Brookings: Topics - Jordan

Why Jordan Is Building Two New Nuclear Power Plants

John P. Banks — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: As Jordan looks to develop a civilian nuclear energy program, some domestic and international analysts are questioning the feasibility and intentions of its efforts. In an interview with Monocle, John Banks suggests that while Jordan’s efforts are the result of domestic energy shortages, its program will be hard to develop for a number of reasons. Read an excerpt below.

Monocle: Now the generally accepted role of Jordan is to be the Middle Eastern country which doesn’t make everybody nervous. Possibly because they would like just a little bit of attention for a change, possibly because, who knows, they have a sincere desire to provide for their future energy requirements, Jordan is about to commission two nuclear reactors.

Amman is believed to be choosing between tenders from a French Japanese consortium and a Russian competitor. Jordan is almost totally dependent on oil and gas imports and this twelve billion euro project would spare Jordan from relying on the stability of their neighbors, which as recent events have reemphasized, is one of the world’s very least reliable qualities. Well joining us now to tell us more is John Banks, non-resident Fellow of the Energy Security Initiative at The Brookings Institution in Washington DC.

First of all, should we be pleased about this?

John Banks: Well, first thanks for having me. It depends on your perspective. Certainly from the Jordanian perspective there are several major drivers why they are pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program. The first is they are looking at annual electricity demand of about eight percent per year over the next decade or so. They are expected to need to add several thousand megawatts of capacity just to keep up with that electricity demand. And secondly, as your intro made reference to, they have energy security reasons for pursuing civilian nuclear power. They really have a situation where they’re highly dependent, as the intro mentioned, overwhelmingly on imports of energy, more than 90% dependent imports for energy across the economy, but in particular in transport and in power generation. One of their overall strategies is to diversify fuel sources and in particular to limit reliance on imported fossil fuels.

Monocle: The trouble that has been in the past though is that Jordan has had quite a stop-start nuclear program. It has been stopped by the Israelis; it has been stopped by the Americans. Obviously there is some fundamental concern about, not lightly, the safety of this.

Banks: Any country, but particularly a country that is pursuing its first nuclear reactor is going to be faced with a variety of very serious challenges, not the least of which is the need to develop a very robust framework to provide for the safe operation of the facilities as well as the security of the facilities and also to prevent proliferation. These are some of the major challenges that any county is faced with, but particularly for a country pursuing its first reactor. If you are starting from a position where you have no nuclear infrastructure and very little human resources capacity, this is a very big challenge. You need to develop a legal and regulatory framework, put in place the human resources capabilities, and allocate sufficient funding to ensure that this sector is operating according to the highest standards. So there is no question that, I think the Jordanian government recognizes the challenges, the question is are they going to be able to overcome them.

Listen to the full interview » (starts at 17:30)

Authors

John P. Banks

Publication: The Monocle Daily

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

(Re)branding Amman: A "Lived" City's Values, Image and Identity

Bessma Momani and Luna Khirfan — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:01:00 -0500

ABTRACT

By addressing two separate branding exercises for Amman, Jordan, we investigate the links between the city's image and the visual image of its brand. We build on previous research by proposing a theoretical framework that combines city branding, Canter's theory of place and Kevin Lynch's Image of the City. We test this theoretical framework by contrasting the development of Amman's city brand in 2002 and its rebranding exercise in 2009. We address, first, how Amman's brand(s) and image(s) are linked, and second, how the city brand and its image influence and are influenced by the values Ammanis ascribe to their city. We find that while it incorporated intensive promotional campaigns and place-making interventions, the 2002 branding exercise excluded the residents of Amman; the ensuing brand image therefore failed to correspond to the residents’ perceived values of Amman. Conversely, Amman's 2009 branding exercise aspired for an inclusive process (‘inward branding’), which allowed the new brand and its ensuing image to be ‘lived’ by and to ‘enliven’ Ammanis. We thus trace how Amman's 2009 branding effort achieved more success among residents than the multidimensional branding exercise of 2002 simply by capturing the intricacies between residents’ affective perceptions and the new brand image.

Read the full article on Palgrave Journals »

Authors

Bessma Momani
Luna Khirfan

Publication: Palgrave Journals

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States

Wed, 12 Dec 2012 12:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 12, 2012
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Turkey continuing to pursue civil nuclear energy programs, the Middle East is likely to play host to the first new civil nuclear energy states of the 21st century. After a long hiatus, the likely entry of several new states into the global nuclear power sector presents a number of unprecedented challenges, including the development of the institutional and human capacity to run their programs competently and sustainably.

On December 12, the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion of its latest research paper, “Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East.” Based on case studies from three countries in the Middle East, the paper offers a series of recommendations on human resource related risks for emerging market nations looking to enter the civil nuclear sector. Following the presentation of the report’s findings and recommendations, Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger, director of the Energy Security Initiative, moderated a discussion with its authors.

Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East

John P. Banks, Kevin Massy and Charles K. Ebinger — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 09:47:00 -0500

With the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Turkey all continuing pursuit of civil nuclear energy programs, the Middle East is likely to play host to the first newcomer civil nuclear energy states of the 21st century. After a long hiatus, the likely entry of several new states into the global nuclear power sector presents a number of unprecedented challenges. To meet these challenges, it is essential that new nuclear energy states develop the institutional and human capacity to run their programs competently and sustainably. Against this backdrop, this paper assesses human resource development (HRD) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Turkey against these two criteria.

With widely varying economic, political, and social contexts, each of the three countries under review has different HRD requirements and objectives. However, while each country has unique challenges related to its individual circumstances, it is also possible to identify areas of relative success and concern with regard to leading HRD practices.

With a high level of sovereign wealth and a well-formulated, well-articulated strategy for the implementation of civil nuclear power, the UAE has the most comprehensive approach to HRD among the countries under review. The principal challenges for the UAE relate to its ability to reconcile the extensive needs of its civil nuclear program and the objectives of recruiting the requisite number of qualified nationals into training programs and professional positions. Jordan faces more challenges than the UAE with regard to preparedness for a civil nuclear program. While the country has a large educated population the country has far fewer financial resources. Further, some of the biggest obstacles with regard to its nuclear program are the result of a lack of public-sector coordination and communication. Finally, while Turkey has struggled to develop commercial-level nuclear power, its nuclear-related education programs have been established for decades. With no commercial-scale operational experience, however, the host country may be vulnerable to a situation of information asymmetry its regulator may not have sufficient expertise and capacity to competently oversee the construction and operation of the new design they have chosen for construction.

Based on the conclusions from the three country case studies, the paper offers a series of recommendations on competence and sustainability-related HRD risks for the three reviewed countries and emerging market nations looking to enter the civil nuclear sector.

These recommendations are:

• HRD should be a central part of a new nuclear energy state’s strategy

• HRD programs should place a large emphasis on safety culture

• Quality control initiatives should include merit-based recruitment, international benchmarking and vendor involvement

• Stakeholder engagement should be a core element of new nuclear energy programs’ HRD strategies

• HRD strategies should be designed around the operational needs of the nuclear industry rather than around high-profile academic programs

• New nuclear energy states adopting new reactor technologies should allocate additional HRD time and resources to become an “intelligent customer”

• National quota policies should be flexible to the needs of new nuclear programs

• Regional cooperation should not be relied upon as the primary or major source for HRD in the nuclear sector

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Image Source: © Petr Josek Snr / Reuters

Jordan's Arab Spring

Bruce Riedel — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The Arab awakening is stalking its next victim, King Abdullah II of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a key American ally. President Obama and his national-security team have another critical challenge.

Jordan is the invention of Winston Churchill. At the end of World War I, England needed to give their Arab Hashemite allies a reward for their loyalty in the fight against the Ottoman Turks. King Abdullah I was given the kingdom after Churchill drew its borders on a map in Cairo. It has always been a fragile place surrounded by stronger neighbors eager to eat it. Abdullah I secretly made peace with Israel. His grandson Hussein made it official, and his son Abdullah II keeps the peace.

For most of the last two years, the unrest in the Arab world simmered in Jordan, but never boiled. Like his father before him, Abdullah II often promised reform and changed prime ministers and spy chiefs constantly to buy off demands for real change. For decades, the Hashemites were written off as antiques who would not survive.

Now the country is boiling. Cuts in gas subsidies produced massive protests and riots across the kingdom—the worst riots in the country since Abdullah became king in 1999. Most important, for the first time, protesters called for the regime to fail. No more reform, just revolution.

The main opposition party is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has avoided calling for an end to the monarchy. The country is deeply divided between the Palestinians—refugees and their descendants from the West Bank, and their Hashemite counterparts from the East Bank.

A civil war in 1970 was won by the East Bankers and they control the army and the General Intelligence Directorate. The head of GID is the second-most-powerful man in the land. There are always an abundance of rumors about splits in the royal family. The Saudis and the Emirates have already intervened with force once to save the monarchy in Bahrain. The idea of an Arab king being toppled is their worst nightmare, but there are limits even to their money and power. Here in the Gulf the region looks to be exploding out of control and the royal palaces are deeply worried.

