Brookings: Topics - The Arab Awakening and Middle East Unrest

Civil Wars and Syria: Lessons From History

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Sean Zeigler — Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Most of the international debate about Syria policy focuses on how to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.

Options for NATO states and key Arab League partners include everything from enlisting Russia’s help in a diplomatic approach, with a conference now envisioned for early June, to arming the rebels to perhaps even supporting them with limited amounts of airpower. Removing Assad, however, would no more end the Syrian conflict than overthrowing Saddam Hussein in 2003 brought stability to Iraq. The United States must create a more integrated overall strategy.

Not just the Iraq example, but broader scholarly studies on civil war onset and recurrence suggest that should the House of Assad fall, the likelihood of continued bloodshed in Syria will remain uncomfortably high.

Studies indicate that more than a third of all civil conflicts have some form of relapse after they end. Though there is much disagreement about the particular causes of war renewal, certain factors are widely recognized as relevant. Many are present in the current Syrian context.

First, the human cost of the Syrian conflict is already high. To date, roughly 80,000 deaths are attributed to the war. In contrast to the “war weariness” adage that longer and bloodier conflicts are eventual precursors to peace, violence tends to beget more violence. The more intense a conflict, the greater the risk it will reignite down the road, according to a host of literature on the subject.

This argues against the likelihood that, even if Assad falls or flees, remaining partisans will quickly make peace among themselves.

Second, so-called existential wars are hard to stop. Fights for regime change and control of the state can quickly evolve into all-or-nothing contests. Even if different groups pledge to work together and share power once an ancien regime is displaced, it is difficult for them to trust each other, given the high stakes they are fighting for. Contesting the government’s legitimacy can also shrink any potential scope for future bargaining and compromise.

Third, weak political institutions do not bode well for a country’s chances of stability in the wake of a civil war. The Syrian government, built around the Baath party and the Assad family, does not have a great deal of institutional depth. While the effect of political structures on war recurrence is debated, there is some agreement that only more consolidated democracies can avoid renewed conflict. Political participation often lowers the likelihood that disaffected citizens will take up arms once wars are over. Autocracy, therefore, is generally more associated with both civil war onset and recurrence.

Finally, when wartime coalitions are tenuous and factionalized, the odds of conflict recurrence increase considerably. This is particularly true in Syria, with its dozens if not hundreds of insurgent groups.

These factors indicate that supporting the overthrow of the Syrian regime, perhaps through directly arming rebels, may invite sectarian conflict to widen, not subside. Understanding these complicating factors is key to building any chances of peace.

So where to go from here? There are a number of options beyond the increasingly unspeakable – standing aside while Assad’s forces try to win the war, or at least take back most of the country.

One option is to acknowledge all the above, accepting the brutal logic of civil warfare and deciding not to do much about it. This could mean relegating Syria to become the next Somalia, if and when Assad falls.

Over time, the huge number of insurgent groups now operating in Syria might merge into a more modest number. But the warfare could resemble the protracted militia combat witnessed until recently in Somalia – or in 1990s’ Afghanistan. Beyond its disastrous humanitarian implications, this approach would also allow a sanctuary for terrorists to develop in the heart of the Levant and on the borders of five countries now crucial to the United States — Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq.

A second option is to go in strong with a multinational ground invasion force, capable of imposing consolidation on the opposition and order on the country. But as we learned in Iraq, this is easier said than done – and is likely to involve more than 100,000 foreign troops, taking casualties at a likely rate of dozens a month for several years. It is a nonstarter.

The most amenable strategy, therefore, is some form of political settlement followed by deployment of a smaller (but significant) international force to help monitor the deal and cement the peace. This could involve a simple power-sharing formula with a strong central government, as well as a guarantee of safe passage out of the country for Assad.

Given the degree of sectarian animosity and distrust now prevalent in Syria, this peace accord might have to resemble the Bosnia model, with a relatively weak central government and autonomous regions. Each region would be run predominantly by one confessional group or another, but with strong protections for minority rights. Multiethnic major cities in the country’s center would have to remain multiethnic in any case.

Accepting a number of foreign boots on the ground will be asking much of the international community. Yet there is probably no other way to do it given where Syria is today and what we know about civil wars.

The alternative, if not a regionalized war, is some type of victor’s justice followed by a distinct possibility of conflict renewal.

