Brookings: Topics - Missile Defense

Israel’s Three Gambles in Syria

Daniel L. Byman and Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

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Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

NATO and the Costs of Star Wars

Clara M. O'Donnell — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Over the last decade, the US has spent tens of billions of dollars constructing a shield to stop nuclear missiles from North Korea or Iran reaching its soil. So far, the shield does not work. Fortunately for the Americans, neither Pyongyang nor Tehran has nuclear missiles that could hit the US. Unfortunately, however, America's missile defence programme has upset China and Russia, two countries that do have nuclear arsenals that could reach its homeland. America's European partners in NATO should try to convince Washington to scale back its missile defence ambitions for the next few years. Not only would this allow the US government to spend its shrinking defence budget on more pressing military needs. It would also improve European security by reducing tensions between NATO and Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been increasingly worried about nuclear attacks by 'rogue' states. In 1998, a study group chaired by Donald Rumsfeld predicted that North Korea and Iran could field intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years. Today, however, Iran has neither intercontinental missiles nor a nuclear bomb. In March of this year, a report from the Pentagon's intelligence agency (erroneously declassified) assessed "with moderate confidence" that Pyongyang could build a nuclear device that fits on a missile. But there is still no evidence that North Korean missiles are sophisticated enough to reach the US.

Although the American mainland is not currently under threat, every president since George H.W. Bush has sought to deploy nation-wide defences against a limited attack by ballistic missiles. Reviving some of President Ronald Reagan's 'star wars' ambitions, the US has had missile interceptors deployed in Alaska and California since 2004. Both the George W Bush and Obama administrations have also had various plans to deploy interceptors against intercontinental missiles at bases in Europe. (The Obama administration, working with NATO, has also been deploying interceptors in Europe to protect Europeans and US troops in the region against shorter-range missiles from Iran – a threat which does exist.) In March, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel announced that because of technical problems and budgetary constraints, the US is suspending its efforts to build Europe-based strategic interceptors. He also said that in response to the bellicose attitude of North Korea's new leader, the US will add 14 missile interceptors in on its West Coast, and perhaps deploy a few more on the East Coast, too.

The Obama administration has been wise to cancel the European leg of its strategic missile defence plans. Several recent studies had highlighted significant shortcomings in the programme. For example, a 2012 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the interceptors planned for Europe would have been too slow to stop an incoming missile. But the US would be ill advised to increase the number of interceptors on the West – and possibly East – Coast. Studies have shown that the interceptors in Alaska and California do not work well either. According to Congress' Government Accountability Office, ten out of the 30 interceptors rely on technology which has never intercepted a missile during tests. The GAO estimates that it will take several years to repair this technology, costing the US taxpayer an additional $700 million. Hagel has promised to fix these glitches before the new interceptors are deployed. But the Pentagon does not yet have a solution to another big problem. None of its interceptors can distinguish between an incoming warhead and debris or decoys. (Ballistic missiles can easily carry decoys in addition to warheads.)

America's strategic missile defence efforts have made the US taxpayer fund a weapon that does not work to tackle a threat that does not exist. They have also antagonised China and Russia. Both countries worry that US technological breakthroughs could undermine their strategic deterrents. Moscow has been most displeased. The Kremlin has been asking for legal guarantees that the US would not direct its missile defences against Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. To reassure Russia, the Obama administration has encouraged Moscow to co-operate with NATO's defence programme against Iranian short and long-range missiles. (Moscow is less worried about NATO's defences against Iranian short-range missiles because the interceptors used would be too slow to stop a Russian strategic missile.) Washington has also been willing to provide Moscow political guarantees that its nuclear deterrent is not under threat.

But so far, the Obama administration has refused to give Russia legal guarantees. The US has made such commitments in the past. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established limits on what Moscow and Washington could do in this area from the 1970s until 2002. President George W Bush then withdrew from the agreement in order to pursue America’s missile defence ambitions unhindered. The Obama administration fears that Republican senators – who are keen on missile defence – would not ratify a treaty that would constrain the US. As a result, missile defence has become one of the most contentious issues in a troubled US-Russia relationship. Moscow has refused to negotiate further cuts in its nuclear arsenal until the issue is resolved. Last year, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces threatened to attack the European NATO countries hosting US missile defences. And according to press reports, Russian bombers have been simulating strikes against American missile defence installations.

Now that Hagel has cancelled the European leg of US strategic missile defences, there is a chance that NATO and Russia could end their dispute. Senior American and Russian officials have resumed talks about Russia co-operating with NATO's missile defence efforts. US policy-makers have also been encouraging Moscow to negotiate new bilateral nuclear reductions – a top priority for President Barack Obama. According to some Russian officials, President Vladimir Putin may be open to an agreement when he meets President Obama at the G8 in June or at their bilateral summit in September. But the Russians still want legal guarantees on strategic missile defences.

Europeans welcome the possibility of improved NATO-Russia ties. Most of them have never been convinced of the need for, or feasibility of, strategic missile defences and many disliked Washington's decision to leave the ABM treaty. Germany and others have been keen for Russia to co-operate with NATO's missile defence programme as a way to alleviate tensions. To maximise the chances of a deal between Washington and Moscow, Europeans should now encourage their American allies to include legal guarantees on missile defence in a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution point out in their book 'The opportunity' that treaty limits could still allow the US to deploy all its planned defences against North Korea and Iran: the US and Russia could for example agree to each having a maximum of 125 interceptors capable of engaging intercontinental missiles. (The ABM treaty initially allowed for 200.) The treaty could also be limited to ten years, so that both sides could reconsider its ceilings in light of how the threats from North Korea and Iran evolve.

The White House, and Europeans, would struggle to convince some Republican senators to ratify such a treaty. But without it, Russia is unlikely to reduce its numerous tactical nuclear weapons – an arsenal that worries both Democrats and Republicans. Europeans should also discourage their US counterparts from deploying additional interceptors against strategic missiles until tests have shown them to be effective. The risk of wasting large sums of money at a time of savage defence cuts should help senators to reassess their views on missile defence.

As Greg Thielmann, a former senior US state department intelligence official, remarks, Europeans have "tamed ill-considered American instincts" in the past: in the 1980s, Europeans encouraged a reluctant Reagan administration to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For the benefit of NATO-Russia relations and global arms control, the Europeans should encourage their ally to reassess its stance again.

Authors

Clara M. O'Donnell

Publication: Centre for European Reform

Image Source: © Yves Herman / Reuters

At a Dollar a Shot, Lasers Bring Down Missiles and Costs

Peter W. Singer — Sun, 14 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research on emerging developments in warfare and defense technologies, Peter Singer sheds light on some of the pressing security concerns facing the Gulf Cooperation Council region and the need for greater defense coordination.

ECSSR: In your enlightening lecture, you raised very important questions about leadership issues regarding selecting and investing in the right kind of military technologies. What kind of new approaches and technologies should peace-loving countries like many GCC states with relatively small militaries invest in to ward off threats posed by big nations in their vicinity, like Iran, to strike a balance of power?

Peter Singer: I think there are several important issues to be put on the table here. First, while GCC member states are small countries, they do have relatively powerful defense budgets, when you sum them together. So while individually they may not be a match for the size of a large neighbor, like an Iran, collectively that is certainly within their power; particularly when you add in the advantage that they have of being able to purchase high technology.

In most areas, they are a generation ahead of Iran. For example, in terms of jet fighters they are literally a generation ahead. Secondly, they can have partnerships with allies like the US and France that aren’t accessible to a nation like Iran. So that gives them certain opportunities.

The challenge for the GCC, as I see it as a defense analyst from the outside, is a couple of issues. There hasn’t been as much cooperation and coordination as there might be both within the states of the GCC and with their allies, like the US and France. We can see this when it comes to areas like air defense and missile defense, where we still don’t have a well-integrated relationship despite the very clear threat from an Iran, particularly when it comes to missiles.

Another area of cooperation will be if you look for a low level threat from Iran. There is fear that they may not engage in direct hostilities but do something like mine the seaways nearby, which is something they had done previously in their history. And yet we don’t see the kinds of investment being made in mine-detection and mine-clearing at sea by the local states here that might match that threat. The United States, for example, has had to push almost all of its mine-sweeping capacity into the Gulf right now.

The second issue is focusing on spreading out your investments. There is a clear amount of technological change going around in the world today, ranging from the rise of unmanned systems to directed energies etc., and so each of the nations —whether it is the United States or the states of the GCC —have to figure out how to make smart investments. In many ways, like an investor on the stock market, you don’t put all you money in one place but spread out the risks. Again, you particularly don’t put all your money in the thing that is most shiny and most appealing. That’s a challenge, which is facing many militaries and we see that playing out in the market today. So I think that given the amount of transition that is going on, locking into any one program, or locking into any single system is not the way to go. There is enough uncertainty right now that you spread out the risk.