Obama should be worried too. Jordan is a key intelligence partner against al Qaeda, Iran, and in Syria. It has been a stable force for decades. It keeps the peace on Israel's longest border. The king has escaped peril before, including an al Qaeda assassination plot. Like his father he is a survivor. But the Arab awakening is a formidable force.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

Women After the Arab Awakening: Making Change

Thu, 25 Oct 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 25, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Women played an integral role in the Arab uprisings, and the continued empowerment of women will be critical to the emergence of democracy in the region. Gender rights and women’s equality are among the most consequential and controversial issues facing newly elected governments across the Arab world. Some fear that the election of Islamist parties will turn back the clock on women’s rights, but others see more open politics as a new opportunity for efforts to achieve equality in the Arab world. How has the Arab awakening affected the women of the region? How are activists and politicians seeking progress for women in this uncertain and evolving landscape?

On October 25, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, with Vital Voices Global Partnership and the Project on Middle East Democracy, hosted activists from Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan who are advocating for women’s rights in a variety of ways: combating child marriage, working to repeal gender-discriminatory laws, promoting gender equality in the new Egyptian constitution, and protecting the rights of women workers. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Women After the Arab Awakening: Making Change

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Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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Editor's Note: The following is a Campaign 2012 policy brief by Shadi Hamid proposing ideas for the next president on U.S. policy in the Middle East. Tamara Wittes prepared a response arguing that the next president must remain flexible in response to the political instability throughout the region. Raj Desai also prepared a response arguing that the next administration should focus on economic development in the region in order to drive democracy and rebuild America’s influence.

It seems unlikely that U.S. policy toward the Middle East will get much attention during the 2012 presidential campaign, especially when it comes to the epochal transformations under way in the Arab world, colloquially referred to as the “Arab Spring.” It received painfully little airtime as the various Republican contenders jostled for their party nomination. There may be some discussion of how best to confront Iran. If Iraq slides back into civil war, as seems ever more possible, there may be some painful debates over who “lost” it. And Republicans have routinely attacked Barack Obama for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, and will continue to do so. But there is seemingly little desire to address what are likely to prove the most influential events of all those currently transpiring across the region. This is in stark contrast to the 2008 contest, where Middle East policy figured prominently in the campaigns of most major candidates.

It was in 2008 that Barack Obama positioned himself as the anti-Bush, drawing sharp contrasts with Republicans on democracy promotion, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, and, of course, Iraq. For many Americans—and many Arabs—the promise to reorient U.S. foreign policy was key to Obama’s appeal. Yet after a brief honeymoon period, opposition to American policies in the region soared under the Obama administration. In fact, according to several polls, U.S. favorability ratings have been lower under President Obama than they were during the final days of the Bush administration.

What was once a major strength and source of appeal for Obama has become a potential liability. Indeed, on the Middle East, President Obama’s first term will be defined by the Arab Spring and his response to it. In part because it initially deprioritized democracy promotion in the region, the Obama administration was caught unprepared. As late as January 25, 2011—the day Egypt’s revolution began—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously stated, “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable.” Eventually, senior U.S. officials responded to Cairo’s massive demonstrations by calling for an immediate transition and by using their influence to urge Egypt’s military—which receives over 20 percent of its budget from the United States—to refrain from using force against protesters. Since then, the administration has tried to get on the right side of history, with President Obama repeatedly proclaiming his support for Arab democratic aspirations. Yet the rhetoric has not been translated into clear policy initiatives, let alone significant material assistance. A major critique of neoconservatives and Arab revolutionaries alike is that the Obama administration has—in nearly every country facing mass protest—been slow to support protesters on the ground.

For its part, the Obama administration has avoided articulating a broader vision or grand strategy and instead emphasized the need for a “boutique strategy” that focuses on the specifics of each particular case. Considering the vastly different contexts of each country, this is unavoidable. Yet, a case-by-case approach, to be successful, needs to be guided by a coherent vision. Despite the historical import of the Arab Spring, there is nothing approaching the unified purpose of Truman’s Marshall Plan or even the rhetorical sharpness of Bush’s short-lived “freedom agenda.” The scale and scope of Obama’s declared policies can at times seem tepid. The amount of U.S. economic assistance promised to transitional countries is minimal, dwarfed by the commitments made by the Gulf countries.

In the United States, there is growing sentiment, particularly on the Left, that America’s declining influence and negligible credibility in the region compel it to adopt a “hands-off” approach and reduce its footprint in the Arab world. Yet it is precisely because of its still considerable power and influence in the region that the United States can and should provide critical support to Arab countries transitioning to democracy. After supporting autocratic regimes for more than five decades, the United States has a second chance to get it right and, in the process, build considerable goodwill among Arab populations and the governments they elect. That new governments are likely to be Islamist in orientation only strengthens the argument for sustained U.S. engagement. By establishing a working relationship with Islamist parties, the United States can encourage them to consider and respect key U.S. security interests, such as isolating Iran, pursuing peace with Israel, maintaining a stable oil market, and continuing vital counterterrorism cooperation.

Whether Obama is reelected or replaced by a Republican, the United States must:

Articulate a comprehensive strategy toward the Middle East that advances American long-term interests by prioritizing the support of democracy and democrats in the region.
Institutionalize the promotion of Arab democracy by coordinating the funding of a multilateral “reform endowment” that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement necessary reforms.
Pursue a strategic dialogue with rising Islamist parties in key countries of interest.
Recognize that the window for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is closing, commit to rebuilding frayed ties with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and outline clear U.S. parameters on borders, right of return, and the status of Jerusalem.

The Obama Record

Obama’s record on the Middle East, and the Arab Spring in particular, is challenging to assess because of the unrealistic expectations set early on. When he first took office—in part because of how he ran his presidential campaign and in part because he seemed the opposite of George W. Bush in every way—Arabs of all stripes (and often of radically different viewpoints) were well disposed toward the president. His June 4, 2009, Cairo address was applauded across the Middle East and seemed to be the first sign that Obama would be the sort of leader that so many in the region had hoped for. But the disappointment quickly set in. Beyond some limited programming on entrepreneurship and some science and technology cooperation, there was surprisingly little follow-up after the speech.

Initially, the administration put the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace at the core of its Middle East policy—as signified by the appointment of special envoy George Mitchell. Administration heavyweights let it be known that they believed that once the conflict was satisfactorily resolved, a truly refashioned relationship with the Middle East would become possible. But the administration’s almost single-minded focus on halting settlement construction backfired, arousing the ire of the Israeli government while distracting from the key Palestinian concerns of borders and the right of return. Faced with this initial rebuke, the administration seemed to lose interest in the Israeli--Palestinian issue, and thereafter few new ideas or initiatives were forthcoming. When Senator Mitchell resigned in May 2011, the administration made no move to replace him with someone of similar stature.

Compared with its predecessor, the Obama administration put little emphasis on promoting democracy abroad. As early as March 2009, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, Sameh Shukri, approvingly noted that bilateral ties were improving because Washington was dropping its demands “for human rights, democracy, and religious and general freedoms.” In her first trip to Cairo, that same month, Hillary Clinton assured the Egyptian government that “conditionality is not our policy.” Meanwhile, U.S. democracy assistance to Egypt was slashed by 60 percent (from $54 million to $20 million) and funding for civil society and good governance programs in Jordan fell by 44 and 36 percent, respectively.

The administration’s priority, instead, was strengthening government-to-government relations, something that Obama administration officials felt had suffered unnecessarily under the Bush administration. The relationship with Egypt had gotten so icy that President Hosni Mubarak suspended his annual visits to Washington for five years. Journalist Spencer Ackerman, who interviewed Obama’s foreign policy advisers extensively during the 2008 campaign, wrote that the Obama Doctrine was “dignity promotion” rather than democracy promotion. Indeed, the common thread throughout the statements and speeches of Obama and his senior advisers is the emphasis on institutional reform, economic development, and poverty alleviation first, and free and fair elections later. Such gradualism may have made sense for status quo powers like the United States that sought to avoid the untidiness of rapid democratization, but it made little sense for Arabs, who had already waited decades and only seen their societies grow more closed and repressive.

In the lead-up to elections in Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain in late 2010, the Obama administration did little to exert pressure on leaders in these countries, all three of them close allies. The polls produced the most unrepresentative parliaments in Egyptian and Jordanian history—in Egypt because of widespread fraud and in Jordan because of an opposition boycott. Throughout the region, there was a pervasive sense of steady political deterioration, after the short-lived democratic openings of the “first Arab Spring” of 2004 and 2005, triggered in part by the Bush administration’s democracy promotion measures.

After the Arab uprisings began in early 2011, the Obama administration stated that it supported the peaceful struggles for freedom and congratulated the Tunisian and Egyptian people on their revolutions. The administration’s rhetorical support for democracy—particularly the pressure on Mubarak to leave office—was seen as an ominous sign by Arab regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, and created significant tension between the two countries. At the same time, the United States tried to reassure Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other allies that it stood behind them. President Obama reportedly called King Abdullah of Jordan personally to assure him of American support. He also sent the State Department’s then number three official, William J. Burns, and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on a tour of Arab capitals to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to their bilateral ties. Rather than assuaging the fears created by the Arab uprisings, the administration’s diplomatic efforts backfired. They alienated a wide range of potentially pro-American groups, simultaneously convincing Arab protesters and revolutionaries that Obama was siding with the dictators and panicking Arab autocrats into suspecting he was backing revolutions across the board.

