Brookings: Topics - Peacekeeping and Conflict Management

65 Years After 'Catastrophe,' Palestinians Have Little to Cheer About

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On May 15, the Palestinians will commemorate 65 years of their “Nakba” – “the Catastrophe.” This is how they describe 1948, which saw the destruction of Palestinian society, 750,000 Palestinians forced from their homes, and over 450 Palestinian towns wiped off the map. Today, there are over 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations’ UNRWA. But while 1948 was a terrible trauma for the collective Palestinian memory, the reality is that it was only the beginning of a long journey of displacement, dispossession, and exile. The real Nakba is ongoing, and the Palestinian people live it on a daily basis both inside and outside the Palestinian territories. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry throws himself into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, we have to ask: Will his efforts bring this human tragedy a step closer to the end? Or only make it worse?

On a recent trip to Lebanon, I made sure to visit the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. While under control of the Israeli army that occupied Beirut in 1982, approximately 800 to 3,500 Palestinian refugees were massacred at the hands of Christian militias. In the camps today, the bitter reality of the Palestinian refugees’ life in exile is on full display: an enormous mass grave in the camps’ center holds the victims of 1982 massacre. It is a daily reminder to the refugees of their continuing human tragedy.

The Palestinians in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee camp have hardly been spared the bitterness of displacement and dispossession. Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the estimated 150,000 Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk have reportedly been subjected to terror, horror, and murder of all kinds. Many have fled the camp to become “double refugees” in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Um Mazen, one of these twice-displaced told the Financial Times, “It’s the Nakba of Yarmouk.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, too, have their share of Nakba. An Israeli policy of collective punishment has left 1.7 million Palestinians trapped in a besieged Gaza, the world’s largest prison. In the West Bank, the modern-day Nakba can be seen in continued settler violence, settlement expansion, and a dividing wall that encroaches on Palestinian land and, in many cases, deprives people of their livelihoods. This is in addition, of course, to the many Palestinians of Jerusalem who lost the right to return home after living only a few years abroad.

Against this grim backdrop, Kerry has made a public commitment to bring peace to the region through his intensive personal diplomacy. But while it may be too early to pass judgment on his initiative, the traditional American approach to this conflict has been predictable – and unworkable. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, suggested ending the agony of Palestinians refugees’ exile by sending them to…Chile and Argentina.

As Edward Abington told me, Arafat urged President Bill Clinton to ask Benjamin Netanyahu to stop or at least delay the construction of the Har Homa colony – a colony that threatened the collapse of the entire peace process. Abington – former U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem and the key U.S. contact with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1996 – said that Arafat repeatedly entreated Clinton, but to no avail. Finally, Clinton is said to have passed the request on to newly appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She seemed to done nothing. It was then, Abington said, that Arafat knew he could not count on the Americans to make a real difference.

The Palestinian Nakba is one of the root causes of today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict; if Secretary Kerry is to succeed, he will need to address it. The economic package he plans to introduce would affect the Palestinians in the West Bank. But it would do nothing for the Yarmouk’s double refugees or Shatila – surrounded by death, past and present.

Kerry’s major step to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been the adjustment of the 11-year-old Arab Peace Plan to include mutual land swaps. The plan will now accommodate the illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank – including Har Homa. It is absurd that Washington’s position has shifted from freezing settlement activities during the Obama administration’s first term to accommodating those settlements in the second term.

By pressuring the Arabs to accept land swaps even before negotiations begin, Kerry has set up his mediation efforts for failure. He has left no incentive for the Netanyahu government to negotiate; on the contrary, now that the Arabs have in principle accepted land swaps, Netanyahu will likely take advantage of this concession to further intensify settlement activities.

By presenting the land swap to Netanyahu without a firm commitment to stop settlement building, Kerry has sabotaged himself. As he will discover, Netanyahu’s right-wing government is only interested in exploiting every possible opportunity to sabotage peace efforts, building more colonies – and as a result, continuously exacerbating the crisis of America’s image and credibility in the Middle East. To be certain, Netanyahu government has just announced, in response to Kerry’s land swap, the building of 300 units at the heart of the West Bank’s city, Ramallah. This outcome has shown clearly there is nothing innovative about Kerry’s peace plan and that his efforts align perfectly with traditional Washington mediation efforts of appeasing Israeli governments, damaging American image and credibility in the region, and of course making the anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba more painful.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohammed Salem / Reuters

The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

Read the full article »

Authors

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

What Future for the Central African Republic?

Julius Agbor and Michael Rettig — Sat, 06 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

On March 24, 2013, a loose coalition of rebel groups known as the “séléka rebels”, ostensibly dissatisfied with the Bangui government’s implementation of the January 2013 ceasefire agreement brokered by the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union and the United Nations, seized power and named Michel Djotodia as interim president of the Central African Republic (C.A.R). While the March 24^th coup d’état in the C.A.R. was not a remarkable event on its own – power has violently changed hands at least four times in the short history of the country, including when the now-deposed President Bozizé seized power in 2003 – the coup nonetheless has some important implications for the country, the Central African region and for the international community.

For the C.A.R., a major implication of the coup is that, going forward, it is less likely that the country will experience political stability and advance towards democracy. Two broad arguments militate in favor of this prediction. First, the legacy of French colonial rule left the C.A.R. with no visionary leadership and an ill-developed institutional and physical infrastructure. The C.A.R. is a very small country– its population is comparable to the state of Alabama. Yet its huge surface area – comparable to that of the state of Texas – is richly endowed in natural resources, notably timber and diamonds, which explains the continued interest of its former colonial master and other foreign nations in the country. Since the colonial period when the C.A.R was called Oubangui-Chari, France’s colonialism (and subsequent neocolonialism) was aimed at extracting the C.A.R.’s resources at the expense of developing the country’s human resources, institutional and physical infrastructure.

For instance, right up to 1971 – almost a decade after independence from France – the C.A.R.’s gross secondary enrollment rate was barely 4 percent; less than 2 percent of the country’s total road network had been paved; and only about one physician per 50,000 people was available. The March coup, like previous ones, was anchored in economic grievances linked to an ineffective governance system inherited from colonial rule and which has been further compounded by international meddling. Furthermore, France’s strategy of super-imposing its military presence in its former colonies (in order to protect its economic interests) has greatly undermined the ability of French-speaking African states to constitute a veritable national army that is capable of defending their territories against internal as well as external aggressors. It is therefore easy to understand France’s frequent military intervention in its former colonies (as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 or recently in Mali), but it is also easy to see why France’s nonintervention in cases like the recent C.A.R. coup is perceived as a betrayal in some quarters. Consequently, France’s colonial rule in the C.A.R., like in most other sub-Saharan African countries, has greatly undermined the development of local leadership capacity both in civilian and military affairs. It is not surprising that the C.A.R. has been home to several mercenaries – some of whom eventually ruled the country – and also to bandits and gangsters of Joseph Kony’s caliber.

The second argument predicting continued instability in the C.A.R. is that the coup leader doesn’t have sufficient incentives to lay down a solid foundation in order for the C.A.R.to transition to democracy. Already, he has dissolved the parliament and constitution and is ruling by decree, and without a strong civil society, organized opposition parties, free press and independent judiciary, there is no counterbalancing power to keep his regime in check. Experience elsewhere in countries where military coups have preceded the development of democratic institutions, notably in Nigeria and Turkey, clearly demonstrates that democracy rarely emerges without established agencies of restraint. Further, the C.A.R.’s military also has little tradition of respecting the primacy of civilian rule. The C.A.R’s first and only democratic transition in the 1990s faced an attempted coup by the ousted dictator shortly after elections, and a successful coup by the country’s military chief another two years later. Furthermore, political transitions that are unaccompanied by rapid and sustained economic growth have seldom been sustainable and often give in to successive internal counter-coups. This prediction is likely self-fulfilling in the C.A.R.’s case, where economic growth is projected to decline this year from 3.8 to 2.5 percent as a result of political instability and the decline in foreign aid and investment by key European donor countries facing austerity at home. In sum, even if Djotodia’s good motives were unquestionable, with no agencies of restraint in place and with the C.A.R.’s economic prospects in decline, it seems unlikely that the groundwork for a stable transition to democracy exists.

