Brookings: Topics - Religion, Policy and Politics

Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:08:00 -0400

Abstract:

How do jihadist insurgencies differ from non-jihadist ones? Jihadist insurgents, like all insurgents, seek to control the government, need money and weapons, and thrive where government is weak. Yet their cause—jihad at local, regional, and global levels—gives them instant friends and resources, but also built-in enemies and burdens. Jihadist insurgents often organize, recruit, and fund-raise differently than traditional insurgent groups. The agendas of these militant groups often go against the local residents' sense of nationalism and anger these communities with their extreme interpretations of Islam. To take advantage of this, the United States can amplify local voices that are best able to discredit these insurgents and press allied regimes to disrupt the mosques, schools, and fund-raising networks that help support them. However, Washington should also recognize that weakening these groups at the local level may make them more likely to embrace international terrorism. Allied efforts to co-opt jihadists may make area societies and governments less favorable to other U.S. policies. Finally, failed democratization—a particularly salient issue given the Arab Spring—risks playing into the jihadist narrative.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Who’s on God’s Side? Reclaiming a Vision of the Common Good

Wed, 03 Apr 2013 14:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 3, 2013
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

New York Times bestselling author Jim Wallis believes it’s time for people to ask what it means to be on God’s side, rather than claim God to be on theirs. In his latest book, On God’s Side: What Religion Forgets and Politics Hasn’t Learned About Serving the Common Good (Brazos Press, 2013), Wallis recovers the ancient vision of the common good as a key to transcending the nation’s most polarizing ideological and political divisions, and discovering, together, what’s right and what works.

On April 3, Governance Studies at Brookings hosted a discussion about a vision of the common good that can transform not only politics, but personal lives, families, and communities. Moderated by Senior Fellow E.J. Dionne, Jim Wallis will discuss key highlights from his book and offer insights on what it means to be on God’s side.

Citizenship, Values and Cultural Concerns: What Americans Want From Immigration Reform

Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:01:00 -0400

The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), in partnership with the religion, policy and politics project at Brookings, conducted one of the largest surveys ever fielded on immigration policy, immigrants, and religious and cultural changes in the U.S.The survey of nearly 4,500 American adults explores the many divisions—political, religious, ethnic, geographical, and generational—within the nation over core values and their relationship to immigration.

The accompanying research report, Citizens, Values and Cultural Concerns: What Americans Want from Immigration Reform, authored by PRRI CEO Robert P. Jones, PRRI Research Director Daniel Cox, and PRRI Research Associate Juhem Navarro-Rivera, along with Brookings Senior Fellows E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Galston, explores general sentiment toward immigrant communities, opinions on the impact that immigrants have on American culture and public support for specific policy approaches to immigration reform. The report also explores support for immigration policy among religious groups and the political implications of the issue for and within both the Democratic and Republican parties.

The following is a summary of the survey’s findings and highlights from the accompanying report:

More than 6-in-10 (63%) Americans agree that the immigration system should deal with immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally by allowing them a way to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements. Less than 1-in-5 (14%) say they should be permitted to become permanent legal residents but not citizens, while approximately 1-in-5 (21%) agree that they should be identified and deported.
More than 7-in-10 (71%) Democrats, nearly two-thirds (64%) of independents, and a majority (53%) of Republicans favor an earned path to citizenship.
Majorities of all religious groups, including Hispanic Catholics (74%), Hispanic Protestants (71%), black Protestants (70%), Jewish Americans (67%), Mormons (63%), white Catholics (62%), white mainline Protestants (61%), and white evangelical Protestants (56%), agree that the immigration system should allow immigrants currently living in the U.S. illegally to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements.
Americans rank immigration reform sixth out of seven issues, far behind economic issues, as the highest political priority for the president and Congress.
Nearly half (45%) of Americans say the Republican Party’s position on immigration has hurt the party in recent elections.
Americans are more likely to say they trust the Democratic Party, rather than the Republican Party, to do a better job handling the issues of immigration (39% vs. 29%) and illegal immigration (43% vs. 30%). However, nearly 1-in-4 (23%) Americans say they do not trust either party to handle the issue of immigration.
Views about immigrants’ impact on American society are strongly associated with political ideology. Conservatives (36%) and liberals (31%) are nearly equally as likely to say that immigrants are changing their own communities a lot. However, conservatives (53%) are significantly more likely than liberals (38%) to say that immigrants are changing American society a lot.
Overall, Americans are more likely to have positive rather than negative views about immigrants. A majority (54%) of Americans believe that the growing number of newcomers from other countries helps strengthen American society, while a significant minority (40%) say that newcomers threaten traditional American customs and values.

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Authors

Robert P. Jones
Daniel Cox
Juhem Navarro-Rivera
E.J. Dionne, Jr.
William A. Galston

Publication: Public Religion Research Institute and The Brookings Institution

Religion, Values and Immigration Survey Release: What Factors Influence Views on Immigration Policy?

Thu, 21 Mar 2013 14:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 21, 2013
2:30 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Root Room
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

Register for the Event
On March 21, the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) and the religion, policy and politics project at Brookings hosted a forum to release a new national opinion survey on religion, values and immigration reform. With nearly 4,500 respondents, the survey is one of the largest ever conducted on the issue of immigration. The accompanying research report, authored by PRRI CEO Robert P. Jones, PRRI Research Director Daniel Cox, and PRRI Research Associate Juhem Navarro-Rivera, along with Brookings Senior Fellows E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Galston explores general sentiment toward immigrant communities, opinions on the impact that immigrants have on American culture and public support for specific policy approaches to immigration reform. The report also explores support for immigration policy among religious groups and the political implications of the issue for and within both the Democratic and Republican parties.

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Religion, Values and Immigration Survey Release: What Factors Influence Views on Immigration Policy?

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The Thistle and the Drone: The United States, Islam, and the War on Terror

Akbar Ahmed — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:03:00 -0500

“We will not tolerate more genocide of innocent tribesmen.”

This was the message of hundreds of tribesmen from Waziristan demonstrating in front of the Governor’s House in Peshawar, Pakistan on March 5, 2013. They were protesting the on-going drone campaign Pakistan which is almost exclusively targeting their home of Waziristan. Only 18 drone strikes in Pakistan have been outside of the two tribal agencies that comprise the region of Waziristan. These tribesmen were bringing attention to the fact that these drone strikes have traumatized entire tribal communities and resulted in the deaths of many innocent people, including women, children, and the elderly, in traditional meetings of councils of elders, inside mosques, and in residential homes.

