Brookings: Topics - Kenya

A Theoretical Framework for Kenya's Central Bank Macroeconometric Model

Maureen Were, Anne W. Kamau, Moses M. Sichei and Moses Kiptui — Fri, 17 May 2013 10:29:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the theoretical framework for the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) macroeconometric model. In addition, it highlights the theoretical base for the model’s main behavioral equations. The justification for the model relates to its usefulness in aiding the policymaking process at the CBK. It is expected that the model will support the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and Research Department in further understanding how the economy works through the complex interactions of various economic agents. The conduct of monetary policy requires fairly accurate analyses and forecasts backed up by sound economic theory and a rationale ensuring that effective monetary policy is formulated and implemented. In this regard, the model will provide consistent short-term forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as economic growth and inflation. In addition, the model will be helpful in evaluating the impact of various shocks and policies on the economy. The MPC may also use the model as an instrument to help in structuring its communication with the public on the rationale behind its decisions.

This paper is organized as follows. The rest of Section 1 discusses the type of macro model developed, Section 2 presents the model’s logical and theoretical framework and illustrates the linkages between the monetary submodel and the other blocks of the model, Section 3 discusses the theoretical foundations of the model’s behavioral equations, and Section 4 concludes.

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Authors

Maureen Were
Anne W. Kamau
Moses M. Sichei
Moses Kiptui

Image Source: © Antony Njuguna / Reuters

Six Major Decision Points for Uhuru Administration

Eric Aligula and Anne W. Kamau — Sun, 12 May 2013 16:18:00 -0400

On March 4, 2013 Kenya successfully concluded elections under the new Constitution, ushering in new leadership in a devolved form of government.

President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto are faced with the surmountable but difficult task of revamping economic growth and implementing the new supreme law while seeking to deliver on promises made to Kenyans during their campaign.

The new government is faced with a tight resource environment within which to manoeuvre, hence the need to carefully identify priorities that will facilitate the quantum leap of the economy in the next five years, including measures to achieve an appropriate balance between private and public sector investments in the economy. Kenya’s economic performance in the last five years has been on the upswing from its low 2008 performance, but still faces some challenges. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, the economy grew at 5.8 percent, 4.4 percent and 4.5 percent per annum, respectively.

It is projected to grow at an annual rate of 5.1 per cent, 6.0 percent and 7.1 percent in 2013, 2014 and 2015. However, these growth rates remain below the psychological 10 per cent per annum target which is also under the national development blueprint Vision 2030.

As a matter of fact, this administration has promised a double-digit growth rate. Government resources are stretched with a rising wage bill estimated at Sh458 billion, which is about 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

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Authors

Eric Aligula
Anne W. Kamau

Publication: Business Daily

Image Source: © Marko Djurica / Reuters

Kenya: A Country Redeemed after a Peaceful Election

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Tue, 02 Apr 2013 10:27:00 -0400

The aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya – which resulted in 1,300 deaths and thousands more displaced from their homes— left an ugly scar on the country’s image. Since attaining independence from British rule in 1963, Kenya had been one of few African exceptions to military coups and civil conflicts. The post-election violence in 2007 greatly undermined Kenya’s position as country where the people were united. It revealed serious grievances and divisions in the society and many ridiculed Kenya as yet another story of a state doomed to fail.

However, over the five years, Kenyans have made significant reforms in their institutions that in part contributed to the violence in 2007. Kenyans now have a new constitution, which not only creates lower level county governments but also reduces the powers of the presidency and establishes many independent institutions that are not subject to manipulation by the executive. The most important of these include a reformed judiciary and the Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

On March 4, 2013, Kenyans participated in a complex election that included voting for the president and deputy president, county governors, senators, members of parliament and women representatives. Kenyans turned out in large numbers with over 80 percent of registered voters coming out to vote. There were no serious incidences of violence and the electoral process was deemed by many international observes as free, fair and credible. Although the IEBC faced challenges in the tallying process as a result of the technological failure of the data transmission system, the reversion to manual tallying did not compromise the integrity of the process.

After days of tallying and counter-checking the election results, the IEBC declared Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto as having been duly elected as president and deputy president, having received over 50 percent of the votes cast. Their closest rival, Raila Odinga and his running mate, Kalonzo Musyoka, managed about 43 percent of the votes cast. However, Mr. Odinga refused to accept the results on the grounds that the IEBC had failed to conduct a credible election. But on March 31, 2013, the Supreme Court of Kenya declared that the March 4 election was free, fair and credible.

To a large extent, the prevailing peace in Kenya is a result of the many reforms that the country has undertaken to create credible institutions like the IEBC. Kenyans also trust the reformed judiciary, which has demonstrated its professionalism, independence, and capacity to adjudicate on complex matters, including the presidential election. One major lesson for the international community is that peace is more likely to be durable when it’s the people of Kenya and their own institutions that are left to handle their problems.

Now that credible and peaceful elections have taken place, Kenya has redeemed itself. This is the big story that the local media has been covering. However, the international media coverage of the elections has been extremely poor and demonstrated a mundane understanding of the electoral dynamics in Kenya. Apparently, international media outlets sent their best war correspondents and not election experts. It seems like they expected to cover stories of violence rather than elections. Frustrated with peaceful elections, these correspondents failed to note the great progress that Kenya has made and the monumental significance of the 2013 elections.

Kenya and the International Community

Leaders from all over the world— including from the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Russia, China, U.N. Secretary General Moon, and many others— have congratulated Kenya’s new president-elect and his deputy. They have all praised the major progress that Kenya has made in conducing credible and peaceful elections. The statement released by the White House noted that “the electoral process and the peaceful adjudication of disputes in the Kenyan legal system are testaments to the progress Kenya has made in strengthening its democratic institutions, and the desire of the Kenyan people to move their country forward.” These statements underscore the progress that Kenyans have made to resolve their own problems.

The statements by the United States and United Kingdom also noted that Kenya must continue to uphold “its international obligations, including those with respect to international justice.” This is specifically in reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has indicted both Mr. Kenyatta and Mr. Ruto. The two have committed to clearing the allegations by the ICC and will abide with the ICC process.

However, if the international community is truly committed to the fair adjudication of justice by the ICC, it must also ensure that the court is not used to play politics. It is quite obvious that the Kenyan cases currently before the ICC were poorly investigated and the selection of the accused was purely a political move to remove the most popular candidates from the presidential contest. Evidence recently revealed shows that witnesses were manipulated to lie in order to get convictions. Witnesses have actually recanted and some of the cases dropped. In fact, one factor that boosted the support of the Kenyatta and Ruto is precisely that Kenyans realized that the ICC had been sucked into the Kenyan politics. Now that this scheme has failed and the two have been elected, the international community needs to place more scrutiny on the ICC so that it does not continue to divide Kenyans and other Africans.

As noted previously, the prevailing peace in Kenya is the outcome of the interplay of the Kenya’s own institutions. With the reformed judiciary that Kenyans trust, the ICC intervention in the country needs to be reconsidered. So, as global leaders call upon Kenyans to uphold their commitment to international justice, they must also recognize that the ICC is itself far from perfect and prone to political manipulation.

Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta Deserves Support of the International Community

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 09:46:00 -0400

The people of Kenya have elected Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta as their president and William Ruto as the deputy president. This was the first election under a new constitution and also the first presidential election after the 2007 post-election violence. Although there were technical challenges with the electronic system that was meant to transmit results from the polling stations to the national tallying center, the election was largely free, fair and credible. Contrary to widespread predictions that the race would end in a runoff, Kenyatta was able to receive over 50 percent of the votes cast in the first round as required by the constitution for a candidate to be declared president.

The electoral process was managed by an electoral commission that is independent, and one that has conducted its business in an open and transparent manner. The commission set various eligibility requirements for the candidates to run for the presidency and other elected positions. The commission has also followed the election regulations guiding its operations. The reformed judiciary properly adjudicated the eligibility of the candidates. Thus, by all standards and provisions of Kenya’s new constitution, Uhuru Kenyatta has been duly elected the fourth president of the Republic of Kenya.

The election was conducted under intense international oversight of a large contingency of international observers. The general verdict of the observers is that the election was free and fair. Thus, the election of Kenyatta and Ruto is a true reflection of the will of the people of Kenya and is therefore an advancement of democracy in Kenya and Africa.