The administration’s efforts at a nuanced policy toward the Arab Spring—what its critics damned as half-hearted and half-baked—produced additional confusion with its decisions on Libya. There, the Obama administration initially disparaged the appropriateness of a military option. Washington, to its credit, later reversed course and took decisive action after Muammar Qaddafi’s forces threatened to commit massacres in Benghazi, the seat of the democratic rebellion. Even then, however, France and Britain, Libyan rebels, and some Republicans like Senator John McCain attacked Obama for waiting too long. Moreover, after the first few weeks of the NATO operation, Washington publicly distanced itself from the ongoing fight and withdrew considerable American military hardware, once again leaving Arabs to wonder just what parts of the Arab Spring the United States was trying to support—and why. Ultimately, Libya was a qualified success for President Obama. Without American diplomatic and military support, the NATO intervention would not have happened and Qaddafi would almost certainly still be in power today. Yet it did little to ease the confusion over how the administration intended to pursue American interests in the region.

Washington’s handling of Syria has only muddied the waters further. If the administration’s handling of Libya was a qualified success, then Syria can only be seen as the opposite. Early on, the intensifying regime violence and the militarization of some opposition elements provoked only the most grudging and tardy of condemnations from the United States, coupled with half-hearted diplomatic efforts. Moreover, the violence in Syria provided a rebuke to the Obama administration’s early attempts to peel Syria off from Iran and bring it into the Western orbit, making those efforts seem naïve or even cynical in retrospect. After holding out hope that Bashar al-Asad might be persuaded to reform, the United States finally called on him to step down in August 2011 and began implementing asset freezes, travel bans, and sanctions on the regime and its most senior officials. As the Syrian uprising reached its one-year anniversary, the Syrian regime’s assault against civilian population intensified, dragging the country into all-out civil war. With the international community failing to stop the killing, the criticisms that the United States was either leading from behind—or not leading at all—persisted.

In formulating responses to the many and varied Arab uprisings, the Obama administration has opted for slow deliberation and caution, avoiding the strong, sometimes impulsive, gestures of the Bush administration. But the line between caution and irresolution can easily be blurred. Whatever the genesis of the term “leading from behind,” it does seem to capture key aspects of the administration’s approach to the Middle East and the president’s temperament on foreign policy more generally. The declining influence of the United States in comparison with the influence of rising powers like China, Brazil, India, and Turkey has led many American policymakers and analysts to conclude that the United States cannot act like it once did and that it must allow, even encourage, others to lead. Senior American officials routinely emphasize the inability of the United States to shape events in the Arab world and alter the behavior of reluctant allies. However, America’s actual influence often stems from how others, friends and enemies alike, perceive it rather than from a strict assessment of its objective ability or (more often) willingness to take action. By repeatedly discounting U.S. leverage in the region, the Obama administration has undermined the impact of its own declarations and policy measures when it does choose to act.

The result, in the Arab world, has been a noticeable power vacuum, with growing confusion over the thrust of American policy. What role does the United States see for itself in a rapidly changing region? “I’ve never seen Americans so confused and worried as I have ever since January [2011],” said Egypt’s Hisham Kassem, a prominent liberal publisher. While this may be overstating the case, the narrative of a United States that is feckless, incoherent, and increasingly irrelevant is one that has taken hold in Arab public discourse. And in the Middle East, perception is often reality.

The Republican Critique

Republican responses to Obama’s policies toward the Middle East in general and the Arab Spring specifically run the gamut. Republican hawks who remain close to the neoconservatives, such as John McCain and to a lesser extent Mitt Romney, believe Obama’s “less is more” approach has endangered efforts to promote democracy in the region. Other Tea Party–influenced Republicans, animated by a sense of American overcommitment abroad, have criticized Obama’s adventurism in Libya and suggested that he too quickly withdrew support from embattled allies, including President Mubarak.

As varied as they are, two common threads run through Republican critiques. First, they portray President Obama as an indecisive leader whose ad hoc, incoherent policies have undermined American credibility abroad. Second, they argue that Obama is not comfortable with American supremacy and is abdicating leadership to others in acknowledgement of a “post-American century.” With few exceptions, the Republican candidates failed to offer anything resembling a coherent alternative to Obama’s policies. To the extent that they have, the candidates, save Ron Paul, focused primarily on three issues—Israel, Iran, and the threat of Islamism—which gives some sense of where priorities will lie under a Republican administration. Republican policy toward emerging democracies—or existing autocracies—would primarily be a function of a given government’s positions on Israel and Iran as well as whether or not it had an Islamist orientation.

Republican candidates have reserved their harshest rhetoric for Obama’s approach to Israel. Romney, for example, has regularly attacked the administration for throwing “Israel under the bus” and blames Obama’s policies of “appeasement” for encouraging the Palestinians to pursue statehood at the United Nations. Meanwhile, several candidates cast doubt on the very notion of an independent Palestinian state—the product of decades of bipartisan consensus. Most famously, former Speaker Newt Gingrich called the Palestinians an “invented people.” In addition, he declared shariah law a “mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the world as we know it.”

Indeed, Republicans have routinely brought up the specter of an Islamist threat and have tended to lump nonviolent Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, with violent ones, such as al Qaeda. The Obama administration, in contrast, has begun engaging, if reluctantly, with the Muslim Brotherhood and has repeatedly affirmed the need to respect democratic outcomes, regardless of who wins. President Obama’s willingness to engage with Islamists has invited a flurry of attacks from conservatives that he is soft on extremism and indulges anti-American forces. There is some degree of fantasy in these criticisms. Notwithstanding the aggressive anti-Islamist rhetoric coming from most candidates, a Republican administration would have little choice but to adapt to new realities and work with Islamically influenced governments too.

Middle East Policy in the Next Presidential Term

None of the extant problems of the Middle East are likely to abate over the next four years. There may be some bright spots—Tunisia in particular shows considerable promise—but the overall regional trend is unlikely to improve significantly for some time, and it could well get worse before it gets better. Thus the central question for the next American president is the extent to which he wants to try to alleviate the problems of the region and help steer it away from the worst paths and toward better ones. The inward turn of American public opinion, political deadlock in Washington, and the country’s continuing economic problems will all limit just how much any president might do for the Middle East. None of these obstacles, however, is so great that determined leadership might not be able to overcome or at least mitigate them.

The direction of U.S. policy toward the region is far from settled and is likely to vary considerably depending on who wins the November election. During the primary campaign, different presidential candidates staked out very different positions, from neo-isolationism, to restrained involvement, to a much more muscular role in the region. On the Middle East, the divide between the Democratic administration and mainstream Republicans has continued to grow, certainly in rhetoric but also, increasingly, on policy—a result of real philosophical differences over the importance of American leadership during a time of significant financial constraints and greater global competition. If President Obama is not elected, there is still a considerable range of views within the Republican Party itself.

With the lack of bipartisan consensus or even a consensus within either party, there is an opportunity for a frank and wide-ranging debate about the past and future of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The relative decline in America’s influence and standing in the region—whether real or perceived—can, and should, be reversed, and the Arab Spring presents a particularly opportune moment to do so. Many of the American establishment’s long-held assumptions about the Middle East have proved false. A Democratic or Republican administration must be prepared to think creatively about how to reengage with the region on the basis of a new set of principles. The aspirations of ordinary Arabs can no longer be cast aside as irrelevant to U.S. interests. Americans are no longer engaging solely with unelected and unaccountable regimes but with populations that are demanding a voice not just in their own affairs but in foreign policy as well.

Active and consistent support for democratic change in the Arab world—even if it means occasionally angering long-standing allies—is important for a number of reasons. First, it aligns American policy with regional trends that are irreversible. Instead of being caught unaware once again, the United States should anticipate the changes to come—and recognize that the region is growing more, not less, democratic. It means little to support the demands of protesters after they have already won. It will send a much stronger signal to the region’s future leaders if Washington encourages and defends them when it is not easy and when their victory is far from a foregone conclusion.

Second, before the Arab Spring, anti-American sentiment could be—and often was—ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. After all, it mattered what governments did, and most Arab governments were firmly in the pro-U.S. orbit. In the coming years, however, what Arabs think and what their governments do will be much more closely linked. And, as long as tens of millions of Arabs dislike the United States, viewing it as a destructive force in the region, Arab democracies will feel compelled to act against American interests to gain popular support. Of course, Arab public opinion, fueled by deeply held resentments, will not change overnight, but, over the long run, the United States can work to build new relationships—based on shared values and common interests—with the region’s rising democracies.

As for countries that are not democracies, and may not be anytime soon, a forward-looking strategy is required. Many, including Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, will follow a middle path, somewhere between outright revolution and total repression. Here, the United States and like-minded nations should work to persuade them that they must start or continue down the path of reform because substantive change, however difficult, is ultimately the only viable option. Rather than being satisfied with partial, cosmetic reforms, the United States should clarify that the ultimate goal is a revamped political system in which the king or dictator relinquishes significant power to elected bodies. The United States should judge reform efforts by that standard. In these cases, it is critical that American policy be seen as supportive and beneficial to those who are willing to tread this arduous path. Reform is costly and often painful, and material assistance of all kinds from the United States and its allies should figure at least as prominently as the threat of sanctions—diplomatic, economic, and otherwise—in Washington’s efforts to help foster stabilizing change in the Middle East.