As the debate about the drone and the war on terror in America emerges, these are the voices that are not heard—those of the victims and the targeted communities. They are lost in the din of the war on terror and the 24 hour media cycle in the United States. The debate is in fact no debate at all: only one position, that of America, is represented. The arguments swirl around the precision of drone technology, keeping American boots off the ground, and the legality of the strikes. Few are concerned with the moral implications of the drone’s use and the social and historical reasons why certain members of the targeted communities have resorted to violence, being merely cast aside as “Islamic terrorists,” “Islamists,” or “jihadists.”

My latest study with Brookings Press The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, the third book in my trilogy on relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world after 9/11, provides the missing part of the debate. The Thistle and the Drone explains an important correlation: the United States uses drones almost exclusively against Muslim tribes with strong codes of honor and revenge living on the borders between nations—the tribes on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Yemen, Somalia, the southern Philippines, Turkey, and Mali. For these communities, the deadly drone is a symbol for America’s war on terror. It is constantly hovering above unseen, operated by Americans on the other side of the world, and with the ability to strike at will. The thistle is a symbol of these fierce tribes, invoking Leo Tolstoy’s novel Hadji Murad in which he compares the Caucasian tribes battling the advancing Imperial Russian army in the 19th century with this prickly flower.

Many of these tribal communities had been fighting for decades in order to defend their identity, culture, and independence in the chaotic and often brutal modern states created after the departure of the European colonial powers. After the tragic events of 9/11, it was to the “ungoverned spaces” of these peripheral communities that the United States looked to in their hunt for al Qaeda. Many of their central governments found it convenient to ally themselves with the United States and become integrated in the globalized financial, military, information, and communication networks. The United States, dominated by ideas of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam, were quick to ascribe the retaliatory actions of the tribes as the work of al Qaeda or al Qaeda-linked militants as part of a “global jihad.” Once the specter of al Qaeda was invoked, the United States’ was fully committed to bolstering the military capabilities of its allies. U.S. involvement, especially the use of the drone, proved to exacerbate and expand these conflicts, each with their own social and historical context. The war on terror had thus become a global war on tribal Islam.

Amidst the anarchic violence, it is, however, the innocent men, women, and children of the periphery who suffer the most—children in a school, poverty-ridden families standing in line for food, or congregations at worship in a house of prayer. These communities are facing a massive humanitarian crisis yet their plight goes unrecognized under the din of America’s war on terror and the heavy fog of war. Pounded by drones and military strikes one day, suicide bombers the next, the people of the periphery cry out, “Everyday is like 9/11 for us.”

Relying upon forty case studies of tribal societies across the Muslim world, from Morocco to the southern Philippines, The Thistle and the Drone shows that the war on terror across the Muslim world is being fueled by the structural breakdown between the center and periphery rather than any compulsion within the Islamic faith. This study takes the reader into the heart of the war on terror—Waziristan—one of the most battered regions of the world by drones and where I served as the government administrator, or Political Agent, in the late 1970s. Using my own experiences in Waziristan, I describe how traditional tribal society functions and how to effectively administer them as a representative of government authority. I then show how the historical tension between the center and periphery spiraled out of control after 9/11, leading to one of its deadliest manifestation, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) based in the toughest clan of the toughest tribe of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, the Shabi Khel of the Mahsud.

Expanding to other tribal societies in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe, I establish a new frame for understanding the war on terror based in the historical conflict between the central government and tribal periphery, resulting in the mutation of the tribal code and increasingly deadly violence. I even discovered the catalyst for the war on terror—the 9/11 attacks—impossible to fully understand without knowledge of tribal society and this new paradigm for the war on terror. Of the 19 hijackers on 9/11, 18 of them, along with Osama bin Laden himself, were Yemeni tribesmen motivated by tribal codes. Of the 18 Yemeni hijackers, 10 were from the Yemeni tribes of the beleaguered Asir region on the southwest periphery of Saudi Arabia.

After over a decade, it is abundantly clear that the United States has been fighting the wrong war with the wrong methods against the wrong enemy. Only by recognizing the true source of the violence and the nature of the tribal society which produces it can the U.S. begin to provide lasting solutions. The Thistle and the Drone lays down this path to ending and winning the war on terror. In this age of globalization, we must be guided by the shibboleth tikkun olam—to go out and “heal a fractured world.” Peace is in everyone’s best interests.

Authors

Akbar Ahmed

Islam and Secularism in the Arab World: Lessons from Turkey

Thu, 28 Feb 2013 01:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM AST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On February 28, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion focused on the relationship between Islam and the state in the Arab world and the idea of a “Turkish model” for reconciling Islam and secularism. At the event, Ahmet Kuru, a visiting fellow at the BDC, presented his recently published policy briefing, “Muslim politics without an ‘Islamic state’: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a model for Arab Islamists?” In discussion with Kuru was H. A. Hellyer, a nonresident fellow with the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. The event was moderated by BDC Director of Research Shadi Hamid and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business and media communities.

Ahmet Kuru began his presentation by establishing a distinction between what he called “assertive secularism” – as practiced in France or during Turkey’s Kemalist past – and the “passive secularism” embraced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) today. While the former actively seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere, the latter encourages the accommodation of the public visibility of religion. Kuru argued that an “AKP model” – characterized by both the party’s move from Islamism to passive secularism and a shift of state institutions from assertive to passive secularism – provides important and practicable lessons for Arab Islamists today.

This model, he stressed, should not be seen as a perfect blueprint to be imposed from above. Certain aspects of the “model” may appeal to Arab parties more than others, and the exchange of the ideas associated with it may occur in an organic manner through a variety of channels. Kuru added that the AKP model itself is not without its own deficiencies; Arab Islamists should seek to learn from its failures as much as its successes.

At the moment, Kuru said, the Arab world finds itself in a middle ground between the passive secularism of Turkey and the “semi-theocratic semi-republican model of Iran.” While Tunisia looks set to maintain a constitution that refers neither to sharia or secularism, Egypt has taken a step in the Iranian direction by granting al-Azhar a constitutional role in the interpretation of Islamic law. By moving toward Turkey’s model, Kuru argued, Arab states would “allow diverse understandings of sharia to apply in a bottom-up, rather than top-down fashion.”

The second pillar of the “AKP model” refers to its ability to conduct “Muslim politics” – the pursuit policies that reflect Islamic values – without seeking the establishment of an Islamic state. Many Islamic actors in Turkey, Kuru said, see that an “Islamic” state is actually a hindrance to the application of Muslim values. Often, these states’ perceived religious legitimacy makes them less accountable to their people. Furthermore, these critics assert, “Islamic” states often focus on formalistic aspects of Islamic law rather than genuinely promoting the substance of Islamic ethics.