It is probably in anticipation of continuing socio-political upheavals in the C.A.R. that the international community, notably, the United Nations, the African Union and the ECCAS have vehemently rejected the C.A.R.’s new leadership as well as its three-year transition plan to democracy. In its last summit meeting on the C.A.R. held on April 3, 2013, the ECCAS called for Djotodia’s instant removal and the creation of a five-person executive council that would oversee an 18-month transition to democratic elections. The international community’s rejection of the Séléka coup is commendable as it sets precedence that political power can no longer be accessed through the use of force. Happily, the Séléka leadership has announced its willingness to collaborate with the transition proposals set out by ECCAS. Notwithstanding, if the claims that child soldiers were used in the Séléka rebellion are true, then the Séléka rebel leaders must face trial for violating international conventions. Given the important ramifications that the crisis in the C.A.R. has for the entire Central African region – in terms of the potential of spill-over of rebel coups, influx of refugees to neighboring countries and the hunt for Joseph Kony – a more sophisticated and internationally backed solution for the C.A.R. is warranted. For instance, it might be a sensible option to place the country under a U.N. appointed administrator, as was seen in Cambodia, for a transitional period of three to five years, during which the critical ingredients needed for democracy to thrive (namely, an educated citizenry, independent courts, free press, a disciplined police force and army, vibrant civil society, independent electoral commission, etc.) are put in place. At the end of this transition period, elections could then be held and power transferred from the temporary administrator to a democratically elected C.A.R. government. The weakness of the ECCAS transition plan for the C.A.R. is that it assumes that democracy and economic prosperity would automatically emerge after holding a successful election, but experience doesn’t suggest that is plausible.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Michael Rettig

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

The Fear That Drives Russia's Support For Syria's Assad

Fiona Hill — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Fiona Hill discusses how Vladimir Putin’s fear of state disintegration influences his actions on Syria. Read an excerpt below.

Neal Conan: Repeated American attempts to work with Russia on Syria have floundered on a fundamental difference. Vladimir Putin insists on a deal that includes Bashar al-Assad as part of Syria's future. So the civil war grinds on and the situation of civilians there grows ever more dire. So why? Arms exports? Access to the port of Tartus? Standing up for old allies?

In a recent article in foreign affairs Fiona Hill argues that Putin looks at Syria and sees his old fears of Chechnya brought back to life. Fiona Hill was co-author of "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin," and joins us now on the phone from Florida near Miami. Good to have you with us today.

Fiona Hill: Hi. Thank you, Neal. Thanks for having me.

Conan: So how can Mr. Putin look at a civil war in Syria and she - a nightmare for him, the old rebellion in Chechnya?

Hill: Well, this is a prism that he's brought to looking at most conflicts like the conflicts in Syria that threatened the sanctity of his state. Mr. Putin actually came in to the presidency if you can recall back in '99, 2000 in Russia, just as the second war in Chechnya was starting off. And he saw that as his biggest challenge of keeping the Russian state together, so it didn't fall down the same path as the Soviet Union into collapse. And Putin was really brutal in pursuing the war in Chechnya. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in that holocaust of conflict including many civilians.

The capital city of Grozny in Chechnya was reduced completely to rubble, and Putin felt that this was worthwhile because it kept the state together. And over the course of the conflict in Chechnya it morphed in the same way that we've actually seen in the war in Syria. It went from a conflict that was mostly focused on political secession from Chechnya, from the Russian Federation and over time, really took on more of an extremist element, more of Sunni extremist groups who moved in to exploit the conflict and also many people who came from outside including from Syria to fight in Chechnya.

And Putin is now pretty much concerned that we're going to see a repetition, the collapse of the states in Syria, knock-on effect for conflicts at home for him as well as (unintelligible) across the hall in the Middle East. And yet again, another collapse of the state, that is something that he would like to see avoided at all costs.

Conan: Now Russia, a state with considerable resources was able to pacify, I think that's probably the right word - Chechnya. It is a completely different situation in Syria.

Hill: Neal, I'm very sorry. I didn't hear that. Could you repeat it, please?

Conan: I was saying that because of its enormous resources, Russia was able to pacify Chechnya, at least for the time being. Syria seems to be a very different situation.

Hill: That's very much the case. Yes. Mr. Putin has a lot of things that he was able to draw upon that Mr. Assad has not. He was able to take out the Chechnyan position, both at home and also abroad. In 2004, the Russians assassinated one of the top leaders of the Chechnyan opposition, Mr. Yandarbiyev, who had been an acting president and he was in Doha in Qatar at the time and was killed in a car bomb explosion.

Also other members of the opposition were picked off in other cities including in Europe. And Mr. Putin brought the full weight of the Russian army against the Chechnyans. And also he was able to perceive the war for such a long time quite ruthlessly because the Chechnyan opposition, generally, because of the number of very high level terrorist attacks and this infiltration of extremists lost any kind of support among the population.

So it was a very different conflict. It was very much confined to one region of Russia although there were terrorist attacks and spillover across the whole of the Russian Federation. But it wasn't at all like Syria where it's a full-blown civil war. And Mr. Assad is actually, at this point, seemingly perhaps not outgunned but certainly outnumbered by the number of opposition that are arrayed against him.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: NPR

Image Source: © Rogan Ward / Reuters

The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad

Fiona Hill — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 12:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by Foreign Affairs.

Few issues better illustrate the limits of the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia than the crisis in Syria. For more than a year, the United States has tried, and failed, to work with Russia to find a solution to end the violence. Moscow has firmly opposed international intervention to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, arguing that the conflict must be resolved through negotiations and that Assad must be included in any transitional arrangement leading to a new government. Although the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reached out recently to the leaders of the Syrian opposition, these talks produced no indication that the Kremlin is seriously recalibrating its positions on Syria. And that’s hardly surprising: the main obstacle to any shift in Russia’s calculations is President Vladimir Putin himself, whose aversion to forcible regime change is intense and unwavering.

Why has Putin offered such steadfast support to Assad? On the surface, Moscow seems to profit from exporting arms to Syria, and it depends on the regime’s good will to maintain Russian access to a naval facility at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. But these are marginal and symbolic interests. Putin is really motivated to support the Assad regime by his fear of state collapse -- a fear he confronted most directly during the secession of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Chechnya, which he brutally suppressed in a bloody civil war and counterinsurgency operation fought between 1999 and 2009. (In Russia, the republics are semi-autonomous federal units comprising the historic territories of the country’s non-ethnic Russian groups.) In a series of interviews he gave in 2000 for an authorized biography, Putin declared that “the essence of the ... situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist.... I was convinced that if we did not immediately stop the extremists [in Chechnya], then in no time at all we would be facing a second Yugoslavia across the entire territory of the Russian Federation -- the Yugoslavization of Russia.” And we know how Putin feels about the demise of the Soviet Union; in 2005 he called it “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century,” a comment that was meant to bemoan the collapse of the Soviet state rather than the demise of communism.

For Putin, Syria is all too reminiscent of Chechnya. Both conflicts pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups. In Putin’s view -- one that he stresses repeatedly in meetings with his U.S. and European counterparts -- Syria is the latest battleground in a global, multi-decade struggle between secular states and Sunni Islamism, which first began in Afghanistan with the Taliban, then moved to Chechnya, and has torn a number of Arab countries apart. Ever since he took office (first as prime minister in 1999 and then as president in 2000) and was confronted by the Chechen war, Putin has expressed his fear of Sunni Islamist extremism and of the risks that “jihadist” groups pose to Russia, with its large, indigenous, Sunni Muslim population, concentrated in the North Caucasus, the Volga region, and in major cities such as Moscow. A desire to contain extremism is a major reason why Putin offered help to the United States in battling the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. It is also why Russia maintains close relations with Shia Iran, which acts as a counterweight to Sunni powers.

