Brookings: Topics - Nuclear Energy

Energy Security in Northeast Asia: A Pivotal Moment for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Shoichi Itoh — Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Two years have passed since the Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake devastated northeastern Japan and the subsequent meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant shook the world. The government, then led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), proved unable to revive the ailing economy (the problems of which pre-dated the earthquake), and also made no clear-cut decision on a new energy policy for Japan. Faced with popular opinion and public demonstrations against nuclear power but faced with a high energy economy, the DPJ administration’s equivocal stance on nuclear power generation remained unchanged. As Japan’s nuclear reactors shut down after Fukushima, Japan once again found itself a resource-poor country whose energy security is seriously affected by international surroundings.

The DPJ suffered its own virtual meltdown in the December 2012 lower house election, suffering incessant intra-party strife and a complete lack of leadership as a ruling party; it won only 57 seats in the election, compared to the 231 it held before. Its ambiguously anti-nuclear stance in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster did not help it with voters as the more pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) scored a landslide comeback victory, increasing its seats from 118 to 294 and recapturing the Prime Minister’s office, which it had lost in 2009.

At the U.S.-Japan summit in Washington, D.C. on February 22, 2013, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asked President Barack Obama to approve liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Japan at an early date, as this is an important way for Japan to reduce fuel costs which increased sharply after the Great East Japan earthquake. According to a press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, President Obama noted that the export licensing issue was still under review, but he is aware of the importance of Japan as a U.S. ally. Prime Minister Abe also pledged to conduct a zero-based review of the previous administration’s policy of exploring a possible phase-out of all nuclear reactors by 2030, and noted that he intends to formulate responsible energy policies with a view toward working with the United States at various levels in international nuclear cooperation. Besides nuclear power, bilateral cooperation on development of clean energy and climate change issues were highlighted. The two leaders basically agreed that their governments would continue to work on Japan’s prospective participation in the TPP on the condition that they recognized both countries would have bilateral trade sensitivities.

Amid this broad range of issues, energy security is a key issue that the United States and Japan must emphasize in reconsolidating and broadening their alliance beyond mere bilateral issues. The construction of a U.S.-Japan energy security alliance based on the two pillars of nuclear power generation in Japan, and exports of U.S. LNG to Japan, could be used as a model for reducing volatility in energy markets and even helping to ensure geopolitical stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Nuclear Power as a lynchpin of the alliance

Given rapid changes in the international energy landscape, Tokyo can not waste any more time in clarifying its post-Fukushima energy strategy. Japan is the world’s third biggest oil consumer and tops the list of LNG importers; it depends almost completely on imports to meet its hydrocarbon consumption needs. The rapid increase of LNG imports following the post-Fukushima nuclear reactor shutdowns led to dramatic increases in natural gas prices in Asia. LNG import prices in Asia are indexed to oil prices, but do not benefit from the trend of decreasing prices elsewhere―including North America―that is a feature of the shale gas revolution. Therefore, in Asia imported gas prices basically hover at high rates in accordance with high oil prices while in North America gas prices are set competitively as supplies come from numerous domestic sources.

Therefore, the energy policy choices Tokyo makes will have major consequences not just for the domestic economy, but also for international energy markets. Given its extremely low energy self-sufficiency rate of four percent (without nuclear power), Japan’s policy options for ensuring its future energy security are limited.

Simply put, Japan must restart nuclear reactors, and it must also introduce and enforce stricter safety regulations. In order to do so, the government must make a clear political decision to end the endless ideological and emotional debate about nuclear power. The “mythification” of nuclear safety before Fukushima was an important lesson the whole population obviously learned from the tragedy; people will and should now be more skeptical. Some activists argue that nuclear reactors should restart only after their “perfect safety” can be assured; obviously, it is an illusion to think that humankind could ever create perfect safely in its literal sense. However cautious we may be; complete mastery over nature, science, and the future is not possible. Only strong political leadership can put an end to this pointless debate; the government should identify, at the earliest stage and in light of international experience, a set of yardsticks to satisfy legal requirements for nuclear restarts even if we must recognize that it will be a learn-by-doing process. This is Japan’s inescapable responsibility for its own economic life, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the international community.

Postponing nuclear reactor restarts have drained Japan’s national wealth considerably. It became a trade-deficit nation for the first time in more than three decades. A major factor in this development is the jump in LNG imports due to replacement of nuclear power generation by gas-fired thermal plants. Imports grew from 70 million tons from 2010 to 78.5 million tons in 2011 and 87.3 million tons in 2012 – an increase of almost 25 percent in two years. However, during the same period, the total value of LNG purchases increased by more than 70 percent from about 3.5 trillion yen in 2010 to 6 trillion yen in 2012 due to the sharp increases in LNG prices per million Btu (British thermal unit) destined for Japan: the average LNG import prices for Japan increased by about 55 percent from approximately $11 per million Btu in 2010 to approximately $17 per million Btu in 2012. The increase in Japan’s LNG imports accounted for the predominant chunk of its trade deficit of about 6.9 trillion yen in 2012. Nuclear restarts would result in huge savings in domestic fuel costs. Moreover, it would help stabilize the global LNG markets; the Northeast Asian natural gas market is most seriously affected with Japan consuming about one-thirds of the world’s LNG demand.

It also must be emphasized that Japan’s nuclear future will directly affect the range of U.S.-Japan cooperation which goes by far beyond mere energy issues. The Japanese and U.S. nuclear industries have developed as “twin brothers” for more than a half century. Today, Hitachi and GE, as well as Toshiba and Westinghouse, have nuclear power joint ventures. Japanese nuclear vendors have made significant contributions to make up for the declining of the nuclear industry in the United States after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, by developing high-tech nuclear products for civilian use and producing a large number of the world’s top-class engineers.

A phase-out of nuclear power in Japan would also have an adverse impact on the global non-proliferation regime. While shale gas causes natural gas prices to remain low, there is increased uncertainty in the United States about introducing new nuclear power plants. Ironically, this has increased the importance of sustaining high standards for nuclear technologies against the background of diffusion of nuclear power for civilian use in the world. This diffusion is irreversible, regardless of U.S. and Japanese domestic nuclear policies, in order to meet drastic rises in energy demand in emerging economies. The loss of Japanese nuclear vendors’ international competitiveness would jeopardize the bilateral alliance’s presence in global nuclear markets, which would in turn weaken Washington’s and Tokyo’s voices in the future non-proliferation regime. Japan needs to rediscover its role as one of the most serious advocates for reinforcement of global efforts on non-proliferation.

Maintaining a certain amount of nuclear power in the energy mix is also important from a climate change perspective. Tokyo must realistically readjust the over-ambitious target of cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25 percent below 1990 levels that was announced by then-DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama at the United Nations Summit on Climate Change in September 2009, which received little support from the domestic business community. But Japan should continue to play its own roles to combat climate change as long as a principle of fairness of international burden-sharing is guaranteed. A nuclear restart is an indispensable way to reduce a certain amount of GHG emissions, given that too many uncertainties await dramatic expansion of renewable sources in the energy mix at least in the foreseeable future, due in part to high costs.

LNG as a fuel to increase Japan’s burden-sharing

Increases of LNG exports from the United States to Japan will become a new way to strengthen the alliance, and the impacts extend beyond energy. Undoubtedly, Japan would benefit from prospective participation in the TPP, and co-designing the future framework of economic rules in the Asia-Pacific region would also reinforce the bilateral alliance. TPP membership for Japan would remove a potential obstacle to increase LNG exports from the lower 48 states. According to the U.S. Natural Gas Law, LNG exports to non-FTA trade partners must be authorized by the Department of Energy on a case-by-case basis (Japan has imported LNG from Alaska since 1969.) However, the meaning of increasing LNG supplies to Japan should be emphasized in a wider context, entailing geostrategic importance besides the economic benefits of improving the U.S. international balance of payments. LNG imports from the United States will beef up Japan’s economic muscle, better allowing it to play the role of the main “bridgehead” of the U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region. With sound economic growth, Japan can be expected to contribute more to burden-sharing as it will be able to increase its budgets for defense, economic aid to developing countries, and many other issues that benefit the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Even if Tokyo decides in principle to restart nuclear reactors, both the political and technical processes will take some time. Public support will have to be nurtured in a step-by-step manner. This means that increased access to economically competitive LNG supplies remains urgent. As late as February 2013, Japan paid approximately five times more than the U.S. Henry Hub price per million Btu (British thermal unit), on average, for LNG purchases. Although of the price of future imports of LNG from North America remains uncertain, it is generally estimated that the final cost of LNG from the lower 48 states―including liquefaction costs, transportation fees, and other costs―are still lower than the average price of Japan’s current LNG imports.

Aside from the price issue, securing new LNG supply routes from North America is also important to ensure the safety of Japan’s seaborne hydrocarbon transportation. Currently, approximately 80 percent of crude oil and 30 percent of LNG destined for Japan cut across the East China Sea, where Sino-Japanese tension is simmering.

Toward a joint architecture for Asian-Pacific energy security

Against the background of the shale revolution, there are rising expectations about “energy independence” in the United States, which is thought not only to boost the domestic economy with cheap energy prices and reduce vulnerability to international oil prices, but also to increase policy options for U.S. diplomacy. The ongoing debate about diplomatic implications of U.S. energy independence within the next decade by and large tends to focus on the question of how it would affect the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. However, a blueprint for placing energy independence in the context of the so-called U.S. “pivot to Asia” has yet to emerge. New roles and functions for the U.S.-Japan alliance should be designed in the context of U.S. energy independence. Today in Northeast Asia, the energy security environment is rapidly changing with impending new challenges for the U.S.-Japan alliance to tackle.