Finally, the AKP’s pragmatism – for instance in its gradualist approach to effecting change or its ability to balance conflicting foreign policy agendas – offer further important lessons for Arab Islamists. Spefically, Kuru asserted, ruling Islamists in Arab countries will find this sort of flexibility useful in their efforts to establish working relationships with Western governments on which they rely for economic and other forms of support.

To be sure, the AKP’s transformation came about as a result of certain constraints and incentives – from the military, Turkish society, and the West – that may not exist in the same way in Arab cases. Still, Kuru argued, other institutional or societal influences may well encourage the embrace of passive secularism in the Arab world. These could include the enduring influence of anti-Islamist security establishments or the presence of indigenous Christian populations in countries such as Egypt.

Hisham Hellyer began by stressing that the appeal of the Turkish model in the Arab world had a lot to with the idea of autonomy, which had also been at the core of uprisings in countries such as Egypt. In that regard, Turkey’s homegrown success in building its own economy – more than the AKP’s approach to religion – was what had initially attracted Arab Islamists, he said. It should not come as surprising, therefore, if Arabs focused on building their own futures reject the idea of an external model being imposed.

In the Arab world today, no “post-uprising ideological formation” has yet solidified, Hellyer said. The model that may emerge, he argued, may well share much with the centrist, “moderate secularism” embraced by the AKP and will “probably owe very little to the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to the Salafi political vision.” Hellyer posited that Libya and Syria – where pious Muslim leaders outside the realm of Islamism hold significant influence – may well be the first to develop this model.

Hellyer agreed with Kuru on the advantages of state-sponsored moderate secularism in countries where there is deep religious belief. While Kuru saw a state role in defining religious law as a blow to democracy, however, Hellyer suggested that it could perhaps be beneficial. He argued that in the contemporary Muslim world, there is a “crisis of religious authority” fueled in part by a proliferation of preachers (for instance in Tunisia and Egypt) who “feel they have the right to issue fatwas and expect people to act upon them.” The establishment of a “quality assurance mechanism” in the form of a role for institutions such as al-Azhar may not be negative development, as long as that role remains consultative rather than coercive.

Hellyer joined Kuru in warning against the idea of an “Islamic state.” He sought to deconstruct the term, saying that in adopting the goal of an “Islamic state,” Islamist movements often failed to acknowledge that the state itself is a modern construct. The idea of a pre-modern “Islamic state” that must be revived, Hellyer insisted, is something of a fallacy, and one that is largely ignored by today’s Islamists. He further questioned Islamists’ claim to a monopoly on interpretations of Islam. Islamism is not simply “political Islam,” he asserted, but is rather the marriage of a “certain reformist approach to Islam” with politics. He pointed out that religious institutions in many Muslim countries “contest the right of Islamist political movements to independently articulate religion.” Hellyer questioned whether Arab Islamists would be able or likely to adopt an AKP model, given the important differences that exist “not only in their political histories, but in their religious approaches.”

Following their presentations, Shadi Hamid questioned both panelists on the applicability of an AKP model in Arab societies that, unlike Turkey, often show strong support for the application of sharia. Perhaps countries such as Egypt – where according to a 2010 Pew poll, as many as 82 percent support the stoning of adulterers and 77 percent favor cutting off the hands of thieves – may actually want to establish Islamic states?

Kuru responded by arguing that the situation in Egypt and Tunisia over the last four months had shown that Islamists’ strategy of appealing solely to their base would backfire. The degree of instability in Egypt had shown that a “more balanced discourse is clearly needed.” Furthermore, he contended, by encouraging more diverse interpretations of sharia, the Muslim Brotherhood would succeed in distinguishing itself positively from its Salafi rivals.

Hellyer argued, meanwhile, that in reading these sorts of polls, there is a need to distinguish between religiosity and religious literacy. While Egypt regularly ranks as the “most religious country in the world,” he said, religious literacy there is “incredibly low.” Where questions pertain to religious identity, Egyptians will largely respond in an emphatic manner. This is not to say, however that they see religion as a political priority. “Inflation, unemployment, and the lack of security” were consistently cited as the top priorities of supporters of all major political parties, he said, while Islamic law “didn’t feature.”

Event Materials

BDC_AKP Model_Kuru

Participants

Moderator

Shadi Hamid

Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists?

Ahmet T. Kuru — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Islamist parties assume power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, many – in both the West and the region – have turned to the experience of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) for lessons on negotiating the relationship between Islam and the state.

The “AKP model,” it is argued, occupies the middle ground between the “assertive secularism” of Turkey’s past, and the marriage of religion and politics seen in countries such as Iran. Given striking differences, however, between Turkey, with its Kemalist past, and the Arab world, where “secularism” itself is sometimes almost taboo, can the AKP’s experience really be an effective model? Will Islamists in deeply conservative Arab countries even see it as desirable?

In a policy briefing from the BDC, Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a Model for Arab Islamists?, Visiting Fellow Ahmet T. Kuru explores the relationship between Islamism and secularism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Kuru writes the continued rise of the AKP and its embrace of a “passive secularism” that effectively advances Islamic values provide an important and potentially attractive example for Arab Islamists. The differences between the Arab and Turkish contexts, he argues, need not inhibit the adoption of certain aspects of the AKP model. Rather, the dividends brought by the AKP’s pragmatism and the party's success in pursuing Muslim politics without seeking an “Islamic” state may yet encourage Arab Islamists to follow a similar path.

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Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Law’s Virtues: Exploring the Tensions between Law and Values in the United States

Thu, 31 Jan 2013 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Throughout our nation’s history, lawmakers have had to balance serving the common good with the protection of individual freedom. This task is particularly difficult in a pluralistic liberal democracy such as the United States, especially when it comes to sensitive moral issues, such as abortion or euthanasia. Should the law be morally neutral so as not to impose a particular set of values on society as a whole? Or should the law make a moral judgment on such issues?

On January 31, Brookings Senior Fellow William Galston moderated a discussion of Law’s Virtues: Fostering Autonomy and Solidarity in American Society (Georgetown University Press, 2012), by legal scholar and moral theologian Cathleen Kaveny. Kaveny argues that legal frameworks are never value-neutral, yet sound lawmaking must take more than morality into account when deciding how to regulate particular actions. Kaveny discussed her vision for a realistic relationship between law and morality. After her presentation, a panel of experts joined the conversation.

This event was hosted by the religion, policy and politics project at Brookings and is also part of the Governing Ideas series intended to broaden the discussion of governance issues through forums on timely and relevant books on history, culture, legal norms and practices, values and religion.

