Brookings: Topics - Islamist Movements

The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

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Authors

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Morsi and the Muslims

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Many Americans -- and many Egyptians -- are souring on the Muslim Brotherhood. Some are rather smugly saying, "I told you so." From the American and Arab liberal perspectives, the Brotherhood seems run by hyper-charged Islamists bent on imposing their will on the Egyptian people. Like most things in politics, though, it depends on what exactly you're comparing them to. More than two years into the Arab revolts, Islamists are weighing the virtues of moving more aggressively to implement their agenda versus the benefits of proceeding cautiously in an attempt to placate their critics and opponents.

There is little doubt that the Brotherhood has veered to the right. The real debate within the group is whether they've veered far enough. With Egypt as polarized as ever, the Brotherhood has effectively given up on reaching out to liberals and leftists, focusing instead on closing ranks and rallying its base. During the presidential race, Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood's original candidate, chose a Salafi-leaning council of scholars for his first campaign event, where he affirmed that the application of sharia law was his ultimate goal and that he would form a committee of scholars to help parliament achieve that goal. After Shater's disqualification, Mohammed Morsi -- a weaker, less convincing candidate -- doubled down on Shater's back-to-basics message. "Needless to say," Morsi said, "[I am] currently the only contender who offers a clearly Islamic project."

After winning the presidency, Morsi took a brief stab at rising above his partisan origins. But the tragic events of Dec. 4, when anti-Brotherhood protesters and government supporters clashed outside the presidential palace, rendered such efforts moot. The violence of that night -- provoked by the Brotherhood when it called on supporters to confront protesters -- claimed "martyrs" on both sides. For many in the opposition, this was the point of no return -- blood had been spilled.

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Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Could al-Qaeda Direct a Canadian Plot From Iran?

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 15:30:00 -0400

The revelation of an alleged plot to attack the Canada-U.S. train system by a small cell somehow connected to al-Qaeda’s presence in Iran has sparked interest in the relationship between the Sunni Muslim terror group and the Shia Muslim Iranian government. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda has a presence in Iran – but how it relates to the Tehran regime has been murky for years.

The relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been shrouded in mystery and secrecy for years. Al-Qaeda operatives have transited through Iran regularly before and after Sept. 11, 2001, and some found sanctuary in Iran after fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001, although the circumstances of their status in Iran was always unclear. But the hints of occasional operational co-operation between al-Qaeda and Tehran are mostly outweighed by the very considerable and public evidence of the deep animosity between Sunni-extremist al-Qaeda and Shia-extremist Iran.

Antipathy for each other is at the root of their ideologies and narratives. It has been most visible in their competition for influence in Iraq, and now also in Syria.

The Sept. 11 plot is a good place to start if we wish to understand the mystery. The 9/11 Commission report concluded that there was evidence of contacts between Osama bin Laden and Iran (through its Lebanese Hezbollah ally) dating back to his years in Khartoum in the mid 1990s.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Globe and Mail

Image Source: © Jon Blacker / Reuters

Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 19:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
7:30 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

On April 24, during an event honoring His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, Martin Indyk asked about Qatar's views on the Syrian crisis, the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the still unfolding Arab Awakening. The event marked Qatar's ten years of support for the Brookings Doha Center and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

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Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:08:00 -0400

Abstract:

How do jihadist insurgencies differ from non-jihadist ones? Jihadist insurgents, like all insurgents, seek to control the government, need money and weapons, and thrive where government is weak. Yet their cause—jihad at local, regional, and global levels—gives them instant friends and resources, but also built-in enemies and burdens. Jihadist insurgents often organize, recruit, and fund-raise differently than traditional insurgent groups. The agendas of these militant groups often go against the local residents' sense of nationalism and anger these communities with their extreme interpretations of Islam. To take advantage of this, the United States can amplify local voices that are best able to discredit these insurgents and press allied regimes to disrupt the mosques, schools, and fund-raising networks that help support them. However, Washington should also recognize that weakening these groups at the local level may make them more likely to embrace international terrorism. Allied efforts to co-opt jihadists may make area societies and governments less favorable to other U.S. policies. Finally, failed democratization—a particularly salient issue given the Arab Spring—risks playing into the jihadist narrative.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Camps are Not the Answer to Syria’s Displacement Crisis

