Brookings: Topics - Political Campaigns

Policy Leadership and the Blame Trap: Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate

R. Kent Weaver — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: This paper is part of the Governance Studies Management and Leadership Initiative.

Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate not just election campaigns in the United States, but the policymaking process as well. And politics dominated by negative messaging (also known as blame-generating) tends to result in policy stalemate. Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative information than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains. Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging in recent years. There are a number of strategies that allow politicians to maneuver around the “blame trap” and avoid policy deadlock in some circumstances, including passing the buck to non-elected bodies and putting in place triggering mechanisms that generate politically unpopular policy changes in the future. All of these strategies have limitations and disadvantages, however, so both blame-generating politics and policy stalemate are likely to be the “new normal” in American politics in the near future.

There are several strategic options for avoiding policy stalemate in a political environment dominated by negative messaging. Each of these options has distinctive advantages and limitations, and risks. None is suitable for all situations, but together they offer some important opportunities to avoid policy stalemate.

Passing the Buck: A first strategy that politicians can use to try to avoid the blame trap is to pass the buck to non-elected bodies—often temporary commissions—to reach deals behind closed doors without the pressure of staking out and defending partisan and ideological positions.
Grand Deals and Circling the Wagons: A related strategy to passing the buck is for Democratic and Republican leaders to negotiate behind closed doors to try to strike a grand deal on an issue like budgets and taxes or immigration, which they then sell jointly to the public and to rank-and-file legislators (“circling the wagons”) as the best deal that is achievable—and better than no deal at all.
Government by Autopilot: Another strategy for making difficult decisions is to set up a procedure under which reaching some trigger (e.g., deficit levels, or Social Security deficits) leads automatically to programmatic adjustments according to a formula set up in the original legislation unless Congress agrees to overturn it.
Feet to the Fire: This strategy starts with the same mechanism as policy by auto-pilot: policymakers set up an automatic mechanism that will trigger politically painful policy changes without politicians themselves pulling the trigger.
Experiment: On some policy issues where parties are divided, it may be possible to try out different approaches to policy before making a firm choice at the national level. This can be done in several different ways. One is to give more authority to states and localities to experiment with new policy options rather than having a uniform national policy.
Executive Action: If a hyper-partisan and divided Congress is unable to break policy stalemates, what about executive action as an alternative? There certainly are some opportunities for breaking stalemate through executive action, as President Obama showed in June 2012 when he suspended deportation of young illegal immigrants who had entered the country illegally.
Compromise: A final strategy for overcoming the blame trap is the oldest and simplest one: politicians can split the difference with their partisan foes and meet them halfway.

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Authors

R. Kent Weaver

Beppe Grillo: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution for Italy’s Democratic Party?

Ruth H. Santini — Mon, 04 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Many aspects of the recent Italian general elections surprised observers and commentators, from the extent to which established political parties such as the center-left Democratic Party and the center-right People of Freedom Party lost consensus across the country (receiving respectively 3.5 million and 6.2 million of votes less than in the previous elections), to the unforeseen success of Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement. Given the dearth of information and media coverage in the run up to the elections of the Five Star Movement, perhaps most surprising was its success. This movement, which is not a party, was only created at the end of 2009 and, running for the first time at the national level, gathered 8 Million votes, equaling one quarter of the electorate. The Five Star Movement is now the largest single group in the lower house.

The Italian establishment as a whole, from the political class, to the main media groups and the economic lobbies, had disregarded Grillo, and often depicted him as a populist, demagogue, enraged and dangerous political figure, without lending him any credibility. Yet the former comedian has in the past few years effectively transformed himself into a media-savvy political entrepreneur. The refusal to engage with Grillo on the personal level has translated into the inability to engage with the issues his movement has consistently waged for: formulating a law against corruption, reducing the costs of the political establishment, adopting models of environmentally sustainable development, defending public goods, creating a more transparent and more efficient public administration. More than anything else, the movement has battled for the moralization of political and economic life and for the primacy of politics vis-à-vis economics. However, rather than recognizing, both instrumentally but also existentially, the issues where convergence would be desirable in the interest of real reforms, the Democratic Party has often demonized Grillo and refrained from distinguishing him from the movement and its campaigns. The strategy of ignoring the wave of discontent, even when it came coupled with pragmatic proposals to deal with public affairs, has backfired and the Democratic Party is, once again, now in a difficult soul-searching phase.

Rather than seeing in such a protest movement (an anti-establishment, albeit not an anti-political movement) an antidote for post-democracy and its illnesses, the Democratic Party has retrenched. It failed to run an electoral campaign, falsely self-confident that the fear of a Berlusconi come-back or a renewal of painful austerity measures by Mario Monti would suffice to scare voters towards its ranks. The party failed to build any kind of narrative articulating the challenges Italy faces as well as pointing out what the light at the end of the tunnel might look like. It likely did so because it assumed that there is no autonomy for politics vis-à-vis economics and its constraints. The Democratic Party fell in the trap of believing that economic imperatives will dictate the pace of changes and reforms and that Italian political decisions will continue be taken elsewhere, be it Brussels or international financial markets.

In voting for Grillo, a quarter of the electorate has chosen a different approach. One where communication is simple, where proposals are advanced, where new ideas are tested, and where getting people involved, in some embryonic form of liquid democracy, is encouraged. Grillo’s voters feel that sovereignty should be exercised independently from Brussels and financial markets. Their starting point is the necessity to react to the rapid shrinking of the middle class which has accelerated since the global financial crisis hit Italy, exacerbating a stagnating political and economic system. The Five Star Movement aims for a resurgence of conscience and will to engage in political activities, at all levels. And therefore it should be an inspiration for traditional political parties, given its effective style of communication, innovative and truly interactive use of social media, the way in which it selects political personnel from civil society, and the issues it chooses to prioritize, emanating from local demands directly affecting civic and public life.

