Brookings: Topics - Lebanon

Echoes of Lebanon in Syria

Paul R. Pillar — Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Expressions of angst over Syria have entailed several themes, one of which concerns possible “spread” of the Syrian civil war into nearby states. Lebanon, for reasons of physical and ethnic geography, is most often mentioned as a locale of such spreading. But at least as useful as speculation about what the Syrian civil war may do to Lebanon is to reflect on how current events in Syria are echoing an earlier civil war in Lebanon. We have been through much of this before—thirty years ago, when Ronald Reagan was president.

By the early 1980s Lebanon had been suffering several years of combat among sectarian militias, reflecting disagreement over the fairness of old power-sharing agreements among the confessional communities. The biggest stirring of this already turbulent pot came in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. The principal Israeli targets—declared targets, at least—were fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization who had been in Lebanon ever since being kicked out of Jordan a decade earlier, after losing the Black September confrontation with King Hussein. A small multinational force of U.S., French, and Italian troops entered Lebanon in August 1982 and supervised the extraction of the PLO to Tunisia before itself withdrawing to ships in the Mediterranean.

Israeli objectives were not limited just to booting the PLO out of Lebanon, however, and Israeli forces remained enmeshed in the sectarian fighting, besieging Beirut. Menachem Begin had ideas about trying to maintain a client to the north in the form of the pro-Israeli Christian government of Bachir Gemayel, who became president about when the PLO was leaving. Three weeks later Gemayel was assassinated, triggering the most horrid blood-letting of the Lebanese war. At least several hundred—and by some outside estimates perhaps something closer to 2,000—Palestinian civilians were slaughtered in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The massacre was carried out by the Christian Phalangist militia, which was allied to and supplied by the Israelis. Israeli forces, whether wittingly or not, facilitated the massacre by maintaining a cordon around the area of the camps, and fired illuminating flares that enabled the Phalangists to continue their work by night.

The massacre stimulated the Reagan administration to organize a new multinational force that eventually included 1,800 U.S. marines as well as French and Italian troops. The force initially had some success in acting as a buffer between contending elements. But the intervention later became a textbook example of the near-inevitability of getting drawn into ever costlier commitments and endeavors in any situation as messy as Lebanon at that time. U.S. military engagement included not only the marines on the ground but also combat between carrier-based U.S. aircraft and Syrian forces (which had originally entered Lebanon as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force). At one point even the 16-inch guns of the battleship New Jersey were brought into action.

Those striking back at the increasingly resented foreign forces used methods against which jet fighters and battleships are of little use. In April 1983 a truck bomb was detonated at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 persons. Six months later, another truck bomb was used against barracks housing U.S. troops (along with an identical and simultaneous attack against French troops). 241 U.S. servicemen were killed in that bombing—the deadliest terrorist attack against U.S. citizens until 9/11. Congressional pressure on the administration to withdraw from Lebanon increased. The last U.S. forces left in February 1984. The Lebanese civil war continued for several more years until sheer exhaustion, and a new political accord brokered by Saudi Arabia and Syria, brought it to an unsatisfying end.

Some parallels between that experience and the current situation regarding Syria are obvious. There is the overall complexity of the conflict and the presence of bad guys all around. There also is Israel taking advantage of a neighboring state's civil war to pursue its own objectives, whether those are to smash a Palestinian force or to intercept long-established Hezbollah supply lines, regardless of how much its actions stoke and escalate the war. And if much of the discourse in Washington about Syria since the (presumed) Israeli attacks there over the past few days are any indication, there again is the pattern of Israeli actions increasing the chance of the United States getting sucked into the mess.

Let us hope that those eager to get into the mess will reflect more than the statesmen of 1982 did about how this all will end. Moreover, those who talk about damage to U.S. prestige or credibility also ought to think about that aspect of the experience in Lebanon. Withdrawing the U.S. troops in 1984—although it was the least bad thing the Reagan administration could have done at the time—was a U.S. defeat by Hezbollah. There is no way to sugar-coat that conclusion. It was just the sort of caving in to bad guys that we so often hear that we need to avoid. And it could have been avoided in Lebanon if the United States had not gotten involved in the mess in the first place, or at least if Israel had not—in its futile pursuit of absolute security for itself regardless of the insecurity it causes for everyone else—made the mess worse.

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Interest.

Authors

Paul R. Pillar

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Yazan Homsy / Reuters

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Lebanon and its Multiple Challenges

Thu, 31 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2013
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On January 31, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion on the state of Lebanon at a time when the country faces grave challenges from within and without. Speakers discussed Lebanon’s failing governmental institutions and the possibility of reform, as well as the long shadow cast over Lebanese politics and society by the Syrian conflict. The panel featured Ziad Baroud, former minister of interior and municipalities; Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri and former minister of finance; Ali Hamdan, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Lebanon’s Amal Movement; and Rami Rayess, spokesman of the Progressive Socialist Party and media advisor to Walid Jumblatt. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business, and media communities.

Even as the discussion opened on Lebanon’s domestic challenges — namely, costly and unreliable electricity, underdeveloped infrastructure and high unemployment — it almost immediately turned to the Syria crisis. While moderator Salman Shaikh challenged participants to address the Lebanese government’s historic failure to deliver real services to its citizens, participants were ready to defend the current government as having maintained Lebanon’s stability amid what Mohamad Chatah called a “perfect storm in the region.” Ali Hamdan stressed that Lebanon “is not an island” and that this government, led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati, came to power amid regional “turbulence.” Rami Rayess, also from the March 8 bloc, said that, given events in Syria, the government’s effort was “good enough.” Even though Chatah, of the opposition March 14 coalition, offered some stinging criticisms of the March 8 government, he nonetheless emphasized that Lebanon is “lucky” not to be at war.

When the debate delved into the real dysfunction of Lebanese politics, however, participants found blame in the very nature of Lebanon’s political system. Rayess, for instance, pointed the finger at a political community that approaches issues in the narrow terms of how its members can secure gains for their constituents. Chatah attributed that to a Lebanese system “filled with moral hazard” – a system that drives politicians and leaders to act sectarian or else risk missing a promotion or being punished by their constituents. Chatah said that this dysfunctional system could probably be traced back to the birth of Lebanon, a sentiment seconded by Hamdan, who said that since its independence, Lebanon had failed to build up a real government and concept of citizenship. The result, he said, was a level of trust that was negligible and led the country’s parties to constantly level accusations against one another. Ziad Baroud, a political independent, said that the same problems had been going on for decades but still bemoaned what he saw as a purely reactive approach to dealing with Lebanon’s worsening social and economic problems.

These systemic problems have now helped shape the debate over the law governing Lebanon’s June parliamentary elections. Baroud described a situation in which there is no stable legislation for the country’s electoral law, which means that political parties simply draft a new electoral law from which they expect to benefit. Both Baroud and Hamdan complained that Lebanon was still hashing out the same legal issues that had supposedly been resolved with the 2008 Doha Agreement. Baroud, Chatah, and Hamdan all expressed sympathy with the Christian demands for more effective representation that have underpinned the proposed “Orthodox Gathering” electoral law. Baroud said, though, that the issue was less one of numbers than of the role Christians can play in building modern Lebanon.

Rayess emphasized that the dispute over the electoral law should not be an excuse to delay elections. Lebanon has been holding elections for the past 60 years, he said, and at a time when other Arabs are making sacrifices to realize democracy at home, Lebanon cannot be seen to go backwards. If Lebanon does not go to elections, Baroud asked, who guarantees that the country’s system will not collapse? And if it does, who guarantees that the country will get another system – and at what price?

In part, these fundamental issues return to disparate readings of the country’s constitution and what Chatah referred to as its “constructive ambiguity.” Both Chatah and Rayess pointed to the establishment of a bicameral system, with a Lebanese senate alongside its parliament, as a possible way out of the country’s political deadlock. Hamdan warned against a reliance on quick fixes. He said that the country’s problem lay in the selective implementation of the Taif Accord, which itself calls for the eventual establishment of a senate. Baroud said that, whether the solution was a senate or anything else, the real challenge lay in establishing mechanisms to “make diversity function” in Lebanon.

Of course, the discussion was not without some partisan back-and-forth. Chatah in particular made some sharp allegations against the country’s March 8 government. The government, he said, had come to power after its predecessor was toppled by the threat of force and sectarian war, and government figures had repeatedly shielded the assassins (attempted or otherwise) of March 14 leaders. He pointed to the assassination of Wisam al-Hassan, who had just uncovered an alleged Syrian plot to assassinate prominent Christian and Sunni leaders, as what finally forced March 14 to withdraw from any negotiations or dialogue.

Hamdan nonetheless called for a return to the national dialogue that began in 2006, a dialogue that has lately centered on Lebanon’s national defense strategy – that is, state authority over Hizballah’s arms. Even though Hamdan agreed that the dialogue had yet to show solid results, he said that even if the Lebanese wasted time in dialogue, it was better than boycotting. Rayess also thought that national dialogue is a necessary exercise and should be kept open at all costs. While he expressed appreciation for Hizballah’s liberation of Lebanese land from Israeli occupation, he said that the state had to monopolize military power. The faster Lebanon built a consensus on a national defense strategy, he said, the sooner it could build capabilities to confront Israeli aggression. Chatah, however, rejected Lebanon’s national dialogue as essentially pointless; the dialogue could only go in circles, he said, given that Hizballah’s sole objective was to maintain the status quo. He called the dialogue a “sham” and a “charade,” complaining that Hizballah’s “declared” strategic link with Iran means that Lebanese are left to wait for their next war, one whose timing will be decided by others. Still, Baroud said that the dialogue seemed to be the only remaining political alternative. He said that some factions had made the mistake of thinking they could defeat others outright; consensus, he stressed, is “how Lebanon functions.”

