Brookings: Topics - Saudi Arabia

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Sectarianism Spreads to Egypt

Geneive Abdo — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

Considering Egypt's wide-ranging political and economic crises, a recent national dispute might seem minor in the scheme of things, but it says volumes about the Middle East in the era of the Arab uprisings.

On April 1, more than 50 tourists from Iran visited Egypt— perhaps the first to do so since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when ties between the two countries were severed after Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. The decision to welcome Iranians into the country was backed by President Mohamad Morsi and the Minister of Tourism, but fiercely opposed by Salafist groups and others. As leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party explained, when I was in Cairo two weeks ago, it was a pragmatic decision: Egypt needs tourists to aid its failing economy, and the Iranian market is not only virgin territory, but Iranians are not afraid to visit, no matter the chaos.

But for Salafists group, allowing Muslims who are Shi’a into the country risks they will try to convert Egypt’s majority Sunni population to their Islamic sect. At least this is what many Salafists told me. The issue has created so much controversy over claims of a “Shi’a invasion,” that on April 9, Egypt’s presidential spokesman said tourist flights from Tehran to Cairo would be suspended until June. He made the statement after a series of protests organized by Salafist groups, who clashed with police.

As someone who has been researching the escalating Shi’a-Sunni divide for more than a year (you can read my new paper here), I think this is a significant development. It is understandable that countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarianism has had a long and sordid history, would be immersed in the conflicts we are seeing today. But why Egypt, where there is virtually no history of such sectarian sentiments, at least not among Muslims?

There are a few reasons sectarianism has now sparked emotion, fear, and political dilemmas in Egypt: Some Salafists consider Shi’a Muslims to be heretics, since the split in Islam occurred and Shiism became a separate doctrine in the ninth century. As a result, there is a perception among Salafist groups, not only in Egypt but in Lebanon and other countries, that Iran intends to invade Sunni lands, now that Syria could fall from Alawite control to Sunni domination. In other words, in anticipating the loss of Syria, the Salafists believe Iran is now looking to make other conquests.

Iranian officials have tried to assure the Egyptians this is not their objective. Iran's charge d'affaires, Mojtaba Amani, said in comments carried by the Egyptian state news agency MENA after a Salafist protest at his home in Cairo, that allegations Shiism was being spread in Egypt were a "major lie."

But the Salafists think otherwise. “We have evidence the Shi’a plan to marry Sunni women and promise them a better life and then they will have to convert,” one Salafist leader told me.

And it is not only the Salafists who are nervous about President Morsi’s warm overtures toward Iran. Some religious scholars at Al Azhar, the mosque and university complex that is the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims, also told me they feared Iran was trying to spread Shiism in the Sunni world.

The feelings expressed by the Egyptians reflect alarm across the region— which perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and Iran itself. One only needs to read the statements in the Iranian-state run media each day laying claim to all Muslims and praising what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls the "Islamic awakening" when referring to the Arab uprisings. But what Khamenei fails to acknowledge is that many Sunni Muslims have no intention of embracing Iranian overtures and, in fact, as the war in Syria rages on, animosity toward Iran, President Bashar al Assad’s main patron escalates, and the sectarian divide deepens.

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Geneive Abdo

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The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

Prepare for the Unknowns: India's Black Swans

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Imagine the breaking news headline: Revolution in Riyadh. The scenario: The House of Saud, which has ruled Saudi Arabia for years, has been overthrown. Closer to home, think about what China going off the rails would look like-and portend for India. These are just two of the "Black Swans" that foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution recently identified as deserving the attention of the U.S. government, along with a series of Big Bets that the administration should make in President Obama's second term. These black swans are low-probability, high-impact events that can have a dramatic impact on the plans and policies of a country. The idea behind this project was to identify potential events, suggest ways to prevent them if possible and prepare for them if they occur. With American involvement in a number of countries in the world, it might seem natural to undertake such exercises in the United States. It is essential, however, that such thinking take place in India -- whose global interests and involvement are growing -- as well.

Just a glance at the black swans that Brookings scholars envisioned indicates how each of them could affect India's interests. The collapse of the Saudi monarchy would bring instability in a country that is India's largest oil supplier and critical to its economy. It is also the location of two of Islam's holiest sites. The spillover into other countries in the region that is not just the source of most of the crude oil and natural gas that India imports but is home to a large number of Indians, will also have major ramifications. A Eurozone collapse would have a significant impact on the Indian economy. A China-U.S. confrontation or especially a direct military conflict between them over Korea -- though seemingly distant from India's area of operations and interest -- would change the geopolitical context in which India is operating. A confrontational Chinese leadership, driven by popular nationalism and desire for regime survival into war, could have serious consequences for India. Domestic revolution in China could also affect not just India's geopolitical interests but its economic ones as well; it could also lead to significant changes in the Tibet dynamic. Finally, a dramatic rise in sea levels could devastate India's coastal areas where about a fifth of its population resides.

One could dismiss these scenarios as far-fetched, but ignoring such possibilities entirely can be risky. India itself has felt the brunt of black swans -- for instance, the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959 or the black swan triple whammy in 1990-91 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has also benefited from some black swans -- for example, from two crucial ones that Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who generated the black swan theory, laid out in his book The Black Swan: the development and spread of the computer and the Internet.

India could face black swans again: A serious and sudden deterioration of the situation in Tibet. A climate change-caused catastrophe in Bangladesh with thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people trying to cross over into India. A major cyber attack with uncertain origins. A disintegration in Pakistan with the "loose nuke" problem becoming real. A collapse in the price of gold. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement -- a black swan that could throw up challenges or opportunities for India.

Black swans are not always negative and do not necessarily have a negative impact. As my Brookings colleague Govinda Avasarala notes, a major breakthrough in grid-level battery storage developed in India that could make solar and other intermittent forms of energy instantly economic could be one such "positive" black swan. This development would not only change India's energy picture, it would change the debate on and the available solutions to the climate change challenge. It would also put India at the forefront of the next big technology revolution.

It is important to think about such black swans, consider ways of preventing them if they are negative ones and facilitating them if they are positive, and lay out ways of coping with them. Government agencies can do some of this thinking. Indeed, recently, at a talk organised by RAW, former president Abdul Kalam highlighted the need for the country's intelligence apparatus to be prepared for black swans. Policy planning staffs can also undertake such exercises. Government agencies, however, are often burdened or overburdened with day-to-day priorities, with little time, inclination or resources to undertake such thinking. Therefore it is outside government -- in think tanks, universities and the corporate sector -- that such thinking about black swans, as well as forecasting, scenario planning and war gaming can and must take place. Such exercises do not necessarily require classified information. They do require time, resources, expertise and, most importantly, imagination.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: India Today

Image Source: © Rafiquar Rahman / Reuters

With Prince Muqrin’s Appointment, Saudi Succession Crisis Looms

Bruce Riedel — Sun, 03 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Generational change has been postponed again in Saudi Arabia, and the kingdom’s succession process is now clear for the foreseeable future. With King Abdullah’s appointment this week of his half-brother Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz to the position of second deputy prime minister behind Crown Prince Salman, the inner circle of princes that has run the kingdom for half a century will retain power.

