Brookings: Topics - Latin America and the Caribbean

Vice President Biden’s Visit to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 24 May 2013 09:40:00 -0400

The Vice President and Dr Jill Biden head to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago the week of May 26th “to see a much deeper engagement within the Western Hemisphere.” After President Obama’s visit to Mexico and Central America in late April, why is the Vice President heading back to this hemisphere? Have not the issues of trade and immigration been addressed sufficiently? No, is the answer. Biden believes that:

[T]his is a moment to look forward to build – build the friendships and partnerships that are going to allow us to deal with the share challenges and shape – jointly shape a global system 10, 20, 50 years from now. It all begins now, it seems to me.
(Speech to the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, Washington, D.C., May 9, 2013)

What is the nature of these partnerships and why are they new? Has the United States not cultivated partnerships in South America since Vice President Nixon visited Venezuela on May 13, 1958. That trip ended with anti-American demonstrators rocking the Vice President’s limousine and unnerving both the VP and Mrs. Nixon. They never went back to South America.

Both the Alliance for Progress and the Cold War are over. Communism is no longer considered a threat. Instead, the growing middle class in the Western Hemisphere is seen as a rising market of 225 million consumers in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Biden is wrong to anticipate that this emerging group of citizens is wealthy enough and “could qualify for a gold card.” According to categories established by the Mexican Association of Market Research & Public Opinion Agencies (AMAI) the middle class is found in the socioeconomic C and D+ categories. They are urban, possess a car, take one vacation a year away from home and own cell phones, but they are not yet middle class in U.S. terms. Nevertheless, Biden is right in recognizing that this group of citizens accounts for approximately 40 percent of citizens in Latin America. They seek quality education and will over time become the professional class that holds that gold credit card.

This changing societal landscape will continue to place great demands on energy, transport and electronic goods. Thus the opportunity for U.S. businesses to invest in infrastructure, participate in the design of urban transportation, establish enterprises to produce the sophisticated electrical goods that consumers need. The Western Hemisphere will continue to provide the opportunity for increased trade and investment. Already, U.S. exports to the hemisphere have risen from $490 billion in 2007 to $650 billion in 2011. In 2013, U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico represents a trillion-dollar trading partnership. This translates into more U.S. jobs; quality jobs that design products, engineer projects, market goods and research means to reduce the carbon footprint. These benefits result, in large part, from trade in goods and services.

U.S. exports to both Brazil and Colombia have grown at a rapid pace, but there is room for further growth. According to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in 2012, Brazil was the 8th largest market for U.S. goods and services. In that year, the U.S. exported goods valued at $43.7 billion and in the three months ending March 31 2013, U.S. export of goods totaled $10.4 billion. This accounted for a U.S. trade surplus with Brazil of $11.6 billion, up 3.57 percent from 2011. In relative terms, the value of U.S. exports in private sector goods – not including U.S. military sales and defense expenditures – has increased by 183 percent from 2000 to 2012. More significant than total trade numbers is the nature of our exports. Over this period, the top value of U.S. exports to Brazil was in electrical machinery, plastics, aircraft and aircraft parts. Agricultural exports continued, but the growth is in sophisticated manufactured products. That explains Washington’s determination to build upon the Action Plan on Science and Technology Cooperation, the MOU on Aviation Partnership and Partnership for the Development of Aviation Biofuels with Brazil. Similar trading patterns and partnerships occur with Colombia.

Since the entry into force of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement in May 2012, exports of U.S. aircraft and aircraft parts have increased by 179 percent. Exports of U.S. railway locomotives and track fixtures have increased by 79 percent, and iron and steel articles have increased by 50 percent. Although agricultural exports have increased by 68 percent with soybean meal, rice and pork leading the way, the growth path will be found in electrical machinery and equipment. Colombia seeks U.S. government help in gaining membership to the OECD. Recent initiatives, such as negotiations with the FARC, early start on implementing a hemispheric-wide electrical grid, and significant reforms to Colombia’s education system justify its membership of this 34-member club. Biden should support Colombia’s entry into an association that shares a commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all its citizens.

In his speech to the Council of the Americas, Biden identified the Western Hemisphere as democratic. He is right in identifying the rejection of military dictators who ruled most South American nations from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Electoral democracy is firmly established. In its Freedom of the World 2013 report, Freedom House categorizes Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago has “free.” Colombia is classified as “partly free” as it awaits a full investigation and prosecution of suspects in the murder of a local community activist and the director of a Colombian radio station. There is also concern regarding the independence of the judiciary in a case involving a newspaper editor charged with criminal libel. Apart from these three Colombian cases which occurred in 2012, Freedom House recognizes that the great majority of nations in the Western Hemisphere respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and the right of assembly.

However, Biden has also noted that Venezuela is not free and that its citizens, while given electoral democracy, do not currently enjoy “freedoms of expression and assembly” and protection from violence. A second reason for visiting the hemisphere at this time is to recognize that liberal democracy can better ensure the security of citizens, opportunity for economic growth and political stability through non-violent discourse. Three nations in South America are in danger of rejecting these values, preferring controlled economies and centralized power to benefit populist leaders. Biden is expected to address this divide and call for increased dialogue among neighboring countries.