Kenyatta and Ruto’s win has not come easy. The two have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged involvement in the 2007 post-election violence. The ICC intervention in Kenya has, however, been seen by Kenyans as largely a political, rather than a judicial, process. A large fraction of Kenyans have come to regard the ICC intervention as an attempt to remove the two from political contention rather than seek justice for the victims of the violence. This view was given credence by statements by European and U.S. officials warning Kenyans of dire consequences if they elected Kenyatta and Ruto. These statements came just when polls showed that the race for presidency was tightening. Therefore, many Kenyans considered the statements an attempt by the United States and Europe to impose leaders on them: To an extent, Uhuru’s win represents a rejection of what Kenyans consider neo-colonial intervention. Even with intimidation over sanctions, Kenyans have made their choice, and this choice should be respected by all those who genuinely stand for democracy and freedom.

The election of the two should also be seen as repudiation of the ICC. As I have observed over the last year, the ICC intervention in Kenya has had the very adverse effect of exacerbating ethnic divisions in the country. To some extent, the rejection of Prime Minister Raila Odinga is because of his real or perceived collaboration with the ICC to selectively have his key competitors accused. While this perception of his motives may be unfair, it has gained traction and was a key factor in bringing Ruto and Kenyatta together into the winning coalition. In essence, the credibility of the ICC in Kenya and, indeed, in Africa is severely damaged. As such, the international community’s engagement with Kenya should not be informed by the ICC process. Already the cases are falling apart and the Court has in fact referred one of the cases back to the pre-trial chamber to reconsider the confirmation of charges. There are indications that the charges should be withdrawn as witnesses have recanted their statements, which were pivotal in confirming the charges. It is therefore irrational and shortsighted for foreign governments to base their relations with a democratically elected government on the basis of what Kenyans have come to rightfully consider a highly political ICC process.

The head of state and his deputy face a challenging task ahead of them. The new leadership must focus on the issues surrounding the post-election violence, including historical grievances, such as land ownership and access to economic opportunities, that were the real cause of the violence. They must also focus on regional inequalities and youth unemployment, both of which have the potential to destabilize the country. Finally, the new leadership has inherited a country that is severely divided along ethnic lines, especially because of the ICC intervention. Kenya cannot become the great nation that it aspires to be with such a fractionalized society. The success of the Kenyatta administration will therefore largely depend on how well it succeeds in unifying Kenyans.

For the Kenyatta administration to succeed in steering Kenya towards a path of economic transformation, it must strengthen Kenya’s relations with her neighbors in East Africa and Africa at large. The administration must also deepen and diversify the country’s strategic relations with the wider international community, especially in respect to development cooperation, trade and investment. However, such relationships should not be at the expense of ceding Kenya’s sovereignty. This is the clear and resounding message that Kenyans sent in voting for Kenyatta and Ruto.

A few weeks before the election, President Barack Obama delivered a pointed message to the people of Kenya in which he made it clear that the United States was not supporting any particular candidate and that his government would work with the leaders that Kenyans elect in a free and fair election. The Kenyans have made this choice and have done so guided by a new constitution that has largely overhauled the country’s institutions. To advance the course of peace and stability in Kenya, it is crucial that the international community, led by President Obama, support Kenyatta and his government as he takes over the leadership of the country. This support should start with an explicit message congratulating the president-elect.

President Obama can demonstrate his commitment to the advancement of democracy in Africa by making an official visit to Kenya as soon as possible. It will be great day for Kenya and Africa when the democratically elected President Kenyatta hosts the leader of the free world in the country of his father’s birth.

Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Image Source: © Thomas Mukoya / Reuters

Kenyans Head to the Polls - and a New Displacement Crisis?

Megan Bradley — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 11:45:00 -0500

Last night, Kenyans across the country crowded around radios and televisions for the second round of Presidential election debates. With elections less than a week away, tensions are running high. This is no ordinary election. The country’s last elections, in 2007, unleashed a surge of violence that left 1,300 dead and forced 600,000 from their homes – including some of my family friends, who fled the village of Ahero in western Kenya and eventually found shelter in the soccer stadium in Kisumu, Kenya’s third largest city. One of the leading presidential candidates and his running mate have been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against humanity for allegedly orchestrating much of this violence. Our friends have returned to Ahero, but scores of Kenyans will not be able to cast their votes on Monday from their home towns: an estimated 250,000 Kenyans are currently displaced. Some have still not been able to go home – or find a new home – after the last round of election violence. In 2012 alone, over 118,000 people were newly displaced by ethnically and politically charged violence.

On top of all this, in addition to a new president and MPs, Monday’s vote will see Kenyans elect representatives to a host of new positions created under the country’s 2010 Constitution. Chaloka Beyani, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), points out that, “Elections this year are not only about national positions, but also about local ones. Power struggles over political representation at the local level have already resulted in new displacements in some instances.”

In order to ensure that Monday’s vote does not repeat the tragedy of 2007/2008, the government needs to ramp up efforts to prevent and prepare for potential violence and displacement. As the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, has noted, “Instances of localized violence likely to result in the arbitrary displacement of persons in Kenya have steadily increased in the run up to the elections.” To its credit, the government of Kenya has laid the foundation for this prevention work by adopting a new IDP Act in December 2012 and approving a comprehensive IDP policy. According to the Special Rapporteur, “The IDP Act clearly obliges the government and others to guard against violence and prevent internal displacement.”

In addition to its obligation to prevent violence and new waves of displacement, the government of Kenya – and the international community – have a responsibility to hold the architects of the 2007/2008 crisis to account. Whatever the outcome of next week’s elections, this challenge must still be faced. In the meantime, I’ll be thinking of our friends in Ahero, hoping that the next time they visit the Kisumu soccer stadium, it will be to see a match and not to stay the night.

Authors

Megan Bradley

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Perspectives on Kenya’s Presidential Election: Reflections from 2007

Anne W. Kamau — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 12:00:00 -0500

In just about one week, Kenyans will cast their ballots in the 2013 presidential election. This historic event has provoked intense emotions across the country, with many citizens experiencing a rare combination of hope for the future and anxiety about the past. Earlier this week, my colleague Mwangi S. Kimenyi and I discussed Kenya’s national mood with Karuti Kanyinga, professor at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi. Our conversation recounts personal experiences from the tragic post-election violence of 2007, as well as what we believe has been progress made to reconcile and heal the people of Kenya.

We hope you enjoy this, and Kwaheri, and kila la heri Kenya!

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Kenya's Presidential Election, 2013: Looking Back to Move Forward

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Anne W. Kamau

Kenya Decides: The 2013 Presidential Election

Wed, 20 Feb 2013 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 20, 2013
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Next month, Kenya will hold its first elections since 2007. While the country has made significant progress since this time, including approving a new constitution and achieving strong economic growth, two of the leading candidates for president and vice president – Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto – are being indicted by the International Criminal Court for their alleged role in the violence that followed the 2007 elections. International pressure for free and fair elections in Kenya is high and holding peaceful elections in the country will have major implications for the region and relations with international partners, including the United States.

On February 20, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on Kenya’s upcoming elections. Panelists included: Jendayi Frazer, distinguished service professor at Carnegie Mellon University; Karuti Kanyinga, professor the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi; and Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative. Vincent Makori, host of Voice of America’s Africa In Focus, moderated the discussion.

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The High Return to Private Schooling in a Low-Income Country

Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Germano Mwabu, Tessa Bold and Justin Sandefur — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 15:39:00 -0500

Despite widespread policy interest in market solutions to public service delivery, a large literature on the effect of private schooling on academic achievement shows little or no causal benefit. In a much-cited paper, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find that a voucher program that dramatically expanded private schooling in Chile led to no discernible increase in test scores over time. In the U.S., Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) find little or no impact of Catholic schooling on test scores after controlling for selection effects. Similarly for Indonesia, Newhouse and Beegle (2011) find that private schooling has a significant, negative effect on test scores. Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002) find significantly positive, but modest, effects from a policy experiment in Colombia, with recipients of randomly allocated vouchers scoring roughly 0.2 standard deviations higher than non-recipients.

In this paper we demonstrate that in a low-income African country with weak public sector institutions, i.e., Kenya, the effect on test scores of moving to private schooling may be dramatically higher than found in previous work in the U.S., Latin America or Asia.

Over the past decade, private school enrollment has grown rapidly in Kenya. In a companion paper, we argue that this secular trend was driven, somewhat paradoxically, by the abolition of fees in public primary schools in 2003 and the concomitant decline in the perceived quality of public schools (Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabu, and Sandefur 2011).