Moving in this direction requires measures that institutionalize the promotion of Arab democracy. The next president should coordinate the funding of a “reform endowment” that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement necessary reforms. The endowment would include a minimum of $5 billion and would be available to all interested countries. Receiving aid would be conditioned on meeting a series of explicit, measurable benchmarks on democratization. These benchmarks would be the product of extensive negotiations with interested countries. Unused funds would be reinvested, while new democracies would be asked to contribute annual dues to help grow the endowment over time. For skeptical Arab audiences, the message from the United States and other donor countries would be clear—democracy cannot be imposed, but it can be actively and vigorously supported.

For transitional states like Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, benchmarks could include military noninterference in civilian affairs, the establishment of judicial independence, and the protection of a vibrant, independent press. For liberalizing monarchies, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait, benchmarks should focus on expanded political space for opposition groups and the gradual devolution of power to elected institutions that are accountable to the people. This reform endowment should be funded with contributions from the United States, European nations, Turkey, Brazil, Qatar, and other like-minded powers. An international board would apportion loans and grants to states seeking to bring about real reform.

Democracy skeptics will counter that such efforts are in vain and that democratization has its dark side in light of the rise of Islamist parties. In a sense, they are right; in the Middle East, the future is Islamist. Instead of denying or fighting what is now an unmistakable reality, the United States and Europe should adapt by pursuing a strategic dialogue with Islamist actors across the region. Such parties are either already playing major roles in parliament and government or are likely to do so in the near future. Therefore, U.S. interests in the region will, whether Americans like it or not, be inextricably tied to theirs. With this in mind, there is an urgent need to foster a degree of mutual understanding and trust with these groups. Many of them, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, have made clear their desire to engage with the United States, realizing that American support will be critical to boosting trade and attracting foreign investment. Again, timing matters. Such relationships should be developed before these parties come to power, rather than afterward, when American leverage is likely to be less effective. With such channels, the United States can exert influence—and, if necessary, pressure—when Islamist parties overreach and take action that threatens vital U.S. interests in the region.

It is, by now, a cliché, but the importance of getting on the “right side of history” should not be underestimated. Yet all the support of Arab democracy will still fail to usher in a refashioned U.S. relationship with the region if, as currently seems likely, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to fester. There is reason to fear that the window of opportunity for a two-state solution is closing, and the next president will have the weighty task of trying to resuscitate a defunct peace process. A Republican administration is unlikely to make this a priority, while a second-term Obama administration will continue to be constrained by its tense and sometimes acrimonious relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (or a similarly minded right-wing government). A top priority for the next president must therefore be rebuilding trust with Israeli leaders and reaching out to the Israeli public. A presidential visit and public address in Israel, focusing on the concerns and fears of Israelis, would be a good place to start.

The Arab Spring will see the emergence of governments that are less amenable to Israel’s security interests. The more democratic the Middle East becomes, the more anti-Israel new elected governments will be. Israel’s isolation is only likely to grow. With this in mind, the United States should make clear that it stands firmly by Israel during a difficult time, while also impressing upon it the need to act sooner rather than later to make the difficult but ultimately necessary compromises for a durable peace.

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Prioritizing Democracy

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Now the Pressure’s Building on Jordan

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 12 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Jordan’s image in European and American eyes as a “moderate” pro-western monarchy has earned it a privileged place in the region. When in 1994 Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, becoming the second Arab country after Egypt to do so, its importance to the strategic axis in the Middle East was further enhanced. Now, with the Mubarak regime no longer in power and the region undergoing unprecedented change, the U.S. and Europe are placing greater emphasis than ever on Jordan’s ability to maintain stable relations with Israel. Whether Amman will still be able to do so in the absence of a credible peace process is now a weighty question, not least because the Jordanian monarchy is facing mounting troubles domestically.

For all that, in the absence of Egyptian leadership Jordan is seeking to take on a more significant role in pushing forward the peace process, most recently hosting Quartet talks in Amman and receiving Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in high-level discussions with King Abdullah. Whether this will facilitate the peace process in the absence of Egyptian leadership, or just deflect attention from Jordan’s domestic challenges, remains to be seen. But Jordan’s internal political situation can no longer be ignored, and urgent democratic reforms there have become crucial to western interests. They should also strengthen Jordan’s efforts to influence Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

American and European policymakers alike see Jordan as an agent for reform in the region, and some have even held the country up as evidence that moderate monarchies in the Middle East can help secure both democratic values and western strategic concerns.

Jordan has long been a key EU partner; it has enjoyed privileged trade status with Europe since 1977, and the EU is currently Jordan’s second trade partner behind Saudi Arabia. The Association Agreement signed with the EU in 1997 replaced the 20-year-old Cooperation Agreement and will incrementally establish free trade between the EU and Jordan. The EU also grants aid to Jordan through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), with a budget worth some €12bn for 2007-2013.

Jordan’s relationship with the United States has been similarly strong. It is now the region’s second largest per capita recipient of American aid after Israel, with total U.S. assistance having risen from $353m in 2001 to $818m in 2010. The 2000 free trade agreement with the U.S. makes Jordan one of only five nations in the region to have such an arrangement, and in return Jordan provides intelligence information and helps to safeguard American and Israeli strategic interests in the region.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is, meanwhile, seeking to shore up Jordan with greater economic support, while also opening up the possibility of more integrated security partnerships with the well-trained Jordanian military and intelligence services. As part of this strategy, Saudi Arabia last year granted Jordan $1bn in aid. The possible expansion of the GCC to include Jordan and Morocco reflected the Gulf nations’ initial “security-first” approach to the Arab awakening. By expanding an organisation that groups monarchies in the Middle East, the GCC had hoped to ride out the wave of reform while maintaining the status quo in those countries.

Yet change has become increasingly unavoidable. The GCC has had to facilitate the transfer of power away from Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, and it has come to take a stronger stance against the autocratic reign of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It therefore appears to be increasingly unlikely that Jordan will be granted membership of the more activist GCC. Jordan is in any case more unstable than many key allies realise or are willing to acknowledge. Domestically, it has long faced internal threats that have so far not been allayed by “top-down” reforms whose eventual aim is to introduce a more representative political system.

Jordan’s King Abdullah has in his 13-year reign appointed 10 cabinets, the latest last October to quell protests against the government of Marouf al-Bakhit, who was widely seen as part of the “old guard” and thus not serious about cracking down on corruption or interested in democratic reform. King Abdullah’s commitment to introducing a constitutional monarchy, even though in 2005 he claimed that Jordan would “absolutely” pursue that path, is widely doubted, and seen by many Jordanians as little more than a rhetorical promise. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index in 2010 rated Jordan 117th out of 167 nations, placing it firmly among those labelled as “authoritarian”. The king and his new prime minister, Awm Khasawneh, have, however, repeatedly proclaimed their desire to enact reforms to make the political system more representative, with elections scheduled for later this year. Although the king may truly aspire to reform the system, implementation has been slow, making Jordanians increasingly nervous.

Jordan nevertheless continues to benefit from much unconditional western support. There has been surprisingly little mention in official U.S. or European statements of the popular protests that have been taking place in Jordan since last year, even though high-level figures like EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton visited the kingdom during the height of last June’s unrest. The western commitment to Jordan remains strong, with the U.S. signing grants for Jordan worth $360m last August, and both the EU and President Obama praising King Abdullah’s proposed reforms.

Nonetheless, Jordan’s commitment to reform remains uncertain. With an estimated 55-70% of its population of Palestinian origin, Jordan’s social cleavages also threaten its political stability. Economic inequalities have aggravated these problems as Palestinians tend to dominate the business elite while East Bank Jordanians have done less well. But the East Bankers account for much of the political elite, and often are hesitant to accept changes that would permit more representative governance because that would diminish their political power. Some East Bankers hope for political reform, but Jordan’s opposition groups are primarily Palestinian, strengthening fears that political divisions follow sectarian cleavages.

Another element that further complicates Jordan’s social composition is the large number of Palestinian refugees. UNRWA reports that 1.9m Palestinian refugees and displaced persons are now in Jordan. This population, if granted citizenship, would represent a huge bloc of voters whose interests would align with neither the East Bank population nor with Jordan’s elite Palestinians, thereby creating a new social cleavage in an already divided country.

Even among the tribal East Bank population, Jordan suffers from severe divisions. Some 40% of Jordan’s population is affiliated with one tribe or another. These have traditionally been loyal to its Hashemite monarchs, making their recent actions that much more disconcerting to the regime. In a joint statement issued early in 2011, 36 tribal figures warned that without political reform Jordan would experience similar protests to Tunisia and Egypt and demanded immediate change. “Political reform is now an urgent matter that cannot be delayed,” they said, adding that “holding the corrupt and thieves accountable and freezing their assets, prohibiting them from travelling are all part and parcel of political reform.”