Energy is an important theme for Biden in all of the host nations. Trinidad and Tobago is the leading Caribbean producer of oil and gas and its economy is heavily dependent upon these resources. Forty percent of GDP and 80 percent of exports come from oil and gas, but that industry only provides employment for 5 percent of its citizens, according to the World Bank. Consequently, there is more focus on the production of liquid natural gas (LNG) and renewable energy sources. Trinidad and Tobago claims to be the most advanced and dynamic economy in the English-speaking Caribbean, demonstrated by its high mobile phone penetration of over 120 percent. The potential use of mobile phones for banking, health and education services, as well as its energy potential should encourage Biden to consolidate a strong relationship with this leading CARICOM nation.

Finally, education is a critical theme, which is strengthened by Dr. Jill Biden’s presence on the trip. She is a professional teacher at community colleges where thousands of young Americans acquire the technical skills necessary to move into engineering and scientific jobs. She is also a strong advocate for industry partnerships between community colleges and employers. As President Obama seeks to develop the “100,000 Strong in the Americas,” a State Department program to increase international study in Latin America and the Caribbean through greater international exchange of students, he finds a strong partner in Jill Biden. She knows the advantages of public-private partnerships in education. Her visits to university campuses throughout this visit will focus attention on the importance of education in achieving social inclusion, healthier citizens and environmental sustainability.

The trip should consolidate U.S. partnerships not just with these three nations, but send a message that a new form of engagement with the United States is now possible. The days of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere are over, and a president and vice president no longer travel with a packet of aid. Indeed it was notable that President Obama offered no financial assistance during his visit to Mexico and Central America despite the recognition of “shared responsibility” for the drug-related violence. Instead, constructive partnerships are sought with offers to develop technology, share scientific practices and encourage our students to seek quality education both at home and in the United States. Biden can rightly conclude that this trip represents “…the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, longtime.”

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

What Is the Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation?

Andrés Rozental — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The decision by the Peña Nieto administration to channel the U.S.-Mexico security agenda through the Interior Ministry is not designed to negatively affect the close ties established over the past years in intelligence sharing and cooperation. Rather, it is the result of the Mexican government's decision to bring all the official agencies involved with that agenda domestically under a single umbrella.

The previous Public Safety Ministry and Federal Police are now coordinated from the Interior Ministry, so it is logical to have counterpart U.S. agencies use that same channel. There is no reason to believe that this change will negatively affect the bilateral relationship on security or drug trafficking issues since President Obama clearly concurred with this new approach during his visit to Mexico and during conversations with Mexico's president and his cabinet.

Aside from the security agenda, which is still an important element in the relationship, the two presidents indicated that other priorities will characterize the agenda going forward, especially economic ties, business facilitation, border infrastructure and educational exchanges. This is a positive development in my view as it moves the U.S.-Mexico agenda back to the issues that have historically brought our two countries together and de-emphasizes the monothematic nature of the relationship over the past six years.

Read the full article »

Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Obama in Costa Rica: Seeking Consensus Among Central America’s Leaders

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 03 May 2013 09:20:00 -0400

Editor’s note: In the second of a three-part series on Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, Diana Negroponte outlines the challenges President Obama will face in seeking consensus among Central America’s leaders. Negroponte reviewed what is at stake for the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship on May 1. She will preview Obama’s visit with Central American business leaders on May 3.

On May 3 and 4, President Obama has two meetings with Central American political and business leaders in San Jose, Costa Rica. The first meeting is with the seven Central American presidents plus President Danilo Medina of the Dominican Republic (DR). Developing consensus among the eight leaders on both the agenda and the desired goals is difficult and a watered down consensus document is likely to emerge, which will disappoint all participants.

The basis for skepticism regarding this meeting is the disparate objectives of the eight leaders. Although the overt purpose is for the Central American and DR leaders to engage with the U.S. president under the auspices of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integración Inter-Americana or SICA), that multilateral organization relies upon the political will of the member states to implement their far reaching plans. Despite its foundation in 1991, SICA faces a continual challenge to harmonize its regional plans. In the absence of a common Central American plan of action to which all nations have committed resources and political will, the individual presidents will seek to pursue their own national goals:

El Salvador will seek faster disbursement of U.S. government funds appropriated under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI);
Guatemala will ask for additional numbers for permanent non-agricultural EB-3 workers;
Honduras seeks additional funds for addressing extreme poverty;
Belize seeks additional funds with which to combat emerging youth gangs, as well as assistance in monitoring its intricate coastline and dense forests;
Nicaragua will focus on investment in its major infrastructure projects;
The Dominican Republic will focus on immigration issues for its citizens within the 2013 Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act (S744)
Panama seeks further training in counteracting money laundering; and
Host Costa Rica will focus on strategic policies for the region, as well as investment in green energy.

All these countries seek to confirm their commercial and political ties with Washington in the face of growing instability in Venezuela. The task is to harmonize these distinct objectives into a single agenda; a most challenging enterprise.