The conflicts in both Chechnya and Syria pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups.

In the case of Chechnya, Putin made it clear that retaking the republic from its “extremist opposition forces” was worth every sacrifice. In a speech in September 1999, he promised to pursue Chechen rebels and terrorists even into “the outhouse.” He did just that, and some opposition leaders were killed by missile attacks at their most vulnerable moments. The Chechen capital city of Grozny was reduced to rubble. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, along with jihadist fighters who came into Chechnya with the encouragement of extremist groups from the Arab world, including from Syria. Moscow and other Russian cities endured devastating terrorist attacks. Putin’s treatment of Chechnya became a cautionary tale of what would happen to rebels and terrorists -- and indeed to entire groups of people -- if they threatened the Russian state. They would either be eliminated or brought to their knees -- exactly the fate Putin wishes for today’s Syrian rebels.

After two decades of secessionist strife, Putin has contained Chechnya’s uprising. Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel who switched his allegiance to Moscow, now leads the republic. Putin granted Kadyrov and his supporters amnesty and gave them a mandate to go after other militants and political opponents. Kadyrov has rebuilt Grozny (with ample funds from Moscow) and created his own version of an Islamist and Chechen republic that is condemned by human rights organizations for its brutal suppression of dissent.

For the past two years, Putin has hoped that Assad would be able to do what he did in Chechnya and beat back the opposition. Based on the brutal record of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in suppressing uprisings, Putin anticipated that the regime would have no problem keeping the state together. But now Assad seems to have failed, and Putin is not one to back a losing horse. He and the rest of the Russian leadership are well aware that their staunch support for Assad has damaged Russia’s standing in the Arab world, but they have no alternative plan to get out of the stalemate. Putin is still not ready to sanction an intervention that could lead to the dismantling of the Syrian state and to risk creating a situation akin to that in Afghanistan in the 1990s, when warring groups of extremists fought each other and created a breeding ground for global jihadism. In Putin’s view, lawless post-Qaddafi Libya, which has become an exporter of guns, fighters, and refugees to its neighbors, only further underscores the dangers of international intervention.

Before abandoning Assad, Putin will need to have answers to some pressing questions: Who will be responsible for the fallout from the regime’s collapse? Who will keep Sunni extremists in check? Who will keep extremists away from the North Caucasus and other Russian regions with large Sunni Muslim populations? And finally, who will ensure the security of Syria’s chemical weapons? Putin certainly does not trust the United States to play this stabilizing role: as he sees it, when the United States pulled out of Iraq, it left behind a Shia strongman, Nouri al-Maliki, to suppress the Sunnis; the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is leaving only uncertainty in its wake. In short, Putin doubts that the United States and the international community can deliver stability to Syria, so he continues to stand by the flailing regime as the only means of avoiding the collapse of the state altogether.

Although Putin looks at Syria and sees Chechnya, the situations are quite different. All of Syria is in the throes of civil war, and Assad does not have the same resources that Putin had in dealing with Chechnya. He cannot eliminate key representatives and supporters of the opposition abroad as Putin did with the Chechens, including by assassinating the former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004 to stop his fundraising and recruiting activities. Unable to crush or co-opt the opposition, Assad has taken Syria over the precipice. Syria is also bristling with conventional weaponry along with an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that pose a significant threat to neighboring states. Those neighbors -- Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, and Iran farther afield -- have been engulfed in the conflict. In contrast, in spite of the flows of money and men into Chechnya and the spillover of refugees and terrorist acts into the rest of Russia (and sometimes into Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), there was no similar proliferation threat in the Chechen war, and no outside powers ever became heavily involved. Chechnya is in a bad neighborhood, but Syria is in a terrible neighborhood, and the effects of the Syrian conflict cannot be contained in the way that Chechnya’s were.

Neither these differences nor the scale of the humanitarian tragedy will convince Putin to change his mind on Syria. The Russian president will continue to hold out against intervention and insist that negotiations with Assad must be part of the way forward, until some strongman can be found to restore a semblance of order to Syria’s chaos. If, by some miracle, Syria does not turn into a full-scale regional disaster, Putin will pat himself on the back and say it was thanks to him because he prevented an intervention. If the more likely scenario plays out, Putin will blame Washington. He will hold the United States responsible for destroying Syria and empowering Sunni Islamist extremists by championing democracy and the Arab revolutions. Meanwhile, Putin’s obstinacy is already turning his worst nightmare -- the fracturing of a geopolitically important state -- into a reality.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: Foreign Affairs

Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters

Nonviolent Resistance Key to Middle East Breakthrough

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Almost twenty years of negotiations “brought us nothing but more Israeli settlement. Palestinians have had enough of negotiations,” one senior Palestinian official said at a conference I attended recently. And yet, ahead of his first visit to the Middle East as secretary of state this month, John Kerry appeared to be suggesting more of the same.

“My prayer is that perhaps this can be a moment where we can renew some kind of effort to get the parties into a discussion,” he reportedly said. Such platitudes bode poorly for President Obama’s planned visit to the region this week. Indeed, it seems as if it will be business as usual on Palestinian-Israeli policy during the president’s second term, with yet more fruitless talks and an ever-increasing disconnect between U.S. diplomacy and developments on the ground.

Yet unmentioned by U.S. officials and diplomats is the fact that a credible alternative to the 20-year-old, U.S.-sponsored negotiation process has emerged on the ground. Nonviolent popular resistance could create a real breakthrough – and even an opportunity for a constructive American role.

Read the full op-ed on CNN »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohamad Torokman / Reuters

China's Intervention in the Myanmar-Kachin Peace Talks

Yun Sun — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: The article first appeared in Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 200, February 20, 2013, published by the East-West Center.

Peace talks between Myanmar's government and the rebel Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Ruili, China, on February 4, finally rendered a glimpse of hope after 17 months of bloody conflict. Although the two sides still need more time and further dialogue to reach a peace agreement, major breakthroughs were achieved on key issues such as strengthening communications, easing tensions and holding further talks before the end of February.

Peace talks are not unusual for the KIO and the Myanmar government. Since the most recent outbreak of the conflict in 2011, the two sides have engaged in multiple rounds of informal talks, including at least three rounds in Ruili. However, these latest talks set a new precedent because of the central role that China played in the process and signify a major intervention by Beijing that is unique.

China was instrumental in arranging the latest round of dialogue between the two parties. Due to the lack of trust between the KIO and the Myanmar government, both preferred a third party location rather than Laiza--headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)--or Naypyidaw. During the talks, China not only provided the venue, but also explicitly guaranteed the security of all participants. On the substance of the talks, China played a quiet, behind-the-scenes role of coordinating and mediating under the guidelines of "persuading for peace and promoting dialogue" (劝和促谈). A Chinese expert on Myanmar's northern affairs commented publicly that China "carefully listened to the demands and conditions of both sides and actively mediated between them," according to the Global Times. China has never before played such a public role in an internal conflict between the central government and a local rebel group of another sovereign nation. Ambassador Luo Zhaohui, director general of the Department of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with representatives of both sides and participated in the meetings as a "witness.

China's participation is perhaps the most important factor that led to the success of the talks. Given its distrust of Naypyidaw, the KIO has consistently called for a third party big power to mediate the dialogue, and China's intervention is also reportedly welcomed by Naypyidaw according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. China has refused such a role in the past, fearing it would be perceived by Naypyidaw as interference in its internal affairs. But this time, Beijing's new policy completely changed the landscape, paving the way for peace talks. By acting as coordinator and "witness" between the KIO and the central government, China has positioned itself openly as a mediator and a tacit guarantor of any agreement reached between the parties. Privately, some analysts in Washington have expressed recognition and appreciation of China's stepping up to assume its "big power responsibility" in maintaining regional peace and stability.