Audio

Law’s Virtues: Exploring the Tensions between Law and Values in the United States

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130131_Laws virtues_corrected_transcript

Christmas Confusion as Copts Experience "Other" Egypt

H.A. Hellyer — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Yesterday was a rather confusing day for many Western observers of the Arab world, particularly Egypt. Many in Europe and North America had taken an extended holiday, considering the proximity to Christmas Day and New Year’s Day – and most of them would have returned this past weekend, to start work again in the new year on Monday the 7th of January. When contacting their interlocutors in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, they would have been met with a surprise. “Sorry, we’re not working today. It’s Christmas.”

It is true that some people do stretch their holidays, so that they last far beyond the actual day of the special occasion – but in this case, that is not what happened, and what happens, every year. The 7th of January is the date of Christmas according to the Coptic calendar, and as such, it is a national holiday. Such as been the case in Egypt since I can remember – and none of that seems set to change under the new Islamist government of President Mursi.

The occasion is one usually where Muslim politicians, religious leaders and ordinary citizens express their heartfelt appreciation of the Christian element of the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, and offer words of greeting to them. This year was something of a first for Christian Egyptians, though.

Religiously forbidden

It was the first year where Christian Egyptians celebrated Christmas under an Islamist president – a president who did not attend the Christmas celebrations, although he did send a representative. It was the first year that a sectarian discourse that identified Christians and the Coptic Church as potential subversive elements was unabashedly public. – and from senior levels. When the protests against the president were at their height, a senior Muslim Brotherhood figure went on TV to declare that 60% of the protestors were Christian – under the assumption, one presumes, that this would make the protests less legitimate.

At the same time, Salafi sheikhs, as well as senior Muslim Brotherhood figures like Khairat al-Shater, either issued or supported the notion that wishing Christian compatriots a ‘Merry Christmas’ was religiously forbidden, and sinful for Muslims to do – hardly a note of positive co-existence in a time when sectarianism is rearing its head.

But this is not the only story in Egyptian Christianity after the beginning of the revolution in January 2011. There is another.

Other story

That other story is the story of Muslim Egyptians going to stand outside of churches on the 25th of December (when some Christian denominations in Egypt celebrate Christmas), on the 6th and the 7th., to reassure Christian Egyptians that indeed, they and them were one people. That other story is the story of Muslim and Christian Egyptians, to this day, still chanting ‘One Hand’ in demonstrations, and even within churches, when Muslims who came to the churches in solidarity with Christian Egyptians.

That other story is the story of the remembrance ceremony at Maspero in Cairo earlier this year, where Muslims and Christians joined together to recall and commemorate the sacrifices of mostly Christian protestors, who lost their lives in a clash with the military, after the revolution began.

That other story is of Dr. Mazhar Shaheen, the imam of the Omar Makram mosque on the edge of Tahrir Square, who was greeted by applause, cheers and given a standing ovation by Christian worshippers when he was invited to give a speech at the Qasr al-Dobara Church nearby.

That other story is the story of supporters of the revolution who remember those 18 days in Tahrir Square, from the 25th of January 2011 to the 11th of February 2011; those days where Christians praying were surrounded and protected by Muslims, and vice versa.

That other story is Egypt.

But that other story is not the only Egypt that is possible, sadly, after the revolution began in 2011. Too many individuals and groups will work hard to break that essential ingredient of the Egyptian people; that ingredient of tolerance and co-operation. Egyptians prior to the revolution, particularly those from the majority Muslim community, tended to take good relations between Christians and Muslims for granted – they no longer do. They can no longer afford to.

Rather, such good relations between these religious communities are to be preserved, fought for, and actively renewed, again and again. Therein, perhaps, lies one of the most core values of that revolution, forged in that square of liberation, two years ago. As Egyptians draw nearer to the second anniversary of its beginning, they would be well advised to remember that.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Al Arabiya

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Four More Years for the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 17, 2012
9:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

The federal government has a long history of partnering with religious and secular charities in an effort to serve people in need. Former President George W. Bush formalized these efforts by creating a White House office and a number of centers across various federal agencies, and he also established a specific set of church-state rules to govern these partnerships. President Obama retained this White House office and has continued some Bush policies, while making notable changes in other areas.

On December 17, the religion, policy and politics project at Brookings hosted an event featuring comments from Joshua DuBois, executive director of the White House office, and other Obama administration officials on the past work and future plans for the office. Following the presentations, a panel of experts responded and offered their thoughts regarding priorities for this White House office during President Obama’s second term. Speakers will explore how the Obama and Bush White House offices differ, whether the office is succeeding in meeting the needs of people who are at the margins in today’s society, and what the prospects are for resolving contentious issues such as religion-based decision-making regarding government-funded jobs.

Brookings scholars E.J. Dionne and Melissa Rogers co-moderated the panels and took audience questions after each.

Audio

Four More Years for the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121217_faith_based_c

Muslim Integration in Germany

Jonathan Laurence — Wed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview with NPR's Charles Hawley, Jonathan Laurence discusses Muslim integration in Germany along with its implication of increasing cultural tensions.

Charles Hawley: Primarily I know that you’re mostly focused on immigration, Muslims in Europe. The debate in Germany I find to be somewhat unique, in Bonn a small party of anti-Islamist populists decided in their campaign for the state elections to display Mohammad caricatures in front of Muslim facilities and they engendered a response that was perhaps not surprising, but was nonetheless unfortunate, when Salafists attacked the police protecting the small demonstration. How is it that such a small tiny group could define the debate about Islam in the German press for months?

Jonathan Laurence: Well there are two tiny groups in that case that are defining the German debate rather unhelpfully at the same time. And each has its own place of primacy even though they’re really quite small. (Unintelligible) has its most recent experience in the public realm as the prime mover behind a campaign against the construction of a grand mosque in Cologne’s city center. Which is not far from the main cathedral. And their plan to build a Mosque in central Cologne inspired this small coalition of self-anointed anti-Islamization prophets basically who view any sign of permanence of Islam in Germany or in neighboring countries to be a real challenge to the country’s fundamental identity. So out of really very small numbers, they were able to mount this very visible campaign against the construction of the mosque and this lead to some real significant clashes. That fact brought out I think some of the worst in the Muslim origin population in that the mainstream organizations which are basically all of them said that if you don’t want us to have a transparent visible proper mosque in the city center, then why do you criticize the prayer spaces that we have that are in the second courtyard. We’re just trying to make ourselves at home here. And so the (unintelligible) movement has its roots in this and wound up provoking this Salafist fringe within the organized Muslim community, which is really tiny, we’re talking in the low thousands for the entire country.