The conversation eventually returned to the Syria crisis, which Hamdan described as “the greatest threat” to Lebanon in its history. He praised the June 2012 “Baabda Declaration,” according to which Lebanon announced a clear policy of “disassociation” or “positive neutralism.” As he put it, the Lebanese have no other choice; Lebanon can do nothing to affect the situation in Syria, while the war’s spread into Lebanon would consume the country.

For his part, Chatah was willing to take sides – rhetorically. Those socially and ethnically closest to the Syrian people in Lebanon, he said, were among the foremost adversaries of the regime. He said that some in Lebanon, and in the North in particular, had been subjected to the sort of bombing and killing 25 years ago that can be seen in Syria today. Syria’s Lebanese allies, meanwhile, are those with a “strategic link” with the Syrian regime. Chatah nonetheless emphasized, in the same terms as Hamdan, that Lebanon should not be involved in Syria; he praised the Baabda Declaration, saying it was “historic” and should be enshrined in the country’s constitution.”

Participants voiced fears, however, that Baabda might not be enough, or that some were willing to flout it. Rayess warned that the commitment of the document had to be reinforced, as the presence of Lebanese fighters in Syria and other provocations like Hizballah’s Ayoub drone had threatened to destabilize the situation. Chatah likewise warned that sending fighters or amassing weapons for Syriainside Lebanon could only put the country in harm’s way.

At the time of this discussion, the previous night’s Israeli airstrike on a Syrian target had only complicated the Syria situation. Chatah, the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime among the participants, said that Lebanese were without exception against the Israeli action. If Israel thinks it can buy credibility with the Syrian rebels, he said, it is wrong. Hamdan complained of daily Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, land, and sea, and warned that Israel was waiting for the weakening and division of Arab power so it could act again. Chatah discounted the possibility that the Israeli air attack on Syria was a signal of a broader campaign, as, in his reading, Israeli “aggression” is never declared or signaled in advance. Still, he said, the Israeli action drove home the need for the Lebanese to be united on this issue.

When asked about how the international community could help Lebanon, answers differed. Chatah said that the influence of the international community has “waned” and that there is “a lot of exaggeration” of the impact of international action. Still, he flagged Lebanese calls for international technical assistance in monitoring the country’s Syria border, but said that such help was hamstrung by strong opposition from Hizballah. Baroud reiterated Lebanese requests for international funding assistance in absorbing the country’s new refugee burden, and Rayess said that dealing with the humanitarian situation is the best way to preserve Lebanon’s stability.

In the diplomatic realm, Hamdan asked that the international community not adopt a double standard in dealing with Israel and its Arab neighbors, and Baroud and Hamdan warned against plans for a “new Sykes-Picot” that would divide Syria and the wider region. Rayess called for international consensus on the June 2012 Geneva agreement, while Chatah asked that the international community affirm and act on Lebanon’s declaration of neutrality. If the world treats Lebanon as a staging ground for Syria’s war, he said, the country will be in grave trouble.

Among those who spoke at the event’s end was special guest Miguel Moratinos, former foreign minister of Spain. He said that, after 20 years of dealing with Lebanon, he was optimistic for the country. There was no comparing the Lebanon of today with the Lebanon of 15, or even five, years ago, according to Moratinos; he could not imagine the Lebanon of previous years not being totally engulfed by the Syria issue. He expressed his hopes that the Syria crisis would be a moment for the Lebanese to take their destiny in their own hands; this time, he said, the Lebanese could have a dialogue in Beirut, not Doha or Taif.

This sort of forward-looking change may need to start now. As Chatah pointed out, in the coming decade Lebanon faces two milestones: the centennial of its founding in 2020 and the first returns from the country’s Mediterranean natural gas reserves. If Lebanon sees a huge influx of money into a government that continues to be dysfunctional or corrupt, real reform may be put off indefinitely. The Lebanese people’s ability to come together over the next few years, then, stands to determine whether Lebanon begins its second century with political change or with more of the same.

Women After the Arab Awakening: Making Change

Thu, 25 Oct 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 25, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Women played an integral role in the Arab uprisings, and the continued empowerment of women will be critical to the emergence of democracy in the region. Gender rights and women’s equality are among the most consequential and controversial issues facing newly elected governments across the Arab world. Some fear that the election of Islamist parties will turn back the clock on women’s rights, but others see more open politics as a new opportunity for efforts to achieve equality in the Arab world. How has the Arab awakening affected the women of the region? How are activists and politicians seeking progress for women in this uncertain and evolving landscape?

On October 25, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, with Vital Voices Global Partnership and the Project on Middle East Democracy, will host activists from Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan who are advocating for women’s rights in a variety of ways: combating child marriage, working to repeal gender-discriminatory laws, promoting gender equality in the new Egyptian constitution, and protecting the rights of women workers. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.

After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.

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Syria: The Crisis, the Rebels, and the Endgame

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

PBS Frontline turned to 10 experts — Syrian activists, journalists who have reported from the country’s dangerous front lines, and analysts who specialize in the region — to explain the long-term impacts of Syria’s deadly conflict. Below, you will find Salman Shaikh’s excerpts from the Frontline piece.

There are reports that thousands of the country’s Alawites are fleeing regions with bigger Alawi populations like Latakia and Tartous. Some have even speculated the eventual formation of an Alawite state in these coastal areas as an option of last resort. What are the prospects for some sort of a separate Alawite refuge in Syria as the conflict continues?

I don’t believe that there is a realistic prospect for a retreat of Alawi communities to the mountainous areas of northwest Syria, as some have suggested. Over the course of the last 80 years or so, Alawi communities have become increasingly urbanized and no longer represent a unified, geographically distinct bloc.

What is more, I am unconvinced that most Alawis would choose to follow the regime rather than stay where they are if the Assads do retreat to their traditional base. Increasing numbers of Alawis are already in touch with the opposition — at great risk to their safety — seeking the sort of reassurances that will encourage them to abandon the regime.

What are the longer-term regional ramifications of the Syrian refugee crisis?

These figures point to the reality of what is a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis. Those refugees join millions of others across the region – some of who have been tragically without a permanent home for decades. These refugees can also represent a huge strain on local communities, and are likely to affect the security and stability of neighboring states.

Syria has five of the most sensitive borders in the world and instability on those borders represents a dangerous development. We face the prospect of increasing terrorism and insecurity in Turkey, the reigniting of sectarian conflict in Lebanon, a further uptick in Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq, and even the possibility that Israel’s northern borders will be challenged or compromised.

When the Syrian uprising first broke out, there were many who predicted it would be mere months before President Assad’s regime fell. A year and a half later, and a slew of failed international efforts to resolve the crisis, the regime is still intact. What’s behind its survival, and what would it take to end the conflict?

In the absence of a united international will to pressure and isolate Bashar al-Assad, his regime was always likely to last longer than some expected. At the outset, many assumptions were based on the eventual alignment of international powers behind a transition of power — particularly once the Arab League had backed that course. Alongside the impotence of a divided U.N. Security Council, the regime was able to benefit from the direct support of reliable allies in Iran and Russia.

On the other side, those in the international community that have called for an end to Assad’s rule have not shown the political will to adopt some of the tougher options in support for Syrians striving for that goal on the ground.

In addition to financial and other sanctions targeted towards regime figures, the U.S. and other Western allies have — at least until very recently — largely relied on a fruitless diplomatic course centered on shifting Russia and China’s stance.

In the meantime, the Assad regime’s brutal campaign against protestors – civil and armed – has been calibrated to make the most of this diplomatic back-and-forth. While its modus operandi has always been fear, intimidation, and violence, the regime has gradually escalated the severity of its onslaught in a way that allowed it to maintain the degree international support necessary for its survival.

At this point in the conflict, is a diplomatic or negotiated political solution still possible?

Competition between rebel groups for arms, money, and influence is becoming an uncomfortable reality in key areas of the country. This is a trend, which is likely to continue absent a greater effort to organize and influence the armed opposition.

… State Department officials have recently been engaged in impressive efforts to encourage opposition consensus on a common vision for the future of the country. Washington must now also redouble its efforts to familiarize itself with the military dimension of the opposition – as it has indeed begun to do.

Meanwhile, the U.S. should continue to directly target the core elements of the regime — now stripped to a handful of families and a cadre of Alawi security officers — in order to encourage their abandonment from the regime. Increased pressure, and threats of legal action in international courts should be accompanied by incentives offered to those willing to turn on Assad.

Read the full set of interviews at PBS.org »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: PBS Frontline

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

The Arab Revolutions, Political Islam, and Democratic Transitions

Wed, 29 Feb 2012 18:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 29, 2012
6:00 PM - 7:30 PM EST

The Brookings Doha Center

Doha, Qatar

On February 29, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion with Gilles Kepel, professor at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP) and research director for France’s National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). Professor Kepel’s address focused on the large-scale dynamics of the Arab Awakenings, with particular focus on the impact of changes in the region on the role of Islam in the political arena. The event, which was followed by a question and answer session, was moderated by Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, and attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic, and media communities.

Kepel began his remarks by explaining that the recent uprisings in the Arab world have had varying trajectories in different parts of the Middle East. He noted that all successful revolutions have been in North Africa, while attempts at revolution in the Arabian Peninsula were stalled, and it remains to be seen what effects the uprisings will have on the Levant. Kepel then divided the Middle East into three subregions, which he dubbed Zone A (North Africa), Zone B (Arabian Peninsula), and Zone C (the Levant).

Zone A, Kepel said, is unique because it is the area where the first successful revolutions took place. That region is distinct, he said, because domestic issues there are more important than international ones. For example, even when change came to Egypt, a key player in the Arab-Israeli system, the revolution was perceived by the outside world as a development that could be absorbed by the international system. Kepel went on to distinguish countries in Zone A as having a fair degree of national cohesion – especially in comparison with the states of the Levant. In Libya, he said, in spite of the country’s tribal divisions, the revolutionary process itself had engineered a significant degree of national cohesion. Kepel went on to say that revolutions could take place in Zone A largely because that change they were not perceived as a threat to the global order. In fact, some outside actors even welcomed these revolutions both for ideological reasons, as they supported democracy, as well as from a strategic point of view.