First, the rise of China with its surging energy demand has raised concerns about its impact on the global energy market. According to estimates published by the International Energy Agency in its November 2012 World Energy Outlook 2012, China is forecasted to account for more than half of increases in global oil demand by 2030; its dependence on imported oil will increase from 54 percent in 2011 to 77 percent in 2030. Likewise, China is projected to account for about 28 percent of increases in global demand for natural gas with its import dependence to rise from 14 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2030. Its impact on global oil prices and thus on the growth of the world economy would be considerable. Furthermore, Beijing’s anxiety about ensuring stable access to energy resources may stimulate the expansion of Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy’s power projection capabilities, as a means to increase and secure access to overseas oil and natural gas supplies.

The deepening of China’s economic interdependence with both the United States and Japan is unstoppable in the foreseeable future. Steady growth of the Chinese economy, which requires finding a solution to the upsurge in China’s energy demand, is of great significance to the United States and Japan. In this regard, the two allies should explore possibilities for strengthening cooperation with China in a number of areas, especially energy efficiency, clean energy, and nuclear power generation. Outside (or uninformed) observers of Sino-Japanese relations tend to be overwhelmed by the contemporary geopolitical dispute and rising nationalism that fill the headlines, and overlook the fact that Beijing and Tokyo have developed extensive cooperation in the energy sector, including on energy conservation and clean energy technologies, for more than three decades. Japan can share its rich experiences in energy and environmental projects in China with the United States to capitalize on the recent success of Sino-U.S. clean energy cooperation. Beyond the business benefits, such collaboration could have invaluable political implications. If the three biggest energy consumers in the world could find a joint flagship project it could help create a new international framework for engaging China.

From the standpoint of reducing hydrocarbon consumption and carbon dioxide emissions, the U.S.-Japan “nuclear twins” should pursue nuclear cooperation with China, which has 18 nuclear power plants currently in operation. The nuclear stakes in China are about to get much bigger: there are about 30 reactors under construction and more than 50 in the planning stage. This expansion is of global importance. Successful growth in nuclear power generation would reduce China’s hydrocarbon consumption and GHG emissions, and operational safety of the plants amidst such a rush of construction is an obvious concern.

Secondly, Russia has devoted every effort to enhance its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, taking advantage of hosting the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok last September. Moscow is anxious to accelerate the development of untapped hydrocarbon resources in the eastern regions of the country as a way to gain new business opportunities while enhancing its geopolitical influence in Northeast Asia. The 4700 km crude oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (ESPO) was completed in December 2012. Russia currently exports about 0.6 million barrels per day by the ESPO pipeline, but aims to increase the volume as much as possible.

The U.S. shale gas revolution came as a harsh blow to Moscow, given that Russia is frustrated by the gradual decreases of its natural gas exports to Europe as consumption there declines and the EU seeks diversification of natural gas supply routes. The Sakhalin-2 is the only LNG project in Russia, as of today, with a maximum capacity of exporting 9.6 million tons per year; a new LNG plant in Vladivostok is in the planning stages. In recent months Russia has aggressively approached Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea to strengthen partnerships in oil and gas sectors.

Meanwhile, the United States already has a bastion in the energy landscape of Northeast Asia, with ExxonMobil as the operator of the Sakhalin-1 project. The destination of natural gas exports from the project has remained undecided due to conflicts of interest between ExxonMobil and Russia’s state-owned gas company, Gazprom, which has monopolized Russia’s natural gas exports to date. Yet, while President Putin has recently disclosed a plan to liberalize the natural gas export market, the state-owned oil company, Rosneft, has galvanized itself to find new foreign partners. It has expanded agreements with ExxonMobil, addressing new oil and gas projects in Russia’s Far Eastern and Arctic regions, and has acquired a stake in Exxon’s gas project in Alaska.

However, Russia does not yet seem to have emerged as a factor in the U.S. pivot to Asia. Especially since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the demise of the Soviet military threat in the Asia-Pacific, Washington’s approach to Russia has been overwhelmingly Euro-centric. Russia’s aggressive move to the Asia-Pacific region in the energy sector should be taken into account, when we imagine diplomatic implications of U.S. energy independence for this region. Obviously, one of the impetuses of Russia’s rapid move to the east is Moscow’s concern about the rise of China. Notwithstanding the economic benefit of the drastic increase in oil trade volumes with China, voices among the Russian power elite are gradually emerging to alarm that Russia might become a “resource appendage” to its neighboring geopolitical rival. It should be noted, however, that increasing hydrocarbon exports from Russia’s eastern regions would also be one of the ways in which the impact of China’s explosive energy needs upon the global energy market can be reduced peacefully. U.S. and Japanese policymakers should consider this point when they discuss Russia’s role as a big energy supplier in the context of energy security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Energy security in the Asia-Pacific region entails numerous uncertainties in both energy markets and geopolitical dynamism. The robust U.S.-Japan alliance must be anchored in solving energy challenges, but this requires clarification of Tokyo’s post-Fukushima energy policies including an internationally responsible political decision on restarting Japan’s nuclear power plants. Wisdom and long-term perspectives are needed to reduce the economic and security costs of ensuring regional stability in the years to come. It is high time for the United States and Japan to begin to design a roadmap for an international framework of energy security in which other regional key players such as China and Russia are effectively engaged.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, or any other organization.

Authors

Shoichi Itoh

Image Source: © Issei Kato / Reuters

Earthquake, Tsunami, Meltdown - The Triple Disaster's Impact on Japan, Impact on the World

Elizabeth Ferris and Mireya Solís — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Two years ago today, a devastating 9.0 earthquake struck Japan’s east coast, followed minutes later by a massive tsunami with 100 foot waves. Japan’s legendary investment in earthquake-resistant design meant that only about 100 people died in the earthquake itself although almost 20,000 people lost their lives in the tsunami. The economic destruction of the "Triple Disaster" was massive: 138,000 buildings were destroyed and $360 billion in economic losses were incurred. This was the most expensive disaster in human history. Japanese response to the earthquake and tsunami was rapid, effective and life-saving. Some 465,000 people were evacuated after the disaster. But it was the meltdowns at the Fukushima nuclear plant – the world’s worst global nuclear crisis since Chernobyl in 1986 – which caused the most fear and provoked the greatest criticism of the Japanese government’s response.

The Triple Disaster had effects on Japan and on the world.

The economic, political, and social consequences of the Triple Disaster have changed Japan in fundamental ways. The uprooting of entire communities and the large infrastructural losses produced immediate disruptions in Japan’s extensive supply networks. These in turn caused dramatic drops in industrial production that imposed a toll not only on Japan’s economy, but also on the many other countries linked through these production networks. While Japanese companies creatively restored the supply chains in just a few months, the shutdown of the nuclear reactors has had far more damaging long-term economic consequences. Since 3/11 only two nuclear reactors have restarted operations, and the Japanese government has had to resort to large increases in oil imports to make for the gap in electricity supply. Consequently, since 3/11 Japan has experienced record trade deficits, in the order of $78 billion in 2012.

The social and political aftereffects of 3/11 are also formidable. A large citizen movement calling for the abolition of nuclear power in Japan developed in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. The enactment of more exacting safety standards and the development of new patterns of government regulation and monitoring of the nuclear industry have emerged as key topics in the national political debate. On a more positive note, the Triple Disaster also revealed Japan’s most valuable asset: the strength of its civil society. The world watched in awe as Japanese citizens who had lost everything, immediately sprung to help one another. The dignity, creativity, and orderly response of the Japanese population to this mega disaster is indeed the best measure of Japan’s potential. And just as a previous natural disaster, the Kobe earthquake of 1995, helped spur the NGO movement in Japan, March 11, 2011 has seen has seen the activation of scores of non-profit groups and the consolidation of a culture of volunteerism.

However, the reconstruction challenges remain daunting for Japan. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced, the quality of the nuclear cleanup continues to raise concerns, and the financial cost of rebuilding the Tohoku region is staggering (in its latest stimulus budget, the Abe government slated $18 billion dollars for this purpose). Japan’s energy future is also uncertain as the government has yet to issue a long-term strategy that clarifies the role of nuclear power in the country’s energy mix.

The effects of the Japanese disaster went far beyond Japan, of course. It served as a warning that even developed, well-prepared countries are not immune from terrifying disasters. It illustrated the extremely high economic costs of disasters occurring in developed countries and the vulnerabilities that come with urbanization and coastal settlement. It served as a wakeup call to the world that unanticipated disasters (or "black swans") happen and that those engaged in contingency planning need to be prepared for much more devastating disasters. Internationally, the fallout of the Fukushima meltdowns for the future of nuclear energy has been mixed. While immediately after the accident some governments announced plans to phase out of nuclear energy, others have continued their nuclear planning (although it’s probably true that all nuclear plants worldwide looked more seriously at their safeguard mechanisms in light of Fukushima). Japan’s tragedy has also led to a re-energizing of investing in disaster risk reduction strategies.

In October 2012, the Japanese government and the World Bank co-hosted the Sendai Dialogue to highlight the lessons learned from the disasters and to adopt comprehensive guidance for reducing risk in other parts of the world. To continue the learning of lessons from Japan for disaster risk management in Asia, we are organizing a day-long conference at Brookings on May 10, 2013 to examine the lessons from March 11, 2011, the challenges of disaster risk management in Asia and, more broadly, strategies for mainstreaming disaster risk management in development assistance. We hope in a small way to contribute to continued learning from Japan’s tragedy and to prevent further tragedies resulting from similar disasters which occur elsewhere.