Hawley: You spoke also of the fact that the (Unintelligble) is interested in maintaining the identity of that region of Germany as a whole. When talking to them of course, they also emphasize or they primarily emphasize that they are there to defend democracy. Is that an honest argument on their part?

Laurence: Not entirely, if you allow that this democracy with its constitution upholds religious freedom. And what they are objecting to within Islamic organizations within Germany is more a result of Islam not having found analogous institutional structures to the churches or synagogues and other religious communities that have been here for a while. The German constitution, the Grundgesetz, took over from the Weimar constitution a whole section concerning religious freedoms, allowing for religious communities to be formed, allowing for religious communities to be recognized as public law corporations, and to enjoy certain privileges. So to teach in public schools an hour of religion each week, to collect some funds, revenue, church taxes for the running of the community, to have seats on the boards of certain public broadcasting corporations. There’s a whole range of privileges, which Muslims now that they are becoming more and more part of the citizenry are asking for access to quite naturally. So the idea that preventing them from exercising their constitutional rights is a defense of democracy is somewhat disingenuous. But what they are objecting to in the (Unintelligible) circles are the radical fringes of the religion.

Hawley: What is it about that political background that makes Germany prone to these periodic orgies of angst?

Laurence: Well Germany has this funny experience of dual dictatorship in the 20th century, which has really conditioned the way that citizens experience democracy. The West German Federal Republic was already quite constrained in its international degrees of freedom because of its anchoring in NATO, but also because of the American occupation. And then of course the Soviet occupation, which wound up taking the form of East German Democratic Republic, extended also an experience of essentially totalitarianism from the Nazi period of the Third Reich. And so I think that those two experiences of dictatorship as perceived from the West led to a whole series of restrictions on how far freedoms should be allowed to go because of the risk of their spilling over into intolerance. And so a kind of anti-fascist broadly speaking mentality of no freedom for the enemies of freedom developed. And of course to have activities on the politically extreme is perfectly natural in Western democracy, it’s not possible that the parliamentary party system covers everyone. And if you have freedom of opinion, then you have to expect that there are going to be some people out there with really nasty opinions. But it’s very hard for I think Germans to feel quite responsible for those experiences of dictatorship and ensuring that they never occur again. So it’s often coming from a kind of well-intentioned place. When they want to prevent the spread of Islamism, that’s not just pulling out, that’s Germany government policy essentially. They don’t speak to groups that define themselves as Islamist even if they’re nonviolent. So the aims of that are perfectly understandable, they don’t want to come to a situation where there is a religious theocracy.

Listen to the full interview at nprberlin.de »

Authors

Jonathan Laurence

Publication: NPR Berlin

Image Source: © Thomas Peter / Reuters

Integration or Emancipation? (Muslime in Deutschland brauchen Emanzipation)

Jonathan Laurence — Sun, 18 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In his article in Der Tagesspiegel, Jonathan Laurence takes a look at the degree to which Muslims in Europe – many of them immigrants – have become truly emancipated. Emancipation of a minority, he argues, is different from their integration or assimilation. As political situations come and go and change daily attitudes towards Germany’s religious minorities, Germany must be careful to preserve the small steps already taken toward minority emancipation. Read the article in English or German below.

German President Joachim Gauck’s visit to the Sehitlik mosque in Berlin before Eid al Adha earlier this month heartened critics who regretted his earlier hesitation to claim Islam as an integral part of federal republic. The about-face revealed a paradox within the man – just as within the country and perhaps the continent – that is tearing at the fabric of 21st century European Islamic life. Despite enormous progress, European Muslims still do not enjoy what has historically been called “emancipation.”

No mainstream politician denies the permanence of Islam’s presence. But as Islam is more visibly accommodated in the public sphere, it elicits fiercer resistance from nativists, who want proof of loyalty and a higher tribute in exchange for admission to the nation. Islam-critical populism no longer lingers on Germany’s political extremes alone. This reopens a wound that 1999’s historic citizenship reform was intended to heal, leading to “hyphenated” Germans’ frustration with limits on religious liberties and apparent double standards in the fight against political and religious extremism.

Rooting Islamic organizations and religious observance in domestic institutions in Germany and elsewhere in Europe is undeniably underway: the Deutsche Islam Konferenz and other consultations have led to hundreds of new prayer spaces in construction, the availability of religious education, and scores of imams, teachers and theologians who are being locally trained.

The legal and political status of Islam, nonetheless, escapes easy categorization. Two trends are impeding the anchoring of Islam. Within Europe, Islamkritik has slipped from aiming to preserve the “neutrality” of the public sphere or to defend “western human rights,” and towards a basic dubiousness about Islamic religious practices in general. This in turn reinforces the protective instinct within the countries of origin, where new ministries are to maintain religious, political and economic ties with diasporas abroad.

Emancipation in the sense of the way Prussian reformers Stein and Hardenberg used the term, offers a robust and realistic way out: The mass entry of a previously excluded group into the democratic order, based on the rule of law and equal rights and obligations as citizens -- including collective rights, if they choose to join a religious community or certain other types of secondary association. Of course, it has also always implied new duties, including taxation and the possibility of military conscription. Emancipation is a generational process that takes time; France’s Jews received full rights in 1791, whereas it took the 1871 Imperial Constitution (Reichsverfassung) to grant the same across a united Germany. The process has always been characterized by a “dual movement.” With one hand, the state liberates, equalizes and enfranchises, and acknowledges collective identity. While with the other, it forces adaptation and the reform of community structures.

Over the long and winding course of democratization in 19th and early 20th century Europe, Groups who were once absent from the body politic – including Jews, minority Catholics, and the working classes – gradually acquired full citizenship. And they were soon thereafter granted “group” status –in the form of central councils, concordats or trade unions — to administer institutional privileges and to anchor their organizations domestically within a constitutional framework.

But why use this outmoded expression? The word evokes the failures of German democracy, but it might as well point a way to reclaiming some of the brighter spots in the country’s democratization. Twelve years of Third Reich should not be atoned by reneging on earlier progress.

Emancipation also offers a way out of the false dichotomy of integration or assimilation. Integration cannot be the appropriate word for the millions who were born, raised and educated here, and who don’t consider themselves to be foreigners or immigrants. And to them, assimilation sounds like a euphemism for dissolution. In other words: if you uncover your hair, give up your minarets, stop your brutal halal slaughter and cruel circumcision rituals – then we have a deal: Welcome! Emancipation, in contrast, has historically meant becoming subject to the rule of law – and thus winning protection from administrative arbitrariness – and armchair theologians.