President Obama does not come to this summit empty handed. His government has a successful track record since CARSI was founded in 2008. To date $496.5 million has been appropriated for security and violence prevention projects in Central America. (The Dominican Republic participates in a separate security program for the Caribbean nations.) In FY 2012, the State Department requested $100 million for CARSI, but succeeded in raising that sum to $135 million thanks to the recognition that Central Americas’ problems were serious and impacted the United States. This year, State requested $107.5 million but, after a full review of projects, expects that amount to rise to between $150 and $160 million. In addition, USAID has received $146 million between FY2008 to FY2013, and in FY2012 alone, USAID implemented projects worth $50 million.

The U.S. Congress has agreed with State that Central America is geographically caught in the transshipment corridor between cocaine producers in South America and the North American market. Until such time as the nations of Central American – in particular the three northern nations of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – strengthen their rule of law and law enforcement institutions, they will remain vulnerable to drug traffickers and international criminal organizations. Belize, a nation of 350,000 people is also affected by smugglers who use the coastal bays and forest tracks to transport drugs, people and wildlife to the U.S and European markets.

Beyond overall dollar figures, President Obama must demonstrate the impact of CARSI, as well as USAID projects. Since 2008, USAID has committed $132 million to support justice sector reform, municipal crime prevention and services for at-risk youth. In FY 2012, USAID implemented $46.5 million in projects to support social prevention and citizen security. These included working with local mayors and stakeholders in Central American municipalities to develop their own crime prevention plans. Also, outreach centers have emerged in high-risk communities to provide vocational training for at-risk youth. Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Guillermo Céspedes is working in El Salvador to adapt Los Angeles’ Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) to the context of this and, in future, other countries of the region. The intent is to show a decrease in the number of youth joining the gangs and an increase in the number who stay in school, or join technical training programs. Measuring success can be subjective, but Vanderbilt University’s three-year impact evaluation study has demonstrated -- at its mid-point -- lower crime rates and improved public perception of security in communities receiving USAID programs.

In addition to sharing the positive news of U.S investments in law enforcement and socio-economic projects, Obama will have to listen to complaints. This is a tiresome exercise, but it fulfills the cultural need of national leaders in Central America to articulate their demands before the U.S. president. We must hope that the chair will limit the time allotted to each Central American leader, but Obama must recognize that each leader is writing the headline in his or her national media. Should the meeting be off the record, we can expect less public pontification, but equal quantity of gripe about unmet needs.

So how does President Obama emerge from the meeting with a constructive way forward? He has listened, he will digest and he will seek ways to accommodate through current legislative debate on immigration and maybe on gun control. He can seek to increase CARSI funds from the requested $107.5 million, but he should ask the recipients to share effectively in implementing the projects and measuring impact. He might also ask them to contribute a larger amount of tax revenue to education, skills training and housing programs. The United States can assist the Central American nations in responding to public security threats, but the prime responsibility for strengthening democratic institutions must lie with the nations themselves. The hegemonic age is over and the people of Central America and the DR have the capacity to strengthen the rule of law through regional and national efforts. SICA is the vehicle through which they constructed regional plans. With the roadmap in place, it is now up to each nation to implement the programs.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

President Obama's Trip to Mexico Emphasizes America's Future Economic Prosperity and Security

Diana Villiers Negroponte and Ted Piccone — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Mexico and the U.S. are mutually dependent on one another for their collective and respective economic and national security interests. President Obama’s meetings with Mexico’s new president Enrique Pena Nieto will certainly cover border security issues, weapons, drug trafficking and immigration, but these two leaders will want to find ways to further cement the economic relationship between the two countries. Earlier this week, Senior Fellows Ted Piccone and Diana Negroponte sat down together to examine the importance of these talks.

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President Obama's Trip to Mexico Emphasizes America's Future Economic Prosperity and Security

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Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 02 May 2013 09:00:00 -0400

President Obama recognizes that security is a pervasive problem in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. But in his April 30 press conference prior to setting out for Mexico, Obama highlighted the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship:

“A lot of the focus is going to be on economics. We’ve spent so much time on security issues between the United States and Mexico that sometimes I think we forget this is a massive trading partner responsible for huge amounts of commerce and huge numbers of jobs on both sides of the border. We want to see how we can deepen that, how we can improve that and maintain that economic dialogue over a long period of time.”

Beyond the statistics of expanding trade, what more should the presidents discuss?

Total two-way trade reached $494 billion in 2012, which according to Mexican Ambassador Medina-Mora means more than $1.3 billion per day; almost $1 million dollars per minute. In absolute terms, Mexico is America’s third largest trading partner, and in 2012 U.S. exports to Mexico were $216.3 billion. According to Medina-Mora this is more than the combination of U.S. exports to all the countries with which the United States has a trade agreement in place – except for Canada. Surprisingly, it is more than U.S. exports to Japan and China combined, that is $180.6 billion.

We agree that exports to Mexico both maintain and create jobs in the United States. The U.S. government estimates that each additional billion dollars in new exports supports more than 6,000 new jobs. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, almost 6 million U.S. jobs rely on trade with Mexico, the consequence of which is the potential creation of 107,000 new U.S. jobs.

Furthermore, individual states benefit from exports to Mexico such as Arizona, California and Texas which hold Mexico as their main export destination. Mexico is also the second destination for exports from 20 other states and is ranked among the top five export destinations for 34 states.