Authors

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Why Jordan Is Building Two New Nuclear Power Plants

John P. Banks — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: As Jordan looks to develop a civilian nuclear energy program, some domestic and international analysts are questioning the feasibility and intentions of its efforts. In an interview with Monocle, John Banks suggests that while Jordan’s efforts are the result of domestic energy shortages, its program will be hard to develop for a number of reasons. Read an excerpt below.

Monocle: Now the generally accepted role of Jordan is to be the Middle Eastern country which doesn’t make everybody nervous. Possibly because they would like just a little bit of attention for a change, possibly because, who knows, they have a sincere desire to provide for their future energy requirements, Jordan is about to commission two nuclear reactors.

Amman is believed to be choosing between tenders from a French Japanese consortium and a Russian competitor. Jordan is almost totally dependent on oil and gas imports and this twelve billion euro project would spare Jordan from relying on the stability of their neighbors, which as recent events have reemphasized, is one of the world’s very least reliable qualities. Well joining us now to tell us more is John Banks, non-resident Fellow of the Energy Security Initiative at The Brookings Institution in Washington DC.

First of all, should we be pleased about this?

John Banks: Well, first thanks for having me. It depends on your perspective. Certainly from the Jordanian perspective there are several major drivers why they are pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program. The first is they are looking at annual electricity demand of about eight percent per year over the next decade or so. They are expected to need to add several thousand megawatts of capacity just to keep up with that electricity demand. And secondly, as your intro made reference to, they have energy security reasons for pursuing civilian nuclear power. They really have a situation where they’re highly dependent, as the intro mentioned, overwhelmingly on imports of energy, more than 90% dependent imports for energy across the economy, but in particular in transport and in power generation. One of their overall strategies is to diversify fuel sources and in particular to limit reliance on imported fossil fuels.

Monocle: The trouble that has been in the past though is that Jordan has had quite a stop-start nuclear program. It has been stopped by the Israelis; it has been stopped by the Americans. Obviously there is some fundamental concern about, not lightly, the safety of this.

Banks: Any country, but particularly a country that is pursuing its first nuclear reactor is going to be faced with a variety of very serious challenges, not the least of which is the need to develop a very robust framework to provide for the safe operation of the facilities as well as the security of the facilities and also to prevent proliferation. These are some of the major challenges that any county is faced with, but particularly for a country pursuing its first reactor. If you are starting from a position where you have no nuclear infrastructure and very little human resources capacity, this is a very big challenge. You need to develop a legal and regulatory framework, put in place the human resources capabilities, and allocate sufficient funding to ensure that this sector is operating according to the highest standards. So there is no question that, I think the Jordanian government recognizes the challenges, the question is are they going to be able to overcome them.

Listen to the full interview » (starts at 17:30)

Authors

John P. Banks

Publication: The Monocle Daily

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

Learning to ‘Coexist with Risk:’ The Essence of Japan’s Technical Cooperation with Central American Countries

Goshi Tsukamoto — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 10:24:00 -0500

The Japanese archipelago is one of a number of regions that has been vulnerable to frequent natural disasters. Through its history, tragic experiences have accumulated, and the modern Japanese society and each individual in the country have learned lessons from each of those occasions. Based on these experiences, the Government of Japan has globally disseminated the spirit of “BOSAI,” a Japanese word meaning disaster reduction efforts, in its foreign aid menu.

Central America is an important target area for Japan’s BOSAI assistance. Because of geographical and geological reasons, the region―located in the rim of the Pacific Ocean as Japan is―faces substantial risks of storms and floods, mudslides, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. The countries in this region have strived in the past decades to cope with these chronic problems not only at national level, but also at the regional level. One of the fruits of the efforts made by those countries is the establishment of the Coordination Center for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC). However, they still need support from the international community. Upon request by Central American countries, Japan implemented a “Project on Capacity Development for Disaster Risk Management in Central America” (known in shorthand as Project BOSAI) from May 2007 until May 2012. This project brought a variety of know-how and experience for dealing with possible disasters caused by natural phenomena in Central American nations, aimed especially at enhancing capacity for disaster reduction at the local level.

“Aprendiendo a convivir con el riesgo”

Project BOSAI sought to introduce feasible practices for prevention and reduction of damage from inevitable natural disasters, as well as adequate treatments after events, at the community level. Following intensive consultation between the Government of Japan and CEPREDENAC, the project was implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). It included some of the most vulnerable villages and communities as prioritized pilot sites in targeted countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. During the five year course of the project, JICA dispatched a number of experts in various fields, including prevention and reduction of damage caused by inundation, mudslide, volcanic eruption, and tsunami, to those pilot sites. They organized seminars and workshops collaborating with local governments and villages, sharing useful knowledge accumulated in Japanese history, providing materials, and trying to strengthen local institutions and inspire local people under the slogan “aprendiendo a convivir con el riesgo”: learning to coexist with risk. The concrete activities and the fruits of Project BOSAI can be summarized as follows.

Visualizing the risks

For a community to deal with disaster risks, a shared common knowledge in the community about the risks faced in daily life is indispensable. For example, in Atitlan, Guatemala, which frequently suffered from mudslides in the past, an expert from Japan organized a seminar and conducted “Town watching for BOSAI,” in which local people walk around with the expert to appreciate the potential risks and acquire the essential common knowledge by visualizing the risks which confront the community. The participants who joined this program constructed a visible risk map. In fact, they didn’t need to depend on satellite photos but they could understand the environment of the community by handwriting by themselves. Once a community creates a common risk map, it can share the visualized risks which enable people to take action for future prevention and reduction.

Introducing an early warning system

Project BOSAI introduced an early warning system which doesn’t rely on high-tech equipment. For example, in Saragoza, El Salvador, experts from Japan worked with local junior high-school students to make basic rain gauges, utilizing recycled bottles. When it rains, the villagers are asked to observe the amount of precipitation using the hand-made rain gauges and to record whatever happens around the community according to the amount of precipitation. If they steadily continue this, the villagers can obtain a “sustainable early warning system” built on meaningful data. The community can consult this data in subsequent rainstorms to know when the villagers as a whole should take action to prevent and reduce specific damage caused by storms and floods.

Building useful infrastructure from re-purposed waste materials

The coastal communities around the Cañas River in Costa Rica have suffered repeatedly from inundation. They require a large dike, strong enough to prevent flooding. This region is also home to sugar plant plantations that produce a lot of used tires as waste. Therefore, Project BOSAI, inspired by the initiative of local people, helped build a dike utilizing used tires as basic building materials. The community members learned the construction know-how, scientifically justified by Japanese experts, and can reproduce useful dikes as long as they can access used tires. Project BOSAI tries to share this know-how with other targeted countries as well.[1]

Strengthening institutions for disaster reduction

Hurricane Ida struck the Central American isthmus in November 2009. It caused considerable damage to the region. However, the village of Las Ojas, El Salvador, a Project BOSAI pilot site, recorded no fatalities. As the hurricane approached the country, the villagers of Las Ojas could access the updated information emitted by Committee for Disaster Reduction of San Pedro Masahuat, whose local government covered the village Las Ojas, through a radio provided by Project BOSAI. The fact that some of the members of Committee for Disaster Reduction of San Pedro Masahuat had participated in JICA training programs in the past helped facilitate smooth communication between Las Ojas and the municipality. Sirens placed around the community, also provided by Project BOSAI, sounded two hours before the main storm came too close so that people had enough time to prepare themselves.

These examples demonstrate that the spirit of “learning to coexist with risk” has taken root in Central America. It is worthwhile to mention that what Project BOSAI introduced to recipient communities depended neither on expensive high-tech equipment nor on mega infrastructure, but focused on promoting knowledge sharing and inspiring local people. The fruits of the project remain important in the targeted sites, and the positive impact is expected to expand from the pilot sites to other regions. This kind of technology transfer can eventually foster growth in institutional and even personal capacities for prevention and reduction of disaster damage in the region as a whole. In this way, Japan’s foreign aid activities―including those based on the spirit of “aprendiendo a convivir con el riesgo”―draw upon some of the many lessons that Japanese society has learned through its own experiences with natural disasters and applies them to global disaster reduction efforts. Because human beings cannot escape frequent natural disasters, we must prepare ourselves in all ways possible prior to the events for the purpose of reducing the scale of damage and suffering. Japan believes that its own experiences should be shared as a common asset of human society, and therefore it strives to inspire people to adopt damage reduction practices by disseminating thought-provoking experiences. Japan is expected to continue this sort of intellectual contribution in its foreign aid.

[1] The Spanish guidelines are accessible as follows: Guía de la Construcción del muro de contención, con llantas usadas, http://www.jica.go.jp/project/all_c_america/001/materials/pdf/manual_01.pdf; Guía para la Construcción del Dique, http://www.jica.go.jp/project/all_c_america/001/materials/pdf/manual_02.pdf.

Authors

Goshi Tsukamoto

Image Source: © Luis Galdamez / Reuters

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and The Prospect of A Nuclear Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

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Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

Big Bets and Black Swans: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

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Nuclear Power in Developing Countries? Let's Talk about It

John P. Banks and Kevin Massy — Sun, 16 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This opinion piece first appeared on the Global Post website.

With annual negotiations on a global climate change in Doha, Qatar just completed, it is clear that the world is failing to meet the challenge to reduce carbon emissions. As countries squabble about low-carbon investment funds, historical responsibility, and “climate compensation,” one proven low-carbon technology is being left out of the discussion: nuclear power.