The main contribution of the paper lies in estimating the causal effect of private schooling on test performance for Kenyan primary school students using nationwide standardized test scores. An obvious obstacle here is the endogenous sorting of pupils. The key to our identification strategy is aggregation in the spirit of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006). The growth of private enrollment will only affect average scores in a district—aggregating over both public and private schools—inasmuch as there is a genuine causal force at work. Controlling for time-invariant district characteristics, we document a large performance advantage of Kenyan private schools, equivalent to a full standard deviation of pupil- level test scores.

Furthermore, we use survey data on households’ education expenditure to show that Kenyan private schools operate at low cost relative to public schools: Nearly two-thirds of pupils in the private system pay fees less than the median per-pupil funding level in government schools.

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Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Germano Mwabu
Tessa Bold
Justin Sandefur

Image Source: © Noor Khamis / Reuters

Presidential Election a Major Tipping Point for Kenya’s Role in International Community

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Wed, 13 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Democracy’s health in Africa was mixed in 2012. Free and fair elections in Kenya will go a long way to stabilizing democracy across Africa, says Mwangi Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings. The next leader of Kenya, he says, not only has to think about the ethnic divide between Kenya and the international community, but needs to focus on quality education, access to health care and food security.

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Presidential Election a Major Tipping Point for Kenya’s Role in International Community

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Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Kenya’s Elections: Implications of Ethnic Rivalries and International Intervention

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 14:50:00 -0500

On March 4, 2013, Kenyans will go to the polls to elect their fourth president in the most crucial election the country has held since independence. It comes five years after the 2007 post-election violence and it will be the first election under a new devolved constitution.

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Presidential Election a Major Tipping Point for Kenya’s Role in International Community

The election has attracted eight presidential candidates but the real contest is primarily between the current prime minister, Raila Odinga, who is making a third attempt at the presidency, and Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, who is making his second bid. Both Uhuru and Raila are charismatic leaders and have been able to galvanize broad support across the country boosted by a tight grip on their respective ethnic communities.

The rivalry between the two and their communities dates back to the days of their fathers. Uhuru is the son of Jomo Kenyatta who was imprisoned by the British colonialists and branded a terrorist for pushing for independence. His father later became Kenya’s first president. Raila is the son of Jaramogi Oginga Ondiga who served as Kenyatta’s Vice President before the two fell out and Odinga joined the opposition.

Since the fall out between President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and Oginga, a Luo, the two ethnic groups have remained suspicious of each other and their relationship has been marked by mistrust and at times open animosity. Most of the recent elections have mostly been a contest between Kikuyu candidates and the Odingas.

The 2013 election mirrors the previous contests with a Kikuyu and a Luo as the main contestants— this time with the same family rivalries as the 1960s.

In the first multi-party election in 1992, the main challengers to then incumbent president Moi were Kenneth Matiba (a Kikuyu), Mwai Kibaki (a Kikuyu) and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (a Luo). The opposition lost to Moi, an outcome attributed to the fact that the Kikuyus denied the elderly Odinga a chance to face Moi alone. This scenario was to repeat itself again in 1997 when the main challengers to Moi were Kibaki and Raila Odinga. In 2007, the presidential contest was again between current president Kibaki and Raila. The 2013 election mirrors the previous contests with a Kikuyu and a Luo as the main contestants— this time with the same family rivalries as the 1960s.

Because of a constitutional provision requiring the winning candidate to receive over 50 percent of all votes cast, all the candidates have reached out beyond their ethnic bases and traditional alliances, bringing longstanding rivals together: Raila and his running mate, Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka, were arch rivals for long time while Uhuru and his running mate William Ruto were in opposite camps during the 2007 election.

The new alliances, which are to a large extent formed around ethnic groups, are key to winning the election. One unfortunate outcome of the new constitutional provision is that rather than reducing the role of ethnicity in the elections, it has created the need for new alliances that have tended to balkanize Kenya into tribal blocs. Although the candidates have formulated impressive issue-based manifestos, voting is likely to be based not on issues but on primarily ethnic alignments.

In addition to the old ethnic rivalries and new alliances, the next election is also fueled by the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has indicted Uhuru and his running mate, William Ruto, in connection to the post-election violence. The ICC process has also galvanized ethnic communities in support of the accused as they see the indictments as victimization of their communities. Thus, while indications are that there is likely to be much fewer incidences of violence, Kenya is much more fractured and will remain so after the elections.

Johnnie Carson, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recently issued a statement stressing that there would be consequences if Kenyans elect those indicted by ICC.

On top of the ICC indictments, the international community has become heavily involved in the Kenyan elections. Johnnie Carson, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recently issued a statement stressing that there would be consequences if Kenyans elect those indicted by ICC. The assistant secretary’s statement has been widely criticized by Uhuru’s supporters who feel that it contradicts a statement issued by President Obama, which declared that the U.S. government would work with any person elected through a fair and free election in Kenya. European governments have also issued statements warning Kenyans that the country would be subjected to sanctions if they elected those indicted by the ICC.

Unfortunately, it does appear that the comments by foreign governments have had the effect of increasing the ethnic divisions in Kenya. Those in support of Uhuru see this as yet another way that Western nations are imposing specific leaders on Kenyans and have branded their statements and intervention as imperialistic. Some have even compared the stance of these western countries to the treatment they imparted on Uhuru’s father during the anti-colonial rebellion.

However, supporters of other candidates see these comments by the international community as fair given the gravity of the matter. One valid concern relates to how Uhuru would lead the country while fighting the charges at the Hague. This is a particularly serious matter because Uhuru’s running mate is also facing charges in front of the ICC.

Notwithstanding, it is almost certain that the next president will be either Raila or Uhuru. But it is highly unlikely that any of them will attain the necessary votes for a first round win. Therefore, the support of other candidates will be crucial in determining the winner. As a result, Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi, who is also in the race, may end up being the “kingmaker.”

After the election, Kenya will likely face many challenges. Although the presidential candidates have promised to focus on the economy, especially job creation and other aspects of development, it is probably the task of building a united Kenya and breaking down the tribal rivalries that will be most daunting. The ethnic divisions remain a key barrier to Kenya’s economic takeoff.

Regardless of which ticket wins the presidency, the country is bound to be challenged by the intervention of the ICC and also by the bad blood created by the intervention of foreign governments. The new leaders must deal with these issues cautiously to avoid exacerbating the already severe ethnic divisions.

The ICC must also trend carefully, especially now that some witnesses have recanted the evidence which seems to radically weaken the case against some of the accused. It is critical that the ICC process not be seen as a political one and must remain strictly judicial.

Leaders of some of the ethnic groups must also seek ways to bury old rivalries that continue to divide the country and act as a constraint to the country’s development.

Leaders of some of the ethnic groups must also seek ways to bury old rivalries that continue to divide the country and act as a constraint to the country’s development. Solutions will not come from foreign governments and intervention by foreign governments only makes divisions more severe. Political leaders are also unlikely to solve the problem because their political capital is based on ethnic cleavages. This task is therefore best left to elders of the respective communities. Thus, elders from the Luo and Kikuyu communities for example should come together and chart a way forward that unites the two communities. After all, these two groups do not have longstanding land disputes between them, which have often been the source of conflict between other ethnic groups.

The election also holds many opportunities. Unlike in the 2007 election, Kenya has a reformed its judiciary and has set up new independent electoral institutions. These institutions will ensure a free and fair election thus minimizing the probability of electoral violence. A violence free election will go a long way of erasing the bad memories of 2007.

But with all the attention focused on the Odinga-Uhuru contest and its implications on ethnic divisions, a crucial aspect is missing—the gubernatorial elections of county leaders. Kenya’s new constitution established 47 county governments and these governments will be new centers of power where citizens will be able to more effectively exercise their political voice. The devolved system of government holds great potential of improving local service delivery which has been a major problem under the current governance system.

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Presidential Election a Major Tipping Point for Kenya’s Role in International Community

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Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

African Experts Discuss the Region's Top Issues in 2013

Anne W. Kamau — Fri, 21 Dec 2012 12:00:00 -0500

Each year, the Africa Growth Initiative uses the occasion of the New Year to preview events and trends that are anticipated to shape Africa in the coming year. And this year’s Foresight Africa report— a collection of short briefs on what our scholars see are the major issues for Africa in 2013— seeks to continue this tradition.