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies.

Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity.

The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

Related to the growth in two-way trade is the need to facilitate movement of trucks across the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite an increased use of pre-clearance procedures, Mexican trucks must line up several kilometers from the border while they wait their turn to reach the fast lane that leads up to and through the U.S. border. Public-private partnerships are needed to construct the access roads some 10 kilometers from the border so that pre-cleared vehicles can move rapidly through the border zone. Currently, GPS vehicle trackers are used to link the sending and receiving manufacturers with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). Before the truck even reaches the border post, CBP will know the content and value of the merchandise, as well as specifications on the cab and its driver. Only if tampering is detected will CBP stop the truck for secondary inspection, otherwise the truck sails through the border and onto its final destination. The Mexican private sector has demonstrated interest in constructing those access roads, but it needs presidential mandates from both governments to support the projects, as well as Mexican government purchase of necessary land.

Increasingly, the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico depend upon each other. There is much for the presidents to discuss and many challenges lie ahead, including productivity and education in both our countries. As President Obama begins his second term, it is constructive for him to put energy and political will into deepening that economic relationship.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

A Conversation on President Obama’s Trip to Mexico and Costa Rica

Joshua Meltzer, Diana Villiers Negroponte, Ted Piccone and Neil Ruiz — Wed, 01 May 2013 17:59:00 -0400

In advance of President Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica later this week, Brookings scholars Ted Piccone, Joshua Meltzer, Neil Ruiz and Diana Negroponte discuss the main priorities on the agenda between the United States, Mexico and Costa Rica. Topics covered include: expanding trade and economic cooperation between the U.S., Mexico and Central America, U.S. immigration reform, border security, drugs, crime and violence in Mexico and Central America, energy cooperation, and local politics in Mexico.

Read the transcript » (PDF)

“I think there has a been a view around for awhile now that the bilateral relationship at least with Mexico has been dominated by drugs and violence. And I think there is going to be a concerted effort here to refocus attention on to the depth and size of the economic relationship.” — Joshua Meltzer

“It’s a second term trip for the president, but its early in his second term and I think he’s got a lot of heavy lifting still to do on issues that are particularly important to Latin America and especially important to Mexico and Central America. These issues [jobs and the economy, immigration, security] are not the typical ones on the foreign policy agenda. These are issues that are bread and butter, hot-button domestic political issues but they are very important to the Latins, particularly in Mexico and Central America.” — Ted Piccone

“Immigration is a hot button issue of course. It’s something that is still alive here in the U.S. There’s no reform yet to report back to Mexican and Central American leaders. But these meetings actually set the stage for building the relationship for working together once immigration reform is implemented into law.” —Neil Ruiz

“This is a time when Enrique Pena Nieto, the newly elected Mexican president, has got a chance to really celebrate the strength of the Mexican economy: 3.5 percent GDP growth this year, 3.9 percent GDP growth last year… [and] a growing middle class, which means more people with a car and an ability to take a vacation, with iPods, with cellular telephones, and more mobile.” —Diana Negroponte

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A Conversation on President Obama’s Trip to Mexico and Costa Rica

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Latin America's Macroeconomic Outlook in the Global Context: Bright Future or Déjà Vu all Over Again?

Mon, 29 Apr 2013 09:15:00 -0400

Event Information

April 29, 2013
9:15 AM - 10:45 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

After displaying eight years of high growth, some Latin American economies are cooling off in spite of a sustained favorable external environment and continued large inflows of foreign capital. In addition, some countries in the region may be exposed to lingering global financial risks. This recent trend has led many economists to question whether Latin America still has the potential to maintain a strong growth performance.

On April 29, the Brookings-CERES Economic and Social Policy in Latin America Initiative hosted a discussion on the macroeconomic policy challenges policymakers should meet head-on to sustain growth and minimize financial risks. Panelists included: José Juan Ruiz Gόmez, chief economist and manager of the research department at the Inter-American Development Bank; Ernesto Talvi, director of the Brookings-CERES Economic and Social Policy in Latin America Initiative; Augusto de la Torre, chief economist for Latin American and the Caribbean at the World; Alejandro Werner, director of the western hemisphere department at the International Monetary Fund. Vice President Kemal Derviş, director of Global Economy and Development at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

President Obama’s Visit to Mexico: Key Anti-Crime Issues

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 11:57:00 -0400

Up to two weeks ago it looked like President Barack Obama would be going to Mexico with a very strong hand. Had the gun control measures, which the Obama administration pushed as one of its key domestic issues in the second term, passed in the U.S. Congress, the U.S. President could have arrived in Mexico next week having delivered on a sticky bilateral issue: For more than a decade, successive Mexican presidents have been demanding greater weapons checks and tighter gun control from the United States, with the hope that such measures would reduce the excruciatingly high criminal violence in Mexico.