Done right, the multinational approach would not have to require more than 10,000 to 20,000 Americans, as perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent of a total force starting in the range of 50,000 or so. It should have large contributions from Turkey, Arab League states, NATO Europe and possibly Russia too.

Getting to this kind of deal may require more military help for the opposition in the short term. But President Barack Obama’s reluctance to provide arms or airpower support is understandable in the absence of a strategy that considers the question of what comes after Assad has fallen.

We need to fashion that strategy. Scheduling a conference, reasonable though it may be, and hoping for the best is not enough.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Sean Zeigler

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Building New Democracies: Institutional Reform after the Arab Spring

Wed, 22 May 2013 01:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2013
9:00 AM - 11:00 AM AST

Doha Ritz Carlton, Doha, Qatar

On May 23, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a plenary discussion on the challenge of institutional reform after the Arab Spring as part of the 13th Doha Forum. Speakers discussed how the countries of the Arab Spring could build new, representative governments, as well as how they could best balance demands for change with the requirements of an inclusive and successful transition. The discussion featured Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian Ambassador to the United States and founding Dean of the American University in Cairo’s School of Public Affairs; Dr. Rafiq Abdessalam, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia; Dr. Bernardino Leon, European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean; Nikolay Mladenov, former Foreign Minister of Bulgaria; and Michael Posner, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh.

The panel opened with speakers taking stock of the situation of the countries of the Arab Spring, and Egypt and Tunisia in particular, more than two years after 2011’s revolutionary wave. Both Fahmy and Abdessalam pointed to the challenges their countries faced. “It’s impossible to deny that almost everybody [in Egypt] is frustrated at this point,” Fahmy said. He told the audience that he remained optimistic over the long term but was, over the short term, “quite disturbed.” For his part, Abdessalam acknowledged that Tunisia’s transition had been difficult. At this point, he said, the goal of the Tunisian “Troika” was to steer the country through this period “at the least possible cost” with an approach based on partnership and consensus.

These challenges reflected the scope of the change underway in these countries. Fahmy asserted that what is happening in Egypt is a “societal” transition, not merely an institutional one – an argument that Abdessalam seconded. Egyptians, Fahmy said, are now defining an Egyptian political identity for the 21st century. Mladenov identified this as a key point of difference between earlier transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and those in the Arab world: whereas the end goal in European transitions may have been relatively clear, in the Arab world it is still in the making.

In order to best conduct this societal dialogue, Mladenov emphasized the “roundtable” approach Bulgaria had taken to arrive at a consensus vision for the future. This had parallels with the Tunisian approach, which Abdessalam said was based on a recognition that no single faction could bear these burdens alone. Fahmy, meanwhile, expressed unhappiness that Egypt had entered the political process before setting its constitutional ground rules, a decision he blamed for Egypt’s polarization. When politics are put first, he said, political forces “pull you apart rather than push you forward.” Posner was also critical of the Egyptian case, and in particular what he saw as a “very flawed” constitution – both the drafting process and the resulting document.

Participants worked to put forward an approach that was forward-looking but also workable. Leon laid out the key points on which he had counseled these transitioning countries. He advocated a transition that held accountable those responsible for excesses and dramatically reformed fiscal structures and the security services. At the same time, he argued for retaining the personnel and institutions of the state and broadly accommodating officials not implicated in crimes as part of the former regime. Fahmy warned that by too-aggressively dismantling everything that had come before the revolution, you risked “destroy[ing] the core of the country,” while Mladenov cautioned against not going far enough – he said that old regimes “have a tendency to come back from the ashes.” Leon read the successes of al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt as evidence of a desire for change – but said that support for Ahmed Shafiq in Egypt’s presidential election and Beji Caid Essebsi in Tunisia showed the need for a process that was respectful to and inclusive of all parties.

Any solution, of course, has to match up with the aspirations of the peoples who overthrew their dictators. As Posner put it, these are “young societies” whose people want economic opportunity and a political stake in the future of their countries. Fahmy argued that people need to see real progress on reform and improving their quality of life if they are to remain committed to the transition.