Cited by many as a critical component of any meaningful carbon reduction effort, nuclear energy has been relegated in developed countries. Some nations are planning complete nuclear-power phase-outs and others see a reduced role for the technology as safety related costs and the viability of alternatives – principally natural gas – increase.

While the developed world gets cold feet on nuclear power, its prospects in developing countries are different. The challenges of meeting electricity demand, reducing reliance on imported energy, and promoting economic growth while lowering carbon dioxide emissions, leave many emerging nations with no alternative but to consider nuclear energy as a key component of their economic development and energy security strategies.

The International Energy Agency (IAEA) projections show that these countries will account for 40 percent of total global nuclear power generation by 2035, up from 17 percent in 2010. Of nuclear reactors currently under construction, 69 percent are in China, India and Russia, with China alone accounting for 40 percent of the total. In addition, several developing countries are looking to construct their first nuclear reactors in the next decade or so; the United Arab Emirates has broken ground on the construction of its first units, and Turkey, Jordan and Vietnam are also well along in their plans to build their first civilian nuclear reactor. A handful of others are seriously considering nuclear power, but commitments are pending.

Serious challenges remain in expanding or introducing a nuclear energy infrastructure in developing countries. Major barriers include the high cost of building nuclear power plants, the time required to develop robust legal and regulatory frameworks, the long-term commitment required, establishing a sustainable safety and non-proliferation culture, small grid sizes and lack of interconnections, and lack of human resources capacity.

Our research has highlighted one issue that has received insufficient attention even as it is gradually emerging as critical both in existing nuclear energy states as well as in countries aspiring to introduce their first reactors: the lack of comprehensive, timely and transparent stakeholder engagement is contributing to a growing opposition to nuclear power.

The IAEA emphasizes that stakeholder engagement is of the “utmost importance.” In building popular support it is essential to promote understanding of the advantages of nuclear power, to explain how its risks will be addressed and to legitimize the program in the eyes of the public. The role of stakeholder is also critically related to a country’s ability to attract, motivate, and retain qualified individuals in its nuclear power industry.

In Jordan, skepticism about the rationale for its nuclear power policy is expressed in distrust of official information and rising public protests. Opposition to the nuclear project has spread to the parliament: in May 2012 the Energy and Mineral Resources Committee of the lower house recommended that the government suspend the nuclear power program. As part of an exercise to assess for Jordan lessons from Japan’s Fukushima experience in 2011, a government official acknowledged that “silence and defensive attitude creates doubts…and the more people know, the more they support nuclear energy.”

In Turkey, public protests in the aftermath of Fukushima against that country’s plans to build a nuclear power plant on the Mediterranean coast prompted a Turkish think tank to state that a more regular and comprehensive communication strategy would be helpful in “defusing the polarization surrounding the transition to nuclear power.”

Other countries are also witnessing more vocal opposition. In China, four retired officials of Wangjiang County petitioned against the government’s planned construction of the Pengze nuclear power plant, citing poor or falsified data used in the plant’s application and approval process. The country’s Ministry of Environmental Protection stated that one of the lessons of Fukushima for China is that Beijing “should further strengthen publicity and information disclosure.” Since Fukushima, protesters have been intensifying their demonstrations against the nuclear power plant at Kundakalum in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

Whether due to Fukushima, particular local circumstances, the rise in access to information technology and social media, or generally heightened political and environmental awareness, emerging market countries are witnessing nascent, but increased, opposition to nuclear energy plans.

In our view, lack of stakeholder engagement is a major contributing factor. Governments that may not have a tradition of proactively explaining policy decisions and responding to questions and concerns in a timely and transparent manner are now confronting the reality that engaging in a dialog with all interested parties is essential, especially for an endeavor with such long-term and unique safety, environmental, cost, proliferation and strategic characteristics.

Stakeholders include the news media, NGOs, the general public, opinion leaders, and national and local government officials. Governments in developing countries intending to introduce or expand nuclear energy should engage in serious discussions with all of these interests. If they don’t, the viability, sustainability and safety of their programs will be compromised.

Authors

Publication: Global Post

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States

Wed, 12 Dec 2012 12:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 12, 2012
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Turkey continuing to pursue civil nuclear energy programs, the Middle East is likely to play host to the first new civil nuclear energy states of the 21st century. After a long hiatus, the likely entry of several new states into the global nuclear power sector presents a number of unprecedented challenges, including the development of the institutional and human capacity to run their programs competently and sustainably.

On December 12, the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion of its latest research paper, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East.” Based on case studies from three countries in the Middle East, the paper offers a series of recommendations on human resource related risks for emerging market nations looking to enter the civil nuclear sector. Following the presentation of the report’s findings and recommendations, Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger, director of the Energy Security Initiative, moderated a discussion with its authors.

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East

John P. Banks, Kevin Massy and Charles K. Ebinger — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 09:47:00 -0500

With the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Turkey all continuing pursuit of civil nuclear energy programs, the Middle East is likely to play host to the first newcomer civil nuclear energy states of the 21st century. After a long hiatus, the likely entry of several new states into the global nuclear power sector presents a number of unprecedented challenges. To meet these challenges, it is essential that new nuclear energy states develop the institutional and human capacity to run their programs competently and sustainably. Against this backdrop, this paper assesses human resource development (HRD) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Turkey against these two criteria.

With widely varying economic, political, and social contexts, each of the three countries under review has different HRD requirements and objectives. However, while each country has unique challenges related to its individual circumstances, it is also possible to identify areas of relative success and concern with regard to leading HRD practices.

With a high level of sovereign wealth and a well-formulated, well-articulated strategy for the implementation of civil nuclear power, the UAE has the most comprehensive approach to HRD among the countries under review. The principal challenges for the UAE relate to its ability to reconcile the extensive needs of its civil nuclear program and the objectives of recruiting the requisite number of qualified nationals into training programs and professional positions. Jordan faces more challenges than the UAE with regard to preparedness for a civil nuclear program. While the country has a large educated population the country has far fewer financial resources. Further, some of the biggest obstacles with regard to its nuclear program are the result of a lack of public-sector coordination and communication. Finally, while Turkey has struggled to develop commercial-level nuclear power, its nuclear-related education programs have been established for decades. With no commercial-scale operational experience, however, the host country may be vulnerable to a situation of information asymmetry its regulator may not have sufficient expertise and capacity to competently oversee the construction and operation of the new design they have chosen for construction.

Based on the conclusions from the three country case studies, the paper offers a series of recommendations on competence and sustainability-related HRD risks for the three reviewed countries and emerging market nations looking to enter the civil nuclear sector.

These recommendations are:

• HRD should be a central part of a new nuclear energy state’s strategy

• HRD programs should place a large emphasis on safety culture

• Quality control initiatives should include merit-based recruitment, international benchmarking and vendor involvement

• Stakeholder engagement should be a core element of new nuclear energy programs’ HRD strategies

• HRD strategies should be designed around the operational needs of the nuclear industry rather than around high-profile academic programs

• New nuclear energy states adopting new reactor technologies should allocate additional HRD time and resources to become an “intelligent customer”

• National quota policies should be flexible to the needs of new nuclear programs

• Regional cooperation should not be relied upon as the primary or major source for HRD in the nuclear sector

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Image Source: © Petr Josek Snr / Reuters

Japan’s Energy Future

Fri, 05 Oct 2012 13:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 5, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Following a summer of protests over the safety of nuclear power—prompted by last year’s Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis—the Japanese government recently released a much-awaited energy strategy. The new plan from the governmental Council on Energy and the Environment called for a “zero-nuclear” Japan, phasing out all nuclear power by the year 2040. However, the Japanese Cabinet abstained from fully endorsing the zero-nuclear option, and a small number of new nuclear reactors remain under construction. Obscured by an array of competing priorities and economic, political, and energy security considerations, Japan’s energy future seems unclear.

On October 5, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) and the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on Japan’s energy future, including the shifts in Japan’s energy policymaking, the different energy scenarios for Japan and the challenges of developing alternative sources of renewable energy. Panelists also addressed the implications of a nuclear phase-out for Japan’s export industries, global energy markets, climate change goals, and trade in liquid natural gas.

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Japan’s Energy Future

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The Military Uncertainties of an Attack on Iran

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 15 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Military strikes against the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, together with other possible targets related to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, could last for a single day and single sortie – or they could last for several days or even weeks. The latter possibility of course implies American participation too, and probably requires the use of air bases in one or more Gulf states as well, given the likely U.S. interest in using stealthy planes that at present don’t fly from aircraft carriers (though B-2 bombers could fly from Diego Garcia, for example).

So what is the likely effectiveness, and what are the likely risks, of each possible approach? I’d argue that there is there is significant unpredictability about how well an air campaign by Israel in particular would work – not least in terms of how much of the existing Iranian nuclear infrastructure it would destroy, and how long it might take Iran to recover (and that’s even leaving aside the huge issue of how Iran might retaliate).

First, though, it’s worth reviewing some basic information on previous, somewhat analogous, air campaigns, as well as the nature and locations of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

In Operation Desert Fox, in 1998, the United States and Britain used 650 aircraft sorties and 415 cruise missile strikes, against 97 targets (11 WMD facilities, 18 command and control, 8 Republican Guard barracks, six airfields, 19 key regime sites such as Special Republican Guard barracks). They were reasonably effective. But of course we had been monitoring Iraq closely for nearly a decade by this point, on the ground and in the air, and Saddam Hussein had already abandoned his nuclear aspirations, we now know.