Prince Muqrin, along with King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman, are all the first-generation offspring of the current kingdom’s founder, King Abdul Aziz. This generation has been in power for nearly 60 years, and the Arab spring isn’t stopping the House of Saud from sticking with its veteran lineup.

The new second deputy prime minister, the slot from which future kings move up in the kingdom, was born Sept. 15, 1945. Educated at the Royal Air Force College in Cranwell, England, Prince Muqrin became a pilot in the Saudi Air Force and then, like many of the royals, he was given a remote province to govern as a young man. In 1999 he was promoted to be governor of Medina province, home of the kingdom’s second holy city. Eight years ago, Abdallah made him head of Saudi intelligence, a job he held until last year, when he was replaced by the former ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Muqrin is an affable and competent leader, but he did not excel as spy chief.

Muqrin has always been one of Abdullah’s favorites and often accompanies the king when he travels for business or for health reasons. Both the king and crown prince are in poor health, with the king making repeated trips to hospitals in the United States in recent years. Salman has been reported to be increasingly ill as well and often not up to the job.

The current Saudi Kingdom is the third state created by the House of Saud. Two earlier kingdoms dating back to 1745 collapsed due to outside pressure and internal divisions created by succession quarrels. All three have been based on a unique partnership between the Saudi royal family and a conservative clerical establishment begun by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, one of the most important Islamic figures since the earliest days of the faith. The Saud-Wahhab alliance remains crucial to the kingdom’s stability today. Since the kingdom is also home to Islam’s two holiest cities, that partnership has global implications.

Simmering just below the surface is a country perhaps increasingly ripe for revolution. Sixty percent of Saudis are 20 or younger, and most have no hope of a fulfilling job. Seventy percent of Saudis cannot afford to own a home; 40 percent live below the poverty line. The royals, 25,000 princes and princesses, own most of the valuable land and benefit from a system that gives each a stipend and some a fortune. Foreign labor makes the kingdom work; 19 million Saudi citizens share the Kingdom with 8.5 million guest workers. Since the start of the Arab spring, the king has spent $130 billion in new stipends and projects to try to buy off dissent.

Other fault lines are getting deeper and more explosive. Hejazis in the west and Shia in the east resent the strict Wahhabi lifestyle in the Nejd central desert. Gender discrimination, essential to the Wahhabi worldview, is a growing problem, as more and more women become well educated with no prospect of a job. Sixty percent of Saudi college graduates are women, but they are only 12 percent of the workforce. Abdullah recently tried to appease them with appointments to the powerless consultative council, only to provoke outrage from the Wahhabi establishment.

For decades, the kingdom has been blessed with good leadership, and King Abdullah is a progressive by Saudi standards. Muqrin is a good choice for now. But sooner rather than later the third Saudi state will face an unprecedented succession challenge. Since the death of ibn Saud in 1953, succession has moved only among his sons. Now they are all old, ill, and few in number. The kingdom will have to pick a grandson of ibn Saud, and there is no agreed formula for how to do so other than the last of the current line will choose from his own sons. The House of Saud will enter a new world then, without the legitimacy its leaders have enjoyed for a century. History is not encouraging. The second Saudi state fell apart over succession problems in the late 19th century.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: © Ali Jarekji / Reuters

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and The Prospect of A Nuclear Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

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Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

Revolution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

Bruce Riedel — Sun, 20 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdullah has complete authority to do as he likes. But while a revolution in Saudi Arabia is still not likely, the Arab Awakening has made one possible for the first time, and it could come in President Obama’s second term.

Revolutionary change in the kingdom would be a disaster for American interests across the board. Saudi Arabia is America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, a partnership that dates to 1945. The United States has no serious option for heading off a revolution if it is coming; we are already too deeply wedded to the kingdom. Obama should ensure the best possible intelligence is available to see a crisis coming and then try to ride the storm.

Still, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a proven survivor. Two earlier Saudi kingdoms were defeated by the Ottoman Empire and eradicated. The Sauds came back. They survived a wave of revolutions against Arab monarchies in the 1950s and 1960s. A jihadist coup attempt in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca but was crushed. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda staged a four-year insurrection to topple the Sauds and failed less than a decade ago. Saudi al Qaeda cadres remain in the kingdom and next door in Yemen.

Today the Arab Awakening presents the kingdom with its most severe test to date. The same demographic challenges that prompted revolution in Egypt and Yemen, a very young population and very high underemployment, apply in Saudi Arabia. Extreme gender discrimination, long-standing regional differences, and a restive Shia minority add to the explosive potential. In recognition of their vulnerability, the Saudi royals have spent more than $130 billion since the Arab Awakening began to try to buy off dissent at home. They have made cosmetic reforms to let women sit in a powerless consulting council.

Abroad they have sent tanks and troops across the King Fahd Causeway to stifle revolution in Bahrain, brokered a political deal in Yemen to replace Ali Abdullah Salih with his deputy, and sought closer unity among the six Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies. They also have invited Jordan and Morocco to join the kings’ club. But they are pragmatists too and have backed revolutions in Libya and Syria that fight old enemies of the kingdom.

The Saudis fear, probably rightly, that real power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. But we should plan very quietly for the worst.

If an awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia, it will probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and violent, have wracked the oil rich Eastern Province for more than a year. These are Shia protests and thus atypical of the rest of the kingdom. Shia dissidents in ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, also have used cyberwarfare to attack its computer systems, crashing more than 30,000 work stations this August. They probably received Iranian help.

Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in Sunni parts of the kingdom. These might start in the so-called Quran Belt north of the capital, where dissent is endemic, or in the poor Asir province on the Yemeni border. Once they begin, they could snowball and reach the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jeddah, Mecca, Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition has a vibrant information technology component that could ensure rapid communication of dissent within the kingdom and to the outside world.

The critical defender of the regime would be the National Guard. Abdullah has spent his life building this Praetorian elite force. The United States has trained and equipped it with tens of billions in helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful, especially at the start.

The succession issue adds another layer of complication. Every succession in the kingdom since its founder, Abdel Aziz bin Saud, died in 1953 has been to his brothers. King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman are the end of the brood; only a couple of possible remaining half brothers are suitable. Both the king and crown prince are ill, and both are often unfit for duty. If Abdullah and/or Salman die as unrest begins—a real possibility—and a succession crisis ensues, then the kingdom could be even more vulnerable to revolution.

As in other Arab revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda elements in the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to Shia, and the center becomes a jihadist stronghold.

For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would be a game changer. While the U.S. can live without Saudi oil, China, India, Japan, and Europe cannot. Any disruption in Saudi oil exports—whether due to unrest, cyberattacks, or a new regime’s decision to reduce exports substantially—will have a major impact on the global economy. In addition, the CIA war against al Qaeda is heavily dependent on the kingdom: Saudi intelligence operations foiled the last two attacks by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on the American homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest of its kind in the world. The Saudis also have been a key player in containing Iran for decades.

The other monarchs of Arabia, meanwhile, would be in jeopardy if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia. The Sunni minority in Bahrain could not last without Saudi money and tanks. Despite all their money, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are city states that would be unable to defend themselves against a revolutionary regime in what had been the kingdom. The Hashemite dynasty in Jordan would be at risk as well without Saudi and Gulf money and oil. Only Oman is probably isolated and strong enough to endure.

