Brookings: Topics - The Presidency

President Barack Obama’s Counterterrorism Speech Nails it on Drone Strikes

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 24 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

President Barack Obama’s counterterrorism speech Thursday did not deliver any radical policy changes or huge revelations, but it was well done nonetheless. It explained his reasoning behind the use of certain techniques of warfare including drone strikes and Guantanamo detentions, even as he also promised to minimize the use of these methods in the future and try to move towards a world in which the 2001 authorization for war against al Qaeda and affiliates would no longer be needed. It was an intelligent blend of the tone of his more idealistic speeches, such as the Cairo address of June 2009, with his more muscular messages like the December 2009 Nobel Prize acceptance speech.

But one section of his speech is worth particular focus – the use of armed unmanned combat vehicles or drones. Even though President Obama did not specify exactly how drone strikes would change in the future, and did not provide a great deal of new information about them, the modest amount of detail he did provide was welcome. That is because U.S. drone strikes are badly misunderstood around the world, a point underscored by a New York Times op-ed today contained the following statements:

“...the C.I.A. has no idea who is actually being killed in most of the strikes. Despite this acknowledgment, the drone program in Pakistan still continues without any Congressional oversight or accountability.”

Such statements are incorrect and inflammatory, causing problems for example in U.S.-Pakistani relations. Indeed, even so-called “signature strikes” have typically been conducted only after a great deal of surveillance of a given site, very robust establishment of the fact that such a site is an enemy headquarters or related facility, and considerable care in ensuring that noncombatants are not present (and as Obama said, Congress is “briefed on every strike that America takes”).

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Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

The Road to War : Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 280pp.

If you remember the golden age of broadcast network news, then you probably welcomed Marvin Kalb into your living room on a regular basis. Recruited by Edward R. Murrow to join CBS News, Kalb went on to a distinguished three-decade career with CBS, and then NBC News. In The Road to War, Kalb examines the role of diplomatic commitments made by presidents. These commitments, rather than formal declarations of war, have led one president after another, from Truman to Obama, to order American troops into wars all over the world.

Condensed Excerpt:

Since World War II, presidents have relied more on commitments, public and private, than they have on declarations of war, even though the U.S. Constitution declares rather unambiguously that Congress has the responsibility to “declare war.”

Over the years, presidential commitments have come in different shapes and sizes, suggesting honor and integrity, strength and determination, the word of a president backed by the military power of the United States. No trifling matter, in diplomatic affairs. And yet . . .

Some commitments, such as America’s to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have been successful and durable, in part because they have been based on solemn treaties ratified by Congress. Another example is America’s commitment to South Korea, also based on a mutual defense treaty, supported by the presence of 28,500 American troops armed with nuclear weapons until December 1991.

Words have consequence. Spoken by a president, they can often become American policy, with or without congressional approval.

South Vietnam represented a very different challenge. It was war by presidential commitment, the United States sliding mindlessly, one administration after another, into a guerrilla war in Indochina, which cost more than 58,000 American lives. Few in Congress or the media questioned the war’s provenance or legitimacy, until it was too late.

Finally, in this book, which focuses on American commitments to South Korea, South Vietnam, and Israel, the one to Israel is perhaps the most fascinating. Here we have an unusually close relationship, culturally, religiously, politically in alignment, more or less, yet one without any basis in a formal treaty linking the interests of one nation to the other. It is based primarily on private presidential letters to Israeli prime ministers, rich with American promises and pledges to Israeli security. Over the years many of the promises have been honored, but some were betrayed, leaving feelings of anxiety among Israeli leaders about the ultimate reliability of an American commitment.

No doubt, presidential commitments are seen as serious, almost sacred, promises to act made by a chief executive on behalf of his administration. And other nations may view these commitments as binding nation-to-nation promises that succeeding administrations will honor, too. But there is a problem. Will they?

In 1982, for example, President Ronald Reagan pledged America’s “iron- clad commitment to the defense of Israel.” The commitment made sense to Reagan at the time, and it has been echoed by one president after another ever since. But does Reagan’s pledge have the same resonance now that it did then? Does it mean that if Israel feels it must bomb Iran to stop its nuclear program that America must join in the attack? Much has to do with trust between leaders and countries. Do Israeli leaders trust President Barack Obama as much as they did Bill Clinton and George W. Bush? These are questions that cut to the heart—and viability—of a presidential commitment.

Words have consequence. Spoken by a president, they can often become American policy, with or without congressional approval. When a president “commits” the United States to a controversial course of action, he may be setting the nation on the road to war or on a road to reconciliation. In matters of national security, his powers have become awesome—his word decisive. Who decides when we go to war? The president decides. As former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told me, it “all depends” on the president. “It’s his call.” Likewise, it is his decision when and whether, and under what conditions, to support a friendly nation.

In the final analysis, for reasons both political and military, Israel may, on its own, strike Iran. Would it then expect American diplomatic and military support? Obama has strongly implied yes. But, without a mutual defense treaty, there may always be a question about the durability and reliability of a presidential commitment.

A president, such as Barack Obama, for example, pledges that the United States has “an ironclad commitment” to Israel’s security—meaning, one would imagine, that if Israel were attacked, the United States would come to Israel’s defense. Is there anything more to this commitment than a presidential promise? Obviously, yes. Israel enjoys broad-based support from Congress and the American people. For the most part, both nations share common values and common aims. But the president is the key to determining the flow and texture of this delicate relationship.

A question often asked by political leaders in Israel is whether Obama will live up to his word. Will his commitment be honored or betrayed by him or by a successor? The answer to this question can mean war or peace. Might it not be better for both nations to negotiate a formal defense treaty—and, in this way, try to reduce or even eliminate areas of doubt in their relationship? Those who question the value or relevance of a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty point out that in recent years Obama has tried to organize Israeli-Palestinian peace talks only to fail abysmally because of Palestinian objections to Israeli settlements and Israeli insistence on building such settlements in the name of security. How would a treaty resolve these problems, they ask? Indeed, even the effort to negotiate a defense treaty would likely kick up fresh tumult and anxiety among Arab states, which are apt to see a U.S. treaty with Israel as proof that the United States can no longer be counted on as an impartial negotiator.

Another question: Obama has warned, more than once: “Let there be no doubt—America is determined to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.” Though the world has heard this warning, there are still many, especially in the Middle East, who question whether Obama would really use American military power to stop Iran from “getting nuclear weapons,” however that phrase might be defined. It is said in Washington and Jerusalem that never before have Israel and the United States been in closer alignment on stopping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. True, and yet not quite true. In the final analysis, for reasons both political and military, Israel may, on its own, strike Iran. Would it then expect American diplomatic and military support? Obama has strongly implied yes. But, without a mutual defense treaty, there may always be a question about the durability and reliability of a presidential commitment.

* * *

The Road to War is available in both hardcover and eBook formats:

Praise for The Road to War:

“Every road to war is ultimately also a tragedy. Kalb’s concluding chapter, however, offers a timely and important ray of hope: a defense treaty between the U.S. and Israel in the context of a fair peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians might avoid not just one but even two wars. President Obama should read this chapter.”
—Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. national security adviser

“Marvin Kalb has written a fine book that should be required reading for everyone who wants to be president because it underlines what every president seems not to know in the beginning—that it is much easier to get into war than to get out of it. Terrific insight, carefully researched and clearly written.”
—Bob Schieffer, CBS News

“Kalb raises important questions about the unchecked power of presidents to take the nation to war. His provocative proposal for a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty will certainly add to the debate about the future of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.”
—Graham Allison, Harvard University

Before tag at bottom:

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marvin Kalb

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Free Trade Is Not Quite President Obama's Neglected Stepchild, But...

Bill Frenzel — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In the first Obama term, trade was not quite a step-child, but neither was it a priority. Mostly, the Obama trade team concentrated on improving enforcement of trade laws. That is useful work, but it’s no fun for trade enthusiasts. They would rather play offense by opening markets instead of looking for ways to slow down trade.

The team did manage to complete 3 trade treaties handed to it by its predecessors. Only one of them, Korea, required significant renegotiation. The President’s most important trade action was the initiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, effectively managed by U. S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk.