Kepel began his description of Zone B by stressing that changes in the Gulf have a global impact given the region’s critical importance to the global petrol supply. Therefore, regime change in Zone B is considered far more dangerous than elsewhere. For instance, the uprising in Bahrain provoked fears of upheaval in global markets and the political order. Indeed, despite the fact that they did not use Shi’i language and stressed their cause as Bahraini, the revolutionaries were widely seen as “stooges of the Iranian Republic.” When the uprising was then quashed by the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, international reaction was muted, as many feared the global effects of genuine revolution in the Gulf. Yemen, the other country in the Gulf experiencing a widespread uprising, was on the verge of disintegration. Ultimately, however, the GCC stepped in with a political solution to the crisis, as neighboring countries and other powers have a critical stake in keeping unrest in Yemen within Yemeni borders.

Zone C, Kepel explained, could be distinguished by the deep sectarian and ethnic divisions in the societies in the Levant. This subregion, Kepel noted, was deeply scarred by Lebanon’s civil war. Today, then, the possibility of the fall of Bashar al-Asad in Syria is measured against the fact that this might unleash a bloody civil war. Indeed, one main challenge to the Syrian opposition is whether the group would be able to deliver social peace in the event of Asad’s ouster. Asad himself is playing on this fear both internationally and domestically. In fact, it is this fear, Kepel contended, that has prevented the elites of Aleppo and Damascus from withdrawing support from the regime. Because Iran and Israel are located in this Zone, the explosion of neighboring Syria will change the balance of power. Syria, Kepel said, is “to some extent the linchpin of the Middle East system politically – as much as the Arabian Peninsula is its lynchpin financially and economically.” At the moment, he explained, Arabs are split on the issue of Syria. Some consider Western support for the opposition evidence that the uprising is a plot of American imperialism and Zionism. Others, however, see the need to oust Asad as a means of diminishing Iranian power in the region.

Kepel next described the recent revolutions as having three phases. The first, he said, included events that proved to be starting points, such as the self immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi and uprising of Sidi Bouzid, the arrest of lawyers in Benghazi, the assassination of Khalid Said, and repression in Deraa. During this phase, certain actions crystallized latent tensions. These events played off popular discontent, since social conditions had significantly worsened in the region in recent years. Originally, these first phases of revolt had very little to do politically with Islamists of any kind, he noted.

Kepel described the second phase as that of elections, in which Islamists, primarily of the Muslim Brotherhood have been successful. Phase three, he explained, is the post-election period. During that time, those who have succeeded at the ballots must now deliver socially and economically. Al-Nahda in Tunisia in particular is already facing this pressure, as unemployment has increased and prices have risen. Meanwhile, Kepel described a “tripod of power in Egypt: the army, parliament, and the square.” Tahrir Square, Kepel said, had originally been the source of revolutionary legitimacy though this was hijacked, he claimed, to some extent by the Muslim Brotherhood, who have the popular legitimacy of the ballots. Kepel stressed that the Brotherhood will be forced to deliver when control is ceded by the military – in particular as Egypt faces the threat of bankruptcy in a matter of weeks.

Kepel ended his remarks by stating that two issues are of great concern for the immediate future. The first is that of the GCC-Iranian tension and its link to Syria. If the Syrian system breaks down, Iran will clearly have less leverage in the Levant and Arab world more broadly. This, Kepel asserted, may therefore be seen by Israel as an opportunity to strike Iran, which would have massive global consequences. The second is the social issue. Tunisia and Egypt are already feeling enormous economic pressures, and the new regimes’ ability to deal with such issues will be a litmus test for the very near future and harbinger for future tensions.

Following Kepel’s remarks, the question and answer session covered a range of issues, including the role of Al Qaeda in the revolutionary Middle East, the emergence of extra-regional powers on the Middle Eastern stage, and Israel’s stance on the Arab Awakenings. Moderator Salman Shaikh began by asking whether the success of Islamists at the ballot box could be explained by the fact that they were the best organized parties or whether their success connoted increased religiosity in the post-revolutionary era. Kepel answered that astute autocrats like Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar al-Qadhafi remained in power largely by exploiting the threat of radical Islam, while moderate Islamists garnered support on the ground. Once the autocrats were ousted, Islamist parties remained the only other political force, and “a re-Islamization of society at a basic level made their political language palatable.” People feel deeply religious, Kepel stated, and Islamists were using language they understood.

Another question concerned what parties would come to power if mainstream Islamists fail to meet social and economic needs of the post-revolutionary countries. Kepel answered that the rise of the Salafis is a significant trend in post-revolutionary North Africa. This is surprising, he noted, as Salafis originally did not support the revolution, at least in Egypt. The Salafi vote in Egypt is now economic vote, with most of their support coming from among the poorest communities. He stated that the extent of the Salafis’ electoral success was an embarrassment for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It remains to be seen, however, to what degree Salafi movements will attempt to apply whatever religious or social agendas they have, or whether they will act more as opposition parties.

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Gilles Kepel

Professor at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP)
Research director for France’s National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Hezbollah's Triumph and Agony in Lebanon

Bruce Riedel — Sat, 23 Jul 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Few terrorist groups ever succeed in taking over a country. The Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah has done so this year, but at its moment of triumph it faces the most severe challenges it has ever faced.

Hezbollah, or the Party of God, was created in 1982 by Syrian and Iranian intelligence agents after one of Israel’s invasions of Lebanon. It rapidly gained support among the angry and downtrodden Shia community, which had been at the bottom of Lebanon’s archaic political and economic system for decades. Hezbollah suicide bombers blew up the U.S. Marine and French paratrooper headquarters in October 1983, driving America and Europe out of Lebanon. Then they waged a long and difficult war against Israel until it too left in defeat in 2000. Another bloody war with Israel ended just five years ago in a stalemate. Along the way Hezbollah held dozens of foreigners hostage, murdered a CIA station chief, hijacked airliners, and blew up Israeli targets as far away as Argentina.

But it also became a political party in Lebanon and gradually acquired more and more political power. In 2008 it flexed its military power by briefly taking over most of Beirut for a few days, then drew back to let the message sink in that Hezbollah can do what it likes. This year the party succeeded in getting its candidate for prime minister, Najib Mikati, selected, and it now effectively dominates the government.

It has an arsenal of thousands of rockets and missiles aimed at Israel. Its leaders claim they can hit any city in Israel, even the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Without doubt it can fire into Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel’s two large cities on the Mediterranean Sea.

At this moment of success, however, the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon has delivered sealed indictments and arrest warrants to the Lebanese government for the arrest of four Hezbollah members wanted for the murder of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005.

At the top of the list is Mustafa Badreddine, one of the most notorious terrorists in the world. He is cousin and brother-in-law to Imad Mughniyah, who died in a car bomb in Damascus in 2008. Mughniyah is infamous for his decades of terror attacks. Together the two planned and executed the attacks on the Marines and French paratroopers in 1983, and then car bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait later that year. Badreddine was captured and imprisoned in Kuwait for those attacks.

For the next decade and a half Hezbollah tried to get him freed by hijacking airplanes and kidnapping hostages in Lebanon. Finally he got out when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and opened the jails. With Iranian assistance he got back to Lebanon. He is said now to have taken over Mughniyah’s job of running Hezbollah's external-operations branch and is a member of its ruling shura council.

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has accused the UN tribunal of being an American and Israeli conspiracy against Lebanon. Hezbollah has made it clear it will not cooperate with the judicial process and will prevent the Lebanese government from doing so as well. The government is supposed to arrest the four suspects by the end of July so they can stand trial in The Hague. If they are not turned over, the trial will take place without them.

An even more dangerous challenge for Hezbollah is the revolution next door in Syria. The Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad is in deep, probably fatal trouble. Four months of demonstrations have isolated the Assad regime and wreaked havoc on the economy; and despite violent repression, the protests are getting bigger and bigger. With the advent of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in August, the unrest is certain to get even more intense.

Under Hafez Assad, Hezbollah was created; under his son Bashar, it has matured. Without Syrian help the group would never have become the monster it is today. The deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah and one of its founders, Sheik Naim Qassem, wrote in 2007 that Syria is “the cornerstone” of Hezbollah's survival in the region. While there are differences between Syria and Hezbollah, he said the relationship is a “necessity” for Hezbollah.

Worse, the next Syrian government is likely to be dominated by the Sunni majority in the country, not the Alawi minority that the Assads come from. A Sunni Syrian regime, especially one heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, will be a fierce enemy of Shia Hezbollah, particularly after it has been exposed as the assassin of the popular Sunni former prime minister Hariri. Both Iran and Hizbullah will lose their most important ally in the Arab world.

Hezbollah will still dominate Lebanon and will still have its Iranian benefactor. It will remain the best armed terrorist group in the world. But it will now face international isolation, a UN-driven judicial process, and a hostile neighbor next door. Hezbollah knows well how easy it is to destabilize Lebanon from a base in Syria; soon it may be on the receiving end of the very process that made it triumphant.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Hezbollah's Power Play in Lebanon

Shibley Telhami — Thu, 13 Jan 2011 13:15:00 -0500

Once again, Lebanon faces an internal crisis, generated by the collapse of the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri (who followed in his father Rafik’s footsteps after his assassination) following the withdrawal of Hezbollah and its allies from the coalition. Mr. Hariri will continue to head a caretaker government until a new one is constituted, but his ability to maneuver in the meanwhile, let alone govern, will be vastly reduced. More importantly, he will be facing immediate and uncomfortable choices. In this crisis, Hezbollah has been the key driver.