Participants touched on different ways that the West could support these transitions and reform processes. Mladenov raised as examples both European efforts to assist political party formation and the EU Endowment for Democracy. Still, Leon said that it is “very important to listen to what these societies want.” Posner and Mladenov agreed that any process had to be domestically driven, given the particularities of any given country case; looking at examples as diverse as Argentina, Serbia, and East Germany, they rejected a one-size-fits-all model.

In a discussion of the Gulf role in supporting these transitions, Abdessalam praised Qatar’s role but condemned some other Gulf states’ fear of change and “pessimistic depiction” of what is now going on in Egypt and Tunisia. Fahmy said that the Gulf should continue to provide support for these transitions, but not for one party over another. Posner, for his part, was sharply critical of the Gulf states’ position on the uprising in Bahrain. Bahrain should have been a model for a managed transition to a constitutional monarchy, he said, but instead the Gulf had been silent as the Bahraini government declined to implement key recommendations of the “Bassiouni Report.” Mladenov and Leon, on the other hand, were much more positive about the support of the Gulf for the Arab transitions and the Gulf countries’ role as a partner for the West. Mladenov did warn, however, that the Gulf faced possible blowback from its involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Dr. Yassin Said Noaman, Secretary-General of the Yemen Socialist Party and former Prime Minister of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, had been meant to represent the Yemeni experience in the discussion but was ultimately unable to attend. Fortunately, Yemeni Minister of Information Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Minister of Industry and Trade Saad al-Din bin Taleb were able to contribute during the panel’s question-and-answer session. They discussed the progress on and hopes for Yemen’s national dialogue and, in the case of bin Taleb, highlighted how previous regimes’ corruption and self-serving contracts had left their countries with an unsustainable economic burden.

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy

How Arab Public Opinion Is Reshaping the Middle East

Tue, 21 May 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 21, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The Arab awakening that began in 2011 is transforming the Middle East in ways that continue to surprise seasoned observers. As new political leaders and movements struggle for power and work to shape the region’s future, one thing is clear: public opinion is more consequential now than it has arguably ever been. How Arabs view themselves and the world around them will have enormous consequences for the region and the larger international community in the years ahead. How are changes in Arab public opinion shaping the changes occurring across the region? Have the U.S. and its allies done enough to understand and support the voices of Arabs seeking greater representation and opportunity?

On May 21, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, as part of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, hosted the launch of The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East (Basic Books, 2013), the latest book by Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami. Kim Ghattas, BBC’s State Department correspondent, engaged Dr. Telhami in a discussion of the book and the issues it raises. Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks.

Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Abstract:

This article examines the initial Western response to the Arab Spring. Traditional interests – oil, counterterrorism, containing Iran, and the security of Israel – offer only a limited explanation. Domestic politics and a humanitarian agenda explain some variation, but they too are insufficient. A number of leaders appeared to believe change would happen no matter what, so it was often better to embrace it than fight it. Others desired to showcase a new model, where the United States would not necessarily lead. Western powers also recognized the limits of their power and desired to maintain alliances with conservative countries like Saudi Arabia.

Read the article » (subscription required)

Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: The Journal of Strategic Studies

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

Read the full article »

Authors

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Morsi and the Muslims

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Many Americans -- and many Egyptians -- are souring on the Muslim Brotherhood. Some are rather smugly saying, "I told you so." From the American and Arab liberal perspectives, the Brotherhood seems run by hyper-charged Islamists bent on imposing their will on the Egyptian people. Like most things in politics, though, it depends on what exactly you're comparing them to. More than two years into the Arab revolts, Islamists are weighing the virtues of moving more aggressively to implement their agenda versus the benefits of proceeding cautiously in an attempt to placate their critics and opponents.

There is little doubt that the Brotherhood has veered to the right. The real debate within the group is whether they've veered far enough. With Egypt as polarized as ever, the Brotherhood has effectively given up on reaching out to liberals and leftists, focusing instead on closing ranks and rallying its base. During the presidential race, Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood's original candidate, chose a Salafi-leaning council of scholars for his first campaign event, where he affirmed that the application of sharia law was his ultimate goal and that he would form a committee of scholars to help parliament achieve that goal. After Shater's disqualification, Mohammed Morsi -- a weaker, less convincing candidate -- doubled down on Shater's back-to-basics message. "Needless to say," Morsi said, "[I am] currently the only contender who offers a clearly Islamic project."