In support of this year’s Foresight Africa, I recently interviewed scholars from five leading think tanks in Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda, asking them to identify the biggest challenges facing their respective countries in the year ahead, and how these issues will likely impact relations with the United States and the welfare of their citizens. Their responses touch on similar themes of governance, youth employment, and how economic growth can better support the continent’s broader development goals.

We are interested to hear your thoughts on what you see as the top issues for Africa in 2013 as well as your feedback on our report. You can join the conversation on twitter using the hashtag #ForesightAfrica and please tune in to our live webcasted event on January 9, where we will delve into these issues with a group of leading Africanists.

We look forward to hearing from you and, on behalf of the Africa Growth Initiative, happy New Year!

Anne W. Kamau

Uganda

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Foresight Africa: Uganda

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Anne W. Kamau

Why the Resignation of Ambassador Gration is Significant—and Tragic

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 11:23:00 -0400

The resignation of U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Major General Scott Gration, comes at a critical time as Kenya is preparing for the first general election under its new constitution. The respected Gration served as a special envoy to Sudan before being appointed by President Obama in May, 2011 to replace Ambassador Michael Ranneberger.

In his resignation, Ambassador Gration indicated that he was prompted to leave his post due to differences in his leadership style and disagreement with Washington on priorities. Although he did not provide details, the resignation is unfortunate. First, it is a critical time for Kenya because of the expected political transition in 2013, thus making a stable Kenya-U.S. relationship is crucial. Second, unlike many other diplomats who have been more like activists than diplomats, Gration was all business and seemed to focus on the issues that matter for Kenyans and Americans including issues of trade and more effective engagement of American businesses. Finally, for the short time that he served in Kenya, he was largely a neutral player and did not let himself to be captured by any wing of the coalition government. He was very passionate about Kenya and was the type of diplomat that was certainly good for the country.

There must be good reasons as to why he disagreed with Washington and one could only speculate about the sources of those differences. Some speculate that there were concerns about the ambassador’s recent pronouncements about terror activities in the Coast; differences regarding post-election violence, the International Criminal Court and role of the United States in the forthcoming elections, or even the U.S. position on some social issues and how they might impact U.S. policy in Kenya. It is widely acknowledged among Kenyans that Gration’s approach to the reform agenda may have differed with that of his Washington bosses—all speculation but not far-fetched.

In selecting a replacement, President Obama must be cognizant of the delicate situation in the country. With this in mind, it is imperative to have a substantive replacement as soon as possible. The new ambassador must also be one who respects the wishes of the Kenyan people and should not seek to play politics as some have done in the past. Neutrality in the next general election will be critical not only for United States but also all foreign governments. Furthermore, the new envoy must have a progressive mindset—Kenya is not begging for aid, it is seeking to establish mutually beneficial relationships that can result in sustainable economic growth and job creation. The job of the new ambassador should not be to give Kenyans lectures on issues that they are already well-versed in but to work with them to identify opportunities for development.

Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Image Source: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah / Reuters

Kenya in Transition: A Conversation with Vice President Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka

Tue, 22 May 2012 13:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2012
1:30 PM - 2:45 PM EDT

.
The University of California Washington Center
1608 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

Few countries have experienced transitions as dramatic as those occurring now in the Republic of Kenya. Just in the past year, Kenyans have adopted a new national constitution, deployed security forces to Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabaab militants, and discovered commercially-viable oil deposits. Amid these developments, Kenya is preparing for its first presidential elections since the 2008 election disputes.

On May 22, the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at Brookings hosted Kenya’s Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka for a discussion on these dramatic transitions and current national challenges and opportunities. Vice President Musyoka was appointed by President Mwai Kibaki in 2008, and previously served as foreign affairs minister from 1993–98 and 2003–04. Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative, provided introductory remarks. Witney Schneidman, special guest with AGI, moderated the discussion.

After the program, Vice President Musyoka took audience questions.

Participants

Panelists

Mwangi Kimenyi

The Honorable Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka

Vice President

Witney Schneidman

Special Guest

From National Responsibility to Response – Part II: Internally Displaced Persons' Housing, Land and Property Rights

Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark — Wed, 22 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The first part is available here.

This post continues our discussion of the study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement" recently released by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

Addressing housing, land, and property (HLP) issues is a key component of national responsibility. Principle 29 of the non-binding but widely accepted Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement emphasizes that competent authorities have a duty to assist IDPs to recover their property and possessions or, when recovery is not possible, to obtain appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

The 2005 Framework for National Responsibility – which set the benchmarks we applied in our current study – reaffirms this responsibility (in Benchmark 10, “support durable solutions”) and flags a number of the challenges that often arise, such as IDPs’ lack of formal title or other documentary evidence of land and property ownership; the destruction of any such records due to conflict or natural disaster; and discrimination against women in laws and customs regulating property ownership and inheritance. The Framework for National Responsibility stresses that, “Government authorities should anticipate these problems and address them in line with international human rights standards and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.”

The extent to which a government has safeguarded HLP rights, including by assisting IDPs to recover their housing, land, and property thus was among the indicators by which we evaluated the efforts of each of the 15 governments examined in our study. Our findings emphasized the importance of both an adequate legal and policy framework for addressing displacement related HLP issues and the role that bodies charged with adjudication and monitoring can play in ensuring implementation.

HLP Law and Policy Frameworks

One of the most encouraging signs of governments taking seriously their responsibility to address internal displacement has been the development, adoption and implementation in all regions of the world of specific laws and policies that respect the rights of IDPs. Some of the countries surveyed have developed laws, decrees, orders, and policies that protect IDPs’ HLP rights, but these measures are also not without their limits and challenges. A few examples are presented below.

In Colombia, while Law 387 on Internal Displacement (1997) stipulates the right of IDPs to compensation and restitution (Article 10), the government has been hard-pressed to establish measures enabling them to realize that right (see further, below). In Colombia, the constitutional complaint process – the acción de tutela petition procedure – has made the government accountable to IDPs and has influenced government policy toward IDPs, including the policy of allocation of government assistance such as housing subsidies.

In Georgia, the legal framework for IDP protection includes a property restitution law for IDPs from South Ossetia, adopted in 2007, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution and Compensation; however, this body never became operational and the status of the law is unclear following the August 2008 conflict. The State Strategy on IDPs, also adopted in 2007, protects IDPs against “arbitrary/illegitimate eviction” and sets out a large-scale program for improving the living conditions of IDPs in their place of displacement, all the while reaffirming their right to property restitution.[1]

Displaced families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the August 2008 received $15,000 from the government to rebuild their homes, although many IDPs have held off reconstruction efforts due to concerns about insecurity. The RSG on IDPs recommended in 2009 the established of a comprehensive mechanism for resolving HLP claims for both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, in 2010, Georgia adopted procedures for vacating and reallocating IDP housing, which, among other things, addresses those cases in which removal of IDPs from a collective center is ordered by the government and may require an eviction, and spells out safeguards for guaranteeing the right of IDPs.[2]

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution protects Iraqis against forced displacement (Article 44(2)). Through its Property Claims Commission, formerly the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes established by Order No. 2 (2006), Iraq has sought to recover property seized between 1968 and 2003, although significant gaps and challenges remain. For those internally displaced between 2006 and 2008, Prime Ministerial Order 101 (2008) sets out a framework for providing property restitution for registered IDPs with a view to encouraging and facilitating their return to Baghdad governorate, the origin of the majority of post-2006 IDPs and the location of the majority of post-2006 returnees. However, there have been few claims; many IDPs lack the necessary documentation, do not trust government institutions, fear retribution or cannot afford the requisite costs.[3]

In Afghanistan, where national authorities have not yet defined “internally displaced persons,” property and land rights of IDPs are either specifically addressed or generally implicated in substantive and procedural provisions found in a series of executive acts that have been issued since 2001, including the most IDP-specific of them, Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2005). This decree sets forth a basic framework for distributing government land to both IDPs and returnees as a means of addressing their housing needs. However, IDPs seeking access to land are required to provide their national identity cards (tazkera) and documentation proving their internal displacement status—documentation which they may have lost. Moreover, the decree does not recognize other fundamental rights or needs of the internally displaced; it is valid only in areas of origin; and its implementation has been marred by inefficiency and corruption within the very weak ministry that is tasked with its implementation.

Although the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal included a commitment to return occupied land and property and to allow for the return of displaced persons, four years after the peace agreement (and three years after the adoption of a national policy), between 50,000 and 70,000 people remained displaced. Nearly half of the returnees interviewed by the Nepal IDP Working Group reported serious land, housing and property problems. Of the more than 10,000 claims for compensation for property filed in 2007 only 2,000 families had received support to reconstruct or repair their houses by 2009. It is widely reported that IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been the least likely to recover land and property.