Mexico’s other long-term demand has been immigration reform: increasing legal job opportunities for Mexican workers, reducing deportations, and allowing Mexican families to travel and connect without great personal security and legal risks. President Obama might yet be in a position to remove the immigration thorn from the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship. Clearly, any immigration reform will not pass before he goes to Mexico next week. But he can credibly indicate that his administration has made immigration reform a key domestic priority and that there is more congressional movement on immigration, including on offering a path to citizenship to the millions of undocumented migrants living in the United States, than there has been in years. And at least until the Boston terrorist attacks, it appeared that immigration reform would finally pass in the U.S. Congress. Those opposing immigration reform or demanding a tightening of borders and fail-proof screening that cannot realistically be achieved, are seizing on the Boston attacks as an excuse for derailing the immigration reform legislation. But the prospect of reform is still very much alive.

In addition to gun control and immigration, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto will want to talk economics. Upon assuming office last year, he announced that he would like to break out of the Mexico-U.S. relationship being captured in the prism of the drug trade violence and collapsed into anti-crime cooperation, and to have the relationship refocus on global and bilateral trade and energy issues.

But security issues will inevitably be on the agenda, and the discussions may not be easy. For a long time, Washington was suspicious that if the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which President Peña Nieto leads returned to power, it might be tempted by its old ways —again lessening Mexico’s determination to tackle organized crime and its penetration into Mexico’s law enforcement and administrative institutions and its grip on large segments of Mexico’s society. Since being elected, President Peña Nieto has repeatedly disavowed any negotiations with criminal groups, but he has also maintained that the priority for his government will be not to disrupt drug flows to the United States (as his predecessor President Felipe Calderón sought to do), but to minimize the terrible drug violence in Mexico. Both the reduced focus on disrupting drug flows and the new emphasis on reducing violence, especially should it lead to changed interdiction and targeting patterns in Mexico, might be difficult to sell to Washington and would require the United States to abandon some of its established, albeit often ineffective and counterproductive, international anti-crime and anti-drug policies.

For its part, the new Mexican government has been surprised and made uncomfortable by the extent and tightness of U.S.-Mexico anti-crime cooperation that was established during the Calderón years. Not only has much of the strategic and tactical intelligence for interdiction and other anti-cartel operations come from the United States, but also, and in an unprecedented way, U.S. advisors have become intimately involved in helping to design and shape tactical interdiction operations of several Mexican entities used for anti-cartel law enforcement as well as in reforming law enforcement institutions in Mexico. Conscious of sovereignty, eager to establish tight control of these security institutions, and seeking to redirect Mexico’s security policy to reducing violence, the Peña Nieto administration has been mulling over whether or not and how to shape U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. It needs to take care not to throw the baby out with the bath water. U.S. cooperation, including intelligence provision and law enforcement reform assistance, continue to be greatly valuable for Mexico, and Mexico is hardly in the position to do without them.

For its part, Washington needs to recognize that seeking to reduce criminal violence, including killings, kidnappings, and extortion, is the right priority for Mexico, and indeed, should be a key goal for law enforcement in any country. The United States should wholeheartedly support that objective in Mexico. But achieving violence reduction in Mexico will not be easy, as President Peña Nieto and his security team have already learned in their first six months. Major questions remain about the details, operationalization, and actual implementation of the security strategy Peña Nieto has outlined. As I detail in my report Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime, many components of the new strategy, such as the organizational reshuffle of Mexico’s security institutions, the establishment of a new gendarmerie, or even the youth-crime prevention focus (important as the last element is for any sustainable long-term strategy to reduce criminality) do not easily, quickly, and directly translate into violence reduction in Mexico.

Paradoxically, the policy that is most directly available to Mexico to reduce criminal violence is the one for which it needs the most cooperation from the United States: changing targeting patterns. Instead of deploying the Mexican military or federal police or the gendarmerie (whenever it will actually become available) merely in response to wherever violence intensely breaks out and making cartel capo decapitation the core of its strategy, Mexico needs to prioritize targeting in a way that will reduce violence. That means abandoning both top-level decapitation and reactive deployment of forces. Instead, a wiser interdiction pattern would be more selective and based on an analysis of which law enforcement actions will stimulate what responses and actions from and among the criminal groups. The changed interdiction pattern can include focusing on the most violent group in a particular area and focusing on the middle layer, as opposed to the top capos, of a cartel. As I also explain in another report, Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: Concepts and Practicalities, strategically choosing the basis of prioritized targeting and moving away from interdiction based only ad hoc on how intelligence becomes available requires careful calibration and an uneasy balancing of the pros and cons of each possible option for prioritized interdiction. It often entails uneasy tradeoffs.

Nonetheless, Washington should not define the prioritized interdiction approach (which can mean not vigorously going after some groups for a while) as yet another manifestation of the corruption of Mexican law enforcement institutions by organized crime groups. In turn, explaining to the United States that prioritizing law enforcement actions is smart policy, not weakness and corruption, requires that Mexico maintains extensive discussions with Washington.

What in the long term will increase the rule of law in Mexico is ensuring that communities obey laws, by increasing the likelihood that illegal behavior and corruption will be punished via effective law enforcement, but also by creating a social, economic, and political environment in which the laws are consistent with the needs of the people and allow citizens to embrace their police forces and state presence. Reducing criminal violence is a key element. Adopting a smarter interdiction pattern is an important first step.

Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Venezuela’s new president Nicolas Maduro takes office under a cloud of controversy and with significant challenges to address. His razor thin victory over the opposition has spawned questions and protests. Still, Maduro will assume leadership of the country once headed by the late Hugo Chavez. These are challenging times in Venezuela; its economy is weak, its national debt is high and the populace is in doubt. Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Negroponte says Venezuela is a country in turmoil.

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Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Maduro as President of Venezuela: What to Expect

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 15:27:00 -0400

On April 15, the Comisión Nacional Electoral (CNE) confirmed Nicolás Maduro as the next president of Venezuela, following the death of Hugo Chavez on March 5 and presidential election on April 14. The Organization of American States and the U.S. government have both asked for a 100-percent recount “necessary to ensure than all Venezuelans have confidence in the results” (as White House Press Secretary Jay Carney explained). However, this is unlikely to occur.

What happens next and what should we expect from President Nicolas Maduro? The opposition, led by Governor of Miranda state Henrique Capriles Radonski, called for a recount and gathered his supporters to bang their pots and pans during the night of Monday April 15 in protest the CNE’s definitive result. The cazerolazos (pot bangers) would let Venezuelans and citizens throughout the hemisphere know of their call for a recount through non-violent protest. Thousands responded, reflective of the 49.07% of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition party, Mesa Unidad Democrática (MUD); they lost by only 262,000 out of 14.9 million votes. There are 3,200 formal claims of electoral fraud, as well as countless claims of intimidation, but they are unlikely to change the CNE’s decision because 4 out of the 5 commissioners were appointed by Hugo Chavez and are members of his political party, the PSUV.

Beyond pot banging, it is unlikely that the opposition’s protest will turn violent or endure. Maduro will be sworn into office on April 19 and will have to confront serious problems. Inflation has increased from 20 percent year-on-year in December 2012 to 23 percent in February 2013. Furthermore, the currency is overvalued, despite a recent 32 percent devaluation and stable oil prices. Consequently, slower economic performance is expected in the 2013-2014 period. Nevertheless, Maduro is expected to continue social spending for housing, education and health in order to demonstrate that Chavismo, the philosophy of the late Hugo Chavez, is not dead. Scotiabank has also warned its customers that interventionist public policies will continue. In the last year these policies resulted in shortages of basic foods and medicines for all Venezuelans.

With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB), Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. “empire.”

Maduro’s supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuela’s debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is critical.

Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since 2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuela’s oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Sun Hongbo from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences saw great benefit to China from a “strategic partnership based on long term complementarity.” The CNPC relies upon 800,000 bpd which Venezuela promised in 2007 as collateral for its $14 billion loan under the China Venezuela Joint Fund. We should therefore anticipate increased Chinese influence within Venezuela, as well as demands for greater efficiency both within PDVSA and the delivery of social services. However, payment on the Chinese loans implies lesser revenues from oil sales on the open market. Therefore, Maduro may seek to reduce the amount of subsidized oil that Venezuela provides the Caribbean nations and Nicaragua. Cuba will be an exception with its reliance on 90,000 bpd.

Given the reliance on China to keep the Venezuelan economy afloat, what else might we expect? Politically, the poor showing of the PSUV in this April election reflects the diminution of the Chavez’ aura. Maduro waged his campaign as “son of Chavez,” but it was not good enough to ensure a clear victory. He is now alone to run the country, but he has competitors. According to the Venezuelan constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, should have assumed office pending elections when Hugo Chavez failed to assume office on the constitutionally determined date of January 10. The Supreme Court decided in favor of continuity backing Vice President Nicolas Maduro, but Diosdado now claims through his Twitter account that he would have been more successful in last Sunday’s presidential election. The rivalry between the two men will become more evident throughout the six-year term that Maduro begins this week.

What does this mean for Venezuela? Maduro’s authority to lead the country will be contested. Based on the 3,200 claims of electoral fraud, his legitimacy as president has already been challenged. Without the compelling charisma that Hugo Chavez exuded and without plentiful resources, Maduro will come to rely on authoritarian means. Opposition political figures and student leaders may find themselves in pre-trial detention for varying lengths sufficient to scare them from open protest. Current criminal inmates of Venezuelan jails are reputed to be violent, using rape and threats of murder to control the penitentiaries. Most political opponents will probably choose to shut up or seek exile rather than face jail terms.

Under these circumstances, what should the U.S. government do? I anticipate that President Obama will recognize Maduro as president in the near future, and cannot prevent growing Chinese influence. However, Washington should not accept the abuse of human rights and the denial of the rule of law. Together with the democratic countries in the hemisphere, it should use the weight of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its effective court system to protect Venezuelan citizens and prevent the consolidation of authoritarian rule in the hemisphere.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

In Venezuela, Will 'Chavismo' Last Without Hugo Chavez?

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:54:00 -0400

Editor's note: In a collection of opinions by several experts in a PBS Newshour article on “Chavismo” after President Hugo Chavez’s death, Diana Negroponte looks at the responsibility Vice President Maduro has inherited and the future of U.S. relations with Venezuela.

"Chavismo" is based on the theory that an intrinsic relationship exists between the state and the citizen through the person of Hugo Chavez: he is both state and citizen. The state remains dedicated to advance the interests of its citizens and citizens commit to advancing the interests of the state. With the death of Hugo Chavez, who can provide the means to ensure this interlocking relationship between state and citizen?

