Brookings: Topics - North Korea

Why Focus On Iran When It's North Korea That Has The Bomb?

Steven Pifer — Mon, 10 Jun 2013 09:25:00 -0400

Iran is pursuing a nuclear program that clearly goes beyond peaceful, civilian purposes, though the U.S. intelligence community assesses that Tehran has not yet decided to build a bomb, only to have the capability to do so. North Korea, on the other hand, has tested nuclear devices three times since 2006. So why do the United States and international community usually focus more attention on Iran than on North Korea?

Two reasons explain this. First, the international community is more likely to affect Tehran’s calculus than Pyongyang’s. Second, the proliferation ramifications of Iran getting a nuclear weapon would be much worse.

North Korea and Iran are both under UN Security Council sanctions for their nuclear programs. The United States has led the way in applying additional sanctions on the two countries.

North Korea, however, has a poor, autarkic economy. The CIA World Fact Book estimated per capita gross domestic product in 2011 at $1800. North Korea has limited trade with the outside world. In 2011, the CIA put its total trade turnover at less than $9 billion; two-thirds of that was with China, which has been reluctant to apply a real economic bite to North Korea. The impact of sanctions on North Korea’s largely stagnant economy to date is difficult to see.

Iran, on the other hand, is a richer country and far more integrated into the global economy. The CIA estimated per capita gross domestic product in Iran at just over $13,000 in 2012 and put its trade turnover in 2012 at $133 billion. Oil is Iran’s main export commodity. Recent energy trends— including development of unconventional gas and oil deposits in the United States and soft global energy demand— have allowed countries to curb their imports of Iranian oil, which make up 80 percent of Iran’s exports. The CIA estimated that the country’s total exports fell from $129 billion in 2011 to $66 billion in 2012. The financial and other economic sanctions are having a bite; Iran’s currency, the rial, lost 40 percent of its value in one week last fall, and the country’s gross domestic product declined for the first time in some 20 years.

How this all affects Tehran’s calculations remains to be seen. The West hopes that the Iranian government will not be able to ignore the sanctions’ effect on the economy or the political impact as falling economic standards provoke popular disgruntlement. In any event, the effect in Tehran is certain to be greater than in North Korea, where a large portion of the population barely ekes out a living and probably sees no incremental economic effect from the sanctions applied on their country.

The second reason for a focus on Iran is the potential ramifications for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should Tehran develop a nuclear weapon. That would be a game-changer in the Middle East, leading other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, to consider whether they should acquire nuclear weapons as well. In the worst case, the emergence of four new nuclear weapons states in the region would put huge stress on the NPT regime. And with these four states, plus Israel, having nuclear weapons, the Middle East would become a far more volatile region.

To be sure, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons puts the NPT regime under stress— but not as much. The two countries in the region most concerned, South Korea and Japan, have long been American allies under protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The U.S. military deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea until the early 1990s, and the B-2 overflight during the March tensions with North Korea provided a pointed reminder that the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal still protects the country. While some in South Korea and Japan have pondered whether their countries should go nuclear, the governments appear reassured that the U.S. nuclear guarantee remains and that they do not need nuclear weapons of their own.

Should Iran get nuclear weapons, the United States might seek to extend a nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Former Secretary of State Clinton suggested that possibility several years ago. Turkey has long rested under the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States to NATO (and reportedly hosts U.S. nuclear weapons). But would it work with other states in the region, which have not had nuclear security arrangements with the United States that go back decades?

Iran may feel that it is being unfairly singled out. Perhaps. Life, particularly life in international politics, isn’t fair. But the United States and international community have a clear rationale for doing so. A nuclear-armed Iran would put more stress on the nuclear non-proliferation regime than does North Korea. And the chances that sanctions may have an impact on Tehran’s calculations are far greater than in the case with Pyongyang.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Where U.S.-China Relations Are Headed After the Xi-Obama Meetings

Cheng Li — Mon, 10 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with anchor Anand Naidoo of CCTV America, Cheng Li discusses what was achieved during the recent meetings between Presidents Obama and Xi, in particular in the areas of cybersecurity, bilateral trade relations as North Korea. Li also examines the future directions of U.S.-China relations, stressing that the development of a personal, working relationship between the two leaders trumps all issues on the agenda.