Authors

Peter W. Singer

Publication: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Will Russia Take "Yes" for an Answer on Missile Defense?

Steven Pifer — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 11:47:00 -0400

When Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced this month that the Pentagon would increase the number of missile interceptors in Alaska, he noted that the U.S. missile defense program in Europe would be restructured. This means cancellation of Phase 4 of the plan, which called for the deployment of upgraded interceptors in Eastern Europe.

The decision could open the way for resolving U.S.-Russian differences over missile defense, one of the thorniest problems on the bilateral agenda, and remove an obstacle to further nuclear arms reductions — if Moscow can say something other than “nyet.”

The initial Russian reaction gave little ground for optimism. But Russian officials often react slowly to new ideas, so we may not yet have the final word.

The Obama administration unveiled its “European Phased Adaptive Approach” in 2009 with the goal of deploying increasingly capable SM-3 missile interceptors in anticipation that Iran would develop missiles with increasingly longer ranges. Moscow initially appeared to welcome the approach.

In November 2010, NATO and Russia agreed to explore a cooperative missile defense for Europe. Talks between U.S. and Russian officials in early 2011 yielded significant convergence on questions such as transparency, joint exercises and jointly manned NATO-Russia centers to share early warning data and plan how NATO and Russia missile defense systems would work together.

The dialogue stalled, however, as Russian officials began to complain more vociferously about Phase 4 of the plan, originally scheduled for 2020, when the SM-3 IIB interceptor would achieve the capability to engage intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Moscow asserted that Iran stood many years, if not decades, from developing an ICBM, and claimed that the United States instead planned to target SM-3 IIBs against Russian ICBMs. U.S. officials countered that SM-3 IIBs in Europe would be ill-placed to engage Russian strategic missiles.

Hagel’s announcement renders that argument moot.

Now if the Russians do not want to move forward on resolving their differences with Washington over missile defense, they have to find other reasons to object. And they may.

A Russian official has expressed opposition to the fact that Phases 2 and 3 of the missile defense plan will go forward in Romania and Poland. SM-3 interceptors in those phases, however, will only be able to engage intermediate-range missiles. That presumably poses no problem for Moscow, as a 1987 treaty bans Russia (and the United States) from having intermediate-range missiles.

Russian recalcitrance may reflect simmering resentment about NATO enlargement, and the prospective deployment of SM-3 missile interceptors in Eastern Europe could add to the unhappiness. But how will small U.S. military detachments with interceptors to defend against missiles that Russia does not have pose a threat to Russia?

Moscow has sought a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic missiles, even though they know full well that Senate Republicans would block such a treaty. Russian officials assert that the absence of legally binding limits creates uncertainty about the offense-defense relationship.

Moscow is correct that increasing missile defense capabilities could undermine the balance in strategic offensive forces, but that problem will not arise for 15 or 20 years, if then. The United States plans to deploy only 44 interceptors capable of engaging ICBMs in 2017.

Russia could cut its strategic missile force by 50 percent or even 75 percent and still easily overwhelm those interceptors. Until the gap between strategic offense and defense narrows considerably, a U.S. political commitment not to target Russian missiles, coupled with transparency on missile defense plans, should suffice.

Domestic motives may lie behind the Russian position. President Vladimir Putin may see political value in scratchy relations with the United States. Similarly, the Russian Ministry of Defense may hope that keeping alive tensions over missile defense will produce greater resources for military modernization.

If the Russians want to continue the argument over missile defense, they can offer various pretexts. But that should not obscure the main point: their assertion that missile defenses, specifically SM-3 IIB interceptors, will threaten Russian ICBMs and thereby undermine the strategic balance now has no substantive basis.

So is Moscow prepared to engage in a serious way with Washington and NATO to settle the missile defense question and pursue a cooperative approach?

Russian officials have begun to offer a more nuanced reaction to Hagel’s announcement and, on Monday, he and the Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, agreed to resume consultations on missile defense. This is good news.

The question now is whether Moscow can find a way to say yes. Or will it instead seek an excuse to keep the fight going? President Putin, over to you.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The New York Times

U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Prospects and Challenges

Steven Pifer — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 14:32:00 -0400

Editor's note: Senior Fellow Steven Pifer gave a March 25 seminar at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on "U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Prospects and Challenges." He outlined the possibilities for future U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions and resolution of differences over missile defense, as well as the challenges that must be overcome in order to take advantage of those possibilities. Listen to the audio, view the slide presentation, and read an excerpt below.

Well Marty, first of all thanks for having this. Let me talk a little bit, I’ll draw some ideas on the opportunity, but talk a little bit about where I think Washington is on some questions such as next steps in nuclear reductions, what to do about missile defense, and a couple of other arms control issues, and then I’ll talk a little bit about some of the challenges that I think this administration faces in achieving what it would like to do.

First, just to start off with where things are now, the New START treaty was signed about three years ago. It’s now in its third year of implementation, having entered in force in February of 2011, and these are the three main limits in the treaty; 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and I think those are the two more meaningful limits. I should note that 1,550 is arms control math, in that 1,550 actually probably equals about 1,800 on the American side, and that’s because that 1,550 limit counts the actual number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but since neither the American nor the Russian militaries keep weapons on bombers, the negotiators decided to attribute each bomber with one weapon. And the Federation of American Scientists estimate is that there are about 300 cruise missiles and bombs for U.S. strategic nuclear bombers, so in this case 1,550 on the American side is probably more like about 1,800. Now this is certainly, I think, a significant step forward on the START 1 Treaty, which allowed each side 6,000 weapons using slightly different counting rules, but I think there is still a question to be asked whether 20 years after the end of the Cold War, and 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whether these sorts of numbers are still necessary.

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Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Image Source: © Sergei Karpukhin / Reuters

Obama’s Aims to Reduce Nuclear Threat

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Steven Pifer — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Barack Obama will reportedly reiterate his interest in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, though unlikely to announce specifics. The administration is interested in seeking an agreement with Russia, building on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and cutting U.S. strategic nuclear forces by another third in the expectation that Moscow will do the same with its nuclear arsenal.

This would leave each country with roughly 1,000 deployed long-range warheads, plus several thousand more in reserve and in tactical arsenals.

It would be an appropriately modest step toward serious pursuit of Obama’s (and President Ronald Reagan’s) goal of a nuclear-free world. With 1,000 warheads, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would remain more than capable of targeting any reasonable set of military sites abroad. Washington and Moscow would also avoid tempting any medium-size nuclear powers, most notably China, with its 250 or so warheads, to pursue nuclear superpower ranks.

It is sound policy. Dramatic enough to make a major difference in Obama’s foreign policy legacy yet measured enough to sustain U.S. deterrence for Washington and its allies abroad. Still, it will work best if several additional steps are included:

Modest U.S. unilateral cuts are a reasonable way to jump-start the process if Moscow is not immediately amenable to reciprocative measures. But they should be modest and reversible ‑ until we see how Russia reacts. This is not about fear of a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange, but rather about avoiding the possibility that Moscow would become more assertive if it somehow felt empowered by a new position atop the nuclear hierarchy.

Tactical and surplus warheads should be constrained. As a first step, data exchanges and some informal monitoring provisions should be explored. U.S.-Russian arms-control treaties have not previously limited warheads in these inventories. Since they are not normally affixed to big missiles or bombers, they are harder to track. But that is why they must be limited in some way. We will need to improve monitoring methods for these warheads if other countries are to be brought into the nuclear arms-control process in future rounds, since most other nations’ arsenals are dominated by these shorter-range weapons.

Missile defenses need to be part of the process. Since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the George W. Bush administration, there have been no ceilings on any type of missile defenses. There is little point here in trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together. Not only do congressional Republicans strongly oppose any limits on U.S. missile defenses but the technologies are evolving too fast (and are still too immature) for restraints to make much sense. Especially since some missile defense capability is a reasonable desire for those worried about North Korean and Iranian threats. But greater transparency, some degree of actual collaboration between the United States and Russia and, depending on the evolution of not just the technology but also the threat, some greater flexibility regarding U.S. plans to put advanced missile defenses into Europe in the future makes sense. The flexibility should not go so far as to weaken Washi! ngton’s bonds with allies and should not prevent the United States and its allies from protecting themselves. This point needs to be made plainly to Moscow.