With all the risks for everyone involved, Hezbollah has retained the upper hand, even as the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister is under review at a UN tribunal. The demographics inside Lebanon are on the side of its Shia base. The internal distribution of power is also decidedly in its favor. Politically, Hezbollah managed to assert itself in both the previous ruling coalition and the current March 14 coalition by exercising its military superiority in the confrontations of 2008. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah continues to be among the most popular in the Arab world—with his opponents looking weaker by the day through the continuous revelations coming out of WikiLeaks. Expected new releases about the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict are likely to play into Hezbollah’s hands in the war over Arab public opinion as well.

Read the full article at nationalinterest.org »

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Sharif Karim / Reuters

From Tribunal to Turbulence: Lebanon and the Middle East's Multiple Challenges

Wed, 20 Oct 2010 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 20, 2010
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Doha
The Brookings Doha Center

Doha, Qatar

On October 20, 2010, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion at the Diplomatic Club with Rami Khouri, director of the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and editor-at-large of The Daily Star. The talk dealt with the political turmoil facing Lebanon, as the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon prepares its indictments on the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri. The event, which was followed by a lively question and answer session, was moderated by Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, and was attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic, and media communities.

Khouri began his discussion by addressing the tribunal, explaining that it has set off “political fireworks” in Lebanon and may force the country to confront a number of latent political issues. In Khouri’s eyes, the challenges Lebanon faces are “a reflection of trends throughout the region.” The crisis in Lebanon mirrors a new configuration of power emerging across the Middle East. He delineated “three and a half” main arbiters of power in the region: the monarchy, representing political authority, the mosque, representing religious, cultural, and tribal identities, and the market, representing economic forces, as well as the media. These factors, which operate locally and on the regional level, are all evolving at the same time. In Khouri’s view, “Lebanon is the best microcosm we have of all the forces at play.” Khouri sees in the current Lebanese crisis “extraordinary dynamism,” which could prove to be productive or destructive depending on how it is handled.

Khouri also outlined five underlying issues at play in both Lebanon and the broader region. First, countries are facing the question of implementation and organization of constitutional power-sharing agreements. Second, the issue of identity is being confronted on the individual, collective, national, and transnational levels. Third, relations between Arab and non-Arab governments are being affected by three main non-Arab players: Israel, Iran, and the United States with its Western allies. Fourth, governments are seeking to maintain stability and sustainable socio-economic development. Fifth, the question of the relationship between the citizen and the state, particularly the role of the rule of law, has grown in importance.

These five challenges represent great hurdles or extraordinary opportunities, or both. Indeed, Khouri noted that the current turbulence may be an indication that the people, institutions, and governments of the Arab world are seriously grappling with the issues of identity, sovereignty, legitimacy, statehood, and human dignity for the first time since the 1930s. Furthermore, with the waning of American influence, we are seeing “for the first time in Arab history… a certain balance of power that is heavily indigenous.” Actors are being forced to devise local solutions, reflecting what Khouri dubbed “the birth of Arab politics.” This renewal can be seen most clearly in open states such as Lebanon but is also evident in countries like Egypt. With that in mind, Khouri argued that the region may very well be at a crossroads: “In most places, countries are in a position to make a transition from a legacy of authoritarianism to a more pluralistic mechanism.”

In his concluding remarks, Khouri returned to the subject of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s forthcoming indictments, calling it a “moment of reckoning,” as well as a an opportunity for Lebanon and other Arab countries to prove their ability to address issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, and governance. He also views the tribunal as an indicator of the likelihood of a resolution to the three great conflicts in the region: Arab-Israeli, Iranian-Arab, and Middle East-United States. In Khouri’s view, then, this is a “crucial moment,” at which the Lebanese will choose either the relative stability of the status quo or justice that may lead to political change but possibly at the cost of renewed civil conflict. He added that “nobody knows” which way the country will go.

Following Khouri’s presentation, the question and answer session covered a range of issues, including the effect of political instability in Lebanon on the situation in Iraq, its possible impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the role of outside powers in Lebanon and the region. Moderator Salman Shaikh asked about Syria’s role in the region in the context of America’s waning influence and the emergence of new powers. Khouri answered that Syria is “the most important political actor in the Middle East right now,” as it is the only nation linked to every conflict and major player in the region. In fact, Khouri dubbed Syria, along with Iran and Turkey, examples of a new phenomenon. They are all predominantly Muslim Middle Eastern countries which are resistant to the status quo and willing to confront the West, which is uncertain about how to handle these new types of states. The key, Khouri explained, is not to look at Syria vis-à-vis its relationship with Lebanon, but rather as a “master of political engagement in the region.”

One audience member asked how much influence the Special Tribunal’s findings would have on the situation in Lebanon, as the court does not have the ability to make arrests. Khouri responded that the tribunal represents political consensus in the Security Council and was supported unanimously. However, despite strong international support, the tribunal may not have immediate on-the-ground effect; after all, the indicted Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir still sits in power.

Another audience member asked whether the involvement of external actors would decrease only when the Lebanese domestic situation stabilizes and internal forces are united. Khouri explained that Lebanon has sought outside support since the 1870s. Therefore, issues of statehood, legitimacy, and sovereignty have never been fully defined. There is no concrete view on what the relationship is or should be between citizen and state. These issues are only being grappled with now, thus signaling that the coming period will be a critical and perhaps unprecedented one for Lebanon and the rest of the region.

Audio

From Tribunal to Turbulence: Lebanon and the Middle East's Multiple Challenges

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

1020_lebanon_transcript

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Rami Khouri

Director, Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy
Editor, The Daily Star

A More Viable U.S. Strategy for Lebanon

Bilal Saab — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 14:57:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States should adopt a new approach toward Lebanon if it wishes to secure its interests in that country and in the broader Middle East. The 1983 attack against the U.S. Marines in Lebanon was the beginning of the end of the United States’ involvement in Lebanon. Since then, with the exception of a brief period during the George W. Bush administration, there has been a strong sentiment in Washington that the price of U.S. engagement is too high, and that problems in Lebanon are not threatening to American strategic interests in the Middle East. Even when Lebanon’s problems boiled over on several occasions and threatened to engulf other parts of the region in conflict, the United States still assumed it could treat these problems on the cheap. When the United States did engage during the George W. Bush administration, it did so inconsistently, without a sense of purpose, and without a long-term plan in mind, thus undermining not only Lebanon’s stability, but also U.S. interests in the region.

The core of a new, effective U.S. strategy toward Lebanon should entail a clear understanding by Washington of what is at stake and what it will take to achieve success. The United States has gotten it wrong in Lebanon over the years because it misdiagnosed its own interests there and misunderstood the implications of Lebanon’s problems for U.S. policies.

There are three main reasons why Washington should pay closer attention to Lebanon and help it address its problems while nurturing its assets: One, Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty uphold U.S. geopolitical interests in the Middle East by denying U.S. adversaries—Iran and Syria—the ability to exploit Lebanon to improve their strategic positions in the region at the expense of the United States and its allies. Two, an internally secure and strong Lebanon that is capable of fixing or defusing its own problems boosts U.S. security interests in the Middle East and those of its ally, Israel. Three, the United States has a strategic interest in supporting democratic countries and in strengthening democratic institutions around the world. The fact that Lebanon is a democracy (even if imperfect) with liberal impulses that plays an important cultural-intellectual role in the region, but is surrounded by neighbors who are outright hostile to it should be an American concern.

The United States’ past experiences and setbacks in Lebanon furnish a number of useful lessons that should guide the formulation of a new U.S. strategy toward Lebanon:

• The United States should strike the right balance between immediate needs and longterm interests.

• Washington should take concrete diplomatic action to prevent Israel from using excessive force against Lebanon during times of military confrontation with Hizballah, as largescale punitive operations by Israel against Lebanon are counterproductive and undermine American interests in Lebanon.

• The United States should not intervene militarily to support one Lebanese camp over another. Doing so would deepen Lebanese political polarization, exacerbate existing communal cleavages, and jeopardize the entire U.S. approach.

• The United States should not use Lebanon as a battlefield against regional adversaries or as a bargaining chip in regional diplomacy. Doing so would further destabilize the country.

• Washington should implement a policy that contains Hizballah. No U.S. policy in Lebanon can succeed without an effective containment strategy for Hizballah, the single most powerful political and military actor in the country.

Because Lebanon has internal problems, such as a weak central authority, as well as external problems, such as excessive intervention in its domestic affairs by outside forces, any new U.S. policy toward Lebanon should contain a local component and a regional component. The local part of a new U.S. strategy should entail assisting Lebanon in bolstering its internal strength and stability. While USAID has already made strong contributions to strengthening Lebanese state capacity, Washington should focus on investing in the building of a strong, modern Lebanese national military and security apparatus. Indeed, no area in Lebanon’s state apparatus deserves more urgent attention by Washington than the Lebanese Armed Forces. The current Lebanese military is incapable of assuming the responsibility of defending the country from major internal and external threats, given the small size of its budget and poorly trained and badly equipped combat force. Therefore, because security in Lebanon is in short supply, all attempts at reform and state building will suffer and remain incomplete unless security is achieved.

The regional part of a new American strategy toward Lebanon should address the problem of external intervention. While Hizballah is a product of Lebanon’s internal weakness (the Lebanese state has been historically unable to address the political, security, and socio-economic needs of Lebanese Shi’ah), it is also the product of Iran’s and Syria’s interventions in Lebanese domestic politics. Indeed, Lebanon would have been able to more effectively limit external intervention in its affairs if it were not for Hizballah’s links to Damascus, and especially, Tehran. Washington’s goal, therefore, should be to take diplomatic measures that help turn Hizballah into a purely local actor and end its active involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The “Syrian solution” to the Hizballah challenge (asking Syria to reign in Hizballah) should be a non-starter because its record is bleak and its price tag is high. Indeed, not only did Damascus fail to contain Hizballah when Syria was militarily present in Lebanon (1990-2005), it also harmed Lebanese democracy by maintaining a tight grip over Lebanese politics. A Syrian solution should be even more unappealing to Washington today because President Bashar al-Asad has repeatedly stated that it is in his country’s interest to pursue policies that seek to bolster, as opposed to weaken, Hizballah.