Megan Bradley — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 13:48:00 -0400

A few years ago, I visited some of the Palestinian refugee camps scattered across Lebanon. After spending some time in Bourj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut, I travelled to Wavel -- a highly impoverished but comparatively spacious camp in the rural Beqaa valley, where a Palestinian refugee boy asked me a question: Can you see the sky in Bourj al-Barajneh? I was surprised by this question, but upon reflection realized it is perfectly reasonable. Bourj al-Barajneh is notoriously overcrowded. After more than 60 years of displacement, tents have been replaced by packed apartment blocks and narrow concrete alleyways. Without permission to expand the boundaries of the camp, residents have had to build in and up, so that there are indeed many places in Bourj where you can stand outside and yet barely see the sky.

Despite these cramped conditions, residents of Bourj al-Barajneh and other camps have opened their doors to the 36,000 Palestinian refugees who were living in Syria, but have now fled to Lebanon. Thousands of Lebanese families, many with little room to spare themselves, are sheltering scores of the 400,000 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon. In Jordan as well, "host families" are making a critical contribution by accommodating many of the 1.3 million refugees who have fled Syria since the uprising started in March 2011. Within Syria, the UN reports that approximately four million people are now displaced. Untold thousands have found shelter - however precarious - with extended family members, or even strangers.

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Authors

Megan Bradley

Publication: The Atlantic

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

As Mubarak Sits in a Cage, Egyptians are Moving On

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National.

A few months after the beginning of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, I was in Washington DC, addressing a group of Egyptian expatriates on the situation in Egypt.

They asked me about the trial of Hosni Mubarak - a trial that I thought, at the time, might not even take place. When they asked me if it should happen, I paused, thought about some consequences that had little to do with the justice involved in such a trial, and replied "no".

The response was lively and engaging, as it would have been anywhere Egyptians gathered.

But this week, as a new trial started - and just as quickly stopped, with the presiding judge recusing himself - the most intriguing development is that very few people seem to care about it.

I answered "no" to the question in 2011 because I thought the powers that be would never let Mr Mubarak take the stand freely, for fear that he might spill the beans about many state and international secrets. I thought counter-revolutionary actors might start all sorts of trouble to forestall a trial, and that, I believed, would be counterproductive for Egypt.

A brutal autocratic dictator he may have been, but I did not think he was worth the trouble a trial would bring, particularly as he seemed likely - at 82 and sickly - to meet his maker soon in any case.

Two years later, Egypt has moved on from Mubarak. Most Egyptians, whether for him or against him, do not appear to be particularly engaged in the process of his new trial. They are being kept busy with other matters. If they are interested in politics, it will be in the failings of Mohammed Morsi's government, the inept nature of the opposition, the machinations of the "deep state" and its supporters or the inability of the revolutionary camp to translate lofty ideals into practical plans.

That last aspect of the political arena is probably the most striking when it comes to Mubarak. The revolutionaries fought, obviously, for his overthrow. But they also wanted the restructuring of the entire Egyptian state. Not only have they not seen that so far, but the revolution for which they continue to fight has been forgotten by many who initially supported it.

Indeed, for many, it is "politics as usual" - government versus opposition, and so on. Many who were in Tahrir Square in those brave days are now attacking revolutionaries who did not vote for Ahmad Shafiq in the presidential elections - the same Ahmad Shafiq whom Mubarak appointed prime minister at the height of the uprising.

That cannot be simply dismissed or swept under the rug. The reality is that many who dreamt that the revolution would bring about sweeping changes by now have been bitterly disappointed, and now consider that Mr Shafiq might have been the lesser evil after all.

It is difficult to square any support for the revolution with support for such a counter-revolutionary, who would have crushed the Tahrir uprising in its infancy if given the chance, and who calledMubarak his "role model" even after the revolt.