In Turkey, the government has yet to take full responsibility for displacement caused by its security forces against a largely Kurdish population. In its Law 5233 on Compensation of Damages That Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terror (27 July 2004) and its Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program, displacement is defined in terms of “terrorism” or the “fight” against it. This law does not specifically focus on internal displacement, but it does benefit IDPs among other affected populations. Law 5233 and its related amendments and regulations compensate for “material damages suffered by persons due to terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror” between 1987 and 2004. Compensation is provided for three types of damage: loss of property; physical injuries, disabilities, medical treatment, death and funerals; and inability to access property due to measures taken during “the fight against terrorism.”

According to the law, compensation is to be determined by damage assessment commissions (DACs) at the provincial level, with funding provided by the Ministry of the Interior. From 2004 to August 2009, the commissions received just over 360,000 applications. Of those, over 190,000 claims were decided: 120,000 were approved and the claimants awarded compensation; the remaining 70,000 were denied. Around $1.4 billion in compensation was awarded, of which close to $1.1 billion has been paid.[4] The existing legal and policy framework do not adequately address the obstacles to return, including the village guard system, insecurity and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

In Kenya, the government’s promotion of return included a National Humanitarian Emergency Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims of 2007 Post-Election Violence which was to meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But in practice, the government has been criticized for promoting return before conditions were safe. The government has also tended to focus on IDPs who own land and to attach durable solutions to land; there is no clear strategy for dealing with landless IDPs, such as squatters and non-farmers.

Awareness among IDPs as to their housing, land, and property rights under existing law – where there is law addressing those rights – is inadequate in many instances. For example, in Turkey, about half of IDPs surveyed in 2006 were not aware of their entitlements under the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program or the Law on Compensation. [5]

National Human Rights Institutions and Constitutional Courts

In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and constitutional courts have a critically important role to play in supporting as well as in holding governments accountable to guarantee the rights of IDPs. In a number of the countries our study examined, the work of NHRIs on internal displacement has included a focus on HLP issues.

In Georgia, for example, the Public Defender has been actively monitoring and reporting on the country-wide housing program begun in 2009 and has raised concerns about evictions of IDPs and the quality of housing in relocation sites. The Public Defender’s office also has undertaken a study on the conditions of the hidden majority of IDPs living in private accommodation rather than in collective centers.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported on and raised concerns about the large number of IDPs living in urban slums and informal settlements and about the fact that many IDPs were unable to return to their homes due to disputes over land and property.

Constitutional courts have in some instances played a role in strengthening the national legal framework for protecting the property rights of IDPs. Notably, Colombia’s activist Constitutional Court, in its Decision T-821 in October 2007, ordered the government to ensure respect for IDPs’ right to reparation and property restitution. In January 2009, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to comprehensively address land rights issues and to establish mechanisms to prevent future violations.

Subsequently, the government has sought to ensure these rights by adopting in 2011 the historic and ambitious Law 1448, known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. In this law, government acknowledges for the first time ever the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and recognizes as “victims” those individuals or communities whose rights were violated under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The law regulates reparations for all victims of the armed conflict since 1985 – numbering over 5 million – including through land restitution or compensation for IDPs which is to occur over the next decade.

However, restitution of land does not guarantee returnees’ security and may even endanger people given that land disputes and seizures remain a driving force of displacement. Aiming to prevent further victimization of returnees as a result of insecurity and violence, the government established a new security body, the Integrated Center of Intelligence for Land Restitution (Centro Integrado de Inteligencia para la Restitución de Tierras, also known as CI2-RT) within the Ministry of Defense. Additional participants include the Office of the Vice President, the Ministry of Justice and Interior, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Social Action (Acción Social), Incoder, and organizations representing victims of violence. Time will tell how successful the implementation of this ambitious law will be.

In Georgia, the Constitutional Court has also played an important role by recognizing the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status or in any way jeopardizing their right to return.

Conclusion

Securing HLP rights for IDPs is, of course, a key component of finding durable solutions to displacement. The study found that land and property disputes are almost always sources or manifestations of lingering conflict and often an obstacle to IDPs’ free exercise of their right to return. While some governments have made efforts to provide mechanisms for property restitution or compensation, those mechanisms have rarely been adequate to deal—at least in a timely manner—with the scale and complexity of the problem. National human rights institutions and constitutional courts can play a key role in holding governments accountable for HLP and other rights and freedoms of IDPs.

[1] Government of Georgia, State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, Chapter V.

[2] The Standard Operating Procedures for Vacation and Reallocation of IDPs for Durable Housing Solutions (2010) (www.mra.gov.ge)

[3] IDMC, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis Remain Internally Displaced: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 4 March, 2010, p. 240 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[4] IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 12, citing correspondence with the government of Turkey, 17 September 2009 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[5] Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, "Findings of the Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey," press release, 6 December 2006, cited in IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 11 (www.internal-displacement.org)

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Erin Mooney
Chareen Stark

Publication: TerraNullius

From National Responsibility to Response – Part I: General Conclusions on IDP Protection

Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The second part is available here.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement recently released a study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement." The study examined 15 out of the 20 countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

According to estimates, these 15 countries represent over 70 percent of the world’s 27.5 million conflict-induced IDPs. Wherever possible, we also tried to include government efforts to address internal displacement by natural disasters. But in this and the subsequent blog post, we will focus on our main general conclusions as well as particular issues around housing, land and property (HLP) rights that emerged from our analysis (see Part II of this posting).

The study looks at how governments have fared in terms of implementing 12 practical steps (“benchmarks”) to prevent and address internal displacement, as outlined in the 2005 Brookings publication entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility." The 12 benchmarks are as follows:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Stepping back from HLP issues (to be addressed in a subsequent set of comments in Part II of this guest posting), we drew several key observations on our overall findings.

The study found that political will was the main determining factor of response to internal displacement. Governments cannot always control the factors that cause displacement, or may themselves be responsible for displacement, but they can take measures to improve the lives and uphold the rights and freedoms of IDPs. Internal displacement due to conflict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are affected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection offered to different (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of efforts by international organizations to provide protection and assistance to IDPs.

While none of the governments surveyed was fully protecting and assisting IDPs, four stand out in particular—Colombia, Georgia, Kenya and Uganda—for implementing their responsibility toward IDPs while three others—Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen—had particular difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs. In Myanmar, the obstacles were primarily political while in Yemen and the Central African Republic, as in many of the countries surveyed, the limitations appear to arise primarily from inadequate government capacity.

The other eight countries were somewhere in between. For example, some, such as Nepal, have demonstrated a significant commitment at one particular point in time but have failed to follow through. Others, such as Sri Lanka, have at times demonstrated blatant disregard for their responsibility and have moved swiftly to try to bring an end to displacement. Sudan, Pakistan, and to a certain extent, Turkey, have very problematic records with respect to preventing displacement in one part of the country yet have supported efforts to bring an end to displacement in others. In some cases, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the continuing conflict and the role of nonstate actors (and in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign militaries as well) have made it difficult for the government to respond effectively to internal displacement.

Prevention of internal displacement is paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken in the countries assessed, which all had large IDP populations. Given the scale of displacement in the fifteen countries surveyed, it was to be expected that these governments would not have been successful in preventing displacement. Nearly half of the fifteen countries assessed had adopted some preventive measures on paper, but all fifteen have fallen short of actually preventing displacement in practice.

Moreover, many national authorities themselves have been or are perpetrators of violence or human rights abuses that have led to displacement, and many states foster a culture of impunity for alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Further, the presence of foreign military forces and/or non-state armed actors limits the ability of many states to exercise full sovereignty over their territory and therefore to prevent the conditions that drive people into displacement. Some countries have taken steps to prevent displacement due to natural disasters or development but not due to conflict, indicating that the former is perhaps less politically taboo and/or practically less difficult to implement than the latter.

Sustained political attention by the highest authorities is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for taking responsibility for IDPs. Nearly all of the governments surveyed, at least at some point, have exercised their responsibility to IDPs by acknowledging the existence of internal displacement and their responsibility to address it as a national priority, for example, by drawing attention to IDPs’ plight. However, government efforts to raise awareness of internal displacement through public statements was not always a useful indicator of a government’s commitment to upholding the fundamental human rights and freedoms of IDPs.