Or consider the Kosovo campaign of the spring of 1999. In the first month of the campaign, daily strikes averaged 5 against air defenses, 2.5 against lines of communication, and 4 against command and control (for the rest of the campaign, the respective figures were 3, 5, and nearly 7). Total sorties per day averaged 250 in the first week, and close to 500 in April. This campaign had a much different purpose, but underscored the difficulty of achieving major goals with a limited number of air strikes. Initial forecasts of a quick Milosevic capitulation, in Washington and elsewhere, were badly off.

All this suggests that a single-day air campaign against a large nuclear infrastructure would be quite unusual in the annals of modern air warfare. To be sure, the United States sometimes uses more assets than perhaps required simply because it can. But typical attacks last several days and involve hundreds of sorties. Often, those attacks that were originally expected to take just a few days take weeks, as well. Nuclear facilities, meanwhile, are typically quite large, meaning that a planeload or two of ordnance will quite often be far short of what’s required.

Recent improvements in precision strike technology and GPS guidance make it quite possible that we could successfully drop numerous munitions into the same hole, digging deeper and deeper, even in bad weather and even if dust and other debris would make laser guidance challenging. In addition, it appears likely that we have tested this methodology fairly carefully, and it appears likely the Israelis could carry it out too. Even in a single-sortie attack, successive planes reaching a target could perhaps therefore execute such a mission.

However, air defenses could be quite problematic for non-stealthy planes and perhaps even for stealthy planes, since the locations of attack can be anticipated extremely well. This challenge would place a greater premium on a larger attack force, to allow attacks against radars and command centers and SAM launchers, and argues against the single-sortie mission. Recent precedents suggest that dozens of bombs could be needed to deal with an air defense system, especially since Iran’s enrichment facilities aren’t near its borders.

In addition, bomb damage assessment could be challenging. We may be able to dig deep with bombs, but we may not know if we were successful right away. Protracted examination of the site after initial strikes might be needed to confirm if any activity continued at those locations, meaning that the need for follow-on strikes might not be immediately apparent. This is especially true at the second uranium enrichment site near Qom. Again, this would be a downside of the single-sortie option.

All that said, we need to remain cognizant of the risks of even the prolonged attack scenario as well – going well beyond the well-known risks of Iranian retaliation, even greater internal Iranian consensus on the desirability of going nuclear after the attack, and the likely weakening of international sanctions after the attack as well. There could be a third enrichment site that we fail to attack simply because we don’t know it currently exists. The Iranians may bring in a group of civilians to “inspect” the site of the first attack, making follow-on waves difficult with the use of such human shields. (This would be risky but much less dangerous than how the regime used its own young soldiers in the Iran-Iraq war.) Air defenses could be repaired and/or relocated as well, while any attack involving hundreds of sorties or more would very likely involve the loss of one or more airplanes due to Iranian defensive action or simple aircraft malfunction.

We frequently talk pseudo-scientifically about the likelihood of a one to two year delay in Iran’s program after such a strike. I believe the range is more like 6 months to 3 or 4 years, given how hard it would be to predict the damage to Qom, as well as other uncertainties such as the possible existence of other enrichment sites.

All this means that there’s greater uncertainty in the outcome of an Israeli or U.S. air campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities than frequently appreciated, whether it is carried out quickly or over a period of days or even weeks.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: CNN.com

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

A Slow Chicken Game: Iran and the P5+1 Nuclear Talks

Ruth H. Santini and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi — Wed, 27 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The third round of nuclear talks between the international community and the Islamic Republic of Iran began in April in Istanbul, continued in Baghdad in May and few weeks later in Moscow on June 18th-19th.

All parties, especially the P5+1 (the five permanent member of the UN Security Council plus Germany), acknowledged the extent of the impasse, with a number of expectations raised in Istanbul that, however, led to disappointment in the two subsequent meetings. Given the distance between the Iranian stance and that of the P5+1, it was decided that negotiations would continue only on a technical, rather than political level. The P5+1 has a clear agenda: “Stop, Shut and Ship”. Stop uranium enrichment, Shut the Fordo nuclear facility near Qom and Ship the uranium enriched beyond 20% abroad.

The statement delivered in Moscow by Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, demonstrated that the P5+1 is currently putting more emphasis on the necessity of Iranian compliance with its "international", not just its NPT, obligations (i.e. suspending all its enrichment activities), differently from what came out in Istanbul. Of course, the burden of proof is on Iran’s shoulder, and as for the international community, 20% uranium enrichment lies at the heart of the matter. Agreeing to stop the enrichment and ship the stockpiles of 20% enriched uranium abroad are the main parameters of any agreement proposed by the P5+1. Before the last talks, pressures on Tehran were strongly exerted not just by the EU, but also by Russia and China. So far, to no avail.

This time around, expectations were high not only because previous political-level meetings led many to believe that new steps could be undertaken to overcome the nuclear stalemate, but also because the meeting took place in Russia. The common assumption was that Moscow had managed to secure some bilateral agreement on progress to be made with regards to negotiations with the Islamic Republic. This would have increased Russia’s political capital and leverage vis-à-vis the US.

Read the full article at Aspenia Online »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: Sergei Karpukhin / Reuters

Iran’s Nuclear Crisis: Domestic, Regional and International Pressures

Ruth H. Santini and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi — Mon, 04 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Before the latest talks in Baghdad between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the “P5+1” group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany), there were speculations that an agreement on the nuclear program was in the cards, given the constructive atmosphere since the restart of negotiations in April 2012. However, not only an imminent breakthrough failed to materialize, but only two days after the Baghdad talks, Iranian authorities denied the possibility they might accept to suspend 20% uranium enrichment.

In Moscow, on June 18-19, there will be a third round of nuclear negotiations after the talks held in Istanbul on April 14 and the ones in Baghdad on May 23-24. Both rounds in Istanbul and Baghdad were predictably inconclusive, given the amount of reciprocal distrust that has accumulated over the past few years between the two sides and the technicalities involved in any possible agreement.

Truth be told, the offer on the table from the P5+1, on the key issue of uranium enrichment, had not been framed in unequivocal terms: many in Tehran believed that a suspension of highly-enriched uranium could have been compensated not only with the shipment of uranium, but with the continuation of enrichment to 3.5-5% levels, in line with the NPT and finalized to enrichment for civil purposes. As it turned out, however, the offer only consisted of a revival of previous attempts to convince Iran to ship abroad its stockpiles of enriched uranium, offering in return fuel for its Tehran medical reactor, assistance with safety at all other reactors, and help to the country’s airline industry in acquiring spare parts. Iran was required to suspend all enrichment activities, contrary to the NPT framework, the terms of which were reiterated by the parts in Istanbul. Rather than a positive tit-for-tat, where in exchange for the suspension, all sanctions would be lifted, it was made clear that pressure would be eased only when Iran will take concrete steps to prove it does not seek nuclear weapons.

The timing of the next round of talks was chosen by accident: on July 1, new and tougher sanctions – barring the imports of Iranian oil into Europe as well as financial transactions with all Iranian banks – are scheduled to enter into force.

Interestingly, while on the surface critical factors revolve around the percentage of uranium enrichment, it is domestic elections in Iran, the United States and Israel that will shape the evolution of negotiations.

Iran has been a recurring theme in foreign policy debates during American presidential campaigns for the last three decades. The discourse has periodically shifted from containment to engagement, as was the case during the 2008 presidential campaign. From Obama as a candidate to Obama as President, the U-turn was visible and caught some by surprise. Constructive and appreciative of Iranian culture and society during his electoral campaign, confident that dialogue could break the impasse linked also to mistakes of the previous administration, once elected Obama strengthened coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Tehran: sanctions have never been as tough and ‘biting’ as under his presidency. The President has become convinced that under the current circumstances a deal is almost impossible and is resorting to diplomacy in a last attempt to stave off an Israeli pre-emptive war before November.

Any deal is more likely to be reached after the American elections in November: foreign policy is hardly a sexy topic in the current political climate where retrenchment and downsizing seem to capture the mood of most Americans. If a deal were to be seriously discussed before the elections, it would likely regard only the nuclear issue, avoiding any mention of ‘grand bargains’. This is so partly because the geopolitical situation in the Middle East has changed and the US no longer considers Iran a potentially legitimate regional power, but aims at curtailing its influence and tame its ambitions. Today, Afghanistan and Iraq no longer represent a topic of common interest between Washington and Tehran, or when they do, the interests of the two sides rarely overlap. Moreover, also as a consequence of Iran’s decade of nuclear activities, any deal could be seen as insufficient to fully reassure Israel and placate its security concerns.

In Iran, President Ahmadinejad is moving into his last year in office and the ruling theocracy is closely watching for any signs of internal opposition resurging before next year's elections.

Ahmadinejad looks increasingly weakened at every new round of talks, as demonstrated by his inability to play a central role in the nuclear negotiations. "If the Westerners change their attitudes and pay respect to the Iranian nation, they will be treated respectfully by Iranians, in return," Ahmadinejad said recently during a tour of eastern Iran. "They should know that the Iranian nation will not take a single step back from its basic rights" - a clear reference to uranium enrichment. However, Ahmadinejad is isolated and does not represent any specific power center within the Iranian religious, political and economic establishment. In a last-ditch attempt to capture media attention, given his diminishing influence on foreign policy, Ahmadinejad undertook provocative actions, such as visiting - and delivering a speech - at the contested island of Abu Masa, being the first senior member of the Islamic Republic to do so. The dispute over the island, which strongly mirrors Iran’s nuclear program in terms of national sensitivity, provoked angry reactions from several Arab countries.