Nevertheless, China's intervention is hardly altruistic but rather reflects multiple considerations of China's own national interests. First, the Kachin conflict has imposed tremendous pressure along China's border. Since the escalation of tensions in late 2012, several Burmese artillery shells have exploded inside China, resulting in economic disruption, political disturbances and rising dissatisfaction regarding Naypyidaw's careless military actions among Chinese citizens. In addition, thousands of Kachin refugees have fled into China. As Beijing strives to maintain a stable border, there has been mounting domestic pressure for authorities to take action and press for a ceasefire.

From China's perspective, the persistence of the Kachin conflict threatens the security and profitability of Chinese investments in the region. China's efforts to improve its energy security through diversification of transportation routes have created new strategic oil and gas pipelines that are scheduled to become operational before the end of May. As these pipelines transit areas immediately adjacent to the conflict zone, the ongoing conflict casts a shadow over the security of this expensive but vulnerable strategic investment. Other than the pipelines, China has also invested in hydropower projects in the area, including the suspended Myitsone dam and the Dapein dam, which was forced to shut down since the beginning of the conflict. Overall, the conflict has taken a heavy toll on Chinese investment projects throughout Northern Myanmar and China also has significant commercial interests in future natural resource projects in Kachin state.

China's decision to step up its intervention in the conflict was also partially motivated by a potential US role. As Washington grows increasingly wary about Myanmar's ethnic conflicts and their impact on the country's future, there were voices from within the United States and other ethnic groups calling for US intervention and mediation. This scenario was particularly troubling for Beijing. Such a move would further enhance the US role in Burmese politics; it could potentially insert a US presence right along China's border in an area critical for Chinese pipelines and other strategic interests in South and Southeast Asia. Beijing understood that had it declined to intervene, the United States could well have become involved, resulting in negative consequences for China's geopolitical interests. Therefore, soon after US Ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell's visit to Kachin state in mid-December, China decided to act and offered to host the peace talks to preempt a similar move by Washington.

Finally, China also intervened partially out of fear of a complete defeat of the KIA and the consequences that could entail. Immediately before the peace talks, the Myanmar military was gaining ground against the KIA, taking control of Hka Ya Bum, a strategic mountain shield near Laiza. As a result, the KIA was forced to relocate its headquarters. Beijing is fully aware of the fact that the disintegration of the KIA is not in China's interests. Rogue Kachin guerrillas would no longer be restrained and might potentially attack any target they identify. Therefore, this most recent round of peace talks not only saves the KIA, but also potentially protects China.

Therefore, China's intervention in the Kachin dispute casts new light on China's traditional non-interference principle. As long as the intervention has the consent from both sides of a conflict in the host country and China has significant interests at stake, Beijing seems to be willing to demonstrate some flexibility, to experiment and to adapt. As China's national interests expand and diversify, so too will its foreign policy principles.

Authors

Yun Sun

Publication: Asia Pacific Bulletin (No. 200)

Supporting Teachers in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

Tue, 12 Feb 2013 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 12, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Teachers living in situations of armed conflict, forced displacement, and state fragility risk their lives to be on the frontlines of educating children. Often they are the only educators present, working in difficult and dangerous conditions with little or no support, sometimes without receiving a paycheck for months. Supporting the wellbeing of teachers is essential in any context, but it is particularly important for advancing education during and after violence and crises.

On February 12, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings (CUE) hosted a discussion on the policies needed to support teachers working in fragile and conflict-affected states. The discussion drew on findings from a recent report by CUE and CfBT Education Trust, “Building Effective Teacher Salary Systems in Fragile and Conflict-affected States.” Panelists included: Lori Heninger, director of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies; Susy Ndaruhutse, head of international development and education at CfBT Education Trust; and Brookings Senior Fellow Rebecca Winthrop, director of CUE. Yolande Miller-Grandvaux, senior education advisor at the U.S. Agency for International Development, moderated the conversation.

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Supporting Teachers in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

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A Lasting Peace? Yemen's Long Journey to National Reconciliation

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Yemenis sit down to their long-delayed national dialogue, they face an array of challenges that threaten to pull the country apart – from an unfinished revolution to regional demands for independence. Can Yemen grapple with its legacy of dictatorship and violence and prevent another slide into civil conflict?

In a new paper from the Brookings Doha Center, A Lasting Peace: Yemen’s Long Journey to National Reconciliation, Ibrahim Sharqieh outlines a process of national reconciliation that is Yemen’s best hope for stability.

Based on extensive field research and interviews with key Yemeni figures, Sharqieh describes the challenges facing post-revolutionary Yemen and the key actors in the country’s national reconciliation, from the Islamist Islah Party to the country’s tribes. He also lays out the mechanisms for a successful reconciliation process, discussing not only the country’s nascent national dialogue but also the sort of transitional justice bodies that must follow it. Finally, he concludes with how the international community can help Yemen achieve reconciliation – and warns against regional and international powers acting as spoilers.

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Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Image Source: © Mohamed Al-Sayaghi / Reuters

Finding a Lasting Solution to Instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Conversation with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson

Mon, 11 Feb 2013 15:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 11, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:15 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Over the last decade, the United States and much of the world has reengaged with the government and the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the hope of promoting security and development. This support has included military training and reform, diplomatic engagement to increase regional stability, and millions in foreign assistance. Despite these efforts, the DRC continues to face serious political, security and development challenges. The tense elections of 2011 were followed by violence and chaos. The recent attacks by M23 rebels have destabilized the eastern region and the ongoing humanitarian crisis has been marked by rampant violence against women.

On February 11, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a conversation with Ambassador Johnnie Carson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, on finding a lasting solution to instability in the DRC. Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi S. Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, director of research for Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

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Time for U.S. to Stop Shielding Israel

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Wed, 23 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

We are now set for a third term for Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu. And, although Netanyahu’s Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition seems to have underperformed expectations, a plurality of the vote will allow him to once again lead Israel’s government.

But even a somewhat moderated Netanyahu government will continue to advance radical positions that put regional and global security in danger. The question, then, is how the United States can best push another right-wing administration to behave in accordance with the principles of the international security system – and its own national interests.

Over the past two Netanyahu terms, the international community, and the United States in particular, adopted an approach based on accommodation when dealing with the Netanyahu government. The hope was that this approach would contain the risks this extremist government posed to international security. Yet just as that strategy did not work then, it will not work now. The United States must therefore now take a harder line with Israel’s coming government – it must switch from a strategy of accommodation to one of confrontation, and it should start by letting fall its diplomatic shield.

In order to protect Israel from international pressure, the United States has repeatedly vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions that criticize Israeli government actions – including resolutions on settlement construction that the United States itself publicly rejects. In return, Netanyahu has publicly flouted American priorities. Europe has also accommodated the Netanyahu government. In exchange, Netanyahu refused a request from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, his strongest European ally, to temporarily freeze settlement construction. The negotiating “Quartet,” meanwhile, has yielded to the Israeli government’s position since its inception. The Quartet – made up of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations – was repaid in last January’s Amman talks. It requested that each negotiating party submit in writing its vision for final status talks; while the Palestinians complied, Netanyahu declined, dealing the Quartet a humiliating defeat.

This international forbearance has tipped the already skewed balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians and essentially left Israel with no incentive to negotiate or compromise. A Netanyahu-led Israel whose military, economic, and now diplomatic power dwarfs that of the Palestinians no longer sees any reason to be part of a sustainable solution.