A year ago, at the Egyptian-American Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, Mr Shafiq said he would use executions to restore order to Egypt, and would provide Omar Suleiman, the infamous and brutal head of military intelligence, with a job if a suitable one could be found.

All of that is now forgotten - forgotten in large part because Mr Shafiq never had the opportunity to make good on any of those plans, and also in large part because the victor, Mr Morsi, has been an utter disappointment to the overwhelming majority of Egyptians.

A year after Mr Morsi's victory, the fact that Mr Shafiq represented a full return to Mubarak's system has been left by the wayside by many who fought against that system - because Mr Morsi's government has proven to be so unsatisfactory.

As I passed Mubarak's military hospital on the day his new trial was to have begun, I saw a small crowd of his supporters outside.

I found this demonstration ironic, considering that under Mubarak such a protest, in defence of someone so clearly unsupportive of the ruling regime, would never have been allowed.

More than that, however, it was to me downright bizarre that there was a crowd there - and that passers-by were waving in support. It was not support for Mubarak I sensed, but rather opposition to Mr Morsi, and to the desperate economic situation that Egyptians now find themselves living in.

There is another way to look at this, however. Perhaps the biggest irony is that a Morsi government is actually a strategic win for the revolution, in spite of Mr Morsi.

Had Mr Morsi not been elected, he would not be in power to show the Egyptian nation how utterly bankrupt the Muslim Brotherhood is. Under a Shafiq government, the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity would probably have broken all records by now.

Under Mr Morsi, Mr Shafiq's supporters do exist and may even increase in number. But really no non-Brotherhood leader could reveal the policy impoverishment of the Brotherhood project better than Mr Morsi is doing.

Mubarak may think he has been proven right (and judging by the smug grins in court this week, he does). But in the end it is he who is in a cage. Egyptians are now free to take on not only him and his system, but also the Brotherhood - a struggle that had to happen at some point, if only to show that Egypt has other options, better than either the Brotherhood or a return to dictatorship and autocracy.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The National

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters

The Dangerous Price of Ignoring Syria

Vali Nasr — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in The International Herald Tribune.

President Obama has doggedly resisted American involvement in Syria. The killing of over 70,000 people and the plight of over a million refugees have elicited sympathy from the White House but not much more. That is because Syria challenges a central aim of Obama’s foreign policy: shrinking the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and downplaying the region’s importance to global politics. Doing more on Syria would reverse the U.S. retreat from the region.

Since the beginning of Obama’s first term, the administration’s stance as events unfolded in the Middle East has been wholly reactive. This “lean back and wait” approach has squandered precious opportunity to influence the course of events in the Middle East. There has been no strategy for capitalizing on the opportunity that the Arab Spring presented, or for containing its fallout — the Syrian crisis being the worst case to date. The president rewarded Burmese generals with a six-hour visit for their willingness to embrace reform, but he has not visited a single Arab country that went through the Arab Spring.

Obama sees Syria as a tragic humanitarian crisis without obvious strategic implications for the United States. “How do I weigh tens of thousands who’ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo?” he asked in a New Republic interview in January. When the president visited the region last month he chose to focus on the Arab-Israeli peace process rather than Syria. The peace process is now at the top of Secretary of State John Kerry’s agenda.

The plight of Palestinians is a perennial concern, but it is in Syria that the future of the region hangs in the balance. Choosing the peace process over Syria underscores not the administration’s interest in the Middle East but its determination to look past it.

Washington has wasted precious time in using diplomatic, economic and military levers to influence the course of events in Syria. That neglect has allowed the conflagration to rage at great human cost, radicalizing the opposition and putting at risk U.S. allies across the region.

America cannot and should not decide the fate of the Middle East, but it should be clear about its stakes there, and not shy away from efforts to at least nudge events in more favorable directions as this critical region faces momentous choices. A “lean back and wait” posture toward unfolding events is dangerous.