Grillo’s voters, like many other Italians, point to a desire for ”more” and not less politics, closer to them, which is able to listen rather than preach and lecture. They believe that professional politicians need to earn popular respect on the basis of what they deliver, a somehow revolutionary message in 2013 Italy.

Of course, one should not be fooled and forget that having a non-elected leader of a movement whose non-statute was written by only two people and never put to a vote is also not ideal. Yet while the Five Star logo is the property of Grillo and not the movement itself, one should not confuse the founder with its members.

The Five Star Movement has its contradictions, many of which remain to be discovered and brought to life. But much could be learned from the movement which could help revitalize the way in which politics is conducted in Italy. Italy’s traditional parties should embrace the Five Star Movement’s vitality, accepting and endorsing the idea and practice of citizens regularly expressing their dissent, and using protest and pressures to encourage change from within the party system.

Now the Five Star Movement’s “citizen-deputies” will be torn between two opposing objectives, the desire to realize some of the most pressing issues within their platform, and their goal of serving as an “outsider” watchdog designed to denounce the mistakes and corruption of the existing political elites. It is the tension between these two goals that will test the truly democratic nature of the Movement, and the autonomy of its elected representatives vis-à-vis their non-elected leader, Beppe Grillo.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Transatlantic Academy

Italy’s Post-Election Chaos Isn’t What You Think

Carlo Bastasin — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

No parliament, no government, no president of the republic. And now not even a pope. The situation in Italy resembles a house of cards in a perfect storm.

It’s not just a matter of politicians, scenarios and furniture flying all over the place until the storm subsides. The problem is deeper than that. The new Italian Parliament has three minorities that are unable to form a majority. It is a power game in which Pier Luigi Bersani, the electoral winner, is the political loser, and the electoral losers, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and ex-comic Beppe Grillo, are the political winners.

Consider this. Almost half of those Italians who cast their ballots for one of the traditional parties switched their vote this time. You think Americans are fed up with Congress? In Italy, trust in the government stands at 5 percent, and trust in Parliament at 8 percent. The rate of abstentions is high. The party holding the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies -- 54 percent, as required by law -- won the support of just 20 percent of the electorate.

On top of all this, the timeline to form a new government is tight. The Parliament convenes for the first time March 15. Amid all the confusion, the parties must agree within 10 days on the leaders of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Then they have to nominate a prime minister, who must form a government and take an oath in front of the president of the republic. All this before April 15, when the Parliament meets to elect a new president of the republic.

Against Everything

So I can sympathize with those who despair and say Italy has chosen nihilism, or who say, in effect, that Italians voted against everything -- including Europe and austerity, which they had come to believe in before the debt crisis. I understand why people are saying Italy could bring down the whole euro project. But I disagree with them.

Italians remain pro-European, and fewer people than you would suppose are seriously thinking of relinquishing either the euro or the economic-policy commitments that come with it.

Discontent is focused, above all, on taxes. They are among the highest in the euro area. Taxes on business are the highest of any euro member, and they are severely hurting a weakened economy. Italians see excessive taxes mainly as the consequence of bad political management. It’s not that they object to Europe and austerity. Rather, they are angry about the tax increases introduced under the banner of Europe and austerity.

If austerity means fiscal discipline, Italians actually want more of it. This is why New York Times columnist Paul Krugman is wrong to say Italians shunned an intelligent and credible man such as Prime Minister Mario Monti because he was “the proconsul installed by Germany to enforce fiscal austerity on an already ailing economy.”

In Italy’s case, however, the argument about fiscal stimulus just misses the point. A bigger budget deficit wouldn’t do much to stimulate demand, because the real problem is the breakdown in Italy’s supply of credit. From the beginning of the euro crisis three years ago, Italy has seen a faster shrinkage in total credit supply than most euro-area countries, as foreign banks have repatriated their loans. This widespread lack of credit has crushed the private economy. Businesses and households can’t get loans and are cutting investments and consumption at an unprecedented rate.

Effective Answers

Reviving the market for credit is the first job. This would be far more effective than delivering a new fiscal stimulus. In fact, continued budget discipline is vital in ending the credit crunch. The new government must negotiate a deal with the European Union and with the European Central Bank, so that the ECB can support the Italian banks. But this can’t happen unless the ECB is sure that it has a reliable partner in the Italian state and that Italy will remain as fiscally stable as possible.

Italians understand this, and so the political crisis may be a little easier to resolve than many think. Under the pressure of markets, Italian parties are likely to close ranks behind another technical prime minister, just as they did in November 2011 behind Monti. They will nominate someone familiar with financial issues -- some high official at the Bank of Italy, or maybe even Monti himself. They will call it an “institutional government” and ask it to make the political system more honest and functional, reining in the anger and recrimination of the citizens.

It’s a strange way to run a country -- but don’t write off Italy.

Authors

Carlo Bastasin

Publication: Bloomberg

Image Source: © Tony Gentile / Reuters

The Rise of Anti-Politics

Carlo Bastasin — Sun, 24 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: As Italian voters make their way to the polls on February 25, Carlo Bastasin discusses the rise of ‘anti-politics’ and whether the election will be determined by those who vote based on economics or by those who pay greater attention to the personalities of the individual candidates. A translation of the exchange from with Spanish news outlet La Razón appears below. The original article in Spanish is available on the La Razón website.

Q: Do Italians base their votes on economics or are they directed by the images of the candidates?

A: My perception is that economics are going to be decisive. It is a very critical issue that has become an emotional one. The leadership and personalities of the candidates are connected to the economy. Italians have never before voted in the context of a profound economic recession like the one that we have now. GDP has fallen by 7 percent since 2008, industrial capacity by 25 percent and over half a million jobs have been permanently lost. This economic debacle has a high emotional potential to provide motives for indignation and protest. For that reason, the leaders that that express their anger (Grillo) or their optimism (Berlusconi) can benefit more than more rational candidates (Monti).

Q: Why has ‘anti-politics’ emerged so strongly?