Continuing to enable the latest iteration of the Netanyahu government threatens a host of dangerous, unpredictable consequences. Netanyahu’s plans to continue settlement expansion will effectively put an end to peace efforts in the region. Just Tuesday, British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that Israel’s settlement policy “will make a two-state solution impossible.” Now, a further deterioration of peace prospects could produce the long-overdue “Palestinian Spring.” We may see the first stirrings of this sort of mass, nonviolent protest in Bab al-Shams and Bab al-Karama – two tent cities that have sprung up to obstruct Israeli expansion plans in the occupied West Bank. More dangerously, though, settlement growth will likely lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, something the United States has gone to great lengths to protect and support. The vacuum left by the Authority’s implosion could lead to a surge of violence, which may seem to many Palestinians like their only legitimate alternative. The same void would effectively invalidate the Quartet’s reason for existence – and even require direct international intervention to restore order. And all this is to say nothing of the possibility Netanyahu could drag the United States into a new region-spanning war with Iran, just as America is winding down its long, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of course, there is now reason to think that Israel’s ironclad international support may be changing. Europe made an obvious and historic shift in its diplomacy when its member states either voted yes or abstained in the recent United Nations vote on Palestinian statehood. President Obama’s nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, coupled with his refusal to withdraw the nomination in the face of sharp opposition, also suggests a possible policy evolution. Obama has entered his second term with a freer hand on foreign policy. Hagel’s anti-war positions and his openness to dialogue with Iran imply that Obama may be willing to challenge Netanyahu at some point; if so, he will have European and international backing.

The Obama administration has leverage, and it should use it. Further accommodation of Netanyahu and his right wing policies will only exacerbate the already complicated and difficult issues underlying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The United States has to draw the line sometime – and that time should be now. It can start by practicing more assertive diplomacy, namely by refusing to provide diplomatic cover for dangerous, unproductive moves – settlement expansion is only one example. If Netanyahu wants to continue on this road, he must understand that he’ll have to do so alone. The American veto policy of unconditional support for illegal Israeli practices must end, and, like the Europeans, the Obama administration must let Benjamin Netanyahu face the consequences of his own policies.

By letting slip its diplomatic shield, the United States can leave behind a failed policy of accommodation. In doing so, it can once again provide hope for a just, sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and at the same time protect its national interests in the Middle East.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Camp David Peace Treaty Collapse

Tamara Cofman Wittes and Shadi Hamid — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has been resolutely focused on maintaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. While Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi has signaled he is willing to set aside the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological opposition and most Egyptians’ hostility to Israel, several factors could destabilize the situation. Shadi Hamid and Tamara Cofman Wittes drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How should the U.S. engage with President Morsi to preserve peace between Egypt and Israel?
What can the U.S. do to improve communications between Egypt and Israel?
How should the U.S. prepare for a scenario in which the treaty breaks down and there is a direct confrontation?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Tamara Cofman Wittes and Shadi Hamid

Since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, the United States has been resolutely focused on maintaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a cornerstone of regional stability and as an essential platform for broader efforts at Arab-Israeli coexistence. The loss of this 33-year-old treaty would represent a profound strategic defeat for the United States in the Middle East.

Recommendation:

To mitigate such a possibility you should take immediate steps to deepen U.S. engagement with the Morsi government, the Egyptian military and opposition forces; consider negotiating new Israeli-Egyptian agreements to address each side’s grievances about Sinai security; promote better communication and confidence building measures between the Egyptian and Israeli militaries; and be ready to intervene immediately should a crisis erupt.

Background:

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s decision to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in November 2012 signaled that he was willing to set aside the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological opposition and most Egyptians’ hostility to Israel in favor of a pragmatic raison d’etat. Nevertheless, there are several possible ways by which the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty might be ruptured.

Third-party terrorist attacks in Sinai or emanating from Gaza could draw in Israeli and Egyptian troops and rupture relations. In August 2011, for example, a terrorist attack led Israeli forces on a hot pursuit into Sinai, during which they killed five Egyptian soldiers. This generated heated demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo. That incident took place under the military council’s rule; a future incident would take place under a democratically-elected government that would face strong popular pressure to respond, provoking a further crisis and threatening the treaty itself. While Israel has been careful since then to avoid any provocation in Sinai, it has also watched continued terrorist activity there, and Egypt’s inability or unwillingness to tackle it, with growing alarm. At the end of the day, Israel will insist on its right to self-defense. Terrorists and others with an interest in creating a crisis could easily provoke an incident in a location that would heighten the chances for a direct Israeli-Egyptian military confrontation.

Even without a border incident, an elected, Muslim-Brotherhood-led government might resort to populist nationalism to sustain support for its rule. While the international community saw Morsi’s diplomacy in Gaza as a signal that an Islamist-led Egypt would act responsibly to reinforce regional stability, his opponents in leftist and revolutionary circles attacked him for working within the Mubarak framework of relations with Israel. Even Morsi’s own Brotherhood has taken a harder line than he, as for example in August 2012 when it claimed that a recent terrorist attack on Egyptian soldiers in Sinai was a “Zionist” plot. In the coming years, Morsi’s opponents are likely to make greater use of anti-Americanism and anti-Israel sentiment to attack the Brotherhood in the court of public opinion (just as the Brotherhood did to Mubarak).

Moreover, the touch policy measures required to stabilize the Egyptian economy will worsen the pain of average Egyptians, making populist policies, and particularly adventurism abroad, a tempting distraction for an increasingly unpopular government. A continued failure to address deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian relations could also spark further violence between Hamas and Israel or a collapse of the Palestinian Authority, exacerbating anti-Israeli sentiment in Egypt. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government security-focused approach to Sinai’s problems relies on ham-handed repression while failing to invest the necessary resources to promote local development and reduce local grievances. This increases the incentives for locals to participate in violence. Morsi and the Brotherhood cannot be expected to continue to confront increasing public pressure over these issues without any impact on cooperation with Israel. At some point, the temptation to make a symbolic move against the treaty could become too strong to ignore. Morsi might then demand amendments to the treaty or put it to a popular referendum. He might also seek to address both security threats in Sinai, and perceived slights on Egyptian sovereignty there, by moving additional forces into zones where the Treaty restricts forces without Israeli consent.

Should Morsi be tempted to use hostility toward Israel to bolster his domestic standing, this will only persuade Israeli officials that their worst fears about the Arab Spring are being realized. Any Egyptian move to undermine the Treaty would be seen as implying a sharp decrease in Israel’s deterrent capabilities, and would likely produce a sharp response.

Israel is already nervous. Since Egypt’s revolution, Israel has acquiesced in Egypt’s remilitarization of eastern Sinai, accepting a semi-permanent Egyptian presence close to its border. At the same time, Israel has doubled the number of battalions it has deployed along the border, built a border fence, and established a new “Southern Brigade” to defend Eilat. In the context of anti-Israeli populism, any Egyptian military move that Israel does not know about or approve could easily provoke suspicion and a matching Israeli military mobilization intended to send a signal about the costs of abandoning the treaty. But given the already-increased troop presence and the limited communication between the two sides, such a scenario heightens the chances for unintended escalation.

Preventing a Peace Treaty Rupture:

There are steps you should take now to reduce the chances that terrorist provocations or populist moves by Egypt’s leadership might end in the rupture of the Treaty:

• Deepen U.S. security cooperation and coordination with the Morsi government so that, even in the event of growing anti-Israel agitation inside Egypt or a terrorist provocation in the Sinai, Morsi and the Brotherhood feel they have a vital stake in not upsetting the bilateral relationship.

• Sustain and expand U.S. engagement with the Egyptian military and with political actors across the Egyptian spectrum, in the course of which administration officials should extol the benefits of peace with Israel for Egypt’s stability and economic recovery. In order to avoid the perception of a Mubarak-style authoritarian bargain, your embassy in Cairo should balance its cooperation with Morsi with broader political outreach and sustained pressure on the Brotherhoodled government to promote inclusive democracy.

• Consider developing a new Egypt-Israel modus vivendi that would enhance the sustainability of the peace treaty. Israel is not happy with the very limited bilateral communications over Sinai and Gaza, which occur through a high-level intelligence channel; Egypt is unhappy with the Treaty’s limitations on forces in Sinai. These limitations may also no longer meet the needs of the two parties when the primary security threat is non-state terrorism and illicit activity. A revised agreement that codifies the alreadyaltered realities on the ground, and that adds more robust bilateral information sharing and coordination mechanisms, could potentially relieve pressures on the Treaty within Egyptian politics, while better serving both sides’ security interests.

