbul continues to be framed as part of a Christian-Muslim conflict. I see it differently. I taught diplomatic history for a good 20 years and I see the Ottomans no differently than other dynasties of Europe such as the Bourbons or the Habsburgs or the Romonovs.

How about modern Turkey?

Tearing Turkey away from Europe would be the biggest mistake that anyone could commit against Turkey. But there is jealousy and resentment on both sides. You know what, I would have very much liked Turkey to turn to Europe in 2012 and say “You’ve helped as through bad days, now you’re having trouble. Let us help, what can we do for you?”

What are your thoughts on Turkey’s new found interest on the the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

Even the Chinese elite admit that there is a serious problem of law and corruption in the country. I think in a scenario where Turkey is in close and deep cooperation with these countries there would inevitably be spillover effects on Turkey. Turkish democracy will stay healthy as long as its integration with the West continues.

So SCO should not be an alternative to the EU….

I’m saying that it cannot be an alternative, at least as long as Turkey wants to be a leading economy in the world and a democracy with strong rule of law by 2023.

You’ve defined Turkey’s changing foreign policy with the “trading state” theory. What is a trading state?

It’s a theory developed in the 1980s. It says that countries who have developed strong economic relations with each other can also solve problems with dialogue instead of violence and that, in turn, this brings greater prosperity to these countries. I look at Turkey in the 1990’s and see a country who organized frequent military operations into Northern Iraq and who threatened to “enter Syria from one side and exit through the other.” Then I look at Turkey today. The biggest difference between the two is the increase in Turkish trade with its neighbors and hence the pressure to have better relations.

Does this theory still hold after the collapse of the zero-problem policy?

Some steps that Turkey has taken recently are obviously different than what a trading state would have done. A case in point is Israel. Hypothetically, a trading state would have found a way to solve its problems instead of rupturing the relationship. With Russia on the other hand, I would say Turkey has managed the Syria crisis in line with the interests of a trading state. Even though it looks like there is a proxy war between the two countries regarding Syria, bi-lateral relations have not been adversely affected. This I believe is because both sides know that a hostile attitude towards each other can damage a good and beneficial economic relationship.

You once argued in an article that Bill Clinton played a crucial role in raising Turkey’s democratic and economic standards. Why?

I was in the U.S. during part of Clinton’s presidency and thus had a chance to closely observe this period. I read the archives and relevant documents from congressional records. I also conducted interviews with many high level officials. I concluded that the U.S. did a critically important job in helping Turkey improve its democracy, revive its NGOs and ameliorate its relationship with the EU. It was the Americans who made it possible for the OSCE to gather in Istanbul in 1999. That meeting was a turning point in Turkey’s democratic transformation.

How does the Obama administration compare in this regard?

Washington is still under the influence of the political reforms that Turkey has made in the mid-2000s. Turkey’s democracy has had some problems since then. However democracy in the Western world, including the US, is in a crisis right now. So Turkey’s problems don’t stand out as much as it used to back in the 1990s.

Really?

The US before 9/11 was much more liberal. It was ambitious in promoting democracy in the world, it was economically strong enough to spend money on human rights issues. This has changed after 9/11. It’s still ahead of Turkey in upholding the rule of law. But it would be difficult to argue that it has the same level of freedom of speech as in the 1990s.

Why does Turkey still need the U.S. or the EU’s help to take steps towards greater democracy?

I can explain this only through examples. Spain, Portugal, Greece… All these countries were once dictatorships. And it wasn’t easy for them to make the transition to democracy. EU was the anchor, especially in Spain. Today Spain is able to discuss and debate Basques’ secessionist demands in its parliament without violence. It was the EU who enabled that!

So the EU can play a role in solving the Kurdish problem as well…

People usually compare this issue to similar conflicts in Ireland and Spain… One thing should not be forgotten, these countries made peace under EU’s umbrella. Today, not too many people can claim that people in Turkey enjoy greater human rights compared to mid-2000s. What changed? The EU is no longer an anchor.

Read the interview in Turkish on the Milliyet website.

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: Milliyet

Egypt’s Transition Two Years Later: A Turkish Perspective

Ahmet T. Kuru — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

I was probably the only one wearing a tie in the Tahrir Square on January 25, 2013—the anniversary of the revolution. Different groups were gathering in the late afternoon while I was giving an interview to TRT (Turkey’s public TV) about my observations of post-revolution Egypt during my 11-day stay in Cairo. I had the opportunity to conduct interviews with 20 Egyptian politicians, activists, and scholars. I asked them questions around three main subjects: 1) How do you explain the revolution, why 2011 and why not before? 2) Are you satisfied with the aftermath of the revolution? and 3) What do you think about the future alliance between Egypt and Turkey in terms of having a shared policy toward the Middle East?