Political polarization makes everything difficult, but the Administration faced other daunting trade problems, too. One of its principal constituencies, big labor, opposes most trade treaties. That labor position has been a powerful deterrent to trade expansion policies.

Most important treaties passed by other administrations in the post-war period were handled under the “fast track” process, now called Trade Promotion Authority, which guarantees an up or down vote in both houses. President Obama and his trade people have never had that authority.

The 2013 State of the Union address was the first sign of change. In it, the President served notice that he has moved trade up the priority ladder in his second term. He cited two major negotiations: the TPP which he hopes to complete this year; and a new initiative, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

The Trans Pacific Partnership has been moving along through a dozen and a half negotiating sessions. Until a few months ago, it had a less than impressive list of participants. Then Canada decided to join. Japan followed shortly. Those new entrants, and others as yet unannounced, but known to be waiting in the wings, gave a dose of steroids to the TPP. It began to look more muscular, and therefore more attractive to American businesses.

Surprisingly, the push for TTIP originated in Europe. There, leaders tired of recession and austerity saw it as an economic booster shot. Apparently, President Obama thought so, too. He accepted the difficult challenge of negotiating a Trans-Atlantic agreement. This long-time dream of American and European trade expansionists will require extended and arduous negotiations with no assurance of completion in the next 3.5 years left in Obama’s term. But, it is a prize worth the effort. Europe amounts to about 20% of total US two-way trade.

Taken together, TPP and TTIP form an aggressive effort which, if successful, could be the needed substitute for the moribund WTO Doha Development Round. They could spark a growth spurt in world trade. They also might be the force which causes the WTO multinational Doha Round to arise from its sick-bed. This new Obama trade priority has escalated US trade policy from the minor leagues to the majors.

Last week came more good news on the trade front. Stories from the White House indicate that the President intends to nominate Michael Froman as his new US Trade Representative to replace Kirk, who returned to private life after 4 years on the job. Froman, is a White House insider who previously advised the President on international economic policy, and who is held in high regard by many business people.

The US has been fortunate to have a succession of great Trade Representatives over the 50 year history of the office. Some of the most effective have been those who enjoyed both the ear, and the confidence, of the President. Those who lacked ready access to the President found the job more difficult. If history is any guide, Froman would seem to possess a critical asset for his new trade job.

In the first Obama term, some trade observers were wont to say that the President was wasting the most pro-trade Congress in years. This term will test that assessment of both the President and Congress. Will Congress’ pro-trade proclivities allow it to overcome the polarization that has stalemated the legislative process? Or will the on-going fist-fight under the Capitol dome doom trade legislation that might otherwise claim majority votes?

Trade’s higher priority and increased visibility are assured, but its success is not. The Congress has the right inclinations. The President is showing leadership. The omens appear favorable. But, both branches of government have a long way to go before they can bring home the difficult treaty legislation needed to increase US and world trade.

Authors

Bill Frenzel

Publication: Forbes

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Syria's Use of Chemical Weapons: The Ball’s in Your Court, Mr. President

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 09:18:00 -0400

The news that Washington and London finally believe Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own people is both an opportunity and a series of traps. Both the opportunity and the traps are huge, and President Obama needs to tread carefully to quickly exploit the first and avoid the second.

Credible observers of Syria like my colleague at the Brookings Doha Center, Salman Shaikh, have been reporting since December on the evidence that Assad’s forces have used small quantities of chemical weapons in the civil war that has been raging in Syria for more than two years. Like almost everything else in Syria, Assad’s arsenal of missiles and chemical weapons are a legacy of his father Hafez Assad. After the Syrian army and air force was defeated by Israel in Lebanon in 1982, Hafez ordered development of a chemical arsenal to provide a deterrent against the Israelis. Syrian scientists developed an effective chemical weapons program using the nerve agent sarin, a substance 500 times more toxic than cyanide. In 1988, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used sarin in his war against the Iranians and in attacks on Iraqi Kurds with devastating impact.

Syria mated the nerve agent with Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. When Israeli learned of the Syrian program, it considered military action to destroy it but concluded the program was too developed and too disbursed to be susceptible to air attacks without an unacceptable risk that Syria would respond by firing chemicals into Tel Aviv, potentially killing thousands. The Syrian arsenal remains disbursed in numerous facilities making it a complex military challenge.

By using chemical weapons Assad has crossed not only an American red line but an international consensus against the use of chemical weapons that goes back to the First World War. He has given Obama the opportunity to break the Russian and Chinese diplomatic support for Syria that has paralyzed the United Nations from imposing harsh sanctions on Syria as well as a total arms embargo on the Assad regime. Washington is right to demand an immediate UN-led inspection on the ground in Syria with a very short deadline.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

President Obama’s Visit to Mexico: Key Anti-Crime Issues

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 11:57:00 -0400

Up to two weeks ago it looked like President Barack Obama would be going to Mexico with a very strong hand. Had the gun control measures, which the Obama administration pushed as one of its key domestic issues in the second term, passed in the U.S. Congress, the U.S. President could have arrived in Mexico next week having delivered on a sticky bilateral issue: For more than a decade, successive Mexican presidents have been demanding greater weapons checks and tighter gun control from the United States, with the hope that such measures would reduce the excruciatingly high criminal violence in Mexico.

Mexico’s other long-term demand has been immigration reform: increasing legal job opportunities for Mexican workers, reducing deportations, and allowing Mexican families to travel and connect without great personal security and legal risks. President Obama might yet be in a position to remove the immigration thorn from the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship. Clearly, any immigration reform will not pass before he goes to Mexico next week. But he can credibly indicate that his administration has made immigration reform a key domestic priority and that there is more congressional movement on immigration, including on offering a path to citizenship to the millions of undocumented migrants living in the United States, than there has been in years. And at least until the Boston terrorist attacks, it appeared that immigration reform would finally pass in the U.S. Congress. Those opposing immigration reform or demanding a tightening of borders and fail-proof screening that cannot realistically be achieved, are seizing on the Boston attacks as an excuse for derailing the immigration reform legislation. But the prospect of reform is still very much alive.

In addition to gun control and immigration, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto will want to talk economics. Upon assuming office last year, he announced that he would like to break out of the Mexico-U.S. relationship being captured in the prism of the drug trade violence and collapsed into anti-crime cooperation, and to have the relationship refocus on global and bilateral trade and energy issues.

But security issues will inevitably be on the agenda, and the discussions may not be easy. For a long time, Washington was suspicious that if the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which President Peña Nieto leads returned to power, it might be tempted by its old ways —again lessening Mexico’s determination to tackle organized crime and its penetration into Mexico’s law enforcement and administrative institutions and its grip on large segments of Mexico’s society. Since being elected, President Peña Nieto has repeatedly disavowed any negotiations with criminal groups, but he has also maintained that the priority for his government will be not to disrupt drug flows to the United States (as his predecessor President Felipe Calderón sought to do), but to minimize the terrible drug violence in Mexico. Both the reduced focus on disrupting drug flows and the new emphasis on reducing violence, especially should it lead to changed interdiction and targeting patterns in Mexico, might be difficult to sell to Washington and would require the United States to abandon some of its established, albeit often ineffective and counterproductive, international anti-crime and anti-drug policies.

For its part, the new Mexican government has been surprised and made uncomfortable by the extent and tightness of U.S.-Mexico anti-crime cooperation that was established during the Calderón years. Not only has much of the strategic and tactical intelligence for interdiction and other anti-cartel operations come from the United States, but also, and in an unprecedented way, U.S. advisors have become intimately involved in helping to design and shape tactical interdiction operations of several Mexican entities used for anti-cartel law enforcement as well as in reforming law enforcement institutions in Mexico. Conscious of sovereignty, eager to establish tight control of these security institutions, and seeking to redirect Mexico’s security policy to reducing violence, the Peña Nieto administration has been mulling over whether or not and how to shape U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. It needs to take care not to throw the baby out with the bath water. U.S. cooperation, including intelligence provision and law enforcement reform assistance, continue to be greatly valuable for Mexico, and Mexico is hardly in the position to do without them.