A: Berlusconi represents both realities: politics and anti-politics. When he fails as a politician, he promotes anti-political sentiments that he then collects. Thus, he is in a position to “always win,” even when he loses. In any case, considering that his/their resurgence is more fiction than reality. The latest polls do not give a realistic picture of the situation. I am not even sure that Berlusconi will place second after Bersani; he could even be third after Grillo. What is real is the wave of anti-politics.

Authors

Carlo Bastasin

Publication: La Razón

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Costs of a Fixation: After Benghazi

Paul R. Pillar — Thu, 24 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Interest.

There appears to be no end in sight to the fixation on the lethal incident last year in Benghazi, Libya and to the determination to wring as much recrimination from it as possible. The topic demonstrates how much an issue launched and exploited during the heat of an election campaign can continue as a national distraction well after the election has come and gone. One might have thought that Secretary of State Clinton's swan-song Congressional testimony this week would mark the end of this preoccupation, but that now seems unlikely. Anyone with an interest in undermining the political prospects of this once-and-possible-future presidential candidate, or of the administration she has been serving the past four years, has an interest in keeping the issue going.

I addressed last fall the principles that need to be borne in mind when thinking about an incident such as the one in Benghazi. I am pleased to note that the director of national intelligence—who does not have a dog in the partisan political fight that has become a subtext of this issue—agrees with my observations enough to have incorporated them explicitly into a speech. The principles remain valid.

The State Department's accountability review board has completed its study of the incident, has issued its report, and has had all of its recommendations accepted by the secretary of state. If this does not bring closure to the matter for anyone who has a straightforward, non-political, non-recrimination-driven concern about the incident, it is hard to imagine what would or should bring such closure.

Given the shape that the preoccupation and associated rhetoric about this incident has taken, we also should note that the fixation on it has a couple of longer term costs.

One of them comes under the heading of the perfect being the enemy of the good. The zero-incident standard that is implied by much of the rhetoric—and that is implied by the discourse that habitually follows many terrorist incidents—risks impeding government operations in ways that outweigh whatever good can be done by pursuing the unattainable goal of zero incidents. In the case of the events in Libya, the impeding has to do with the unavoidable trade-off between diplomats and other foreign-based U.S. officials doing their jobs energetically and effectively, and keeping those same officials secure from those who might do them harm. The longer and louder are the recriminations about Benghazi, the more that future secretaries of state and those who work for them will respond by low-risk approaches that keep their people relatively safe behind the high walls of fortress-like embassies, at the expense of doing their jobs effectively. The resulting damage to U.S. foreign policy can take many forms, including damage to counterterrorism.

Another cost concerns the common-knowledge narrative that seems to be emerging about what led to the attack in Benghazi. The narrative is simply that a terrorist group plotted the attack and that other circumstances, including an inflammatory anti-Islam video that was receiving much attention at the time, had nothing to do with it. That narrative is incorrect as well as damaging, notwithstanding all the laborious reconstructions about this particular attack not growing out of a popular demonstration. Terrorist attacks rarely grow out of popular demonstrations, but popular anger has a great deal to do with stimulating terrorism, providing a permissive environment for it, and increasing the pool of angry people who may resort to or be recruited into terrorism. Anti-U.S. terrorism correlates with people being angry about things associated with America, including unofficial things such as the offensive video and official policies and actions. Failure to understand that connection encourages the unproductive view that countering terrorism is just a matter of eradicating a fixed roster of terrorist groups; making that view the basis for policy increases the chance of more Americans becoming victims of terrorism.

Authors

Paul R. Pillar

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Esam Al-Fetori / Reuters

The 2012 Election: What Happened, What Changed, What it Means

William A. Galston — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

William Galston analyzes the political backdrop against which the 2012 general campaign was waged, offering fuller context into voter attitudes, the composition of the winning coalition, and the events, economic realities, policy and ideological issues that shaped the election and President Obama’s eventual victory.

On November 6, 2012, Barack Obama concluded his reelection campaign with a somewhat more comfortable margin than many had been predicting even a week earlier, Galston observes. So, what happened and what does the 2012 election mean in a broader political and historical context?

Galston asserts that what transpired between Labor Day of 2011 and Election Day in 2012 was one of the more noteworthy political comebacks in recent American history. In isolation, Galston argues, the modest improvement in unemployment might not have sufficed to ensure an Obama reelection. Instead, the president and his senior political advisors planned and executed one of the best-run reelection campaigns ever, writes Galston. They decided on a theme—fairness—and a strategy—using policies and events to mobilize key constituencies. And they waged a near-flawless tactical battle, including the decision to spend the summer—and much of their war-chest—characterizing Mitt Romney as a heartless plutocrat. Through the fall, economic optimism rose, as did the enthusiasm of the president’s core supporters.

The paper’s other highlights include:

Data analysis of the 2012 electorate, final vote tallies, vote share by candidate and trends in the 2012 swing states, including a section devoted to what transpired in Ohio.
Examination into demographic and attitudinal changes that paved the way for an Obama reelection, including the rise of voter engagement and mobilization of women, Latino, African American and millennial voters.
Discussion of how these structural changes in the American electorate, while important to the outcome, can be over-emphasized when interpreting the 2012 election.
Analysis into how this election did little, if anything, to decrease political dysfunction and polarization in Washington, an unfortunate trend that continues to threaten U.S. governance.

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Authors

William A. Galston

Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters

Drafting the Constitution: Defining Post-Revolutionary Egypt

Wed, 14 Nov 2012 11:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 14, 2012
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On November 14, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion on the drafting of the new Egyptian constitution. Speakers discussed the challenges facing Egypt’s Constituent Assembly and the possibility of producing a new constitution before the current deadline of December 12, 2012. The panel featured Amr Darrag, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Constituent Assembly and head of the Freedom and Justice Party’s Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador Hesham Youssef, Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League and formerly head of Amr Moussa’s 2012 presidential campaign, and Hossam Bahgat, executive director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business, and media communities.