America has no serious options for effecting gradual reform in the kingdom. The Saudis fear, probably rightly, that real power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. But we should plan very quietly for the worst. The intelligence community should be directed to make internal developments, not just counterterrorism, its top priority in the kingdom now. We cannot afford a surprise like Iran in 1978, and we need to know the players in the opposition, especially the Wahhabi clerics, in depth. This will be a formidable challenge, but it is essential to preparing for a very dark swan.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Huffington Post

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

Big Bets and Black Swans: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

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Revolution in Riyadh

Bruce Riedel — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Revolution in Riyadh, the possible overthrow of the House of Saud, would represent a severe setback to America’s position in the region and provide a dramatic strategic windfall for Iran. Former veteran intelligence official Bruce Riedel drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How has the Arab Spring increased the risk of revolution in Saudi Arabia?
How would the overthrow of the Saudi Monarchy roil global oil markets?
What should the United States do to ensure stability in the Arabian Peninsula?

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TO: President Obama

FROM: Bruce Riedel

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdallah has complete authority. A revolution in Saudi Arabia remains unlikely but, for the first time, due to the Arab Awakenings, it has become possible. The Saudi royal family has unique strengths and legitimacy; the Kingdom was founded in the 18th century as an alliance between the royal family and an austere Islamic preacher whose followers still partner with the House of Saud to govern the state. Almost alone in the Islamic world it was never conquered by European imperialism. The King is the Custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities. And it has the world’s largest oil company and the world’s largest oil reserves. This combination of religious piety and vast revenues has so far been sufficient to stave off the kind of unrest that has shaken much of the Arab world in recent years.

Nevertheless, revolutionary change in the Kingdom would be a disaster for American interests across the board. As the world’s swing oil producer, prolonged instability in Saudi Arabia would cause havoc in global oil markets, setting back economic recovery in the West and disrupting economic growth in the East. Saudi Arabia is also America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, a partnership that dates back to 1945; the overthrow of the monarchy would represent a severe setback to America’s position in the region and provide a dramatic strategic windfall for Iran. The small oilrich monarchies of the Gulf would be endangered, as would the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Recommendation:

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the stakes, the United States has no serious option for heading off a revolution in the Kingdom if it is coming. Since American interests are so intimately tied to the House of Saud, the U.S. does not have the choice of distancing the United States from it in an effort to get on the right side of history. Nevertheless, you should try to reestablish trust with the King and urge him to move more rapidly on his political reform agenda, while recognizing that this effort is likely to have limited results. In the meantime, you should ensure the best possible intelligence is available to see a crisis coming, put in place measures to limit the impact on the global economy of any disruption in oil supply, be ready to shore up the neighboring kingdoms and sheikhdoms, and then try to ride out the storm.

Background:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a proven survivor. Two earlier Saudi kingdoms were defeated by the Ottoman Empire and eradicated. But the House of Saud came back. They survived a wave of revolutions against Arab monarchies in the 1950s and 1960s. A jihadist coup attempt in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca but was crushed. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda staged a four-year-long insurrection to topple the royal family and failed less than a decade ago. Nevertheless, al Qaeda cadres remain in the Kingdom and next door in Yemen.

Today, the Arab Awakenings pose the most severe test for the Kingdom since its creation. The same demographic challenges that prompted revolution in Egypt and Yemen apply in Saudi Arabia: a very young population and very high underemployment. Extreme gender discrimination, highly restricted freedom of expression, longstanding regional rivalry with revolutionary Iran across the Gulf, and a restive Shia minority add to the explosive potential. In recognition of their vulnerability the Saudi royals have spent over $130 billion since the Arab Awakenings began to try to buy off dissenters at home. Abroad they have sent troops across the King Fahd Causeway to stifle revolution in Bahrain, brokered a political deal in Yemen replacing Ali Abdallah Salih with his deputy, and sought closer unity among the six Gulf Cooperation Council sheikhdoms. They have also invited Jordan and Morocco to join the “kings club.” But they are also pragmatists and have backed revolutions in Libya and Syria that undermine longstanding enemies of the Kingdom, especially Iran.

So far, they have helped ensure that revolution has not unseated any Arab monarch. However, Bahrain and Jordan have become the weakest links in the royal chain. The King of Bahrain is failing to suppress a prolonged rebellion against his rule; the King of Jordan could be next. Unrest in Jordan would threaten the peace with Israel. But the United States – and Israel – can cope with instability in both small states. Not so in Saudi Arabia.

If an Awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia it will probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and violent, have wracked the oil-rich Eastern Province for over a year. These are Shia protests and thus atypical of the rest of the Kingdom because Shias represent only 10 percent of the population. Shia dissidents in ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, have also used cyber warfare to attack its computer systems, crashing over 30,000 work-stations this past August. They probably received Iranian help.

Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in Sunni parts of the Kingdom. These might start in the so-called Koran belt north of the capital where dissent is endemic or in the neglected Asir province on the Yemeni border. Once they start they could snowball and reach the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jidda, Mecca, Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition is well-armed with mobile phone technology, which could ensure rapid communication of dissent within the Kingdom and to the outside world.

The critical defender of the regime would be the National Guard. King Abdallah has spent his life building this Praetorian elite force. The United States has trained and equipped it with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful, especially at the start.

The succession issue adds another layer of complication. Every succession in the Kingdom since its founder Abdel Aziz bin Saud died in 1953 has been among his brothers. King Abdallah and Crown Prince Salman are, literally, the end of that breed and both are in frail health; after them there are only two remaining half brothers that might suit and then there is no clear line of succession in the next generation. If Abdallah and/or Salman die as unrest unfolds, and a succession crisis ensues, then the Kingdom could be even more vulnerable to revolution.

Like in other Arab revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda and Wahhabi elements in the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to Iranbacked Shia and the center becomes a jihadist stronghold.

For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would be a game-changer. While the United States can live without Saudi oil, China, India, Japan and Europe cannot. Any disruption in Saudi oil exports either due to unrest, cyber attacks or a new regime’s decision to reduce exports substantially will have major impacts on the global economy. The CIA war against al Qaeda is heavily dependent on the Kingdom; Saudi intelligence operations foiled the last two al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attacks on the American homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the Kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest such mission in the world. The Saudis have also been a key player in containing Iran for decades. King Abdallah was the author of the Arab peace plan that bears his name.

The other monarchs of Arabia would inevitably be in jeopardy if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia. The Sunni minority in Bahrain could not last without Saudi money and tanks. Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are city-states that would be unable to defend themselves against a Saudi revolutionary regime, despite all their money. The Hashemite dynasty would be at risk as well without Saudi and Gulf money and oil. Only the Sultan of Oman is probably isolated and strong enough to endure. Despite the stakes, the options are as unappealing as those President Carter faced in dealing with the end of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran. And unlike the Shah who tried half-hearted reforms, the Saudi royal family has shown no interest in sharing power or in an elected legislature.

The United States has no serious options for effecting gradual reform in the Kingdom. The King fears, probably rightly, that power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. In Bahrain, the Saudis showed clearly their view that opening the door to political pluralism will doom a monarchy. And the King will be distrustful of your counsel on this matter because of the stance that you took against his friend and fellow authoritarian, Hosni Mubarak.