For its part, Washington needs to recognize that seeking to reduce criminal violence, including killings, kidnappings, and extortion, is the right priority for Mexico, and indeed, should be a key goal for law enforcement in any country. The United States should wholeheartedly support that objective in Mexico. But achieving violence reduction in Mexico will not be easy, as President Peña Nieto and his security team have already learned in their first six months. Major questions remain about the details, operationalization, and actual implementation of the security strategy Peña Nieto has outlined. As I detail in my report Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime, many components of the new strategy, such as the organizational reshuffle of Mexico’s security institutions, the establishment of a new gendarmerie, or even the youth-crime prevention focus (important as the last element is for any sustainable long-term strategy to reduce criminality) do not easily, quickly, and directly translate into violence reduction in Mexico.

Paradoxically, the policy that is most directly available to Mexico to reduce criminal violence is the one for which it needs the most cooperation from the United States: changing targeting patterns. Instead of deploying the Mexican military or federal police or the gendarmerie (whenever it will actually become available) merely in response to wherever violence intensely breaks out and making cartel capo decapitation the core of its strategy, Mexico needs to prioritize targeting in a way that will reduce violence. That means abandoning both top-level decapitation and reactive deployment of forces. Instead, a wiser interdiction pattern would be more selective and based on an analysis of which law enforcement actions will stimulate what responses and actions from and among the criminal groups. The changed interdiction pattern can include focusing on the most violent group in a particular area and focusing on the middle layer, as opposed to the top capos, of a cartel. As I also explain in another report, Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: Concepts and Practicalities, strategically choosing the basis of prioritized targeting and moving away from interdiction based only ad hoc on how intelligence becomes available requires careful calibration and an uneasy balancing of the pros and cons of each possible option for prioritized interdiction. It often entails uneasy tradeoffs.

Nonetheless, Washington should not define the prioritized interdiction approach (which can mean not vigorously going after some groups for a while) as yet another manifestation of the corruption of Mexican law enforcement institutions by organized crime groups. In turn, explaining to the United States that prioritizing law enforcement actions is smart policy, not weakness and corruption, requires that Mexico maintains extensive discussions with Washington.

What in the long term will increase the rule of law in Mexico is ensuring that communities obey laws, by increasing the likelihood that illegal behavior and corruption will be punished via effective law enforcement, but also by creating a social, economic, and political environment in which the laws are consistent with the needs of the people and allow citizens to embrace their police forces and state presence. Reducing criminal violence is a key element. Adopting a smarter interdiction pattern is an important first step.

Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Palestinian Politics Do Matter

Khaled Elgindy — Sun, 24 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With President Obama's visit to Israel and the occupied territories now behind us, attention is likely to turn to how we might restart the peace process. But if the past is any indication, one crucial element will be largely ignored in the discussion: Palestinian politics.

In contrast to the almost limitless deference shown to the pressures of Israeli domestic politics (as when Obama abandoned calls for a settlement freeze in 2010 because of the composition of Israel's governing coalition), American officials remain remarkably tone deaf to Palestinian political needs. But there are some realities they need to understand about the deeply divided Palestinian body politic.

It has now been seven years since Hamas defeated Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah faction in a parliamentary election for control of the authority. That 2006 electoral victory emboldened Hamas' forces to seize control of the Gaza Strip, ending nearly half a century of Fatah domination of Palestinian politics. Although Abbas has managed to cling to his position as president of the Palestinian Authority, he and his leadership have little to show for their rule other than a series of failed negotiations, a cash-strapped government on the verge of collapse and an unprecedented schism in the Palestinian national movement.

Meanwhile, Abbas' term has long since expired, and the Palestinian parliament has not convened in nearly six years — both testaments to the paralysis of Palestinian politics as well as the waning legitimacy of Palestinian leaders.

Palestinians today are deeply frustrated with this divided and ineffective leadership, Israel's ongoing repression and ever-expanding settlement enterprise, and a so-called peace process that has done little more than enable all of these.

Despite all of this, the United States continues to operate as though Abbas' West Bank leadership has no political opposition or public opinion to answer to. For too long, American policymakers have treated Palestinian politics as something that can be avoided, suppressed or, if need be, reshaped. Indeed, if an accommodation is to be made, it is usually Palestinian politics that must bend to the perceived needs of the peace process rather than the other way around.

Even today, the United States continues to pressure Palestinian leaders to return to talks, despite their slim chance of success and the enormous costs incurred by repeated failures. And, despite the strong desire of Palestinians to see an end to the seven-year rift between Fatah and Hamas, the Obama administration continues to oppose internal Palestinian reconciliation efforts.

As convenient as it might seem, the idea that Palestinian politics don't matter, or that they can somehow be reengineered by outside actors, is both wrongheaded and dangerous. Hamas may be a problematic actor, but it cannot simply be wished away or boycotted out of existence. Despite its record of violence, including horrific attacks against Israeli civilians, Hamas remains a major force in Palestinian politics; it has also shown a willingness to play pragmatic politics, both in terms of Israeli security and a two-state solution.

Attempting to exclude Hamas or any other political group is a recipe for perpetual internal conflict; it is also self-defeating. As the recent Gaza conflict has demonstrated, the policy of isolating Hamas while building up the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has been a spectacular failure. Hamas has more international legitimacy today than before, while the authority is on the brink of collapse.

Even thorny issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugees, another important political constituency long neglected by both the peace process and their own leaders, cannot be ignored indefinitely.

Palestinians may not have a state yet, but that doesn't exempt their political leaders from very real domestic constituencies and political pressures that they must answer to, whether inside the occupied Palestinian territory or in the diaspora. Just as we intuitively understand the constraints imposed on the administration by Congress and by powerful domestic lobbies, or remain preoccupied with the ever-present concerns of Israel's coalition politics, so too should the U.S. begin to acknowledge and accommodate Palestinian politics.

Although it is true that Palestinians do not enjoy anything like the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel, simple logic ought to dictate that a weak and divided Palestinian leadership with questionable domestic legitimacy is in no position to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with Israel. More important, for such an agreement to hold, it must have buy-in from key Palestinian political constituencies, including both supporters and opponents of the current leadership. The same is true of Israel, or any other nation — a point President Obama alluded to in his speech to Israeli students in Jerusalem when he stressed that "peace must be made among peoples, not just governments."

"As more governments respond to popular will," the president said, "the days when Israel could seek peace with a handful of autocratic leaders are over." Although the president was referring to Arab states in the throes of revolutionary change, the point applies equally to the Palestinians.

The United States does not have to like Palestinian politics or endorse its themes or outcomes — any more than it needs to embrace the appointment of pro-settlement and anti-peace figures to Israel's Cabinet — but it does need to acknowledge them. No political leadership should have to choose between international acceptance and domestic legitimacy. Indeed, any credible peace process must allow the Palestinians to have both.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Los Angeles Times

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Back to the Beginning in the Middle East

Marvin Kalb — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 10:09:00 -0500

Let us, for a moment, imagine what it might have been like in mid-February, 2009, if Barack Obama, then a new president, perhaps a transformational president (he was, after all, the first African-American elected to the job), decided that, in foreign policy, he would focus on the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and, miracle of miracles, produce a breakthrough. Miracles have been known to happen in that part of the world.

Instead of opening his Mid-East diplomacy with a cutting critique of Israel’s cantankerous settlements policy, often considered the third rail of Israeli politics, instead of traveling first to Egypt, where he delivered a warm speech, opening his arms to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but ignoring Israel, which proved to be a stunning blunder, instead of allowing, even encouraging, a discomfiting coolness in Israeli-American relations, instead of monopolizing America’s foreign policy rather than leaving some of the legwork to his secretary of state—instead of all this, if Obama did then what he appears to be doing now, four wasted years later, the Israelis and the Palestinians might be engaging in serious, face-to-face negotiations on a peace treaty by this time. Who knows?

Now, Obama appears to be allowing his new Secretary of State, John Kerry, to play a major role in the sensitive Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, a subject in which the former Senator has a passionate interest. He never allowed his first Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, once his principal opponent in the Democratic race to the White House, to lead an American initiative in this area, to engage in the sort of “shuttle diplomacy” that brought not only results but fame to another Secretary of State, named Henry Kissinger. On his first weekend as the nation’s top diplomat, Kerry made news by telephoning Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, informing both that he intended to visit the Middle East very soon, his way of signaling a new American activism in the region, particularly in the dormant negotiation between these two old antagonists.

