Brookings: Topics - Israeli Elections

Brookings Experts on Netanyahu’s New Coalition Government in Israel

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:59:00 -0400

Yesterday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled his new coalition government, seven weeks after his re-election. Following deadlocked negotiations, a slimmer government—with just 21 members—emerged and will be Israel’s first without ultra-Orthodox parties since 2005. Netanyahu’s announcement comes just days before President Obama is scheduled to visit the country. Martin Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, and Natan Sachs weigh in on the new coalition, and analyze the effect on the Middle East peace process.

Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Benjamin Netanyahu starts his new term as Prime Minister in a weakened position after he conceded essentially to all of Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid's demands (even yielding on education minister at the last minute) and still not getting an agreement for another week.

Lapid as finance minister, and Yesh Atid holding education and welfare, puts them in a strong position to fulfill campaign promises and position Lapid for greater gains in the next election. Indeed, the next election seems his primary concern. For Lapid, the peace process is not a priority issue.

Bayit Yehudi, for its part, received ministerial positions for Jerusalem, Diaspora, and religious services, all key for its constituency. A former head of the settler council, Uri Ariel, will run the ministry of housing and construction. No one expects this government to last a full term. Scenarios raised are either that it won't pass a budget or that Netanyahu will stymie Lapid so badly that it will drive him out of the coalition, allowing Netanyahu to bring in the religious parties and to shape the government he wanted all along. The latter could, I believe, only strengthen Lapid in new elections.

Aryeh Deri notwithstanding, the Haredis' attitudes on territorial compromise have changed. Netanyahu may not be comfortable with the status quo in Israel's relations with the Palestinians, given the price in international isolation and the harm to trade and relations with Europe. But beyond making some gestures, it's not clear how much he is willing to do. And with or without the Haredim, his coalition will not push him in a conciliatory direction.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

If the U.S. pushes Netanyahu on anything serious (not likely), then the coalition will fall, because Bennett will not be able to support. Which leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: you really need the ultra-Orthodox parties in the government to support serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues, because those parties give the government an extra margin of support.

I predict a short life for this coalition. This strikes me as a government in which everybody will be jockeying for position in the next election right away. The big issue will be Haredim in the military, and that will be very divisive.

Israelis love to complain about the Haredim, it's true, and everybody thinks they have gone too far. However, the secular-religious fight that is going to open up will be brutal. It's the biggest fault line in the society, and once the religious start hammering away at this government, I think we will see lots of cracks open up quickly—on lots of different issues.

The territorial questions are not central to the Haredim’s political identity and their participation in a government gives the prime minister more room to maneuver. They do not facilitate, and they have obstructionist tendencies, but they help to create an environment that is more propitious than what we get without them, which we see before us now. To me, it's a great irony of Israeli politics that I never contemplated before now.

Martin Indyk
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program

The Haredim issue will not divide the government, but I don't doubt it will divide society. However, the bark is always worse than the bite in Israeli politics.

The proposition that the ultra-Orthodox parties need to be in the government for it to be able to make serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues is unsupported by any evidence. The Haredim have been one of the enablers of the settlement movement, and they moved progressively to the right on peace issues while they were in the government. Now in the opposition they'll be in bed with Labor and the Arab parties. Maybe that will bring them back to where they were during the Yitzhak Rabin years, but even then they were unreliable peace partners.

The Haredim are out of this government, so drafting them into the army will not divide it or bring it down. On the contrary: Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett are united on this issue, Tzipi Livni supports them, and Avigdor Lieberman’s side of the Likud is at least as hard line on it as they are. The rest of the Likud are secularist settler sympathizers. And the Haredim won't get much comfort from Shelly Yacimovich and their new leftist-secularist parties allies in the opposition. We are about to see a reasonable sharing of the burden. Good news for Israeli society even if it's bad news for the peace process.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree that the Yair Lapid-Naftali Bennett alliance hides real differences between their parties, especially on issues of religion and foreign policy. In some respects, this is not a “natural” alliance; I'm actually very impressed by the discipline among the ranks of Bennett's Jewish Home party throughout these negotiations, sustaining the alliance with the secularist Yesh Atid. But the religious issues might not fracture the coalition in the short term; the main questions surrounding the Haredim have been agreed upon already and will be implemented before long, according the coalition agreement. In other words, that hurdle is largely passed. Now what remains is for Jewish Home to collect the benefits, in terms of jobs and influence within the religious community, from control over the religious affairs ministry and other positions of power. This they will be very happy to do.

One potential source of tension in the coalition is actually is the Bennett-John Kerry axis. If the United States pushes on the Palestinian issue, fissures can emerge between the core of the coalition and its far right. I agree completely that the Haredim are not a secure base for the Middle East peace process, but the Jewish Home is much less so. One of their central demands was to get the housing portfolio, with settlements in mind, and with the new, hawkish defense minister (Moshe Yaalon, from the Likud) there may be more activity on that front.

The potential silver lining for diplomacy is that some of the recent noises from the prime minister’s office are consistent with Tzipi Livni's more moderate approach. Even Yaakov Amidror, the national security advisor—probably as right wing as anyone—now reportedly sees the diplomatic price Israel pays over the settlements. The PMO's solution will likely be an attempt to garner support through talks--and through having Livni in place to lead them—whether or not these talks are meaningful or based on a true change in policy. But it's worth remembering that there is always discussion whether now—of all times—there is a change of heart in Netanyahu's circles on the Palestinian issue. This may well just be spin.

If and when the government falls, there could either be an alternative government, with the Haredim, or even new elections. A lot depends on whether Lapid sees an electoral opportunity and whether Livni is inclined to leave as well. If the center leaves en masse, Netanyahu will have a hard time, mathematically; the right + religious is likely too narrow for comfort. If Bennett's party leaves because of diplomatic developments, the Haredim may jump back in to get revenge on the Modern Orthodox, but if the mood is that Netanyahu is vulnerable, they may prefer elections to get their revenge on him too. In short, as is usually the case, the brand new government in Israel may not last its full term.

Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

It looks as though the new Israeli government intends to be quite active on the Palestinian issue after all—though not in the way most had hoped. With the appointment of Uri Ariel, former head of the settlers’ umbrella group known as the Yesha Council and himself a West Bank settler, to head the Ministry of Housing and Construction we can expect an even greater surge in settlement expansion in the occupied territories than we’ve seen in recent years. Ariel’s Bayit Yehudi party, the third pillar of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition and third biggest vote-getter in the Knesset, not only opposes territorial concessions to the Palestinians but openly rejects the two-state solution itself—sentiments shared by many in Netanyahu’s own Likud party. The strong pro-settlement bent of the new Israeli government is certain to alarm Palestinian leaders in Ramallah, who are sure to reiterate their message about the dangers posed by the settlements and the urgency of a two-state solution to President Obama directly on his upcoming visit to Israel and the occupied territories. Having withstood similar pleadings for much of the last four years, however, there is little reason to expect the administration to abandon its laissez faire attitude toward settlements or become more actively engaged in peacemaking any time soon.