Among the five countries with laws on or related to internal displacement, there were notable limitations to the scope of the laws and gaps in implementing them. Legislation was quite comprehensive in scope in at least two cases and was narrow in others, addressing specific rights of IDPs or a phase of displacement. Other countries lacked a national legislative framework on IDPs but had generic legislation relevant to IDPs. Still others had laws that violated or could violate the rights of IDPs. Laws on internal displacement must be viewed in the context of other legislation and administrative acts applicable to the general population (e.g., those related to documentation, residency, housing, land and property, and personal status), which this study reviews to the extent possible, particularly in the case studies on Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Africa, the region with the most IDPs, states have recognized in legally binding instruments the importance of addressing internal displacement by incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic legislation and policy.

Many of the governments surveyed have adopted policies or action plans to respond to the needs of IDPs, but adequate implementation and dissemination were largely lacking. Nine of the countries surveyed had developed a specific policy, strategy or plan on internal displacement, implemented to varying degrees; those in six of these countries were still active at the time of writing. In addition, at least two countries had national policies in draft form, and one country that does not recognize conflict-induced displacement had a plan for mitigating displacement by cyclones and a plan on disaster risk reduction, although it did not discuss displacement. While in some cases positive steps had been taken, by and large implementation of policies on internal displacement remains a challenge and has, in some cases, stalled. Available information indicates that efforts to raise awareness of IDP issues and policies have largely been inadequate.

It is difficult to assess governments’ commitment of financial resources to address internal displacement, but some trends were identified. Addressing internal displacement, especially over time, is a costly venture. While it was difficult to obtain a full picture of a country’s expenditure on IDPs, several countries allocated funds to assist IDPs, including a few that had no national laws or policies on IDPs. In at least two countries, funds for assisting IDPs seemed to diminish in recent years. In many countries, difficulties arise at the district or municipal levels, where local authorities bear significant responsibility for addressing internal displacement but face many obstacles, including insufficient funds, to doing so. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of funds intended to benefit IDPs at certain points has been observed in some of the countries assessed. Some countries seem to rely on international assistance to IDPs rather than national funds.

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) contribute invaluably to improving national responses to internal displacement in a number of countries. In recent years, an increasing number of NHRIs around the world have begun to integrate attention to internal displacement into their work. NHRIs have played an important role in raising awareness of internal displacement, monitoring displacement situations and returns, investigating individual complaints, advocating for and advising the government on the drafting of national policies to address internal displacement, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of national policies and legislation. In particular, the NHRIs of six of the countries surveyed stand out for their efforts to promote the rights of IDPs in their countries. Interestingly, almost all of their work with IDPs is funded by international sources, raising the question of whether national governments themselves should not be doing more to increase their funding of NHRIs in order to support their engagement with IDP issues.

International actors are valuable resources for efforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. In many cases, the past Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (RSGs) mandated to study the issue of internal displacement (Francis Deng and his successor Walter Kälin) and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (Chaloka Beyani) had exercised significant influence on governments in encouraging and supporting action on behalf of IDPs. Along with these actors, UNHCR and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement have provided technical assistance to support governments’ efforts to develop national legal frameworks to ensure IDPs’ access to their rights.

Durable solutions: Return was the durable solution most often supported by the governments assessed. The Framework for National Responsibility identifies three durable solutions—return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. However, the fifteen countries surveyed herein reflect a global tendency to emphasize return, often excluding the other durable solutions. Yet for solutions to be voluntary, IDPs must be able to choose among them, and local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country may in fact be some IDPs’ preferred solution. Especially in situations of protracted displacement, those may be the only feasible solutions, at least in the near future.

The most difficult benchmarks to analyze were those whose underlying concepts are very broad and those for which data was seemingly not publicly available. Chief among these were the benchmarks on preventing internal displacement (Benchmark 1), raising national awareness (Benchmark 2), promoting the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking (Benchmark 9), and allocating adequate resources (Benchmark 11). Analysis on all other benchmarks also faced data constraints as in many cases data were outdated or incomplete or simply were not available. Nonetheless, we found that the twelve benchmarks all directed attention to important issues in governments’ responses to internal displacement.

We also found that while protection is central to the Framework, the issue is of such importance that there should be a benchmark explicitly focused on it—and specifically on protection as physical security, provided to IDPs during all phases of displacement. This benchmark would also underscore the responsibility of governments to protect the security of humanitarian workers engaged with IDPs.

Overall, the study found that the Framework for National Responsibility is a valuable tool for analyzing government efforts to prevent displacement, to respond to IDPs’ needs for protection and assistance and to support durable solutions. But this study also reveals certain limitations to using the Framework as an assessment tool, particularly in terms of accounting for the responsibility of nonstate actors; accounting for national responsibility for protection, particularly during displacement; and accounting for causes of displacement other than conflict, violence and human rights violations.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Erin Mooney
Chareen Stark

Publication: TerraNullius

"From Responsibility to Response" Report Launch

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 5, 2011
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Stein Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

On December 5, 2011, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a private launch event for its report, From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, which examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. The analysis presented in the report is based on the first ever systematic use as an assessment tool of the document, Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, developed by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2005 to provide guidance to governments in their response to internal displacement.

Roberta Cohen (nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and former co-director of the Project) moderated the event, which featured remarks from the co-authors of the report, Elizabeth Ferris (senior fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement), Erin Mooney (senior IDP and protection adviser at the United Nations and former deputy director of the Project) and Chareen Stark (senior research assistant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement). In attendance were representatives from the US Department of State and international NGOs, as well as researchers from think tanks and universities.

Cohen opened the event by discussing the background and significance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. From the very beginning of discussions about internal displacement, there was an emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of national governments to protect and assist those displaced within their territory. And yet over the years there has been an awareness that international actors also have a role to play. She noted the positive strides that have occurred over the past twenty years in regards to government response to internal displacement. Country visits by the UN experts on IDPs—the Representatives of the Secretary-General on IDPs—have been instrumental to improving government response, in some instances leading governments to address internal displacement for the first time. Today, most governments understand their obligations and responsibilities to protect and assist IDPs; the challenge is often translating that understanding into concrete actions.

Elizabeth Ferris gave an overview of the Framework for National Responsibility, which was used to assess government response in each of the fifteen countries in the report (Afghanistan, The Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen). The Framework outlines twelve minimum steps—or benchmarks—that governments can take to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons within their territory, from preventing displacement to appointing a focal point on IDP issues, to facilitating the work of the international community. She explained the methodology used in the study and described the challenges the authors faced in conducting the research. For example, basic data on various aspects of government response was lacking in many instances and it was often difficult to determine the impact of a particular government policy in addressing internal displacement. In addition to analyzing the response of the fifteen governments on each of the twelve benchmarks, the study included four extended case studies commissioned for this report: Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya and Sri Lanka. Ferris discussed some of the overall findings of the study, noted that the Framework had proven to be a useful assessment tool for examining national responses to displacement, and suggested a number of areas where further research is needed.

Erin Mooney briefed the audience on benchmark seven—designating an institutional focal point on IDPs—and benchmark ten—supporting durable solutions for IDPs. Mooney noted that designating a governmental focal point for addressing internal displacement is important for clarifying institutional responsibilities and, therefore, for increasing governmental accountability. Of the 15 countries assessed, all but one had designated a national institutional focal point for addressing internal displacement. She discussed some of the challenges institutional focal points often face, including a lack of funding and a lack of political clout which often challenge their ability to coordinate across government agencies. Benchmark ten, the achievement of durable solutions, was one of the most complex and politicized areas of government action, and is arguably the one in which government commitment to addressing displacement becomes most apparent. Governments tend to emphasize return as the primary solution to displacement, but, in situations where return has occurred, there is usually little information about whether IDPs have in fact achieved a durable solution. Mooney discussed some of the challenges the fifteen governments faced in finding durable solutions, noting that in none of the countries have durable solutions to displacement been fully achieved.

Chareen Stark discussed the report’s findings on benchmark one—the prevention of arbitrary displacement—and the study’s overall recommendations. Given that the study assessed governments already experiencing large-scale displacement and, in most instances, multiple waves of displacement, Stark said it was obvious that all fifteen governments had failed to prevent displacement. There were three major limitations to governments’ ability to prevent displacement: many of the governments are themselves parties to conflict; many of the governments assessed do not exercise effective sovereignty over all of their territory, due to the presence of nonstate armed actors and/or foreign militaries; and all of the assessed countries face financial and human capacity limitations. She explained that the study found that nearly half of the countries assessed had developed some sort of preventive measures (at least on paper), including several governments that had taken measures to prevent displacement from natural disasters but not conflict. Stark discussed some of these laws, policies and institutional mechanisms as well as the challenges to their effective implementation. She also outlined the report’s recommendations to governments of countries with IDP populations, such as developing and implementing laws and policies in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and devoting adequate resources at the national and local levels.