Soon thereafter, apparently not by coincidence, the White House announced that the president himself will visit the Middle East on March 20—in other words, to do now what he should have done in 2009, namely, visit Israel, the Palestinian West Bank and, then as a gesture to a tottering ally, Jordan. On this trip, he will not visit Egypt, perhaps because an unstable Egypt may be too dangerous a destination.

According to American experts, Obama wants to focus on two main subjects in his talks with Netanyahu--Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s convulsing civil war. But Netanyahu, having already talked to Kerry, expects the president to raise another hot topic—namely, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. Netanyahu told his Cabinet last Sunday that this subject is very much on the president’s mind. “There is no doubt,” Netanyahu is quoted as saying, “this matter will be part of the work of the next government.” The prime minister is in the process of forming a new, broad-based government in Israel, one result of a political shake-up after the recent election that weakened his own base of political support and strengthened new and moderate forces more eager than he to resume negotiations with the Palestinians.

If Obama is, in fact, intent on launching a new American initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, he knows, or should know, that this effort requires a great deal of advance preparation, and little has been done. Realistically, Obama can do little more on this visit to the Middle East than set the stage for the negotiation and then leave it to his secretary of state to do the daunting, detailed legwork, starting with reopening the stalled dialogue between Netanyahu and Abbas. Then the serious work begins. Fortunately, for Kerry, he would have to shuttle only a short distance between Jerusalem and Ramallah, the interim Palestinian capital.

2013 may be the year, theoretically, for the US to pivot to Asia and the Pacific, but it is likely that this strategic pivot may have to be delayed, in part because the Middle East has a way of nipping at America’s heels. The crises in Iran and Syria may demand Obama’s attention this year. No one really knows, or so it seems, but Iran may be on the edge finally of developing a nuclear bomb. Is she six months away, or a year? And what does Obama do? He is on the record as saying the US will stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even using its military power to do so. Syria is absorbed in a civil war of increasing intensity and danger. The US may be changing its policy about providing lethal weapons to the anti-Assad opposition, but everyone asks, who is the opposition? Can it be trusted? Or is it a new incarnation of al-Qaeda?

And then there is the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, for which guarantees of success can only be described as being in short supply. If even modest success were possible, it would clearly make it easier for the US and Israel to coordinate their strategies on the Iranian nuclear threat and on the unpredictable but deadly civil war in Syria.

Every president seems to harbor a secret dream to bring peace to the holy land. This is now Obama’s turn. In 2009, he started out with such high hopes and expectations and then quickly stumbled. Maybe now, four years later, he will do better. Maybe this is his time. Let’s wish him well.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

President Obama’s Second Term: Staffing Challenges and Opportunities

Kathryn Dunn Tenpas — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Recent departures of White House Chief of Staff Jack Lew and Senior Adviser David Plouffe have drawn attention to a frequently overlooked aspect of the American presidency – the men and women who work most closely with the president in the Executive Office of the President, writes Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. Though Cabinet secretaries wield significant influence within the administration, no one can deny the influence of White House advisers, many of whom consult with the president on a broader range of issues and, most likely, more frequently than Cabinet members due to their closer proximity. Little is known, however, about the frequency with which these individuals come and go.

This report documents staff turnover rates amongst the president’s “A” team (the top tier of staff in the Executive Office of the President as designated by the National Journal) and compares the Obama team to those of Presidents Reagan, Clinton and Bush. By the end of the first term, 71 percent of President Obama’s “A” team had left their original positions—a rate comparable to his predecessors. As President Obama begins his second term, less than one third of his original team will be occupying their initial positions. To be sure, staff departures affect White House operations – loss of institutional memory, costs imposed when rehiring and orienting the new people, disappearance of networking contacts and relationships on the Hill and in the Washington community – to name a few. Complicating matters further, second terms are never easy as presidents tend to overplay their hand at the start and political capital diminishes rapidly as Congress increasingly perceives the president as a lame duck. This study provides original data documenting staff turnover rates and discusses President Obama’s staffing challenges and opportunities in his final term.

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Authors

Kathryn Dunn Tenpas

Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters

President Obama's Pragmatically Progressive SOTU Speech

Isabel V. Sawhill — Wed, 13 Feb 2013 09:04:00 -0500

In his State of the Union address, President Obama made a passionate appeal to Congress to endorse an agenda that should have warmed the hearts of those who voted for him but which has little chance of being enacted, given the composition of the Congress. Raising the minimum wage, providing a high quality preschool experience to every child, enabling more families to refinance their mortgages, providing assistance to struggling communities, or creating new jobs are all worthy ideas. But it's not clear how to pay for them or enact them in the current environment.

On fiscal issues, the president made a strong pitch for replacing the arbitrary cuts called for by the sequester with a balanced package including new revenues from tax reform and some modest cuts to Medicare, for example by means-testing benefits. He got some of his biggest applause when he said it was time to put the nation's interest above that of one's party.

As expected, the president spoke of climate change, immigration reform and gun violence. I was more surprised by the promise to bring the troops home from Afghanistan sooner than expected and to appoint a commission on voting rights. He also challenged Congress to put his proposals to a vote, suggesting that it is only in partnership with Congress that anything can be accomplished, and implicitly criticizing those who have blocked action in the past.

My sense was that what we heard was the president's own values driving a pragmatically progressive agenda with much more confidence and backbone than we heard in the first term.

Authors

Isabel V. Sawhill

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Fairness: How President Obama Found His Voice

Darrell M. West — Wed, 13 Feb 2013 09:18:00 -0500

It was his first term and President Obama was struggling. Unemployment remained high and many voters didn't like his health care program, auto bailout, or economic stimulus package. Seventeen percent thought he was a Muslim and many others were unsure of his vision. Congressional Republicans were voting against his proposals en masse. A year before the general election, his political prospects did not look very strong.

Yet Obama cruised to re-election and now has a job approval rating in the mid-50s. The crucial turning point came in December, 2011 when the president realized he needed a clearer message and had to identify a way to distinguish his vision from that of the GOP. In a speech to voters in Osawatomie, Kansas, Obama spoke of the importance of fairness and fighting for the middle class. The problem with the economy, he said, was that voters felt the system was rigged against them and too many of the fiscal benefits were going to those at the very top.

Since that time, Obama has found his voice by emphasizing economic and political fairness. In this year’s State of the Union address, he continued this narrative. He spoke of billionaires with “high-powered accountants” and the need to invest in education and research. He complained about long voting lines and called for a commission to improve the voting process. He argued that a growing economy represented a better way to reduce the deficit than austerity politics based on slashing government programs. He called for Congress to raise the minimum wage, invest in advanced manufacturing, and reform the tax code.

On issues such as immigration, gun violence, and renewable energy, he threw down the gauntlet and dared Republicans to vote no. If they block popular proposals, he made it clear he would seek to turn the 2014 midterms into a referendum on middle class fairness. If people were wondering which Obama we would see in the second term, we now know the answer. In both his Inaugural Address and the State of the Union, he is presenting a clear choice. He is asking Republicans to work with him and if they don’t, he will go to the public and ask for a Democratic Congress.

The question facing the GOP is how they respond to this plan. On issues such as immigration reform, a number of leading Republicans have come forward with pragmatic solutions and bipartisan proposals. On problems such as gun violence, most Republicans are holding their ground and not pushing for substantial changes. If the economy continues to recover over the next year and national unemployment drops below seven percent, Obama may be on strong ground to force an electoral confrontation.

Authors

Darrell M. West

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Reaction and Analysis to President Obama's 2013 State of the Union

William A. Galston — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 22:21:00 -0500

President Obama’s victory in the 2012 election left Republicans in control of the House of Representatives. That left the administration with a fundamental strategic choice: to reach out to the opposition, or to use the lever of public opinion to move House Republicans in their direction. The negotiations over the fiscal cliff suggested that the White House had chosen the latter course. The president’s 2013 State of the Union address—his single best opportunity to set the agenda for his second term—offers further evidence of that choice, on which he is betting the future of his presidency.