After winning the presidency, Morsi took a brief stab at rising above his partisan origins. But the tragic events of Dec. 4, when anti-Brotherhood protesters and government supporters clashed outside the presidential palace, rendered such efforts moot. The violence of that night -- provoked by the Brotherhood when it called on supporters to confront protesters -- claimed "martyrs" on both sides. For many in the opposition, this was the point of no return -- blood had been spilled.

Read the full article on Foreign Policy »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

A Preview of the 2013 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 06 May 2013 12:35:00 -0400

We’re just a month away from the tenth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which will take place in Doha on June 9-11. The Forum will feature discussions of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relationship between political reform and economic development, and international responses to the crisis in Syria. We will also host sessions on the role of arts and culture in societies emerging from conflict, and the evolution of Arab identity.

As always, our Forum will include four expert working groups to consider some crucial issues: advancing women's political participation, the role of faith based leaders in diplomacy, freedom of speech within Muslim communities, and promoting inclusive development in Egypt and Tunisia.

If you won’t be with us in Doha, you can join our conversations online. To get an idea of what’s in store, please view our website— where there are findings and recommendations from our working groups last year—or watch our video highlights from last year’s forum entitled, “New Voices, New Directions,” below:

Download Media

U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

We recently engaged Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani in a conversation on the key questions about Qatar’s diplomatic, economic, and political role in the region. I invite you to listen to the discussion with Sheikh Hamad, moderated by Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk.

Keep checking this space for updates on the upcoming forum, as we post videos previewing the lively discussions to come. Follow us on Twitter or tweet your own ideas with the hashtag #usislam13.

Video

U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Image Source: Paul Morse

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia

Can Egypt’s Transition and Economy Be Saved?

Hafez Ghanem — Wed, 01 May 2013 12:19:00 -0400

The Egyptian economy is unlikely to collapse suddenly. However, in the absence of a serious macroeconomic stabilization program it will continue to deteriorate gradually, with low growth and increasing unemployment and inflation. Even corruption appears to be on the rise. The Egyptian people are also feeling the pinch in terms of higher prices and shortages of some imported necessities. If this continues, the transition to democracy could be jeopardized. On the other hand, politics in Egypt is so polarized that it is difficult to see how serious economic reforms could be implemented without first reaching compromises on some thorny political issues. Perhaps the recent agreement on a coalition government in Italy could serve as a model for Egyptian politicians.

There are signs that the democratic transition is in danger. Loud grumblings can be heard all over Egypt. There is even nostalgia for autocratic rule and some are calling for a return of the military. According to the Pew Center’s “Global Attitudes Project” more than 70 percent of Egyptians are unhappy with the way the economy is moving, 33 percent feel that a strong leader is needed to solve the country’s problems, and 49 percent believe that a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. The number of people disillusioned with the revolution is likely to increase as the economy weakens further.

In addition to freedom and dignity, the young people who started the Egyptian revolution on January 25, 2011 were demanding better living conditions and greater social justice. Their demands are far from being met as economic growth has declined and unemployment has risen (figure 1). Industrial growth which was at a healthy 5-7 percent a year before the revolution has fallen to about 1 percent, and the official unemployment rate rose from 9 to 12.5 percent. About 95 percent of the unemployed are youth with at least a secondary education. Nearly three-quarters of those who are lucky enough to find jobs end up working in the informal sector where wages range between $2.60-3.70 per day.

The Egyptian government’s fiscal policy has not been conducive to growth and employment generation. Figure 1 shows that the government deficit rose from about 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to nearly 11 percent in 2011. It could exceed 12 percent of GDP in 2013. The increasing deficits have been financed almost entirely domestically, and the public domestic debt rose from some 60 percent of GDP in 2010 to 70 percent in 2012. At some point in 2012, the Egyptian government was paying 16 percent interest on its short-term domestic debt. That is, the government has been sucking liquidity from the domestic financial system and crowding out the private sector; discouraging investment, growth and employment creation.

Surprisingly, corruption seems to have increased after the revolution. Ending corruption has been a key demand of the revolutionaries, and the country witnessed more than 6,000 corruption investigations and several high profile incriminations since February 2011. Investigations and police action send a political signal, but they do not constitute an effective anti-corruption program. In 2010, Egypt was ranked 98th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Its ranking deteriorated to 112th in 2011 and 118th in 2012. Data for 2011 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) also shows deterioration in corruption control. The WGI 2012 data is not yet available.