The United States should also forgo military approaches to declaw Hizballah. Israel’s 2006 war shows (as do its previous military actions in Lebanon) that any strategy aimed at militarily destroying Hizballah—short of waging a total war against Lebanon as a whole, which would ignite a regional conflict—would likely fail and backfire. Equally important, any U.S. or Israeli military approach to the Hizballah challenge would significantly undermine other U.S. and Israeli interests in Lebanon by weakening the country and possibly causing further political breakdown and disintegration.

Only Iran, which has long invested in and nurtured Hizballah, is in a position to exert control over the group. Therefore, the United States has a good chance of localizing and taming Hizballah by engaging in direct talks with Iran. However, Washington should realize that Iran will never accept demands to disarm Hizballah (in any event, only the Lebanese people can disarm Hizballah). The most it would do is instruct it to discontinue its regional role and adopt a more compromising posture toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

While it is true that a U.S.-Iranian understanding that includes an agreement on Hizballah would not eliminate Syria’s influence in Lebanon (perhaps nothing would), it can significantly limit it. The main reason why Hizballah has defended Syrian interests in Lebanon over the years is because Syria sends arms to the group and facilitates weapons shipments that come from Iran, making it possible for Hizballah to be a regional, rather than a local, actor. However, if Iran were to instruct Hizballah to discontinue its regional role and armed struggle against Israel, the group would no longer need to receive weapons from Syria and would no longer feel obliged to defend Syrian interests in Lebanon. Instead, it would focus on its local interests, Islamist agenda, and role in Lebanese politics.

Yet, a strategy that reduces Syrian influence in Lebanon would not address the Palestinian issue in Lebanon. Only an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement that successfully tackles the future of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (and elsewhere) would solve Lebanon’s refugee problem.

In order for the United States to protect its interests in Lebanon, it will have to break from its past policies and look at Lebanon in a truly different light.

Implementing a new U.S. strategy for Lebanon would be a difficult task, given the country’s many internal and external complexities, but it is a challenge worth pursuing. The opportunity for a more principled and consistent American approach in Lebanon, one that benefits Lebanon and advances both American interests and ideals still exists, but the recent drums of war in the region serve as a stark reminder that the opportunity may not be around for much longer.

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Authors

Bilal Saab

Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the Middle East

Mary Kraetsch and Samantha Constant — Tue, 15 Jun 2010 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an effort to shed light on the challenges that youth continue to face in the Middle East, Samantha Constant and Mary Kraetsch have created an interactive map and corresponding fact sheets that provide key statistics associated with youth issues for all 18 countries in the Middle East. In the accompanying note, they provide an overview of the data and their main findings.

Click to view the interactive map »

Click on an individual country in the map to view the country fact sheet, which includes key statistics related to that country’s economy, demographics, education and youth employment status.

Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the Middle East

The Middle East is at a demographic turning point. Many countries in the region are reaching the peak of their ‘youth bulges,’ meaning that the share of young people in the country’s total population will soon begin to decrease. At the same time, young people in the region continue to represent a high proportion of the total population with persisting challenges of high unemployment and increasingly underemployment. According to estimates from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the League of Arab States, the region's economies will need to create around 51 million jobs by 2020 to meet the demand of the total unemployed and those entering the work force.[1] A significant proportion of these jobs are needed for currently unemployed youth and new youth labor force entrants during the next decade.

Indeed, youth-inclusive development remains as important as ever in the region. What lessons can be learned from countries where the youth bulge has peaked and how can these lessons be shared across borders to better support the region’s next generation? How can countries adopt best practices and institutional models to more effectively support young people’s transition from school to work and their transition to marriage and family formation? Answers to these questions are critical for understanding and initiating any policies and programs aimed at addressing the Middle East’s long-term development trajectory.

Using available data, we have collected key statistics related to the general economic and demographic conditions of each country in the region as well as statistics on the education and employment status of youth.[2] However, for some countries there are gaps in the available data, and for other countries the available data is somewhat outdated. Additional surveys and data collection – and the regular publication of existing data by government agencies and research institutes in the region – will be invaluable for researchers seeking to examine the root causes of youth development gaps and for those who are, in turn, seeking to devise knowledge-based policy and program solutions that can better address those gaps.

In this note, we provide an overview of the data and our main findings. The accompanying interactive map and fact sheets provide key statistics associated with youth issues for all 18 countries in the Middle East.

Introduction to the Data:

General Economy. Key statistics related to the general economy of each country include total GDP, GDP growth rates, GDP per capita and the primary sectors of the economy. This data provides a general economic context for each country. It also highlights the diversity of the Middle East region, which includes wealthy oil-producing countries with relatively small populations and lower-income countries with relatively large populations. These differing country contexts affect youth and their transitions to adulthood in particular ways. However, at the same time, youth across the region face a number of similar issues and challenges in terms of their school-to-work and work-to-marriage transitions.

Demographics. The information includes total population and projections for the absolute number of youth and the youth share of the population for 2010 and 2020, which gives an indication of the size of the youth bulge in each country.

Education. Statistics on school enrollment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels measure access to education and educational attainment. While access to education is relatively easy to measure through available data, it is more difficult to measure educational quality. We have also included data on public expenditure on education and pupil-teacher ratios as crude measures of education quality. Scores on international standardized tests such as TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA are more widely recognized and accepted measures of educational quality. In the Middle Eastern countries that participated in the 2007 TIMSS, average 8^th grade student performance in math and science was below the low benchmark, indicating basic knowledge of the subject area.[3] However, the TIMSS scores are not included in the map and fact sheets because they are difficult to interpret without a more elaborate analysis that compares the scores to other countries and to the low, intermediate, and high benchmarks.

Employment. Data on unemployment and labor force participation rates allow us to assess youth employment status in the Middle East. This data was drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the International Labor Organization Laborsta database, the Arab Labor Organization, and the Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections database (EAPEP). When data was available from multiple sources, the most recent data was selected. For some countries, unemployment and labor force participation rates are drawn directly from the source. In other cases, these rates were calculated using data from the Laborsta and EAPEP databases. We present this information for youth aged 15-24 and 15-29 (where available). In general, unemployment rates are higher for the 15-24 age group than the 15-29 age group due to the larger proportion of first time labor market entrants in the 15-24 group. In addition, labor force participation rates for the 15-24 group tend to be lower due to the high proportion of this group that are still in school.

Main Findings:

A number of key findings emerge, which highlight the challenges and struggles that Middle East youth experience during their transitions to adulthood:

Demographics

Many countries in the region have reached the peak of their youth bulge. Youth (aged 15-29) as a proportion of the total population ranges from 25 percent in Kuwait and UAE to 34 percent in Iran and Qatar. For most countries, the youth proportion of the population will begin to decline in the next ten years. An estimated 29 percent of Egypt’s population is between the ages of 15 and 29 today, but by 2020 that will drop to 25 percent. Jordan’s youth population is 30 percent of the total population today, but in ten years it will be only 27 percent. Morocco will drop from 29 percent (2010) to 24 percent (2020), while Iran’s youth share of the population will fall from 34 percent today to only 22 percent in 2020. However, there are still countries in the region where the youth share of the total population will remain level or continue to grow: Iraq (28 percent in 2010 to 29 percent in 2020) and West Bank and Gaza (27 percent in 2010 to 29 percent in 2020). In addition, in absolute numbers, the 15- to 29-year-old population in the region will continue to increase.[4]

Educational Outcomes

Most countries in the region have achieved near-universal school enrollment at the primary level. Enrollment rates at the secondary and tertiary levels are more varied across countries, but they indicate a high level of educational achievement in many of the region’s countries. This expansion in enrollment is a result of government investment in expanding access to education as well as student and parent recognition that school enrollment (especially at the secondary and tertiary levels) is necessary to secure heavily sought after positions in the civil service and public sector. While educational attainment has increased, educational quality in the region’s schools is generally poor and students leave school without the skills and knowledge needed to succeed in the job market. Poor education quality is a consequence of educational tracking systems and a reliance on high-stakes tests for university admission. This results in a system of education that promotes rote learning and memorization rather than the development of critical thinking and problem solving skills.[5]

Employment Outcomes

High levels of school enrollment have not translated to positive trends in the youth labor market. In general, the region’s youth unemployment rates are high, ranging from 20-30 percent in most countries, but reaching as high as 45.6 percent in Algeria and 45.4 percent in Iraq. In addition, Middle East youth experience long periods of unemployment and often end up searching for jobs for two to three years in countries like Egypt, Iran and Morocco. The causes of high unemployment rates among youth vary from country to country and are often the result of a preference for government employment among educated youth, the dearth of quality jobs in the private sector, and skills mismatch in the job market. After completing their education, many youth prefer to wait for employment opportunities in the public sector rather than accept low quality jobs in the informal private sector.[6] In some countries in the region, youth are beginning to adjust their expectations to the realities of the job market. New research shows that youth unemployment rates in some countries have begun to decrease as youth are accepting employment in low quality jobs. For example, in Egypt, the recent decline in youth unemployment is paradoxically associated with a deterioration of job quality rather than any major improvement in labor market conditions.

Outcomes for Young Women

The gender gap in educational enrollment at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels has narrowed. In fact, female enrollment at the tertiary level is greater than male enrollment in many Middle Eastern countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and the West Bank and Gaza. However, this narrowing of the gender gap in education has not translated to a similar narrowing of the gender gap in the labor market. Gender-specific data on unemployment and labor force participation highlight the unique challenges that young women experience in their transition from education to employment. In general, unemployment rates for young women are much higher than those for young men. In addition, labor force participation rates for young women are much lower than those for young men. These figures indicate that many young women do not enter the workforce upon their exit from school, either due to cultural norms and women’s own choice to focus on their roles as caretakers or due to their frustrations at poor labor market prospects.[7] Those young women that do decide to enter the workforce experience higher rates of unemployment.