Why even bring religion into this discussion? Isn’t the focus on religion divisive and problematic and a contribution to needless communitarianism? There is no reason to pretend or to wish that Islamic identity or piety be the defining trait of the generations born here of immigrant background. Just as with “free markets”, which do not exist suspended in a theoretical space, but are regulated in myriad ways, so too is “universal citizenship” structured with many formal and informal institutions. Citizenship guarantees individual religious rights. But it is group status – usually in the form of public law – that gives meaning to those rights in city halls, government ministries, armed forces, prisons, schools, hospitals and sometimes even in public streets.

While not all European states have immigrant or foreign culture-oriented policies, all have religion offices and maintain some privileges, and often, a formal relationship with faith communities. State-Islam relations have begun to lay the groundwork for German Islam. Muslim students in NRW now have the option of Islam religion classes. Hamburg just concluded a historic state contract with several major Islamic federations. At eight universities, there are now centers of Islamic studies or chairs training future teachers, imams and theologians. This is still at a small scale: the cumulative enrollment is in the low dozens, while there’s an existing need for more than 2,000 imams and religious leaders in Germany.

This new institutional presence has already helped reduce tensions related to the “defense of Islam” in the public sphere and helped manage cyclical religious scandals. The YouTube user who uploaded an anti-Islamic video that went viral in September was a geistiger Brandstifter (intellectual arsonist). But the Muslim communities of Europe proved they are not a tinderbox, waiting to catch fire at the slightest provocation. Images of attacks abroad on schools, consulates, and embassies were dispiriting, yet all of the tragic violence occurred elsewhere. In Europe, the angry responses took the form of lawsuits and small demonstrations.

It’s tempting to think that nothing has changed in the quarter century, since Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. But the reaction to violent extremists should be proportionate to their numbers. The legal complaints filed against authors and magazines illustrate the power of formal institutional access that comes with full emancipation. By registering their offense, by protesting discrimination where they see it, European Muslims have begun to employ their democratic rights.

Another example of this came during last spring’s NRW elections. In the aftermath of a violent Salafist protest against the Prophet cartoons in Bonn, something much more meaningful took place. Federations representing hundreds of thousands of German Muslims condemned the violent protesters and implored constituents to express their dissent by fulfilling the civic duty of voting. As the proportion of Muslims of foreign nationality living here decreases, democratic political institutions are increasingly kicking in.

Nonetheless, the mixed experience of the current Federal Interior Minister reminds Germans of the need for non-partisan (überparteilich) consensus on Islam policy. The NSU murders and revelations of rightwing infiltration of the security apparatus, moreover, in addition to differences in counter-radicalization strategies, has broadened and deepened the sense of mistrust vis-à-vis German institutions.

Perceptions matter, and many German Muslims perceive that their community’s status shifts dramatically from one President to another, and from one coalition government to the next. The communication channels between Islamic organizations and the authorities during these crises never completely broke down, but relations have suffered. This is not unique to Germany, of course – France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK all have experienced some form of it. In the absence of that consensus, it pushes the discussion in minority communities back towards the option of dual citizenship, just in case. The loss of confidence in German or European institutions would mean a return to internationalization.

But this is also a genuine opportunity for Germany to push back. The dual citizenship battle shouldn’t be about confiscating foreign passports. It is rather about endowing the German identity card with binding commitments. Without a basic minimum set of guaranteed rights there will always be a market for protection – whether from ancestral homeland governments or transnational political movements.

This is a complex and multi-level interaction between state and religious actors within and across borders. Nonetheless, it is the nation-state that is ultimately responsible for guaranteeing the free exercise of its citizens’ religious rights. Only individual European governments can emancipate Europe’s Muslims, and the longer there is no final status agreement – in whatever form that take, whether it be Religionsgemeinschaft, Körperschaftstatus or something new – then the more fragile and reversible that progress will be. Until then, a real danger exists that the modest early accomplishments of emancipation will be undone before Muslims’ incorporation has even taken place.

Muslime in Deutschland brauchen Emanzipation

Anlässlich des muslimischen Opferfestes hat Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck im Oktober die Berliner Sehitlik-Moschee besucht. Seine Kritiker ließ diese Tatsache Hoffnung schöpfen – jene Kritiker nämlich, die seine frühere Weigerung bedauert hatten, den Islam als integralen Bestandteil Deutschlands anzuerkennen. Diese Kehrtwende legt Gaucks paradoxe Haltung offen, die in Deutschland und vielleicht auf dem ganzen Kontinent vorherrscht und die das muslimische Leben im Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts bestimmt.

Trotz enormer Fortschritte genießen die europäischen Muslime immer noch nicht das, was im historischen Kontext „Emanzipation“ genannt wird.

Kein demokratisch gesinnter Politiker in Deutschland leugnet, dass die Präsenz des Islam in Europa von Dauer sein wird. Aber während der Islam in der Öffentlichkeit demonstrativ willkommen geheißen wird, löst er zunehmend heftigen Widerstand bei den Nativisten aus, die von Muslimen einen Loyalitätsbeweis und mehr Integrationsbemühungen als Gegenleistungen für ihre Zugehörigkeit zur Gesellschaft einfordern. Islamkritischer Populismus ist längst nicht mehr nur an den Rändern des politischen Spektrums zu Hause. Dieser Populismus reißt eine Wunde wieder auf, die 1999 durch die Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts geschlossen werden sollte. Die neuen „Bindestrich-Deutschen“ sind frustriert angesichts der Grenzen, die ihrer Religionsfreiheit gesetzt werden und angesichts der Bigotterie im Kampf gegen den politischen und religiösen Extremismus.

Die Einbindung islamischer Organisationen und auch ihre Einbettung in bestehende gesellschaftliche Strukturen in Deutschland und Europa funktionieren zunehmend besser: Die Deutsche Islamkonferenz und ähnliche Gipfeltreffen von Politikern und Verbänden haben zu Hunderten neuer Gebetsräume und Gotteshäuser geführt, auch wenn viele davon noch im Bau sind. Ebenso positiv anzumerken sind die verbesserten Angebote religiöser Erziehung in Schulen und die immer größere Zahl von Imamen, Lehrern und Theologen, die im Land ausgebildet werden.

Der rechtliche und politische Status des Islam in Europa hingegen entzieht sich trotz aller Bemühungen einer Einordnung. Zwei Entwicklungen behindern seine Verankerung: Die Islamkritik in Europa verschiebt sich von der Betonung der Neutralität des öffentlichen Raumes und der Verteidigung westlicher Menschenrechtsvorstellungen hin zu einem generellen Unbehagen gegenüber allen muslimischen Glaubenspraktiken. Das wiederum ruft in den Herkunftsländern Beschützerinstinkte hervor, Ministerien werden geschaffen, um die religiösen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bande mit der Diaspora zu erhalten.