It is therefore far from certain that these tribal leaders can still be seen as reliable supporters of the regime, or whether it could long survive without them. A good many analysts contend that Jordan's political elite has been able to use this tribalism as a bulwark against the increasing popularity of Islamists, and to counter the emergence of a credible liberal opposition to autocratic governance. The tribal leaders’ support could become critical at a time when King Abdullah is facing challenges from East Bank loyalists as well as Jordan’s Palestinians.

Corruption will probably be the issue that unites opposition. Popular anger at the unpunished graft of key officials and other elites has already provoked some of the biggest mass protests so far, bringing together Islamists, leftists and others. The sighting of powerful businessman Khalid Shahin in London last April when he was supposed to be undergoing medical treatment in the U.S. while serving a three-year sentence for corruption, was a major embarrassment for the Jordanian authorities, and forced the justice and health ministers to resign. Last August, the prime minister was cleared by Parliament of all charges relating to a controversial deal to set up a casino on the Dead Sea. The widespread perceptions of a “whitewash” united leftist and Islamist opposition forces against the government, including the powerful Islamic Action Front. Last May, they formed the National Front for Reform (NFR) on a platform of “fighting tyranny and corruption.” Its leader is the respected former prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who insists that “fighting corruption starts with reforming the regime itself.”

Even after Jordan’s unpopular Bakhit government was sacked last October, with former ICC judge Awn Khasawneh coming to power, complaints about corruption have continued. In early December, protestors stepped up their rallies against government corruption, leading King Abdullah to comment publicly that “no one is above the law.” Prime Minister Khasawneh endorsed the king’s strong stance against graft, vowing that his government would back the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

The reality, however, is that Jordan’s government still operates as an absolute monarchy, despite promises of greater democratic accountability. King Abdullah’s recent promises of an elected government have done little to bridge the “trust deficit” between his words and his actions.

Europe, working with the U.S., has the ability to push for such democratic reforms. Its trade and aid relations give it considerable leverage, as do its links with Jordan’s military and security forces. In advocating reforms, Europe must no longer accept cosmetic and piecemeal efforts, because the experience of the Arab awakening so far clearly shows that if democratic reform isn’t forthcoming, Jordan risks the same chaos and instability as elsewhere in the region.

Further, Jordan is in any case far from being isolated from the effects of the uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East. As the Syrian crisis becomes increasingly violent, with King Abdullah publicly calling on Bashar al-Assad to step down, threats of spillover become all the more daunting. Change in the region, whether in North Africa or in Syria, is likely to spur Jordanians to push harder still for democratic reform at home.

Just as in Egypt, Jordan’s “western aid for peace with Israel” deal may easily be swept away. Mubarak’s ousting means Jordan is now the lynchpin in such an arrangement, but the question is how long this increasingly unstable structure can last.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Europe's World

Image Source: © Mohamad Torokman / Reuters

The Worsening Humanitarian Crisis in Syria

Elizabeth Ferris — Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:56:00 -0500

As the violence in Syria drags into its twelfth month, there is growing evidence that a humanitarian disaster is taking place and there are painfully few options for effective response. More than 5,000 people have been killed in the violence – although given difficulties in access, the actual number may be much higher. In Homs, there are reports of shortages of medical supplies, food, water and electricity. The UN estimates that between 100,000 and 200,000 people have fled the fighting, tending to seek refuge with family and friends within the country. At the time of writing, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Red Crescent had entered the city of Hama to supply 12,000 people with a month's supply of emergency assistance, and their negotiations were ongoing to provide evacuations and humanitarian assistance to the Baba Amr suburb of Homs. The top humanitarian official of the UN system, Valerie Amos, is still waiting for permission to visit Syria.

The crisis isn’t just in Syria. Some 80,000 Syrians have reportedly fled into Jordan in recent weeks where the government is considering constructing a camp for the refugees. In Lebanon, aid agencies are preparing for a major influx of people fleeing the violence in Syria in spite of reports that Syria has been laying landmines along its border with Lebanon. Reports from Turkey indicate that some 10,000 Syrians have already crossed the border. Almost forgotten in the news reports on Syria is the plight of Iraqi refugees, some of whom have reportedly been targeted in the violence. Perhaps 100,000 of them returned to Iraq in recent weeks while others have fled to other countries. The displacement of Syrians is taking place in a region already characterized by complex and politically-sensitive population movements.

Even though comprehensive, accurate information is lacking on the scale of the humanitarian crisis, the international community faces a depressingly familiar quandary: how to assist Syrians when the government is intransigent and the international community is blocked from taking needed political action?

The ICRC has called for a daily two-hour pause in the fighting to allow humanitarians access to evacuate the wounded and provide supplies to increasingly desperate people. So far its negotiations with the Syrian authorities have not been successful. The other alternative being discussed is the establishment of humanitarian corridors – areas respected by all sides as neutral zones where assistance can be provided. Unfortunately the record of safe areas – or as Anne-Marie Slaughter called them last week ‘no kill zones’ – is not a good one. Unless protected by UN peacekeeping or other forces, such areas are likely to become targets for military action by the Syrian government, particularly if such areas become havens for the armed opposition or are used to collect intelligence on Syrian activities (as Slaughter proposed last week). Even if such zones were to be protected by UN peacekeeping forces, UN forces would likely be drawn into direct conflict with the Syrian authorities, undermining any claim of neutrality or humanitarian principles. Safe zones or humanitarian corridors are an iffy proposition at best; mixing them with explicitly military objectives is a recipe for disaster.

These conundrums bring Srebrenica to mind, where even the presence of peacekeepers wasn’t enough to prevent the massacre of 8,000 men in 1995. There are other disturbing parallels between the Bosnian conflict of the mid-1990s and Syria in 2012. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria has concluded that gross violations of human rights amounting to crimes against humanity had been ordered by the highest level of the Syrian government and armed forces. Another obvious parallel is that when political processes are blocked, everyone looks to humanitarian assistance to fill the void. The recent Friends of Syria conference in Tunis wasn’t able to do much to stop the violence, but did agree to call on the Syrian government to allow humanitarian agencies access to those in need. The US government has pledged $10 million in humanitarian aid for Syria. Even the Russian government has expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Syria, publicly supporting ICRC’s call for a daily two-hour humanitarian truce. But if we’ve learned anything from the past 20 years or so, it’s that using humanitarian assistance as a substitute for political action weakens humanitarian principles.

In the absence of political action, there aren’t any straightforward answers to the question of how to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Syrians trapped in an increasingly violent and desperate situation – though ICRC’s call for a two-hour daily truce should obviously be supported. Actually, in a world where sovereignty is a linchpin of the international system, there are no straightforward answers about how to stop the violence of the Syrian state towards its people. The world can and should stand ready to provide all assistance possible to Syrians who are able to cross the border into neighboring countries and to the states that allow them to enter. And plans should be made to mobilize needed assistance inside Syria as soon as that is possible. This isn’t nearly enough, but feasible alternatives for assisting people in need against their government’s will are in dreadfully short supply.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Jordan's Experiment: Does Top-Down Democratic Reform Work?

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Jordan has a new prime minister and a new government. Once again, there is hope that a change in leadership will put this Middle Eastern monarchy back on the right course toward democratic reform. In the Jordanian press, approval of Awn al-Khasawneh's selection as prime minister has been nearly unanimous. Western observers have also sounded optimistic notes. But, for those who wish to see Jordan develop into something resembling a democracy, King Abdullah's recent moves—apparently intended to reassure skeptics that democratization is forthcoming—suggest more of the same.

Khasawneh—a former judge on the International Court of Justice—is by all accounts a smart and well-meaning individual. As one former Jordanian minister told me, "Awn is a great guy but a bad manager." I saw Khasawneh speak at the World Economic Forum on October 22. He was humble, self-deprecating, and won over the crowd. His admission that he didn't know much about economics managed to be both endearing and somewhat frightening. But the focus on Khasawneh, his skills and his deficiencies, is something of a distraction.

Still, the prime minister can't be Jordan's solution because the prime minister isn't really the problem. The prime minister is appointed by the king—usually with minimal consultation—and serves at his pleasure. He has limited powers and operates within a claustrophobic political structure in which the monarchy, the royal court (with a staff of more than a thousand), and the intelligence services dominate. In a new Brookings paper, my colleague Courtney Freer and I take a closer look at king's role in the Jordanian politics and what it means for the country's reform prospects.

The current situation reminds me of 2004 and 2005, when I was living in Jordan. It was a tumultuous time with growing opposition to Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez's increasingly repressive measures against professional syndicates and other civil society organizations. Fayez was soon replaced by the academic Adnan Badran, a well-meaning liberal with a reputation for integrity. But Badran, like so many others before him, was only able to tinker around the margins, despite the existence of an ambitious reform blueprint known as the "National Agenda." The National Agenda was never implemented. The architect of the agenda—then deputy prime minister Marwan Muasher—has suggested that it was those officials around the king, rather than the king himself, who blocked the reform process from going forward.

Read the full article »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The Atlantic

How Stable Is Jordan? King Abdullah’s Half-hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the Arab Spring

Courtney Freer and Shadi Hamid — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 15:00:00 -0400

In the wake of revolts in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, Jordan—another seemingly stable pro-Western regime—has received curiously little attention. Yet, in Jordan, an already deteriorating political situation has been exacerbated by sectarian tensions between East Bank Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

While protests have remained relatively small, there is growing support among opposition groups for “constitutional monarchy.” Reduction of the king’s powers and prerogatives was long the third rail of Jordanian politics; that they are increasingly being debated in public is just one sign of a shifting political discourse, and one that demands closer attention.