Third parties should be asked to promise restraint, too. The other U.N. Security Council Permanent Five nuclear powers ‑ Britain, France and China ‑ as well as Israel, India and Pakistan should promise not to exceed current arsenal sizes, or at least not by much. This need not be a deal breaker if they refuse. But it would be a useful complement that would help ensure that no new nuclear competition is triggered by U.S. and Russian cutbacks, and would help pave the way for future multilateral treaties. To help persuade the other nuclear powers to agree, all countries could be asked to promise not to develop or augment existing nuclear weapons inventories. In other words, language could be proposed that would allow non-nuclear states to make the same pledge, and that would not require countries such as Israel to acknowledge officially that they have nuclear weapons. (Since right now they might not.)

Other arms-control measures could be considered. Top of the list is ratification of the 1990s-era Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States and China, among the world’s declared nuclear powers, have not yet ratified. (The Senate voted it down in 1999.) Another ratification debate is not prudent if it leads to a formal Senate defeat. But this is an opportune moment to remind Americans that our current arsenal is holding up extremely well without testing, and to make the case for formalizing our testing restraint. The last U.S. test was in 1992; no state other than North Korea has tested in the last dozen years.

Obama has rightly seized this nuclear arms-control opportunity. It may or may not make him the president who started the real march toward a nuclear-free planet. Indeed, that may not even be a realistic or desirable goal at this stage.

But his plan should help future presidents and Congresses evaluate the wisdom of such a possible step. Meanwhile, it saves a little money and, more important, helps keeps America and her allies safe.

Authors

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © STR New / Reuters

Nuclear Arms Control: Another New START

Steven Pifer — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama has the opportunity — provided that Russian President Vladimir Putin is prepared to engage — to enhance U.S. and global security significantly through further reductions in nuclear arms and a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement. Steven Pifer wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What non-proliferation objectives should President Obama pursue?
Is there an opportunity for the U.S. and others to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?
Can renewed nuclear non-profileration talks improve U.S.-Russia relations?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Steven Pfier

New START was one of the key foreign policy achievements of your first term. However, even once it is fully implemented, the United States and Russia will each maintain some 5,000 nuclear weapons, a level that makes little sense 20 years after the end of the Cold War. You have the opportunity — provided that Vladimir Putin is prepared to engage — to enhance U.S. and global security significantly through further reductions in nuclear arms and a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement.

Recommendation:

Your administration should build on the New START Treaty and your 2009 Prague vision, pursuing four objectives:

• Conclusion of a new treaty limiting the United States and Russia each to no more than 2,000-2,500 nuclear weapons, with a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.

• Achievement of a NATO-Russia agreement for a cooperative missile defense of Europe.

• Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

• Preparing the ground to multilateralize the nuclear arms reductions process.

Background:

Arms control has made some progress over the past four years, though not as much as we would like. New START’s implementation is proceeding smoothly, with the treaty’s limits scheduled to take full effect in 2018. A cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement remains stalled over Moscow’s demand for a legal guarantee that U.S. missile defenses not be directed against Russian strategic forces. Even if you were prepared to They have shown little enthusiasm for arms control generally, as evidenced by the fact that the CTBT remains un-ratified.

Your second-term arms control agenda should have four components: negotiation of a new nuclear arms reduction treaty, missile defense cooperation, ratification of the CTBT, and multilateralization of the nuclear arms reduction process.

1. A New Treaty. New START covers only 30 percent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (deployed strategic warheads). You should seek to engage Moscow in negotiation of a new treaty to cover all nuclear warheads — strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed — with the exception of those in the dismantlement queue (to be dealt with separately). An aggregate limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads would require a 50 percent reduction in the current U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. It would be a transformational arms control achievement.

The aggregate limit would create a mechanism under which the United States could trade a reduction in its numerical advantage in nondeployed (reserve) strategic warheads in return for Russia reducing its advantage in non-strategic (tactical) nuclear warheads. Within an aggregate limit of 2,000-2,500 total warheads, there should be a sublimit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, covering the weapons of greatest concern. The sublimit would represent a 35 percent cut from the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.

Such reductions would obviate a need for Russia to build back up to the New START limits. That could lead Moscow to cancel its planned new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which would pose a threat to U.S. ICBMs in their silos while resulting in a more destabilizing force on the Russian side (large numbers of warheads on a relatively small number of vulnerable launchers).

You should reach out to President Putin directly on this. You should aim to conclude a new treaty in 2015, so that it does not have to face a ratification debate in an election year. While negotiating, you should consider early implementation of the New START limits.

2. Missile Defense. If Moscow drops its demand for a legal guarantee that U.S. missile defenses are not targeted against Russian strategic forces, the way to a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense would be open. Your administration could build on ideas already discussed by U.S. military experts, such as transparency, joint exercises, and data fusion and planning/operations centers, both of which would be jointly manned.

You may be able to increase the prospects of a Russian agreement to a cooperative missile defense by offering greater transparency on U.S. programs and plans, including annual declarations and facilitating Russian observation of SM-3 interceptor tests. Your administration should offer the flexibility on U.S. plans, e.g., state that deployment in Europe of the SM-3 Bloc IIB (the interceptor of concern to Russia) could be deferred if Iran is not making progress toward an ICBM capability.

3. Test Ban. You should test the possibility of Senate approval of the CTBT. U.S. ratification would encourage others, particularly China, to ratify. A permanent end to nuclear testing would lock in a significant U.S. knowledge advantage.

Arguments in favor of ratification include the success of the stockpile stewardship program, which provides confidence in the reliability of the U.S. arsenal without testing. Improvements in monitoring mean that explosions in excess of 1 kiloton — and in many areas, including North Korea, in excess of .1 kiloton — would be detected (the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was in the 10-20 kiloton range).

That said, the current testing moratorium, observed by all states expect North Korea, is preferable to a failed ratification vote in the U.S. Senate. You should press for a vote only if confident that you have a two-thirds majority in hand.

4. Multilateralization. At some point, other nuclear states will need to be brought into the nuclear reduction process. Your administration should work with Moscow to prepare the ground for this.

You will want to approach multilateralization gradually, perhaps by building on the discussions already underway among the UN Security Council Permanent Five. It would be desirable to get third countries to assume a “no increase” commitment in connection with the U.S.-Russian treaty described above. (Their agreement to this would be essential if we seek Russian reductions beyond that treaty.)

A new initiative will advance U.S. interests in a number of ways:

• A new agreement could further reduce the strategic threat to the United States and cut non-strategic warheads that threaten U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.

• Further nuclear reductions would mean having to build fewer systems in the future in order to maintain a modern deterrent. That would save defense resources, particularly when you face expensive decisions on a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, a new bomber and a new ICBM.

• Further U.S. (and Russian) nuclear reductions can bolster the credibility of American diplomacy on nuclear proliferation. While a new treaty will not change minds in North Korea or Iran, it will strengthen your administration’s ability to secure third-country support to increase pressure and sanctions, at a time of growing tension with North Korea and looming crisis with Iran. • Further progress on arms control can give a positive impulse to the broader U.S.-Russia relationship, helping to move bilateral relations from their current scratchiness toward a sustainable follow-on to the “reset.”

Will President Putin be prepared to deal on further nuclear arms reductions and missile defense cooperation? U.S. advantages in strategic force levels, including in reserve warheads that could be added to the strategic ballistic missile force, give Moscow incentives for a new negotiation. The Russians also likely face budget pressures similar to those confronting the Pentagon. You should raise the new negotiation in your early exchanges with President Putin.

Limiting non-deployed strategic weapons and non-strategic weapons will pose new verification challenges. These are not insurmountable but will require work and creativity.

Attaining a two-thirds vote in favor of ratification for a New START follow-on treaty or CTBT will be difficult, as evidenced by the New START experience in the Senate. The administration — and you personally — will want to engage the Senate early on. While less preferable, if the Senate proves resistant on arms control, you might consider reductions to be made in parallel with reductions by Russia, conducted outside of a formal treaty context.

Third-country nuclear weapons states, particularly China, will resist being drawn into the reduction process as long as U.S. and Russian weapons numbers remain so much larger than theirs. You will have to put this high on your agenda with those countries.

Conclusion:

Achieving this agenda will not be easy. It will require your direct engagement. But it provides an opportunity to cement your legacy on an issue of key importance for U.S. national security and the future global order.

Numbers in charts are drawn from Hans M. Kristensen, “Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, December 2012 and Federation of American Scientists, “Status of World Nuclear Forces End-2012.”