Salman Shaikh, Hossam Bahgat and Amr Darrag

Amr Darrag began by joking that he had been hoping for a break from speaking about Egypt’s constitution after six months of discussing it with the Constituent Assembly, on television, and even with his family. Acquiescing to what he called his “fate,” though, he chose to focus on the positives of the constitutional drafting process. Public tensions aside, Darrag said that the constitution was the “fruit of [Egypt’s] revolution” and that for the first time Egyptians felt they had a role in shaping their country. He said that he made a point of sending thanks to anyone who submitted an idea or suggestion to the process and shared the story of a man who, when he was thanked, burst into tears – he said that it was the first time in his life that he had submitted something to an Egyptian government body and felt that it was taken seriously.

Darrag acknowledged that the process of issuing new and amended drafts of the constitution could sometimes be confusing, but said that this was “natural” when trying to maintain an open, transparent process. He minimized the issue of the Assembly’s makeup, saying that it was something that they had “gotten past.” Darrag personally objected to the classification of the body’s members as “Islamist” or “civil,” saying that, like most Egyptians, he considered himself liberal and sympathetic to social justice, not just “Islamist.” He also objected to the same sort of lens being applied to the constitution itself. He questioned why Islam was reduced to the constitution’s Article 2 and a few other articles – as if Islam had nothing to say about human rights and anti-corruption.

Darrag said that there was a diversity of opinion within the Assembly, but that it did not represent fundamental divisions over content. Instead, he said, public disputes among Assembly members essentially amounted to political and electoral gamesmanship. Members (Islamist and non-Islamist alike) would agree on a given article inside the Assembly, then go to the media claiming that the same article will be a “disaster” or that it will “bring Egypt back to the Dark Ages.” He emphasized that, in the end, Assembly members were public servants – they were volunteers who had taken on their responsibility for the sake of their country. Although there were disagreements on “details,” difference on the “pillars” of the constitution was minimal. Listing key areas of consensus, Darrag said that all Egyptians (again, Islamist and non-Islamist) agree on the principles of sharia as a basis for legislation; they agree on guaranteeing individual freedoms to the maximum extent possible, even if they might disagree on some details; and they agree on a division of powers between the branches of government.

Darrag set out his goal as arriving at the best constitution possible and the maximum amount of consensus, even if nobody would be 100 percent satisfied with the result. The Assembly had put in place a mechanism to amend the constitution at a later date, and possible five- or ten-year restrictions on amendments had been struck. For the sake of political and economic stability, he said, Egypt must move forward.

Amb. Hesham Youssef and Salman Shaikh

For his part, Ambassador Hesham Youssef lamented the atmosphere of “deep polarization” surrounding the drafting process. He emphasized that the approach to writing the constitution should have been different from the start: it should have been one of reconciliation, not confrontation; inclusion, not the exclusion of a dissenting minority; and consensus, instead of what now seems close to an imposition. Without naming specific factions, Youssef complained of groups who were intent on passing the constitution “by hook or by crook,” believing that their majority allowed them to move in their preferred direction. Outlining the key issues that he felt the constitution must address – including defining a national identity, laying out the people’s rights and freedoms, and establishing a division of powers that included checks and balances – Youssef contended that this constitution had fallen short on all of these points.

Youssef complained of a few damaging perceptions of the drafting process, many of which he endorsed. First, that the constitution has been written in the context of a sort of battle between those who support sharia and those who oppose it; this perception, Youssef said, was “not true.” Second, that time will not be enough. Youssef said that the constitution is not a law that can be changed by parliament; rather, it requires a lengthy and complicated process characterized by precision, clarity, and consistency. He said that there will not be enough time to discuss the document in the Constituent Assembly himself, much less have a society-wide debate, and that even some close to the Muslim Brotherhood believe the constitution will be “half-baked.” Third, that a sense of confusion has prevailed throughout the process. While he agreed with Darrag on the transparency of the process, he said that the poor flow of information had led to a situation in which Egyptians heatedly debated certain articles, only to discover that they were already struck from a later draft. Perhaps most damagingly, Youssef said that many are of the opinion that the constitution in its current form does not reflect the spirit of the revolution. He would have preferred a constitution of which Egyptians could have been proud all over the world, not the bare minimum of what can be achieved today.

Youssef also resisted Darrag’s contention that real disagreements were minor, pointing to fundamental differences on the role of sharia, freedom to worship, the rights of women, and questions related to the balance of powers. He also pointed to serious objections from parties including Egypt’s judges, women’s groups, military, liberals, and even the country’s Writers’ Syndicate. He said that a novel oversight role for the religious scholars of al-Azhar University and a role for the military that barely differed from the November 2011 “Selmi Document” were among issues that aroused concern and had to be changed.

Hossam Bahgat sharply objected to Darrag’s description of the constitution and the approach of treating the constitution as a “bitter pill” to be swallowed in the name of stability. He emphasized that constitution is, in fact, a crucial step in Egypt’s democratic transition and that the drafting process will define the legacy of President Muhammad Morsi. As such, Bahgat said, the process should be given as much time as it requires. Though he expressed disappointment that the drafting had not been an opportunity for national debate and healing, he said that he is pleased to see the FJP and President Morsi at least recognize that the constitutional deadlock represents an escalating crisis. Those who had met with Morsi, however, had all left saying that the president’s priority was stability, and Bahgat said that the meetings had not yet produced a way out of the crisis.

Bahgat decried the drafting process as “severely mismanaged.” He described the Constituent Assembly itself as a “bundle of birth defects.” He traced the process of forming the Assembly first through the Egyptian parliament’s failure to establish objective criteria for participants in the body’s first iteration, then through the “sad turning point” of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces-brokered 50-50 split between Islamists and non-Islamists. That moment, Bahgat said, was when the process “broke beyond repair,” as the FJP and the Nour Party took 50 seats and left the remaining 50 to be divided among al-Azhar, the Coptic Church, representatives of state institutions, and others. Bahgat complained that the resulting body was neither an expert body nor a nationally representative one. Moreover, it was similarly stacked with parliamentarians, and thus vulnerable to the same challenges to its legality. After its formation, the second Assembly then used its first meetings to establish undemocratic rules of procedure, choosing a 57 percent threshold for agreement only because the majority knew it had 57 ready votes. Bahgat relayed the complaints of Assembly members about a lack of transparency even within the Assembly itself (including drafts that would change inexplicably after leaving committees), as well as his own disappointing experience submitting his organization’s suggestions.