Concluding the discussion, the panel responded to questions from the audience on issues such as incentives for governments to address internal displacement using the Framework for National Responsibility and challenges in data reporting and analysis. Specific questions were also raised on benchmarks five (laws on internal displacement), six (policies on internal displacement), three (designating an institutional focal point for IDPs) and twelve (working with the international community).

Event Materials

From Responsibility to Response Nov 2011doc

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Erin Mooney

Senior IDP and Protection Adviser at the United Nations

Chareen Stark

Senior Research Assistant, The Brookings Instution

Around the Halls: Vice President Biden Visits Africa

Emmanuel Asmah, John Mutenyo, John Page, Ezra Suruma and Olumide Taiwo — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 11:50:00 -0400

Vice President Biden travels to Africa this week with several stops, including Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Experts from around the halls of Brookings weigh in on the significance of a visit that highlights a new U.S. strategic interest in region. Issues to be discussed include economic growth, peace and stability and a range of other bilateral and regional issues.

In this edition:

Ezra Suruma: Is Vice President Biden Coming to Help Carry the African Burden?
John Page: From Cairo to the Cape - The Wrong Conversation
Emmanuel Asmah: Focusing on ‘the Positives’ in Africa
John Mutenyo: Zero Tolerance for Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa
Olumide Taiwo: Peace and Stability in the DRC

Is Vice President Biden Coming to Help Carry the African Burden?
Ezra Suruma, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

Both Americans and Africans should take pride in the fact that America’s victory in World War II was quickly followed by decolonization in Asia and Africa. American ascendency to world leadership promised and delivered freedom from colonial rule inspired by America’s own exemplary struggle against colonialism and aspirations for human equality and democracy. Despite those early hopes for freedom and development, it is now almost 50 years since most African nations attained political independence, yet poverty and instability continue to bite hard.

As Vice President Joe Biden visits Africa, he cannot help but take stock of the continuing upheavals and threats of upheavals in the Great Lakes Region notably Congo, Somalia and Sudan. With al Qaeda’s long arm reaching out to Somalia, Darfur and elsewhere, America’s professed lack of interest in Africa has now faded, making Africa’s burden also America’s burden. Peace and security is Africa’s number one problem since without it economic development cannot proceed. No foreign or domestic investor can contemplate a serious investment in Somalia, Darfur, or eastern Congo. With the UN Security Council meeting in Kampala this month to consider among others, the instabilities in Congo, Sudan and Somalia, it is clear that Biden needs little reminder of the severe implications of yet another military front for the U.S. The vice president will therefore be expected to assure Africa’s leaders in Nairobi and Pretoria of America’s full commitment to peace and security in the continent.

It is good that Vice President Biden will join other world leaders to kick off the world’s greatest sports event, the World Cup. While the U.S. may not be a front runner in the matches, it is important that it is participating and Biden’s presence will go a long way in boosting the U.S. team’s morale. The African teams are in a similar position as the American team in that they are not favored to win. Nevertheless, they are most enthusiastic that this great event is taking place in Africa.

Biden’s visit will be seen by African nations as a show of U.S. support for Africa. The symbolism is excellent. What it says to Africa is: “We are with you in this one and we shall be with you in other matters as well.” This should help to lighten the burden of the vice president’s visit. Sharing in the joy of participating in the World Cup in Africa should bring much needed relief to the entire world community, America included. From the stresses of war, economic recovery and environmental disasters, Americans should hopefully be able to have a ball if only for a few weeks. The United States and Vice President Biden are certainly most welcome in Africa.

From Cairo to the Cape - The Wrong Conversation
John Page, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development

Vice President Biden’s Africa trip is a welcome demonstration of interest in Africa by the U.S. administration, but his talking points in Egypt, Kenya and South Africa represent a missed opportunity to focus on a crucial missing link for creating jobs and growth in Africa—regional integration. In Egypt, Vice President Biden will meet with President Hosni Mubarak to discuss "a full range of bilateral and regional issues," begging the question of which region will be discussed given the current international climate. In Kenya, he will address matters of "peace and stability;" and in South Africa, Biden will “meet with South African and world leaders attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup.”

From Cairo to the Cape, Biden will visit the three largest economic powers in COMESA—the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa—a regional economic grouping, encompassing 19 member states with a population of 430 million. This regional market of significant size and diversity has failed to deliver on its potential. When I spoke at the COMESA investment forum held in Egypt in April, both the potential and the frustrations of COMESA were evident. Business leaders from across the continent meeting with senior trade and development officials from member states were bullish on COMESA—pointing to its robust recent economic growth, improved investment climate and recovering global export markets as sources of dynamism. Simultaneously, they were deeply frustrated with lack of progress by member states in achieving meaningful progress toward true regional integration.

COMESA is a “common market” in name only. It has not achieved free trade among its members, cross-border movement of people remains problematic, and it is far from integrating its financial markets. Its member states belong to other regional economic groupings—most importantly the East African Common Market and the Southern African Development Community—and it is unclear how these multiple and overlapping regional groups relate. Without leadership from its most important members—precisely those countries Vice President Biden will visit—COMESA is likely to continue to frustrate investors and trading partners alike.

Why is regional integration so important for Africa? Its economies are small both in population and economic size. Transport and power links between countries are limited, and poorly performing institutions such as regulation of commerce and customs raise the cost of trade logistics. Without effective regional integration, Africa simply cannot compete in the global market for manufactures, traded services such as tourism and IT-based services, and high value-added agriculture. Yet the region’s long-term ability to create high-paying jobs and sustain growth depends fundamentally on its success in competing globally in these industries. Integrating locally to compete globally is fundamental to Africa’s economic success.

Biden’s trip is a missed opportunity to raise the issue of how Egypt, Kenya and South Africa can push the pace of creating an effective COMESA; and for the administration to think about how it can support regional integration in Africa through aid and trade. Africa and Biden deserve a better set of talking points.

Focusing on ‘the Positives’ in Africa
Emmanuel Asmah, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Africa is coinciding with a historic World Cup soccer competition that is being held in Africa for the very first time. This means the entire world will be watching Africa, giving the continent more international media coverage than ever before. This is a great opportunity for Vice President Biden to communicate the diversity and wealth of Africa and the contribution it can make to resolving global problems, like low-carbon growth and food security.

The last thing Africa needs is intense global media attention on negative African stereotypes and challenges, such as humanitarian tragedies, famines, disease, piracy, violence and state capacity deficits. People should be made to realize that Africa is a diverse and vast continent. Therefore, headline-grabbing challenges in a few areas in the continent should have little bearing on conditions elsewhere. By highlighting Africa’s successes during his visit, Biden can change the way Africans are perceived by the international community.

Africa needs more investments and fair trade to accelerate the pace of economic growth and development. Moreover, Africa needs a renewed sense of respect, real partnerships and positive engagement with the rest of the world. Foreign investors and the international community should focus their attention on:

Africa’s rich human and natural resource potentials;
profitable trade and investment opportunities
some remarkable achievements in human development, political accountability, peace and security; and
improved investment climate change related areas.

The last decade has seen remarkable examples of recovery from conflict and democratic consolidation. Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Kenya are a few examples. Improvements in governance performance in 31 out of 48 countries, as assessed by the Mo Ibrahim Index are also worth mentioning. As an expression of political commitment to good governance and openness to criticism, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been a positive sign for those countries that have submitted themselves to assessment.

Though progress is still insufficient, public expenditure management in several countries has improved, regulatory and supervisory bodies have been strengthened, and tax systems have been reformed to internationally recognized standards of good fiscal practice. Some measures to improve the business environment, such as alleviating supply-side bottlenecks, have created a more attractive environment for foreign investment. As a result, Africa is performing much better today than a decade ago and African economies look motivated to sustain the momentum that has been building up in recent years. Africa is hoping to add to ‘these positives’ with a World Cup win by an African country. The future looks bright for Africa and nothing less than a campaign for political goodwill, positive encouragement and practical support for Africa’s economic and social development is needed during Biden’s visit to the continent.