Falling tourism and foreign direct investment, together with increasing capital flight, led to a decline in foreign reserves from more than $35 billion in 2010 (covering 7 months of imports) to less than $15 billion in 2012, which covers less than three months of imports (figure 2). As a result foreign exchange has become scarce and the Egyptian pound started depreciating rapidly. It has depreciated against the US dollar by about 15 percent in the past three months. Moreover, a black market in foreign exchange has emerged. In addition, Egypt’s credit rating suffered a setback as Moody’s downgraded Egypt’s debt to “caa”, which means it is of poor standing and entails very high risk.

Imports are becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to procure. Egypt is highly dependent on the imports of many necessities, including food and fuel. The Egyptian pound’s depreciation means that domestic prices for imports are rising; which affects millions of poor and middle class families. Scarcities of some imported goods (e.g. diesel fuel) are appearing as foreign exchange is increasingly difficult to obtain, and foreign banks are wary of providing credit to Egyptian importers. Some businessmen complain that it now takes more than six weeks to open a letter of credit, while it only took three days before the revolution.

It’s clear that Egypt is facing an economic crisis, and needs to implement credible reforms to stabilize the economy, control corruption, and lay the foundations for inclusive growth. Such reforms would normally include a reduction in the fiscal deficit to bring the domestic debt under control and a further depreciation of the Egyptian pound to encourage exports and tourism. The Egyptian government is negotiating with the IMF to obtain support for such a stabilization program. IMF support is desirable because it would open the doors for increased assistance from other bilateral and multilateral donors, and thus help ease the pain of stabilization.

But macroeconomic stabilization requires implementing unpopular measures such as reducing subsidies and raising taxes. The government, which is already facing stiff opposition and unrest, is, understandably, reluctant to adopt such measures. It has so far been able to postpone difficult decisions by getting exceptional financial support from regional allies. However, this has not been enough to turn the economy around.

The Egyptian government appears to be in a no-win situation. Implementing reforms could lead to greater unrest and political instability and jeopardize the democratization process. On the other hand, doing nothing will imply a deepening economic crisis and more hardship. This will also lead to unrest and instability, and ultimately jeopardize the transition process.

How then can Egypt’s transition be saved? A national consensus needs to be reached and the reforms have to be broadly owned and accepted. The opposition (which itself is divided between liberals, Nasserists and Salafists) will have to buy into the economic reform program. This is unlikely to occur unless a consensus is also reached on outstanding political issues (e.g. election law, revision of the constitution, reform of the judiciary, etc.). Both government and opposition will have to make compromises. But do they have the required level of political maturity to do that?

Authors

Hafez Ghanem

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Arab Uprisings and Completing Turkey's Regional Integration: Challenges and Opportunities for US–Turkish Relations

Kemal Kirişci — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 13:33:00 -0400

Abstract:

Today, regional economic integration in the Middle East continues to remain at an unusually low level compared to other regions of the world. This is especially problematic because traditionally, regional integration has long been seen as an effective tool for encouraging regional peace, stability and prosperity, with also the added expectation that economic growth may also help or facilitate transition to democracy. This paper asks the question of whether the Arab uprisings might provide a new environment in which Turkey and the USA, together with the European Union, could cooperate to bring about some degree of regional economic integration. The paper discusses Turkey's increasing economic engagement of its neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War and argues that this experience constitutes a good basis for cooperation, even if there remain a number of challenges stemming from Turkey as well as the Middle East. As much as these challenges may seem insurmountable, initiating a tri-lateral dialogue is of critical importance as the rewards of regional integration in the Middle East in terms of stability, peace and prosperity would be huge and of a ‘win-win’ nature for Turkey, for the EU, for the USA, and of course for the region.

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Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies

Syria, Chemical Weapons, And The Intervention Question

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with NPR’s On Point program, Shadi Hamid calls for American intervention in Syria on the basis of humanitarian grounds, as well as rising levels of anti-American sentiment and radicalization on the ground. Hamid says a lot of damage has already been done with regard to radicalization in Syria and that the country’s future is bleak. Despite this reality, Hamid concludes it remains important for the United States to intervene.