• Press now for increased communication between Egyptian and Israeli militaries. Those operating along their shared border must have some direct means to share information in the event of a crisis. You can also work to enhance the role of the Multinational Force Observers in Sinai (MFO). Currently, limited numbers and capabilities as well as security concerns restrict MFO movements. A larger, more mobile and capable force could improve information sharing and verify that new Egyptian deployments in Sinai are sized, equipped, and operating according to agreements. This would also lessen Morsi’s ability to “surprise” Israel with any new military deployments, reducing his incentive to do so.

Minimizing Fallout in the Event of Further Deterioration:

In extremis, if the treaty is broken, or if tensions flare to the point that cross-border fighting is conceivable, you should be ready to act quickly to:

• Deter both sides from a direct confrontation, or bring one to a swift end. Since the Egyptian military is unlikely to seek allout war with the far-superior Israeli Defense Forces, it may welcome U.S. intervention. This could involve seeking an immediate separation of forces monitored by MFO, and, if necessary, putting nearby U.S. forces on alert to deter aggressive movements by either side in advance of such a separation taking hold. The temptation in Washington might be to declare swift and clear support for Israel’s defense. But in a case where extreme nationalism is driving Egyptian actions this would not itself act as a deterrent to further escalation.

• Prevent terrorist elements in Sinai or Gaza from taking advantage of the crisis to fire rockets or breach Israel’s borders. Success in this objective will require getting both Egypt and Israel focused on the primacy of the terrorist threat: pressing Egypt to back down swiftly, urging Israeli restraint in response to provocations, and mobilizing third-party channels to Hamas in Gaza warning against such moves.

• Prevent an Egyptian-Israeli rupture from having ripple effects in the region. The United States should engage swiftly and firmly with Arab capitals, especially in the Gulf, to head off any statements of support for Egyptian actions against the treaty and to elicit public and private messages expressing a desire to maintain regional peace. Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel would become an immediate target should this effort fail, and the United States as well as our Gulf allies should seek to demonstrate their support for the maintenance of Jordan’s peace with Israel in the face of what could be a fierce nationalist onslaught.

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The Black Swan: Camp David Collapse

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Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

Chaos in Kabul

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A security meltdown in Afghanistan would severely compromise America’s ability to pursue its interests in the region, leaving the United States with few policy options. Vanda Felbab-Brown drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What actions will the U.S. have to take to ensure stability in a post-2014 Afghanistan?
What can the U.S. do to end corruption and strengthen accountability and rule of law in Afghanistan?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Vanda Felbab-Brown

As the 2014 transition to a radically diminished U.S. presence and mission in Afghanistan approaches, it is likely to leave in its wake a perilous security situation, a political system few Afghans see as legitimate, and a likely severe economic downturn. Although a serious security deterioration, including the possibility of a civil war that many Afghans fear, is far from inevitable, it is a real possibility. Such a security meltdown would severely compromise American ability to prosecute U.S. interests in the region, leaving the United States with few policy options.

Recommendations:

Even though U.S. leverage in Afghanistan diminishes daily, U.S. decisions still critically affect Afghanistan’s future. The United States can still take important steps to minimize the chances of a critical security meltdown in Afghanistan after 2014:

• Withdrawing in an orderly fashion at a judicious pace that does not step ahead of Afghanistan’s security capacities;

• Continuing to provide security assistance, such as training, combat support, and specialty enablers after 2014, and restraining the splintering of the Afghan National Army;

• Defining negotiations with the Taliban as a broader societal reconciliation process that entangles equally the Taliban and the Afghan government in rule-of-law constraints and pluralistic processes, rather than as close-to-the-vest powerbroker bargaining and a fig leaf for U.S. departure;

• Elevating the emphasis on good governance on par with security, supporting political reformers, and not consistently compromising good governance for the sake of short-term military exigencies — without greater legitimacy for the Afghan government, there is little chance for stability in Afghanistan;

• Avoiding a premature embrace of abusive Afghan powerbrokers, many of whom are currently favored by the United States — the United States may have to rely on them eventually to help protect U.S. interests including counterterrorism operations, but that does not mean that it should embrace them today.

Background:

In the military surge areas of Helmand and Kandahar, there have been palpable security gains. How robust they are remains to be seen. In the east, where the Haqqanis operate close to Pakistani safe-havens, the war is stalemated. Parts of the north, such as Balkh, are very stable, but bitter ethnic tensions are brewing in Kunduz and Baghlan and elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have improved, but cannot yet function without international enablers. Patronage networks pervade the ANSF, and a crucial question is whether the forces will splinter along ethnic and patronage lines post-2014.

Since 2009, U.S. aid has flooded into Helmand and Kandahar but instead of bringing sustainable development, it distorted local economies and triggered contestation over the spoils. Turning off this spigot is no loss. But U.S. departure will produce a massive economic constriction in Afghanistan.

Corruption, serious crime, land theft and other usurpation of resources, nepotism, a lack of rule of law, and exclusionary patronage networks permeate Afghanistan’s current political dispensation. Afghans crave accountability and justice and resent the current mafia-like rule. Improved human security plus leadership accountability are their unfulfilled aspirations. Whether the 2014 elections will usher in better governance or trigger violent conflict is another huge question mark.

U.S. Interests after 2014:

The United States will continue to have important interests in Afghanistan’s stability, including countering terrorism. The Taliban may have soured on al Qaeda, but a full break with al Qaeda generates costs — with respect to maintaining internal unity and provoking attacks by the now-betrayed salafi brethren. Whether the Haqqanis would obey the Taliban or pick al Qaeda is also a question mark. Should the Taliban, through fighting or a negotiated deal, come to control parts of Afghanistan, at best the Taliban will attempt to appease both the salafists and the United States.

Prosecuting U.S. counterterrorism interests from the air depends on local bases and human intelligence. Many powerbrokers and informants cultivated by the United States will have an incentive to hedge and minimize intelligence flows to those serving their, not necessarily U.S., interests.

Should a Pakistani nuclear weapon or some fissile material be acquired by a terrorist group, a usable Afghan military base would be highly advantageous for the U.S. ability to recover them.

An unstable Afghanistan will be like an ulcer bleeding into Pakistan. It will further distract Pakistan’s leaders from tackling the country’s internal security, economic, energy, and social crises, and the radicalization of Pakistani society. These trends adversely affect U.S. interests.

An unstable Afghanistan will also worsen overall security in the broader region, destabilizing Central Asia as well. Iran, Russia, India, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries, and perhaps even China will be at least indirectly drawn into the Afghanistan conflict and cultivate proxies.

Scenarios of a Security Meltdown and U.S. Policy Options:

A major security collapse in Afghanistan will in the initial phases likely resemble the early 1990s pattern of localized and fragmented ethnic and local-powerbroker infighting with pockets of stability, rather than the late 1990s when a Taliban-advancing line of control moved steadily north. The extent of violence and fragmentation will depend on whether the ANSF, particularly the Afghan Army, splinters. Even then, a rump ANSF and the Afghan government may have enough strength to hold Kabul, major cities, and other parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban will control parts of the south and east. Elsewhere infighting may be among members of a resurrected Northern Alliance or among Durrani Pashtun powerbrokers. But ethnic fighting may eventually explode even on the streets of Kabul where Pashtuns harbor resentments about the post-2001 influx of Tajiks that changed land distribution in the capital.

Options available to protect U.S. interests will depend on whether a U.S.- Afghan Status-of-Forces agreement (SOFA) has been signed and the United States has military forces and bases in Afghanistan. In the absence of a SOFA and bases, the United States will be dependent on indirectly supporting selected warlords.

If the United States retains bases and forces in Afghanistan, you will face the following choices:

• Should the United States fly sorties and for what purposes? Against al-Qaeda only or more broadly against the Taliban? Should the United States extend assistance to the Afghan government? Any attacks on U.S. bases will generate pressures for either U.S. ground operations or a full troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

• Should the United States support certain battlefield objectives — for example, avoiding the fall of Kabul or supporting a de-facto partition of Afghanistan north of Kabul? Through what military means — the use of air power only or special operations forces assistance, or other ground-combat support as well?