In a wide-ranging speech focused on strengthening the middle class, Obama gave little ground to his adversaries. While he did not back away from the social policy initiatives—on immigration, gun safety, and climate change—that took center-stage in his second inaugural address, he clearly shifted his emphasis to the economy and jobs, which recent surveys have placed at the top of the public’s concerns. He advanced a vision of an activist government that would raise wages and incomes, boost education and skills, and improve the climate for job creation. While insisting that, “Nothing I’m proposing tonight should increase the deficit by a single dime,” he did not spell out how much these initiatives would add to federal spending or how their cost would be offset. He proposed no significant cuts in existing programs. And he ducked the structural problems that dominate the long-term fiscal horizon.

Speaking in advance of the speech, White House press secretary Jay Carney characterized the president’s second inaugural address and the 2013 State of the Union as “two acts in the same play.” Clearly, the FY2014 budget proposal will be the third act that clarifies the meaning of the second. And then comes the denouement – the partisan conflict that will determine the outcome of what the president has set in motion.

In social policy, Obama renewed his call for comprehensive immigration reform, including an earned path to citizenship for immigrants now residing in the United States illegally, and for gun legislation that bans assault weapons and high-capacity magazines as well as closing loopholes in background checks. Rather than proposing new legislation to slow climate change, he focused on executive actions his administration would take in the event of congressional inaction on a “market-based solution,” and he restated his commitment to natural gas, renewable energy sources, and increased efficiency

Concerning the economy, Obama’s emphasis on restoring manufacturing jobs was notable. Among other initiatives, he proposed reforms that would lower the corporate tax rate and make the research and development tax credit permanent while providing preferential treatment for manufacturers and others who invest in the U.S. economy. Rejecting calls to institute a “territorial” tax system, which he fears would set off a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates, he called instead for a new minimum tax on offshore earnings.

Obama proposed to attack the problem of low wages and stagnant household earnings on two fronts. In education and training, he emphasized (as he has before) the crucial role of community colleges in providing marketable skills. And he endorsed a new partnership between the federal government and the states to provide access to high-quality preschool for every child, a goal that many education experts endorse. But the president was not content to rely on these long-term strategies for boosting wages. Not only did he renew his call for a “Paycheck Fairness Act” to close the gap between men and women, he also proposed an increase in the minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.00 per hour, indexed for inflation.

On the public’s other major priority—reducing the federal budget deficit—Obama broke little new ground. In the face of looming legislative deadlines—the sequester at the end of February, the expiration of the continuing resolution at the end of March, and another encounter with the debt ceiling in late spring, the president urged agreements that would avert these events but offered nothing beyond what he had already put on the table.

While the president did offer an outline of a long-term approach, it is unlikely to satisfy the many Americans who regard the budget deficit as a grave threat to the country’s future. Rather than proposing a “grand bargain,” as many budget experts and bipartisan commissions have urged, he reiterated his target of $1.5 trillion in additional deficit reduction over the next decade. While this would be just enough to stabilize the ratio of debt to the Gross Domestic Product during that period, it would do little to address the long-term imbalance between the commitments we have made to programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security and the revenues now available to fund them. Well before the end of the decade, his approach would allow the deficit to begin rising again, with no end in sight. Obama appears to have decided that there is no possibility of resolving the larger fiscal issues on terms that he and his party would find acceptable. So he will hand these issues off to the next president, who will no longer enjoy the luxury of delay.

Although the State of the Union was less about progressive principles than was the second inaugural, its tone and substance extended few olive branches to the Republicans. For a while, anyway, Obama is committed to an outside-in strategy: he will take his case to the country to build support for his program and ratchet up pressure on the opposition party to go along.

This represents a high-stakes gamble. If the strategy succeeds, the president will end up with an impressive roster of legislative accomplishments. But if it leaves Republicans unmoved, he will face an unpleasant choice between negotiating with a weakened hand and accepting gridlock.

Authors

William A. Galston

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Re-Betting on Turkey

Kemal Kirişci — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

During his second term, President Obama has the opportunity to re-invest in the U.S.-Turkish relationship, focusing on a long-time U.S. ally. Kemal Kirişci wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

Why is Turkey an important cornerstone in establishing the liberal global order?
Can Turkey set an example and help spread democratic values to neighboring countries?
How can the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) boost the U.S.-Turkish relationship?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Kemal Kirişci

Turkey is a country that has been a long time ally of the United States with a major stake in the liberal world order. During your first term, you rightly recognized the nation as a Big Bet--paying your first official visit in Europe to Turkey and becoming only the second U.S. president, after Bill Clinton, to address the Turkish Parliament. Turkey was offered a model partnership with the U.S., and great hopes were invested in the relationship. However, reality evolved somewhat differently and a number of Black Swans intervened. The 2010 Turkish vote at the United Nations Security Council against sanctions on Iran accompanied with deteriorating relations with Israel as well as the EU and persistent anti-Americanism among the Turkish public have all led to fears that Turkey is “shifting axis” and being “lost”. Yet, this is only part of the picture.

Your Big Bet on Turkey fostered the development of a close rapport with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and you made the most of this connection by frequently consulting with one another on world and regional affairs. Turkey cooperated closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. Both countries adopted similar approaches towards the Arab Spring even if Erdogan expressed some virulent frustration with the U.S. for not supporting the opposition against the Assad regime in Syria more forcefully and decisively. There were also modest but important gains made in bi-lateral trade that had constantly been falling in relative terms since the end of the Cold War. This was coupled with field oriented pragmatic cooperation to assist reform in the Arab and Muslim world.

Recommendation:

Clearly, much more could have been achieved and highlighting a more ambitious agenda for U.S.-Turkish relations for your administration is critical. Turkey itself is still a Big Bet if the global liberal order in Turkey’s neighborhood and Turkey’s own membership to that order is going to be ensured. That would also help keep the multitude of Black Swans from getting in the way of realizing the grander Big Bets or for that matter Turkey itself becoming a Black Swan.

The time to double-down on Turkey is especially ripe, and a delay could be costly. As Turkish President Abdullah Gul reaffirmed in the January-February issue of Foreign Affairs, “from a values point of view we are with the West”. This opportunity coincides with a time when there are increasing signals from Turkey to reinvest into its relations with the West.

Background:

It is often forgotten that Turkey was a participant in the making of the global liberal order at the end of the Second World War, albeit of course a very junior one. Yet, it was this experience that set Turkey on the unusually long path of becoming a multi-party democracy with a liberal market economy. Indeed Turkey’s transformation was a slow and painfully one with lots of ups and downs. All U.S. administrations from Harry Truman onwards played a role in this process but the most critical one was probably the Clinton administrations. They played a particularly central role in nudging Turkish democracy and economy a little closer to European standards and helped Turkey first to sign a customs union with the EU in 1995 and then eventually become a candidate country for EU membership in 1999 followed by the beginning of accession negotiations. These policies were Big Bets that handsomely paid off. Both President George W. Bush in 2004 like his successor in 2009 recognized Turkey’s economic and democratic success and hoped that Turkey could set an example for its neighborhood, particularly for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Actually, some of their hopes can be said to be materializing. Turkey has both economically and politically become deeply integrated with its neighborhood. Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product in 2011 was greater than all of its surrounding eleven neighbors economies put together excluding Iran and Russia. This economy is increasingly becoming an engine of growth for these neighboring countries even if modestly. Turkey’s trade with these countries increased from 10 percent of Turkey’s overall foreign trade in 1991 to 22 percent in 2011 while its trade with the EU and the U.S. has dropped from 50 and 9 percent to 41 and 5 percent respectively. An ever growing number of Turkish companies are investing in most of these countries while Turkey is fast becoming an immigration country and a source of remittances for labor migrants of the region. This kind of economic engagement is having a transformative impact and helping to integrate this neighborhood into the global markets. Turkish government and civil society are also modestly involved in projects and programs assisting political transition and reform. However, Turkey’s both economic and democracy gains remain fragile. Turkey runs an important current accounts deficit and needs to raise its savings levels as well as research and development budgets. The Arab Spring has adversely affected its trade and economic relations with the Middle East. There are also growing concerns about an erosion of the democratic gains achieved in the recent past particularly with respect to freedom of expression and rule of law. The Kurdish question still constitutes a major challenge to long term domestic stability. The constitutional reform process appears to be stuck too.