Authors

Cheng Li

Top Five Issues President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping Should Discuss

Richard C. Bush III, Cheng Li, Jonathan D. Pollack, Eswar Prasad and Ian Wallace — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 15:23:00 -0400

President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet in California later this week, where they are scheduled to hold in-depth meetings on a wide range of issues in the U.S.-China relationship. Brookings experts identify the top five topics the two leaders should discuss: cybersecurity, North Korea, China's foreign investment, China's new government and East and South China Seas dispute.

1. Cybersecurity

All countries engage in some form of spying, but China’s cyber-spying on American industries is especially threatening. If China refuses to curtail the practice, Ian Wallace explains, the U.S.-Sino relationship could be profoundly undermined.

Download Media

Cyber-security: Putting China on Notice

2. North Korea

North Korea’s brinksmanship is disturbing to the region and problematic for the Chinese government, which is often asked to calm the country down. China agrees that North Korea needs to change, notes Jonathan Pollack, director of the China Center at Brookings.

Download Media

North Korea: China's Problem

3. China's Foreign Investment

China’s foreign investment is staggering and continues to grow. China’s dollars also buy political influence around the world and could even hinder U.S. industrial growth. It may be unsettling but there’s little the U.S. can do. Eswar Prasad has the details.

Download Media

China's Foreign Investment: Purse Strings and Political Power

4. China's New Government

The tension between the U.S. and China is largely fueled by their respective desire to reach the same goal: they both want to be the world’s preeminent power; but Cheng Li says this isn’t as ominous as it sounds.

Download Media

The U.S. and China: Mutual Respect, Mutual Fear

5. East and South China Seas Dispute

Maritime rights have been a long-festering problem affecting several countries in the East Asian region. It’s an issue that can destabilize the neighborhood or the world and could possibly lead to war as Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, explains.

Download Media

East and South China Seas Disputes

Video

Authors

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Obama, Xi and North Korea: The Long Overdue Conversation

Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 10:30:00 -0400

When President Obama meets with President Xi Jinping this week in California, North Korea will feature prominently on the agenda. Xi seems prepared to engage in a serious discussion of this endlessly vexing and worrisome issue. For decades, Pyongyang has defied external pressure to alter its behavior, exploiting fissures among neighboring powers and the United States while sustaining pursuit of nuclear weapons development. But the North’s repeated threats of recent months and its open defiance of Xi Jinping have done more damage to its relations with China than perhaps any event since North Korean agents assassinated a substantial portion of South Korea’s cabinet on a visit to Burma in October 1983.

Leaders in Beijing now openly acknowledge that North Korea’s actions and weapons programs directly jeopardize Chinese vital interests. This has not been easy for China to admit, but better late than never. President Obama no longer needs to chastise Beijing (as he once did to Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor) about China’s “willful blindness” toward the DPRK. Beijing is also pursuing closer relations with the Republic of Korea, irrespective of the North’s heated objections to such ties. This process will culminate with the state visit of South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, to Beijing later this month.

The discussions between Obama and Xi will enable a long overdue conversation about the dangers posed by North Korea, and how both countries (in conjunction with the ROK) weigh the risks to their collective interests. It represents a major test of whether China’s declared interest in a new pattern of major power relations is a serious policy initiative and not simply a slogan designed to reassure the outside world.

This post has been modified.

Authors

Jonathan D. Pollack

Image Source: © Gary Cameron / Reuters

Reviving U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order

Thu, 30 May 2013 15:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 30, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

A rising China, climate change, terrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a tumultuous Middle East, and a defiant North Korea all present serious challenges for U.S. foreign policy, but could internal factors actually pose the biggest threat to the United States, its security, and its position as a global leader? In his new book, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order (Basic Books, 2013), Richard Haass argues that U.S. national security depends on the United States addressing significant internal issues: repairing its crumbling infrastructure, improving education, reforming its immigration policies and reducing its burgeoning debt. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that these shortcomings directly threaten America's ability to project power and exert influence overseas; to compete in the global marketplace; to generate the resources needed to promote the full range of U.S. interests abroad; and to set a compelling example that can influence the thinking and behavior of other nations.

On May 30, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Haass for a discussion on the challenging issues facing the United States at home and their impact on the successful pursuit of U.S. foreign and security policies abroad. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan joined the discussion. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the conversation.