Conclusion

These broad trends show that there is still much to be done to ensure smoother and more productive transitions for young people in the Middle East today and for future generations. The school-to-work transition for the ‘youth bulge’ that is now passing into adulthood has been marked by impressive gains in access to education compared to previous generations. However, the quest for gainful employment is still fraught with challenges. More research is needed to determine how institutions can inform the paths taken by young women and how institutions can grant young women greater career opportunities beyond traditional roles.

Even with updated statistics on demography, education and employment, there is still an astonishing amount of information that we do not know about today’s youth in the Middle East. This is because while we have good methods for measuring, for example, how many young people are enrolled in secondary school, indicators that examine the quality and value of what they are learning in the classroom are harder to define and measure. In terms of employment, it is relatively easy to determine whether or not someone is employed. However, job quality – often defined to include factors such as job security, pay, working conditions and benefits – is often neglected in large surveys. Looking ahead, it is critical that policymakers and researchers continue to ask these tough questions and support efforts to define and measure these elusive but necessary indicators of youth wellbeing.

[1] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries (New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2009), 109. Ali Abdel-Gadir and Khalid Abu-Ismail, Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A Human Development Approach (Cairo: UNDP and League of Arab States, 2009), 32-33.

[2] Generally speaking, the World Bank, International Labor Organization, and other international organizations define the “youth” age group as those between the ages of 15 and 24. However, we define youth as those between the ages of 15 and 29, in order to capture the full transition from youth to adulthood, including the school-to-work transition and the work-to-marriage transition.

[3] Navtej Dhillon, et al. “Missed by the Boom, Hurt by the Bust: Making Markets Work for Young People in the Middle East,” Middle East Youth Initiative report, (Washington: Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings and Dubai School of Government, 2009).

[4] United Nations Population Prospects (UNPP) data (2008) projects an approximate increase of 12 million more young people (ages of 15-29) between 2010 and 2035.

[5] Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Navtej Dhillon, “Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East: A Framework for Policy Reform,” Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper 8 (Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution and the Dubai School of Government, 2008).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

Authors

Mary Kraetsch
Samantha Constant

The Middle East and the New Global Economy: Economic Recovery and a New Government in Lebanon

Jad Chaaban and Tarik Yousef — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 09:24:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In our new series, "The Middle East and the New Global Economy: The Drive for Competitiveness, Skills and Innovation," the Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI) turns once again to our network of scholars to ask how the region is faring. Have chronic unemployment challenges in the region been exacerbated by the economic slowdown? Has the global crisis forced a rethinking of development strategies in the region? Have ambitious programs been put on hold due to declining revenues from commodities, investment, exports and tourism?

Part 3: Economic Recovery and a New Government in Lebanon

Tarik Yousef: In May of this year, you spoke with MEYI [Middle East Youth Initiative] Director Navtej Dhillon and gave an initial assessment of how Lebanon was faring in the midst of the global economic slowdown. You indicated that Lebanon’s strong and heavily regulated financial sector was mostly shielded from the crisis, but predicted that the real economy might see a decline in remittances, which would in turn affect real estate investments and Lebanon’s important construction and telecommunications sectors. Recently, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] published a note entitled "Resilient Lebanon Defies Odds In Face of Global Crisis" projecting that Lebanon could grow faster in 2009 than previously predicted. What is your current assessment of how Lebanon has fared in weathering the crisis so far, and what are its future macroeconomic prospects?

Jad Chaaban: As you mention, growth in Lebanon [in 2009] is predicted by the IMF and several other institutions, such as private banks working in Lebanon, to be between 6 and 7 percent. That is a pretty good number for this year, especially since we are still in a global financial crisis.

There are many reasons why Lebanon is still faring pretty well compared to other countries. The one essential factor this year was that there has been some kind of stability in political terms and also on the security front. We had a very good tourist season with a lot of Lebanese immigrants and international visitors coming in: about 2 million visitors in 2009 compared to 1.3 million in 2008.

You also have to add that, due to the stable financial system and the stable banking system in Lebanon, we still have very good inflows coming in... The balance of payments surplus now is almost $3.3 billion for the first seven months of the year. This is double the surplus posted in the same period last year. This mostly comes from petrodollar-rich Gulf countries, where many Gulf investors are still looking to Lebanon as a destination for their investments. Unfortunately most of this is still going to real estate investments and major real estate compounds; although they are good for the Lebanese economy, in the long run they create a certain crowding out of other activities like agriculture and industry.

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Authors

Jad Chaaban
Tarik Yousef

National Dialogue and State-Building in the Middle East

Mon, 09 Nov 2009 18:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 9, 2009
6:00 PM - 8:00 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On November 9, 2009, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion with H.E. Mohamad Chatah, the Lebanese minister of finance, H.E. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Palestinian Government Media Center, and H.E. Ayad Al Samarrai, speaker of the Iraqi Parliament on the project of inclusive national dialogue and state-building in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq. The speakers examined past and current nationally-driven conflict resolution efforts, which encompass national unity governments, national dialogue processes, their record in state-building/state-effectiveness, and the role of external interference in the state-building projects of the countries under consideration. After opening remarks from Brookings Doha Center director, Hady Amr, the center’s non resident fellow, Salman Shaikh, moderated the discussion, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic and academic communities.

The discussion was undertaken in a question and answer format with the moderator directing questions to the speakers.

The first was on the status of inclusive national dialogue in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq. In response, H.E. Finance Minister Chatah mentioned that while all factions in a specific context should be represented in government, the distribution of power typically takes a long time to occur. Given that fact, dialogue should be aimed at mechanisms for decision-making. H.E. Chatah underscored the importance of a governing system that effectively serves the citizens of Lebanon while the more gradual process of inclusive national dialogue is at work. The finance minister said that inclusive dialogue is a constitutional imperative and has been attempted at every point in Lebanese history. Although this is the case, he believes that Lebanese national dialogue should strive to be more effective, specifically with regard to decision-making, than it has been in the past.

As for the Palestinian territories, H.E. Khatib maintained that in spite of President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas' decision to resign—which points to the perilous state of the peace process—and the breakdown of the Cairo-brokered negotiations between Fatah and Hamas, there are reasons to be optimistic about Palestinian national dialogue. H.E. Khatib stressed that the dialogue has progressed over time and that the Palestinians are actively working on bridging the gaps between them. He also pointed out that inclusivity in national dialogue is ensured by elections since the people are the ultimate arbiters. However, H.E. Khatib argued that threat of a failed peace process is a constant reality because of what he called unchecked U.S. support for Israel and the internal divisions in the Palestinian camp.

When speaking about Iraq's experience with national dialogue, Samarrai articulated that after the state's collapse, Iraqis had many different visions for the future of their country. While some took up arms in opposition to the political process, many over time came to join the cause of national reconciliation. Furthermore, H.E. Samarrai strongly emphasized that national dialogue is a serious process without which a state based on democratic principles and institutions cannot be built.

The moderator also questioned the speakers on how Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq are faring with regard to the objective of state-building. H.E. Mohamad Chatah, the Lebanese minister of finance, expressed that dialogue is necessary, but that it is not a substitute for policy-making and taking action. He expressed his concern that since the June 2009 general election in Lebanon, too much time has been spent in dialogue. H.E. Chatah explained that the political landscape in Lebanon has produced a situation conducive to stalemates and inaction. This is because, according to the Lebanese constitution, in order to pass any law, a two thirds majority is needed, so if the opposition is in the government, deadlocks are likely to occur. In this case, unity governments like the current one run the risk of being unproductive. He offered a solution, which is for unity governments to focus on transitional issues around which all parties can unite.

In approaching the matter of state-building, H.E. Khatib referred to Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority Salam Fayyad's recently announced Two Year Path to Palestinian Statehood. H.E. Khatib discussed the premise of Prime Minister Fayyad's program which places a 2 year ceiling on the realization of an independent Palestinian state. This plan endeavors to convince the international community that Palestine has a right to statehood, Palestinians are capable of self-rule, and that the Palestinian people are ready to develop state institutions.

Subsequently, the moderator asked H.E. Ayad Samarrai about the role the international community has played with respect to Iraqi state-building. H.E. Samarrai informed the audience of the expertise that the international community provided during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution. He then mentioned that some countries chose to ignore Iraq throughout the reconstruction stage, and others only interfered when they stood to benefit from the situation.

H.E. Chatah was also requested to comment on Lebanon's position vis-à-vis the complex political landscape of competition and cooperation in the Middle East. He responded by saying that "Lebanon is indeed not an island" and that the regional dynamics and competing interests of various Arab states, Iran, different Islamist factions and the United States all have a bearing on Lebanon's political landscape. He added that, on the whole, international interference has had both negative and positive effects on Lebanese politics and society. He cited UN Resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 war in Lebanon as an example of the latter.

On the topic of international interference in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, H.E. Ghassan Khatib called the Palestinian struggle for a homeland the "first pan Arab nationalist cause." He said that with respect to regional dynamics in the Middle East, the Palestinian leadership has historically sought a balance between enjoying Arab support and political realities such as rivalries on the ground H.E. Khatib also indicated that in recent times, inter-Arab disputes are fueling Palestinian factionalism.

The panel fielded questions on the challenges of national reconciliation in Iraq, the size of the Lebanese national deficit, and whether the processes of state-building and inclusivity in national dialogue are inherently incompatible. H.E. Samarrai said that Iraq is overcoming infighting and that the national stance is being consolidated; he reiterated that former opposition members continue to embrace the political process.

With respect to an inquiry on the seemingly substantial Lebanese national deficit of $50 billion, H.E. Chatah advised the audience to consider that in the past year the deficit decreased from 180 percent to 150 percent. Also, he asked the audience to bear in mind the size of the country's deficit relative to the national economy. The Lebanese finance minister also replied to the question of whether the priority of an inclusive national dialogue agenda and state-building are in disagreement. He stressed that a state, particularly a fractured one, must have strong institutions to protect its sovereignty; the state apparatus should be at work and on a separate track from matters that require national reconciliation.