Bahgat summed up his take on the constitution’s latest draft by saying that if deposed President Hosni Mubarak had agreed to reform the Egyptian system slightly, this is the sort of system he would have produced. The draft has improved on the 1971 constitution in some respects, but in others it goes backwards and is “pre-revolutionary.” Bahgat painted several different scenarios (all negative) for how the drafting process might go forward, but said that, in sum, he does not think this constitution can result in long-term stability. Noting the procedural hurdles that make it almost impossible to amend the constitution, Bahgat ended on a deeply pessimistic note.

Following presentations from each of the panelists the floor was opened to questions. Youssef, when asked about the specific articles to which he objected, provided several examples from what he said were 15 to 20 problematic articles. He emphasized that while 100 percent agreement would be impossible, the real goal of the process was the “maximum amount of consensus.” He said that the most recent draft was “not a disaster,” but pointed to the need for more work towards agreement.

When Bahgat was asked about his objection to parliamentarians’ participation in the Assembly; he said that he had no objection to that per se, but rather to the failure to set any objective criteria for nomination to the body. He went on to discuss how the Assembly’s formation opened it to legal challenge and how the process had been “hijacked” by senior legal experts and judges, preventing Egypt from benefiting from more modern constitutional thinking. Darrag, in turn, responded to criticisms of the Assembly’s makeup, saying that the nomination process was judged to be better than more democratic elections – after all, elections would likely have produced a body just as Islamist-heavy as the country’s new parliament.

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Drafting the Constitution: Defining Post-Revolutionary Egypt

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First Step in Ending D.C. Dysfunction

Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 12:31:00 -0500

After the sound and the fury, the public disdain for government — particularly for Congress — the high stakes and looming fiscal disaster and $6 billion, we end up where we began — with Barack Obama in the White House, Democrats with a modest majority in the Senate, and Republicans retaining control of the House.

It appears we are back to the same ingredients that produced the least productive and most destructive Congress in memory, whose public approval plummeted to historic lows. That reality is reinforced by House Speaker John Boehner’s claim of a mandate for House Republicans even as Obama won a sweeping electoral victory for a second term.

But appearances can be deceiving. In this case, they are.

The Republican approach for Obama’s first term was simple — use every available tool of obstruction to hamper and delegitimize his presidency. They opposed anything and everything he proposed, even policies they had recently embraced. The GOP used the filibuster to defeat, obstruct or discredit his every initiative. They took the debt ceiling hostage after their 2010 election victory, which lowered America’s credit rating and slowed the economic recovery, and gave us the “fiscal cliff.” They killed every serious effort in Congress to strengthen the economy, increase jobs and pass a balanced package of deficit reduction and debt stabilization.

Read the full piece at Reuters »

Authors

Thomas E. Mann
Norman J. Ornstein

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

On Election Day, A New American Mainstream

William H. Frey — Thu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Tuesday’s election might someday be seen as a historic turning point in American politics: the last time a major party candidate could hope to win the presidency with a campaign aimed directly at the nation’s “mainstream” white population.

If that was Mitt Romney’s strategy, he succeeded wildly, gaining a nearly unprecedented Republican vote advantage over Democrats among whites, 59 percent to 39 percent.

In the end though, he lost largely by ignoring the rising clout of the country’s minority population, including blacks, Asian Americans and especially Hispanics.

The failure to reach out more to these groups went a long way toward costing him the presidency, leading to losses in rapidly growing swing states like Nevada, Colorado, Virginia, Florida, and almost North Carolina—states that that once stood squarely within the GOP’s Sun Belt wheelhouse. In each of these states, through enthusiastic turnout or stronger support, Hispanics made bigger contributions to Obama’s election than in 2008.

Romney’s blind spot was Obama’s strength. He continued his 2008 strategy of expanding the Democratic base in growing regions, including the Southeast and Mountain West, and among select demographic groups—including young people, college graduates and single women—after two elections of relative stagnation.

Yet, the part of this coalition that will bring its longest run benefit to the Democrats is the strong appeal to minorities, which Obama carried by a margin of roughly 80 percent in the past two elections.

That minorities accounted for a historic high (28 percent) of voters in Tuesday’s elections had much to do with his popular vote advantage. Minority representation will continue as millennials, whose eligible voters are 39 percent minority, grow older. More pronounced will be the effect of U.S.-born children, 46 percent minority (including 23 percent Hispanics), become voting age citizens.

Yet, as much as these trends hold future advantages, Democrats may also be developing their own blind spot in failing to cultivate greater support among whites, including those who older, married, and without college educations. The mere 39 percent support Obama received from whites on Tuesday was the lowest for a Democrat since 1992, when third party candidate Ross Perot drew votes away from both Bill Clinton and Republican George H. W. Bush; and the 20 point marginal loss to Republicans was the biggest since 1984 when Walter Mondale lost to Ronald Reagan.

Some of this widening white deficit can be attributed to extremely poor showings in states that are well outside Democratic reach, such as Mississippi and Alabama with Republican margins of 79 and 69 points respectively. Still, most states in regions where comparisons could be made showed worse Democratic support among whites on Tuesday than in the previous election. Democrats did worse among white demographic groups, including white millennials who switched from Democratic support in 2008 to GOP support (though overall millennials still favored Obama).

Of course, whites matter and, in fact, made a difference in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin where more modest Republican margins in the 5-17 percent range allowed strong black minority turnout to win those states for Obama. These are areas with a union tradition among working class whites, and where Romney’s personal appeal was not particularly strong. They are also relatively “white” states. So any reduction in Republican support will have a big impact and allow enthusiastic minority support for Democrats to triumph.