The paroxysm of violence in Syria is expected to kill tens of thousands more and produce as many as three million refugees by the year’s end. That is a humanitarian tragedy to be sure, but one with immediate strategic consequences. American insouciance in the face of that devastation is fomenting anti-Americanism. The waves of refugees will constitute an unstable population that will be a breeding ground for extremism and in turn destabilize the countries where they take refuge. Syria’s neighbors are not equipped to deal with a humanitarian disaster on this scale.

The longer the devastation goes on the more difficult it will be to put Syria back together, and failing to do so will leave a dangerous morass in the heart of the Middle East, a failed state at war with itself where extremism and instability will fester and all manner of terrorists and Al Qaeda affiliates will find ample space, resources and recruits to menace the region and world.

Worse yet, the conflict in Syria could spill over its borders. Syria has become ground zero in a broader conflict that pits Shiites against Sunnis and shapes the larger regional competition for power between Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Syria’s paroxysms if allowed to drag on could potentially spread far and wide and even change the map of the region. America may think it does not have any interests in Syria, but it has interests everywhere the Syrian conflict touched.

Lebanon and Iraq are each deeply divided along sectarian lines, and both countries teeter on a knife’s edge as tensions rise between their ascendant Shiite populations who fear a setback if Bashar al-Assad falls, and the minority Sunnis in their own countries who support Syria’s Sunni-led opposition. Sectarian tensions stretch from Lebanon and Iraq through the Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain and on to Pakistan where sectarian violence has exploded into the open.

It is time America takes the lead in organizing international assistance to refugees. America should not hide behind the Russian veto. It should pursue a concerted diplomatic strategy in support of arming the rebels and imposing a no-flight zone over Syria. That would not only hamper Assad’s ability to fight, it would allow refugees to remain within Syria’s borders, thus reducing pressure on neighboring countries.

It is time the U.S. took over from Qatar and Saudi Arabia in organizing the Syrian opposition into a credible political force — failure to do that accounts for the chaos that has paralyzed the group. There are powerful economic sanctions that the U.S. could use to cripple the Assad regime.

Finally, America should build ties with the Free Syrian Army with the goal of denying extremist groups the ability to dominate the armed resistance and gaining influence with groups that will dominate Syria’s future. It was failing to build those ties in Afghanistan that allowed the resistance groups who opposed the Soviet Union to disintegrate into the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The Syrian crisis has become a Gordian knot that cannot be easily disentangled. As daunting as the crisis looks, there is a cost to inaction — in human suffering, regional instability and damage to America’s global standing. And as the Syrian crisis escalates, America and the world will only rediscover their stakes in the Middle East. If Obama truly wants to pivot away from the Middle East then he has to help end the bloodletting in Syria.

Authors

Vali Nasr

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Al Qaeda Comeback

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

After months of silence, al Qaeda’s Amir Ayman Zawahiri reappeared this week with a long diatribe on the state of the global jihad with special emphasis on Syria, Iraq, and Mali. His commentary underscores his central role in the Qaeda movement once again and in providing leadership to the group and its franchises across the Islamic world.

Zawahiri’s latest audio message, his first since last November, runs over a hundred minutes long and was distributed by al Qaeda’s media arm, As Sahab (“In the Clouds”) from his hide-out in Pakistan. It is vintage Zawahiri. He bemoans the fall of the Ottoman caliphate at the end of the First World War and breakup of the Islamic world into 50 or so small states ruled by “traitor rulers” playing the “satanic American program” to benefit the “biggest criminals in Washington, Moscow, and Tel Aviv.” Zawahiri says some of these countries are so small they can only be seen with a microscope on the map and “barely fit the foreign military bases that occupy them,” a likely reference to the American naval base in Bahrain.