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Authors

Steven Pifer

Image Source: © Kacper Pempel / Reuters

NATO-Russia Missile Defense: Compromise is Possible

Steven Pifer — Fri, 28 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

NATO leaders and then-President Medvedev agreed in November 2010 to seek to develop a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense. Over the past two years, however, the sides have been unable to agree upon a formula for such an arrangement, and missile defense is becoming a contentious issue on the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas. It is in the sides’ interest to find a mutually acceptable solution. This piece suggests the elements of such a compromise.

It is difficult to see how Washington, Moscow or NATO would benefit from missile defense remaining a problem issue. Among other things, that could pose an obstacle to further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions below New START levels. It could interfere with other types of cooperation. Agreement on a NATO-Russia cooperative missile defense arrangement, on the other hand, could remove this problem. It would provide a better missile defense of Europe, including European Russia. It would make NATO and Russia allies in protecting Europe, which could prove a “game-changer” in altering lingering Cold War attitudes in both Russia and NATO member-states.

Experts from the Pentagon and Russian Defense Ministry reportedly held productive exchanges in early 2011 regarding what a cooperative missile defense arrangement would entail. They discussed transparency, joint exercises and two jointly manned missile defense centers: a data fusion center, and a planning and operations center.

Progress slowed in spring 2011, when Russia took the position that it required a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic forces. The Russian concern has an understandable basis in principle: if U.S. missile defenses continue to grow in numbers and quality, at some future point they could undermine the balance in strategic offensive forces between Russia and the United States. But it is difficult to see that happening in the next decade or two. An optimistic projection of the maximum number of ground-based interceptors and Standard Missile (SM-3) Bloc IIB interceptors, which will have some capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles, would be at most 100 in 2023. That number would pose little real threat to the hundreds of warheads on Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, to say nothing of the decoys and other countermeasure carried by those missiles.

Even if the Obama administration were prepared to negotiate a legal guarantee, there is no possibility of securing the two-thirds majority in the Senate needed for consent to ratification of a treaty. Indeed, one quite possibly could design a treaty of ten years’ duration that would constrain missile defenses in a way that would reassure Moscow that there was no threat to Russian strategic missiles and allow Washington to do all that it wants and plans over the next decade to defend the United States against limited ballistic missile attack from countries such as Iran and North Korea. But, for a certain segment of the Senate, missile defense has become a theological issue, and that treaty would have zero chance of ratification. The Obama administration has instead offered a political commitment not to direct U.S. missile defenses against Russian strategic missiles.

Elements of a Future Compromise

If Moscow is prepared to move off of its requirement for a legal guarantee, and Washington and NATO are prepared to show some greater transparency and flexibility in their approach, one can see the elements of a compromise that would allow agreement on a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement.

Developing Ideas Already Discussed. The United States/NATO and Russia should develop the ideas already discussed for a cooperative missile defense. They apparently agree that each would retain independent control over its radars and other sensors and over a decision to launch its interceptor missiles. That makes sense. Given that a decision to launch an interceptor missile would need to be made in minutes, there would be no time for consultation between NATO and Russia regarding a launch decision.

The sides should define and agree on the kinds of transparency that each is willing to provide regarding its current and planned future missile defense capabilities. Transparency is important, as it will provide the other side information on which to make a judgment as to whether or not there is a threat to its strategic ballistic missiles. In this context, the United States should describe more fully how it would operationalize the offer made by Missile Defense Agency Director O’Reilly in 2011 to allow Russian experts to observe SM-3 tests and clarify that this offer would apply to tests of the SM-3 Bloc IIA and Bloc IIB, the SM-3 variants of greatest concern to the Russian military.

The sides should agree on arrangements for regular joint NATO-Russia missile defense exercises. This should not be difficult, as NATO and Russia have conducted joint missile defense exercises for a number of years.

The sides should agree on the details of a jointly manned data fusion center. That center would combine warning and tracking data provided by U.S., NATO and Russian radars and other sensors to create a “common operational picture” of the missile defense environment around Europe. The center would then transmit that enhanced picture to the NATO and Russian missile defense command centers, where the authority to launch missile interceptors would reside.

A jointly manned planning and operations center could take on a number of tasks. It could provide the venue in which to conduct transparency exchanges and discuss possible ballistic missile threats and attack scenarios against Europe. The sides might also at this center consult on plans for intercepting attacking ballistic missiles, including rules of engagement. It would be particularly useful to discuss procedures for coordinating intercepts in areas of overlapping coverage by NATO and Russia missile interceptors. At a minimum, NATO and Russia would want to ensure that, if they both launched interceptor missiles against an attacking ballistic missile warhead, the interceptors engaged the attacking warhead, not each other.

Legal or Political Commitment. Moscow should agree to drop its demand for a legal guarantee that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic missiles. As noted above, it would have no chance of ratification in the Senate. Instead, the United States should provide Russia a political commitment, in written form and signed at the highest level, that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic forces. For its part, NATO would make a parallel, written political commitment, building on the language in its May 2012 communiqué.

Adapting the U.S./NATO Approach. The United States and NATO could introduce three additions or modifications to their current approach to missile defense and missile defense cooperation.

First, the United States should commit to provide Russia an annual declaration regarding U.S. missile defense capabilities and future plans. The declaration would specify for each key element of U.S. missile defenses—including, at least, ground-based interceptors (GBIs), SM-3 interceptors (broken down by Bloc IA, Bloc IB, Bloc IIA and Bloc IIB), GBI launchers, SM-3 land launchers, associated radars and warships equipped to carry SM-3 interceptors—the current number and the planned maximum number for each year in the coming ten years. For example, the line in the notification for the SM-3 Block IB would read as follows:*

The United States would further commit to provide Russia advance notice of any change in its planned maximum numbers. For example, for changes in the planned maximum numbers of SM-3s, it could be 18-24 months’ advance notice, as it appears to take about two years from the time a decision to purchase an SM-3 is made for the contract to be concluded and for the interceptor to be built and delivered to the military. For changes in the planned maximum number of warships, the advance notice would be longer.

Russia is also developing its missile defense capabilities. It would be useful for Russia to provide the United States parallel declarations regarding its current capabilities and future missile defense plans.

Second, NATO should modify its current position, which appears to be that any cooperative defense with Russia would in no way change NATO missile defense deployment plans. The Alliance should instead indicate a readiness to consider Russian-proposed changes, provided that those changes do not degrade the ability of NATO missile defenses to defend NATO territory. For example, under this approach, NATO would be willing to consider a Russian proposal that SM-3 interceptors to be deployed in Poland be relocated from the planned site on the Baltic coast to a military base in southwest Poland if those interceptors could provide essentially the same protection for NATO members from the new site, in particular, for the Baltic states and Norway.

Third, the U.S. government should state unambiguously that, were it to become evident that Iran was not making progress toward having an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, the United States would defer deployment in Europe of the SM-3 Bloc IIB interceptor. That would be entirely consistent with the concept of the “European phased adaptive approach”—if the Iranian ICBM threat does not materialize, there would be no need to deploy a defense in Europe to counter it.

Why a Compromise?

The approach described above would build upon and operationalize NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation along lines that have already largely been discussed by U.S. and Russian military experts. Moscow would drop its requirement for a legal guarantee, accepting instead political commitments from Washington and NATO. The United States and NATO would introduce a greater degree of transparency and flexibility into their approach to missile defense.

This compromise would not provide the limits and predictability that a legally-binding treaty that capped interceptor numbers, velocities and locations would. As noted, it would be impossible to gain Senate approval for such a treaty, at least with the present Senate. But this compromise would respond to Russian concerns in two important ways.

First, the annual declarations would provide the Russian military a very full and regularly updated picture of U.S. missile defense capabilities and future plans. The Russian military could compare those capabilities and plans with its current and projected strategic ballistic missile forces. That would allow the General Staff and Ministry of Defense to determine whether there was, or in the future would be, a serious threat to Russian strategic missiles and to the U.S.-Russian strategic offensive balance (with a parallel Russian declaration, the U.S. military could make its own determination).

Second, although this arrangement would not legally constrain missile defenses, each side would always have the option, if it chose, to make a unilateral statement in response to the other’s declaration. That statement could include how it might react were the other side to increase its numbers beyond the planned maximum numbers contained in a declaration. For example, Russia might state that, were the United States to increase the number of SM-3 Bloc IIB interceptors beyond the planned maximum number indicated for a certain year, it could consider the strategic offensive balance endangered and might take corresponding measures. Such corresponding measures could include withdrawal from the New START Treaty or a from a successor treaty that further reduced nuclear arms. Moscow could, if it wished for political purposes, portray that as something of a de facto limit. At the least, a Russian statement would indicate to Washington that there could be consequences if U.S. missile defenses increased beyond the declared number.