Jordan, along with Morocco, is one of the few Arab countries that has publicly declared its commitment to political reform. However, King Abdullah’s recent steps have fallen short of opposition expectations, calling into question the trajectory of Jordan’s reform process.

This policy briefing takes a closer look at Jordan’s changing political dynamics, with a focus on the role of the king, the royal court, and the feared security services. Hamid and Freer conclude that Jordan is indeed “stable,” although that stability is more tenuous than observers often admit. With mounting calls for reform and a heightened risk of polarization, it may be time for the Obama administration to focus greater attention on Jordan. Considering the strong ties between the two countries and the warm relations between President Obama and King Abdullah, the United States has the opportunity to make the kind of push in Jordan that it cannot elsewhere.

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Authors

Courtney Freer
Shadi Hamid

Image Source: Â© Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

After the Arab Spring: What’s Next for the Economies of the Middle East and North Africa

Fri, 23 Sep 2011 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 23, 2011
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

With many countries in the Arab world experiencing popular protests and regime change, much of the focus of the international community and media has been the region’s political transition from autocratic rule to democracy. However, the economic transition that many of these countries now face is also critical for the future growth and development of their economies and the prosperity and well-being of their citizens. The international community and Arab leaders must now closely examine what reforms these countries need to take on in order to ensure an economic transition that creates jobs, attracts investment and turns these nations into globally competitive economies.

On September 23, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on the economic transition of Middle East and North African countries post-Arab Spring and the role that Arab governments and the international community have guiding these economic reforms. Mustapha Nabli, central bank governor of Tunisia and Ahmed Galal, managing director of the Economic Research Forum, made opening remarks on the efforts needed to spur economic growth in the region. Gunilla Carlsson, Sweden’s minister for international development cooperation and Dirk Niebel, Germany’s minister for economic cooperation and development, responded with their perspective of the efforts of the international community. Vice President Kemal Derviş, director of Global Economy and Development, moderated the discussion.

After the program, the participants took audience questions.

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After the Arab Spring: What’s Next for the Economies of the Middle East and North Africa

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20110923_arab_spring_economics

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Ahmed Galal

Managing Director
Economic Research Forum

Mustapha Nabli

Governor
Central Bank of Tunisia

Gunilla Carlsson

Minister for International Development Cooperation
Kingdom of Sweden

Dirk Niebel

Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development
Federal Republic of Germany

A New Security Strategy, but Not Necessarily a New Gulf Cooperation Council

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 16 May 2011 15:31:00 -0400

The Gulf Cooperation Council's invitations to Jordan and Morocco to apply for membership surprised nearly everyone. But perhaps it shouldn't have. Since the Arab revolts began, the Gulf has adopted an aggressive regional posture. The GCC has granted Bahrain and Oman US$20 billion (Dh73.5 billion) in aid, mediated the crisis in Yemen and, perhaps most importantly, dispatched troops into Bahrain to quell the protests there.

In this context, letting Jordan and Morocco join the club makes some degree of sense. The two countries are conservative, pro-western monarchies facing domestic unrest and calls for greater democracy. After the Obama administration acquiesced to the Egyptian regime's collapse, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful Gulf state, began doubting the United States' commitment to regional stability. So it has taken matters into its own hands. In a time of unprecedented upheaval, the Saudis are digging in.

The economic rationale of the move is considerably less compelling. Compared to the Gulf states, Jordan and Morocco are relatively poor, with high levels of economic inequality, structural underemployment, and rampant corruption. Culturally, Jordan and Morocco couldn't be more different than the GCC nations. And then, of course, there is the small matter of them not actually being in the Gulf. All of this suggests the GCC will not become the integrated economic union many hoped it would. Already, the 2010 deadline for establishing a common currency passed rather unceremoniously.

Focused on the threat of Iran from without and burgeoning protest movements from within, the GCC is solidifying into a loose security alliance, dominated by Saudi Arabia. Jordan, in particular, has much to offer in this domain, boasting one of the region's best-trained militaries and intelligence services. As Gulf states face growing discontent, such services may prove particularly helpful. This "new" GCC, if it ever comes to fruition, would bear resemblance to the old alliances of the Cold War, such as the Baghdad Pact, adopted in 1955, which aimed to contain Soviet influence.

In short, while the short-term rationale is evident - security, after all, always takes precedence - adopting Jordan and Morocco as members will dilute the GCC while provoking the non-aligned "pro-democratic" states, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Qatar, Lebanon and Turkey, to do their own balancing (to say nothing of Iran). Even within the GCC, enthusiasm for the move seems to be lacking. Reportedly Kuwait, Oman and Qatar expressed reservations, suggesting that a two-tiered membership is a likely scenario. Under such a system, Jordan, Morocco - and anyone else - could aspire to a "privileged partnership" short of full membership.

With the Gulf throwing its weight and Egypt re-asserting itself as a regional force, Jordan and Morocco have been the odd men out. They are also the two countries with a reputation for intermittent attempts at liberalisation, free (if not necessarily fair) elections, and political inclusion of Islamist parties. Instead of crushing recent protests, they have opted for a strategy of selective accommodation, initiating dialogue with the opposition and revising some laws.

While it is unlikely that the monarchies in either country will voluntarily give up power, there is also little to suggest that they will resort to brute force against their own citizens. At least rhetorically, the Jordanian and Moroccan kings have committed themselves to political reform. In a major speech on March 9, King Mohammed of Morocco announced sweeping changes, including constitutional revisions and a shift toward elected, rather than appointed, governments. But in Morocco, the gap between rhetoric and policy has often been considerable. Saudi Arabia's influence and leverage would likely put clear limits on Morocco's democratisation process, just as it did in Bahrain.

The United States, a close ally of all the states in question, has reason to be concerned. Jordan is the second largest per-capita recipient of U.S. assistance. Morocco, meanwhile, has a multi-year $698 million Millennium Challenge Compact agreement with the United States. Saudi Arabia is stepping well beyond its traditional sphere of influence and stepping on US (and European) territory. The Obama administration, for its part, does not want to see Morocco or Jordan dragged back toward a more robust authoritarianism. But the United States, tied down by contentious budget debates at home, is unwilling to provide the kind of economic assistance that the Saudis are.

Accordingly, the already public Saudi-U.S. breach may continue to grow. A newly revitalised GCC is shifting its strategies and alliances, testing America's traditional role as the sole guarantor of Gulf stability. Increasingly, the region is facing not just domestic upheaval but a potential "revolution" in its fundamental security architecture. But, as the Saudis themselves would point out, not all revolutions end well.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The National

Protracted Refugee Situations: An Iraq Case Study

Roberta Cohen — Wed, 20 Apr 2011 00:00:00 -0400

On April 20, 2011, Roberta Cohen addressed American University’s Washington College of Law on the topic of protracted refugee situations. The beginning of her speech follows, and the full speech is available for PDF download.

In looking at protracted refugee situations, my focus will be on Iraq from where some 2 million refugees fled for Jordan, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries beginning in 2006. My main purpose, however, will be to explore the options open to refugees in order to see whether the Iraq situation or ones similar to it can be addressed and prevented from becoming long lasting.

The exodus from Iraq was the largest one in the Middle East, larger even than the original Palestinian exodus. But unlike most Palestinians, the Iraqis are able to reside in urban areas, not camps. However, they have no legal rights in neighboring Arab states and it is now five years since they fled to Jordan and Syria. What are their prospects?

To begin with, let’s examine the cause of their exodus because the reasons often influence whether returns are possible or desirable. Some 2 million fled Iraq in 2006 and 2007 because of intense sectarian violence following the U.S. invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Under Hussein, the Sunnis had been in a dominant position whereas thereafter the majority Shia came into ascendance. The inability of the two groups to work out power sharing peacefully, combined with the absence of an effective government, resulted in violence and forced displacement.

Shia and Sunni militias, sparked by the bombing of a major Shia shrine, systematically and purposefully began to persecute, kill and expel members of the opposite group from their home areas in Baghdad and other cities. And the brutality used – beheading of people for example -- was intended to ensure that those expelled would not seek to return to their home areas. And to date it has succeeded. Most of those who fled to Jordan and Syria do not want to return to their original homes, according to the United Nations. And of those who have returned, many prefer to stay in areas where they are in the majority rather than return to their original homes. This pattern may be similar to what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the ethnic cleansing. Although substantial numbers did eventually return, at least a million did not, and most of those who did return did not go back to their homes of origin but to areas where their ethnic group was in the majority. The point being that persons deliberately targeted on ethnic and religious grounds have a different experience from those trapped in generalized violence and for that reason may be more wary about returning to or wanting to return to their original homes.

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Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: American University's Washington College of Law

Middle East Youth May Be Key to Economic and Political Stability

Samantha Constant — Sat, 19 Feb 2011 10:47:00 -0500

Introduction

Over the past several weeks, the world watched enraptured as crowds led by young Egyptians thronged the streets of Cairo to protest President Hosni Mubarak’s rule and to force him from office. No two countries are exactly alike. But many of the same demographic and economic forces that produced the Egyptian earthquake are present throughout the region—which could mean more tremors ahead.