Martin Indyk

In addition to settler control of the Housing Ministry, the Interior Ministry will be in the hands of Likud and the Defense Ministry also. So the three critical ministries for settlement activity will be in the hands of those most committed to the settlement cause.

Authors

Israelis Love to Argue: And Four Other Tips for Obama's First Presidential Visit to Israel

Natan B. Sachs — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Barack Obama's announced trip to Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank in March appears at once premature and long overdue. Premature because the tangible goals of this trip seem, as yet, unclear. Overdue because -- as many critics have suggested -- his failure to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority in his first term contributed to a sense, among Israelis in particular, of a presidential cold shoulder.

Of the two big items on the president's Israel plate -- dealing with Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- the former appears paused, awaiting a diplomatic move by the international community, while the latter is in deep freeze and beset by pessimism on all sides. Unsurprisingly, Obama does not plan to announce a major new peace initiative on this trip, and he is unlikely to bring about a breakthrough on Iran now. Rather than seeking to extract specific policy concessions from any of the parties, the president should approach this with the broader aim of restarting his engagement with Israelis and Palestinians, while setting the stage for dealings with Iran and the peace process over the next four years. But even an unambitious trip to the Middle East is full of political minefields. Here, then, are five suggestions for Obama's first presidential journey to the Holy Land.

Don't promise the moon.

Many things are lost in translation between the political cultures of the Middle East and United States, but few contrasts are as sharp as the gap in cynicism. Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbors are cynical to a degree that often astounds Americans, and with the endless unmet promises of peace and of "process," the attitude is not completely unwarranted. As Obama knows all too well, to have tried and failed in Middle East peace is sometimes worse than not to have tried at all. Today, after so many failures, the fanfare of the 1990s peace process is best replaced by sober -- though vigorous -- negotiations more reminiscent of the mid-1970s, when Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy set the stage for the subsequent grand gestures of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

But in the halls of Washington these days, there is speculation that Secretary of State John Kerry could back a new full-scale push for comprehensive peace. The motivation is understandable, even laudable, and the goal of achieving a two-state solution is vitally important. But the peace process of old is over; the trust between the parties that was to be wrought through interim steps is long gone, to the degree that it ever existed.

A push for peace now should not assume that the process has merely stalled; its old form is likely dead. The repeated failures to achieve final status agreements from the second Camp David summit in 2000 onward and the new realities of the Middle East -- with turmoil in Egypt, Syria, and potentially among other neighbors of Israel -- have redefined the nature of the process at its core. Right now, quiet talks over practical steps, with peace as the ultimate goal, are far better than grand promises that few believe will be fulfilled.

But don't give up on reaching for the moon.

The myriad difficulties of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not lessen the vital need to halt backsliding on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the need to advance toward an eventual resolution. The untenable nature of the status quo is no less true because of the difficulties of achieving the goal.

In this respect, there's a silver lining for Obama in the grim cloud of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though seemingly dead in the water, the peace process did leave both parties and the international community with a relatively clear view of what resolution would eventually look like. Obama can therefore focus on articulating U.S. interests -- as he has done in the past -- rather than dealing with the intricate details of negotiation (something his predecessor, Bill Clinton, may have done too often).

The irony is that the very same polls that show Israeli and Palestinian skepticism of the prospects for peace also show their fundamental agreement with the terms required to achieve it (even among right-wing Israelis, there is willingness for real compromise). Stopping the backsliding on the ground -- the erosion of the Palestinian Authority and the moderates, on one side; the construction of Israeli settlement outposts, on the other -- while building Palestinian independence and ensuring long-term Israeli security remains in everyone's interest. On these points, the president should not shy away from articulating the long-term U.S. vision, whether his hosts agree with every detail or not.

Talk to ordinary Israelis.

Israelis may seem tough and argumentative, but at times it seems that they just want to be understood. While Israelis don't "deserve" Obama's undying love, the trust of ordinary Israelis can be a useful tool for a president facing several dramatic crises in the Middle East -- not least of which involving Iran's nuclear program -- and a prime minister with whom he's not on particularly good terms. In this regard, he could stand to learn a thing or two from Bill Clinton on how to capture the hearts of Israelis: mention Israel's right to exist, acknowledge the horrors of the Holocaust, and reaffirm the ancient Jewish attachment to the Holy Land. Quote from the Old Testament (not the New). Psalms worked well for Clinton.

Here's something to avoid: don't repeat that part of the 2009 Cairo speech which seemed (to Israeli ears) to suggest that Israel was born of the Holocaust. In fact, the state was founded mostly by the Jews who already lived there, and modern Zionism predates World War II by many decades. This matters to Israelis.

But, of course, there's more than sympathy and understanding. Ordinary Israelis want to hear (yet again) the president's resolve to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon -- a commitment that is underappreciated both in Israel and among Obama's opponents in Washington. The clearer the public alignment of goals is on Iran (despite important differences in nuance), the less likely it is that Israel will launch a unilateral strike. Both ordinary Israeli citizens and the nation's elite are already deeply divided over the wisdom of an Israeli strike, and the best antidote to rash decisions is Obama's firm, stated leadership.

Don't read too much into the Israeli election results.

The news of Obama's visit has already stirred speculation in Israel that the White House is trying to meddle in domestic politics and intervene in the ongoing coalition-formation process. Clearly, the precise makeup of Benjamin Netanyahu's next coalition (which could easily change again in the future) is not what motivates the first presidential visit since George W. Bush, but there is a longstanding temptation to overplay the U.S. hand in Israeli politics.

Obama faces a dilemma here: the United States is an influential actor in Israeli political life, and swaying the population can have an effect. But Washington is not adept at meddling in the details of Israeli party politics (as it tried to do, unsuccessfully, in 1996) and it shouldn't bother, for both practical and principled reasons.

Nor should Obama read too much into the purportedly moderate results of the Israeli elections. Netanyahu won, as widely expected (albeit more narrowly than most predicted) -- and while the makeup of his new coalition will have important ramifications for his foreign policy, it will not be altogether more centrist than, for example, Netanyahu's short-lived grand coalition in the summer of 2012. In truth, on the Palestinian question, Israeli politics has moved much less than is often claimed, whether to the right or to the center. Yes, there is a real rise of radical politicians on the right, but the strength of the overall blocs -- right, religious, center, left, and Arab-Israeli -- is remarkably stable.

Don't underestimate how much Israelis like to argue.

With 120 members in the Knesset, there are, at the very least, 120 opinions on anything. Argument is not merely tolerated among Israelis; it's the national pastime. And Israelis respect someone who does it well. Gaining their trust does not mean obscuring U.S. priorities or papering over disagreements. Appreciating Israel's difficult neighborhood and the complexity of its position does not mean Obama has to agree with Benjamin Netanyahu. Many Israelis disagree with their leader -- and those who don't often pretend to.

In other words, so long as Israelis are sure that the United States is still on their team, disagreement is just a fact of life. Moreover, Obama will realize that Israelis might actually listen to him -- not something they usually do -- and at times even hear him.