Washington could—and most likely would—deny that there was a basis for Russian concern. However, as was the case with the April 2010 Russian unilateral statement regarding missile defenses and the New START Treaty, the United States could not prevent Russia from making the unilateral statement or from taking actions, including exercising its right to withdraw from a treaty limiting strategic offensive nuclear forces, if Russia chose to do so.

This approach, moreover, would not forever preclude the possibility that Russia might return to a requirement for a legal guarantee, including for limits on the numbers and velocities of interceptor missiles. Such a requirement might be understandable in a future world in which the gap between the number of deployed strategic ballistic missile warheads and the number of missile interceptors capable of engaging strategic ballistic missile warheads was not so large as it is today or is likely to be over the next 10-15 years. But that is a question for the future.

This approach offers a middle ground for U.S./NATO-Russian agreement on a cooperative missile defense arrangement. It is possible that Moscow did not want to engage on missile defense in 2012 in part because the U.S. approach to missile defense and missile defense cooperation might have changed radically if a Republican with very different ideas on missile defense became president in 2013. It is now clear that Barack Obama will remain in the White House for the next four years. It is now time to resolve differences over missile defense. The elements of a compromise for a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement are evident. The question is whether the sides have the political will to reach that compromise.

* Numbers from Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 2011.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Russian Center for Policy Studies' "Russia Confidential"

Image Source: © Jim Young / Reuters

Nuclear Arms Control Opportunities: An Agenda for Obama’s Second Term

Steven Pifer and Michael E. O'Hanlon — Mon, 17 Dec 2012 14:35:00 -0500

With his re-election secured, where should President Barack Obama head on matters of nuclear arms control? Some would now consider it a back-burner issue, with his big Prague speech on the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament already given and a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) secured in his first term.

In fact, arms control provides an opportunity to achieve multiple important goals: further reducing nuclear arsenals and enhancing U.S. security, reinvigorating the U.S.-Russian relationship, stabilizing some aspects of broader U.S.-Chinese interaction, and saving money in a cash-strapped defense budget. Also, it may give a shot in the arm to global nonproliferation norms that, although unlikely to directly sway leaders in Tehran or Pyongyang, could better position the United States to mobilize pressure on those countries and to exert leverage on other proliferators in the coming months and years.

For these reasons, the Obama administration should pursue a New START II that would cut deployed strategic weapons from the New START level of 1,550 warheads apiece to 1,000. This would be a sublimit embedded in an aggregate limit of 2,000 to 2,500 total nuclear warheads each, which would also limit tactical and reserve warheads. This level strikes a balance between making meaningful cuts and avoiding overly dramatic measures that cannot be fully verified yet. Such an accord would lead to the development of monitoring provisions in the U.S.-Russian context that later could be applied to other treaties mandating deeper cuts and including additional countries.

It is too soon to set a fixed path to “nuclear zero,” and attempting to do so in Obama’s second term would be counterproductive. Yet, this is an opportune moment to bring nonstrategic systems into the formal bilateral process as a first step toward exploring the viability of more-robust cutbacks down the road.

As for the other countries that have nuclear weapons, there are steps they can take in the near term. These steps, which would not be part of a formal treaty with Russia and the United States, would include greater transparency regarding their nuclear weapons capabilities and political pledges not to increase their arsenals in coming years or at least not to let them grow very much.

Ideally, these political pledges would be complemented by an agreement by the four most important countries that have not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)—China, India, Pakistan, and the United States—to support the treaty. Another valuable addition would be some type of fissile material cutoff accord. That would admittedly be an ambitious agenda. Obama’s second-term goals should include the CTBT and a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), but not be dependent or centered on them.

Read the full article »

Authors

Publication: Arms Control Today

Image Source: © Lee Jae Won / Reuters

Initial Thoughts on the North Korean Missile Test

Jonathan D. Pollack — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 13:00:00 -0500

The NORAD press spokesman has confirmed the evident success of the missile launch: “Initial indications are that the missile deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit.” This success occurred after four previous failures beginning in August 1998.

Unlike the previous attempted missile launch last April, North Korea did not publicize its plans internally, though following the test it broadcast the news to a domestic audience. The success is an undoubted boost to the domestic legitimacy of Kim Jong Un. It comes within the 2012 calendar year, during which time the leadership pledged that it would “open the gate” to becoming a prosperous and powerful state, even though it remains almost desperately poor and internationally isolated. The regime also claims a successful test demonstrates its capacity to defy international condemnation and advance its scientific goals, supposedly for peaceful purposes. It has achieved this success before South Korea could test an advanced missile of its own, with the launch of the latter now delayed into 2013.

The test comes one week before the South Korean presidential election. Most observers assumed that North Korea would not test a missile in advance of the election, lest it weaken the electoral prospects of the opposition party candidate, Moon Jae-in. (Most polls show the ruling party candidate, Madame Park Gun-hye, with an appreciable lead, though a few polls are still within the margin of error.) Public opinion in South Korea is notoriously volatile, but the test further weakens Moon’s election prospects, though it is unlikely to prove decisive. If anything, Pyongyang may have concluded that Moon’s election chances were already diminishing, so why not proceed with the test?

The US appears to have been caught flat footed by the test. On December 10, North Korea announced that because of various technical problems it was expanding the launch window until late December and there were even some reports that it was disassembling the missile. This may have convinced some officials that there was no imminent possibility of a test. It took the NSC press spokesman more than four hours to release a brief, formulaic statement criticizing the test. If Pyongyang was intent on deceiving the outside world about its plans, it succeeded brilliantly.

The bigger risks for Pyongyang concern its relations with China. The US, Japan, and South Korea have already called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, since the North’s test are in direct violation of Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which prohibit North Korea from undertaking any rocket tests “using ballistic missile technology.” Since North Korea announced on December 1 that it would attempt another satellite launch, there have been persistent reports that the Obama Administration would seek to impose even harsher sanctions, even though North Korea is probably already the world’s most heavily sanctioned state. The US thus seems very likely to put great pressure on China to agree to additional sanctions. In recent weeks, the Chinese have openly cautioned the North Koreans from undertaking another test, without signaling what China would do should Pyongyang decide to test. Beijing’s first comments on the test had an ominous tone: “all parties concerned should stay cool headed and refrain from stoking the flames so as to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.” How China chooses to respond will be the first foreign policy challenge for the newly installed Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

The possibility of another nuclear test also looms as a distinct possibility. When the UNSC condemned the attempted missile launch last April, North Korea warned of unspecified countermeasures and there were clear indications of additional tunneling activity at the North’s nuclear test site. Since Pyongyang undertook nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 following UNSC actions, it appeared that would again test, but it refrained, perhaps under major pressure from China, its primary economic and political benefactor. Late last week, the North Korean Foreign Ministry renewed a previous warning that “various circumstances compel us to completely review the nuclear issue.” China clearly disapproves of the North’s missile launches, but it may simply tolerate them and move on. Another nuclear test, however, would be a qualitatively different affront to China, and would underscore Beijing’s inability to prevent Pyongyang from embarking on exceedingly risky steps. Should there be another nuclear test, China’s newly installed top leaders would face a major challenge both in regional security and in US-China relations. This bears very careful watching.

The immediate impulse in some quarters will be to conclude that NK now has the means to reach the continental United States with a nuclear warhead, but this seems very premature. We simply don’t know whether North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear weapon. It is nonetheless a significant technical accomplishment that advances North Korea toward such a goal, if the ability to reach the United States with a nuclear weapon is the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program. However endangered and vulnerable North Korea might first seem, it repeatedly finds ways to punch above its weight, endanger regional security, and defy the international community.

Authors

Jonathan D. Pollack

Image Source: © KYODO Kyodo / Reuters

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Looking Back and Lessons for the Future

Fri, 07 Dec 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 7, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

December 8 marked the 25th anniversary of the signature of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Under this treaty, the United States and Soviet Union eliminated all their land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Such an outcome was hardly foreseeable in the early 1980s, especially after the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in 1983. In December 1987, however, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the landmark agreement.

On December 7, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion of the INF Treaty, exploring the negotiations, the factors that led to their successful conclusion and what lessons might be learned for future nuclear arms control negotiations. Panelists include three former senior U.S. government officials who were closely involved with the INF issue— former Ambassadors Avis Bohlen and John Woodworth, and Major General (USA, Ret) William F. Burns. Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative, moderated. The event marked the release of the new Arms Control Series paper, “The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned.”