The Assad regime will fall regardless of American intervention, Hamid says. The questions, then, are how long the United States waits to intervene and how many people die in the process. On this basis, Hamid supports a military intervention which doesn’t involve putting boots on the ground, but rather uses surgical air strikes and safe zones to diminish the regime’s ability to kill its own people. Hamid says to alternately depend on channels such as the United Nations or wait for a verification process regarding the regime’s use of chemical weapons will take time and delay action, thereby exacerbating existing problems, whether inside Syria or involving anti-American sentiment in the region.

Hamid says the idea that the international community can nurture a perfect Syrian opposition before committing to military action is misguided. He says the fighting forces in Syria are not primarily secularist, and more accurately reflect varying shades of Islamism. Hamid points out extremists tend to gain prominence during situations of war because they generally have better access to weapons and support, and that in Syria these extremists have already come to the fore.

Considering radicalization and rising levels of anti-American sentiment inside Syria, Hamid notes there is an issue of American credibility at stake not just in Syria but in the broader region. Hamid says American intervention in Syria will show the United States sides with the Syrian people and will make a difference in the longer-term of American-Middle Eastern relations. Hamid suggests the world, including Syrians, still look to the United States for moral and political leadership.

Hamid says the American public is historically receptive to foreign policy action in light of humanitarian crises. If the Obama administration wanted to explain the Syrian case clearly, Hamid suggests there would likely be public willingness for American engagement. However, Hamid also says the Obama administration has demonstrated it does not want to get involved in Syria and has a lot of wiggle room to avoid following up on prior-delineated “red lines” on the use of chemical weapons.

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Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: NPR

Is Obama’s Red Line a Green Light?

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime was finally blown open last week. In a letter to U.S. lawmakers, the White House stated that U.S. intelligence agencies believed "with varying degrees of confidence" that Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on a "small scale." The letter followed others sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by Britain and France alleging the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and similar assessments by Israeli military intelligence in the last few weeks.

Still, President Barack Obama's administration sounded a cautious note. Asked whether Assad crossed the "red line" Obama drew last year that could spur American intervention, a U.S. official replied, "we're not there yet." The White House continues to contend that the evidence is not "airtight," and that it needs further corroboration. In meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on Friday, Obama stated that "there are a range of questions around how, when, where these weapons may have been used."

While these are important questions, especially a decade after the intelligence failure in Iraq, the evidence already gathered by Western countries from inside Syria provides significant evidence of chemical-weapons use by the Assad regime. Here is what I have learned about the regime's use -- and logic for the use -- of chemical weapons over the past six months.

The Assad regime's scientists have been experimenting for more than a year with mixtures of toxic and poisonous gasses that could be used to "cleanse areas" of what it calls "terrorists" -- the rebel forces it is fighting. Its security and military apparatus has sought to devise methods to use artillery shells or aircraft to deliver chemical weapons in "localized ways" -- in areas of one or one and a half square kilometers.

The regime's logic was that the relentless bombardment of rebel-controlled areas, including in the neighborhoods around the main cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, had forced most civilians to leave. Civilian casualties, in this warped thinking, could therefore be kept to a minimum if chemical weapons were used in these areas. This was important if the regime was to avoid the attention of the international community, especially the United States, which clearly did not want to intervene in Syria.

I first heard this frightening information in the late summer and fall of last year. It came from a small number of privileged Syrians who often travelled to and from Damascus. I had gotten to know and trust them, especially as their information was often corroborated later by other sources and events. All spoke often to current and former senior security officers and regime personalities from the Assad regime's feared security forces, including the presidential guard, Syrian military intelligence, and Syrian air force intelligence -- people they had known in some cases since childhood.

Listening to them, it was clear to me that the regime had the intention to use these horrendous weapons -- and that it would do so as it came under further pressure in key strategic areas, especially the major cities in the west of the country.

According to my interlocutors, Assad and those closest to him had been emboldened by the international community's weak response to his bloody military campaign. The United Nations claimed in February that the death toll from the fighting in Syria was well over 70,000 people, while, during that same month, a lieutenant from Syrian military intelligence informed one of my Syrian interlocutors that the regime estimated that around 85,000 civilians had been killed, with many more thousands "missing."