Das ist der Ausweg aus der falschen Dichotomie von Integration und Assimilation

Die Emanzipation in dem aufklärerischen Sinn dieses Wortes, den die preußischen Reformer Stein und Hardenberg meinten, bietet einen sicheren und realistischen Ausweg aus dem Dilemma: Den Eintritt einer zuvor ausgeschlossenen Gruppe in eine demokratische Gesellschaft, basierend auf bestehenden Gesetzen, mit den gleichen Rechten und Pflichten für alle Bürger. Emanzipation umfasst auch Kollektivrechte, falls diese Bürger sich entschließen, einer religiösen oder einer anderen Art von Gemeinschaft beizutreten. Natürlich waren damit immer auch Auflagen verbunden, wie solche zur Steuer- oder zur Wehrpflicht. Emanzipation ist ein ungleichmäßiger Prozess, der sich über mehrere Generationen hinzieht. Die Juden Frankreichs erhielten bereits im Jahr 1791 gleiche Rechte, wohingegen jene in Deutschland bis zur Reichsverfassung 1871 warten mussten. Ihm eigen war dabei schon immer eine Art doppelter Handschlag zwischen Staat und Religionsgemeinschaft: Mit der einen Hand sorgt der Staat für Gleichheit und erteilt Rechte. Mit der anderen erzwingt er Anpassung und eine Reform der Gemeindestrukturen.

Auf dem langen und schwierigen Weg der Demokratisierung im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts wurde von der politischen Teilhabe ausgeschlossenen Menschen – Juden, Katholiken, die Arbeiterklasse – nach und nach das volle Bürgerrecht gewährt. Ihnen wurde auch der Status „gesellschaftliche Gruppe“ zugestanden, sie konnten sich in Verbänden, Interessengruppen und Gewerkschaften organisieren, um institutionelle Privilegien wahrzunehmen und ihre Interessen innerhalb eines gesetzlich verankerten Rahmens zu vertreten.

Aber warum sollten wir heute noch den überkommenen Begriff „Emanzipation“ verwenden? Das Wort beschwört die Misserfolge der deutschen Demokratie herauf, dabei könnte es auch die lichten Momente des deutschen Demokratisierungsprozesses beleuchten. Zwölf Jahre „Drittes Reich“ sollten nicht die schon zuvor errungenen Fortschritte negieren.

Authors

Jonathan Laurence

Publication: Der Tagesspiegel

Image Source: © Thomas Peter / Reuters

2012 Post-Election American Values Survey: Analyzing the Election and Looking ahead to the Budget Showdown

Fri, 16 Nov 2012 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 16, 2012
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EST

Fourth Estate Room
The National Press Club
529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045

In October, the Public Religion Research Institute, in cooperation with Brookings, released PRRI’s 2012 American Values Survey (AVS). The survey showed that the coalitions making up the two major political parties are composed of distinctive religious subgroups with starkly different views on the economy, social issues, and the role of government. But what values and issues ultimately influenced voters’ choices, and what do these mean for the upcoming debates over budget priorities? Immediately after Americans cast their ballots, the Public Religion Research Institute returned to the field to ask how they felt about the election and what their priorities are for the future.

On November 16, the religion, policy and politics project at Brookings and PRRI will host a forum to release PRRI’s post-election research, including a call-back national post-election survey, a new post-election survey of Ohio voters and focus groups among white working-class voters in Ohio and Hispanic voters in North Carolina. The surveys will be conducted in the days following the election and will cover attitudes toward the candidates, reactions to the results, and the factors that most influenced voters’ choices. The surveys will also look ahead to the upcoming showdown over budget priorities, exploring values and attitudes on promoting economic growth and reducing the deficit. PRRI founder and CEO Robert P. Jones will present the survey results, and Brookings Senior Fellow E.J. Dionne, Jr. will discuss their implications. Melissa Deckman, Washington College, and John Sides, George Washington University, will offer their reactions to the survey and focus group findings as well.

After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121116_american_values_transcript

OIC Head Talks Religion and Politics in Egypt

H.A. Hellyer — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

When Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), visited Cairo a few days ago, I jumped at the opportunity to get his opinion on the current situation in Egypt. In particular, I wanted to get his opinion on some of the fears and challenges facing the country and its people right now: a return to autocracy; relations with the Coptic Christian community, the largest religion minority in Egypt; and the role of religion in government. As the representative of the largest inter-governmental group of majority Muslim population countries, his voice carries considerable diplomatic weight, even if the OIC relies on soft power more than anything else.

İhsanoğlu is a Turkish diplomat and academic, born, raised and educated in Cairo. He is very much a product of Egypt. Upon coming back to Cairo after the 25 January uprising that saw the end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule, he spoke to me in a tone of optimism, cautiously aware of the challenges that lay before Egypt.

In his mind, Egypt remains in a transitional period, shifting from “an autocratic regime, and towards the aspirations of democratic rule”. But during his visit he was clear in his hope for Egypt, the people of which, he was certain, would “never accept the return of autocracy” in any shape or form, or from any political direction – a message for all of Egypt’s current and future politicians.

Beyond the return to autocracy in Egypt, two of the most prominent fears in Egypt are related to religion: the situation of the largest religious demographic minority in Egypt, the Coptic Christians; and religious identity politics. İhsanoğlu seemed quite aware of the historical basis of these issues. Nonetheless, he took a more long-term view towards finding solutions.

As far as he was concerned, the place of Coptic Christians in Egypt is unquestionable. He spoke about a historical state of “modus vivendi” – agreeing to disagree – between Muslims and Copts. Admitting that in the last days of the former regime, Copts faced “significant problems”, İhsanoğlu regarded the previous Pope, Pope Shenouda, as “a man of wisdom, of learning, and an Egyptian patriot”. Egyptian Copts, as far as İhsanoğlu was concerned, are Egyptians who are part and parcel of the Arab world, and should be treated as such, rather than as a foreign element.

Perhaps most interesting, however, was the Secretary General’s view on religious identity politics and secularism in Egypt and the larger Muslim world. Speaking as an individual and a scholar, rather than as a representative of the OIC, he expressed hope that Muslims would draw a line so that “politics does not dominate religion, and religion does not dominate politics”.

He explained that this effort should be based on “mutual respect, as well as mutual non-interference” between Islam as a religion and the Egyptian political order. At the same time, he said, “for Muslims, it is natural for Islam to have an effect on the political and public arenas.” What that effect would be he left open, without providing further elaboration.