North Korea’s Turn to Diplomacy: Resuming the Six-Party Talks?

Richard C. Bush III — Fri, 24 May 2013 12:14:00 -0400

As summer follows spring, so too does North Korea transition from provocative words and deeds to a seemingly statesmanlike desire for diplomacy and peace. Before, it threatened to hit the United States with nuclear weapons. Now it expresses a willingness to engage in dialogue, even to return to the Six-Party Talks.

But this is all part of Pyongyang’s playbook. We have seen these peace offensives before. The crucial question now is the basis on which North Korea might be willing to negotiate. Is it the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which is the core of the Six-Party Talks and the stated objective of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China? If so, there is a reason to engage – carefully. Or is it Pyongyang’s most recently enunciated point of departure – that Washington, et al., must accept it as a nuclear weapons state, with all the rights and benefits that that implies under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? That is a non-starter, because it is a recipe for instability in Northeast Asia and for prolonged tension in the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan.

The goal of American policy has not been to secure talks for the sake of talks. It has been to induce Pyongyang to understand that it can only have a normal relationship with the international community if it credibly undertakes a fundamental change in policy: regarding nuclear weapons, its relations with South Korea, its role in the region, and its domestic system. North Korea’s latest and predictable shift to diplomacy does not in any way guarantee that change in policy (it may indicate, however, that sanctions are beginning to work). After its recent belligerence and before anyone rushes to the negotiating table, it is up to Pyongyang to demonstrate to Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing that the leopard is indeed going to change its spots.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Reinhard Krause / Reuters

United States Policy towards Northeast Asia

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 07 May 2013 14:37:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the April 2013 edition of SERI Quarterly.

With the Obama administration making the transition to its second term, it is appropriate to review its policy goals towards Northeast Asia and whether policy implementation can be sustained. In this essay, I review what senior officials have said on these subjects, and consider the challenge of coping with the rise—or revival—of China, while focusing more sharply on the Korean Peninsula.

Declaratory policy

Three texts reveal how the United States government views its interests and objectives towards Asia. Chronologically, they are: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s October 2011 article in Foreign Policy; President Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament on November 17, 2011; and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon’s remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[1] Five topics merit attention: terminology; the purposes of policy; its scope; the approach to China; and sustainability.

In terminology, two words have gained the greatest currency: “pivot” and “rebalancing.” “Pivot” is a vivid word that plays upon Obama’s love of basketball, it also has a rather absolutist connotation. “Rebalancing,” on the other hand, is more relativistic, both in terms of where America places its priorities geographically and which policy arenas it emphasizes. The word that is least appropriate for Northeast Asia is “return,” which had some currency in the early part of the administration. “Return” may have been accurate for Southeast Asia but not for Northeast Asia.

In terms of the purposes of rebalancing, senior officials spoke in different but substantively convergent ways:

Clinton referred to “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism”; to “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific”; to responding to the wishes of the region itself; and, in effect, the long, benign impact of America’s presence in and posture toward the region (“We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades . . . and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.”)
Obama spoke simply of a “large and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with friends and allies.”
Donilon also implied a “shaping” objective, even though he did not use the word. He said, “We aspire to see a region where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments and universal human rights are upheld.”

[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011 (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm); “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 17, 2011, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament); “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 15, 2012, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery).

Downloads

Download the full article

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Publication: SERI Quarterly

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

NATO and the Costs of Star Wars

Clara M. O'Donnell — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Over the last decade, the US has spent tens of billions of dollars constructing a shield to stop nuclear missiles from North Korea or Iran reaching its soil. So far, the shield does not work. Fortunately for the Americans, neither Pyongyang nor Tehran has nuclear missiles that could hit the US. Unfortunately, however, America's missile defence programme has upset China and Russia, two countries that do have nuclear arsenals that could reach its homeland. America's European partners in NATO should try to convince Washington to scale back its missile defence ambitions for the next few years. Not only would this allow the US government to spend its shrinking defence budget on more pressing military needs. It would also improve European security by reducing tensions between NATO and Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been increasingly worried about nuclear attacks by 'rogue' states. In 1998, a study group chaired by Donald Rumsfeld predicted that North Korea and Iran could field intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years. Today, however, Iran has neither intercontinental missiles nor a nuclear bomb. In March of this year, a report from the Pentagon's intelligence agency (erroneously declassified) assessed "with moderate confidence" that Pyongyang could build a nuclear device that fits on a missile. But there is still no evidence that North Korean missiles are sophisticated enough to reach the US.