Successive statements from Obama and senior U.S. officials, these interlocutors said, had been interpreted by the regime as a "green light" to continue its campaign. The exclusive focus on political and diplomatic solutions, as well as the international community's rising fear of Islamic jihadists, further reinforced the regime's belief that "the U.S. and its Western allies did not mind the current military operations," according to a retired general in Damascus. "Like any war, there are political and diplomatic efforts, while it is the winner that dictates terms in the end."

In the eyes of the regime, therefore, Obama's "red line" prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- first drawn last August, in the midst of an election campaign -- had to be tested.

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Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Obama's Strategy in the Middle East: The Blurry Red Line

Shadi Hamid — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 13:23:00 -0400

As evidence of the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons mounts, the Obama administration has further confused matters regarding its own stated "red lines." The evidence appears to be strong but not necessarily "conclusive." As the April 25th White House letter states, "the chain of custody is not clear, so we cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions." This sort of rhetoric points to an administration that finds itself cornered but, at the same time, seems intent on postponing any decisive action for as long humanly possible. The debate over whether, how, when, and to what extent lines were crossed not only seems petty (and undermines the very notion of a red line); it is also a distraction.

Presumably, the Obama administration's red-lining of chemical weapons isn't just about the risk of mass civilian casualties. After all, mass slaughter -- with over 70,000 killed -- has already happened and hasn't apparently shaken the U.S. commitment to studied inaction. The real concern is over the security implications of chemical weapon use or transport. First, the weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors, metastasizing the terror threat. Second (and related to the first), the spread of chemical weapons would lead to unprecedented regional destabilization in the form of a sharp increase in refugee flows, which, in turn, could threaten the stability of friendly autocrats like the Jordanian monarchy.

These concerns are of course justified, but the focus on security implications -- rather than focusing on the 70,000 already killed by good old-fashioned artillery and aircraft -- suggests an outdated (and morally problematic) calculus for action. In saying that chemical weapons are a red line, the Obama administration is also saying that the killing of 70,000 Syrians is not a red line, which, when you think about it, is a remarkable thing to say.

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Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The Atlantic

Syria's Use of Chemical Weapons: The Ball’s in Your Court, Mr. President

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 09:18:00 -0400

The news that Washington and London finally believe Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own people is both an opportunity and a series of traps. Both the opportunity and the traps are huge, and President Obama needs to tread carefully to quickly exploit the first and avoid the second.

Credible observers of Syria like my colleague at the Brookings Doha Center, Salman Shaikh, have been reporting since December on the evidence that Assad’s forces have used small quantities of chemical weapons in the civil war that has been raging in Syria for more than two years. Like almost everything else in Syria, Assad’s arsenal of missiles and chemical weapons are a legacy of his father Hafez Assad. After the Syrian army and air force was defeated by Israel in Lebanon in 1982, Hafez ordered development of a chemical arsenal to provide a deterrent against the Israelis. Syrian scientists developed an effective chemical weapons program using the nerve agent sarin, a substance 500 times more toxic than cyanide. In 1988, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used sarin in his war against the Iranians and in attacks on Iraqi Kurds with devastating impact.

Syria mated the nerve agent with Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. When Israeli learned of the Syrian program, it considered military action to destroy it but concluded the program was too developed and too disbursed to be susceptible to air attacks without an unacceptable risk that Syria would respond by firing chemicals into Tel Aviv, potentially killing thousands. The Syrian arsenal remains disbursed in numerous facilities making it a complex military challenge.

By using chemical weapons Assad has crossed not only an American red line but an international consensus against the use of chemical weapons that goes back to the First World War. He has given Obama the opportunity to break the Russian and Chinese diplomatic support for Syria that has paralyzed the United Nations from imposing harsh sanctions on Syria as well as a total arms embargo on the Assad regime. Washington is right to demand an immediate UN-led inspection on the ground in Syria with a very short deadline.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Syria's Humanitarian Crisis Has No End in Sight

Elizabeth Ferris, Megan Bradley and Shelly Pitterman — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Political leaders seem to be unable to bring the violence and carnage in Syria to an end. As a result, the quality of life for those who struggle to survive in the midst of this war continues to deteriorate. With more than five million displaced persons and seventy thousand casualties, the situation is devastating. Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, Elizabeth Ferris examines the growing crisis with Shelly Pitterman, the Regional Representative for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Fellow Megan Bradley.