Much of his commentary is devoted to attacking France for intervening in Mali this year. Al Qaeda’s North African franchise, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, had taken control of the northern half of Mali last year and threatened the capital, Bamako, this winter before Paris sent in elite troops and air power to reverse the situation. Al Qaeda has been driven out of the cities like Timbuktu and into the desert, many of its foot soldiers have been killed and some of its top leaders as well. For Zawahiri it is a bitter setback. The stronghold in Mali was to be the centerpiece of a larger Qaeda emirate across the Sahel from Mauretania to Nigeria. He warns the French to expect a quagmire in Mali like “what America was met with in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Zawahiri lauds the success of al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq in contrast. In Syria, al Qaeda’s franchise, Jabhat al Nusra, has become the fastest-growing Qaeda movement in the world after Zawahiri called upon jihadists from across Islam to go and fight in Syria a year ago. Since then the Qaeda core headquarters in Pakistan has been in close communication with the Nusra front in Syria. Zawahiri also praises the Qaeda organization in Iraq for outlasting the American occupation and for its constant attacks on the Shia government in Baghdad.

In both Syria and Iraq, Zawahiri blames Iran and its ally Hezbollah for supporting the Assad and Maliki governments. He accuses Tehran of secretly colluding with Washington in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Zawahiri says the “true faces of Iran and Hezbollah have been unmasked” by their opposition to al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

Zawahiri pays tribute to the Qaeda franchise in Iraq, the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq, for helping the al Nusra front in Syria get organized. Shortly after Zawahiri’s statement the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, who uses the nom de guerre Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, publicly claimed credit for helping set up the Qaeda franchise in Syria and announced the two groups had merged into an Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria. Al Baghdadi’s statement confirmed what the United States had been saying for months: the al Nusra front is an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Next the leader of al Nusra, who calls himself Abu Muhammad al Golani, walked it back a bit. He said he had not been “consulted” on any merger with the Iraqi group, although he was careful not to criticize al Baghdadi and stressed his loyalty to Zawahiri and al Qaeda. The exchange has brought al Nusra out of the closet; it is clearly now part of the Qaeda global jihadist campaign. Al Golani admitted that he had earlier been a fighter in Iraq and was a supporter of the Iraqi franchise but he went out of his way to declare al Nusra’s loyalty is to Zawahiri and the Qaeda core group.

The tempest over al Baghdadi’s comments is likely to pass, and the two Qaeda groups will continue to collaborate closely. Both in Syria and Iraq al Qaeda is growing in numbers and power at a dangerous pace. And with Zawahiri’s encouragement, al Qaeda’s support base across the Islamic world is funneling sympathizers to go to Syria and Iraq to join the fight. In his statement Zawahiri makes clear the end state is creation of a new caliphate across Islam that can lead the struggle to recover Jerusalem for Islam and destroy Israel.

Despite his rambling, Zawahiri’s new statement also underscores his continued centrality to the Qaeda movement as a whole. Often underestimated, the Egyptian leader of al Qaeda provides a strategic leadership role that would probably vanish if he was killed or captured. He smoothly and quickly replaced his predecessor, Osama bin Laden, when the SEALS killed bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011. No one challenged him then or challenges him now for leadership of al Qaeda. There is no comparable figure in al Qaeda today serving as Zawahiri’s deputy and heir apparent. Zawahiri has made no effort to groom a successor to lead the global jihad. The lack of a clearly identified number two is a potential vulnerability but only if Ayman’s hideout in Pakistan can be found.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Sectarianism Spreads to Egypt

Geneive Abdo — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

Considering Egypt's wide-ranging political and economic crises, a recent national dispute might seem minor in the scheme of things, but it says volumes about the Middle East in the era of the Arab uprisings.

On April 1, more than 50 tourists from Iran visited Egypt— perhaps the first to do so since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when ties between the two countries were severed after Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. The decision to welcome Iranians into the country was backed by President Mohamad Morsi and the Minister of Tourism, but fiercely opposed by Salafist groups and others. As leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party explained, when I was in Cairo two weeks ago, it was a pragmatic decision: Egypt needs tourists to aid its failing economy, and the Iranian market is not only virgin territory, but Iranians are not afraid to visit, no matter the chaos.

But for Salafists group, allowing Muslims who are Shi’a into the country risks they will try to convert Egypt’s majority Sunni population to their Islamic sect. At least this is what many Salafists told me. The issue has created so much controversy over claims of a “Shi’a invasion,” that on April 9, Egypt’s presidential spokesman said tourist flights from Tehran to Cairo would be suspended until June. He made the statement after a series of protests organized by Salafist groups, who clashed with police.