Like Egypt, most countries in the Middle East are experiencing an unprecedented youth bulge. In countries from Morocco to Iran, people ages 15 to 29 make up the largest share of the population. Ominously for the region’s rulers, neither Tunisia nor Egypt, the epicenters of the uprising, is particularly unique in its demographic tilt. Young people represent 29 percent of the population in both Egypt and Tunisia, compared with 28 percent in Bahrain, 30 percent in Jordan, 31 percent in Algeria, and 34 percent in Iran, all of which have faced their own protests. The comparable number in most Western countries is around 20 percent.

What’s more, the next few years may represent a point of maximum demographic pressure across the region—a period somewhat analogous to the 1960s in the United States when the first baby boomers surged onto the political and cultural scenes. In Bahrain and Jordan, the share of the population under 30 is projected to continue rising for several years. But in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran, the youth bulge is either peaking now or will peak shortly. That means the generational demand for change could also be cresting.

Read the full article at the National Journal website »

Authors

Samantha Constant

Publication: National Journal

Israel's Reaction to the Uprising in Egypt

Martin S. Indyk — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 16:39:00 -0500

Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel and now director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, discussed the uprising in Egypt at a recent Meet the Press at Brookings event. Indyk said that Israeli leaders are very concerned about the impact of the departure of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on the peace process. Indyk also discussed how events in Egypt are impacting on broader issues in the Middle East, including Hamas in Gaza, Jordan and Iran.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

In the Middle East: Two Models for Democratic Change

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 02 Feb 2011 11:08:00 -0500

We may very well be entering an Arab democratic moment. This is not about individual countries and their particular economic and political conditions, although those certainly matter. Something bigger is going on here. Arabs are discovering a power they weren’t aware they had. Arab regimes gave the impression of being stable, strong, and secure, backed by overwhelming coercive capacity. Facing such odds, fighting for democratic change seemed a losing battle.

Tunisia, then, was decisive. It showed that the long vaunted stability of authoritarian governments was illusory. They, too, could fall. All you needed was a good dose of people power. There is, after all, strength – and safety – in numbers.

Even if the attempted revolutions fail, Arab regimes can never go back to what they once were. They will live in fear of the next revolt. The opposition will wait in anticipation of the next revolt. The stability of any regime is no longer guaranteed. What is interesting this same feeling is replicated in widely divergent contexts. Inspired by Tunisia – and, now, Egypt – Yemeni activists are planning a “day of rage” for February 3. Syrians will be having theirs on February 5. Northern Sudan, too, has been roiled by protests. Meanwhile, the Jordanian opposition, after several years of treading water, has used a string of successful protests to push for unprecedented changes in the nature of Hashemite monarchy.

Two models of democratic change are emerging. One is the Tunisia-Egypt-Yemen model of overturning the regime. This would seem to apply in republics, where protesters have one simple, overarching demand – that the president give up power. The person of the president, because of his dominating, partisan role, provides a rallying point for protesters. This is conducive to opposition unity. They disagree on a lot, but last they can agree on the most important thing.

The other model of change focuses around constitutional reform in the Arab monarchies. In countries like Jordan and Morocco, there are reasonably free elections. But elections have limited relevance because it’s the king who has final decision-making authority. The problem here is not necessarily the king himself but the institution of the monarchy and its disproportionate power. The solution, then, is constitutional reform that shifts power away from the king toward an elected parliament and an independent judiciary. This is what opposition groups are calling for in Jordan.

While different, both models are about altering political structures rather than gradual, slow reform. Leaders have not caught on. They seem to still think they can offer half-measures to appease their people. But the lesson of Tunisia and Egypt – as well as Yemen, Jordan, and many others – is that Arab populations, after waiting and waiting, have run out of patience.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: POLITICO

A Statesman’s Forum with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh

Mon, 24 Jan 2011 12:30:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2011
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

The list of challenges facing the United States in the Middle East is daunting. In addition to the efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, attempts to reassemble the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and engagement to ensure Iraq’s fractious political landscape does not slide backwards into chaos, many other issues in the region jostle for the United States’ attention. From his efforts to restart the peace process to his recent calls to avoid escalation in Lebanon, Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh stands as one of the most active voices in the region working to address these difficult issues.

On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Minister Judeh for a discussion of the most pressing challenges facing the Middle East today.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. After the program, the Foreign Minister took audience questions.

Audio

A Statesman’s Forum with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20110124_jordan

Participants

Panelists

Nasser Judeh

Foreign Minister
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Arab Elections: Free, Sort of Fair... and Meaningless

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 27 Oct 2010 00:00:00 -0400

A certain Arab country recently held parliamentary elections. The vote was reasonably free and fair. Turnout was 67 percent, and the opposition won a near majority of the seats -- 45 percent to be exact. Sounds like a model democracy. Yet, rather than suggesting a bold, if unlikely, democratic experiment, Saturday's elections in Bahrain instead reflected a new and troubling trend in the Arab world: the free but unfair -- and rather meaningless -- election.

Something similar will happen on Nov. 9 in Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom is a close U.S. ally that has grown increasingly proficient at predetermining election results without actually rigging them. It involves gerrymandering at a scale unknown in the West and odd electoral engineering (Jordan is one of only three countries in the world that uses something called Single Non Transferable Vote for national elections). Even when the opposition is allowed to win, the fundamentals do not necessarily change. Parliamentary legislation in countries like Jordan and Bahrain, after all, can be blocked by appointed "Upper Houses." And even if that were not the case, the King (or the President) and his ministers — all appointed — can also kill any threatening legislation.

If you go to Amman today, there are election tents and colorful posters everywhere. If you're lucky, you may stumble across an impassioned campaign speech. The government has launched a Western-style voter awareness campaign called "Let us Hear Your Voice." The U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) has been conducting voter registration drives and organizing a "Get-out-the-vote" effort to boost youth participation. For its part, the U.S. Congress may very well decide to pass a resolution, as it did in September 2007, commending Jordan for its "continued commitment to holding elections." The elections will likely be free. But, oddly enough, there is no opposition. Jordan's only real political party — the Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing — has opted to boycott. For the first time ever, Jordan, long regarded as a bastion of progressive reform, may very well end up with a parliament where the opposition has 0 out of 110 seats.

Jordan and Bahrain are not alone. Egypt, too, will face parliamentary elections next month. Meanwhile, a growing number of Arab countries have opted to hold reasonably free elections, including Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen. But rarely has the discrepancy between the appearance and substance of elections proven so vast. And rarely has so much been fought over so little.

It is somewhat surprising that things turned out this way, just five years after the short-lived but very real "Arab spring." In 2005, most of the Arab opposition — Islamist, liberal, and leftist alike — believed in elections. Elections, however unfair they initially appeared to be, seemed the best mechanism for advancing democratic reform. Islamist groups, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, adopted a political strategy based almost entirely around contesting elections at every level of society. This "elections-first" strategy, for a short while at least, appeared to be working. Islamist groups registered impressive victories across the region. In the 2005 Egyptian elections, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of parliamentary seats, the largest share of any opposition group since Egyptian independence in 1952. In 2006, al-Wefaq, Bahrain's largest Islamist opposition group, won 17 of the 18 seats it contested — a remarkable win percentage of 94 percent.

But just as Islamist groups adapted to a post-9/11 world in which the U.S. and the international community made democracy a top priority, so too did Arab regimes, which, while resorting to repression when necessary, worked diligently to construct a democratic façade. Some might consider this a workable compromise: Arabs get to vote and let out some steam. Friendly Arab regimes get to maintain their grip on power. After all, with drawdown in Iraq, troubles with Iran, and with Hamas waiting to play spoiler, real democracy — with all of the uncertainty it brings — seems like a luxury the U.S. can live without. Besides, the U.S. has been living without it for more than five decades.

Arabs themselves, however, are unlikely to be as accepting. A rising generation of young Arabs wants to take the promise of democracy seriously, and is growing frustrated with the façade — regardless of how much it pleases international democracy promoters. If free but meaningless elections become the new norm, the Arab opposition may be forced to adopt a more impatient and confrontational approach, one that emphasizes civil disobedience, mass protest, and other "de-legitimization" techniques. This is likely to be a good thing for Arab democracy (at least after the initial messiness and instability) but is less likely to be good for U.S. strategic interests in the region.

The elections in Bahrain, Jordan — and soon in Egypt — might seem to suggest that regimes have matters under control. And they might, but not necessarily for long.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Foreign Policy

Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the Middle East

Mary Kraetsch and Samantha Constant — Tue, 15 Jun 2010 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an effort to shed light on the challenges that youth continue to face in the Middle East, Samantha Constant and Mary Kraetsch have created an interactive map and corresponding fact sheets that provide key statistics associated with youth issues for all 18 countries in the Middle East. In the accompanying note, they provide an overview of the data and their main findings.

Click to view the interactive map »

Click on an individual country in the map to view the country fact sheet, which includes key statistics related to that country’s economy, demographics, education and youth employment status.

Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the Middle East

The Middle East is at a demographic turning point. Many countries in the region are reaching the peak of their ‘youth bulges,’ meaning that the share of young people in the country’s total population will soon begin to decrease. At the same time, young people in the region continue to represent a high proportion of the total population with persisting challenges of high unemployment and increasingly underemployment. According to estimates from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the League of Arab States, the region's economies will need to create around 51 million jobs by 2020 to meet the demand of the total unemployed and those entering the work force.[1] A significant proportion of these jobs are needed for currently unemployed youth and new youth labor force entrants during the next decade.

Indeed, youth-inclusive development remains as important as ever in the region. What lessons can be learned from countries where the youth bulge has peaked and how can these lessons be shared across borders to better support the region’s next generation? How can countries adopt best practices and institutional models to more effectively support young people’s transition from school to work and their transition to marriage and family formation? Answers to these questions are critical for understanding and initiating any policies and programs aimed at addressing the Middle East’s long-term development trajectory.

Using available data, we have collected key statistics related to the general economic and demographic conditions of each country in the region as well as statistics on the education and employment status of youth.[2] However, for some countries there are gaps in the available data, and for other countries the available data is somewhat outdated. Additional surveys and data collection – and the regular publication of existing data by government agencies and research institutes in the region – will be invaluable for researchers seeking to examine the root causes of youth development gaps and for those who are, in turn, seeking to devise knowledge-based policy and program solutions that can better address those gaps.

In this note, we provide an overview of the data and our main findings. The accompanying interactive map and fact sheets provide key statistics associated with youth issues for all 18 countries in the Middle East.

Introduction to the Data:

General Economy. Key statistics related to the general economy of each country include total GDP, GDP growth rates, GDP per capita and the primary sectors of the economy. This data provides a general economic context for each country. It also highlights the diversity of the Middle East region, which includes wealthy oil-producing countries with relatively small populations and lower-income countries with relatively large populations. These differing country contexts affect youth and their transitions to adulthood in particular ways. However, at the same time, youth across the region face a number of similar issues and challenges in terms of their school-to-work and work-to-marriage transitions.

Demographics. The information includes total population and projections for the absolute number of youth and the youth share of the population for 2010 and 2020, which gives an indication of the size of the youth bulge in each country.

Education. Statistics on school enrollment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels measure access to education and educational attainment. While access to education is relatively easy to measure through available data, it is more difficult to measure educational quality. We have also included data on public expenditure on education and pupil-teacher ratios as crude measures of education quality. Scores on international standardized tests such as TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA are more widely recognized and accepted measures of educational quality. In the Middle Eastern countries that participated in the 2007 TIMSS, average 8^th grade student performance in math and science was below the low benchmark, indicating basic knowledge of the subject area.[3] However, the TIMSS scores are not included in the map and fact sheets because they are difficult to interpret without a more elaborate analysis that compares the scores to other countries and to the low, intermediate, and high benchmarks.

Employment. Data on unemployment and labor force participation rates allow us to assess youth employment status in the Middle East. This data was drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the International Labor Organization Laborsta database, the Arab Labor Organization, and the Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections database (EAPEP). When data was available from multiple sources, the most recent data was selected. For some countries, unemployment and labor force participation rates are drawn directly from the source. In other cases, these rates were calculated using data from the Laborsta and EAPEP databases. We present this information for youth aged 15-24 and 15-29 (where available). In general, unemployment rates are higher for the 15-24 age group than the 15-29 age group due to the larger proportion of first time labor market entrants in the 15-24 group. In addition, labor force participation rates for the 15-24 group tend to be lower due to the high proportion of this group that are still in school.

Main Findings:

A number of key findings emerge, which highlight the challenges and struggles that Middle East youth experience during their transitions to adulthood:

Demographics

Many countries in the region have reached the peak of their youth bulge. Youth (aged 15-29) as a proportion of the total population ranges from 25 percent in Kuwait and UAE to 34 percent in Iran and Qatar. For most countries, the youth proportion of the population will begin to decline in the next ten years. An estimated 29 percent of Egypt’s population is between the ages of 15 and 29 today, but by 2020 that will drop to 25 percent. Jordan’s youth population is 30 percent of the total population today, but in ten years it will be only 27 percent. Morocco will drop from 29 percent (2010) to 24 percent (2020), while Iran’s youth share of the population will fall from 34 percent today to only 22 percent in 2020. However, there are still countries in the region where the youth share of the total population will remain level or continue to grow: Iraq (28 percent in 2010 to 29 percent in 2020) and West Bank and Gaza (27 percent in 2010 to 29 percent in 2020). In addition, in absolute numbers, the 15- to 29-year-old population in the region will continue to increase.[4]

Educational Outcomes

Most countries in the region have achieved near-universal school enrollment at the primary level. Enrollment rates at the secondary and tertiary levels are more varied across countries, but they indicate a high level of educational achievement in many of the region’s countries. This expansion in enrollment is a result of government investment in expanding access to education as well as student and parent recognition that school enrollment (especially at the secondary and tertiary levels) is necessary to secure heavily sought after positions in the civil service and public sector. While educational attainment has increased, educational quality in the region’s schools is generally poor and students leave school without the skills and knowledge needed to succeed in the job market. Poor education quality is a consequence of educational tracking systems and a reliance on high-stakes tests for university admission. This results in a system of education that promotes rote learning and memorization rather than the development of critical thinking and problem solving skills.[5]

Employment Outcomes

High levels of school enrollment have not translated to positive trends in the youth labor market. In general, the region’s youth unemployment rates are high, ranging from 20-30 percent in most countries, but reaching as high as 45.6 percent in Algeria and 45.4 percent in Iraq. In addition, Middle East youth experience long periods of unemployment and often end up searching for jobs for two to three years in countries like Egypt, Iran and Morocco. The causes of high unemployment rates among youth vary from country to country and are often the result of a preference for government employment among educated youth, the dearth of quality jobs in the private sector, and skills mismatch in the job market. After completing their education, many youth prefer to wait for employment opportunities in the public sector rather than accept low quality jobs in the informal private sector.[6] In some countries in the region, youth are beginning to adjust their expectations to the realities of the job market. New research shows that youth unemployment rates in some countries have begun to decrease as youth are accepting employment in low quality jobs. For example, in Egypt, the recent decline in youth unemployment is paradoxically associated with a deterioration of job quality rather than any major improvement in labor market conditions.

Outcomes for Young Women

The gender gap in educational enrollment at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels has narrowed. In fact, female enrollment at the tertiary level is greater than male enrollment in many Middle Eastern countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and the West Bank and Gaza. However, this narrowing of the gender gap in education has not translated to a similar narrowing of the gender gap in the labor market. Gender-specific data on unemployment and labor force participation highlight the unique challenges that young women experience in their transition from education to employment. In general, unemployment rates for young women are much higher than those for young men. In addition, labor force participation rates for young women are much lower than those for young men. These figures indicate that many young women do not enter the workforce upon their exit from school, either due to cultural norms and women’s own choice to focus on their roles as caretakers or due to their frustrations at poor labor market prospects.[7] Those young women that do decide to enter the workforce experience higher rates of unemployment.

Conclusion

These broad trends show that there is still much to be done to ensure smoother and more productive transitions for young people in the Middle East today and for future generations. The school-to-work transition for the ‘youth bulge’ that is now passing into adulthood has been marked by impressive gains in access to education compared to previous generations. However, the quest for gainful employment is still fraught with challenges. More research is needed to determine how institutions can inform the paths taken by young women and how institutions can grant young women greater career opportunities beyond traditional roles.

Even with updated statistics on demography, education and employment, there is still an astonishing amount of information that we do not know about today’s youth in the Middle East. This is because while we have good methods for measuring, for example, how many young people are enrolled in secondary school, indicators that examine the quality and value of what they are learning in the classroom are harder to define and measure. In terms of employment, it is relatively easy to determine whether or not someone is employed. However, job quality – often defined to include factors such as job security, pay, working conditions and benefits – is often neglected in large surveys. Looking ahead, it is critical that policymakers and researchers continue to ask these tough questions and support efforts to define and measure these elusive but necessary indicators of youth wellbeing.

[1] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries (New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2009), 109. Ali Abdel-Gadir and Khalid Abu-Ismail, Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A Human Development Approach (Cairo: UNDP and League of Arab States, 2009), 32-33.

[2] Generally speaking, the World Bank, International Labor Organization, and other international organizations define the “youth” age group as those between the ages of 15 and 24. However, we define youth as those between the ages of 15 and 29, in order to capture the full transition from youth to adulthood, including the school-to-work transition and the work-to-marriage transition.

[3] Navtej Dhillon, et al. “Missed by the Boom, Hurt by the Bust: Making Markets Work for Young People in the Middle East,” Middle East Youth Initiative report, (Washington: Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings and Dubai School of Government, 2009).

[4] United Nations Population Prospects (UNPP) data (2008) projects an approximate increase of 12 million more young people (ages of 15-29) between 2010 and 2035.

[5] Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Navtej Dhillon, “Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East: A Framework for Policy Reform,” Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper 8 (Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution and the Dubai School of Government, 2008).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

Authors

Mary Kraetsch
Samantha Constant