Yet he made it clear that religious institutions in Egypt, as elsewhere, would thrive best under “an Anglo-Saxon style of secularism” – a type of secularism in which “religious institutions have autonomy, and a relationship of cooperation with the public sphere, rather than dominating it, or being dominated by it.” That perhaps reflects a subtle trend that is neither akin to the French secularist model that excludes religion from the public sphere, nor a more Islamist preference that refuses to admit the very existence of secularism as a model that Muslims might apply.

It is not all that often one has the opportunity to engage a noted intellectual, academic or a political figure. It is even rarer when the three come together in a single figure. One would hope that Egyptian Muslims would consider these sentiments with regards to minorities and the relationship between religion and state. These topics remain important for Egypt, the Arab region and the wider Muslim world.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Common Ground News

Religion and Political Civility

Peter Mandaville — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Summary:

As communities revise their basic political rules and shape new political institutions, some of the most complex and vexing questions regard religion and what role it should play. On the one hand, there is much to be found in the world’s great religious traditions that strengthens and undergirds citizenship and political civility. Notions of tolerance, compassion, and respect for the rule of law and governing institutions are central to all great faiths.

But difficult issues frequently arise around the question of religion’s role in politics, particularly in the diverse societies that are increasingly the norm in a globalized world. For example, if faith informs public morality, what space is there for those whose religious beliefs are outside the majority—or for non-believers? And while many would agree that religious values can and should infuse political life, the question of whether religious authority has any superior claim to determine or affirm legislation raises a thorny set of issues. What is the appropriate relationship between the state and religious institutions and other faith-based actors? How can the full rights of all citizens—particularly those in the minority—be ensured, and who has the authority to determine the boundaries of citizenship? Given the importance to many of religion and religious values as the fundamental basis for determining right from wrong, what are the respective roles of the state and religious institutions in shaping, implementing, and enforcing both religious norms and secular affairs? Who is authorized to define and speak on behalf of religion? And when, as is inevitable, conflicts do arise over different conceptions of morality, authority, and national priorities, where can we turn to find resources and examples for resolving these disputes judiciously and equitably?

This paper reflects the rich and active discussions that took place on these questions, among others, during the course of the “Long Conversation” on religion, civility, and state-building at the 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum.

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Authors

Peter Mandaville

Compassion: An Urgent Global Imperative

Karen Armstrong — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 16:33:00 -0500

Summary:

At the 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, the Religious Leaders Working Group brought together religious leaders and activists from all over the world to discuss compassion and how to restore it to its rightful place as the test of true spirituality and the heart of religious and moral life. The working group’s participants discussed the Charter for Compassion, written in 2008 by leading activists and thinkers representing six of the major world faiths, and how the group could build a global network of compassionate religious communities. The group decided that it would initially develop a succinct guide to explain what a compassionate synagogue, church, temple, or mosque would look like in the 21st century, making it clear that compassion has nothing to do with pity or sentiment but consists of a principled determination to transcend selfishness and reach out imaginatively and practically to all others—not simply those we find congenial. In September, Karen Armstrong will give the keynote speech at the Islamic Society of North America, and will announce that ISNA has endorsed the Charter and that Imam Mohamed Magid has declared the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center a Compassionate Mosque and will invite all ISNA mosques to do the same.

After we have piloted this scheme, we hope to create an international council of clergy from all faiths, who would bring a truly compassionate and authoritative perspective to world crises and challenges, countering the strident voices of extremism and making the compassionate voice of religion a dynamic, practical, and positive force in our dangerously polarized world. Only then can the faith traditions fulfill one of the chief tasks of our time: to build a global community where people of all ethnicities and ideologies can live together in mutual respect. It is time for religion to become pro-active. As a first step, the group would like to make a two-minute video, filmed and edited by Unity Productions, to make the compassionate ideal more comprehensible and accessible to a still wider audience.

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Karen Armstrong

Developing New Mechanisms to Promote the Charitable Sector

Dean Dilley and Elizabeth Ryan — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Summary:

An important national security priority for every country is preventing the diversion of charitable assets for illegal purposes. At the same time, many Muslim charities and charities operating in Muslim-majority countries now confront significant handicaps in fundraising and in operating overseas. Donors who wish to support such charitable activities face a dilemma when assessing the qualifications of a particular charitable organization in what has been described as “a climate of fear.” Similarly, and in reaction to their own changing regulatory obligations, financial institutions are increasingly risk averse in dealing with Muslim charities.

The working group convened key stakeholders to consider these challenges to philanthropic giving and to develop practical solutions. Among the options considered in this review was the viability of an independent rating or evaluative organization that would produce public reports on individual charitable organizations, assembling purely objective information relevant to prospective donors. This includes, for example, information regarding governance, internal controls, accounting practices, primary donors and grantees, and participation, if any, in any public sector sponsored activities. While this paper attempts to reflect faithfully the discussions of the working group, specific recommendations represent the views of the authors.

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Authors

Dean Dilley
Elizabeth Ryan

British Muslims Split Along Sectarian Lines Over Arab Uprisings

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

For more than a decade I have been studying the community dynamics of Muslim Britons. Their views on the Arab uprisings are intriguing: sectarian fears, disappointments, scepticism, hope and ethnic concerns are all there.

Muslim British community activists have not ignored the Arab uprisings. They could not have. The Arab world is at the heart of the Muslim world.

True, most Muslim Britons do not have Arab ethnic backgrounds, and most have evolved to become essentially "post-Islamist". Post-Islamism, in this sense, means their initial impetus for engaging in political life was from an emotional attachment to Islamism, but they have a secular rationale in the public arena that is not dissimilar from British social conservatives. But many of them have roots in Islamist community organisations and links, if only symbolic ones, to the Muslim Brotherhood.

So even the many Muslim Britons who are post-Islamist are deeply interested in the Islamist project in power, and in the challenges that project finds in Egypt and Tunisia, in particular.

There are, of course, differences of opinion. Many ordinary Muslim Britons of Pakistani descent, for example, now consider Pakistani politics to be utterly hopeless - and instinctively assume that the political state of the Arab world is likewise impervious to constructive change.

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Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The National

Islam: The Long Way to Integration

Jonathan Laurence — Thu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Summary: In an interview with ParisBerlin Magazine, Jonathan Laurence discusses the differences between the French and German Muslim immigrants and the divergent ways in which the peoples and governments of those two nations have responded to the change in their demographics.

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Islam: The Long Way to Integration

Authors

Jonathan Laurence

Publication: ParisBerlin