Conclusion:

At a time when Turkey’s neighborhood is filled with vital challenges, it is of paramount importance that your second administration recognizes the importance of securing Turkey’s commitment to the global liberal order and its potential bearing on the America’s capacity to realize regional foreign policy objectives. There are many ways in which this could be achieved, but the most effective one may well arise from associating Turkey with negotiating a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). This is critical because the free trade agreements that the EU signs with third parties have long been a major source of resentment and grievances for Turkey. This is because the customs union requires that Turkey take on all the obligations associated with such agreements without binding third parties to extend any trade privileges to Turkey. So far the EU has not been very responsive to Turkish calls to rectify this situation.

The U.S. is uniquely positioned to help. Seating Turkey at the negotiating table for TAFTA would be unrealistic. However, the U.S. could convince the EU to at least involve Turkey in a consultation process and ensure that as Turkey opens up its markets to the U.S. Turkish businesses can also enjoy better access to U.S. markets. The logic behind why this would be an effective Big Bet is quite straight forward. The more Turkey can participate in TAFTA, the more its economy would grow. The more it grows, the more it can import U.S. as well as EU goods and services. Furthermore, the more Turkey’s liberal market grows, the greater the demands for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey. In turn, with an economy equaling the 6^th largest in the EU and 15^th largest in the world, Turkey’s economic force would benefit the neighborhood as well. In this way not only would Turkey be tied to the liberal global order, but it would also become an even more effective conduit for disseminating liberal economic and democratic values to a neighborhood still struggling to transition from the legacy of command economies and authoritarian political systems.

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Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Image Source: © Umit Bektas / Reuters

Obama Should Use the State of the Union to Refocus Economic Policy on Equitable Growth and Full Employment, Not Deficits

Elisabeth Jacobs — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 13:33:00 -0500

Much of Washington’s punditry class has already issued a collective yawn over the prospects of the State of the Union, arguing (probably correctly) that the President’s inaugural was far more inspiring and interesting than anything we are likely to hear on Tuesday night. Yet the upcoming speech provides an important and rare opportunity for the newly re-elected president. While the proximity to last month’s inaugural festivities will probably depress viewership, it is still reasonable to expect that more than 30 million Americans will tune in on February 12 to hear what their commander-in-chief has to say. The State of the Union represents one of few moments of collective popular engagement in American politics. It is all too easy for those in Washington who spend their days following the political debates to forget this critical fact.

With so many Americans tuning in to hear what he has to say, what should President Obama offer? A renewed focus on equitable economic growth and full employment as his top economic policy priority, above and beyond the deficit.

With the looming sequester deadlines and yet another narrowly-averted (for now) debt ceiling crisis, the entire economic policy debate in Washington seems to have shifted from reviving a sputtering economy to solving the deficit problem. Yes, the deficit is a problem. Yes, we need to get serious about fixing it. But there are three big reasons why the wholesale post-election shift in attention from a rapid return to full employment to the long-term deficit issue is dangerous, and the President would do well to use the SOTU to refocus attention on the issue of full economic recovery.

First, as Brookings’ Henry Aaron argues, the most serious problem facing the American economy today is the still-soft labor market. Unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment, is crippling today’s output and is likely to have reverberations for decades to come. Yes, the long-term structural deficit will cause problems if left unattended. But Washington is dangerously close to making prospective deficits “a damaging obsession,” as former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers warns, at the expense of seriously addressing the critical issues of unemployment, and equitable economic growth. Failure to successfully tackle these contemporary problems will make the long-term deficit problem far worse. The SOTU gives the President an opportunity to recast his economic policy priorities in this light, refocusing the debate on jobs and growth.

Second, the nature of the current Congress means that the President is unlikely to get anything resembling a “big deal” on the deficit. Republicans in Congress have proven time and time again that they are not willing to negotiate, especially when it comes to taxes. The extreme contemporary polarization of the Republican congressional delegation makes a good deficit deal incredibly unlikely. Focusing on deficit policy is unlikely to yield a salutary outcome, thus it is probably best to get something small done (i.e. avoid the sequester, which would choke off spending at precisely a time when the economy continues to need a boost) and simply move on. On Tuesday night, President Obama would do well to reframe budget politics in terms of incremental progress, and remind Americans of all the other important work that Washington has to do on economic policy.

Third, while public opinion suggests that the deficit is indeed an important priority for many, jobs and economic growth that benefits all Americans rank high as well. For the millions of viewers tuning in on Tuesday night to hear what the President has to say about his priorities, the message that will resonate most is one that speaks to their immediate economic concerns. Four out of five Americans have been impacted by job loss – either through their own or a family member’s or friend’s job loss. Consumer confidence is deteriorating, especially consumers’ labor market outlook. Many viewers are still struggling with the consequences of the Great Recession, and will be looking for their president to offer a governing vision that speaks to their kitchen-table worries. While the election may be over, politics is an eternal game. For now, the everyday concerns of broad swaths of the public align well with what ought to be the main concerns of policymakers. On Tuesday night, President Obama would do well to recognize and speak to this fact.

In the State of the Union, President Obama has an opportunity to harness the power inherent in one of America’s rare moments for collective democratic ritual, and to channel it toward refocusing his economic message for the coming term. He is the only Democratic president to be twice elected with the popular vote – the only other president to achieve this feat of democracy was President Reagan. The State of the Union provides President Obama with an opportunity to use the power of the bully pulpit to shape America’s collective vision for its economic priorities. Let’s hope he does so.

Authors

Elisabeth Jacobs

Image Source: © Lucy Nicholson / Reuters

Should President Obama’s SOTU Mirror His Second Inaugural?

William A. Galston — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 14:30:00 -0500

Former New York governor Mario Cuomo famously remarked that “You campaign in poetry; you govern in prose.” His aphorism offers a concise summary of the relation between inaugural addresses and the State of the Union addresses that follow them. Compare, for example, JFK’s soaring inaugural (“And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you . . .) with his 1961 State of the Union, delivered just ten days later. A sample sentence offers the flavor of the latter: “The overall deficit in our balance of payments increased by nearly $11 billion in the 3 years [1958-1960]—and the holders of dollars abroad converted them to gold in such a quantity as to cause a total outflow of nearly $5 billion of gold from our reserve.” It is reasonable to expect that President Obama will execute a similar, if perhaps less abrupt, shift from the elevated poetry of his second inaugural to the more prosaic task of laying out a governing agenda for his second term.

For newly reelected presidents, the second inaugural is and must be different from the first. The key shift is from “Let us begin” to “Let us continue.” Recent second augural addresses have adopted the same broad triadic frame: We have come a long way during the past four years; in so doing, we have built a strong foundation for future progress; but to seize the future, we must now build on that foundation.

The question is how to best do that. At this point, reelected presidents face a choice. If they believe that the country faces challenges rather than crises, they offer what is often called a “laundry list” of policy initiatives. Although speeches of this sort typically lack narrative coherence, they can reflect a president’s considered judgment as to what the situation requires (and permits). In 1997, for example, Bill Clinton concluded that peace, growing prosperity, and the resolution of the fight over welfare reform meant that he could advocate a wide range of initiatives rather than focusing on a handful of urgent, high-profile issues.

The alternative, of course, is to use the SOTU as opportunity to focus the public and Congress on matters the president regards as key to his second term. A classic example was Ronald Reagan, who used his 1985 State of the Union to continue the push for comprehensive tax reform by laying out in some detail the kind of the reform wanted. Another, less successful, example came in 2005, when George W. Bush underscored his determination to make structural changes in the Social Security system. This year, Barack Obama could choose to give comprehensive immigration reform—last achieved more than a quarter of a century ago – that degree of emphasis.

But should he? Is that what our current situation requires? I think not. Here’s why.

Most commentators—rightly, in my view—see President Obama’s second inaugural address as a restatement of the liberal creed for our time. Its moral and emotion heart lay in the linked themes of fairness and inclusion: the arresting alliteration of Seneca Falls, Seneca, and Stonewall neatly encapsulated the concerns of the coalition that brought Obama to power and sustained him through political peril.