Vice President Maduro inherited Chavez's mantle and he understands the philosophy of Chavismo. With plentiful resources, Maduro could continue the intrinsic relationship. But without those resources -- current economic problems will decrease disposable state expenditures -- Maduro will have to borrow money. Who will bankroll him?

The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) seeks to maintain the flow of Venezuelan crude and the stability of the Venezuelan government. Would the CNPC be willing to renegotiate its loans to ensure that both continued oil production and political stability continue? Probably. However, CNPC may impose limitations on Maduro's use of that "borrowed money". Maduro will have to accept a degree of austerity and further Chinese management and manpower in the Chinese housing, agriculture and energy projects. The nature of this "new reality" may be difficult for the Venezuelans to accept.

We should, therefore, expect Maduro to face growing domestic restlessness as he fails to deliver the promises of Chavismo. Maduro will seek to shift the blame onto others, including the United States. I anticipate deteriorating relations with Washington and raucous calls for the Bolivarian Alliance, known by its Spanish acronym ALBA, to intensify its anti-Yankee rhetoric. U.S. companies may find increasing restrictions on their activities, if not court cases such as the Chevron case in Ecuador. In the end, without sufficient resources ALBA will wither and Maduro will be a one-term president.

Read the full article »

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Publication: PBS Newshour

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

The Obama-Peña Nieto Meeting: Critical Issues in the Upcoming U.S.-Mexico Talks

Thu, 11 Apr 2013 16:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 11, 2013
4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Next month, President Barack Obama will meet with Mexico’s newly elected President Enrique Peña Nieto. While the two leaders met briefly last November, this meeting—Obama’s first in Latin America since his own re-election—will address major issues of concern to both nations including trade and investment, energy, border security and infrastructure, illicit drug trafficking and public safety. With significant political and economic consequences at stake, the Obama-Peña Nieto meeting will take place as both leaders face complex and contentious domestic challenges that have a direct impact on the bilateral relationship.

On April 11, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the critical issues that will dominate the Obama- Peña Nieto meeting. Arturo Sarukhan, Brookings distinguished affiliate and former ambassador of Mexico to the United States, provided opening remarks on the larger political context for the bilateral meeting. A panel discussion followed featuring contributors to the forthcoming book, The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition (Brookings, May 2013). Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Villiers Negroponte moderated the discussion.

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Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japan Foreign Aid Policies for Disaster Reduction

Goshi Tsukamoto — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The international community faces a variety of challenges caused by population growth, environmental problems, and an increase in the frequency of natural disasters in the last half century. In many parts of the world, calamities such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, storm surges, and tsunamis have caused a number of tragedies by creating socio-economic disorder, sometimes leading to unprecedented physical and human disruption.

Relatively well-governed countries have sufficient capabilities for rapid reaction and long-term recovery efforts, and are able to build resilience against adverse situations in their societies. Unfortunately, however, in a number of developing countries adequate social institutions and infrastructure have not been established to deal with such situations due to political, economic or historical factors. These regions remain relatively vulnerable to natural catastrophes, and their people are outside the circle of prosperity. [1]

In the global context, as described in 2011 in the initial Policy Framework document from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), providing assistance in disaster-stricken areas is a fundamental expression of common humanity, representing a visible manifestation of a common belief that is both morally right and strategically sound. [2] While nation states must take the primary responsibility for dealing with their own catastrophes, it is essential for the international community to help others help themselves, based on partnerships.[3] Large-scale disasters in developing countries inevitably cause enormous damage with wide-ranging and long-lasting effects, often eventually resulting in the deterioration of society as a whole. In relation to disaster reduction efforts in developing countries, the significance of international technical and financial cooperation is now shared as a global consensus. In fact, emergency relief and disaster reduction, particularly in developing countries, have become a main focus of international cooperation.[4] Donors have committed themselves to lending life-saving humanitarian assistance through rapid response to emergencies in poorer countries and sharing lessons and technologies to support adequate preparation for disasters. These new techniques and practices are expected to be institutionalized in recipient societies over the long term.

[1] They are more likely to suffer from extremely serious damage from natural disasters and may even be displaced nationally and internationally in some cases. It should also be noted that people in these nations additionally tend to suffer from secondary effects such as a deterioration in sanitary conditions and food shortages, which may last a long time.

[2] United States Agency for International Development, USAID Policy Framework, 2011-2015, p. 2; accessed February 26, 2013, http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.PDF.

[3] Looking at past catastrophic natural disasters, the international community has recognized the importance of disaster reduction and promoted international cooperation in and with vulnerable countries.

[4] In fact, numerous countermeasures against natural phenomena have been designed and implemented.