Audio

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Looking Back and Lessons for the Future

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Obama, Putin, Arms Control and U.S.-Russia Relations (Новый этап в отношениях Вашингтона и Москвы)

Steven Pifer — Mon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: Senior Fellow Steven Pifer wrote in the December 3 Moscow-based Nezavisimaya Gazeta that further steps on nuclear arms control make sense and could provide an impulse for better U.S.-Russian relations. Nuclear arms control, moreover, could ensure President Obama’s continued personal attention to bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. If Moscow is not prepared to engage on this subject, it is difficult to see other “big” U.S.-Russia issues that would engage his interest, and Russia would lose relevance for the White House’s agenda in the president’s second term. Read the article in English and in Russian below.

Relations between Russia and the United States found themselves in something of a pause during the past year, awaiting completion of the presidential election processes in the two countries. Now that Barack Obama has won a second four-year term, following Vladimir Putin’s reelection last spring, how will the United States and Russia engage one another?

The “reset” launched by the Obama administration in 2009 has run its course. It succeeded. In 2008, U.S.-Russia relations had fallen to their lowest point since 1991. The U.S.-Russia agenda comprised mostly problem issues, with the sides differing, often sharply, over questions such as strategic arms control, missile defense in Europe, NATO enlargement, Georgia, Iran and the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

By contrast, during the past four years, Washington and Moscow have concluded a new strategic arms reduction treaty; deepened cooperation on Afghanistan; agreed to increase pressure, including an arms embargo, on Iran; and worked together to bring Russia into the World Trade Organization. The reset did not solve all disputed issues. The sides have very different positions, for example, on Syria and democracy. While the rhetoric is less harsh, they continue to disagree on missile defense. But, by any objective measure, U.S.-Russia relations today are in far better shape than in 2008.

That was the goal of the reset. In the early months of the Obama administration, U.S. officials privately said that the president would devote time and energy to improving relations with Moscow and would take account of some Russian concerns, in hopes that it would secure Russian cooperation on key challenges such as Iran. The relationship took a constructive turn following Obama’s April 2009 meeting with Dmitry Medvedev and his visit to Moscow the following July. Obama saw positive results, and he stayed directly engaged on U.S.-Russia relations throughout his first term, as did Medvedev.

U.S.-Russia relations are now entering a new stage. The problems are more difficult, in part because the relatively easier issues have been resolved. Putin has replaced Medvedev as Obama’s principal Russian interlocutor.

Some speculate that dealings between Obama and Putin will be more contentious than those between Obama and Medvedev. Perhaps. Obama and Medvedev clearly liked each other, and personal chemistry can help in diplomacy. But national interests matter most, and one should not overvalue personal relations. Putin and George W. Bush got along well personally, but that did not stop the steady decline of the U.S.-Russia relationship from 2003 to 2008, with each side blaming the other.

What can provide an impulse for further improvement in U.S.-Russia relations? I would suggest that the sides turn to nuclear arms control, which gave the bilateral relationship a boost in 2009. There are important opportunities in this area for further U.S.-Russian progress.

The New START Treaty was a good step, but it still leaves each side with 5,000 or more nuclear weapons in their arsenals. That level makes no sense 20 years after the end of the Cold War. There is plenty of room for further reductions: the United States and Russia each could cut their nuclear arsenals in half and still have ten times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. On missile defense, if the sides can work around Moscow’s demand for a legal guarantee, and if Washington offers greater transparency and flexibility on its plans, the pieces for a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement could fall into place. The two countries should also consult on how to broaden the nuclear arms control process to engage third countries.

This would be a presidential agenda. It is the kind of agenda that would draw Obama’s interest—and his continued personal engagement on Russia. That cannot be taken for granted. As he prepares for his second term, Obama naturally will begin to think about his legacy, about what history will write about him in 50 years. Policy papers are being prepared throughout the U.S. government with recommendations as to which foreign policy issues Obama should tackle over the next four years. There invariably will be more suggestions than the president can pursue in his second term.

By all accounts, Obama would like his presidency to be transformational on nuclear arms control and reductions. That creates an opportunity to secure Obama’s attention to the U.S.-Russia agenda—provided that the Russian side is ready to engage. If Moscow shows little or no interest in this, it is difficult to see other “big” U.S.-Russia questions that would attract his interest. I suspect that Obama’s attention would turn elsewhere. That would be unfortunate for arms control and for U.S.-Russia relations.

Would it be the end of the world? No. Washington and Moscow would continue to interact on a number of problems. But Russia would have significantly less relevance for the White House and Obama’s second-term agenda. It is doubtful that the level of presidential engagement of the past four years could be sustained. Some on the Russian side, and some on the American side as well, might welcome that. But U.S.-Russia relations clearly benefit when the two leaders take personal interest. Cooperation on arms control can enhance U.S. and Russian security. It can also, as in the past, give positive momentum to the broader relationship.

Новый этап в отношениях Вашингтона и Москвы

В последний год отношения между Россией и США словно приостановились в ожидании завершения президентских выборов в обеих странах. Теперь же, когда Барак Обама победил и пойдет на второй четырехлетний срок вслед за переизбранием Владимира Путина весной этого года, каковы будут отношения между США и Россией?

Перезагрузка, запущенная администрацией Обамы в 2009 году, прошла успешно. В 2008-м отношения между США и Россией достигли своей низшей точки с 1991 года. На повестке дня стояли только проблемные вопросы, и стороны расходились часто очень резко по таким вопросам, как контроль над стратегическими вооружениями, противоракетная оборона в Европе, расширение НАТО, Грузия, Иран и поправка Джексона–Вэника. За последние же четыре года Вашингтон и Москва заключили новый договор о сокращении стратегических вооружений, углубили сотрудничество по Афганистану, договорились об усилении давления на Иран, включая эмбарго на поставку оружия, и работали вместе над вступлением России во Всемирную торговую организацию.

Перезагрузка не решила всех спорных вопросов. Позиции сторон очень сильно расходятся, например, по Сирии и демократии. Стороны продолжают расходиться по вопросу о противоракетной обороне, хотя и в менее резких выражениях. Но по любой объективной мерке американо-российские отношения сегодня стали гораздо лучше, чем были в 2008 году. Такова и была цель перезагрузки.

В первые месяцы пребывания Обамы у власти американские чиновники в частных беседах говорили, что президент будет стремиться к улучшению отношений с Москвой и примет во внимание некоторые вопросы, беспокоящие Россию, в надежде заручиться поддержкой России по ключевым проблемам, таким как Иран. В отношениях произошел конструктивный поворот после встречи Обамы с Дмитрием Медведевым в апреле 2009 года и его визита в Москву в июле того же года. Обама увидел положительные результаты и лично принимал участие в развитии американо-российских отношений в течение своего первого срока, и Медведев поступал так же.

Теперь американо-российские отношения вступают в новую фазу. Проблемы, которые предстоит решать, сложнее отчасти потому, что относительно более легкие вопросы уже решены. На место Медведева в качестве главного собеседника Обамы с российской стороны пришел Путин. Высказываются предположения, что, когда Обама будет иметь дело с Путиным, будет больше разногласий и препирательств, чем с Медведевым. Возможно, Обама и Медведев явно нравились друг другу, а взаимная симпатия помогает в дипломатии. Но национальные интересы превыше всего, и не следует переоценивать личные взаимоотношения. Путин и Джордж Буш хорошо ладили друг с другом, но это не предотвратило неуклонного спада в американо-российских отношениях с 2003 по 2008 год и взаимных обвинений сторон.

Что может стать импульсом к дальнейшему улучшению американо-российских отношений? Я бы предложил сторонам обратиться к вопросу о контроле над ядерным оружием, который подтолкнул развитие двусторонних отношений в 2009 году. Это направление содержит важные возможности для дальнейшего прогресса в развитии отношений между США и Россией. Договор СНВ-3 явился продуктивным шагом, но по нему в арсенале у каждой стороны по-прежнему остается не менее 5 тыс. единиц ядерных вооружений. Через 20 лет после окончания холодной войны такой уровень противоречит здравому смыслу. Возможны значительные дальнейшие сокращения: США и Россия могли бы сократить свои ядерные арсеналы вдвое, и все равно у каждой стороны осталось бы в десять раз больше единиц ядерного оружия, чем у любой третьей страны. Что касается противоракетной обороны, если бы стороны смогли обеспечить требуемые Москвой юридические гарантии и если бы Вашингтон обеспечил большую прозрачность и гибкость своих планов, НАТО и Россия могли бы договориться по совместной противоракетной обороне. Нашим странам также следует консультироваться друг с другом по вопросу о расширении процедуры контроля над ядерными вооружениями с включением в нее третьих стран. Такова могла бы быть президентская повестка дня.