Although the American mainland is not currently under threat, every president since George H.W. Bush has sought to deploy nation-wide defences against a limited attack by ballistic missiles. Reviving some of President Ronald Reagan's 'star wars' ambitions, the US has had missile interceptors deployed in Alaska and California since 2004. Both the George W Bush and Obama administrations have also had various plans to deploy interceptors against intercontinental missiles at bases in Europe. (The Obama administration, working with NATO, has also been deploying interceptors in Europe to protect Europeans and US troops in the region against shorter-range missiles from Iran – a threat which does exist.) In March, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel announced that because of technical problems and budgetary constraints, the US is suspending its efforts to build Europe-based strategic interceptors. He also said that in response to the bellicose attitude of North Korea's new leader, the US will add 14 missile interceptors in on its West Coast, and perhaps deploy a few more on the East Coast, too.

The Obama administration has been wise to cancel the European leg of its strategic missile defence plans. Several recent studies had highlighted significant shortcomings in the programme. For example, a 2012 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the interceptors planned for Europe would have been too slow to stop an incoming missile. But the US would be ill advised to increase the number of interceptors on the West – and possibly East – Coast. Studies have shown that the interceptors in Alaska and California do not work well either. According to Congress' Government Accountability Office, ten out of the 30 interceptors rely on technology which has never intercepted a missile during tests. The GAO estimates that it will take several years to repair this technology, costing the US taxpayer an additional $700 million. Hagel has promised to fix these glitches before the new interceptors are deployed. But the Pentagon does not yet have a solution to another big problem. None of its interceptors can distinguish between an incoming warhead and debris or decoys. (Ballistic missiles can easily carry decoys in addition to warheads.)

America's strategic missile defence efforts have made the US taxpayer fund a weapon that does not work to tackle a threat that does not exist. They have also antagonised China and Russia. Both countries worry that US technological breakthroughs could undermine their strategic deterrents. Moscow has been most displeased. The Kremlin has been asking for legal guarantees that the US would not direct its missile defences against Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. To reassure Russia, the Obama administration has encouraged Moscow to co-operate with NATO's defence programme against Iranian short and long-range missiles. (Moscow is less worried about NATO's defences against Iranian short-range missiles because the interceptors used would be too slow to stop a Russian strategic missile.) Washington has also been willing to provide Moscow political guarantees that its nuclear deterrent is not under threat.

But so far, the Obama administration has refused to give Russia legal guarantees. The US has made such commitments in the past. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established limits on what Moscow and Washington could do in this area from the 1970s until 2002. President George W Bush then withdrew from the agreement in order to pursue America’s missile defence ambitions unhindered. The Obama administration fears that Republican senators – who are keen on missile defence – would not ratify a treaty that would constrain the US. As a result, missile defence has become one of the most contentious issues in a troubled US-Russia relationship. Moscow has refused to negotiate further cuts in its nuclear arsenal until the issue is resolved. Last year, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces threatened to attack the European NATO countries hosting US missile defences. And according to press reports, Russian bombers have been simulating strikes against American missile defence installations.

Now that Hagel has cancelled the European leg of US strategic missile defences, there is a chance that NATO and Russia could end their dispute. Senior American and Russian officials have resumed talks about Russia co-operating with NATO's missile defence efforts. US policy-makers have also been encouraging Moscow to negotiate new bilateral nuclear reductions – a top priority for President Barack Obama. According to some Russian officials, President Vladimir Putin may be open to an agreement when he meets President Obama at the G8 in June or at their bilateral summit in September. But the Russians still want legal guarantees on strategic missile defences.

Europeans welcome the possibility of improved NATO-Russia ties. Most of them have never been convinced of the need for, or feasibility of, strategic missile defences and many disliked Washington's decision to leave the ABM treaty. Germany and others have been keen for Russia to co-operate with NATO's missile defence programme as a way to alleviate tensions. To maximise the chances of a deal between Washington and Moscow, Europeans should now encourage their American allies to include legal guarantees on missile defence in a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution point out in their book 'The opportunity' that treaty limits could still allow the US to deploy all its planned defences against North Korea and Iran: the US and Russia could for example agree to each having a maximum of 125 interceptors capable of engaging intercontinental missiles. (The ABM treaty initially allowed for 200.) The treaty could also be limited to ten years, so that both sides could reconsider its ceilings in light of how the threats from North Korea and Iran evolve.

The White House, and Europeans, would struggle to convince some Republican senators to ratify such a treaty. But without it, Russia is unlikely to reduce its numerous tactical nuclear weapons – an arsenal that worries both Democrats and Republicans. Europeans should also discourage their US counterparts from deploying additional interceptors against strategic missiles until tests have shown them to be effective. The risk of wasting large sums of money at a time of savage defence cuts should help senators to reassess their views on missile defence.

As Greg Thielmann, a former senior US state department intelligence official, remarks, Europeans have "tamed ill-considered American instincts" in the past: in the 1980s, Europeans encouraged a reluctant Reagan administration to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For the benefit of NATO-Russia relations and global arms control, the Europeans should encourage their ally to reassess its stance again.

Authors

Clara M. O'Donnell

Publication: Centre for European Reform

Image Source: © Yves Herman / Reuters

North Korea through Chinese Eyes

Tue, 23 Apr 2013 03:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 23, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:30 PM CST

School of Public Policy and Management Auditorium
Brookings-Tsinghua Center

Beijing, China

North Korea’s threats against the outside world have reached new heights in recent months, triggering mounting concern across Northeast Asia about the possibilities of instability, crisis and even war. Yet there is nothing especially unusual or new in North Korean statements and actions, even if its recent behavior seems particularly extreme and worrisome. Its conduct reflects the isolation and deep frustrations of leaders in Pyongyang, the persistence of dynastic rule in North Korea, its economic weakness in relation to its neighbors (especially the Republic of Korea) and the unwillingness of outside powers to legitimate the DPRK’s claims to status as a nuclear-armed state.

On April 23, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted a public event for Dr. Jonathan Pollack, senior fellow and director of the John Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Pollack is a specialist on East Asian international politics and security. His latest book, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, was published in May 2011 by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In his remarks, Pollack briefly reviewed North Korea’s political history and assessed how Chinese views of the DPRK have shifted in recent years, and then weighed in on how North Korea’s future could affect Northeast Asia as a whole and U.S.-China relations in particular.China is now on the road to redefining its interests on the peninsula and its relationship with North Korea, and to striking discreetly a balance among the various stakeholders, as Pollack indicated.

Ms. Meng Bo, associate director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center gave the opening remarks for the event. Professor Wang Dong from Peking University shared his insights on North Korea from the perspective of a Chinese scholar. After the program, Dr. Pollack answered questions from the audience.

Video

North Korea through Chinese Eyes

Transcript

Event Materials

A Possible "Off Ramp" in North Korea

James E. Goodby — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 14:04:00 -0400

At the Brookings panel discussion on North Korea on April 15, “North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States,” several important points were made that suggest a connecting of the dots would be useful. First, the consensus appeared to be that Kim Jong-un is calling the shots. Second, there is a high risk of catastrophic miscalculation in the present situation. Third, we should pay attention to what the North Koreans are telling us, "in their own words." Fourth, Kim Jong-un would like to open a discussion with the United States but he has left himself no exit from the current confrontation.

It can be argued that Kim Jong-un has in fact left himself an exit in a variety of ways, of which the most commonly mentioned is that the ending of the current United States-Republic of Korea joint military exercise will permit him to ratchet down the rhetoric. There is one other "off ramp" strategy that is never mentioned at all, which is surprising, considering that it was presented in Kim's own words in a highly public manner. It can be found in Kim Jong-un's New Year's Day speech this year, an address that Kim must have seen as a major statement of his intentions but which has been almost totally ignored.

This is what he said: "All the compatriots in the north, south and abroad should launch a dynamic struggle to carry out to the letter the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration, great unification programs common to the nation in the new century and milestones for peace and prosperity."

The June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration was signed by then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung and former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il at a summit meeting held in Pyongyang. It included some features from the 1992 Basic Agreement, including family reunification, but was much less sweeping in its reach than the 1992 agreement. Its emphasis was on an independent effort by North and South Korea to achieve reunification. The October 4, 2007 agreement was signed by then-ROK President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and was much more programmatic and substantive in content than the June 15, 2000 Declaration. Like the earlier summit declaration, the 2007 agreement stressed what it called "by-the-Korean-people-themselves." In the present crisis-filled atmosphere, paragraph 4 of that document can be read as either an anachronism or as a beacon of hope. This is what it said:

The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war. With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

Of course, both the Declaration in 2000 and the Agreement in 2007 were negotiated by leaders of a party that is now out of power in South Korea, and the North Korean leader has been succeeded by his son. Both documents have been gathering dust in the archives for years. But Kim Jong-un's reference to them gave them new relevance. This is the powerful leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea saying that he and all Koreans should live up to the letter of these documents and he was saying that on January 1, 2013.

As an off-ramp strategy, one can find flaws in it, especially in the possibility that it was intended by Kim Jong-un as an attempt to drive a wedge between new ROK President Park Geun-hye and the leaders of South Korea's allies. It also opens the door to economic cooperation and possibly renewed assistance, difficult to contemplate under today's circumstances, which include the shut-down of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. But skillful diplomacy should certainly be able to exploit for the good whatever good there is in it.

Authors

James E. Goodby

North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN and cspan.org. Click here to watch online.

In the past months, North Korea has issued a series of threats and provocative actions, from testing a nuclear device and conducting a missile launch—in contravention of multiple United Nations resolutions—to cancelling the armistice ending the Korean War and threatening a new war against the United States and South Korea. Harsh rhetoric from North Korea is nothing new, but some observers feel that the recent threats represent real danger. Others claim that they reflect internal dynamics in North Korea and that the crisis will pass.

On April 15, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the policy priorities for the United States in dealing with North Korea during and after the current crisis. Brookings experts debated the threat to the United States and its allies and analyzed steps that the United States can take to mitigate the danger, including sanctions, engaging allies and neighbors in the region, nonproliferation efforts and, if necessary, responding to aggressive actions by North Korea.

Video

Audio

North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130415_north_korea_priorities_transcript

North Korea and Nuclear-Armed Missiles: Calming the Hyperbole

Steven Pifer — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In recent weeks, the North Korean government has ratcheted up its rhetoric to ever loftier heights, even threatening to rain nuclear fire on the United States. That understandably has fueled concerns, but what can the North Korean military reliably do?

On April 11, a member of Congress cited a Defense Intelligence Agency report stating that DIA had “moderate confidence” that North Korea had mastered the ability to put a nuclear warhead on top of a ballistic missile. That triggered new concerns, followed by a rush of qualifications. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper released a statement saying “North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear-armed missile.” A spokesperson for South Korea’s Ministry of Defense expressed “doubt that North Korea has reached the stage of miniaturization.”

So what’s going on?

In order to have a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, North Korea must master three challenges: it needs a nuclear weapon; it needs to miniaturize the weapon so that it can fit inside a ballistic missile warhead and withstand the stresses of flight; and it needs a ballistic missile to deliver the warhead. To provide a credible military capability, it must be able to do these things reliably.

As to the first question, North Korea has nuclear devices. It has conducted three underground explosions, although many judged the first two—conducted in 2006 and 2009—to be partial failures, particularly given their low yields. The 2013 test appears to have been more successful.

Jeffrey Lewis at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies notes that North Korea could take one of two approaches to developing a nuclear bomb. One route, which most other nuclear weapons states followed, is to first test a “simple fission device.” That’s big and heavy—no North Korean missile could carry it—and it produces a yield of 15-20 kilotons, much larger than any of the three North Korean tests. Lewis thus inclines to think the North Koreans are developing a miniaturized weapon, which would produce a smaller yield.

This gets to the second question: the need to fit a nuclear weapon inside a ballistic missile warhead that can withstand the stresses of launch, flight and reentry. North Korea may be working on miniaturizing a bomb to fit in a missile warhead. We do not know how successful, or unsuccessful, they have been. We do not know the size of the three devices they tested.

We do know that the North Koreans have not successfully flight-tested a ballistic missile warhead to a range greater than 1300 kilometers. They have tested and deploy Hwasong and Nodong missiles with ranges up to 1300 kilometers, but longer range missiles mean greater stresses on the warhead. For example, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead reenters the atmosphere at a speed of five-seven kilometers per second or 10,000-15,000 miles per hour. Higher velocity means more heat and requires more weight to protect the “physics package” of the warhead, which has to survive and function in a very stressful environment.

The third question has to do with ballistic missiles. North Korea is estimated to have 550-600 Hwasong-5 and -6 missiles, variants of the venerable Soviet SCUD, which was first flown in the 1950s and exported around the world. The Hwasong missiles have ranges of 300-500 kilometers, giving them the capability to target South Korea. North Korea’s Nodong missile is an enhanced SCUD. Some 200 are estimated to be deployed. With a range of 1000 to 1300 kilometers, they could reach targets in Japan in addition to South Korea.

For ranges beyond the Nodong, there are much more serious questions about the reliability of North Korean ballistic missiles. The Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile—two of which reportedly now sit on mobile launchers near North Korea’s east coast—is estimated to have a range of 3200 kilometers. However, the Musudan has never been flight-tested. As Greg Thielmann, a ballistic missile expert with the Arms Control Association notes, a missile that has not flown cannot seriously be called operational.

The Taepodong-1, with a range of 2200 kilometers, has flown once, in 1998 as a space-launch vehicle. Its third stage failed. Over the past seven years, the ICBM-class Taepodong-2 is one for five in flights, none of which demonstrated a warhead reentry capability. The one success, last December, was a space-launch variant called the Unha. All three stages worked, though the satellite apparently was left tumbling uselessly in orbit. Finally, there is the KN-08, reputedly an ICBM-class missile, which paraded through the streets of Pyongyang last year. Several theories address it, including that it is a developmental missile or just a fake. It has never flown.

This test history raises serious doubts about North Korea’s long-range missile capabilities. As a 2012 RAND report by Markus Schiller notes, the United States tested its Atlas ICBM 125 times before it became operational, while the Soviet Union tested the R-16 ICBM 90 times before making it operational. In the 1980s, when the United States had much more experience with ballistic missiles, it still conducted 30 developmental flights of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile.

This is rocket science. Are North Korean engineers so good that they can glean from a handful of flight-tests—or no tests—the information needed to produce a reliable missile, when others conducted dozens of flights? The North Koreans undoubtedly are learning more about missiles (and about reentry vehicles and nuclear weapons), which is of concern. But as General Clapper said, they have not demonstrated the full range of capabilities.

The North Korean leadership bases a big part of its foreign policy on bluster. As an element of this, declaring unproven missiles to be operational makes sense. In such a strategy, it may be less important that the ballistic missiles work reliably—or at all—if one can bluff the outside world into fearing that they do.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Getting Kim Jong Un's Attention

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 09:19:00 -0400

Nothing about the international response to North Korea's third nuclear test in February or subsequent provocations has been unreasonable. The crisis is entirely of Pyongyang's making. But it is possible that the hard-line approach taken by Washington, Seoul and other capitals to the North Korean bluster, brinkmanship and bombast has been far less than optimal.

We need a firm policy. North Korea must pay a price for its irresponsible and dangerous behavior, and know that the world is united in standing against it. The resolve must begin with the U.S.-South Korean military alliance but extend to other nations, most notably China, North Korea's only ally and main benefactor.

But there are a couple of problems. One is that China is uneasy about jeopardizing stability next to its borders and only goes along with sanctions reluctantly. Indeed, one possible explanation for North Korea's behavior is that it is seeking to spook leaders in Beijing so severely that they will be even more averse to applying any further sanctions, perhaps after another North Korean nuclear test.

And the worse this crisis gets, the more it increases the odds of North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong Un, further entrenching himself in hard-line positions from which it will be difficult to backtrack later. Among other things, it would raise the odds that he will seek to accelerate and expand nuclear weapons production activities.

We need a more creative policy should there be another crisis or a substantial worsening of this one (beyond a firing of a medium-range missile, for example). More sanctions might be needed. But new sanctions should sunset automatically, say after two years, unless Pyongyang tests another bomb, expands nuclear production or carries out another aggressive act leading to loss of life.

The key sanctions that could still be imposed would affect basic trade and aid in basic consumer goods, largely what China and North Korea exchange. Most sanctions to date are on banking, technology and the assets of certain individuals.

Temporary sanctions accomplish several goals. They constitute a firm response themselves. But because they do not last forever, they provide an incentive for better North Korean behavior. They also give a nod to China's worry that strong-armed international action against the Kim regime, however justified, is risky. Chinese leaders may or may not be right, but there can be little doubt this is how they think.

At this point it is too late to turn existing, permanent U.N. sanctions into temporary ones without any North Korean concessions, as that would reward Pyongyang's behavior. But we do need to look for ways to de-escalate this crisis. We also need to look for ways to more generally contain the downward trajectory of Pyongyang's relationship with the outside world. As bad as things are now, they can get worse if the regime reactivates its plutonium-producing reactor or expands its suspected uranium enrichment, with the possibility that bombs could be sold abroad.

Although the U.S. position on key issues should stay firm, we should also be willing to talk with North Korea at any point. Beyond that, Washington needs to signal a willingness to engage in a much broader discussion leading to a road map for a comprehensive deal. Right now, Pyongyang shows little interest in internal reform. It needs to be encouraged to move in the direction that China, Vietnam and now Myanmar have taken: reform from within. And the U.S. should work closely with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia to develop a truly coordinated strategy to steer North Korea in this direction.

The regime need not commit up front to relinquishing every nuclear weapon for this kind of deal to begin. But if it is willing to stop producing nuclear arms, gradually scale back its military and begin to reform and ultimately dismantle its gulag system of labor camps and penal colonies, Washington should make it clear that U.S. and international help can extend to much broader economic and technical assistance as well as a comprehensive peace deal.

This may sound like strange talk in the middle of such an acute crisis. But it is partly because the U.S. has no clear strategy for navigating the relationship with North Korea that small crises can metastasize, and that Kim, listening to his hard-line generals, may decide that he has no option but to double down on the juche (self-reliance) Stalinist system that his grandfather and father have built, and on their extremely dangerous confrontational policies toward the West. We need to create a light at the end of the tunnel, even if the light will be very faint for some time to come.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Mike Mochizuki

Publication: Los Angeles Times

The World of North Korea's Kim Jong-un

Kongdan Oh — Thu, 04 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In December 2011 the second generation leader of the Kim dynasty, Kim Jong-il, reportedly died of a heart attack at age 70. His father, Kim Il-sung, the founder of the dynasty, was a guerilla fighter who fought against the Japanese in China and later fled to Russia, where he became an officer in the Soviet army. Although he returned to the northern half of the Korean peninsula after the Japanese had surrendered to Soviet troops, he claimed credit for liberating Korea single-handedly, just as he falsely claimed to have defeated the UN coalition forces during the Korean War. This founding Kim set North Korea on the course that it now follows under the leadership of his grandson, who has consciously imitated his grandfather’s clothing, mannerisms, and “military-first” policy.

The Kim dynasty has successfully maintained a large measure of secrecy about how it operates. It is believed that for the last 20 years of Kim Il-sung’s reign, his son was running most of the country’s day-to-day affairs. When that son took over the leadership on his father’s death from a heart attack in 1994, he ruled in an even more secretive fashion than his father, sometimes not appearing in public for months on end. Throughout his lifetime, Kim Jong-il made only one public speech—of less than ten words—and that may have been due to a mistake made by a sound engineer. Now the world wants to know what is going on in the grandson’s mind as he publicly defies his erstwhile ally China and threatens destruction on South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

North Korea is in the news for two reasons: it has expanding nuclear weapons and missiles programs and it threatens to attack South Korea, the United States, and Japan. The nuclear program is hardly news. The Kim regime has been working since the 1980s on this program, and despite occasional denials of any desire to have nuclear weapons, it has forged ahead relentlessly, even during the days when it had reached a non-nuclear agreement with the United States. It is highly unlikely that the North Koreans were ever willing to completely abandon the program, no matter what incentives they were offered, and in recent years they have firmly renounced any interest in even discussing the program. In 2013 they officially stated that the program is their most important weapon and is not subject to negotiation. This should surprise no one, and it should also save other countries much time and effort that they would otherwise have put into trying to negotiate a new nuclear deal with North Korea.

Read the full article on theglobalexperts.org »

Authors

Kongdan Oh

Publication: Global Experts