There was a near consensus on the first question. My interviewees emphasized similar clusters of reasons: the Tunisian revolution set an example; the Mubarak regime was 30 years old (or in fact the “regime” was 60 years old) and the Egyptian people (who are normally very patient) were fed up with corruption and failed policies; Mubarak alienated not only the wider public but also the military by preparing his son Gamal as his successor; social media equipped young people with new opportunities to get organized (by the way, I do not know the cost during the revolution but cell phone services are now quite cheap in Egypt); the demonstrations in Tahrir Square were at first led by diffuse groups with no hierarchy, but three days later the Muslim Brotherhood joined and substantially increased the number of protesters; and Al-Jazeera played a major role by its nearly nonstop broadcasting of the demonstrations.

As someone who had heard some Turkish leftists depict the Arab Spring as an “American conspiracy,” it was surprising how the role of the United States was so negligible and inconsistent during the Egyptian revolution, according to my interviewees.

The answers to the second question (on the aftermath of the revolution) were much more diverse. It would be wrong to categorize them into two groups—the opposition to and supporters of President Mohamed Morsi. Many of my interviewees were critical of Morsi but their reasons diverged considerably. For some, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood constitute an Islamist threat to Egypt. A professor warned me that “the Muslim Brothers are not like the AKP [Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party]” but “they are like Erbakan’s parties.” He also reminded me how Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was welcomed in Egypt as a hero in his September 2011 visit, but after he asked Egypt to embrace a secular state, his popularity among Islamists quickly dissipated.

Beyond the issue of Islamism, some who had positions in the old regime criticized the Brotherhood for being radical in terms of the speed of change (e.g., pushing the Constitution too quickly without even consulting with the Vice President). Others, however, criticized the Brotherhood for being too slow and compromising toward the old regime, having secret agreements with the military, and letting the old regime survive financially.

The role of the military figured prominently in my conversations. A formerly senior member of the Brotherhood told me with pride: “It took you [Turks] twenty years to solve the problem of civil-military relations, but we did it in two years.” By contrast, many opposition figures noted that this would be a naïve claim; the military still has the power to interfere in politics and continues to play a substantial role in the Egyptian economy.

Besides these specific criticisms, one major argument of the opposition was that Morsi lacked projects and initiatives for solving Egypt’s social and economic problems. They also point out that the Muslim Brotherhood is full of medical doctors and engineers; but includes very few lawyers and social scientists. Yet even the critics admit that the opposition parties do not have such projects or initiatives either.

Even on the issue of democracy, it was unclear to me whether some opposition figures were all that much better than the Brotherhood politicians. For me, the dissolution of an elected parliament by a politicized court decision is nothing but a “judicial coup d’état.” Turkey was saved from such a coup in 2008 and Egypt experienced it in 2012. Yet some opposition members seem to whole-heartedly support the court decision.

In debates about Egypt’s domestic politics, Salafis appear to have a puzzling position. On the one hand, they are blamed for pushing the Brotherhood to be more radical (e.g., inserting Al-Azhar into the constitution as a consultative body on the matter of Sharia and rejecting a female quota in parliamentary elections). On the other hand, they are perceived to be divided and changeable. Several interviewees stressed that it was good to see Salafis in Egyptian party politics for the sake of normalization, in comparison to Tunisian Salafis who largely remain outside of the political system and prone to violence.

My third and last question was on foreign relations, especially those with Turkey. In general, the Egyptian elite seems to be focusing on internal problems and willing to restrain its regional ambitions. Regarding Turkey, nearly everyone I spoke to expressed a desire to have better relations with Turkey than during the time of Mubarak. They would like Turkey to support Egypt domestically, in the economic realm for instance, rather than pursuing joint initiatives in the broader region. This is one reason why the Egyptian elite seems hesitant to take a more pro-active stand against the Assad regime in Syria. Another reason is that there is still a tendency to put Israel at the center of foreign policy issues and they regard Assad as, at least historically, part of the anti-Israel bloc.

I also realized the extent to which Egyptian elites continues to have some misperceptions about Turkey. As an example, several of them tried to convince me in vain that Erdoğan is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Turkey branch.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States

Wed, 12 Dec 2012 12:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 12, 2012
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Turkey continuing to pursue civil nuclear energy programs, the Middle East is likely to play host to the first new civil nuclear energy states of the 21st century. After a long hiatus, the likely entry of several new states into the global nuclear power sector presents a number of unprecedented challenges, including the development of the institutional and human capacity to run their programs competently and sustainably.

On December 12, the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion of its latest research paper, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East.” Based on case studies from three countries in the Middle East, the paper offers a series of recommendations on human resource related risks for emerging market nations looking to enter the civil nuclear sector. Following the presentation of the report’s findings and recommendations, Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger, director of the Energy Security Initiative, moderated a discussion with its authors.

Audio

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121212_nuclear_states