Similarly, reduced white margins will put in play previously safe Republican states in the Sun Belt. This was the case in 2008 when North Carolina landed in the Democratic column. Yet this time its increased white Republican margin put the Tar Heel State out of reach. Virginia, a state with a substantial northern born white population, kept its Republican margins lean this time, making it a continued Democratic player.

More fast-growing states in the Southeast and Mountain West still lie in the province of Republicans (think Texas, Georgia, and Arizona), but their changing demography, coupled with greater Democratic appeal to whites, will gradually change this (witness Florida, Nevada and Colorado). Until those shifts occur, the mainstays of Democratic support will be mostly slow growing states in the industrial Midwest, New England and the urban coasts—with many of them largely white.

While it is true that demography is on the Democrats side long term, they cannot count on minorities alone to drive their train to victory in the next presidential cycle or two.

It’s possible they dodged a bullet this time because of a Republican strategy which almost ignored minority interests. Because the most racially diverse part of the population is not yet old enough to vote and because voter participation is still highest among mostly white, older people (persons over age 45 cast 54 percent of Tuesday’s votes), Democrats will have to cater more to whites. On the other side of the aisle, Republicans will have to open their doors to Hispanics and other minorities as they become part of the new American “mainstream.”

Authors

William H. Frey

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Results of the 2012 Elections: A Live Web Chat with Thomas Mann

Wed, 07 Nov 2012 12:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 7, 2012
12:30 PM - 1:00 PM EST

Online Only
The Brookings Institution

Washington, DC

On November 7, millions of Americans voted to reelect President Obama and the 113th Congress. The results of the elections will have a profound impact on the nation’s future course in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres, and also provide insight into the American electorate. What did Election Day tell us about the issues that influenced voters’ decisions? What do the results tell us about the priorities of the American electorate? What can the nation expect from the next presidential term?

Brookings expert Tom Mann took your questions about the outcomes in a live web chat moderated by Vivyan Tran of POLITICO. Read a transcript of the chat below.

Vivyan Tran: Just a reminder that today's web chat with Thomas Mann starts at 12:30. Feel free to start submitting questions.

12:29 Comment from J. Atkinson: So Nate Silver was right. Can you foresee a future where elections are so accurately predicted there's little left to surprise us on election night?

12:35 Thomas Mann: Nate Silver provides a very useful compilation of national and state polls in a broader statistical model that provides an unbiased reading of where the race stands during the course of the campaign. It actually should reduce all the hype about individual polls and permits journalists to provide less punditry and more reporting and analysis of the states of the election and what is likely to happen after the results are in under difference scenarios. Cheers to Nate and to Mark and his team at pollster.com.

12:35 Comment from Ben: Given that this was one of the most expensive elections in history, do you think that SuperPACs actually had a real affect?

12:38 Thomas Mann: There must be a lot of donors' remorse among those recruited by Karl Rove and his colleagues to pony up big bucks for the campaign. Seldom has so much been spent for so little. Maybe this experience will reduce the demand for Super PACs but I doubt it. Many serious problems of access and influence remain.

12:38 Comment from ByungWoo Bae: What is the most urgent priority of President Obama's second term?

12:40 Thomas Mann: He has already identified his first priority: to deal with the fiscal cliff and the need to reduce deficits and stabilize debt by adopting a balanced program of tax increases and spending cuts.

12:40 Comment from Justin: What should we expect of Mitt Romney now? What do you think his plans will be?

12:41 Thomas Mann: I suspect his life in politics is over, at least in elective politics. He is an intelligent man and will find much to occupy his interest and attention in the years ahead.

12:42 Comment from Ally: Obama won the Hispanic vote by a wider margin than in 2008, and kept Florida, New Mexico and Colorado blue. Given that Hispanics are the largest demographic active on immigration issues, do you think this will push Congress to further reform immigration policy in the next four years?

12:44 Thomas Mann: Yes I do. Republicans must realize they will fall into long-term minority status unless they begin to fashion policies that appeal to the growing nonwhite population. Obama is committed to introducing comprehensive immigration reform and prospects for its passage have improved.

12:44 Comment from Helena Mader (Brazil): Does the Republican Party need to reshape its message, review its values in order to communicate better to certain demographic groups? - What does the near future hold for Mitt Romney? - May more conservative tendencies, such as the Tea Party, find fertile ground to dominate Republican policy making?

12:47 Thomas Mann: Communication is not their problem. A fixation on cutting taxes under any circumstances, limiting government, and resisting the interests of major segments of the electorate must give way to a more tolerant and problem-solving orientation. As the economy improves, the Tea Party will fade in importance within the GOP.

12:47 Comment from Letisha: Is it at all worrisome that Obama won with less electoral votes and popular support than in 2008?

12:49 Thomas Mann: No. It is amazing that he did as well as he has, winning all of the swing states except for North Carolina, amassing 332 electoral votes, seeing his party actually gain seats in the Senate, all in the context of a deeply polarized party and a very difficult economic recovery. In 2008 he was the challenger during an economic crisis opposing a very unpopular president.

12:49 Comment from Abigail: Can either party claim any kind of mandate from last night's results? If not, is there any likelihood of movement in Congress on crucial issues, like the fiscal cliff?

12:54 Thomas Mann: Mandates are not meaningful in the context of deep partisan polarization. Obama and the Democrats won a significant victory in 2008 but it won them no support at all among Republicans in Congress. The politics of dealing with the fiscal cliff and deficit/debt problems are difficult but manageable. But don't look to the public to provide the energy in Washington. The voters have done their job by returning Obama for a second term and punishing the Republicans for their reckless obstruction.

12:54 Comment from Marcus: Does this election change anything? Will gridlock get better?