Obama's upcoming visit carries particular weight because it is so long-awaited. Clinton, though brilliant in capturing the hearts and minds of Israelis, also spoiled them. He visited the country four times and made both Israelis and Palestinians expect that he would be intimately involved in detailed negotiations. But that's not the president's role.

Obama faces a complex task, to say the least. But while his goals should be broad, his aim should be narrow. He needs to restate clearly his vision of peace and re-energize the efforts to prevent backsliding without appearing naïve or, conversely, creating unrealistic expectations. He needs to impress upon Israelis his proven commitment to the U.S.-Israeli alliance while remaining true to U.S. interests. And he needs to capture the hearts of cynical publics -- Israeli and Palestinian -- without losing sight of the grim and volatile realities of the contemporary Middle East. Despite the potential pitfalls and the formidable challenges, the president should be commended for re-engaging the region. True, it's never easy to win friends and influence enemies in the Middle East, but at least it's warm and the food is fantastic. Good luck, Mr. President.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Darren Whiteside / Reuters

Bibi Netanyahu at Bay in Israel

Itamar Rabinovich — Mon, 28 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Few foresaw the surprising setback suffered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his Likud Party, and the right in general in Israel’s recent general election. It is an outcome that will have important ramifications for Israel’s domestic politics and foreign policy alike, particularly its Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Although the final vote tally awaits (soldiers’ votes have not yet been fully counted), the basic result is known.

Given the current stalemate between the right and left, a shift of one or two seats (out of 120) in the Knesset could make a difference in the composition of the next government, which in Israel is always a coalition of some type.

Netanyahu was the sole contender for the position of prime minister, and his reelection, together with the right-wing parties’ overall victory, seemed a foregone conclusion.

He and his allies were challenged by four parties or electoral lists — Labour, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah and Meretz — though their leaders (three of them women) were not perceived to be running for prime minister.

Three of these groups — Labour, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah — were viewed as potential coalition partners in a Netanyahu government; the small, left-wing Meretz was expected to remain in opposition.

At this point, it seems certain that Netanyahu will form a new government, but he will be a much weaker prime minister than he was during the past four years.

The main winner was Yair Lapid, whose Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) emerged suddenly to pick up 19 seats and become the second largest party in the Knesset. Moreover, like the opposition, the right-wing bloc that comprised Netanyahu’s last government has undergone some important shifts.

Several developments converged to produce this unexpected outcome. For starters, the Israeli middle class and younger voters took the social protests of the summer of 2011 into the ballot box.

If Netanyahu thought that he had managed to take the steam out of the protests over high housing prices and falling living standards, he was proved wrong.

Read the full article »

Authors

Itamar Rabinovich

Publication: The Jordan Times

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Israelis headed to the polls just one day after President Barack Obama’s second inauguration and as the peace process remains stalled and changes sweeping the Arab world introduce new challenges for Israel. The tense relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the projected winner of next week’s elections, raises questions as to how the two countries will cooperate in dealing with these challenges, and others, including Iran’s nuclear program. What do the election results tell us about Israel’s trajectory in the coming years? How will the United States and the region react to a new Israeli government?

On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the election outcomes and their meaning for Israeli domestic and foreign policy and for the incoming Israeli government’s relationship with the United States. Panelists included Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, who has spent the last four weeks in Israel observing the election campaign, and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings and former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, Saban Center Research Director, provided introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.

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Time for U.S. to Stop Shielding Israel

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Wed, 23 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

We are now set for a third term for Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu. And, although Netanyahu’s Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition seems to have underperformed expectations, a plurality of the vote will allow him to once again lead Israel’s government.

But even a somewhat moderated Netanyahu government will continue to advance radical positions that put regional and global security in danger. The question, then, is how the United States can best push another right-wing administration to behave in accordance with the principles of the international security system – and its own national interests.

Over the past two Netanyahu terms, the international community, and the United States in particular, adopted an approach based on accommodation when dealing with the Netanyahu government. The hope was that this approach would contain the risks this extremist government posed to international security. Yet just as that strategy did not work then, it will not work now. The United States must therefore now take a harder line with Israel’s coming government – it must switch from a strategy of accommodation to one of confrontation, and it should start by letting fall its diplomatic shield.

In order to protect Israel from international pressure, the United States has repeatedly vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions that criticize Israeli government actions – including resolutions on settlement construction that the United States itself publicly rejects. In return, Netanyahu has publicly flouted American priorities. Europe has also accommodated the Netanyahu government. In exchange, Netanyahu refused a request from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, his strongest European ally, to temporarily freeze settlement construction. The negotiating “Quartet,” meanwhile, has yielded to the Israeli government’s position since its inception. The Quartet – made up of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations – was repaid in last January’s Amman talks. It requested that each negotiating party submit in writing its vision for final status talks; while the Palestinians complied, Netanyahu declined, dealing the Quartet a humiliating defeat.

This international forbearance has tipped the already skewed balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians and essentially left Israel with no incentive to negotiate or compromise. A Netanyahu-led Israel whose military, economic, and now diplomatic power dwarfs that of the Palestinians no longer sees any reason to be part of a sustainable solution.

Continuing to enable the latest iteration of the Netanyahu government threatens a host of dangerous, unpredictable consequences. Netanyahu’s plans to continue settlement expansion will effectively put an end to peace efforts in the region. Just Tuesday, British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that Israel’s settlement policy “will make a two-state solution impossible.” Now, a further deterioration of peace prospects could produce the long-overdue “Palestinian Spring.” We may see the first stirrings of this sort of mass, nonviolent protest in Bab al-Shams and Bab al-Karama – two tent cities that have sprung up to obstruct Israeli expansion plans in the occupied West Bank. More dangerously, though, settlement growth will likely lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, something the United States has gone to great lengths to protect and support. The vacuum left by the Authority’s implosion could lead to a surge of violence, which may seem to many Palestinians like their only legitimate alternative. The same void would effectively invalidate the Quartet’s reason for existence – and even require direct international intervention to restore order. And all this is to say nothing of the possibility Netanyahu could drag the United States into a new region-spanning war with Iran, just as America is winding down its long, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of course, there is now reason to think that Israel’s ironclad international support may be changing. Europe made an obvious and historic shift in its diplomacy when its member states either voted yes or abstained in the recent United Nations vote on Palestinian statehood. President Obama’s nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, coupled with his refusal to withdraw the nomination in the face of sharp opposition, also suggests a possible policy evolution. Obama has entered his second term with a freer hand on foreign policy. Hagel’s anti-war positions and his openness to dialogue with Iran imply that Obama may be willing to challenge Netanyahu at some point; if so, he will have European and international backing.