On the other hand, the Supreme Leader Khamenei has positioned himself at the heart of all matters related to Iranian security. The obvious intent is gaining legitimacy should there be a breakthrough in the nuclear crisis and take control and responsibility for all stages of the foreign policy-making process. Still, Khamenei badly needs to let off steam in a domestic situation that risks implosion, given the unprecedented political and economic isolation and rising factionalism. And while any deal for him would be better than nothing, he has to be able to sell the agreement to several domestic audiences, which, particularly in the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), have been heavily indoctrinated on the nuclear issue. For the IRGC, for example, nothing can and should stop Iran from its unalienable right to enrich uranium. A sign that Khamenei is attempting a delicate balancing act between striking a compromise with the West and maintaining domestic legitimacy is his March statement. In it, he stressed that acquiring nuclear weapons is un-Islamic, with a clear reference to his 2005 fatwa. Such declaration lends credit to the belief that reaching the threshold capability might be Tehran’s ultimate goal, which would address the Iranian leadership’s security concerns without violating the NPT.

The threshold, now even closer given the recent disclosures regarding the degree of enrichment reached at the Fordow plant (well beyond 20%), would not alleviate Israeli security concerns and might tip the balance in Israeli assessments over the costs and benefits of a military operation against nuclear sites in Iran.

Military calculations are not the only game in town in Israel. A tense political battle is being played out on the Iranian issue. On the one hand, Benjamin Netanyahu has decided to avoid early elections and now enjoys an ample majority, which includes the centrist party Kadima. Its leader, Shaul Mofaz, opposes the idea of unilateral action by Israel against Tehran. Former Mossad (secret services) and Shabak (domestic intelligence) chiefs Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin share this view and have called for Israeli leaders to act rationally and refrain from behaving in a “messianic” way. This came in response to remarks by Netanyahu comparing the Iranian threat to the Nazi one in the 1930s. However, despite the existence of prominent dissident voices against the military option, the coalition government actually strengthens the Israeli prime minister, who enjoys wide popularity and legitimacy.

In a three-player game, one defection will suffice to derail the process. In the current context, it is Tel Aviv, rather than Washington or Tehran, that might have the final word.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Publication: The Aspen Institute

Image Source: Thaier Al-Sudani / Reuters

The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: New Thinking in Northeast Asia?

James E. Goodby and Markku Heiskanen — Wed, 28 Mar 2012 15:25:00 -0400

Over fifty heads of state will meet at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26-27. Among the participants is US President Barack Obama, host of the first nuclear security summit held in Washington, DC, in April 2010.

The primary motive for convening the 2010 nuclear security summit was to address the unprecedented threat of nuclear materials in the hands of terrorists. This remains the main task of the summit, but two other security problems will be on the minds of participants: the Fukushima catastrophe of 2011 and the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.

The nuclear crises in the Middle East and Northeast Asia and the stalled promise of a nuclear renaissance in civil nuclear power could all be solved by a more rational approach to the generation of electric power. Although it will take years before the current, outdated system is replaced, the Seoul meeting could provide a political impetus. The new system would rest on three legs: small modular reactors (“mini-reactors”), internationally managed nuclear fuel services, and increasing reliance on the distributed (local) generation of electricity. After the disaster in Fukushima, there has been an understandable retreat from plans for large-scale reactors, with their inevitable safety issues. A vivid example of this reaction is found in Germany, which has cancelled its plans to increase the generation of electricity from nuclear reactors even though they are cleaner and more dependable than most other sources currently available. Vulnerabilities and inefficiencies of long-distance transmission lines point to a paradigm for generation and distribution of electric power that is more local – connected to national grids, to be sure, but able to operate independently of them. This is an ideal situation for mini-reactors, which are safer and less prone to encourage the spread of nuclear weapons. Internationally managed nuclear fuel services already exist and the security of supply can be assured by policies that foster more fuel service centers in Asia and elsewhere, including in the United States. These factors would enable suppliers of mini-reactors to expand their business to nations like North Korea and Iran under IAEA safeguards.

The relevance of this energy paradigm to resolving the issues in North Korea and Iran is evident: both nations could develop civil nuclear programs with assured supplies of nuclear fuel from multiple internationally managed fuel service centers in Russia, China, and Western Europe while avoiding the ambiguity of nationally operated plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Reliance on distributed generation of electricity would be more efficient and less prone to blackouts. And the presence of a level playing field should be apparent from the fact that similar arrangements would be the 21st-century way of generating electricity from nuclear energy in the developed economies as well as in energy-starved economies such as India and China.

Is this vision nothing but a dream? Maybe, but the main issues standing in the way are neither technical nor economic, but political. That is not to say that political problems are easy to solve. Einstein famously said that politics is harder than physics.

Politics will be front and center at the summit because it takes place in one of the major capitals of Northeast Asia, and all heads of state from this region or engaged with it – North Korea excluded – are participating. This will open opportunities to discuss regional problems in a situation quite different from that of the first nuclear security summit in Washington in 2010.

Northeast Asia is one of the most dangerous hotbeds of global nuclear diplomacy. China and Russia are nuclear weapon states; the United States, also a nuclear weapon state, is a regional political actor; North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapons tests; and Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan can “go nuclear” in a relatively short period of time.

The Seoul summit could, at least indirectly, become a launching pad for settling this fatal situation.

One can never be certain when it comes to Korean developments, but new hope has arisen after the United States and North Korea reached an agreement on a North Korean moratorium on nuclear activities in Beijing on February 29. This may be a modest step forward, but it is encouraging. Fulfillment of this understanding would open the door to resumption of the six-party talks, where a framework already exists to discuss the elements of a political settlement: commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula, an interim agreement on borders and means of ready communication between the parties, people-to-people contacts, economic cooperation, and a Northeast Asia organization for security and cooperation akin to the Helsinki process, including its human rights provisions. It can be considered the first major signal by the new Kim Jong-un regime in Pyongyang that they are open to direct dialogue with the Americans.

There will be a shift of power in South Korea in early 2013, when the term of President Lee Myung-bak comes to an end. The United States will hold its presidential and congressional elections in November, Vladimir Putin has just been elected president of Russia, and China will have a new president in 2013. As for Japan, changes in government seem to occur several times a year.

All of these changes cause observers of the Northeast Asian scene to conclude that the time for a more active diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula is approaching. And that refers not only to solving the North Korean nuclear issue but also to several legacies dating from World War II and the Korean War. The ultimate goal should be to sign a peace treaty to end formally the Korean War, which concluded only with an armistice agreement in 1953, and to reunify Korea in one way or another.

There is some well-founded hope that the year 2012 could open a new era in multilateral efforts to finally construct a new post-Cold War political and security architecture in Northeast Asia.

Europeans have a low profile in Northeast Asia. Almost all EU-member states, however, have diplomatic relations with North Korea, and a number of major European states have resident ambassadors in Pyongyang.

The successful post-war arrangements in Europe have often been held up as an example of how a multilateral peace process could be initiated in Northeast Asia. The Finnish experience of the Helsinki CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) in 1969-75 proved that patience and determination will bear fruit in the long run. Perhaps this is also a good recipe for Northeast Asia.

Authors

James E. Goodby
Markku Heiskanen

Publication: The Nautilus Institute

The Year that Shook the Rich: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2011

Thu, 01 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

From the earthquake and tsunami in Japan to fourteen disasters causing over a billion dollars each in damage in the United States, 2011 was particularly damaging for developed countries. Reviewing 2011’s natural disasters, Elizabeth Ferris and Daniel Petz analyze the range of disasters and lessons to be learned from those that occurred in developed countries.

2011 was the most expensive year in terms of disaster losses in history, mostly because of a spate of disasters affecting developed countries. Globally, the economic cost of disasters in 2011 was $380 billion, of which $210 billion were the result of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This was 72 percent higher than the losses in 2005, the second costliest year in history of disaster-related losses.

In terms of both the number of disasters and the number of people affected by them, 2011 was a below-average year in comparison with the previous decade. With 302 disasters recorded by the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT), 2011 saw the lowest number of disasters since the beginning of the millennium. The number of disasters was almost 20 percent below the average annual figure of 384 natural disasters from 2001-2010. There were 206 million disaster-affected persons in 2011, which is about ten percent below the ten-year average.

Developed countries were particularly hard-hit by disasters in 2011 as evidenced by floods in Australia, earthquakes in New Zealand, an earthquake/tsunami in Japan and a series of disasters in the United States. While natural disasters result in higher economic losses in rich countries, fewer people tend to be affected and loss of life is less than in developing countries. Higher levels of preparedness, resilience and good governance in many cases help richer countries to recover faster from natural disasters than poorer ones.

While developed countries generally have the resources to respond to the effects of natural disasters, when a major disaster strikes they still have to deal with responding to offers of international assistance.

The post-tsunami Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan poses serious questions about preparedness for technological and industrial accidents caused by natural hazards as well as questions about the safety of nuclear technology.

Examples from last-year’s disasters in the rich world show that investment in disaster risk reduction and preparedness pay off and are cheaper than postdisaster reconstruction. Still, high-impact low-probability events can overwhelm the best prepared society.

Disaster plans and defenses need to be adjusted to a new and shifting “normal.” Because of climate change, predictions are that intervals of heavy precipitation and extreme temperatures will likely become more frequent in the future. In other words, what was formerly a “once-in-a-century” disaster might become a “once-in-a-generation” disaster. Furthermore, new “once-in-a-century” disasters may simply overwhelm the current state of preparations.

Several positive trends in international humanitarian response were evident in the course of 2011, including promising developments in international disaster law, greater emphasis on disaster risk reduction and preparedness, and better communications during crises, including the use of social media in disaster response.

Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction after a major disaster are long-term processes which need much more scrutiny and attention. Examples from rich countries suggest that rebuilding processes can be participatory and can incorporate sound principles such as risk reduction and green technologies.

There are still major methodological difficulties in terms of measuring the effects of natural disasters, especially when it comes to measuring the economic costs of disasters and understanding the particular characteristics of slow-onset disasters such as drought.

The first famine in twenty years was declared in Somalia in mid-2011, demonstrating the deadly interaction of conflict, political instability and drought that can result in a catastrophe with high human casualties. Although there were warning signs in Somalia for almost a year before famine was declared, the international community was unable to prevent its outbreak due to continuing conflict and the resulting lack of humanitarian access to affected communities.

The interconnections between disasters (especially mega-disasters), media coverage and humanitarian funding means that humanitarian funding tends to be directed toward disasters that have higher media coverage rather than to those with disaster-affected populations in greater need of assistance. Thus in 2011 almost half of humanitarian disaster funding reported through the UN’s Financial Tracking Service was sent to Japan – where it made up only about a third of one percent of the total economic cost of the disaster. Overall, international humanitarian funding for disasters declined from almost $6.5 billion in 2010 to around $1.5 billion in 2011.

Global population is aging at an unprecedented scale and yet the special needs of older people in emergencies are often neglected. In 1950 around eight percent of the world’s population was over the age of 60 – a percentage projected to increase to 22 percent by 2050. In disasters such as the earthquake/tsunami in Japan and Hurricane Katrina, older people made up a disproportionate percentage of casualties. Given the fact that developing countries are also experiencing an increase in the percentage of elderly people, it is likely that a lack of focus on older persons in all phases, from planning to emergency management to post-disaster reconstruction, can result in higher fatalities among older people, long-term chronic health issues, psychosocial trauma and isolation. Treating older people simply as “normal” disaster victims denies the specific vulnerabilities that many older people face.

More work is needed to recognize the positive contributions which older people can make in reducing the risks from disasters, in disaster response and in recovery and reconstruction.

Image Source: Mike Stone / Reuters

Chapter 1 - The Year that Shook the Rich

Thu, 01 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

2011 was the costliest year in history in terms of natural disaster damage, in large part due to major disasters which occurred in some developed countries. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan alone were estimated to have caused over $200 billion in damages.

This chapter looks in more detail at the disasters that shook developed countries in 2011, beginning with the Japanese earthquake/tsunami/nuclear accident – the most expensive disaster in history. While the earthquake occurred with a bit over a minute’s warning, the consequences of that disaster will be felt for years, perhaps decades, to come. Discussion then turns to the United States which experienced a string of costly and varied disasters in 2011. Unlike in Japan where energy and attention focused on a single megadisaster, in the United States, different kinds of disasters occurred in succession.

The flooding experienced by residents of Queensland in Australia in the early part of 2011 was on a physical scale greater than that of all other disasters occurring in 2011. And the earthquake that occurred very close to the center of Christchurch, New Zealand in February caused major damage to half of the city center’s buildings, leaving many of them beyond repair.

Although some of our analysis focuses on the economic costs of the disasters in developed countries, for too many people, economic losses paled in comparison with the loss of family members and homes and the disruption to their lives and livelihoods. For all of those affected by disasters – whether in rich or poor countries – it is hard to overstate the experience of personal loss.

Publication: The Year that Shook the Rich: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2011

Israel-Iran Covert Spy Games Become More Dangerous

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 15 Feb 2012 15:26:00 -0500

The attack Monday in New Delhi on an Israeli diplomat’s car — in which the wife of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) representative in India was wounded — apparently represents the latest escalation in the covert war between Israel and Iran.

Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah have been engaged in a hot spy-versus-spy war for years. Now it is getting hotter and threatens to produce a larger conflict.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lost little time in blaming the New Delhi attack — as well as a foiled attempt to bomb an Israeli embassy car in Tbilisi, Georgia — on Iran and Hezbollah. The prime minister also linked the Shia duo to failed terror plots in Azerbaijan and Thailand targeting Israelis in the last few months.

The latest attacks came four years after the head of Hezbollah’s terror wing, Imad Mughniyah, was killed in a car bomb in Damascus. Mughniyah had been attacking IDF and other Israeli targets since 1982. He was also linked to the attack on U.S. Marines and French paratroopers in Beirut in 1983 and the bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. Air Force barracks in 1996.

Hezbollah has promised to get revenge for Mughniyah’s death since his assassination and made several foiled attempts already to do so. Israel has been on guard every anniversary since his death.

The latest attack in New Delhi was probably more than just a revenge operation for Mughniyah. Tehran blames Israel for a series of attacks on its nuclear scientists over the last two years as well as for explosions and computer viruses that have attacked its nuclear infrastructure.

Reliable news stories have reported that the Israeli intelligence service Mossad has been working with a dissident Iranian terror group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq, to target scientists and facilities inside Iran. Israeli leaders including Netanyahu have made it clear that they intend to use sabotage to try to stop Iran’s nuclear program.

Israel has long used covert operations to kill terrorists and sabotage enemy weapons programs. Israeli spies sent letter bombs to German scientists in Cairo sixty years ago, and Israeli spies and commandos — including Defense Minister Ehud Barak — have been tracking down terrorist leaders and killing them from Norway to Lebanon and Tunisia for decades. Of course, the United States uses drones and SEALs to kill terrorists from Pakistan to Yemen.

For Hezbollah and Iran, the IDF representative in New Delhi was probably a very attractive target, as Israel and India have become close military allies. Since 1991 Israel has sold India almost $9 billion worth of weapons, and India has become Israel’s largest export market for arms. Israel is India’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia. India in turn has launched Israeli spy satellites into space on Indian missiles — satellites that regularly monitor Iranian nuclear facilities.

India may be balking at cutting off economic ties to Iran these days, but it has a very solid military relationship with Israel that Hezbollah would see as an appropriate target for Mughniyah’s revenge and more.

The danger of spy wars is that they can get out of hand. Not only do innocents get killed in the crossfire, the conflict can create a casus belli for a real shooting war. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war had its origins in terror attacks on Israel, which led to retaliatory strikes on Syria and Jordan that escalated into a crisis.

It is hard to keep conflict contained and it is easy to use a terror incident to justify a war. The 1982 IDF invasion of Lebanon that gave birth to Hezbollah was in response to an Iraqi-backed Palestinian terror attack on the Israeli ambassador in London.

The U.S. intelligence community has recently warned that Iran can launch terror attacks inside the United States. That is a real and present danger. Both Iran and Hezbollah have sought such a capability inside the United States for years. Hezbollah has a track record of recruiting support cells in Lebanese émigré communities from West Africa to South America.

Should Israel decide to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will be certain to cite Tehran’s long history of involvement in terrorism as one justification for war. It will probably simultaneously attack Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to pre-empt Hezbollah’s enormous rocket and missile arsenal from targeting Haifa, Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem — all of which are now in range of Mughniyah’s successors thanks to arms deals he negotiated with Iran and Syria after the 2006 war.

A much better way to neuter Hezbollah and set back Iranian ambitions is available now in Syria. The former head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, has written that the Syrian civil war now offers the chance to oust the Alawite regime in Damascus that has been Iran’s key ally for thirty years and was Tehran’s partner in Mughniyah’s carnage. He is right.

A carefully organized campaign to mobilize the Syrian opposition based around Turkish leadership has a chance at toppling Bashar Assad. Already the Syrian city where Iranian Revolutionary Guards used to train and arm Hezbollah, Zabadani, has fallen into rebel hands. But this is a tough mission given the ruthlessness of the Assad government and the understandable reluctance of the international community to use force to fight it.

So the terror war between Israel and Iran is likely to escalate. If Israel starts a war with Iran and Lebanon, America will almost certainly be drawn in. The Obama administration has rightly been urging Israel to give sanctions and sabotage more time to work, but the dynamics are pushing for another Middle East conflict which will be very hard to contain.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Al Monitor

Around the Halls: President Obama and America’s Nuclear Future

John P. Banks and Charles K. Ebinger — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 15:20:00 -0500

On January 27, 2012, President Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) issued its final report, outlining a roadmap forward for nuclear waste policy. Charles Ebinger and John Banks weigh in on the BRC's recommendations.

President Obama and America’s Nuclear Future: A Stunning Disappointment?
Charles Ebinger, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Director, Energy Security Initiative

President Obama’s Blue Ribbon Commission report on America’s Nuclear Future, released today, is exasperatingly devoid of meaningful concrete policies that will move the industry ahead and allow it not only to contribute to the future supply of electricity in the United States but also to make the vital contribution that Professor Socolow’s wedge theory posits nuclear energy must make if we have any chance of reducing rising global CO2 emissions over the next 30 years.

The commission’s mandate was to make detailed recommendations for creating a long term safe solution for management and disposal of the nation’s spent nuclear fuel from reactors and other high level radioactive wastes. While the candid tone of the report deserves praise with the authors warning of the necessity of acting on its recommendations immediately so that we do not abnegate our moral integrity and put off politically difficult decisions onto the next generation for which it holds no responsibility for having created the problem. At the same time, the report does little in addressing what sites might best be investigated as a replacement for Yucca Mountain. Rather it calls for the creation of a major above ground storage facility that could serve as a consolidated single repository for all nuclear waste currently scattered around the country while a permanent geological waste repository is established. The report also says that the nation must move to insure that the proper policies are in place once this single above ground repository is in place to insure that the large volumes of waste moved all over the country to the facility are done utilizing safe and secure manner procedures. While this proposal has merit in that it will over time reduce the volume of waste trafficking the nation’s highways and railways, one has to query why the commission believes that the selection of such a site will not be as subject to local political opposition as have other proposals such as converting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, an excellent geologic site , into a waste disposal site for all civilian nuclear reactor spent fuel and other high level radioactive waste or evacuation concerns that arose over the siting of the Seabrook,Shoreham or Indian Point nuclear power generation facilities.