Такая повестка обеспечила бы постоянное личное заинтересованное участие Обамы в развитии отношений с Россией. Не следует принимать это за нечто само собой разумеющееся. Готовясь ко второму сроку, Обама, естественно, начнет задумываться о своем наследии, о том, что о нем скажет история через 50 лет.

Во всех органах власти США составляются программные документы с рекомендациями в отношении того, какими внешнеполитическими вопросами следует заняться администрации Обамы в предстоящие четыре года. Несомненно, предложений будет больше, чем президент сможет осуществить за свой второй срок. Судя по всему, Обама хотел бы, чтобы его президентство стало трансформационным в области ядерных вооружений и их сокращения. Это дает возможность заручиться вниманием Обамы к американо-российской повестке дня при условии готовности российской стороны к совместным действиям. Если Москва проявит к этому мало интереса, трудно будет найти какие-либо другие «большие» вопросы американо-российских отношений, которые могли бы заинтересовать его. Я предполагаю, что тогда внимание Обамы будет обращено в какую-то иную сторону.

Это было бы печально для дела контроля над вооружениями и американо-российских отношений. Будет ли это концом света? Нет. Вашингтон и Москва продолжат взаимодействовать по ряду проблем. Но Россия будет значительно меньше значить для повестки дня Обамы. Сомнительно, что уровень участия президентов в течение последних четырех лет останется прежним. И с российской, и с американской стороны кто-то может приветствовать это. Но американо-российским отношениям явно на пользу, когда лидеры обеих стран проявляют личную заинтересованность. Сотрудничество в области контроля над вооружениями может повысить безопасность США и России. Оно так же, как это было в прошлом, может придать положительный импульс более широкому кругу взаимоотношений.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Nezavisimaya Gazeta

Arms Control and the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election

Steven Pifer — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, says that more attention needs to be paid to arms control in the 2012 U.S. presidential election, since it is an opportunity to make Americans safer and to advance American security. Since the U.S. and Russia signed the New START treaty in 2011, Pifer says that arms control implementation is going smoothly, but that there are still challenges, in particular with regard to missile defense and further reductions in warheads.

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Arms Control and the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election

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Steven Pifer

Nuclear Arms Control in 2012

Steven Pifer — Mon, 02 Jul 2012 16:21:00 -0400

Nuclear arms control has been a major element of the Obama administration’s foreign policy. To help understand where the United States and Russia are on nuclear arms reductions, as well as possible next steps, Brookings Arms Control Initiative Director Steven Pifer has prepared a PowerPoint presentation that outlines the New START Treaty, next steps on strategic forces, non-strategic nuclear weapons and missile defense issues. This PowerPoint will be useful for anyone seeking a quick introduction to the intricate world of nuclear arms control.

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Nuclear Arms Control in 2012

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Nuclear Arms Control in 2012

In this PowerPoint, Steven Pifer, senior fellow and director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, describes the status of key nuclear arms control issues as of mid-2012 and issues for future negotiations.

The PowerPoint examines the status of nuclear arms control as of July 2012 and key issues facing future negotiations:

New START

Next steps on strategic forces

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Missile defense issues

Future prospects

This PowerPoint, first posted in January 2012, has been updated to reflect developments of the first half of 2012.

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Steven Pifer

Missile Defense: Cooperation or Contention?

Thu, 17 May 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 17, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

U.S. plans to deploy missile defense systems in Europe have posed major issues for U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations over the past five years. Recently, NATO proposed a cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia, but Moscow has proven unwilling to engage until it receives certain specific guarantees from the United States. This continuing stalemate puts cooperative missile defense in Europe at risk. Can the sides work out a cooperative arrangement or will missile defense become, as it was in 2007 and 2008, a contentious issue that negatively affects the broader U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relationships?

On May 17, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion exploring these issues and marking the release of the new Brookings Arms Control series paper, “Missile Defense: Cooperation or Contention.” Panelists include David Hoffman, Foreign Policy magazine contributing editor and author of The Dead Hand (Doubleday, 2009); Arms Control Association Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann; and Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative. Brookings Fellow Clara O’Donnell moderated the discussion.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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Missile Defense: Cooperation or Contention?

Event Materials

20120517_missile_defense_transcript_corrected

Participants

Panelists

Contributing Editor

Senior Fellow

A Preview of the 2012 NATO Summit

Steven Pifer — Wed, 16 May 2012 14:52:00 -0400

Managing Russia’s continuing objections to NATO’s plans for a missile defense system in Europe will be a high priority item at the upcoming NATO talks in Chicago. While charting a course for the future of Afghanistan is crucial, Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, says much of the discussion will focus on Russia’s opposition to NATO’s missile defense plans and the tensions that are growing between Russian leadership and NATO.

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2012 NATO Talks

Image Source: Jim Young / Reuters

The Missing Missile Defense Piece at the NATO Summit in Chicago

Steven Pifer — Tue, 15 May 2012 14:35:00 -0400

When NATO leaders meet in Chicago May 20-21, they will announce that the Alliance’s missile defense system has achieved an interim operational capability. That in large part reflects implementation of the first phase of the “European phased adaptive approach” (EPAA) announced by the Obama administration in 2009: in 2011, U.S. Navy warships with the Standard SM-3 interceptor began operating in the eastern Mediterranean, and a U.S. missile defense radar was deployed to Turkey.

What will be missing is agreement on a NATO-Russia cooperative missile defense arrangement. Russian President Putin will not come to Chicago. Although U.S. and Russian views on how a cooperative arrangement would operate converge significantly, Moscow’s call for a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defense systems would not be directed against Russian strategic missiles has stymied agreement.

Why does cooperation make sense for Washington and NATO? First, it would defuse missile defense from becoming a problem that would undermine broader U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations. Second, involving the Russians would provide a better defense of Europe. Third, genuine cooperation could prove a game-changer in knocking down lingering Cold War stereotypes in Moscow.

What is the problem with the Russian demand for a legal guarantee? The Russians say it should be accompanied by “objective criteria” such as limits on the numbers and velocities of interceptor missiles. It would amount to a treaty. Anyone who follows the Senate knows that anything that hints at limits on missile defense has zero chance of ratification. The Russians know this.

The Obama administration has offered a political commitment in lieu of a legal guarantee and argues that U.S. interceptors lack the velocity and range to threaten Russian strategic missiles. While the Russians have a legitimate concern that missile defense could at some point undermine the strategic balance, it is difficult to see current U.S. plans posing such a threat. But Moscow so far does not buy it.

Various motives underlie the Russian position. In particular, they seem to want to remain in a holding pattern until after the U.S. presidential election in November. That’s likely because they anticipate that a Romney administration would pursue a different course on missile defense than a reelected Obama administration. When one considers how the U.S. approach changed from Bill Clinton (explored a national missile defense) to George W. Bush (withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and rapidly deployed a rudimentary defense of the U.S. homeland) to Barack Obama (radically reconfigured the Bush plan for missile defense in Europe), a Russian decision to wait and see has an understandable rationale.

While perhaps understandable, the Russian position unfortunately blocks the reported progress by Pentagon and Russian Ministry of Defense officials on what missile defense cooperation would mean in practice. They have discussed transparency regarding missile defense capabilities, joint exercises and jointly manned missile defense centers. A “data fusion center” would take data from NATO and Russian sensors and combine them to provide a common operational picture, which could then be shared with NATO and Russian missile defense commands. U.S. officials are interested in access to data from Russian radars that could provide earlier warning of a ballistic missile launch from Iran. A “planning and operations center” would provide the venue for NATO and Russian officers to discuss possible threats and rules of engagement for defending against a missile attack.

This work, however, has been held up by the dispute over a legal guarantee.

With a view toward 2013, the United States and NATO should consider how to make it as easy as possible for Moscow to say yes to cooperation. They should reiterate the offer of a political commitment and transparency regarding U.S. and NATO missile defense programs, including the opportunity to observe U.S. Standard SM-3 tests. The Alliance should indicate that a cooperative arrangement could be time-limited, say to four years’ duration. If, at the end of that period, the Russians still held concerns about NATO missile defenses, they could walk away.

NATO and Washington, moreover, should adjust two points of their public stance on missile defense. First, NATO and U.S. officials repeatedly state that cooperation would in no way affect NATO’s plans. That reduces Russian incentives to agree to a cooperative system. The Alliance should instead say that it is open to Russian suggestions so long as those ideas do not degrade the ability of NATO’s missile defense system to defend NATO members. If that criterion can be met, the Alliance should look at Russian proposals with a flexible mindset.