Concluding remarks included a summation of the main take-away points of the discussion. Notably, H.E. Khatib urged Arab nations to utilize their strategic weight in the service of the Palestinian cause.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

H.E. Mohamad Chatah

Lebanese Minister of Finance

H.E. Ghassan Khatib

Director, Palestinian Government Media Center

H.E. Ayad Al Samarrai

Speaker, Iraqi Parliament

Going Home? Prospects and Pitfalls for Large-Scale Return of Iraqis

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400

ABSTRACT

There is a lot of talk these days about the prospects for the large-scale return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Iraq. More than four million Iraqis have been displaced, either internally as IDPs or externally as refugees. Most fled their communities since the US invasion in 2003 and especially in the aftermath of the sectarian violence that erupted after the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006. While the Iraqi and US governments, policymakers in the region, and humanitarian actors assume that most will return to Iraq in the near future, experience with other displacement crises indicates that return will be neither automatic nor straightforward.

Following a brief overview of displacement and current trends in returns to Iraq, this paper suggests a number of lessons learned from other large-scale return movements which may be helpful in thinking about returns to Iraq. The paper then looks at the relationship between the physical return of displaced populations (both refugees and IDPs) and the more difficult question of their reintegration into Iraqi society. The paper argues that the way in which return and reintegration are carried out will have major implications for Iraq’s future political and social development.

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Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: International Association for the Study of Forced Migration Annual Conference, Nicosia, Cyprus

The Lebanese Elections and the Middle East: An Opportunity for Change?

Tue, 23 Jun 2009 18:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 23, 2009
6:00 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

Following a heated electoral campaign, which featured high levels of spending and much international attention, on June 7, 2009, Lebanese citizens voted for a new parliament in a peaceful election process that produced results that were accepted both domestically and internationally. On June 23, 2009, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion to examine the elections’ broader policy implications for Lebanon and the region, to shed some light on the technical aspects of the elections and the monitoring process, and to explore potential reforms to the Lebanese electoral law and its underlying sectarian political system. The panel consisted of Ziad Abdel Samad, Secretary General of the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections, Karim Makdisi, Assistant Professor of Political Studies at the American University of Beirut, and Hady Amr, Director of the Brookings Doha Center and Saban Center Fellow. Hiba Zeino, Communications Coordinator of the Brookings Doha Center, moderated the discussion.

After a brief introduction by Zeino, Abdel Samad opened up the discussion by first giving some background on the context of these elections. He explained that Lebanon had been “kept on hold” after a long political crisis and that the process of reforming the electoral system has been ongoing for a number of years. He highlighted in particular the Doha Agreement brokered in Qatar on May 21, 2008, which ended an 18-month conflict between Lebanese factions and established General Michel Sleiman as the President. Reform efforts for a new electoral law have been continuing since and have already included new laws on campaign spending and media advertising, in addition to the establishment of a supervisory commission responsible for overseeing the elections. Abdel Samad explained that the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections opened 24 offices in numerous districts in order to be close to the campaigns and voters and that it hired 2,500 trained volunteers for Election Day itself, to make sure the election was carried out legally and properly.

Makdisi continued the conversation, stressing what he saw as the two most important facets of the election. On the one hand, the elections were technically a success. People were motivated and mobilized and there were well-organized NGOs to handle issues that may have arisen. It was important for Lebanon and the region to have this example of a peaceful transition of power. On the other hand, Makdisi also emphasized that on a substantive, underlying structural level, his assessment of the elections was more negative. The elections did not bring any kind of new order with a new political class, but rather the same cast of characters returned to power, with the vast majority of the seats even decided before the elections took place. He argued that the electoral law as it stands merely preserved elite interests and no real progressives were put into power. Makdisi was also disappointed that the campaigns employed the rhetoric of fear and included little discussion of policy on important issues, including the economy, the environment, and social problems.

Based on his experience monitoring elections in South Africa, Bosnia, and the Palestinian territories, Amr offered some additional reflections on the mechanics of these elections. He argued that the elections in Lebanon indicate that transparency is of great importance. He also argued that having both domestic and international observers can be invaluable to both the domestic constituency and the international community’s acceptance of the results. Amr brought up the recently contested elections in Iran in contrast, suggesting that perhaps if the Iranian government had allowed election monitors, there would not be such a high level of doubt in the results. Amr also suggested that given both elections, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Middle East has reached a point when leaders can no longer get away with blatant fraud without some type of protest. When asked about the potential influence of President Obama regarding the election results, Amr remarked that though he could not draw a direct line between Obama’s speech in Cairo and the election results in Lebanon, the new administration’s approach of engaging in respectful dialogue has likely made it more difficult for the region to have knee-jerk anti-American reactions.

Following the remarks of the speakers was a detailed question and answer session. Audience members inquired about the sectarian system in Lebanon and if this is a hindrance to real democracy. Others were curious about what would be necessary to invoke real change to the Lebanese political system and who would be responsible for carrying out these efforts. There was also a question about how to engage youth in the political process, which might help ease the “brain drain” that currently afflicts Lebanon. The panelists explained that new reforms were certainly necessary to tackle all of these issues and as a start, Lebanon needs to adopt a proportional system in the electoral law to ensure equitable parliamentary representation. Abdel Samad also cited in particular the efforts to increase the participation of women in politics and reforms to make it possible for non-resident Lebanese citizens to vote while overseas in the next election. Makdisi stressed that political platforms in Lebanon need to move from traditional rhetoric to address vital issues such as the economy, growing class differences, and the environment.

Audio

The Lebanese Elections and the Middle East

Participants

Moderator

Hiba Zeino

Communications Coordinator, Brookings Doha Center

Panelists

Ziad Abdel Samad

Secretary General of the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections

Karim Makdisi

Assistant Professor of Political Studies, American University of Beirut

U.S.-Backed Alliance Wins in Lebanon

Hady Amr — Wed, 17 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Slightly more than half of Lebanon’s voters turned out in what was billed as a “hotly contested election.” It was obvious that the votes would be counted in a transparent way, given that supporters of each alliance were willing to pay to fly Lebanese voters in from around the world to participate at great expense. But much like the 2000 U.S. presidential elections, where Gore won the popular vote but lost the electoral votes that were counted to Bush, Hizballah’s losing coalition received more total votes than the pro-American winning coalition, leaving the potential for lingering conflict over “unfairness.”

The underlying system has many deep problems that continue to plague the country, causing sectarian division and corruption. Lebanon could learn a lot from its neighbor Israel in administering a proper election. Lebanon has no government ballots. Party activists generally hand the heads of families (or the voters themselves) a slate of names on a piece of paper and those pieces of paper are often put directly in the ballot box, leaving little room for personal choice.

Far worse, Lebanon’s electoral system actually apportions seats by religion. Seats in each district are specified by sect: Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Maronite, Sunni, Druze, Shia, etc. If an American were told in advance that their congressional delegation would be composed of, for example, a Jew, five Christians, a Muslim, a Hindu and an atheist, he or she would be offended if it didn’t sound like the beginning of a tasteless joke. Candidates should run based on the force of their ideas, not how their parents pray.

Further, the fixed Lebanese sectarian system actually builds up the divisions between groups instead of reducing them, and has been a rallying cry for those who feel disadvantaged, sparking unrest. If South Africans—particularly White South Africans who had everything to lose—could put behind their despicable history of segregation to embrace a one-person, one-vote proportional representation system, so too can the Lebanese.

The elected Lebanese parliament members are fully vested in this system and so no change will come about in Lebanon unless international pressure calls for a true proportional representation system in Lebanon as in Israel or South Africa, combined with a final and permanent end to any group carrying arms, including Hizballah. Only then do the problems of Lebanon’s sectarian strife have the opportunity to fade.

Authors

Hady Amr

Publication: Near East Report

Lebanon: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Hady Amr — Sat, 13 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Lebanon has voted, and the results are good, bad, and ugly.

The good news is that the international community, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, declared that election day activities were free from intimidation, and conducted “legally and properly”. Even from a distance, it was obvious that the votes would be counted in a transparent way, given that supporters of each alliance were willing to pay to fly Lebanese voters in from around the world to participate at great expense. So at least the votes counted.

Additional good news is that given that the pro-American coalition won, Lebanon won’t be on a collision course with the West. And there may also be good news for Barack Obama, with some analysts saying his Cairo speech significantly weakened anti-American sentiment in the region thus persuading some swing voters to embrace the pro-American coalition in Lebanon.

But before we get to the really bad news, we need to understand that the results were murky. Lebanese voted for the status quo keeping the current ruling Western-friendly coalition in power with 71 seats, and the Hizballah-led alliance at 57 seats, virtually identical proportions to the last government. But much like the 2000 U.S. presidential elections, where Gore won the popular vote but lost the vote count to Bush, the losing coalition seemed to receive more total votes than the winners. Very fortunately for Lebanon, rules being rules, the losing coalition respected the results, sparing Lebanon the sort of protracted public sentiment endured by America after its 2000 elections. Additionally, in general, it seems that only a handful of Lebanon’s historically powerful families were able to perpetuate their names in the parliament, leaving room for new political blood. But, that’s pretty much the end of the not so bad news.

Now for the unquestionably bad news. The bad news is that at the highest levels, political leadership still seems to be inherited. Inherited in the same way that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak seems to want to pass along the Egyptian presidency to his son, and how Syrian President Hafez al-Assad passed along the presidency to his son. It’s not just a political patriarchy, it’s also a constellation of alliances that line up around these candidates to support the same old business deals going to the same old cronies. This is bolstered by a system with various problems, foremost among them is that actual governmental election ballots do not exist. Voters are generally handed a slate of names on a piece of paper by their families or political leaders and those pieces of paper are often put directly in the ballot box. Of course there is the opportunity of the individual to change the names they vote for, but the process is more akin to mafia style tribal block voting than individual choice.