Zero Tolerance for Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa
John Mutenyo, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

When Vice President Biden visits with African leaders this week, he should stress the importance of good governance and tackling corruption. Botswana and Mauritius clearly demonstrate the “yes, Africa can” develop if it builds strong institutions; while the situation in Zimbabwe proves that bad governance and corruption lead to economic downfall. If Africa is to develop it needs strong institutions to support good governance, strong and independent judiciary, transparency, zero tolerance of corruption, and independent police and the military among others.

African nations typically fall at the bottom of every list of economic activity despite being abundant in natural resources. The bottom 25 spots of the U.N. Quality of Life Index are regularly occupied by African nations. In 2009, 33 of the 49 countries on the U.N. list of least-developed nations were from Sub-Saharan Africa. And in September 2009, out of 40 highly indebted poor countries, 29 were from SSA.

There are many causes for poor economic development and instability in Africa, but weak government institutions due to corruption and bad governance are at the center of the problem. For instance, rigged elections have become quite common and have recently transpired in Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to name a few.

Corruption in African countries is on the rise. According to World Bank data on governance, in 1996, 27 of the 50 most corrupt countries were from Africa; and by 2008, 37 of the 50 countries were from Africa. Corruption seems to be an African affair, even engulfing the mighty South Africa whose corruption index has been worsening since 1990.

Many African governments have instituted anti-corruption agencies and laws, which are basically used to hoodwink the donor community. In the slightest chance that these laws are ever enforced, the culprit is most likely to be a political opponent. During the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in Uganda, it was suspected that some of Uganda’s ruling government officials, including the vice president and several ministers, embezzled serveral million dollars. Surprisingly all these suspects are still occupying government offices today. Shortly before this incidence, millions of U.S. dollar donor-funds meant for treating AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria were stolen. To date, the suspects are at large and some are members of Parliament.

If African countries are to develop economically and fight poverty, emphasis must first be placed on improving the quality of institutions. This will encourage both foreign and domestic investment and discourage capital flight. Vice President Biden needs to stress strong positions against corrupt and despotic regimes. Biden should reiterate the words of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during their separate visits to Africa that the continent needs to build strong institutions, increase transparency, reduce corruption and support democratic processes. Biden, like Obama should also challenge Africa to take charge of its destiny in the world.

Peace and Stability in the DRC
Olumide Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

It is a welcome development that Vice President Joe Biden will visit Africa this week with stops in Egypt and Kenya, and then South Africa, in time for the 2010 World Cup opening ceremony. More assuring, Vice President Biden will spend some time addressing peace and stability issues in the Horn of Africa, specifically in Sudan and Somalia, before the competitions kick off in Johannesburg.

In most African countries, international football competitions usually eclipse ongoing conflicts. The conflicts only become more vigorous after the competitions are over. However, while focusing on peace and stability in the Horn of Africa is laudable, ignoring peace and stability in the heart of Africa or treating the sub-region as unimportant or a lost cause is not.

The focus on Sudan and Somalia is understandable considering the U.S. classifies Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism and Somalia as a safe haven for al-Qaeda fighters. There are presently no perceived links between al-Qaeda terrorism and the multinational conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where militias from Rwanda and Uganda are battling the DRC government over its resource-rich eastern Kivu region. Unfortunately, conditions in this conflict zone make it no less a potential recruiting ground for terrorist activities, especially if things continue to fester. The DRC government of Joseph Kabila remains incompetent in defending its territory and protecting its citizens against foreign militias. Worse still, President Kabila has ordered a “crush or neutralize” tactic to suppress political opponents in order to retain his power. The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the region seem unable to do anything significant to advance peace and stability. The DRC, particularly the Kivu region, is presently a safe haven for war criminals who have created a mini-state for themselves with accompanying threats of violence and land-grabbing. Hundreds of thousands of boy soldiers have been trained and engaged in the conflict. Poverty, unemployment and illiteracy rates continue to rise as conflict after conflict ravages the region. It is important to note that these conditions are not qualitatively different than those which existed in Sudan and Somalia before the incursion of al-Qaeda.

Peace and stability in Kivu region, and ultimately in DRC, is achievable under a credible and strong democratically-elected government that respects human rights. This is not likely to be different from the requirements that Vice President Biden will outline when addressing the situations in Sudan and Somalia. The odds of achieving this goal in the DRC would be significantly improved if Biden devoted some press time during his visit to discuss electoral reforms in the DRC so as to ensure free and fair elections next year.

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Obama's Kenya: A Potential Political Minefield

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 14:15:00 -0500

Of all the countries around the world, nowhere was Barack Obama’s election celebrated more enthusiastically than Kenya, the birthplace of the president’s father. Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki declared a public holiday to mark this momentous event, in which “our son” was becoming the leader of the world’s most powerful nation.

It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that a serious diplomatic row is erupting between the Kenyan government and the Obama administration, which on October 26 announced that it was revoking the visa of a top Kenyan official because of his role in blocking reforms in the country. More than a dozen officials have been threatened with a similar fate, and Nairobi has reacted by calling the moves an “unacceptable” insult to its national dignity. As much as I admire President Obama, and share his broad aims for Africa, I believe the approach his administration is taking is wrong.

The U.S. announcement, by Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, stemmed from Washington’s displeasure over Kenya’s slow progress in fighting corruption and reforming the constitution as well as the judiciary, police force and other government agencies. U.S. officials are also concerned that Nairobi is dragging its feet in dealing with perpetrators of the violence that wracked Kenya following its December 2007 election.

As a Kenyan, I applaud the Obama administration’s special attention to my country, especially its push for a faster pace of much-needed reforms. But the focus should be on overhauling institutions, not targeting individuals. The personalized diplomacy undertaken by Washington could put the president on a slippery slope that undercuts his influence in Kenya and in Africa more broadly, diminishing the enormous goodwill generated by his electoral victory.

It is welcome, of course, that Obama is not treating Africa with kid gloves. For all the excitement in Africa about him, and the sense of empowerment and pride that Africans feel over the achievements of one of their “own,” the president has made it clear in his speeches and pronouncements by Secretary of State Clinton that America will solidify partnerships with Africans based on governments’ record of governance. Obama’s visit to Ghana, a country with a solid record of recent reforms, was meant in part to signal the priority that the administration will place on fighting corruption.

In Kenya, the Obama administration has been emphatic in its dealings with the coalition government led by President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga that the United States expects change—and fast. The Kenyan masses want change too, and see Obama as supporting their desired course. Kenyans are particularly upset by what is seen as laxity in fighting corruption and reforming the current constitution that concentrates power on the executive and consequently dilutes voice.

But by punishing individuals for derailing reforms, the message is that the problem is with the individuals themselves and not the much deeper issue of institutions. The slow pace of dealing with corruption is for example rooted in a weak judiciary while the post-election violence was to a large extent weak electoral institutions and dysfunctional security forces. The assumption that punishing individuals will translate into reforms is misguided; there is not an iota of evidence that similar steps taken in previous cases, in other countries, has expedited the cause of reform.

Moreover, singling out individuals for not being supportive of reforms is contradictory to the American legal principle of due process. President Obama himself faces challenges in Congress in enacting reforms; how would Americans feel if Kenya were to revoke visas for certain senators for refusing to support health care reform?

Another problem posed by the current U.S. approach is that targeting individuals and not institutions will be seen as targeting communities. Unfortunately, in Kenya and other African countries, when individuals are targeted—regardless of the merit—it is often perceived as being aimed at an ethnic group. Obama’s name may be dragged into Kenya’s murky ethnic politics; this will be neither pretty nor helpful to the reform cause that the president champions.

A better approach for the United States would be to support reforms in the Judiciary and especially the on-going constitutional review process and police reforms. In light of the recent post-election violence, special focus should be on reforming and capacitating the institution responsible for organizing elections so as to minimize the possibility of election fraud in the 2012 elections. If such reforms were to be enacted and embraced by the Kenyan government and the nation's society, then the country may be able to look forward to a much more successful transition of power than last time, and a much brighter future.

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Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Brookings: Topics - Kenya

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Kenya Decides: The 2013 Presidential Election

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The High Return to Private Schooling in a Low-Income Country

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Presidential Election a Major Tipping Point for Kenya’s Role in International Community

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Kenya’s Elections: Implications of Ethnic Rivalries and International Intervention

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Around the Halls: Vice President Biden Visits Africa

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Obama's Kenya: A Potential Political Minefield

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