Nevertheless, it is important to try to reestablish trust with the King, who continues to need the United States to counter the external threat he perceives from Iran, and to encourage him quietly to accelerate reforms that he has already indicated a willingness to undertake. But, at the same time, you should plan for the worst. The intelligence community should be directed to make internal developments, not just counter-terrorism, its top priority in the Kingdom now. The U.S. cannot afford a surprise like 1978 and you need to know the players in the opposition, especially the Wahhabi clerics, in depth. You should also take steps to help shore up Saudi Arabia’s smaller neighbors who are staunch allies of the United States and to limit the impact of a disruption of Saudi oil supplies. This will be a formidable challenge but it is essential to preparing for what could be a very black swan.

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Bruce Riedel

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 13:00:00 -0500

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January 17, 2013
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

President Barack Obama begins his second term at a critical moment in world affairs, facing the many challenges that an unstable world—much of it in turmoil—presents. In response to these many challenges, Brookings Foreign Policy scholars have prepared a Presidential Briefing Book with memos to President Obama that detail the “Big Bets” that he should place in foreign policy, and the “Black Swans”—low probability, high impact events— that could unexpectedly dominate President Obama’s second term. The “Big Bets” include: a nuclear deal with Iran; a new approach to China; securing free trade agreements with Asia and Europe; outlining an Obama doctrine for the use and deployment of drones and cyberweapons; and establishing the United States as a leading energy exporter. The “Black Swans” include: a U.S.-China confrontation over Korea; revolution and war in China; the collapse of the House of Saud; the unraveling of the eurozone; the unraveling of the Palestinian Authority; and the impact of rising seas and climate change-related migration.

On January 17, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of “Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.” The first panel focused on the transformational policies that could shape a new global order. The second panel focused on the low probability, high impact events that might derail the president’s second term agenda. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. David Gregory, host of NBC’s Meet the Press, moderated both panel discussions.

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Old Friends, New Neighborhood: The United States, the GCC, and their Responses to the Arab Spring

Shadi Hamid — Sun, 30 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Shadi Hamid's article says the widening policy gap between America and its GCC allies in response to Arab Spring uprisings is the result of differing threat perceptions. Hamid says that “stability” from a U.S. perspective does not mean what it used to, or what Saudi Arabia still thinks it means. For stability to be maintained, U.S. officials believe, governments must respond to the substantive demands of their people and provide them with a real stake in the political process. So while U.S. and Saudi interests do align on a number of issues, they do not align on the broader, philosophical question of how to manage political change.

However, Hamid says there are no ready replacements for the United States in its critical role as the Gulf’s security guarantor. On this basis, Hamid argues the United States and the GCC, despite apparent public tensions, will continue to find ways to work with each other. Neither, for now at least, is in a position to do otherwise.

Hamid concludes that the current nature of American-GCC relations will ultimately dampen any bold U.S. initiative to support greater democratization in the region, particularly in the conservative monarchies of Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan.

Read the article, which is part of the German Marshall Fund's paper series on "The GCC in the Mediterranean in Light of the Arab Spring" »

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Shadi Hamid

Publication: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

Iran Seeks to Exploit Shia Grievances in Saudi Arabia

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 15:33:00 -0500

Saudi Arabia is facing a growing internal threat from its minority Shia community with help from Iran. The royals have put their best man in charge of the fight, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, who has been at the center of fighting al-Qaeda’s challenge to the kingdom for years.

The Shia community in Saudi Arabia is diverse and complex. The largest Shia population is in the Eastern Province, which borders the Persian Gulf and where most of Saudi oil is found. The Shia community there has been in a state of growing unrest since the start of the Arab awakening in 2011. As the Shias have long been discriminated against by the Saudis, there have been increasingly violent protests against the House of Saud in the Shia community’s towns and villages. Since Saudi troops crossed the King Fahd Causeway last year to suppress demonstrations in neighboring Bahrain by the Shia majority there, anger at the Saudi royal family has become even more bitter among the Shias in the Eastern Province.

On Aug. 15, they struck at Saudi Arabia’s Achilles heel. A cyber attack was delivered against the Saudi oil company ARAMCO with devastating results. According to US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, 30,000 ARAMCO computer work stations were rendered useless and had to be replaced. The Saudi oil company, which Forbes magazine ranks as the world’s largest, and the key to the Saudi oil industry, had the data on many of its hard drives erased and replaced with photos of a burning American flag.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Al-Monitor

Image Source: © STR New / Reuters

In Saudi Arabia and Israel, Signals That Iran Has Retaliation in Works

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 26 Oct 2012 09:20:00 -0400

The Iranians and their Hizbullah ally are sending warning signals about how they might fight a future war with the United States and Israel. The signals aren’t subtle—Tehran intends to retaliate for any attack on its nuclear facilities with blows against America’s allies in the region, hitting their most sensitive oil and nuclear facilities.

The U.S and Iran have been adversaries since 1979; we fought an undeclared naval war in the late 1980s. The American presidential election has seen both candidates threaten Iran with military action if it does not forsake development of a nuclear arsenal and halt its nuclear enrichment program. Iran has long threatened it will retaliate dramatically and decisively if it is attacked by the U.S., Israel or both. Now it is showing some of its plans for doing just that.

On Aug. 15, a cyberattack hit Saudi oil giant Aramco with devastating results. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, 30,000 computer workstations were rendered useless and had to be replaced. Aramco, which Forbes magazine ranks as the world’s largest oil company and is the key to Saudi Arabia’s production, had data on many of its hard drives erased and replaced with photos of a burning U.S. flag. Panetta did not directly accuse Iran of responsibility, but other U.S. officials have pointed right at Tehran. Panetta concluded that Iran has “undertaken a concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage.”

A few days later in Qatar, a similar virus attacked the RasGas natural-gas company, a joint venture between Exxon Mobil and the state-owned Qatar Petroleum, which operates the world’s largest natural-gas field. According to Panetta, the two attacks were “probably the most destructive attack the private sector has seen to date.” Neither attack directly targeted the sensitive Aramco and RasGas computer systems that operate the oil industry itself—the attacks were more aimed at its management systems.

The timing was significant. The attack was launched on the eve of the Islamic holy “night of power,” or Lailat al Qadr, which commemorates when the Quran was first revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. Shia Muslims believe it also coincides with the date on which Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was fatally wounded by a poison-coated sword in Iraq. The Saudi and Qatari governments would understand the message clearly; Iran can attack your economy. In effect: we don’t need to shut the Strait of Hormuz, we will shut down your computer instead.

At least the Saudi attack was an inside job. According to The New York Times, a company insider or insiders probably inserted a memory stick that contained the virus. Aramco has almost 60,000 employees, about 70 percent of which are Shia Muslims from the kingdom’s Eastern Province along the Persian Gulf, and where almost all of Saudi Arabia’s oil is found. The Saudi Shia community has been in a state of growing unrest since the start of the Arab Awakening in 2011. There have been increasingly violent protests against the House of Saud in the Shia community, which has long faced discrimination by the Saudis. Since Saudi troops crossed the King Fahd Causeway last year to suppress demonstrations in neighboring Bahrain by the Shia majority there, anger at the Saudi royal family has become even more pronounced among Shia in Eastern Province. Aramco, in short, is a target-rich environment for angry Saudi Shia with ties to Iran. Only a tiny minority would need to seek Iranian technical help to penetrate the digital heart of the kingdom’s oil industry.