Second, Moscow’s concern focuses most on phase 4 of the EPAA, to be achieved in 2020 or 2021 when the Standard SM-3 missile is to acquire capabilities to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Washington should indicate that the “adaptive” aspect of the EPAA includes the possibility that phase 4 could be delayed if it became clear that Iran is not making progress toward an ICBM capability. That could have the added advantage of encouraging Moscow to use its diplomatic weight with Tehran to urge that the Iranians not develop an ICBM.

This kind of approach would position Washington and the Alliance well to test Russian readiness to cooperate. And it could open the path to a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement that is in the interest of all the parties.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention?

Steven Pifer — Tue, 08 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY—

Missile defense has been an issue on the agenda between Washington and Moscow since the 1960s. Although the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty appeared to resolve the question, it kept coming back—in the form of U.S. suspicions about the large, phased array Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk, Soviet concern about the Strategic Defense Initiative, National Missile Defense programs, U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans for deploying missile defenses in Europe.

In 2012, the missile defense issue ranks high on the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas. Policymakers in Washington, Moscow and NATO capitals face a challenge: can they manage the question in a cooperative manner, perhaps by developing a NATO- Russia missile defense of Europe, or will this be a contentious issue that undermines arms control and broader relations?

After a review of the history of missile defense, this paper describes the Obama administration’s “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to missile defense in Europe. The EPAA is based on the Aegis SPY-1 radar and Standard SM-3 missile interceptor, which is to be upgraded over the next decade to defend NATO Europe, and later to augment defense of the U.S. homeland, against prospective longer-range ballistic missiles from Iran (though NATO as a matter of policy does not publicly cite Iran). NATO has endorsed this approach, and the first phase began in 2011, with deployment of U.S. Navy warships armed with SM-3 interceptors in the Mediterranean and a supporting radar in Turkey. Later phases envisage SM-3 interceptors plus SPY-1 radars deployed on land in Romania and Poland.

Initially, the Russians seemed to see the EPAA as less of a threat than the Bush administration plan that it replaced. The Russians agreed at the end of 2010 to explore a cooperative missile defense arrangement with NATO. In 2011, however, Russian officials attached priority to securing from Washington a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic ballistic missiles, accompanied by a series of constraints.

The Obama administration has offered a political assurance on this but could not agree to a legal guarantee. Republican support for missile defense and op- position to any treaty limits on it would mean that a treaty could not obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for Senate ratification. Moscow nevertheless has held to its insistence. The mix of motives that underlies the Russian approach to missile defense and possible cooperation with NATO is not entirely clear but likely includes: concern that later phases of the EPAA or subsequent developments will threaten Russian strategic ballistic missiles; Ministry of Defense reluctance in principle to engage in a cooperative effort; opposition to U.S. military infrastructure on the territory of countries that joined NATO in or after 1999; and a desire to drive wedges within NATO. Finally, Moscow may be in a holding pattern on missile defense, as it is on nuclear arms control issues, until it sees who wins the November U.S. presidential election.

Should the sides find a way around the legal guarantee obstacle, there appears to be a rich menu of ideas as to how a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement might be structured. In 2011, U.S. and Russian officials reportedly found convergence on ideas such as transparency; joint NATO-Russian missile defense exercises; a jointly-manned “data fusion center” that would share early warning data and develop a “common operational picture;” and a “planning and operations center” that would, among other things, implement transparency measures, exchange updated threat assessments, and discuss possible attack scenarios. Several U.S.-Russia Track II dialogues over the past two years have developed complementary ideas for NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation.

The Russian proposal for a legal guarantee is accompanied by a proposal for “objective criteria,” which translates to limits on numbers, velocities and locations of missile defense interceptors—a treaty covering missile defense. Short of a treaty, however, there are ways to reassure Moscow about the capabilities of U.S. missile defenses and the inherent limits on those capabilities. For example, as the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested, the Russians could observe SM-3 interceptor tests to confirm that the velocity and range of the missile would not allow it to engage Russian strategic missiles. The U.S. government might also offer an annual declaration regarding the current and planned numbers of key elements of the U.S. missile defense system—interceptor missiles, silos and land-based launchers, associated radars and missile-defense capable ships— and commit to provide advance notice of changes in the planned numbers. This would allow Moscow to gauge whether the sum of U.S. capabilities seriously challenged its strategic deterrent.

In different political circumstances, given current U.S. plans, it would appear that a ten-year agreement limiting each side to no more than 100-125 interceptors capable of engaging strategic ballistic missiles would (1) assure Moscow that its strategic ballistic missile force was not threatened, and (2) permit the United States to do everything that it wants to do over the next decade to defend against the Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile threats. The administration, however, is not exploring such a treaty, as it understands that any such agreement would have no prospect of Senate ratification.

For the time being, missile defense falls into the category of difficult issues in U.S.-Russia relations. Achieving a NATO-Russia agreement on missile defense cooperation appears all but impossible in 2012. The U.S. and NATO objective should be to keep the door open for a NATO-Russia agreement in 2013. Then, the United States and NATO could offer a package to encourage Russia to join in a cooperative missile defense. Such a package could include some or all of the following measures:

A U.S. and NATO political commitment not to direct their missile defenses against Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
Maximum transparency regarding planned U.S. missile defenses. This should include an offer of an annual notification laying out the numbers of key missile defense elements currently deployed and planned for deployment each year over the next decade. This should be accompanied by a commitment to provide the Russians notice in advance should there be any changes in those planned deployment numbers. Ideally, this would apply on a reciprocal basis.
Technical briefings as to why the Defense Department concludes that U.S. missile defenses will not threaten Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
Reiteration of the offer to allow Russian experts, using their own sensors, to observe SM-3 interceptor tests.
Indicating that a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement could be of a provisional, time-limited nature, with NATO acknowledging at the outset that (1) Moscow has strong concerns regarding U.S./NATO missile defense capabilities and (2) Russia’s decision to agree to a provisional cooperative arrangement does not preclude that Moscow may decide not to make the arrangement permanent if it believes that U.S./NATO missile defense capabilities will threaten its strategic forces.
Indicating that, as long as the ability of NATO’s missile defense to protect all Alliance members is not degraded, NATO is prepared to listen to and accommodate reasonable Russian suggestions for a cooperative arrangement.
Indicating that the “adaptive” part of the EPAA includes a possibility that the United States might slow development of and/or in consultation with NATO choose not to deploy the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor if it were clear that Iran were not making significant progress toward achieving a longer- range missile capability.
Establishing regular U.S.-Russia (or NATO- Russia) ballistic missile threat assessment conferences, focusing on North Korea and Iran, to close the gap in the sides’ estimates.

In 2013, if Moscow is prepared to move forward, these recommendations would provide a basis for engaging the Russians and for moving to agree on and implement ideas for a cooperative missile defense arrangement for Europe. Some of these recommendations would prove controversial in Washington. But they would not undermine current U.S. plans for missile defense to protect Europe and the U.S. homeland. They would only cause a change in those plans if it became clear that some threats, such as an Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile, were not emerging.

The United States and NATO should seek, without degrading their ability to defend against limited ballistic missile attack, to make it as easy as possible for Moscow to agree to a cooperative missile defense arrangement. Ultimately, the Russians will have to decide how to respond. A Russian readiness to accept a political commitment that U.S. missile defenses were not directed against their strategic ballistic missiles rather than a legal guarantee would open dramatic potential for cooperation. The reported convergence in the sides’ thinking could presage a relatively rapid realization of a practical cooperative arrangement. That would be in the U.S. interest, making missile defense an asset rather than a liability on the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas, providing for a stronger missile defense of Europe, and perhaps proving a game-changer in broader NATO and Russian attitudes toward each other.

A note on scope: This paper focuses on Europe, currently the geographic center of the discussion on missile defense. While not addressed here, missile defense is also an issue in the Middle East and in Asia, as demonstrated by the deployment of land-and-sea-based missile defense assets in anticipation of the April 13, 2012 North Korean rocket launch. China also figures in the broader discussion. Having a smaller strategic missile force than Russia, Beijing will closely follow U.S. efforts to defend America against ballistic missile attack. And one reason why the U.S. Navy is interested in the Standard SM-3 interceptor is that it could enhance the Navy’s ability to defend aircraft carriers against Chinese ballistic missile attacks designed to deny access to certain ocean areas.

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Authors

Steven Pifer

Image Source: Sebastien Pirlet / Reuters

The Relationships among the United States, Russia, Iran, and Syria

Javier Solana — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 15:26:00 -0400

At a recent event, Javier Solana discussed the relationships among the United States, Russia, Syria, and Iran and examined how the United States and Russia could work together on issues including the violence in Syria, the nuclear situation in Iran, and the missile defense system.

Authors

Javier Solana