12:57 Thomas Mann: No consensus between the parties is in sight after the election and polarization been exacerbated, not diminished. Nonetheless, the President has some opportunities for breaking through the gridlock, partly because of his new negotiating advantage with the expiration of tax cuts, partly because some Senate Republicans are tired of simply obstructing whatever the president proposes.

12:57 Comment from Marcus: Do you think the Obama administration will become more aggressive in changing the outcome without re-election fears?

12:59 Thomas Mann: I think more aggressiveness in the 112th Congress would not have made any difference. The situation now calls for both engagement and confrontation with Congress. I think Obama will not shrink from playing hardball when it might serve a constructive purpose.

12:59 Comment from James: Do you think that bipartisan cooperation will improve or worsen under the new administration?

1:01 Thomas Mann: If bipartisanship means both parties working cooperatively, don't expect it. But I think there is a possibility of some Republicans in the Senate and House being pulling into construction negotiations.

1:01 Vivyan Tran: Thanks for the questions everyone, see you next week.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121107_election_day

Communications Lessons from the 2012 Presidential Election

Darrell M. West — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 13:06:00 -0500

The 2012 presidential election will go down in history as America’s most expensive campaign. With Obama and Romney each spending over $1 billion, there were record expenditures on campaign advertising plus contrasting uses of digital technology. Yet not all strategies worked equally well. Some approaches were more effective than others so it is important to learn the communications lessons for future races.

1) Early Advertising Frames the Narrative. Obama sought to replay Clinton’s 1996 strategy of winning the race early. He framed the race in the Summer as a choice between fairness versus tax cuts for the rich. Using attacks on Romney’s finance background at Bain Capital and failure to disclose tax returns, and GOP proposals to cut income taxes by 20 percent, Democrats characterized Romney as a rich and out-of-touch businessman who had little understanding of the economic plight of ordinary Americans. By the fall, many voters believed Romney would protect the rich while Obama would help the middle class.

2) Candidates Can Save Money by Buying Ads in Advance. Romney paid significantly more than Obama for his advertisements and therefore got less bang for the dollar. During October, according to Kantar/CMAG data, Obama ran 160,000 commercials costing $400 million versus 140,000 for Romney costing $500 million. The Republican strategy of waiting until late to place its commercials created great inefficiencies in ad expenditures. In some states such as Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin, Republicans outspent Democrats by three-to-two, but reached fewer people. And in places such as Florida, Obama’s ads reached 20 percent more viewers. Based on the Wesleyan Media Project, Obama spent $265 million on 503,255 ads in 63 markets with an average cost of $528 per spot. Romney devoted $105 million on 190,784 commercials in 78 markets at a cost of $552 per advertisement, or about 5 percent more on average.

3) Data Analytics Triumph Over Intuition. The candidates employed “A/B” web ad testing whereby they ran two versions of the same commercial online and tracked viewing, liking, and sharing to see which advertisement worked better. Through data analytics, they brought “experiment-informed programs” to the ad wars. Rather than guessing what works, they tracked actual behavior and saw how many webviews, likes, and sharing with friends took place.

4) Mobile Technology is King. Forty-four percent of Americans own smartphones and 83 percent of them are registered to vote, according to the Pew Research Center. People receive news through handheld devices and this gives people instant access to information at their fingertips. Both presidential candidates put great effort into configuring their websites for mobile use and communicating to mobile devices.

5) Social Media and Search Advertising Are Gaining in Importance. Obama spent about 10 percent of his advertising budget on digital outreach through Facebook, Google, and Bing, which was considerably higher than Romney. This allowed the campaign to engage in highly targeted outreach and reach people beyond the traditional electorate. This expanded the Democratic base and gave the President an advantage in certain states.

6 ) Twitter Allows People to Evaluate the Candidates and Democratize Political Commentary. During the party conventions, Twitter became a major part of the online conversation. Around 9.5 million tweets were sent during the week of the Democratic convention, compared to 7 million during the Republican gathering. President Obama’s acceptance speech generated the most traffic, with 52,756 tweets per minute, followed by Michelle Obama (28,000 tweets per minute), Bill Clinton (22,087 tweets per minute), Joe Biden (17,932 tweets per minute), Mitt Romney (14,289 tweets per minute), Marco Rubio (8,937 tweets per minute), Clint Eastwood (7,044 tweets per minute), and Paul Ryan (6,669 tweets per minute). Observers no longer have to wait for professional commentators to judge speech performance or debates. Social media allow ordinary folks to judge performance during the course of actual events.

7) Tweets Are the New Battleground. Obama advisor Axelrod sometimes engaged in Twitter wars with Romney’s strategists. For example, in January, Romney’s site tweeted “More Americans have lost their jobs under @BarackObama than any president in modern history.” Shortly thereafter, Axelrod responded with a tweet saying “@MittRomney A picture’s worth a thousand misleading words. This chart tells the story (with a link to a Bureau of Labor Statistics table showing 22 months of job growth).” Eric Fehrstrom, a senior Romney strategist responded “@davidaxelrod Sometimes you don’t need a picture to tell a story. The numbers speak for themselves – 1.7 million jobs lost under Obama”. Axelrod replied “@EricFehrn Dude, none of my business, but shouldn’t you be in debate prep instead of trying to explain yourself to me?”

8) Tweets Can Backfire. Sometimes, the rapidity of the Twitter wars got strategists in trouble. After former Commerce Secretary John Bryson had a series of car accidents in Los Angeles over the Summer, Crossroads co-founder Karl Rove tweeted “How does @CommerceSec have 3 car crashes in 5 minutes and alcohol NOT be involved? #Skills”. However, after doctors revealed that Bryson’s aberrant behavior had resulted from a brain seizure, Rove apologized for the incorrect inference and took down the snide comment.