The Saudi Ministry of Interior has long been obsessed with Iranian intelligence activity among the Shia minority. The ministry has always believed a Shia terror group with links to Iran was responsible for the 1996 attack on the U.S. air base in Khobar that killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded 372 Americans, Saudis, and other nationalities. The Khobar Towers are located close to Aramco headquarters in Dhahran.

Hizbullah followed up the cyberattack with a drone mission on Oct. 6. An Iranian-built surveillance drone dubbed Ayoub flew from Lebanon into southern Israel before being shot down by the Israeli air force. Officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force told the Al Arabiya newspaper that the target was the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona, the centerpiece of Israel’s nuclear program. Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, later gave a speech taking credit for the drone flight and warned Israel that more would follow.

Again the timing was no accident. It was the 39th anniversary of the start of the 1973 war, the devastating Arab-Israeli conflict in which 10,000 Israelis were killed or wounded. It was also a stunning failure for Israeli intelligence, which failed to see the attack coming until just hours before Egypt and Syria struck. Hizbullah was warning it, too, might surprise Israel. At the Israel Defense Forces, Major General Aviv Kochavi, director of military intelligence, estimates that Hizbullah today has some 80,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel from Lebanon. The Oct. 6 drone was intended to signal Israel that both Iran and Hizbullah see Dimona as an attractive target for missile attacks if Iran is attacked.

Iran’s capabilities to inflict substantial damage on the Saudi and other gulf-state oil industries by cyberwarfare are difficult for outsiders to assess. Iran is a relative newcomer; until now, it has been mostly a victim. Iranian and Hizbullah abilities to penetrate Israel’s anti-missile defenses are also hard to estimate. Those defenses are among the best in the world, thanks to years of U.S. military assistance and Israeli ingenuity. So it is hard to know how hard Iran can really strike back if it is attacked. Bluffing and chest-thumping are a big part of the Iranian game plan. But the virus and the drone together sent a signal, don’t underestimate Iran.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: © Ali Hashisho / Reuters

Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On

F. Gregory Gause, III and Sean L. Yom — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

No monarchy fell to revolution in the Arab Spring. What accounts for this monarchical exceptionalism? Analysts have argued that royal autocracies are inherently more resilient than authoritarian republics due to their cultural foundations and institutional structure. By contrast, this paper leverages comparative analysis to offer a different explanation emphasizing deliberate regime strategies made in circumstances of geographic fortuity. The mobilization of cross-cutting coalitions, hydrocarbon wealth, and foreign patronage accounts for the resilience of monarchical dictatorships in the Middle East. Without these factors, kingships are just as vulnerable to overthrow as any other autocracy—something that history indicates, given the long list of deposed monarchies in the region over the past half-century.

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F. Gregory Gause, III
Sean L. Yom

Publication: Journal of Democracy

Book Review - The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations

Ahmet T. Kuru — Sat, 06 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

One may argue three law-like generalizations in political science: “no bourgeois, no democracy,” “democracies do not go to war with each other,” and “natural resources are a curse.” Although each of these highly contested arguments is important, the last one has the broadest impact—the negative effects of oil, natural gas, and mineral production go beyond authoritarianism and have economic, military, and societal consequences. Recently, some important publications have challenged the “resource curse” argument, creating doubts about these negative effects. In this regard, Michael Ross’ book[1], The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton University Press, 2012) is an extremely timely work. It not only responds to these critiques but also provides a consistent set of explanations about oil and its effects on authoritarianism, patriarchy, inter-state and civil wars, and economic underdevelopment.

Ross has already written path-breaking articles on these issues and this magnum opus brings together his previous contributions with updated data, revised arguments, and fresh perspectives. Unlike his earlier publications, Ross’s analysis focuses on oil and natural gas, sometimes referring to both as only “oil,” and consistently leaves mineral production aside. His data show how the importance of oil will persist, if not increase, in the near future: “the global market for oil and other liquid fuels will rise from 86.1 million barrels a day in 2007 to 110 million barrel a day in 2035; the market for natural gas will rise from 108 to 156 trillion cubic feet” (p. 251).

Regarding the scope of "Insight Turkey," it would be meaningful to begin with the importance of the book for studies on the Middle East, in particular, and the Muslim world, in general. According to Ross, the Middle East is regarded as exceptional for becoming wealthier “without becoming democratic” and “without making much progress toward gender equality.” Some scholars and pundits blame Islam for these conditions, but Ross links these problems to oil: “most of the world’s petroleum is found in countries with Muslim majorities…; in 2008, Muslim-majority countries—making up about 23 percent of the world’s sovereign states—exported about 51 percent of the world’s oil and held 62 percent of its petroleum reserves” (p. 231).

Ross particularly concentrates on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region when analyzing patriarchy. He argues that oil is the main reason for gender inequality in MENA countries. His general argument draws on the counterfactuals from other regions where patriarchy has been weakened, such as in East Asian cases, as a result of women’s participation in the industrial labor force. In contrast to agriculture, which is mostly a maledominated family business, work in the industrial sector has resulted in women’s increasing participation and influence in economic, social, and eventually political life. In most Middle Eastern countries, however, oil income has resulted in the weakening of export-oriented manufacturing industries, due to the appreciation of national currency, in addition to other negative effects such as increased spending (collectively what is referred to as the “Dutch disease”). This development has minimized the need and opportunity for women to work because the oil sector is not labor intensive. Ross cites Saudi Arabia as an example: “…oil and gas account for 90 percent of the country’s GDP. Yet the entire petroleum and mineral sector employs just 1.6 percent of the active labor force, and 0.35 percent of the total population” (p. 45). Moreover, in oil-rich countries, government allocation of rents to families and high salaries for husbands who work for government have also diminished the financial incentive for women to work. There is also minimal material motivation in the service sector, which provides lower salaries to mostly immigrant male workers. The result is the persistence of patriarchy in oil-rich MENA countries. Ross also clarifies this argument by comparing oil-rich Algeria and oil-poor Morocco; he shows that Algeria has higher gender inequality despite the fact that it has had several progressive socialist governments and higher GDP per capita and that Morocco has a traditional monarchy and lower GDP per capita.

Although the analysis of patriarchy depicts oil as a barrier to the advancement of the industrial sector, the chapter on development shows that oil does not prevent GDP growth. Instead, oil states, where oil income per capita is over $100, “have grown at about the same rate as other countries” (p. 221). The puzzle, Ross notes, is “why the oil states have had normal growth rates, when they should have had faster than normal economic growth, given their enormous natural wealth” (p. 189). In terms of GDP per capita, oil-producers show by and large slower growth rates due to their rapidly growing populations. Ross links this fact to his argument about patriarchy: oil production consolidates patriarchy, and this leads to high fertility and population growth.