The Obama administration has leverage, and it should use it. Further accommodation of Netanyahu and his right wing policies will only exacerbate the already complicated and difficult issues underlying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The United States has to draw the line sometime – and that time should be now. It can start by practicing more assertive diplomacy, namely by refusing to provide diplomatic cover for dangerous, unproductive moves – settlement expansion is only one example. If Netanyahu wants to continue on this road, he must understand that he’ll have to do so alone. The American veto policy of unconditional support for illegal Israeli practices must end, and, like the Europeans, the Obama administration must let Benjamin Netanyahu face the consequences of his own policies.

By letting slip its diplomatic shield, the United States can leave behind a failed policy of accommodation. In doing so, it can once again provide hope for a just, sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and at the same time protect its national interests in the Middle East.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Israeli Elections

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In an interview with Owen Bennett-Jones of BBC World Service, Natan Sachs discusses the potential outcomes of the elections in Israel. Read an excerpt below.

Owen Bennett-Jones: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict wasn’t mentioned in the Obama second inauguration speech. Will the outcome of the Israeli election mean that Washington does put more time into the issue? What do you think the White House will make of this result?

Natan Sachs: It is one of the worst kept secrets in DC that the White House secretly would have preferred Netanyahu to lose these elections, but they had been realistic. They knew that Netanyahu was probably going to win. By and large they are going to try and keep a holding pattern – continue the same sort of approach – not much engagement, I would suspect on the Palestinian issue at least from the White House, although the State Department may be a different issue, and continued focus of course on Iran and its nuclear program.

Bennett-Jones: Let’s stay with that State Department issue. John Kerry coming in there, what are you expecting different from him? Does he want to do something on the Middle East, do you think?

Sachs: Well it remains to be seen, but the talk here in Washington is that Senator Kerry, now Secretary-designate Kerry, if he is confirmed, which he probably will be, would like to move on the Palestinian issue, and would like to push possibly forcibly. He is of course very experienced in foreign policy from the Senate and from before, but there is a disagreement between him and many in the White House who see it differently. The Obama White House was badly burned by their experience early in the first Obama term, where they pushed forcefully for a resolution of the conflict on the Palestinian issue and essentially were rebuffed by almost all parties involved – the Israelis, the Palestinians, and also their Arab partners outside of the Palestinians. So there is probably much more skepticism in the White House about reengaging forcefully for final status resolution at this point in time when it seems quite unlikely to be successful.

Bennett-Jones: Right, so even though these elections are surprising in many ways and do change things within Israel quite a bit, they don’t change it much on that issue – on the Palestinian issue.

Sachs: Not for the time being. Most things in Israel will probably remain the same, in the sense that the leader is the same and foreign policy is mostly set in the prime minister’s office. But the instability that you are hearing about from Israel is profound, and it may mean that things could change within Obama’s term. It may not be the last election in Israel that we see during Obama’s presidency, and Obama may be able to deal with a very different political reality in Israel and possibly elsewhere in the Middle East before his term is through.

Bennett-Jones: That’s a very interesting thought. You’re saying because of the way this is working out it may be quite a short term government.

Sachs: Absolutely. Remember in Israel short terms are the norm. Actually this term, which was a four year term was shortened from its original due date – October 2013 – but even so it was a long term by Israeli standards. Generally, in recent decades two or three years are not unheard of. With this kind of unstable coalition that includes polarized parties, and includes backbenchers, both in Netanyahu’s own Likud and in the right-wing Bennett’s party, who are very radical and very different from the positions that Netanyahu may want to take with Washington, we may see that the coalition cannot withstand external pressure.
But all of this depends on several other key issues in the region stabilizing within the next two or three years – Iran most notably, but also the civil war in Syria and instability in Sinai and potential threats to the Palestinian Authority and perhaps the regime in Jordan.

Bennett-Jones: Tell us about Iran – What does this result mean for that?

Sachs: It is hard to say at the moment, partly because the Iranian issue is not parallel to the Palestinian one in Israel. Hawks on the Palestinian issue are not necessarily hawks on the Iran issue and vice versa. It does mean that Netanyahu does not come with the same kind of strength around him that he had earlier, and as we saw even during his previous term where he had a much stronger position, there was fierce opposition within the security establishment and within the political establishment against his more hawkish approach on Iran. A weakened political situation may hurt his ability to act unilaterally, but it may also mean that Netanyahu moves closer to the position of the United States. But it is important to remember – Iran for Netanyahu is the number one issue bar none. This is what he sees as the defining question of his legacy and on this issue the Prime Minister is likely to take the lead. By and large these things are determined, after all, in the prime minister’s office and not elsewhere.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: BBC World Service

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Israeli Elections: Netanyahu Presumed to Maintain Office

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In an interview with Jason Mark of WBEZ Chicago Worldview, Natan Sachs discusses the election in Israel. Read an excerpt below.

Jason Mark: Let’s just go off one of the latest headlines I saw in one of the Israeli newspapers – turnout highest since 1999. Just off the top of your head, what do you make of that? What does that possibly say for the outcome?

Natan Sachs: Well it is probably the result of a strong energy that swept through Israel in 2011. In the summer of 2011 there were massive protests – social justice oriented protests – that some called ‘Occupy Tel Aviv’, a bit like Occupy Wall Street. But unlike Occupy Wall Street they were huge. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis in a small country of less than eight million went to the streets calling for change in the political system and the economic system. And so some of that energy has left a mark on the younger generation. Perhaps this is what explains the high turnout. I would also just point out that the high turnout is not uniform across the country. Of course the results are preliminary, but we don’t see the same high turnout among Israeli Arabs, about 20 percent of the population of Israel is Arab citizens, and we don’t see the same results in traditional right-wing strongholds. So this will likely strengthen the center and the left, but not strengthen the Arab parties, which are traditionally part of the left in some respects, and weaken perhaps, the center-right.

Mark: That’s interesting that you say that. There was sort of a movement over the last couple of weeks among Israeli Arabs, saying that they were going to stay away from elections as a protest, and a counter-movement to that, that said ‘look, if we don’t vote, we are not going to have a voice.’ Which way does it look like it is going right now?

Sachs: It looks like the trend of apathy or abstaining from voting that has been the case for several years, in fact over a decade and a half, has continued. Israeli Arabs are a minority which is excluded to a certain degree from mainstream politics, but certainly have a voice, and could have a great deal of effect on national politics. In 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin won as head of Labor and then lead the peace negotiations with the PLO, the Arab vote gave him an important base of power – without it he could not have won. Today this is very different. The Arabs vote in much lower numbers than do general Israelis. But that’s not the whole story of course.

Mark: What’s even more interesting to me about those numbers is that over the last several years polls have been carried out by various entities polling Israeli Arabs let’s say in and around Jerusalem, and a huge chunk say that if there was a Palestinian state that was officially formed, a large chunk of them would actually choose to become Israeli citizens. So I am curious as to how both sides of that are working right now?

Sachs: Well, there are two different populations. Inside Israel, including East Jerusalem, Israeli Arabs are full citizens just like anyone else. In East Jerusalem, they were granted the right of residency by Israel when it annexed East Jerusalem after 1967, but they are not full citizens yet. Those polls probably contrast national aspirations, which tend to be aligned with the general Palestinian population of course, with personal preferences – Israel is far richer than the Palestinian territories, and personal prospects and job opportunities are far greater than Israel. So like any individual, they are probably conflicting interests at heart – some national, while others simple family interests, personal interests and job interests.