• Assuming the most important U.S. interest in the region is that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are not acquired by a salafi group, and that having a land reach into Pakistan is important, could Afghan authorities ever consent to the United States having access to Afghan bases only for strikes into Pakistan? Pakistan would of course do all it could to subvert any such arrangement.

Regardless of whether the United States retains bases and directly engages in Afghanistan’s conflict or not, it will also face the following policy questions:

• How should the United States react to any effort by Northern Alliance members to provide safe havens to Baluchi insurgents to retaliate for Pakistan’s support for the Taliban? Pakistan will be determined to ensure that the northerners cannot complicate Pakistan’s security interests and Taliban control in southern Afghanistan. If Pakistan intensifies its support for the Taliban and the United States seeks to limit the Taliban’s control, U.S.-Pakistan military encounters could increase.

• Should the United States acquiesce in or encourage greater Indian security involvement in Afghanistan to minimize Taliban and salafi presence? Pakistan will see such Indian presence as extremely threatening, a development complicating U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Conclusion:

A direct U.S. military engagement, even if limited to air strikes or special forces operations, will entangle the United States in prolonged conflict that, at best, may disrupt al Qaeda presence or Taliban control. Maintaining domestic support for such a U.S. role will be difficult. None of the direct limited or indirect engagement policy alternatives will easily result in stable territorial boundaries and an end to the conflict. U.S. ability to secure its interests would be decidedly poor. Doing all your administration can before 2014 to strengthen Afghanistan’s security and the legitimacy of the Afghan government to avert a major meltdown is by far the best policy.

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Vanda Felbab-Brown

Ramallah Unravels - The Collapse of the Palestinian Authority

Khaled Elgindy — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) demise would eliminate the single most tangible expression of efforts to achieve a two-state solution – all but destroying chances for a peaceful settlement between Palestine and Israel for the forseeable future. Khaled Elgindy drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

If the PA collapses, what would be the initial impact?
What can Congress do to ensure the Palestinian Authority's stability?
How should the secretary of state reapproach political negotiations?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Khaled Elgindy

Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is threatening to dissolve the PA and hand back to Israel full responsibility for the 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank. Even without such a step, the severe fiscal crisis within the PA, compounded by Israel’s withholding of Palestinian tax transfers (accounting for two-thirds of the PA budget) and the drying up of international — especially Arab — donor funds, could lead to the same result.

The collapse of the PA could lead to large-scale Palestinian civil unrest and perhaps even a total breakdown in law and order in the West Bank, increasing the chances of a violent Palestinian uprising against Israel, a full Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, and/or a takeover by extremist elements. From a strategic standpoint, the PA’s demise would eliminate the single most tangible expression of efforts to achieve a twostate solution — an investment totaling tens of billions of dollars from the United States and the international community over nearly two decades — all but destroying chances for a peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians for the foreseeable future. It would also increase the isolation of our ally Israel and force it to deal with Palestinian demographic realities on a whole new basis that threatens the democratic and Jewish nature of the state. It would have serious negative implications for U.S. interests in the region and beyond.

Recommendation:

Despite the dire condition of the PA, its collapse is not inevitable. Strengthening the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, however, will require boosting the PA both economically and politically, as well as preparing the ground for a credible negotiations process. This will require you to press Congress to release aid to the PA, urge Israel to hand over all the tax revenues, and insist that the international donors fulfill their financial commitments. Israel will also need to be persuaded to allow Palestinian development in the West Bank’s Area C and stop new settlement activity. And it will require you to announce early on that you have asked the Secretary of State to prepare for a new initiative to achieve a two-state solution.

Background:

The collapse of the PA would instantly put out of work approximately 140,000 public sector employees, who serve as breadwinners for roughly onethird of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. This includes some 58,000 men who currently serve in the various PA security services. The implications of this are impossible to overstate. On the one hand, mass unemployment and the absence of a police force could easily degenerate into large-scale Palestinian civil unrest and perhaps even a total breakdown in law and order in the West Bank, an environment in which extremists would thrive. This in turn would dramatically increase the likelihood of a violent Palestinian uprising against Israel (a “third intifada”), a full Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, and/or a takeover of Palestinian population centers in the West Bank by extremist or rogue elements. In addition to ending nearly 20 years of security coordination with Israel, the prospect of tens of thousands of idle, frustrated, well-armed and welltrained Palestinian security personnel would pose a whole slew of security challenges for Israel.

The PA’s collapse is likely to result in one or both of the following scenarios:

• Hamas Takeover: As the most obvious and most important beneficiary of the PA’s demise, Hamas would have both the means and incentive to try to extend its current control over Gaza to the West Bank. Buoyed by its recent “victory” in Gaza and its growing regional acceptance, Hamas may judge that Israel would be willing to tolerate Hamas rule in the West Bank if it shows it is able to prevent attacks on Israelis and maintain basic law and order. For Israelis, however, the West Bank is not Gaza, and the prospect of a well-armed, ascendant Hamas force situated just a few kilometers from Tel Aviv and most major Israeli population centers is unlikely to be tolerated by any Israeli government.

• Local Ad Hoc Leaderships: As an alternative to a Hamas takeover (or as a precursor to one), we could also see the emergence of multiple, ad hoc leaderships across the West Bank, comprised of some combination of local clan heads, municipal councils, business interests, and even gangs or warlords. Dealing with multiple centers of power would pose logistical challenges for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in its efforts to protect Israeli settlers while increasing the likelihood of friction both with and within Palestinian communities, making an IDF reoccupation of Palestinian cities and towns far more likely.

Preventing the PA’s Collapse:

In either case, the longer uncertainty and instability (or worse, violence and chaos) persist, the louder Palestinian, Arab, European and other voices will be for Israel, as the Occupying Power, to assume its responsibilities under international humanitarian law for both policing and governing the Palestinian population. The immediate objective for the United States therefore should be to do everything possible to prevent the collapse from occurring.

• The first priority is to prevent an imminent financial collapse of the PA by pushing all international donors, especially Arab states, to follow through on their commitments to the PA. For such calls to be credible, however, the U.S. and Israel must be willing to do the same. Thus, it is equally crucial that you press Congress for the immediate release of $200 million held since the PLO’s unsuccessful bid for full UN membership last year (and to refrain from further aid cuts) as well as pressure Israel to release all withheld VAT transfers, which account for some two-thirds of the PA budget.

• This is only a short-term fix, however, which cannot succeed without parallel economic and political measures. As a recent World Bank report makes clear, genuine economic growth is not possible while restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation remain in place, particularly the Palestinians’ inability to exploit or develop some sixty percent of the West Bank designated as Area C. It is time to have a serious conversation with the Prime Minister of Israel about lifting restrictions in substantial portions of Area C.

• It will not be possible to keep donor funds flowing or to sustain developments on the ground without meaningful and parallel progress at the political level. This will require credible U.S. action on the issue of Israeli settlements aimed at preventing the recent surge in settlement plans — especially in the E-1 corridor and other sensitive areas in and around East Jerusalem — from moving forward on the ground. While new negotiations remain a key objective, it would be a mistake to rush into them. Rather than merely urging (or attempting to force) the parties to return to the negotiating table, you should instruct your new secretary of state to undertake a serious appraisal of the likely requirements for success and causes of past failures, while making clear that an American initiative is forthcoming.

Minimizing the Fallout:

Should these efforts prove unsuccessful, and the PA collapses or is dissolved by Mahmoud Abbas, you would need to move quickly, in coordination with Israel and Jordan, to prevent West Bank cities and towns from descending into total chaos and to contain any outbreak of Palestinian– Israeli violence in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. At the same time, both the United States and Israel would have an overriding interest in preventing the total elimination of Fatah on the one hand and a complete, partial, or even attempted takeover by Hamas on the other. This will require close consultation with the Israelis to contain their military response to any unrest, and to prevent such a response from escalating the violence even further. It will also require engaging (directly or via third parties) with credible Palestinian interlocutors capable of exerting some measure of control on the ground — namely Fatah and Hamas. And since the United States cannot talk directly to Hamas, such coordination would need to take place through a unitary leadership mechanism such as the PLO, which could (at least theoretically) survive the PA’s demise.