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Goshi Tsukamoto

The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:20:00 -0400

A high wire act played out over a 12-hour session of the General Assembly last week at the Organization of American States (OAS): Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out unless their demands were met. Considerable tensions existed within the Hall of the Americas as the foreign ministers witnessed another threat to the organization’s integrity. This time, the contest was over the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Since 1959, the IACHR has taken up and defended the rights of children, of women, of indigenous communities, of sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberty, afro-descendents, people with disabilities, migrants, defenders of human rights: in short, people in vulnerable situations. The IAHCR and its judicial arm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have continued to denounce and sanction violations of human rights. Throughout the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian military dictatorships of the 1970s and early 1980s, the commission and the court played key roles in making visible the victims of abuse. Despite perennial criticisms of the OAS for its failure to defend democratic institutions, the IACHR and the court are considered to be the main collective achievements in defending the rights of individual citizens in the Western Hemisphere.

On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the United States suffered critical attacks, the OAS General Assembly reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed on this historic day in U.S. history. In its Article 8 it gave the right to “any person who consider that his or her human rights have been violated may lodge a complaint or petition before the inter-American system for protection and promotion of human rights.” Individual citizens were recognized as legitimate actors in the consolidation of democracy.

It was therefore disturbing when in 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela raised three complaints about the IACHR: the budget should be limited to contributions from member states and not from observer nations and civil society; the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression should receive less funds and no more than the amount granted to other OAS rapporteurs; and, third, the headquarters for the IACHR should move out of Washington, preferably to Argentina.

The demands of Ecuador and Venezuela were discussed for over 22 months and through 37 meetings of IACHR and 29 working groups, the presentation of 98 documents from civil society, five academic meetings, three hemispheric audiences and one Extraordinary Session of the OAS. When the sought-for reforms were raised at the 44th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly last week, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out if their demands were not addressed.

Ecuador and Venezuela – with Bolivian and Nicaraguan support – called to limit the IACHR budget. This was an effort both to limit outside influences on the human rights commission as well as to reduce, even further its effectiveness. Currently, 55 percent of the IACHR’s budget comes from the OAS, the remaining 45 percent comes from member countries, observer nations and civil society. In 2012, the IACHR had an annual budget of $10 million with which to pay rapporteurs, attorneys and staff. With only 34 attorneys for 35 member countries and 31 other staff members, the work of investigating the 448 complaints submitted in 2012 is already inadequate because it enables consideration of only 10 percent of the complaints. Rather than reduce further the IACHR budget, the commission has requested doubling its budget to $20 million in order to hire more attorneys and consider more complaints.

The second complaint was more serious, namely a reduction in the budget for Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. The work of this office is dedicated to preserving “the right to seek, receive, and disseminate information and opinions freely.” (Declaration of Principles on the Right to Freedom of Expression). The call to reduce the budget for this office was a demand to limit, if not curtail its effectiveness. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, the press has been censured, and in certain cases closed, because of stories critical of the government.

The third complaint requesting that the IACHR move out of Washington did not receive the same objection. Both Costa Rica and Peru offered to host the commission, should it have to leave the OAS building and support structure thereof.

It is noteworthy that Mexico, which has received more complaints before the IACHR in the last two years than any other nation within the OAS, rejected the demands of Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia, which during its civil war with the FARC had been the object of criticism from numerous, alleged victims of human rights, also rejected the demands. While Bolivia and Nicaragua joined in the Ecuadoran demand, the Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) did not do so; nor did Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, Canada and the United States. The four ALBA continental nations were marginalized and on this occasion failed to modify the rules and process of the OAS. Only Argentina prevented the walk-out of Ecuador and Venezuela by presenting a motion that enabled the OAS to continue debating the three reforms.

The contest will continue and Ecuador will seek to lead its ALBA allies in rejecting liberal democratic concepts, such as human rights and press freedom. The significance of the 44th Extraordinary General Assemblyof the OAS is that the ALBA countries failed to undermine the democratic principles of the Inter-American system. If anything, the criticism has strengthened the resolve of the Western Hemisphere to retain its ideals and maintain a process by which individuals can bring complaints before an international body that accepts the sovereignty of the people, not the governors.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

BRICS Investing in Africa: Geopolitical and Economic Ramifications

Thu, 28 Mar 2013 09:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 28, 2013
9:30 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

B-354
Rayburn House Office Building
45 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20515

On Thursday, March 28, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings (AGI) and the Congressional African Staff Association (CASA) hosted a briefing for congressional staffers on the growing relationship between the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—and African countries, and implication for U.S. foreign policy and economic relations with Africa. Panelists included: Yun Sun, Brookings visiting fellow, and Haroon Bhorat, professor of economics and director of the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Vera Songwe moderated the discussion, and Gregory H. Simpkins, professional staff member of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, provided opening remarks.

This event is part of the Africa Policy Dialogue on the Hill, a monthly congressional briefing hosted by AGI and CASA on topical issues relevant to Africa’s growth and security.

TRANSCRIPT

MR. SIMPKINS: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Africa Dialogue on the Hill. I’m Greg Simpkins, Professional Staff Member for the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. Our forums offer an African perspective on Africa issues as well as those of outside experts. This is a monthly co-presentation by the Congressional Africa Staff Association, or CASA, and the Africa Growth Initiative of the Brookings Institution.

For those who don’t know CASA, we’re a bipartisan, bicameral association of staff members who seek to educate our colleagues on today’s substantive Africa issues on the continent and within greater Africa diaspora through panel discussions, briefings, and other events with decision makers and officials involved in Africa policy.

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