Mark: Another fascinating part of this election to me seems to be that the old secular leftist elite that was Labor is gone, and the old rightist elite that was Likud under Menachem Begin is gone. This election seems to be about what they call in Israel kippot srugot – religious nationalists headed by people like Naftali Bennett of Habayit Hayehudi. Talk about Bennett’s rise and the rise of the kippot srugot.

Sachs: There is a sea-change happening behind the scenes. On the face of it, Netanyahu is winning and so it seems like a boring election. But actually there is a lot of change on both right and left. Labor has changed dramatically. It used to be the big left-wing party of Oslo and peace, and now it has transformed and actually re-energized, but as a party of social democracy, very active on economic issues but almost silent on issues of peace and the Palestinians.

On the right on the other hand, the old elite as you said – that Menachem Begin, the former prime minister, typified of the secular and liberal in some respects, not on issues of economics or the Palestinians, but on issues of rule of law and respect for minority rights – that old elite lost badly in the last primaries in the Likud. Instead of them we have modern orthodox – what you called kippot srugot – who are orthodox and religious, but not unlike ultra-orthodox or Hassidic Jews, they participate fully in the military and the economy in Israel, part and parcel of the Israeli society, and they have been growing in prominence. Naftali Bennett, so far the star of the election, although we will have to see what happens tonight, typifies this. He is a young, charismatic, intelligent leader, quite right-wing in terms of Palestinian issues. His proposed annexation plan would sound very radical in the United States – radical to the right – but on most domestic issues, issues of religion-and-state, issues of the economy, he is very mainstream Israeli and his resume is an exemplary mainstream Israeli resume. And this brings the modern orthodox population straight into the mainstream of Israeli society. He is appealing in fact to many secular voters who would never in the past have dreamed to vote for the National Religious Party, which is the old form of Habayit Hayehudi, the Jewish Home.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: WBEZ Chicago Worldview

Image Source: © Darren Whiteside / Reuters

The Limits of U.S. Influence in Israel

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A victory in Tuesday’s Israeli elections by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud Yisrael Beiteinu alliance and the ascent of even more extreme parties are indications of Israelis’ continued move to the right.

It is also an indication of the limits and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in its relationship with Israel. Despite Netanyahu’s obvious preference for President Barack Obama’s Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, in the U.S. presidential elections — and a sense that he was intervening through proxies — Obama’s ability to influence the outcome of the Israeli elections has been negligible.

The Obama administration’s situation underscores the need for a quick decision about its policy toward whatever type of governing coalition emerges in Israel after the election. If Netanyahu forges a government with parties to his right, the White House should drop the pretense of possible peace negotiations and formulate policy accordingly: It can either produce a detailed peace plan or fall back on highlighting international law and human rights and the obligations of the parties that they entail.

Israelis were certainly aware of the tension between their prime minister and the U.S. president. Had they not been, the much-publicized report by journalist Jeffrey Goldberg about White House warnings of Israeli isolation drove the point home. Yet there is no indication that a dispute will have a significant impact on Israeli elections, since the right-wing parties that support the settlements are expected to do well. The question is: Why have the stated American opposition to Israeli settlements and subtle attempts at influencing Israeli opinion been ineffective?

This puzzle is made more acute by the consensus that Israelis — both the public and virtually all politicians—view the relationship with Washington as their most crucial strategic priority.

In the past, Israelis reacted to threats of worsening relations with the United States by punishing those politicians viewed as responsible — as happened in the defeat of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir after his confrontation with President George H. W. Bush in 1992. But it now seems that Israelis have grown to take the U.S. relationship for granted. There is clear evidence of this from the polls.

In a poll I conducted in Israel with the Program for International Policy Attitudes after the U.S. presidential elections, fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute, most Israelis said they believed the tension between Netanyahu and Obama would not affect the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Read the full article »

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Israel Elections: Netanyahu’s New Coalition Troubles

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 15:23:00 -0500

Update: Exit polls indeed suggest a very narrow victory for Netanyahu’s right wing/religious bloc. The results suggest a difficult task ahead for Netanyahu of building—and maintaining—a stable coalition.

Israelis head to the polls today—January 22—to elect the 19th Knesset, Israel’s parliament. With current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return all but assured, these elections at first glance lack drama and indeed, the campaign has been relatively subdued. But slightly beneath the surface, deep political and societal changes on both the right and on the left could alter the future of Israeli politics and foreign policy. That potential, however, might not manifest for a few more years, until another round of parliamentary elections.

While a Netanyahu victory suggests overall continuity in Israel’s foreign policy and U.S.-Israeli relations, the Israeli political landscape’s drift to the right, in some respects, and the make-up of the new Knesset may threaten the very stability of his government, should it face pressures on the Palestinian issue in particular. This suggests less flexibility by Netanyahu in governing on the Palestinian issue, but also raises the prospect of another round of elections before President Obama’s second term is through.

A Fractured Campaign Agenda

The outgoing Israeli government was relatively stable and long-serving by Israeli standards, where early elections are the norm rather than the exception. This is not likely to be a trend. In recent decades as the major parties have shrunk, coalition formation has become even more complex. The 19th Knesset will likely convene with at least a dozen factions, which may splinter further during the Knesset’s term.

Given this, most political parties in Israel entered this election campaign less with the aim of defeating Netanyahu outright and more with an eye toward increasing their own power and gaining a better position in coalition negotiations. While the opposition pays lip-service to the notion of an electoral victory, opposition politicians are visibly jockeying for positions in light of Netanyahu’s re-election. Indeed, early in the campaign, it appeared that the leaders of the major opposition parties, including Shelly Yacimovich of Labor, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni of the Movement, and journalist-cum-politician Yair Lapid of the newly established Yesh Atid party, were hoping to join Netanyahu’s cabinet. They each carved out a niche agenda, hoping to attract a different segment of the opposition vote, but failed to form a united front to mount a genuine challenge to Netanyahu in the elections. With this fragmentation on the left and in the center, deeper changes in Israeli society have emerged into the political arena, exposing domestic differences that are usually masked by the foreign policy debate.

The right also reveals brewing change. While Netanyahu’s leadership of his own camp is unchallenged, he now finds himself with a transformed right wing, consisting of far-right candidates in his own Likud party and a resurgent national-religious party headed by newcomer and this election’s rising star Naftali Bennett.

Taken together, Netanyahu faces a daunting task of reconciling a polarized political landscape in one coalition. If in his next term foreign policy issues do not create pressure on Netanyahu his coalition may end the term early. This was his fate during his first term as Prime Minister from 1996-1999.