Needless to say, this will require the United States to drop its opposition to Palestinian reconciliation, and encourage Israel to do likewise. Moreover, if we are to dissuade Hamas from taking over (or even attempting to) in the West Bank, it will need to be offered something in return. This will entail some sort of power-sharing arrangement in a newly restructured and reconstituted PLO, as well as working with Egypt and other regional partners like Qatar and Turkey to persuade Hamas to go along.

There are many risks involved in engaging with Hamas in this way, including legitimizing a designated terrorist organization whose charter calls for the destruction of Israel as well as the potential for provoking a backlash from Congress (to say nothing of the resistance from the government of Israel). Nevertheless, attempting to ignore or sideline Hamas would be even riskier and more costly, encouraging it to become more assertive and aggressive in both the West Bank and Gaza. Although Hamas would undoubtedly pay a heavy price for any confrontation with Israel, it would come at considerable cost to Israel as well, in both human and political terms. Any period of protracted violence between Israelis and Palestinians will subject Israel to greater international opprobrium and isolation, as well as growing calls for Israel to assume its responsibilities under international law, while extinguishing what little hope may still exist for a two-state solution. The simple reality is that a credible Palestinian interlocutor that can act effectively both on the ground and in the diplomatic sphere, regardless of its composition, is the only thing standing between where we are today and an eventual one-state outcome.

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Khaled Elgindy

Amnon Lipkin Shahak: The Peace General

Martin S. Indyk — Thu, 20 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Amnon Lipkin Shahak died today and Israel lost one of its last warriors in the cause of peace. Amnon was, like his mentor and patron Yitzhak Rabin, a general who became a peacemaker. I met him first when he was the Director of Military Intelligence, and came to work closely with him when he was Rabin's IDF Chief of Staff, and then when he entered politics as Deputy Prime Minister in Ehud Barak's government. Amnon played a leading role in defending the state of Israel and its citizens. But he played an even more important role in peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians. Of all the Israeli players in that tragic drama, Amnon was the most trusted by the Arabs on the other side of the negotiating table. Tall, handsome, with a charming smile and a wry sense of humor, Amnon's integrity shone forth like a beacon in a storm -- wise, all-knowing, reliable.

Two anecdotes from my experiences with Amnon give testimony to his qualities. In 1994, he was despatched to Tunis by Rabin to deal with Arafat after the "Hebron massacre" in which Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein had slaughtered 29 Palestinians at prayer, derailing the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Rabin told Amnon he could offer to evacuate the Israeli settlers who were living in the heart of Hebron if that would bring Arafat back to the negotiating table. That concession was unnecessary. Arafat so trusted Amnon -- probably because he admired him for all the characteristics that he possessed and Arafat lacked -- that he agreed to return to negotiations without demanding any compensation. When Amnon reported this to Rabin, his commander admitted great relief because he feared he would not have been able to deliver on the commitment to evacuate the settlers.

In 2000, at the Camp David peace negotiations, Amnon played a crucial role presiding over a second-track of informal negotiations with Arafat's aides. These negotiations took place on the porch of Amnon's cabin, late at night, as Israeli and Palestinians explored creative solutions to help bridge the differences while the American negotiators listened quietly. The most emotional exchange took place over Jerusalem. He explained to the Palestinians that the Temple Mount was a question of identity for Israelis: "The Temple Mount is the lock and we don't have the key. All that we have is our heritage and our beliefs. I can't put myself in Palestinian shoes; I have only my own shoes. And I can't give it up. You will have control; your flag will fly there. But if we give up our sovereignty we give up our dreams."

Amnon never gave up on the dream of peace. He maintained an active role advising both Israeli and Palestinian leaders on how to resolve their differences to his last breath. But sadly he, like all of the other peacemakers, was unable to reconcile Israeli and Palestinian dreams. He will be sorely missed by all of us. Blessed are the peacemakers, so Amnon's memory will surely be blessed. But it should also remain as a reminder to all those would be peacemakers in the future, that goodwill, understanding, integrity, generosity and humor may not be sufficient to end this too-long conflict but they are the necessary and too often missing ingredients.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: Yediot Aharonot

U.S. Must Step Forward to Stabilize Congo

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Tony Gambino — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The troubled country of the Democratic Republic of the Congo again has come into the headlines as a new rebellion in eastern Congo shakes the center of Africa. The present situation has already displaced hundreds of thousands, with unknown numbers dead — and, as before, it could easily widen, threatening the safety of millions and stability across the middle of Africa.

Earlier this month, M23 rebels fighting the Congolese army withdrew from the eastern regional capital city of Goma, which they had seized 10 days earlier. Their withdrawal occurred after intense international activity, negotiations between M23 officials and Congo President Joseph Kabila in Kampala, Uganda, and an agreement signed there on Nov. 24 by the leaders of a regional African organization, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the chairwoman of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, endorsed this agreement. However, the Kampala Accords and ICGLR role are grossly insufficient to respond to the underlying, interlinked crises in Congo and the wider region.

Congo is plagued by three interlocking crises. First, a local crisis in eastern Congo involving multiple groups has turned violent many times since 1991. Second, a national crisis of poor governance and state failure has stymied Congo for decades. Failed national elections in 2011 added an even deeper crisis of political legitimacy. Finally, an international crisis has existed between Congo and Rwanda since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It remains unresolved, with Rwanda’s clear military support to the M23 rebels its most recent manifestation. All three intertwined crises must be tackled and resolved.

Read the full article at politico.com »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Tony Gambino

Publication: POLITICO

Afghanistan: Endgame or Persisting Challenge with Continuing Stakes?

Tue, 11 Dec 2012 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 11, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On December 11, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of a new book, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan, by Brookings Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown.

After more than a decade of great effort and sacrifice by the United States and its allies, the Taliban still has not been defeated, and many Afghans believe that a civil war is coming. In 2014, foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, international financial flows will radically decrease, and Afghanistan’s presidential elections will intensify political uncertainties. These challenges are mounting at a time when Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption and ethnic factionalization, while the regional environment is not easily conducive to stability in the country. With the U.S. and international publics tired of the war, fundamental questions about any remaining stakes in Afghanistan and the efficacy of any persisting stabilization efforts are increasing.

On December 11, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of a new book, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (Brookings, 2012), by Brookings Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown. Aspiration and Ambivalence analyzes the past decade of U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan and offers detailed recommendations for dealing with the precarious situation leading up to the 2014 transition and after. In her book, Felbab-Brown argues that allied efforts in Afghanistan have put far too little emphasis on good governance, concentrating too much on short-term military goals to the detriment of long-term peace and stability. Felbab-Brown was joined by Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-07). Vice President Martin S. Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Afghanistan: Endgame or Persisting Challenge with Continuing Stakes?

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121211_afghanistan

Participants

Panelists

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence

Martin S. Indyk

Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy

With Ceasefire, Hamas' Isolation Has Ended

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 23 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Critics of the ceasefire reached Wednesday between Hamas and Israel argue that little has changed. For now, they say, the Egypt-brokered de-escalation has merely placed a Band-Aid over a seeping wound, restoring the status quo established after Israel's Operation Cast Lead offensive of late 2008. Certainly, we may well see the return of airstrikes and rockets; the truce represents only a small first step toward a more durable solution. The nature of the agreement, however, points to a clear "Arab Spring truth" and a significant shift in regional dynamics: The international isolation of Hamas has ended.

The influence exercised by Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar was clearly instrumental in delivering this ceasefire. The role of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy, in particular, has been praised by Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alike, with the latter commending Egypt's government for "assuming responsibility and leadership" in de-escalating the crisis.

Read the full article at cnn.com »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: CNN

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 12:41:00 -0500

Abstract:

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Terrorism and Political Violence