The role of oil is more clearly visible in conflicts and authoritarianism. In his analysis of oil and armed conflicts, Ross stresses the importance of civil wars, because, from 1989 to 2006, out of 122 conflicts in the world, 115 were civil wars (p. 146). In his words, “Since the early 1990s, oil-producing countries have been about 50 percent more likely than other countries to have civil wars” (p. 145). Examining authoritarianism, Ross emphasizes that until 1980, oil-rich developing countries were very similar to their oilpoor counterparts, in terms of having authoritarian regimes. Today, however, the oil-rich countries “are 50 percent more likely to be ruled by autocrats” (p. 1). Oil even makes low-income democracies more likely to move to authoritarianism. The only exception is Latin America, where oil-rich several countries became democratic. Ross points to the fact that these countries already had democratic experiences before massive oil production began. Yet it is also important that the amount of oil income generated in Latin American countries is smaller in comparison to the leading oil states. Therefore, “no country with high levels of oil and gas income successfully became a democracy between 1960 and 2010” (p. 74).

To explain the causality behind this clear correlation, Ross claims that “oil has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spending, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption and incompetence,” (p. 63) because oil revenues are “unusually large, do not come from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden” (p. 6). Ross primarily focuses on the last factor—secrecy. He claims that citizens’ attitude toward the government is primarily based on its spending-to-revenue ratio. In oil-rich countries, governments can hide some of the oil revenues. Given this misinformation, citizens’ perception of governments’ spending-to-revenue ratios become higher than they actually are. This perception is a reason for citizens’ relatively higher satisfaction for and lower opposition to oil-rich governments.

Among Ross’s insightful empirical discussions, the Soviet case, where oil income per capita declined from $3,100 in 1980 to $1,050 in 1991, is particularly noteworthy. In his words, “Oil accounted for 80 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings between 1973 and 1985… After oil prices peaked in 1980, they fell by over 70 percent over the next six years; so did Soviet oil revenues, producing the economic and political crisis that ultimately led to the Soviet government’s collapse” (pp. 83-5).

My main reservation with this important book is about its attempt to replace the causal mechanisms between oil and authoritarianism Ross elaborated in an earlier article[1] with new alternatives. In this seminal article, Ross had explained five mechanisms—taxation, spending, group formation, repression, and modernization effects. Later, he critically re-examined some of these effects in an unpublished paper (“Oil and Democracy Revisited,” 2009), noting a lack of statistically significant relationships with authoritarianism when updated data was used. Thus he ignores most of these effects in the book and instead offers secrecy and governments’ perceived spending/revenue rates as new alternatives to explain how oil production causes authoritarianism (p. 105). I do not think these two can replace the causal relations explained by Ross’s 2001 article for three main reasons.

First, Ross’s 2009 paper did not find statistically significant relations between authoritarianism and two effects—repression and modernization—and did not reach a conclusion on the group formation effect. Rather than neglecting them, the book could have revised these effects. Group formation refers to the fact that in many rentier states (where oil and natural gas constitute over 40 percent of government revenues), there is no bourgeoisie, political society, or media independent of the government. This effect can be assessed with new measurements and data on economic associations, political parties, and media outlets. It is true that rentier states are no different from other autocracies in terms of using repressive police and military forces. Yet the book could still have linked the chapter on authoritarianism to that on conflicts, and showed how oil leads to both armed conflicts and authoritarianism. I agree that oil does not prevent schooling, urbanization, and some other criteria of modernization. Nevertheless, the modernization effect still helps us understand why many rentier states have a very high level of GDP per capita while having moderate or low levels of schooling and health conditions (as documented by UNDP’s Non-income Human Development Index).

Second, although Ross’s 2009 paper revealed taxation and spending effects as statistically significant, the book undermines them by employing an absolute measurement (oil income per capita), unlike in the 2001 article that more correctly used relative measurements—the rates of oil rents vs. taxes in government revenues for the “taxation effect,” and government spending as a ratio of GDP for the “spending effect.” In the analysis of economic development and probably conflicts, where GDP is a dependent variable, I agree that oil income per capita is a better measurement than relative measurements, which can create endogeneity problems (since underdevelopment and arguably conflicts are not separate from lower GDP). Yet in analyzing authoritarianism, relative measurements are much better to test the dominance of oil revenues over state revenues and over the economy. The former is important in order to examine a government’s financial independence from society, and the latter is significant in assessing society’s financial dependence on the government through the distribution of rents. Oil income per capita does not explain any of these two. Regarding the book’s primary measurement, Norway has a higher oil income per capita than Brunei, but this undermines the fact that oil only constitutes over 20 percent of government revenues and over 10 percent of the GDP in Norway, whereas in Brunei it accounts for nearly 90 percent of government revenues and 40 percent of GDP (p. 21, p. 32). There is a categorical difference between oil’s impacts on these two countries’ political regimes, which is not seen in their amounts of oil income per capita. In fact, absolute and relative measurements can be seen as complementary analytical tools. Oil income per capita, which documents the amount of oil revenue per person as an exogenous factor, is crucial for the analysis of development and conflicts, while oil revenue as percentage of government revenue and GDP helps evaluate the role of oil in statesociety relations and authoritarianism.

Finally, the book overemphasizes the role of financial secrecy and the ratio of government spending to perceived government revenues. It is not clear whether these two variables are causes or effects of authoritarianism. Moreover, the second variable is highly subjective: if revenue is calculated with an emphasis on “perception,” why not calculate “perceived spending” too? Aren’t perceptions of government revenues and spending also important in oil-poor and democratic states, such as Greece? Moreover, the difference between oil-rich and oil-poor countries regarding the details of government revenues only exists for experts. Most of people do not know these details in any state. For the recent Occupy Movement in the United States, the idea that the top one percent of the population controls the economy and politics was sufficient for the activists; no further details were needed. In oil-rich countries, the luxurious lifestyles of dynasties/rulers and the costly construction of government buildings are highly visible and widely known. People are aware of the enormous oil revenues spent by corrupt rulers. What people primarily lack is not the details of oil revenue, but the political might to challenge the asymmetrically powerful state machine. People cannot use taxation as leverage against the government, are dependent on government’s spending, do not have independent associations and media, are controlled by the security forces, and lack socio-economic complexity. Secrecy and a perceived revenue/spending ratio cannot replace the causal effects coined by Ross’s 2001 article. On the issue of authoritarianism, that article should still be read and taught as an addendum to the book.

The Oil Curse is a landmark book that brings together explanations about the impacts of oil on various key issues from authoritarianism to patriarchy, from conflict to development. It combines qualitative and quantitative methods in a truly interdisciplinary tour de force of political, economic, and social analyses. The book is an excellent source for policymakers as well as scholars of various disciplines, especially Middle East studies.

Note:
[1] Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, April 2001.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Insight Turkey

New Book Portends Crisis, Possible Revolt in Saudi Arabia

Bruce Riedel — Sun, 30 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an antique, the last absolute monarchy in the world, perhaps the last in human history. The Hapsburgs, Romanovs and Pahlavis are gone but the House of Saud survives. But for how long?

Perhaps the greatest international challenge the next U.S. president could face is a revolution in Saudi Arabia if the royal family’s time runs out.

A timely new book, On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future by Karen Elliot House, presents an ominous picture of a country seething with internal tensions and anger.

Sixty percent of Saudis are 20 or younger, most of whom have no hope of a job. Seventy percent of Saudis can not afford to own a home. Forty percent live below the poverty line.