9) In-House Communications Provide the Greatest Control. Obama’s organization built a large, in-house operation that was well-integrated into its overall strategy. It brought experts aboard who specialized in online outreach, social media mobilization, and data mining. The campaign also developed a website dashboard that allowed field organizers to enter data based on phone calls, home visits, and event attendance. Through Twitter and Facebook, it created a comprehensive data base with detailed voter profiles, which it could use to turnout people for events or from whom they could raise money. In contrast, the Romney organization did not have a lot of time to build its own digital campaign. After a bruising primary campaign that went well through the Spring, the GOP nominee out-sourced its data management and social media outreach activities using outside vendors. This is an expensive approach to communications and provides limited control over messaging.

10) Early Voting Means You Can’t Save All the Dirt for End of the Campaign. An estimated 35 percent of Americans cast their ballots before election day. This means candidates no longer can save their best or dirtiest appeals for the closing week of the campaign. Politicians need to understand that people are deciding their votes well in advance and they must communicate clearly and effectively throughout the campaign.

Authors

Darrell M. West

Republicans: In Victory or Defeat

John Hudak — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 10:11:00 -0500

Regardless of the results of today's election, the Republican establishment will argue the party must move rightward and reinforce its most conservative values. True partisans will push for identical responses whether Governor Romney enters the White House or retirement. This reaction will not strengthen the GOP but hinder its future viability.

A Romney Win

If Governor Romney beats President Obama, Republicans will frame the result as a transcendent defeat of conservatism over New Deal-style liberalism. Policymakers, donors, and party activists will urge the swift replacement of existing fiscal, social, and regulatory policies. They will claim that Romney’s win—no matter the margin—signals a nation heartily embracing the most extreme of Republican values. The reaction will be to conflate a win and a mandate.

Four years ago, President Obama confused the two. He won the White House by a substantial margin. He grabbed a larger percentage of the popular vote than any candidate in 20 years and grew his party’s Senate majority to be filibuster-proof. The perceived mandate to pass legislation such as the Affordable Care Act overestimated support and underestimated backlash. The irony is that Republicans should learn from Obama in designing a legislative strategy. Yet, they won’t. They will repeat many of the same mistakes and likely in grander fashion.

A Romney victory will not signal an American public ready for Republican extremism, much like the 2008 Obama victory did not signal readiness for Democratic extremism. Americans will not elect Romney because of a hunger for policies that further isolate women, Latinos, and young voters. They will elect Romney because they want a pragmatic leader who will address the nation’s most pressing problems. However, if the Tea Party reads the tealeaves, pragmatism will be thoroughly absent and more extreme policies will abound.

A strong president could prevent—or at least moderate—this rightward march. Unfortunately for Governor Romney and the future of his party, he will be powerless to stop it. The Republican base is already skeptical of Romney, and based on his prior Senate campaign and gubernatorial record, this concern is justified. Conservatives will go to the polls on Tuesday and cast ballots for Romney not because they adore him or even trust him, but because he is better than their alternative. As a result, Romney will find himself in a difficult position.

If a President Romney sought to moderate policy, the party would revolt. If he worked to build bridges with Latinos and women by relaxing the party line on immigration and social issues, the party would revolt. If he dared incorporate compromise into his dealings with Democrats, the party would revolt. Moderate Mitt will face a 2016 primary challenge, and as a result, the former Massachusetts Governor has no choice but to be a “severely conservative” president.

A Romney Loss

If Governor Romney loses on Tuesday, the party’s reaction will be stinging. They will not blame conservative principles, the isolation of large portions of the American electorate, or the inability to convince voters of a suitable plan for economic recovery. Instead, they will blame Moderate Mitt for the loss.

Some in the party have preemptively pointed fingers at Hurricane Sandy to explain a loss. This argument will be fleeting. Ultimately, the party will claim their mistake was nominating a man who lacked truly conservative bona fides—a candidate who once supported gay rights, abortion rights, and universal health care.

A Romney loss will ignite passion within the GOP to move ever rightward. Never again will the most vocal in the party settle for a moderate candidate. The path to Republican presidential success will not be to redefine its appeal, but to double down. Jon Huntsman will not be the path forward, Rand Paul will. Moderates who can appeal to women and Latinos, like Susana Martinez, will not be seen as the future; they will be viewed as the problem.

In the immediate aftermath of a second Obama term, Republicans will do some soul-searching. That search may come up empty. Rather than changing with a changing nation, the Republican Party will reflect the proverbial definition of insanity. A Republican party that is obstinate will watch as states like Arizona and eventually Texas become swing states. They will also stand witness to formerly red states like Virginia and North Carolina trending bluer.

The Republican Party is not doomed. It will not disappear nor divide. It will come to grips with the realities of a changing society. It will learn that a changing electoral map will work against them in the future—no matter the outcome of the 2012 election. In time, they will realize their path to survival.

November 2012 will not be that time, whether Mr. Romney goes to Washington or back to Boston.

Authors

John Hudak

Obama Versus Romney: The Cost of Higher Education

Beth Akers — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Higher education, with its climbing costs, has been a high priority issue for both presidential candidates. Fellow Beth Akers says the election day winner needs to make good on his campaign promises to keep the nation competitive.

Video

Obama Versus Romney: The Cost of Higher Education

Authors

Beth Akers

What Polling Really Tells Us

John Hudak — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Pollsters have spent months monitoring every nuance of the presidential contest between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. If the polls are to be believed, says Fellow John Hudak, then we already know who the likely winner will be

Video

What Polling Really Tells Us

Authors

John Hudak

Women and the Economy: Key Election Issues

Elisabeth Jacobs — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The anemic American economy has had a preeminent role in the presidential campaign dialogue. Both candidates have railed about spending, entitlements and taxes and now that election day is here, it’s time to see whose words will resonate with voters, notes Fellow Elisabeth Jacobs.

Video

Women and the Economy: Key Election Issues

Authors

Elisabeth Jacobs

Campaign Platforms: What the Candidates Failed to Address

Philip A. Wallach — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

With such a heavy focus on the economy during this campaign season, Fellow Philip Wallach says the candidates missed the opportunity to address other critically important issues.

Video

Campaign Platforms: What the Candidates Failed to Address

Authors

Philip A. Wallach