Outlook for the Next Coalition

The key question to be answered in today’s election – assuming Netanyahu’s bloc indeed wins a majority – is the size of Netanyahu’s Likud/Yisrael Beitenu joint list, and thus the leverage he will bring to negotiating his governing coalition. Should Netanyahu’s own faction be large enough, he will be able to form a relatively stable coalition with either the right or the center, granting him leverage over negotiations with either.

However, should the Likud list drop to the low 30s in terms of MKs, as some polls have suggested, and the combined right-wing/religious bloc to the low 60s (of 120 MKs), Netanyahu will not be able to form a right-wing/religious coalition stable enough to sustain pressure on Palestinian issues or other contentious questions (including budget cuts and legislation on religion-and-state issues). In this case, Netanyahu will be forced to turn to the center, without the leverage of a credible alternative to reduce the demands of centrist parties.
And yet, the center in the next Knesset is expected to be significantly smaller than it was, therefore it will likely not suffice to grant Netanyahu a stable coalition, according to the latest polls. It may well be that Netanyahu, in other wods, will be forced to bring in both right wing or religious parties and center parties, reconciling them with each other in coalition negotiations and the division of sensitive portfolios. Moreover, he will have to maintain this polarized coalition in the face of foreign policy pressures and difficult fiscal decisions looming throughout his next term.

Foreign Policy Outlook

Beyond the fractured Knesset and the rise of extremists in his own party, Netanyahu also faces a diplomatic challenge: with the exit of Defense Minister Ehud Barak from the Knesset and the retirement of President Shimon Peres in two years, Netanyahu loses Israel’s main public faces to the world. Other interlocuters to Washington may also be absent, including Dan Meridor and even Ambassador Michael Oren (rumored to be leaving his post at the end of his term next year). Netanyahu, conscious of Israel’s difficulties in the international arena, may well try to bring some of these figures back into the cabinet on a personal rather than party basis.

The same logic would suggest that Netanyahu will strive to bring in to his coalition centrist figures, such as Tzipi Livni, to soften the image of his government abroad. However, the inclusion of moderates in the coalition may, in fact, have little impact on Israel’s foreign policy. For instance, on the Iranian question, the lines of the debate in Israel do not run parallel to those in the Palestinian arena. Some relative doves on the Palestinian issue are hawks on Iran, and vice versa.

Moreover, the main result of the fractured and polarized Knesset and coalition will be paralysis rather than moderation. Since the center will not suffice to support a coalition on its own, and since Labor is likely to remain in the opposition for the time being, Netanyahu will have to secure his right flank in order to survive politically. To do so, he will probably opt for continuation of the foreign policy status quo as much as possible. This is especially likely given Netanyahu’s own singular focus on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, and his own preference to avoid any dramatic changes on the Palestinian issue.

And yet, for those hoping for change in Israeli policy, the fractured and polarized political arena offers a glimmer of hope for the future. Should there be any U.S. diplomatic movement on the Palestinian question, the pressures within Netanyahu’s coalition may lead to early elections. Netanyahu may find himself having to move toward the center to placate the United States and his centrist coalition partners, while risking an outright revolt from his right and from his own back bench.

Furthermore, in Israel’s next election, the social and political processes outlined above on both the right and the left may change the political landscape considerably. Labor may emerge stronger, and clearer lines between the dominant political blocs may emerge. Most importantly, the current fragmentation in the political center and the lack of a centrist leader may be resolved before the elections to the 20th Knesset. In short, Netanyahu’s likely victory today may spell stagnation on many foreign policy issues for awhile, but the seeds of more fundamental political change in Israel may also be planted by the results announced tonight.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Bibi Can't Lose in the Upcoming Israeli Elections

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

It's one of Washington's worst kept secrets: President Barack Obama's administration would prefer Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to lose the Israeli elections in January 2013. Netanyahu is not only too hawkish on the Palestinian issue and Iran for the White House's comfort, he has the added burden of a fraught personal relationship with Obama -- cemented by his perceived public endorsement of Mitt Romney in the U.S. presidential election.

In theory, a Netanyahu defeat is not beyond the realm of possibility. He is popular in Israel but not loved, trusted as prime minister but not revered. His command in the polls is steady -- essentially undisturbed since he took office in 2009 -- but not overwhelming. He appears to have suffered somewhat from the inconclusive outcome of the recent military operation in Gaza -- though if he lost any votes, they were to the right rather than the center, meaning that his electoral bloc remains intact. Among his biggest assets is a lack of viable alternatives: The leaders of the two largest parties in the current opposition are either too unpopular (Kadima's Shaul Mofaz) or too inexperienced (Labor's Shelly Yacimovich) to credibly challenge him.

Little wonder, therefore, that eyes have been fixed on potential new entrants to the political arena -- or, as is often the case in Israeli politics, recycled entrants. The return of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been the most anticipated of these political earthquakes: Merely four years after leaving office under indictment for corruption charges (of which he was largely acquitted, pending appeal) Olmert appears to be the only man capable of mounting a serious challenge to Netanyahu. In truth, however, his chances of defeating Netanyahu remain lower than wishful thinkers in Washington may like to believe. His imminent announcement on whether he runs is therefore unlikely to alter the outcome of the elections.

The case for an Olmert candidacy has been threefold. First, he has the gravitas and experience that no other opposition leader offers. Although his premiership was marred by public criticism of his leadership in the 2006 Lebanon war (culminating in the Winograd Commission report), he remains one of the most experienced leaders in the Israeli political system. He has led Israel to war in Gaza, like Netanyahu, and handled the country's most tightly held strategic secrets. In contrast to other opposition leaders -- journalists-turned-politicians Yacimovich or Yair Lapid of the newly formed Yesh Atid ("There is a Future") party -- he can credibly challenge Netanyahu on the national security front.

Olmert can also use his foreign affairs experience to capitalize on Netanyahu's electoral vulnerabilities. Olmert maintained a close relationship with the United States during his term, a clear shortcoming of Netanyahu in the wake of Obama's reelection. On dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, Olmert enjoys the trust and support of many in the security establishment, in contrast to the near revolt against Netanyahu's leadership by several former security chiefs. Unlike Netanyahu, Olmert provides a clear vision for trying to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and negotiated in earnest with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. Though the Israeli public is highly skeptical of the chances of peace in the near future, it remains supportive, in theory, of a two-state solution.

All that may be true, but it will count for nothing if Olmert can't forge a governing majority in the Knesset. The second argument for Olmert running has been, accordingly, that he alone has the ability to forge post-election alliances with members of Netanyahu's right-wing/religious bloc. And yet, this argument was less convincing from the start.

It's true that Olmert, a politician of considerable wit and charm, maintains close relationships with many figures who are now in Netanyahu's camp. One of them is Aryeh Der'i, a leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, who himself returned to politics after serving a prison sentence for bribery. Another is Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman -- a leader who offers a mix of inflammatory, nearly xenophobic, rhetoric, but appears pragmatic on some issues of substance. Both Der'i and Lieberman have joined centrist coalitions in the past -- and some assumed Olmert could lure them away from Netanyahu's coalition.