The royals, 25,000 princes and princesses, own most of the valuable land and benefit from a system that gives each a stipend and some a fortune. Foreign workers make the Kingdom work; the 19 million Saudi citizens share the Kingdom with 8.5 million guest workers.

Other fault lines are getting deeper and more explosive. According to House, regional differences and even “regional racism” between parts of the country are “a daily fact of Saudi life.” Hejazis in the West and Shiites in the East resent the strict Wahhabi lifestyle imposed by the Quran belt in the Nejd central desert. Gender discrimination, essential to the Wahhabi world view, is a growing problem as more and more women become well educated with no prospect of a job. Sixty percent of Saudi college graduates are women but they are only twelve percent of the work force. You can hear some of their angry voices in this book.

Since the start of the revolutions in the Arab world in early 2011 the most important question has been will they spread to the Kingdom? The stakes are huge, since one in four barrels of oil sold in the world are Saudi produced.

The American alliance with Saudi Arabia is the oldest alliance Washington has with any country in the Middle East dating to 1945 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with the founder of the modern Saudi state, Abdul Aziz bin al Saud, and fashioned an oil-for-security bargain.

Today the United States needs Saudi Arabia more than ever. Our oil imports are up from the kingdom. The alliance with Egypt is in doubt. Iraq is tilting toward Iran. The Saudis are our critical partner in the war against al Qaeda in Yemen and elsewhere. Saudi intelligence has thwarted at least two al-Qaeda attacks on the American homeland since 2010. Saudi support is important to containing Iran.

Yet the kingdom is also a source of anxiety. European intelligence sources say the kingdom’s rich are still the No. 1 source of finances for extremist Islamic groups including the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s Lashkar-e Tayyiba. And the kingdom has all but annexed its small neighbor Bahrain to squash a democratic revolution on the island that hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet.

The current Saudi Kingdom is the third state created by the House of Saud. Two earlier kingdoms — the first created in 1745 — collapsed because of outside pressure and internal divisions created by succession quarrels. All three have been based on a unique partnership between the Saudi royal family and a conservative clerical establishment begun by Muhhamad ibn Abd al Wahhab, one of the most important Islamic figures since the earliest days of the faith. The Saud-Wahhab alliance remains crucial to the Kingdom’s stability today. Since the Kingdom is also home to Islam’s two holiest cities, that partnership has global implications.

House’s new book is a well-researched and argued assessment of the current state of the kingdom. A veteran journalist who has been visiting and reporting on the Kingdom for 30 years, House has interviewed Saudis from richest royals to the destitute poor.

For decades the kingdom has been blessed with good leadership and King Abdullah is a progressive by Saudi standards. But the third Saudi state will soon face an unprecedented succession challenge. Since the death of ibn Saud in 1953, succession has moved only among his sons. Now they are all old, ill and few in number. Sooner rather than later the kingdom will have to pick a grandson of ibn Saud and there is no agreed formula for how to do so other than that the last of the current line will choose from his own sons. The House of Saud will enter a new world then, without the legitimacy its leaders have enjoyed for a century. History is not encouraging; the second Saudi state fell apart over succession problems in the late 19th century.

Revolution in Saudi Arabia is no longer unthinkable. Ironically, the more successfully the revolutions in other Arab states develop, the more likely Saudis will also want a government that is modern, accountable and chosen by the people. But revolution in the Kingdom may come from angry extremists outraged by the Kingdom’s alliance with America. Ms. House usefully reminds us that al-Qaeda remains a strong force under the surface despite a vigorous and so far successful counter terrorist effort by the Saudis (with American help).

On Saudi Arabia concludes with some useful scenarios for what may be coming in the kingdom. There are several possible directions for the future. Absolute monarchies are not usually capable of reform. Like the Soviet Union, once change starts in a deeply ideological authoritarian state it is hard to control. The downfall of the shah 35 years ago proved to be the defining crisis of the Carter administration. Will the next president face a similar crisis across the Persian Gulf? We have a good guide in On Saudi Arabia.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Al-Monitor

A Conversation with F. Gregory Gause III: Security in the Gulf

F. Gregory Gause, , III — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In a conversation with Marc Lynch, F. Gregory Gause III discusses the relative stability of oil regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, noting the importance of countries' willingness to spend oil money and maintain patronage networks.

Gause also says he believes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to be stable, but that the country's foreign policy extends beyond what it is comfortable with. Describing the KSA as "bullish" on stability, Gause says if the country was going to face significant unrest, it would have done so in 2011. Yet the KSA's recent interventionist tendencies, and its unprecedented generational shift in leadership, implicate change is forthcoming, although it is unlikely to be destabilizing.

In his conclusion, Gause notes there is an immediate academic, theoretical, and policy need to chart and follow what has happened in the region over the last few years. He maintains there is still very little work being completed on Middle East international relations.

Watch the full interview at POMEPS.org »

Authors

F. Gregory Gause, III

Publication: Project on Middle East Political Science

The Return of Prince Bandar: Saudi’s New Spy Chief

Bruce Riedel — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Saudi King Abdullah has shuffled his intelligence command at a critical juncture in the Middle East, bringing back the kingdom’s most experienced international troubleshooter, Prince Bandar bin Sultan.

On the eve of the holy month of Ramadan, the king put Bandar in charge of Saudi Arabia’s foreign-intelligence service. Abdullah elevated its former chief, and his half-brother, Prince Muqrin, to a senior-adviser job. Muqrin and Bandar are close friends.

Bandar served as ambassador to Washington for years. He helped Reagan defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. He helped Bush defeat Saddam in Kuwait. He helped Clinton try to make peace between Israel and the Arabs. And he helped Bush fight al Qaeda. He is a master of clandestine diplomacy and secret deals. In 1989, he negotiated a secret missile deal with China that shocked Washington when it found the missiles were already deployed in secret bases in the Arabian desert.

He has been out of sight most of the last decade. But the king has used him for occasional top-secret missions. When the Arab Spring began and Mubarak fell, the king sent Bandar to Pakistan and China to make certain those two critical Saudi allies were still fully behind the royals.

Now the Saudis see an Arab world in transition from decades of lethargic stability to a chaotic future. The kingdom has intervened with force to stop a Shia revolt in Bahrain, used diplomacy to ease out Yemeni President Salih, and backed the revolts in Syria and Libya against old hated enemies. The Saudis hope the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad will deal a body blow to Iran and Hezbollah. The kingdom wants to make an alliance with the new regime in Egypt and just hosted a visit by President Morsi.

When the Arab Spring began and Mubarak fell, the king sent Bandar to Pakistan and China to make certain those two critical Saudi allies were still fully behind the royals.

At home, the Saudis face mounting unrest among their own Shia minority in the oil-rich Eastern Province. The al Qaeda threat remains deadly in Yemen.

Saudi intelligence is a vital U.S. ally in the fight against al Qaeda. Twice in the last two years, the Saudis foiled al Qaeda plots to attack American cities. Now it will be Bandar’s job.