Today’s liberalism differs from the liberalism of the New Deal era that dominated American politics from 1932 through 1968 and finally expired in Walter Mondale’s 1984 landslide loss to Ronald Reagan. The older liberalism focused mainly on economic progress that would bring more and more working-class Americans in the middle class. By contrast, today’s liberalism focuses on the concerns of the socially marginalized—along with those of upscale professionals for whom economic issues are not paramount In that vein, Obama’s second inaugural address emphasized social issues—gay rights, immigration reform, and to a notable degree, climate change. In the process, Obama gave relatively short shrift to economic growth, and he paired a call for “hard choices” to reduce the budget deficit with evident skepticism about most of the means to that end.

It is doubtful that this agenda would prove adequate, either substantively or in the court of public opinion. A recent Pew survey of 21 possible policy priorities found immigration, guns, and climate change ranked 17^th, 18^th, and 21^st, respectively on the public’s list. Strengthening the economy came in first, followed by improving the job situation and reducing the budget deficit.

It’s not hard to see why. The new budget and economic projections the Congressional Budget Office just released show that on its current course, our economy will not regain its full potential output until 2017—nearly a decade after the Great Recession began, unemployment will remain above 6 percent well into 2016, and the horrendous rate of long-term unemployment will decline only slowly. The American people will want to learn whether the president thinks this is the best we can do, and if not, how the thinks we can do better.

That same CBO report showed that if currently scheduled budget cuts (or their equivalent) go into effect and we do not endure another recession between now and 2023, we can just about hold our debt to GDP ratio steady at 77 percent—about twice what it was just a few years ago. But CBO lists several reasons why all the fiscal surprises in the next decade are likely to worsen rather than improve this outlook. The American people will want to learn whether the president regards this fiscal course as satisfactory, and if not, how he proposes to alter it.

Obama has good reasons, then, to use his 2013 State of the Union to focus more on the economy than he did three weeks ago. And he has another decision to make as well. His second inaugural was widely regarded as a fighting speech—as a staunch, unyielding statement of his core beliefs and those of the coalition that sustained him in dark hours and reelected him last year. But he does not control all the instruments of governance. To move toward his objectives, he will need the cooperation of many Americans—and their elected representatives—who are not members of his coalition and who cannot be browbeaten into acquiescence. If Obama’s 2013 State of the Union launches a real dialogue with his opposition, it could mark the beginning of a highly successful second term.

Authors

William A. Galston

What to Expect in Obama's State of the Union Address

Thomas E. Mann — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 14:36:00 -0500

We have been struggling through an exceptionally difficult and troubling period in American public life, with an economy still performing well below its potential and a polarized political system producing dysfunctional governance. Might President Obama’s State of the Union speech this coming Tuesday, building on his more decisive than expected re-election victory and well-received inaugural address, consolidate his elevated political standing and provide a map to a more cooperative and productive policymaking process?

That is too much to expect. SOTU speeches seldom strengthen a president’s hand, alter the incentives of the opposition party to cooperate or oppose, or increase his prospects for policy success. But they can and this year will shed light on how he proposes to capitalize on his reelection and where he intends to invest most of his energy.

Obama still faces a very conservative Republican majority in the House and a Senate prone to holds and filibusters. Differences between the parties on taxes and spending have not narrowed and solutions to the self-inflicted crises surrounding sequestration, the expiration of the CR, and the debt ceiling are nowhere in sight. The best bet is that the months ahead will be as contentious and ugly as the entire 112th Congress.

Yet the election has altered the political dynamic and Republicans are well aware that their strategy of unremitting opposition to Obama as a route back to power has failed. They are at serious risk of becoming a minority party in presidential elections. Dissident voices are beginning to be heard among Senate and House Republicans and issues that once seemed hopeless are now under serious consideration.

The State of the Union speech will give us a better sense of how the President intends to deal with the continuing constraints and new opportunities. That alone makes it well worth the watch.

Authors

Thomas E. Mann

Brookings Expert Roundtable on President Obama’s State of the Union Priorities

Sarah A. Binder, William A. Galston, Ron Haskins and Thomas E. Mann — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 13:30:00 -0500

President Obama will use the first State of the Union address of his second term on February 12 to present his agenda for the year ahead, the issues he wants address and the battles he hopes to win. In a roundtable discussion, Brookings experts Tom Mann, Sarah Binder, Bill Galston and Ron Haskins preview the hot-button issues the president is likely to cover in his speech. The nation’s economy and the debt crisis top their list, and they offer insights about how the still-pervasive partisanship on Capitol Hill could stand between the White House and its goals.

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The Black Swan: The Big Thaw

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Foreign Policy experts have come together to create a series of policy memos addressing the “big bets”—opportunities to strengthen President Obama’s second term—and “black swans,” the low probability, high-impact events that could derail the administration’s priorities. These were released at a public event on Thursday, January 17. Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris says a “Black Swan” is dramatic climate change and how the Obama administration will respond and take leadership in reducing carbon emissions causing global warming.

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The Black Swan: The Big Thaw

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Elizabeth Ferris

Hagel’s Misreading of How to Treat an Ally

Michael Doran — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Chuck Hagel likes Ike. That much has been apparent for some time. But thanks to David Ignatius’s Jan. 27 op-ed column, “Reviving Eisenhower’s doctrine,” we now know what he likes best: Eisenhower’s management of the Suez crisis. For Hagel, it is more than a shining example of past American leadership. It is a guide for future presidential behavior.

Dwight D. Eisenhower is certainly worthy of emulation, but Hagel has unfortunately learned precisely the wrong lessons. In 1956, Britain, France and Israel launched coordinated invasions of Egypt. To say that Eisenhower disapproved would be an understatement. He directed at his allies a level of hostility typically reserved for worst enemies. After demanding that the attacking forces evacuate Egypt immediately, he imposed crippling economic sanctions on France and Britain. Against Israel, he threatened sanctions while engaging in bare-knuckle diplomacy.

All three powers buckled under the pressure, which was particularly damaging to Britain. Although Prime Minister Anthony Eden was America’s closest ally, Eisenhower brought his economy to the verge of collapse. The pressure destroyed Eden’s career and drove the final nail in the coffin of the British empire.

Realists in the Hagel mold find this episode exhilarating. Eisenhower, they say, pursued the national interest without concern for “sentimental” attachments, to say nothing of domestic lobbies. When applied to the present, the analogy calls for dealing sharply with Israel. The United States, the implication goes, must not allow its client to drag it into conflict with Iran. Instead, Obama must treat Benjamin Netanyahu with the same grit that Ike flashed at Eden.

But this analogy omits a key fact: Ike came to regret those policies. “Years later,” Richard Nixon wrote in the 1980s, “I talked to Eisenhower about Suez; he told me it was his major foreign policy mistake.” By 1958, Ike himself had realized his error and reversed course.

Two primary considerations prompted Eisenhower’s reevaluation. First, the Suez policy simply did not work. By distancing the United States from Israel and the Europeans, Eisenhower believed he was stabilizing the region and laying the foundation for a strategic accommodation between the Arabs, as a bloc, and the United States.

But the anticipated benefit never materialized. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged from the conflict much stronger and more adversarial to U.S. interests. The Soviet penetration of the Middle East deepened considerably. These trends had catastrophic consequences, chief among them the 1958 revolution in Iraq, which replaced the most pro-Western Arab government with a junta that migrated into the Soviet orbit.

The United States, Ike realized, was paying a heavy price for having broken the only immutable rule of a realist foreign policy: Support your friends and punish your enemies. It would continue to pay for years, and not just in the Middle East. When the United States became mired in Vietnam, Britain and France refused to help. Why should they? Eisenhower had taught them that membership in the NATO alliance imposed no binding obligations outside Europe.

As he contemplated these unintended consequences, Ike concluded that he had based his strategy on a false premise. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed it with admirable clarity in the midst of the crisis. U.S. failure to compel Israel to withdraw its forces from Egypt, he remarked to an agreeing Eisenhower, would lead to a catastrophic defeat in the Cold War. It would, Dulles said, “make it almost certain that virtually all of the Middle East countries would feel that United States policy toward the area was . . . controlled by the Jewish influence in the United States and that accordingly the only hope of the Arab countries was in association with the Soviet Union.”