But while Olmert's political skill sets him apart from other opposition leaders, it does not provide him a path to victory on its own. There are significant political obstacles in splitting Netanyahu's allies from him: Der'i, for his part, shares his party's leadership with the ultra-hawkish Eli Yishai, and the final say in Shas belongs to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the 92-year old patron of the party. Shas's electorate, moreover, is firmly right-wing and clearly prefers Netanyahu to any centrist candidate. Nor would Lieberman opt for a centrist government if given the choice, as he proved by forming a pre-election alliance with Netanyahu. For both Shas and Lieberman, a centrist coalition would be palatable only if a right-wing coalition is numerically impossible. In other words, to win the post-election coalition building, Olmert would have to beat Netanyahu in the ballot box.

The third and final argument in favor of Olmert running was that he could potentially steal the votes of moderate right-wing voters. There's some logic to the idea: Given Netanyahu's shift to the right through his electoral alliance with Lieberman and the very right-wing list produced this week in the primaries of his Likud party, there appears to be room in the center for a serious challenge. If enough moderate right-wing voters find the Likud's right-wing shift too distasteful, they may prefer a moderate like Olmert.

Indeed, if Olmert could attract enough right-wing voters to the center, bringing Netanyahu's bloc below 60 (of 120) Knesset members, all bets would be off on the coalition building process. Polling, however, has not been kind to this theory: The right-wing bloc has appeared poised to win around 65 seats throughout the campaign, and the result was not much changed when surveys asked about a hypothetical Olmert run. Nevertheless, an Olmert-led centrist coalition remains the only plausible path to a Netanyahu defeat.

And even if Olmert were to announce his intention to run, his legal troubles may still come back to haunt him. The State Prosecutor's office has announced that it will appeal his partial acquittal. A court decision on a separate corruption case against him is still pending, and legal challenge would likely be mounted against his appointment as prime minister even if he were to win the elections. Many voters on the center-left, moreover, will find Olmert's legal troubles unsavory (even in his partial acquittal, the judges' language in describing Olmert's actions was harsh). Yacimovich has already attacked Olmert on this front, saying that anyone who backs his political return "supports the destruction of the [political] system."

Netanyahu, in other words, remains the heavy favorite to form the next Israeli government regardless of the jockeying in the center. And yet, despite these obstacles, Olmert has been eager to return to the political game. He knows well the cardinal rule of Israeli politics articulated by Ariel Sharon -- himself, once a disgraced minister of defense who climbed his way back to the top of Israel's leadership. Israeli politics, Sharon noted, are like a Ferris Wheel: Sometimes you find yourself on top and sometime below, but the trick is to stay on the wheel. Olmert himself, one should remember, first ascended to the prime minister's office in unlikely circumstances, after it was thrust upon him following Sharon's debilitating stroke.

Should Olmert decide to re-enter the political game, we will be in for a contentious, perhaps dramatic campaign. Those in Washington hoping for a Netanyahu defeat, however, are likely to be disappointed.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: Foreign Policy

Israel Loses an Envoy

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Early in his tenure as Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman explained why he refrained from heading diplomatic negotiations with the United States over the Palestinian issue: “For me to deal with this issue – it would be a clear conflict of interest,” he said, alluding to the fact that he lives in a settlement in the West Bank. “I wouldn’t want to be accused of intentionally sabotaging the negotiations.”

The Israeli government’s solution to the problem—to the fact that Israel’s top diplomat had a “conflict of interest” on a core foreign-policy issue—was to send Defense Minister Ehud Barak in Lieberman’s stead. Barak, as head of the dovish Labor party, served as prime minister between 1999 and 2001 and maintains longstanding working relationships in Washington and elsewhere. In the current and generally-hawkish government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Barak functioned as one of Israel’s de-facto foreign ministers, as did, to a lesser degree, President Shimon Peres. He offered, as some suggested, diplomatic cover for Netanyahu’s right wing coalition and served as an interlocutor between Netanyahu and the U.S. administration.

This kind of arrangement will likely not be available to the next Israeli government, to be formed in early 2013. Barak, facing electoral defeat, retired this week from political life, citing a desire to spend more time with his family. The next prime minister (Netanyahu or his successor) could still appoint Barak as a minister in a future cabinet, as some have suggested (see here as well), but this would require determination and considerable political will on the part of the Prime Minister. More likely than not, Barak will leave the defense ministry—and his diplomatic role—with the formation of a new government.

Barak’s retirement stems from a paradox: though he is one of Israel’s most influential strategists and practitioners, having shaped much of its recent foreign policy, he is deeply unpopular with the public. He is—by all accounts—analytically brilliant, yet plagued by mistrust and even dislike from many of his peers. As Prime Minister he alienated many of his senior ministers and left his voters, many of whom were jubilant at his election, disillusioned and disappointed. He remains, many believe, a commando officer at heart: brilliantly executing complex (at times overly complex) plans but incapable of collaborating effectively with anyone.

To many on the right—including many in the current coalition—he remains the Labor leader who offered a far reaching proposal to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. To some people’s shock, he negotiated over the division of Jerusalem as a capital of both Israel and Palestine. To many on the left, he remains the man most responsible—besides Arafat—for anchoring the perception in Israel that there is no partner for peace on the Palestinian side; he presided over the long-term electoral calamity that befell the Israeli left wing in the aftermath of the Camp David summit of 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada.

An exception to the Barak-the-brilliant-loner rule, for a while, was his collaboration with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the current cabinet. Barak and Netanyahu have known each other for decades; Barak was Netanyahu's commander in the Israeli elite unit Sayeret Matkal in the early 1970s, and later unseated and succeeded him as prime minister in 1999. To the surprise of many, Barak proved able to work harmoniously as defense minister under Netanyahul’s leadership. Most notably, they alone seemed to share the full extent of Israel’s planning with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. Barak was often the voice of the Netanyahu-Barak duo on Iran, in interviews abroad and background briefings.

Barak’s departure, if it is indeed final (never a given in Israeli politics,) will have considerable effect on Israel’s foreign policy. On Iran, it removes a leading hawk from the country’s innermost decision-making circles. On the Palestinian front, it removes one of the few remaining ministers who still urge a proactive Israeli approach. And in Washington and other foreign capitals, it will remove one of Israel’s main de facto foreign ministers.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: The National Interest

Israel, Engage Abbas Now

Natan B. Sachs — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The long-term prospects for the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas are, unfortunately, grim. But Israel may still have recourse with a Palestinian partner who is thoroughly different from Hamas.

From the start of the operation in Gaza that ended Wednesday, the Israeli goal was limited: to restore deterrence with Hamas and dissuade the organization from firing rockets at Israel. Speculation (and accusations) have swirled that Israel's upcoming elections drove the Israeli leadership's calculus when ordering operation "Pillar of Defense" (Israel heads to the polls in January 2013.)

But in truth, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a significant and secure lead in the polls even before the operation, meaning that going to war, with its inherent unpredictability, would only place his own victory in jeopardy. A shrewd and experienced politician like Netanyahu does not create his own October surprise when already ahead.