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Syria's Humanitarian Crisis Has No End in Sight

Authors

Is Syria's Alleged Chemical Weapons Use the Tipping Point for U.S. Intervention?

Kenneth M. Pollack — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Today's admission that the U.S. Government believes that the Syrian regime has employed chemical warfare agents (chemical weapons) in its ongoing civil war places the Obama administration on the horns of a dilemma. Washington has twisted itself into the proverbial pretzel trying to avoid a deeper engagement in the Syrian civil war. Over the past two years, their excuses for inaction have multiplied and morphed in shameless fashion. They have hidden behind everything from "we can't act without Russian permission" to the president's appalling claim that he had to weigh intervention in Syria to alleviate the suffering there against the humanitarian needs of Congo—as if he were contemplating intervention there and despite the fact that he has intervened in neither country.

Nonetheless, the administration is right to be cautious about intervention in Syria. The United States could intervene—there is even a good case to be made that the U.S. and its allies could end the civil war in a positive, hopeful fashion. But doing so would require a huge effort, precisely on the scale of Iraq (as Tom Friedman has rightly warned in the New York Times) because "solving" the Syrian civil war would require an effort tantamount to the surge in Iraq—but lasting longer to prevent the slide back into civil war that we are seeing in Iraq today.

Thus, the administration is understandably wary of intervention in Syria, regardless of the poverty of the excuses it has used to justify its stance. And going after Syrian chemical warfare could create a slippery slope toward general intervention. First, Syria has a large chemical warfare infrastructure and the regime's forces have reportedly stockpiled large amounts in over a dozen locations. Taking out all of these sites—and others if the regime is able to disperse them before we can destroy them—it could require a large military effort, possibly involving the insertion of significant special operations forces and thus raising the possibility of ground battles. Military operations are inherently unpredictable and the hundreds of air sorties and hundreds or even thousands of troops that might be involved in such an effort could become the start of an escalatory spiral that the administration clearly seeks to avoid (even though it might still someday be unavoidable).

However, the Syrian regime's use of chemical warfare poses an equally vexing problem for the administration. The greatest problem is that if the regime believes that it can use chemical warfare with impunity, the war itself—and its spillover into neighboring states will become many times worse. As bad as the Syrian civil war already is, if the regime is employing chemical warfare liberally, deaths will rise and panic will soar. Refugee flows could turn into a torrent, swamping Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. Neighboring Sunni populations would become infuriated and either demand that their governments openly intervene in Syria to stop the fighting, or greatly increase the covert flow of arms, money and jihadists to the opposition. Either and both would be both probable and extremely dangerous for all of the states involved—as would any effort to resist the calls for intervention. In short, unchecked chemical warfare use could have severe repercussions for the rest of the region, and in ways that would threaten American interests.

Add to this the reputational costs of the Obama administration failing to back up its self-proclaimed "red line"—which could have an impact on Iranian thinking, or on Israeli thinking about America's commitment on Iran—and the administration faces real risks if it does nothing too.

At least for the moment, there would seem to be an easy out for the administration: the demonstration shot. The easiest move by the administration would be to pick out a valuable, discreet target of the regime's and obliterate it—with cruise missiles and possibly manned aircraft as well. The strike would be a warning to the Syrians that worse would follow if the regime does not desist from further chemical warfare use and a demonstration that Washington will back up its red line.

That seems to be the administration's obvious recourse here, but the real question then would be the Syrian regime's response. In particular if the regime backs down and does not use more chemical warfare, it will be a sign of optimism about their prospects in the civil war—that they are still more afraid of the Americans than the opposition. On the other hand, if they have become desperate, and fear defeat by the opposition more than whatever the U.S. does, they might shrug off such a limited strike and employ everything in their arsenal to try to stave off defeat. In that case, then the administration will really face a dilemma about what to do next.

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack

Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 19:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
7:30 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

On April 24, during an event honoring His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, Martin Indyk asked about Qatar's views on the Syrian crisis, the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the still unfolding Arab Awakening. The event marked Qatar's ten years of support for the Brookings Doha Center and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

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Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

indyk al thani discussion uncorrected transcript