Eisenhower assumed that the Arabs behaved as a unified bloc, especially with respect to Israel. The fallout from Suez, however, taught him otherwise. The upheavals that accompanied Nasser’s rise shared one factor: They had no connection whatsoever to Israel. From this, Eisenhower learned that the alignment of the Arab states in the Cold War was a function of their own internecine conflicts.

This realization led to a paradigm shift. During Suez, Eisenhower had envisioned the United States as an honest broker, shuttling between the Arab world and the alliance of Britain, France and Israel. By 1958, he defined the American role in an entirely new way. The job of the United States, he now realized, was to balance the status-quo Arab powers against a set of revisionists, who were aligned with the Soviet Union. In that context, Israel was more an asset than a liability. Historians typically ascribe this intellectual innovation to Nixon and Henry Kissinger. They were the first to publicly articulate the perspective, but Nixon had absorbed it while serving at Eisenhower’s side.

Today, another revolutionary wave is sweeping the Arab world, driven once again by internal factors. Meanwhile, Hagel remains fixated on a U.S.-Arab-Israeli dynamic. This magical triangle has never had the all-pervasive influence ascribed to it. As long as Hagel remains in its thrall, Eisenhower’s true realism will elude him.

Authors

Michael Doran

Publication: The Washington Post

How Should President Obama Change U.S. Policy in the Middle East?

Shadi Hamid — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was published as part of a report by the Project on Middle East Democracy. Read the full report »

As Arab attitudes toward the United States are “inelastic,” anything short of a major policy overhaul—such as the tinkering on the margins that has so far defined the Obama administration—will not make much of a difference.

The issue of leverage and aid conditionality has become more relevant than ever in the post-Arab Spring era. The Obama administration’s proposed MENA Incentive Fund and the European Union’s Support for Partnership, Reform, and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programs are both gentle nods in the direction of conditionality. The problem with both programs is how small in scope they are, totaling less than $1 billion annually across the region—simply not large enough to influence the political calculations of Arab governments.

With this in mind, there is a need to coordinate the funding of a “multilateral reform endowment” that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement necessary reforms. The endowment would include a minimum of $5 billion, with the goal of increasing total available funding to $20 billion by 2022. Receiving aid would be conditional upon meeting a series of explicit, measurable benchmarks on democratization, which would be the product of extensive negotiations with interested countries. The endowment would be funded with contributions from the United States, the EU, allies like Japan, Qatar, and Norway, rising democracies such as Turkey and Brazil, as well as international financial institutions.

For transitional states like Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, benchmarks would include security sector reform, military noninterference in civilian affairs, judicial independence, and ensuring press freedoms. For liberalizing monarchies like Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait, benchmarks would focus on expanding political space for opposition groups and the gradual devolution of power to elected institutions accountable to the people. Even if certain countries rejected endowment funds, an important message would still be sent to both Arab leaders and publics that democracy assistance is no longer half-hearted and ad-hoc, but part of an institutionalized, multilateral, and long-term effort to hold Arab governments accountable to a set of explicit standards.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Project on Middle East Democracy

There's a Civil War in America's Business Community, But Will Obama Notice?

William A. Galston — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The chief business of the American people is business,” Calvin Coolidge famously said. But not all business is the same: The policies that assist some may injure others, and the organizations that represent different kinds of business often work at cross-purposes. This reality, which the Republican mantra of “job creators” obscures, could be the key to determining the success of President Obama's second term. The Obama administration will need to recognize the fervent opposition of small businesses to its priorities, while taking advantage of large corporations' willingness to cooperate.

There are deep and strucutral differences between these two sectors. Most small businesses pay taxes through the individual code, while big businesses pay corporate rates. Small businesses typically hire through family and local networks, while big businesses draw from a national labor pool. Small businesses focus mainly on the domestic market, while big businesses are just as concerned about overseas sales. Corporations have sizeable cash flows and access to credit markets, which gives them a cushion against adversity and added costs; small businesses often operate much closer to the margin and are acutely sensitive to policies that threaten to drive up costs. Corporate CEOs can hire experts to help them cope with added regulatory burdens and can spread the costs over a large workforce; small business owners must deal with these burdens by themselves and have few ways dilute their impact.

A glance at the websites of two leading business organizations—the National Federation of Independent Business (the “voice of small business”) and the Business Roundtable (CEOs of leading companies with a collective $6 trillion in annual revenues) underscores these differences. While the NFIB continues to call for the repeal of Obamacare, the BR seeks only modest fixes. The NFIB denounces “overzealous regulation” and advocates a national drive to protect small businesses from regulations recently proposed by the Obama administration. For its part, the BR calls for “smarter regulation” and criticizes eight proposed or pending regulations but also “applaud[s] President Obama’s initiative to streamline the federal regulatory apparatus.” Many corporate CEOs supported the fiscal cliff agreement, which small business people opposed because it increased top marginal rates for high-income taxpayers.

The NFIB stance toward government is almost entirely negative: Most of what government does makes the lives of small businessmen and women harder, and it should just stop doing it. By contrast, last year the Business Roundtable issued “Taking Action for America,” a comprehensive plan for jobs and economic growth that called on the government to act on numerous fronts, from education and immigration to energy and trade. While it is easy to discern the thread of self-interest woven through its agenda, the BR at least acknowledges that well-judged government action can contribute to a more robust economy and a healthier labor market.

For the foreseeable future, the NFIB will remain a building-block of the Republican base and a charter member of the “leave us alone” coalition. Corporate American finds itself in a more ambiguous situation. On fiscal policy, the pantheon of gods to whom they bow includes Simpson and Bowles, Domenici and Rivlin. The Republican Party’s tax rejectionism leaves them cold, but so does what they see as the Democrats’ refusal to take entitlement reform seriously. They favor immigration reform, which most Republicans have not, at least until the recent election, but tilted toward higher skilled workers and away from family reunification—the reverse of most Democrats’ priorities. While they are willing to make their peace with the architecture of the Affordable Care Act, they push for changes such as medical liability reform that are anathema to the Democratic base. The Republicans’ populist, nationalist impulses worry corporate leaders, but so does the Democrats’ heightened emphasis on fairness and redistribution. Neither party is focused on what the CEOs believe is the central challenge we face—sustainable economic growth in a hyper-competitive global economy.

On balance, corporate America remains right of center. But that does not make its leaders comfortable in today’s Republican Party, dominated by a hard-bitten, quasi-libertarian stance toward the public sector. CEOs are closer to being politically homeless than they have been since the waning decades of the nineteenth century, when the pettiness and corruption of both parties drove business leaders to the sidelines. The right kind of Democratic agenda might cement a new alliance with at least a portion of corporate America. Gene Sperling, the author of a notable book entitled The Pro-Growth Progressive and the director of Obama’s National Economic Council, would seem ideally placed to lead the conversation.

But it’s not clear that his boss is interested. President Obama’s second inaugural address was notable for the relatively short shrift it gave to fiscal issues, tax reform, and pro-growth public investments. He spent much more time on climate change and on the social equality agenda, which was clearly the thematic and emotional heart of the speech. And while he spoke in passing of “hard choices to reduce the cost of health care and the size of our deficit,” he spoke much more forcefully about the need the preserve programs for the elderly, raising the moral stakes by calling them the “commitments we make to each other. If economic growth rests in part on expanded public investment—in research and development, education and training, transportation and communication—where is the money to come from? With an agenda dominated by a new emphasis on guns and immigration, and a renewed focus on climate change, where is the energy and political capital that would be needed to put growth first?

It was never exactly true that (in the words of Secretary of Defense and former GM head Charlie Wilson) that “what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa". Still, there is a substantial overlap between the agenda of responsible corporate leaders and the well-being of average Americans. Our country would be stronger if the Democratic Party could find a way of linking the long-term self-interest of corporate America to a progressive pro-growth agenda. But we seem to be headed in another direction altogether, and CEOs are likely to remain without a home in either party.

Authors

William A. Galston

Publication: The New Republic