Read the full op-ed at CNN.com »

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: CNN

Israel Heads to Elections

Natan B. Sachs — Wed, 10 Oct 2012 12:00:00 -0400

Ending rampant speculation here in Israel, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu today announced his intentions to hold early elections--likely in January or early February--setting the stage for a short campaign in which Netanyahu is the clear front-runner.

A Battle to Set the Agenda

Israel's political parties now prepare for a battle to set the agenda for the campaign and choose the issue that will dominate the news. Traditionally, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related security issues have dominated political discourse; since 1967, when Israel took control of the territories, the security-and-territories issue has defined "right" and "left" in Israel. And yet, the Palestinian issue now ranks quite low on the Israeli list of priorities. Israelis--weary of a failed peace process and deeply mistrusting of the Palestinians--now turn their focus to other issues, foreign and domestic.

Netanyahu would like to keep the elections focused on security and diplomacy, where Iran's nuclear program and the international campaign to stop it have dominated the news. Netanyahu has made dealing with the Iranian threat a hallmark of his term; his dramatic statements on the issue, including his recent speech at the United Nations General Assembly, have set the stage for a campaign where the Likud will call on Israelis to trust Netanyahu's experience and resolve to face Iran's nuclear ambitions. In addition, Israelis are deeply concerned over the deterioration of national security on other fronts: a Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt, security threats emanating from the Sinai Peninsula, ongoing civil conflict in Syria and a breakdown of Israel's alliance with Turkey, a regional power.

Even while national security concerns have grown in Israel, the country also witnessed an unprecedented wave of popular demonstrations over social and economic issues in the summer of 2011. Demonstrators (hundreds of thousands of them, with widespread support in a country of less than 8 million) protested the cost of living for the Israeli middle class and social injustice for the poor. Parties in the opposition, both left and center, will try to capitalize on these sentiments, shared by many voters on the right.

The degree to which Netanyahu can steer the election toward security matters, or to which the opposition can highlight social and economic issues, will likely determine their relative gains. The more security stands as the main issue, the stronger Netanyahu will be; the more his economic policy can be highlighted, the weaker his electoral base.

Why Now?

In the Israeli political system, the prime minister and cabinet are appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Israeli parliament: the Knesset. While Knesset terms are set for four years (the current Knesset's term officially ends in a year, in October 2013), Israeli elections are almost always held before the official date. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the ruling party often prefers to choose the date of the elections when it identifies a political opportunity and can set the agenda for the campaign. This is the case now; Netanyahu and his Likud party are running strong in the polls and the opposition is fractured and lacks a leader who is both clearly qualified to serve as prime minister and popular enough among voters to challenge Netanyahu.

Second, as the end of a term nears, junior coalition partners have a diminishing incentive to stick with the coalition. Smaller parties often opt to initiate political crises over their preferred issues--issues on which a strong stance can appeal to their potential voters--rather than be dragged into elections over their opponents' preferred agendas. As Netanyahu put it in his announcement, explaining why elections should be held in January or February rather than October: "We face an election year, and in an election year it is difficult for parties to put the national interest over their political interest." This concern is aggravated by the upcoming negotiations over the last budget of this Knesset's term, due before December 31.

Netanyahu refrained from mentioning that he too prefers to postpone the budget negotiations until after the elections. Israel, which hitherto weathered the global economic crisis relatively well, faces a fiscal crisis (though moderate by international standards,) and deep cuts to popular social programs are now in order. Netanyahu and the Likud naturally would rather not go to elections on the heels of deep spending cuts.

Finally, in his recent speech at the United Nations, Netanyahu effectively pushed back the threat of an Israeli military strike against Iran to the spring or summer of 2013. Forming a new coalition at the start of the year, as he now expects to do, will allow Netanyahu to face the renewed international crisis of Iran's nuclear program with a secure political base.

New (and Old-New) Actors

While Netanyahu is the clear front-runner in the upcoming elections, the shape of the political field will change considerably in the coming elections. On the left, Labor has undergone a transformation. A new leader, Shelly Yachimovich, succeeded current defense minister Ehud Barak--who quit the party--and immediately gave the Labor a different character. Yachimovich, in stark contrast to former Prime Minister (and general) Barak, is a former journalist who has never held a cabinet post. Her worldview is economically-leftist and she has promoted social welfare issues since before the demonstrations erupted in 2011. As such, she is well suited to capture the social justice agenda, even while her lack of experience--especially on security and diplomacy--make her appear ill-equipped to assume leadership of the country. Labor is expected to gain significant power in the elections, but not enough to form an alternative coalition to Netanyahu's.

The most dramatic changes are expected at the center of the political map--between Labor and Likud. Kadima, the party formed by former Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, is expected to lose well over half its seats in the Knesset under the leadership of Shaul Mofaz. A new political actor, Yair Lapid, is now vying for Kadima's electorate.

Lapid, another former journalist, TV anchor and novelist, appeals to secular, middle class Israelis. His agenda is both secular--on the deep political divide between Israel's secular majority and the Ultra-Orthodox segment of the population--and middle-class oriented. Trying to capture the middle class element of the social demonstrations of 2011, concerned with the high cost of living in Israel, Lapid's initial campaign slogan is "Where is the money?" in reference to the plight of middle class taxpayers. Polls suggest Yair Lapid's new party may receive anywhere from 5% to 15% of the vote.

Perhaps the most fascinating new entrant into the electoral scene will be an old name, Arieh Deri: a former leader of Shas, the Sephardic Ultra-Orthodox party, former minister of the interior, and longtime confidant of several prime ministers. Deri was stripped of his party leadership and later sent to prison over corruption, but remains one of most charismatic and intriguing political actors in Israel. His return to politics is sure to shake up the religious-political scene in Israel and may also prove consequential for future coalition arithmetic.

A major loser from these elections, alongside Kadima's Mofaz, is likely to be current Defense Minister Ehud Barak. After leaving Labor with a handful of parliamentarians, there was speculation that he may be promised a spot in the Likud, led by his rival-turned-ally, Netanyahu. But opposition to this possibility within Likud made it clear that Barak would have to seek his political fortunes elsewhere. Should he run alone, polls suggest Barakmay barely enter the Knesset with two members.

Nothing new under the sun?

The general sense here in Israel in recent weeks has been that early elections are politically inevitable but substantively unnecessary. Little dramatic change to the political landscape is expected, as no popular, viable alternative exists to Netanyahu as prime minister. And yet, the outcome of the elections will likely produce a very different Knesset in the center and on the left, with a resurgent Labor and a new center party around Yair Lapid. Both Labor’s Yachimovich and the centrist Lapid have intimated that they would consider joining a Netanyahu government if asked to do so, suggesting that a there is potential for a very different coalition surrounding Netanyahu in 2013.Should Netanyahu choose to bring in the center or the left--as he did in his short-lived alliance with Kadima this past summer--he could approach Israel's significant foreign policy challenges with a large, secure, and more moderate coalition than he currently possesses.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Brookings: Topics - Israeli Elections

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