Bandar's first and most urgent task will be Syria. The Saudis want Asad gone sooner not later and Bandar will get the rebels more arms. Its deeply ironic since Bandar played an important role in helpng Bashar consolidate power when his father Hafez died in 2000. Bandar pressed Syria's generals then to accept the young man as tough enough for the job. Now he must be Bashar's undoing.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: Jim Bourg / Reuters

Transition in the Kingdom: Moving Beyond the Passing of Crown Prince Nayef

F. Gregory Gause, , III — Mon, 18 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, the heir apparent to the throne, Nayef bin Abdulaziz passed away on June 16, 2012. Since Crown Prince Nayef's passing, the Saudi-US Relations Information Service conducted interviews on the Saudi leadership transition with a number of distinguished specialists on Saudi affairs. Below is an interview with Brookings nonresident senior fellow F. Gregory Gause III.

[SUSRIS] Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz passed away on Saturday, June 16, after serving as Deputy Prime Minister and heir apparent since last October when long-serving Crown Prince Sultan died. It is widely assumed that Prince Salman, who followed Sultan as Defense Minister will be the next heir apparent. What are the concerns and considerations for Saudi watchers during a transition such as this one?

[Dr. F. Gregory Gause] This does not appear to be a particularly difficult transition, from the perspective of an outsider like me. Prince Salman was given the Defense Ministry, after his long career as governor of Riyadh, to some extent to give him cabinet and security responsibilities as a precursor to his move into the line of succession. It seems to me that the more open question is who becomes Minister of the Interior, one of the most important ministries, to succeed Prince Nayif.

[SUSRIS] Crown Prince Nayef served as Interior Minister since 1975. What will be the impact of his passing on that important post?

[Gause] This is the biggest question right now. The Interior Minister is the chief policeman of the country, with all the power and resources that position implies. Interior has been at the forefront of the successful struggle against Al-Qaeda in the country, that was the dominant issue in Saudi Arabia from 2003 probably through 2007, and remains the major agency through which the regime deals with the Al-Qaeda threat, both as a security issue and in terms of rehabilitation of former AQ activists.

The ministry is also central to the Saudi reaction to the Arab Spring domestically, carrying out efforts to prevent and control demonstrations and popular mobilizations. It is thus central to the ruling strategy of the regime. It will be very interesting to see who is appointed to take it over. Will it be Prince Nayif’s son, Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, who has very successfully managed the counter-terrorism strategy, or perhaps a member of the elder generation? I am waiting to see.

[SUSRIS] What do we know about Prince Salman, the likely new Deputy Prime Minister, and the impact of his probable ascent to the position of Crown Prince?

[Gause] Prince Salman represents continuity. He is part of the original family coalition that backed King Faysal in his struggle for power against then-King Saud in the late 1950′s and early 1960′s. He has held the most important governorship in the kingdom, that of Riyadh, for decades before his recent move to the Defense Ministry. He is an integral part of the family’s ruling elite, not an outsider whom fate has thrust into a new position of responsibility.

[SUSRIS] The last two leadership transitions we have witnessed, Crown Prince Abdullah becoming King in 2005 and Crown Prince Nayef succeeding Crown Prince Sultan last year, were on the surface very smooth. Can you comment on the process that is in place for these changes?

[Gause] The process is completely within the upper reaches of the ruling family, and thus opaque to outsiders. It will be very interesting to see if the Allegiance Council is convened in the process of naming a new crown prince, and at what point in the process it is convened. But this is in terms of establishing precedents for future contingencies. There does not appear to me to be a candidate for the position now other than Prince Salman. This is very similar to the last two leadership transitions you mentioned — settled at the elite level within the family with very little evidence of any problems.

Authors

F. Gregory Gause, III

Publication: Saudi-US Relations Information Service

Meet Prince Salman, the Next Saudi King

Bruce Riedel — Sat, 16 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

For the second time in less than a year, the heir to the throne of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has died in office. Prince Nayif ascended to become Crown Prince last October when his brother Prince Sultan passed away. Now Nayif has died in Geneva after months of ill health. The good news for Saudis is that his successor is all but certain to be Prince Salman, a more pragmatic and progressive prince with a half century’s experience as the governor and builder of the kingdom’s capital, Riyadh.

Nayif, born in 1933 and interior minister since 1975, was never a proponent of reform, and advocated a tough line on human-rights issues for decades. He opposed giving women the right to drive, or extending equality rights to the minority Shia. He was a prime mover behind the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain a year ago to smash an incipient Shia reform movement. He hated Iran with a passion intense even by Saudi standards. Nayif was also the most skeptical senior prince about America—he held American intelligence services at arm’s length for many years, grudgingly agreeing to increase cooperation only when al Qaeda opened a major offensive to topple the Saudis in 2004.

For Nayif and other Saudi hardliners, the reformist demands for clipping the power of the mukhabarat (secret police) in the kingdom and other Arab states was a direct threat to their authority. From the MOI’s inverted pyramid headquarters in Riyadh, Nayif tracked down al Qaeda and its sympathizers with a ruthless zeal. He did the same to Iranian-backed Shia dissidents in Saudi Hizballah. Any and all dissent was smashed.

Nor is the new heir, Prince Salman, a dove on al Qaeda or Iran. Since he became defense minister last year upon Sultan’s death, he has aggressively pushed the Saudi military to be ready for conflict with Iran if necessary, and has pushed Yemen to take on al Qaeda. There is no sign he disagrees with the occupation of Bahrain.

But Salman also has a reputation, well deserved, for accepting and working with peaceful change in the kingdom. Born on Dec. 31, 1935, he is a son of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the modern kingdom’s father, and the brother of the current King Abdullah as well as Nayif and Sultan. He is a decade younger than his senior brothers. His health is also poor, but he probably stands a good chance at becoming king when Abdullah dies.

Salman was governor of Riyadh province from 1963 until last year. When he assumed the job, the city was a small remote place with a population of less than 200,000. Within a decade, it had half a million inhabitants; today, the greater urban area is home to 7 million people. Salman oversaw this huge transformation—including the construction of desalinization plants to bring water, massive highway infrastructure development, and huge housing blocks.

When the city became the capital in the 1980s, replacing Jiddah, Salman oversaw the construction of its diplomatic quarter to house the foreign embassies. The movement of foreign diplomats to Riyadh was a tricky issue. In Jiddah they lived in a more traditionally tolerant Hejazi city; in Riyadh they would be in the heartland of the Saudi Wahhabi fundamentalist Nejd. Salman pulled it off. He also pushed the kingdom to advance in technology and sciences: one of his sons, Sultan bin Salman, became the first Muslim to go into space on an American shuttle flight.

Change in Saudi Arabia is a subtle and incremental process. King Abdullah has a well-deserved reputation of being a reformer. Abdallah and Nayif were an odd couple in many ways, one a reformer the other a hardliner. The team of Abdallah and Salman will be more philosophically in harmony than the previous one, and Salman is likely to continue Abdallah’s modest reforms without undermining them.

The Arab awakening has put change on the agenda in the kingdom like never before. Young Saudis are watching the revolutions in their neighbors carefully. Shia unrest has grown; women are pushing for more independence and authority. The royal family has spent tens of billions in the last year to buy off dissent. Once the allegiance council, the body created by Abdullah to choose his heir, selects Salman as crown prince, the kingdom will be a little better prepared to handle the storms ahead.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast