Brookings: Topics - Northeast Asia

Strengthening U.S.-Taiwan Relations: A New Partnership for a New Age

Thu, 13 Jun 2013 09:15:00 -0400

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June 13, 2013
9:15 AM - 10:45 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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An Address by Su Tseng-chang, Chairman, Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan

Since the Taiwan presidential and legislative elections of January 2012, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been making a series of adjustments in order to be more competitive in the 2014 local elections and the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Among the issues under review are the party’s policy towards China, the East Asian region, and the United States.

On June 13, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and hosted an address by Su Tseng-chang, chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party. Chairman Su addressed the policy challenges the DPP faces as it prepares for the upcoming contests. Christopher Johnson, senior adviser and Freeman chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies provided a brief introduction. Brookings Senior Fellow and CNAPS Director Richard Bush moderated the discussion.

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Strengthening U.S.-Taiwan Relations: A New Partnership for a New Age

The U.S. and China: A New Kind of Great Power Relationship?

Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 12, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Last weekend’s meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping at the former Annenberg Estate in California presented the two leaders with an opportunity to address a wide range of pressing issues, from flash points in the Korean peninsula to climate change and the global economy. To China’s leaders, this meeting contributed to the development of a “new kind of great power relationship,” a concept that has been heavily promoted in recent months in state media and official pronouncements.

On June 12, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted Madame Fu Ying, the spokeswoman for the China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the chair of the NPC’s Foreign Affairs Committee. As an experienced career diplomat and former vice minister of Foreign Affairs, and now the spokesperson for China’s national legislature, Ambassador Fu has played a unique role in both conducting foreign policy and explaining national policies to Chinese and foreign media. In her comments, she discussed the U.S.-China relationship in the wake of the Annenberg meeting and offer a Chinese perspective on the direction of U.S.-China relations. Senior Fellow Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, gave introductory remarks.

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The U.S. and China: A New Kind of Great Power Relationship?

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20130612_fu_ying_remarks

U.S.-China Relations and America’s Alliances in Asia

Sheena Chestnut Greitens — Tue, 11 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On June 7-8, President Barack Obama met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Sunnylands estate in southern California. Their “official working visit” followed a year of political transition in both countries, including President Obama’s re-election and Xi Jinping’s ascension to the head of China’s party-state, as well as changes in leadership around the Asia-Pacific region. In advance of the summit, observers looked to the meeting as a less formal interaction in which the two leaders could exchange views, develop a personal rapport, and begin to manage the mix of competition and cooperation that have characterized the U.S.-China relationship. Discussions surrounding the summit reflected larger conversations within the policy community in Washington about the importance of a cooperative and stable U.S.-China relationship for regional and global peace and stability.

In discussing this relationship, American public intellectuals have become fond of referencing Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta to issue warnings about the risk of conflict, and to offer advice on how one can best manage the geopolitical tensions that have historically attended the rise of a new great power.[1] Leaders on both sides, the argument goes, must be acutely aware of the dilemma they face if they are to avoid it. Reflecting this discourse, as well as their own research into the rise of previous great powers, Chinese scholars and officials have consistently called for a “New Type of Great Power Relationship” (新型大国关系, xinxing daguo guanxi) between Washington and Beijing that avoids the tensions that surrounded past rising powers.[2]

Many of the prescriptions for avoiding conflict call for the two leaders to spend time, energy, and discussion focused on creating “strategic trust” (战略信任, zhanlue xinren) in the bilateral relationship.[3] In his February 2012 address in Washington, President Xi Jinping called for the enhancement of mutual trust as the first of four major principles upon which American and Chinese leaders should base their relationship.[4] In a 2012 Brookings Institution report, Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi argue that “strategic distrust” is rooted in the narrowing gap in power between the U.S. and China; differences in political traditions and values; and insufficient understanding of each other’s policymaking structures and processes.[5] In an effort to build strategic trust, forums for discussion and the enhancement of mutual understanding have multiplied; over sixty formal dialogues between the United States and the People’s Republic of China now occur each year.[6]

Historical analogies are useful; they help leaders define the stakes of an issue, generate policy options for responding, and assess the consequences of those options.[7] But they require careful interpretation. In this case, Washington and Beijing have focused on one aspect of the Thucydides analogy – the “fear” that he identified as the underlying cause of conflict – and have formulated their policy prescriptions with the goal of ameliorating that fear and distrust. In doing so, they have overlooked an equally important lesson: the importance of alliance management.

Thucydides’ own history demonstrates that the proximate cause of the Peloponnesian War lay in the alliance structure and alliance management processes of the Greek city-states. It was, after all, not a direct conflict of interest between Athens and Sparta that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, but a conflict between two of their allies, Corcyra and Corinth. In Sparta’s discussions over the declaration of war against Athens, fear of Athenian power was acknowledged as a reason for caution, not for war. And dialogue between the two sides was hardly absent; the Athenians were present at the Spartan deliberations, and spoke on their own behalf. Despite that, the Spartans eventually voted for war -- because honor required that they not disregard wrongs done to their allies. In the words of Sthenelaidus, Sparta could not “betray her allies to ruin.”[8]

As the United States considers the U.S.-China relationship in the context of its overall foreign policy in Asia, that is a lesson policymakers on both sides would do well to remember. Alliance management in the region is likely to be one of the most significant challenges to the United States’ efforts to maintain stability in Asia. Although bilateral issues such as China’s currency, foreign investment, cybersecurity, and others are non-trivial irritants in the relationship, they have not been the sole drivers of concern about China’s intentions, nor have they been the major causes of regional tension. For the same reason, bilateral dialogue to foster trust will not by itself eliminate the risk of conflict. Alliances play a critical role in fostering either conflict or cooperation.

Increased concern over China’s assertiveness since 2008 or so has been driven – and since 2010, sustained – by China’s behavior toward American allies in the region, particularly in the area of maritime disputes. Incidents that have drawn media attention and generated policy discussion in the United States include China’s behavior in the South China Sea – especially the April 2012 standoff with the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal – and China’s dispute with Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island area. While Alastair Iain Johnston rightly points out that many of the claims about China’s “new assertiveness” are based on selective analysis that overlooks examples of Chinese cooperation, he does characterize Chinese behavior in maritime disputes as more assertive.[9] Even if China’s overall pattern of behavior is not newly assertive, that distinction is not likely to matter much if the assertiveness that does exist is concentrated in behavior that directly and negatively impact the security of American treaty allies and democratic partners.

China’s policy community itself has fostered the perception that China is seeking to change the status quo in the region at the expense of American allies. In the aftermath of the incident at Scarborough Shoal, and during the Senkaku/Diaoyu tensions, for example, Chinese voices argued that the Philippines and Japan had made a mistake in provoking China, and now needed to pay for it by accepting a “new status quo” in the disputed areas – one less favorable to them and more favorable to Chinese interests.[10] Chinese voices also cite America’s alliance behavior and efforts to strengthen its alliances and security partnerships in Asia – including not only arms sales to Taiwan (a perennial target of Chinese criticism), but American affirmation of its treaty obligations to Japan as tensions rose in the Senkaku/Diaoyu area, participation in military exercises with the Philippines, and changes to the U.S. force posture in Asia such as the deployment of Marines to Australia and the stationing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore – as detrimental to stability and threatening to China’s security.[11] China’s statements about and behavior toward American allies in the region have done much to convince observers of China’s “new assertiveness,” and to drive the responses of America and its allies.

In a question-and-answer session after the conclusion of the Obama-Xi summit, on Saturday evening, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon framed the Obama-Xi meeting and administration efforts to achieve a constructive relationship with China as key components of the American “rebalancing” effort in Asia.[12] The rebalancing policy, first announced as a “pivot to Asia” in autumn 2011, seeks to redistribute American focus back toward the Asia-Pacific in a way that is commensurate with Asia’s economic and strategic importance to the United States.

Linking the U.S.-China relationship to rebalancing, however, further highlights the dilemma that the United States faces when it comes to alliance management in the context of increased focus on the Asia-Pacific and increased fiscal constraints at home. Despite a web of deepening intra-regional security arrangements,[13] America’s allies and partners in Asia also have significant historical and territorial disputes remaining between them. Since 1945, therefore, the United States’ role in Asia has been not only to dampen security dilemmas between its alliance partners and external powers, but between the various alliance partners themselves.[14]

As part of the rebalancing, the United States is debating how burden-sharing within its various partnerships might be adjusted, and whether some of the alliances might be able to take on increased responsibility for regional and global security. Encouraging activism, however, may come with a cost, engendering conflict among American allies themselves and weakening American extended deterrence. It simply may not be tenable for the United States to encourage its allies to take more responsibility for and a more active role in their own security in some areas, but ask them to abide by a status quo that they perceive to be unfavorable in others. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the past few months have seen an increase in cooperation among U.S. allies, but also significant levels of friction in the region: tension between South Korea and Japan that led to the cancellation of high-level meetings and the scuppering of an intelligence-sharing agreement; a shooting incident between Taiwan and the Philippines; and a standoff between Japan and China in the waters disputed by the two sides. Conflicts among U.S. allies weaken extended deterrence, hamper the creation of coordinated and de-escalatory responses to regional crises, and inhibit the ability to conduct effective coercive diplomacy where necessary.[15]

To offset this risk, the United States should coordinate closely with each of its allies to anticipate possible developments and ensure that the alliance responds with measures that appropriately balance reassurance and restraint. (Here, the firm but non-escalatory response of the United States and the Republic of Korea to North Korea’s recent belligerent rhetoric provides a positive example.) It should also stress that disputes among American allies must not be allowed to derail cooperation on shared interests, and should support mechanisms that facilitate intra-allied cooperation. Conversely, Chinese leaders should understand that bilateral efforts to build strategic trust with China are a complement to America’s regional alliance commitments, and not a substitute for them.

Less fear and more trust are indeed likely to contribute to a constructive U.S.-China relationship. But the principal foreign policy challenge facing the United States in Asia today is not the creation of strategic trust between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, or between the United States and China. It is the challenge of alliance management: to reassure America’s allies without emboldening them toward unnecessary adventurism, and to use those alliances to deter potential adversaries without provoking them into spirals of conflict. Wise and steady management of U.S. alliances in Asia will make America’s interests and commitments clear, and help shape the level of conflict or cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship for years to come.

[1] For example, see Graham Allison, “Avoiding Thucydides’ Trap,” Financial Times, 22 August 2012; Graham T. Allison, “Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Common Trap,” New York Times, 6 June 2013. For one of the few pieces that takes a dim view of this analogy, see Daniel Drezner, “The limits of Thucydides in the 21^st Century,” Foreign Policy, 29 May 2013, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/29/the_limits_of_thucydides_in_the_21st_century

[2] Jane Perlez, “Chinese President to Seek New Relationship with U.S. in Talks,” New York Times, 28 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/world/asia/china-to-seek-more-equal-footing-with-us-in-talks.html; Zhang Tuosheng, “Developing a New Type of Major Power Relationship Between China and the U.S.,” China Focus, 4 January 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/print./?id=22800

[3] Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing US-China Strategic Distrust, Brookings Institution John L. Thornton China Center Monograph No. 4 (March 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal

[4] Xi Jinping, “China-U.S. Partnership Creating a Better Tomorrow,” Speech at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and U.S. China Business Council Luncheon, 15 February 2012, for transcript see [习近平, “共创中美合作伙伴关系的美好明天,” Renmin Wang, 16 February 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/17132096.html.

[5] Lieberthal and Wang, pp. x-xi; on the contribution that different political values and systems make to distrust, see Aaron Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy: China, the America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton, 2012).

[6] Lieberthal and Wang, p. 1.

[7] Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[8] See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book I, pp. 35-38. On the role of alliances in international conflict, see Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-68.

[9] Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 7-48.

[10] M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Island Strategy: Redefine the Status Quo,” The Diplomat, 1 November 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/

[11] He Yafei, “The Trust Deficit,” Foreign Policy, 13 May 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how_china_sees_the_us_pivot_to_asia;

[12] The White House, “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,” 8 June 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/press-briefing-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon

[13] Center for a New American Security, The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties, June 2013.

[14] Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009-10), pp. 158-196.

[15] Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and the Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Authors

Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Obama and Xi at Sunnylands: A Good Start

Richard C. Bush III — Mon, 10 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Based on the briefings after the Sunnylands Summit, it appears that the encounter between President Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping met its primary goal of deepening the personal relationship between the two, and in charting a way forward on the key issues of their bilateral relationship.

Of course, the briefers are going to put the meetings in the best possible light, since Washington and Beijing had invested a lot in this meeting. But the two leaders appear to have genuinely connected in a positive way during their eight hours together. Tom Donilon, President Obama’s National Security Adviser, called the conversations “positive and constructive, wide-ranging and quite successful in achieving the goals that we set forth for this meeting.” They began by describing their respective vision for their countries, both domestically and externally. The implication is that a positive U.S.-China relationship will allow each to fulfill his goals. Or, neither will be able to succeed without a cooperative U.S.-China relationship.

On specific issues, Obama and Xi appear to have had the most agreement on North Korea: on the strategic dangers posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, and on the need to fully enforce the resolutions of the UN Security Council to create pressure on the North to choose between nuclear weapons and a normal relationship with the international community. President Obama discussed the problem of cyber-theft targeting public and private American entities. He also urged restraint by all parties to disputes in the East and South China Seas. President Xi reportedly (and not unexpectedly) raised the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and Obama reportedly reiterated the long-standing U.S. position. Xi also asked for more information on regarding the multilateral trade negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Obama pledged to provide that transparency.

Thus, the Sunnylands Summit did not resolve the issues in the U.S.-China relationship, but that was never its objective. Instead, the goal was to create a more effective platform for addressing those issues in the future by deepening the Xi-Obama personal relationship and by making explicit the reality that the success of each will affect the success of the other. This was a good beginning, but it is just a beginning. Chinese observers should not, as they have in the past, infer that all the problems of the bilateral relationship have disappeared simply because the two leaders had a good meeting.

Still, the stakes here are high. Both leaders understand from history that when a country has quickly accumulated power in the past and challenged the existing international system, the result was usually conflict and war. Obama and Xi appear to understand both the need and the opportunity to create a “new model of relations between great powers,” and that their own choices and actions – and their personal interaction – will be crucial in avoiding the old model.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Obama and Xi at Sunnylands: A New Pattern of Relations?

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 16:03:00 -0400

During the extended conversation between President Obama and China’s President Xi Jinping, the topic of a “new pattern of major-power relations” is sure to come up. Xi will be the one to raise it, because he and his predecessors have been calling for a “new pattern” in recent years. Obama will be ready with some sort of response, because his senior officials have already but generally endorsed the idea.

“New pattern of major power relations” is one of those phrases that Chinese leaders initiate, both as a tool to bring coherence to their increasingly unwieldy system and as a means to engage their foreign counterparts. The concept seems arcane, but it could have profound strategic significance – if it gains some content.

That China is focused on a “new pattern” reflects its concern about the old pattern. That pattern, in the Chinese understanding, is that when a previously weak country quickly accumulates power, it ends up challenging the existing international order and the principal countries that defend that order and then finds itself in perpetual conflict and major war.

China today does not wish to repeat the old pattern. It benefits a lot from the international system that the United States created after World War II, even if it dislikes some of the rules and the U.S. forward deployment in East Asia, its home region. And Beijing understands that it is far from ready to fight a war with America. So it’s a good thing that the Chinese are “using history as a mirror” and seek to understand how the dynamics of the past might hurt their national interests in the future. As long ago as 2006, official Chinese television did a documentary series "The Rise of Great Powers” on this phenomenon of power transitions. And the United States, the defender of the current international order, is right to welcome China’s desire to avoid the tyranny of history.

The problem is that the “new pattern” idea is so far just a slogan. It has no content. Among the many questions that would have to be addressed in order to infuse the concept with content are the following:

What in fact was the old pattern of major power relations? Was it simply a case of an irresistible forces meeting an immovable obstacle over and over again? Or was something more complex going on to produce major conflict and war?
In the current era, who are the major powers? China clearly has itself and the United States in mind. But what about Japan? What about Germany, Britain, and France, or the European Union as a whole? What about Russia, India, and Brazil? One can only figure out the pattern when one knows the players.
What is the relationship between the major powers and Tier 2 powers? South Korea, South Africa, and Israel come to mind.
How should major powers manage their relations in the complex situation where they all are present in the same region, where conflicts of interest are most likely? In East Asia, for example, China, Japan and the United States are the key actors.
What issues will be the substantive heart of the new pattern? Is it the relatively easy global issues which are ripe for multilateral cooperation? Or will it be the truly hard issues that threaten the greatest danger to international peace and security?
Should the new pattern be formed by identifying a set of over-arching principles (probably the Chinese presence) or to build the pattern by learning lessons from interaction on specific issues (probably the American inclination)?

Presidents Xi and Obama will not answer these questions and define the “new pattern” at Sunnylands. That’s not the purpose of their meeting. But they have a unique opportunity to agree that this concept is important (which it is) and to initiate a process to invest it with serious content (which they should).

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Brian Snyder / Reuters

Obama and Xi at Sunnylands: Taiwan

Richard C. Bush III — Mon, 03 Jun 2013 09:25:00 -0400

There is no question that Taiwan will come up at the meeting between President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping in California at the end of the week. Because China’s government regards the termination of Taiwan’s separate existence as a fundamental national goal, and because Beijing regularly states that it is the “most sensitive and important” issue in U.S.-China relations, Xi will raise it at some point. The question is how he does so.

In some bilateral meetings, the discussion of Taiwan is a ritualized set-piece. The Chinese side stresses the importance of the issue and what it would like the United States to do (don’t promote de jure independence and end arms sales). The U.S. side reiterates that Washington has a one-China policy, adheres to the three U.S.-PRC communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, and has an abiding interest in a peaceful resolution of differences between the two sides.

That’s all that happens when Taiwan is not a very salient issue between Beijing and Washington. And that may be all that happens at Sunnylands, because Taiwan is not terribly salient between the United States and China right now. Beijing is making gradual progress in improving ties with Taipei, particularly on economic issues, and seems willing to move patiently and incrementally towards its long-term goal.

Yet President Xi may have reasons to pull the United States back in the game. The main one is that progress with Taipei is likely to slow over the next few years and that nothing will happen to lock in political understandings with Taipei, something that Beijing would prefer. Another potential problem: Taiwan’s next presidential election will occur in early 2016. Beijing fears that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, which in its mind is associated with de jure independence and acted provocatively when it was in power before, will return to power and negate the progress that has occurred.

So what might Xi Jinping ask Barack Obama to do? First, he might ask that the United States express rhetorical support for unification and opposition to Taiwan Independence. But Washington has properly and consistently focused on how the Taiwan Strait issue is resolved and not on actual outcomes. The most we have said publicly on Taiwan Independence is that we “do not support” it. It’s up to Beijing to convince the leaders and people of Taiwan that unification is a good idea. There is no need for the United States to help it out.

Second, Xi might seek a U.S.-China negotiation on a framework for limiting and ultimately ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese assumption here is that Taiwan will be unlikely to do a political deal as long as it has U.S. security support, including advanced arms. But the assumption is flawed. True, American security backing enhances Taiwan’s confidence, and the record indicates that Taipei is more willing to negotiate with Beijing when it feels confident. For political and other reasons, however, a Taiwan that feels weak and isolated is unlikely to negotiate at all, and certainly not on China’s terms. In fact, the reason Taiwan is reluctant to engage with Beijing on political issues, either medium- or long-term, is not U.S. arms sales but China’s own formula for resolving the political dispute. That is a point that President Xi should hear from President Obama.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Jason Lee / Reuters

Obama and Xi at Sunnylands: Maritime Tensions

Richard C. Bush III — Mon, 03 Jun 2013 16:00:00 -0400

When President Obama met China’s former president, Hu Jintao, during the first year of his first term, they probably didn’t talk about tensions in the East and South China Seas. Now, when Obama meets Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping, in the first year of his second term, maritime issues are likely to be on the agenda – because they could foster conflicts that drive the United States and China further apart than they already are.

Maritime tensions stem from several, linked disputes that are cumulative in their effect (for more, see my book, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations). The principal driver is the quest of all countries for natural resources to fuel economic growth, in this case oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish. To secure those resources in the maritime domain, the countries concerned—China, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei—claim various rocks and islands in the East and South China Seas, and the broadest exclusive rights to exploit fish in the sea and hydrocarbons and minerals in the seabed. Each creates a self-serving version of history and international law to fortify its case. Each acts diplomatically and in other ways to assert its claims before the world. Nationalistic publics push governments to be firm in protecting these national interests.

China claims the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands northwest of Taiwan and the Paracel and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea (and it has not denied a claim to the waters of the South China Sea as well). The United States, of course, has no territorial or resource claims in East Asia, but we do care a lot about how claimant countries assert and enforce their claims. For one thing, we have defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines, and so might get drawn into a conflict between either of them and China. Washington has stated explicitly, for example, that the Senkaku/Diaoyus fall within the territorial scope of our treaty with Japan. Second, we have interest in the consistent application of international law to the maritime domain (regrettably, the United States has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, even though we adhere to it). And we have an interest in the peace and prosperity that flows from multilateral stewardship of the maritime commons.

What makes the rivalry in the East and South China Seas so dangerous, and where the interaction between Presidents Xi and Obama could have a salutary effect, is the rather aggressive way in which maritime agencies of various countries conduct operations to protect and assert territorial and resource claims. China is probably the most at fault in this regard, but others are not without blame. And China has begun a pattern of exploit actions by others to define a new status quo, whether it is with the Diaoyu/Senkakus or the Spratleys. When a large number of vessels from contending countries operate in close proximity, accidents will happen. And when some of those vessels are armed, the consequences of accidents are compounded. To make matters worse, no country in East Asia has good crises management capabilities, particularly when nationalistic publics are in full fury.

It will be impossible in the short- or medium-term to resolve all aspects of theses maritime disputes (particularly territorial differences). The parties concerned should therefore start by addressing the aspect that is easiest to bring under control, and that is how maritime agencies operate in close proximity. There are concrete crisis-avoidance and risk-reduction measures that might be applied and adapted to the East and South China Seas through discussions between China and its neighbors. But Presidents Obama and Xi have an opportunity to recognize together the danger that these small disputes pose to the interests of their two countries and the entire East Asian region. They can set a tone and create a context for reducing the danger most immediately at hand, which will then permit a shift to more cooperative approaches.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © KYODO Kyodo / Reuters

The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP

Mireya Solís — Fri, 24 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

In recent commentary for the Financial Times, David Pilling argues that the central objective of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations is the exclusion of China. In his view, the desire to build an “anyone but China” club is due both to the perception that China got an easy pass when it joined the WTO and has continued to flaunt international trade and investment rules; and to the articulation of a larger political strategy to marginalize this emerging superpower. Pilling goes on to predict that the TPP will fail to deliver major liberalization as the traditional pattern of shielding sensitive sectors will emerge, and admonishes that only a much diluted trade agreement faces a realistic chance of ratification given the fractured consensus on the new proposed rules. In this rendition, the TPP appears politically myopic and economically irrelevant.

The argument that the TPP is a club that bars Chinese entry is inaccurate and unhelpful. China, like any other APEC economy, has the right to request entry into the TPP. Whether the Chinese leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country’s national interest and whether TPP members can be persuaded that China is prepared to abide by the negotiated disciplines is a separate matter. But it is important to dispel the notion that the TPP precludes Chinese entry. In fact, this trade agreement scores better than most in incorporating an accession mechanism that has already delivered membership expansion from four to twelve members –now comprising 40% of world GDP. More fundamentally, it is hard to understand why TPP countries would pursue the counter-productive and unfeasible goal of marginalizing China. China sits at the apex of the world economy as it ranks number two in share of world GDP and is at the center of global supply chains. A trade agreement that by fiat sought to defy these fundamental economic realities would be foolhardy indeed. Hence the TPP concept is expansive: it aims to eventually develop an Asia-Pacific wide platform of economic integration, not to draw lines encircling China.

If Chinese exclusion were the selling point of the TPP for countries like Japan, then one would be hard pressed to explain why the Japanese government is concurrently negotiating two major trade agreements with China: a trilateral FTA in Northeast Asia and an East Asian trade agreement known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). And the same is true for all other Asian countries in the TPP who already partake in the ASEAN-China FTA and are participating in the RCEP talks. The “us versus them” dynamic of security alliances is not really applicable to free trade agreements. The noodle bowl that characterizes the maze of FTAs illustrates the fact that in the world of international trade overlapping memberships render moot purely exclusive arrangements.

Ascribing an anti-China objective to the TPP is not helpful on three main fronts: 1) it provides political cover to protectionist interests, who argue that they should not be asked to undertake painful economic adjustments for the sake of trade agreements driven by geopolitical concerns; 2) it sends a chilling message to prospective members, who may fear that in joining TPP they will be seen as enlisted in the anti-China camp; and 3) it will discourage China from finding points of convergence with the TPP agenda if this is seen as capitulating to an American strategy of containment.

The most fundamental challenge to the TPP project vis-à-vis China is not that it is built around a faulty notion of containment, but rather that it may not constitute a powerful enough enticement to propel China to sign on to these new standards on trade and investment. China so far has reacted by accelerating its own trade initiatives in Asia. The risk that the United States and China will remain for the foreseeable future in separate trade groupings, without a significant bilateral dialogue on trade and investment, is very real. TPP negotiators cannot postpone the task of fashioning a strategy to engage China until after the TPP agreement is completed. They must be mindful of the fact that rules must be evaluated both in terms of their quality and dissemination potential. China must see in the new trade agenda a deal not unlike its accession to the WTO: while hefty commitments are to be expected, the accompanying domestic reforms will pay off handsomely in terms of improved economic performance.

Authors

Mireya Solís

Image Source: © Bobby Yip / Reuters

North Korea’s Turn to Diplomacy: Resuming the Six-Party Talks?

Richard C. Bush III — Fri, 24 May 2013 12:14:00 -0400

As summer follows spring, so too does North Korea transition from provocative words and deeds to a seemingly statesmanlike desire for diplomacy and peace. Before, it threatened to hit the United States with nuclear weapons. Now it expresses a willingness to engage in dialogue, even to return to the Six-Party Talks.

But this is all part of Pyongyang’s playbook. We have seen these peace offensives before. The crucial question now is the basis on which North Korea might be willing to negotiate. Is it the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which is the core of the Six-Party Talks and the stated objective of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China? If so, there is a reason to engage – carefully. Or is it Pyongyang’s most recently enunciated point of departure – that Washington, et al., must accept it as a nuclear weapons state, with all the rights and benefits that that implies under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? That is a non-starter, because it is a recipe for instability in Northeast Asia and for prolonged tension in the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan.

The goal of American policy has not been to secure talks for the sake of talks. It has been to induce Pyongyang to understand that it can only have a normal relationship with the international community if it credibly undertakes a fundamental change in policy: regarding nuclear weapons, its relations with South Korea, its role in the region, and its domestic system. North Korea’s latest and predictable shift to diplomacy does not in any way guarantee that change in policy (it may indicate, however, that sanctions are beginning to work). After its recent belligerence and before anyone rushes to the negotiating table, it is up to Pyongyang to demonstrate to Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing that the leopard is indeed going to change its spots.

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Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Reinhard Krause / Reuters

Barack Obama and China's Xi Jinping to Meet In California

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 21 May 2013 11:37:00 -0400

Yesterday, the White House announced that President Obama will meet with China’s President Xi Jinping on June 7-8 in California. The announcement said that the two will hold “in-depth discussions on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues, . . . review progress and challenges in U.S.-China relations over the past four years and discuss ways to enhance cooperation, while constructively managing our differences, in the years ahead.”

Yet the purpose of this meeting is not to bargain or to solve specific problems, but to set a tone and create a sense of shared fate between the two leaders by allowing Obama and Xi to firmly establish a good personal relationship, a precondition for the successful conduct of their bilateral relations. The two got a start on that task last February, when Xi visited Washington as China’s vice-president. Two days in California allows both more time and an informal environment for each to talk about his domestic challenges and visions for the future, about his country’s role in the international system and how US-China relations fits with all of this.

Such an interchange is particularly important because each president sits atop a complex and sprawling governmental system that is not easy to monitor or control. This is one of the reasons for recent frictions between the two countries. Their California encounter meeting provides Xi and Obama the opportunity to identify and enlarge the areas of overlap in the interests of their two countries, and then, when they return to their capitals, to set priorities in their systems accordingly. Having seen the value of creating this opportunity, they should seize it.

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Richard C. Bush III

United States Policy towards Northeast Asia

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 07 May 2013 14:37:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the April 2013 edition of SERI Quarterly.

With the Obama administration making the transition to its second term, it is appropriate to review its policy goals towards Northeast Asia and whether policy implementation can be sustained. In this essay, I review what senior officials have said on these subjects, and consider the challenge of coping with the rise—or revival—of China, while focusing more sharply on the Korean Peninsula.

Declaratory policy

Three texts reveal how the United States government views its interests and objectives towards Asia. Chronologically, they are: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s October 2011 article in Foreign Policy; President Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament on November 17, 2011; and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon’s remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[1] Five topics merit attention: terminology; the purposes of policy; its scope; the approach to China; and sustainability.

In terminology, two words have gained the greatest currency: “pivot” and “rebalancing.” “Pivot” is a vivid word that plays upon Obama’s love of basketball, it also has a rather absolutist connotation. “Rebalancing,” on the other hand, is more relativistic, both in terms of where America places its priorities geographically and which policy arenas it emphasizes. The word that is least appropriate for Northeast Asia is “return,” which had some currency in the early part of the administration. “Return” may have been accurate for Southeast Asia but not for Northeast Asia.

In terms of the purposes of rebalancing, senior officials spoke in different but substantively convergent ways:

Clinton referred to “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism”; to “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific”; to responding to the wishes of the region itself; and, in effect, the long, benign impact of America’s presence in and posture toward the region (“We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades . . . and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.”)
Obama spoke simply of a “large and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with friends and allies.”
Donilon also implied a “shaping” objective, even though he did not use the word. He said, “We aspire to see a region where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments and universal human rights are upheld.”

[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011 (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm); “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 17, 2011, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament); “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 15, 2012, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery).

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Richard C. Bush III

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What Will Keep a U.S. Defense Secretary Up At Night Through the Next Decade?

Mon, 06 May 2013 15:30:00 -0400

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May 6, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Editor's Note: This book is available to download now on Kindle and Nook. Hard copy and other e-book versions can be ordered through the Brookings Institution Press.

In his new book, Star Spangled Security: Applying Lessons Learned Over Six Decades Safeguarding America (Brookings, 2012), former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (under President James Carter) offers an insider’s view of U.S. national security strategy over service to ten presidencies and bridges it to current challenges facing the United States.

Dr. Brown currently sits on the Defense Policy Board and previously served as secretary of the Air Force under President Lyndon B. Johnson; director of U.S. research and engineering under President John F. Kennedy; president of Caltech; director of Livermore Lab; and a negotiator on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I and SALT II). He also led the development of the Polaris missile, nuclear ballistic missiles, the stealth bomber, and put the first GPS satellites in the sky.

On May 6, the Brookings Press hosted a discussion of Star Spangled Security. Drawing on his 60 years safeguarding America, Harold Brown discussed how to balance China’s ambitions with U.S. interests to avoid conflict; whose 3 a.m. phone call from the Pacific is most likely to trigger US military action; what strategic positions in the Middle East and in Africa will best serve American interests; what strategy might prevent rogue nations from using nuclear weapons; lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan that ought to shape response to Syria now; a new perspective on drones; and the best ways to cut defense spending and reform the Defense Department.

Vago Muradian, editor of Defense News, moderated the discussion with Brown.

Chinese National Security Decision-making: Processes and Challenges

Yun Sun — Mon, 06 May 2013 16:03:00 -0400

In studies of contemporary China, information about the national security decision-making process is largely absent, despite the abundance of information and analysis on leadership politics and domestic policy-making. A proliferation of foreign policy actors in China has attracted much attention from researchers, leading to a booming number of investigations into the governmental and non-governmental players involved. The processes themselves―in which these players operate and interact to produce the eventual policy decisions―have eluded academic scrutiny, mostly due to the scarcity of available information. The topic, however, is critically important in achieving an accurate understanding of China’s national security policies which often seem unclear and plagued by conflicting messages.

In the Chinese context, the definition of “national security” is significantly different from that in the United States. For the American policy community, the term “national security” usually refers to the country’s external national security interests and threats. The responsibility for coordinating national security affairs lies primarily with the National Security Council. In China’s case, the term “national security” encompasses both domestic/internal and foreign/external security and, therefore, has a much broader connotation. This paper is primarily focused on the external dimensions of China’s national security. There are many overlapping aspects between China’s national security policy and its foreign policy, as the latter also serves to protect China’s national security interests. However, because national security also covers military security, national defense, economic security and other non-traditional security challenges, the framework and coverage is broader than with foreign policy.

This paper examines three processes of China’s national security decision-making: the decision-making at the top level, the policy-coordination process conducted through the National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG), and the informational process for national security decision-making. Generally speaking, the supreme decision-making authority in China is monopolized and exercised through the collective leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee; this is especially true with regard to “strategically important” issues, such as Sino-U.S. relations. However, the paramount leader at the time of this writing, President Hu Jintao (the Politburo’s designated person for national security affairs) commanded large authority and privilege in determining regular national security policies. His primary advisor on national security (at the time of this writing State Councilor Dai Bingguo) played a central role in informing and advising him on key policy decisions. As the Director of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (the same organization as NSLSG),[1] Dai also carried responsibility for inter-agency policy consultation and coordination through the NSLSG/FALSG. Information for national security decision-making is produced primarily by participating agencies and think tanks, but there is a standard process of screening, organizing, and disseminating that allows information to flow to the top.

A fundamental challenge for China’s national security decision-making system lies in the conflict between the need for centralization and the diffusion of power (collective leadership) at the top level. Decisions on strategically important issues must be based on consensus, which is created through time-consuming debates; consensus-building proves especially problematic when a timely response is required. As an informal and ad-hoc committee, the NSLSG does not operate as the core national security team designated to follow, analyze, and coordinate daily national security affairs, nor does it have the adequate human resources and professional capacity to play that role. In reality, its role is more or less confined to the organizer of research and coordinator of policies. Its authority on national security affairs is further undermined by unbalanced civil-military relations and the lack of civilian oversight over daily military operational activities. In the informational processes, the players in the Chinese system are extremely risk-averse. Confined by agency perspectives and career advancement interests, they are reluctant to report new findings that are not in line with established conventional wisdom.

Understanding that most of the challenges in the Chinese national security system have deep historical, political and structural roots, any attempt to address them must be bold and might seem politically unrealistic. Nevertheless, the recommendations offered in this paper are aimed at addressing the fundamental deficiencies of the current system. Their feasibility depends on the future of political reform, which although widely agreed as inevitable, has thus far been successfully avoided.

[1] The general understanding of the relationship between FALSG and NSLSG in China is that it is literally the same organization with two different titles (一个机构两块牌子). However, several government analysts pointed out that within the same organization there is a distribution of labor on national security and foreign policy between two different bureaus.

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Yun Sun

Taiwan’s Response to an Evolving Security Environment

Mon, 29 Apr 2013 14:00:00 -0400

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April 29, 2013
2:00 PM - 4:15 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China (Taiwan) released its second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in early March. The QDR presents a comprehensive examination of developments in Taiwan’s security environment and explains updates in its planning and strategy. As in the United States and other countries, the document is a reflection of the president’s strategic priorities, a serious planning exercise and a public relations tool which seeks to inform the public and win its support.

On April 29, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a discussion on Taiwan’s recently released QDR. Vice Minister of National Defense for Policy Andrew N.D. Yang, presented the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s views of the Asia-Pacific security environment and Taiwan’s defense transformation. Chia-Sheng Chen, director of the defense ministry’s Defense Net Assessment Division, explained the QDR in more detail. Phillip Saunders of the National Defense University added his personal perspective on the security challenges Taiwan faces and the way it addresses them in the QDR.

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China-Taiwan-United States Relations

Tue, 23 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

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April 23, 2013
9:00 AM - 3:00 PM EDT

Conference Room B-1
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC

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China and Taiwan have improved both the tone and substance of their relationship over the past five years, especially on bilateral economic issues. But these advances have not been matched by progress on more difficult political or multilateral issues, and some observers believe that the improvement of cross-Strait relations will lose momentum as these more sensitive issues come up for discussion. The respective political calendars in China and Taiwan may further complicate matters.

On April 23, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a public seminar featuring senior experts from the United States, China and Taiwan. Panelists analyzed the domestic forces influencing cross-Strait relations; prospects for developments in the political, security and regional economic arenas; and possible roles for the United States. Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the board of the American Institute in Taiwan, delivered a keynote address.

Watch video from the event at csis.org »

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North Korea through Chinese Eyes

Tue, 23 Apr 2013 03:30:00 -0400

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April 23, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:30 PM CST

School of Public Policy and Management Auditorium
Brookings-Tsinghua Center

Beijing, China

North Korea’s threats against the outside world have reached new heights in recent months, triggering mounting concern across Northeast Asia about the possibilities of instability, crisis and even war. Yet there is nothing especially unusual or new in North Korean statements and actions, even if its recent behavior seems particularly extreme and worrisome. Its conduct reflects the isolation and deep frustrations of leaders in Pyongyang, the persistence of dynastic rule in North Korea, its economic weakness in relation to its neighbors (especially the Republic of Korea) and the unwillingness of outside powers to legitimate the DPRK’s claims to status as a nuclear-armed state.

On April 23, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted a public event for Dr. Jonathan Pollack, senior fellow and director of the John Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Pollack is a specialist on East Asian international politics and security. His latest book, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, was published in May 2011 by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In his remarks, Pollack briefly reviewed North Korea’s political history and assessed how Chinese views of the DPRK have shifted in recent years, and then weighed in on how North Korea’s future could affect Northeast Asia as a whole and U.S.-China relations in particular.China is now on the road to redefining its interests on the peninsula and its relationship with North Korea, and to striking discreetly a balance among the various stakeholders, as Pollack indicated.

Ms. Meng Bo, associate director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center gave the opening remarks for the event. Professor Wang Dong from Peking University shared his insights on North Korea from the perspective of a Chinese scholar. After the program, Dr. Pollack answered questions from the audience.

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Reviewing Ma Ying-jeou’s Strategies for National Security in Taiwan

Richard C. Bush III — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 14:00:00 -0400

Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou spoke Monday evening by video-link to a group of distinguished scholars at Stanford University. Although nothing Mr. Ma said was particularly surprising, his remarks did have three important features.

In the first part of his the speech, the president reviewed the basis for re-engagement with China after his first inauguration in 2008 and the cooperation that has been subsequently forged. This was not, of course, the first time that Ma has reviewed this record, and by now the process is well and widely understood. Yet it is still a story worth re-telling, if only to remind us that nothing about cross-Strait relations after 2008 was fore-ordained. Leaders in both China and Taiwan had to take certain risks for a more stable relationship. They had to find a mutually acceptable premise for interaction (the 1992 consensus). And agree just as clearly on what would be discussed (easy, mainly economic, issues) and what was off the agenda (e.g. independence or unification). What new agreements will be signed and whether the two sides move toward political talks is quite uncertain at this point, but what has already been achieved was neither trivial nor automatic.

Later on, Mr. Ma provided a concise yet clear statement of Taiwan’s national security strategy. To quote him in full: “The first part involves institutionalization of the rapprochement with mainland China so that neither side would ever contemplate resorting to non-peaceful means to settle their differences. The second part involves making Taiwan a model world citizen by upholding the principles of a liberal democracy, championing free trade and providing foreign aid to the international community. The third part involves strengthening national defense capability.” The first of these is particularly interesting, because it expresses an essentially liberal, internationalist approach to ensuring peace and stability: that is, binding a potential adversary to a cooperative relationship so that the stakes of initiating conflict are just too high. But the other two parts of the president’s strategy clearly indicate that he is not placing all his eggs in a Chinese basket.

In discussing Taiwan’s relations with the international community, President Ma properly cites an important, recent achievement. That is the agreement reached between Taiwan and Japan on April 10^th on fisheries. Taiwan fisherman are of course pleased because it clarifies their right in their traditional fishing grounds, but such an accord would not normally command any interest beyond the two countries concerned. But in this case it should. The matter is part of the nexus of issues that include territorial disputes over maritime land forms, the quest for natural resources, the rules of engagement of maritime vessels of contending countries, and coping with popular nationalism. The Japan-Taiwan agreement is important because it does not try to resolve all issues for all time but addresses the most pressing matters in a pragmatic and mutually beneficial way. It offers a way forward for other countries to reduce the temperature on their maritime disputes and reduce the risk of wider conflict through accident and miscalculation. As President Ma said, the pact “sets a good example of how the concerned parties can find ways to settle their dispute and preserve peace and stability in the region at the same time.” He may not have intended to allude in this remark to China, whose maritime vessels have been operating in a rather edgy way of late. But the shoe certainly fits.

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Richard C. Bush III

A Possible "Off Ramp" in North Korea

James E. Goodby — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 14:04:00 -0400

At the Brookings panel discussion on North Korea on April 15, “North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States,” several important points were made that suggest a connecting of the dots would be useful. First, the consensus appeared to be that Kim Jong-un is calling the shots. Second, there is a high risk of catastrophic miscalculation in the present situation. Third, we should pay attention to what the North Koreans are telling us, "in their own words." Fourth, Kim Jong-un would like to open a discussion with the United States but he has left himself no exit from the current confrontation.

It can be argued that Kim Jong-un has in fact left himself an exit in a variety of ways, of which the most commonly mentioned is that the ending of the current United States-Republic of Korea joint military exercise will permit him to ratchet down the rhetoric. There is one other "off ramp" strategy that is never mentioned at all, which is surprising, considering that it was presented in Kim's own words in a highly public manner. It can be found in Kim Jong-un's New Year's Day speech this year, an address that Kim must have seen as a major statement of his intentions but which has been almost totally ignored.

This is what he said: "All the compatriots in the north, south and abroad should launch a dynamic struggle to carry out to the letter the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration, great unification programs common to the nation in the new century and milestones for peace and prosperity."

The June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration was signed by then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung and former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il at a summit meeting held in Pyongyang. It included some features from the 1992 Basic Agreement, including family reunification, but was much less sweeping in its reach than the 1992 agreement. Its emphasis was on an independent effort by North and South Korea to achieve reunification. The October 4, 2007 agreement was signed by then-ROK President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and was much more programmatic and substantive in content than the June 15, 2000 Declaration. Like the earlier summit declaration, the 2007 agreement stressed what it called "by-the-Korean-people-themselves." In the present crisis-filled atmosphere, paragraph 4 of that document can be read as either an anachronism or as a beacon of hope. This is what it said:

The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war. With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

Of course, both the Declaration in 2000 and the Agreement in 2007 were negotiated by leaders of a party that is now out of power in South Korea, and the North Korean leader has been succeeded by his son. Both documents have been gathering dust in the archives for years. But Kim Jong-un's reference to them gave them new relevance. This is the powerful leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea saying that he and all Koreans should live up to the letter of these documents and he was saying that on January 1, 2013.

As an off-ramp strategy, one can find flaws in it, especially in the possibility that it was intended by Kim Jong-un as an attempt to drive a wedge between new ROK President Park Geun-hye and the leaders of South Korea's allies. It also opens the door to economic cooperation and possibly renewed assistance, difficult to contemplate under today's circumstances, which include the shut-down of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. But skillful diplomacy should certainly be able to exploit for the good whatever good there is in it.

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James E. Goodby

North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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April 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN and cspan.org. Click here to watch online.

In the past months, North Korea has issued a series of threats and provocative actions, from testing a nuclear device and conducting a missile launch—in contravention of multiple United Nations resolutions—to cancelling the armistice ending the Korean War and threatening a new war against the United States and South Korea. Harsh rhetoric from North Korea is nothing new, but some observers feel that the recent threats represent real danger. Others claim that they reflect internal dynamics in North Korea and that the crisis will pass.

On April 15, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the policy priorities for the United States in dealing with North Korea during and after the current crisis. Brookings experts debated the threat to the United States and its allies and analyzed steps that the United States can take to mitigate the danger, including sanctions, engaging allies and neighbors in the region, nonproliferation efforts and, if necessary, responding to aggressive actions by North Korea.

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