In this latter regard, the commission’s clarion call for a ‘ consent based approach” to siting any new nuclear spent fuel facilities borders on the laughable to anyone who has been involved in the sitting of any type of nuclear facility over the last nearly 50 years. Consent and debate needs to be based on fact based investigations and not on emotions. There are times when he national interest must prevail over local parochial interest and while public dialogue and transparency are always good when confronting difficult issues there are times when tough political decisions need to be made and the construction of a long term spent fuel geologic repository is one of them. We spent over 30 years on Yucca Mountain and $20 billion dollars after it was chosen by a distinguished scientific panel and cannot spend another 30 years having the same battles all over again.

The report’s call for the creation of a new agency, independent of Department of Energy, that will be responsible solely for the safe storage and disposal of civilian and other high level nuclear waste may have some merit but given the role that a number of the national laboratories spend on nuclear issues it remains to be seen how these activities might be carved out of the labs’ other activities without creating new redundancies, and more bureaucracy. Would it not perhaps be as reasonable to turn this function over to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, or perhaps the Interior Department? The commission does make a bold and much needed call for changing how the $750 million dollar/year Nuclear Waste Fund is managed to insure that the money appropriated is truly lock boxed so that it is available to be uses as the Congress intended and not for other means.

Finally the report calls for the United States to continue to be the world leader on questions related to nuclear safety, waste management, nonproliferation and security. While reasonable people can disagree it is the opinion of the author that we lost any moral authority we had on non proliferation when we signed the U.S./Indian civil nuclear agreement allowing India , a non-NPT signatory to divert plutonium from reactors produced indigenously to its nuclear weapons program throwing away 30 years of nonproliferation policy. Nonetheless while not perfect the United States remains a positive voice on all these issues in a world that makes policy coherence increasingly complex and often difficult to implement.

The BRC’s Final Report: Workable Solutions Worth Pursuing
John Banks, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) issued its final report this week, outlining a roadmap forward for nuclear waste policy. The BRC hit the nail on the head starting with their correct assumptions that waste management policy in the United States is broken, a burden on taxpayers, and constraining America’s choices in nuclear energy policy. Continuing on this path is not an option, and BRC proposes a sound, workable approach for fixing the main problems afflicting the process.

BRC’s principal recommendations are: establish one or more geologic disposal facilities, and one or more interim centralized storage facilities; develop and implement a consent-based approach to siting; create a congressionally-chartered federal corporation to site, build and operate storage and disposal facilities, thus removing this responsibility from the Department of Energy; and allow access to Nuclear Waste Fund resources to more directly support a revamped waste management policy.

These recommendations address the non-integrated, inflexible, politicized and expensive waste management process that has been in place for decades.
First, establishing consolidated storage facilities provides much greater flexibility to work out longer-term solutions in a more integrated fashion. Specifically, it allows time to study options for long-term geologic disposal and fuel cycle approaches. This point was emphasized in MIT’s 2010 report The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. While the NRC has ruled that dry cask storage is a safe option, there will be a need to expand dry cask storage capabilities in the near future: about 75 percent of the country’s spent nuclear fuel is in cooling pools at reactor sites, and some analysts suggest that pool capacity could be reached by 2015. In addition, initiating efforts to develop a geologic disposal facility provides policy makers the flexibility to look beyond the debilitating debate over Yucca mountain since, as BRC notes, United States spent nuclear fuel inventory will soon surpass the volume of waste that can be legally placed at Yucca even if it moved forward.

Second, the consent-based approach to siting described by the BRC is exactly what is needed to avoid the top-down method that has failed here and in other countries. Recent experience in several European countries and at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (for defense-related waste) indicates that a focus on an approach that is adaptive and seeks to partner with local stakeholders is much more likely to succeed and, in the end, be cheaper. Why not try; states or local communities may actually want the jobs associated with developing and maintaining a centralized storage site, and others may applaud efforts to remove dry cask storage facilities at operating reactors—as well as “stranded” waste from decommissioned sites—in their communities.
Third, the creation of a new waste management institution to develop and manage the spent nuclear fuel policy and facilities can help to de-politicize the process. While it certainly won’t remove political considerations entirely, it can provide a degree of insulation from day-to-day politics, not to mention carve out a specialized institution dedicated solely to the issue.

Fourth, BRC’s recommendations to alter the manner in which the Nuclear Waste Fund is managed are a sound way to provide the resources needed for the new waste management institution, as well as give some relief to nuclear utilities. The BRC proposals seek to ensure that fees paid by utilities on a per kWh basis designed to support a waste management program actually get used for that purpose, and that any unspent monies in the Fund are allocated to the new waste management organization.

There are surely challenges to the BRC’s recommendations: there are many legislative changes required, and in the current small government, belt-tightening environment the creation of a new institution may be a tough sell.

But the BRC’s plan is worth pursuing. Even if all nuclear plants were shut down and no additional plants were built, we still have to deal with spent nuclear fuel. And if we want nuclear power to play a role in our future energy mix, particularly to help combat climate change, we still have to deal with spent nuclear fuel to build a stronger foundation for developing a comprehensive energy policy. Nuclear power faces four fundamental challenges: economic (high up-front capital costs), safety and security, waste, and proliferation. A comprehensive approach to all of these factors is required to maintain nuclear power as a viable policy option. The BRC’s recommendations address the key issues that have plagued the waste management part of the equation for decades. Let’s put that piece back together and move forward.

Authors

Iran and International Pressure: An Assessment of Multilateral Efforts to Impede Iran’s Nuclear Program

Tue, 22 Nov 2011 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 22, 2011
9:00 AM - 2:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Even as the international community seeks to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran continues adding to its stocks of enriched uranium, including the type of enriched uranium needed to arm a nuclear weapon. Given that little prospect exists for resumption of the P5+1 discussions with the Iranian government, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors will tackle the Iran issue when it meets on November 17-18 in Vienna. What is the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, and do the Iranians feel pressure from United Nations Security Council mandates and other sanctions? What are the prospects for holding together the coalition that is now working to halt Iran’s nuclear program?

View archived video of the full event on C-SPAN »

On November 22, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, the Center on the United States and Europe and the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a conference to examine the Iranian nuclear program, assess the impact of international sanctions to date and analyze the ability of the international community to sustain unity and pressure on Tehran. The conference concluded with keynote remarks from U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

Video

Human Rights Issues will not Trump U.S.-China Dialogue

Transcript

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Charles Ferguson

President
Federation of American Scientists

Kevan Harris

Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar
U.S. Institute of Peace

Ray Takeyh

Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

John Parker

Visiting Research Fellow
National Defense University

Francois Rivasseau

Deputy Head of Delegation
European Union Delegation to the United States

Tom Donilon

National Security Advisor
The White House

Nuclear Energy in the United States in the Wake of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukishima

Charles K. Ebinger — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 17:28:00 -0400

Since President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations in December 1953 nuclear energy in the United States has been seen in the 1954 words of Levi Strauss either as a vital source of electricity that within fifteen years would be “too cheap to meter” or as a Faustian bargain with the devil that has no place in the world’s future energy mix. Coming out of the U.S. Navy’s atomic submarine programme, commercial nuclear power for civilian use received a major boost in 1963 when a New Jersey public utility ordered the first commercial-scale plant from General Electric. Over the next decade nearly 50 reactors were ordered either from General Electric, which initially sponsored a BWR (Boiling Water Design), or Westinghouse which supported a PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor). While other vendors in the United States and abroad experimented with modifications of these designs or their own technologies, the use of commercial nuclear power sky rocketed with projections that nuclear energy might provide up to 50% of U.S. electricity by 2000.

Ironically it was this hubris, with each vendor or utility wanting its own unique design, that came to haunt the industry in the following decades, since this approach led to a plethora of different issues for regulators at both the state and federal level to address. This diverse set of designs, rather than the industry agreeing on one or two more “standardised designs,” meant that each licensing hearing occurred in a vacuum with little ability to draw lessons learned from previous decisions and, as reactors moved from the design stage to construction and operation, problems began to arise. The fact that all these technologies were new and had no experience on which to draw meant that regulators in the early days were often deciding issues by the seat of their pants with no firm knowledge of all the issues that would inevitably arise.

The fact that siting, construction and operational licenses were often bifurcated with state and federal regulators each doing their independent reviews rather than acting in concert, also added to the time required to build a nuclear plant. Since at the time these capital intensive plants were not allowed to recover any of their costs from ratepayers until the plants commenced operation led to an escalation in costs that during a high inflation era such as the Carter administration led plants that had been forecast to cost $200-300 million dollars to rise to more than ten times that cost and, in the case of the Nine Mile 2 plant outside Syracuse, to hit over $9 billion dollars. The problem was further exacerbated by environmentalists opposed to nuclear power who used this rate base procedure to delay plants in court, or in regulatory procedures based on a host of questions such as the adequacy of evacuation plans, etc until which time the plants, because of cost escalation, could no longer be justified in the marketplace. While many other factors by the 1970s and 1980s were also responsible, ultimately more than $100 billion dollars of nuclear power plants became stranded assets.

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Authors

Charles K. Ebinger

Publication: BritishAmerican Business