But the ugly news is even worse. Far worse. Lebanon’s electoral system actually apportions seats by religion—and not just Christian vs. Muslim. Seats in each district are specified for one of a dozen plus sects: Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Maronite, Sunni, Druze, Shia, and on and on.

Why is this so ugly? For anyone living in America—or any other country that can really call itself a democracy—being told in advance that their congressional delegation would be composed of, for example, a Jew, five Christians, a Muslim, a Hindu and an atheist would be offensive if it didn’t sound like the beginning of a tasteless joke. Candidates should run based on the force of their ideas, not how their parents pray. Further, the fixed Lebanese sectarian system actually builds up the divisions between groups instead of reducing them, and has been a rallying cry for those who feel disadvantaged sparking unrest and war. If South Africans—particularly White South Africans who had everything to lose—could put behind their despicable history of segregation to embrace a one-person one-vote proportional representation system, so too can the Lebanese.

Both the international community and the Lebanese themselves are complicit in the process. Those elected to parliament through this divisive system have little incentive to change it. So others must. What is needed inside Lebanon is a coalition of ordinary Lebanese and public intellectuals, together with the international community to say they want a unified Lebanon: One Lebanon where anyone, no matter their religion, can be president, prime minister, or speaker of the house. One Lebanon where the rights of individuals to pursue their lives in full liberty as they see fit while doing no harm to others, are guaranteed in the constitution irrevocably. One Lebanon where there is one state and one gun, not a single militia carrying arms. One Lebanon where there is guaranteed inclusion for minority parties. One Lebanon that resembles a modern state made of citizens, not a backward looking fragment of the Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the only thing keeping Lebanon’s electoral system from domestic and international scrutiny is that it’s generally in more miserable company in the Middle East where inherited presidencies are increasingly the norm, or systems like Iran’s where the votes are genuine but the candidates have to be approved first by the “Guardian Council” which disqualifies potential candidates on political grounds.

Lebanon’s electoral system, like Iran’s, should be confined to the dustbin of history. It’s disturbing. And worse, it actively reinforces the divisions which spark civil and sectarian strife. A new system can emerge if Lebanese civil society calls for it, and the international community supports these calls. The outcome would ultimately be a truly democratic Lebanon with less sectarianism, less violence, and more unity.

Authors

Hady Amr

Publication: Gulf News

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Lebanon's Elections

Hady Amr — Fri, 12 Jun 2009 12:00:00 -0400

Lebanon has voted, and the results are good, bad and ugly. The good news is that the international community, led by former US president Jimmy Carter, declared that election day activities were free from intimidation, and conducted "legally and properly". Even from a distance, it was obvious that the votes would be counted in a transparent way, given that supporters of each alliance were willing to pay to fly Lebanese voters in from around the world to participate at great expense. So at least the votes counted.

Additional good news is that given that the pro-American coalition won, Lebanon won't be on a collision course with the West. And there may also be good news for Barack Obama, with some analysts saying his Cairo speech significantly weakened anti-American sentiment in the region, thus persuading some swing voters to embrace the pro-American coalition in Lebanon.

But before we get to the really bad news, we need to understand that the results were murky. Lebanese voted for the status quo, keeping the current ruling Western-friendly coalition in power with 71 seats, and the Hezbollah-led alliance at 57 seats, virtually identical proportions to the last government. But much like the 2000 US presidential elections, where Al Gore won the popular vote but lost the vote count to George W. Bush, the losing coalition seemed to receive more total votes than the winners. Very fortunately for Lebanon, rules being rules, the losing coalition respected the results, sparing Lebanon the sort of protracted public sentiment endured by America after its 2000 elections. Additionally, in general, it seems that only a handful of Lebanon's historically powerful families were able to perpetuate their names in the parliament, leaving room for new political blood. But, that's pretty much the end of the not so bad news.

Now for the unquestionably bad news. The bad news is that at the highest levels, political leadership still seems to be inherited. It's not just a political patriarchy, it's also a constellation of alliances that line up around these candidates to support the same old business deals going to the same old cronies. This is bolstered by a system with various problems. Foremost among them is that actual governmental election ballots do not exist. Voters are generally handed a slate of names on a piece of paper by their families or political leaders and those pieces of paper are often put directly in the ballot box. Of course there is the opportunity for the individual to change the names they vote for, but the process is more akin to mafia-style tribal block-voting than individual choice.

But the ugly news is even worse. Far worse. Lebanon's electoral system actually apportions seats by religion - and not just Christian versus Muslim. Seats in each district are specified for one of a dozen-plus sects: Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Maronite, Sunni, Druze, Shiite, and on and on.

Why is this so ugly? For anyone living in America - or any other country that can really call itself a democracy - being told in advance that their congressional delegation would be composed of, for example, a Jew, five Christians, a Muslim, a Hindu and an atheist would be offensive if it didn't sound like the beginning of a tasteless joke. Candidates should run based on the force of their ideas, not how their parents pray. Further, the fixed Lebanese sectarian system actually builds up the divisions between groups instead of reducing them, and has been a rallying cry for those who feel disadvantaged, sparking unrest and war. If South Africans - particularly White South Africans who had everything to lose - could leave behind their despicable history of segregation to embrace a one-person, one-vote proportional representation system, so too can the Lebanese.

Both the international community and the Lebanese themselves are complicit in the process. Those elected to parliament through this divisive system have little incentive to change it. So others must. What is needed inside Lebanon is a coalition of ordinary Lebanese and public intellectuals, together with the international community to say they want a unified Lebanon: One Lebanon where anyone, no matter their religion, can be president, prime minister, or speaker of the house. One Lebanon where the rights of individuals to pursue their lives in full liberty as they see fit while doing no harm to others, are guaranteed irrevocably in the Constitution. One Lebanon where there is one state and one gun, not a single militia carrying arms. One Lebanon where there is guaranteed inclusion for minority parties. One Lebanon that resembles a modern state made up of citizens, not a backward-looking fragment of the Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the only thing keeping Lebanon's electoral system from domestic and international scrutiny is that it's generally in more miserable company in the Middle East, where inherited presidencies are increasingly the norm, or systems like Iran's, where the votes are genuine but the candidates have to be approved first by the 'Guardian Council' - which disqualifies potential candidates on political grounds.

Lebanon's electoral system, like Iran's, should be confined to the dustbin of history. It's disturbing. And worse, it actively reinforces the divisions that spark civil and sectarian strife. A new system can emerge if Lebanese civil society calls for it, and the international community supports these calls. The outcome would ultimately be a truly democratic Lebanon with less sectarianism, less violence and more unity.

Authors

Hady Amr

Publication: Gulf News

After the Elections: U.S. Policy and Political Stability in Lebanon

Thu, 11 Jun 2009 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 11, 2009
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036

On June 10, Tamara Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Democracy and Development Project at the Saban Center at Brookings, and Daniel Brumberg, acting director of the Muslim World Initiative at USIP and director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University analyzed the significance of the June 7, 2009 parliamentary elections in Lebanon and their impact on U.S. policy in that country and the region.

Tamara Wittes and Daniel Brumberg were members of the international delegation monitoring the elections in Lebanon, and will be newly returned from the field. They gave their impressions of the electoral process and reflected on the significance of the election outcomes for Lebanon and for U.S. policy.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

0611_lebanon

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Daniel Brumberg

Acting Director, Muslim World Initiative, USIP; Director, Democracy and Governance Studies, GU

Lebanon on the Brink of Elections: Key Public Opinion Findings

Shibley Telhami — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 12:00:00 -0400

OVERVIEW

As the Lebanese approach a crucial election on June 7th that could alter not only internal Lebanese politics but also Lebanon’s relations with the world, much of the focus has been on predicting the outcome or the likely coalitions that could emerge. Equally important, however, are the expressed opinions of the Lebanese public, many of whom will be going to the ballot box. In many ways, the attitudes of the public on core foreign and domestic issues will be critical to the type of government that could emerge. During the campaign, some important issues of concern to the United States were discussed in the course of the political debate. For example, the current Hizballah-led opposition sought to assure the public that Lebanon would not become an Iran-like theocracy. The United States, for its part, made its intentions clear, through visits by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice-President Joe Biden, both of whom registered their support for the current ruling coalition.

Whether or not these steps will make a difference remains to be seen, but some things are clear: On many issues, majorities of the Lebanese public remain very much at odds with American foreign policy, even as they express somewhat positive views of President Obama. What’s also clear is that on many issues, all the major communities in Lebanon (Shi’ah, Sunni, Christian, and Druze) are united. A critical reason for this is that, quite strikingly, large majorities of each group see themselves as Lebanese above all else. In this way, expressed Lebanese views are more “statist” than the other countries polled in the Arab world (Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates). One issue on which the Lebanese public largely agrees is that of Iran’s nuclear program; a majority opposes international pressure on Tehran to stop its nuclear project.

At the same time, however, the Lebanese public disagrees on several important issues. Some differences are predictable: Few Shi’ah identify Iran as one of the two biggest threats they face, whereas 45 percent of Druze, 29 percent of Sunnis, and 23 percent of Christians do. Other differences are somewhat surprising: While 11 percent of the Shi’ah polled express support for al- Qa’ida’s methods, 20 percent of Christian Lebanese express similar approval.

Not surprisingly, the Arab-Israeli issue is seen as the central issue through which most Lebanese evaluate American foreign policy. But what is striking is that the second most important issue is economic aid, which is significantly different from what publics in other Arab countries state. Whether or not an assessment of the likely economic consequences of the elections will be a factor on voters’ minds remains to be seen, but it is clearly an important issue to them (one that Vice President Biden may have tried to play on when he spoke in Beirut about the unlikelihood of continuing aid if the Hizballah-led coalition wins a majority).

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Authors

Shibley Telhami