As someone who has been researching the escalating Shi’a-Sunni divide for more than a year (you can read my new paper here), I think this is a significant development. It is understandable that countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarianism has had a long and sordid history, would be immersed in the conflicts we are seeing today. But why Egypt, where there is virtually no history of such sectarian sentiments, at least not among Muslims?

There are a few reasons sectarianism has now sparked emotion, fear, and political dilemmas in Egypt: Some Salafists consider Shi’a Muslims to be heretics, since the split in Islam occurred and Shiism became a separate doctrine in the ninth century. As a result, there is a perception among Salafist groups, not only in Egypt but in Lebanon and other countries, that Iran intends to invade Sunni lands, now that Syria could fall from Alawite control to Sunni domination. In other words, in anticipating the loss of Syria, the Salafists believe Iran is now looking to make other conquests.

Iranian officials have tried to assure the Egyptians this is not their objective. Iran's charge d'affaires, Mojtaba Amani, said in comments carried by the Egyptian state news agency MENA after a Salafist protest at his home in Cairo, that allegations Shiism was being spread in Egypt were a "major lie."

But the Salafists think otherwise. “We have evidence the Shi’a plan to marry Sunni women and promise them a better life and then they will have to convert,” one Salafist leader told me.

And it is not only the Salafists who are nervous about President Morsi’s warm overtures toward Iran. Some religious scholars at Al Azhar, the mosque and university complex that is the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims, also told me they feared Iran was trying to spread Shiism in the Sunni world.

The feelings expressed by the Egyptians reflect alarm across the region— which perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and Iran itself. One only needs to read the statements in the Iranian-state run media each day laying claim to all Muslims and praising what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls the "Islamic awakening" when referring to the Arab uprisings. But what Khamenei fails to acknowledge is that many Sunni Muslims have no intention of embracing Iranian overtures and, in fact, as the war in Syria rages on, animosity toward Iran, President Bashar al Assad’s main patron escalates, and the sectarian divide deepens.

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

The Arab Awakening and the New Sectarian Divide

Wed, 10 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 10, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With the rise of violence between ‘Alawis and Sunnis in Syria, and the ongoing Shi’a-Sunni strife in Iraq, the danger of sectarianism is growing. Will a deepening and potentially violent sectarian divide between Sunni and Shi’a be a lasting legacy of the Arab awakening? How will important smaller countries like Bahrain and Lebanon be affected? Will Iran exploit this trend? How should the United States adjust its foreign policy to reflect the dangers of sectarianism?

On April 10, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Brookings Nonresident Fellow Geneive Abdo, to discuss her forthcoming Saban Center analysis paper, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide.” Abdo was joined by Kristine Smith Diwan, assistant professor of Middle East Politics at American University. Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman, director of research for the Saban Center, moderated the discussion.

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The Arab Awakening and the New Sectarian Divide

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20130410_arab_sectarian_divide_transcript

The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Mon, 08 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The revolts that swept through much of the Middle East and North Africa two years ago have a troubling companion – a rise in religious sectarianism. Mounting tensions between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims could ultimately lead to major security issues in the region, as Nonresident Fellow Geneive Abdo explains.

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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Geneive Abdo

The Arab Spring Ain't Over

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

"...Stimulate that process of reawakening..."

(From the "About" section of the Arab webzine, TahrirSquared.com.)

"Despair is Treason"

(A slogan of the independent news outlet, the Egypt Independent.)

It has been two years since the start of the Arab uprisings. When they began, there was a lot of hope in this part of the world - the promise of a new dawn for the Arabs. There has been much disappointment thus far, and many within and without the region wonder: Is this the future? Or can that promise of that original spirit, which was launched in those powerful places of Tahrir Square and elsewhere, be realized? Is there still the potential of an "Arab promise" for a better future?

In the last few years, there has been much to be disappointed about. The media, and more broadly freedom of speech, have seen better days. Quality has not exactly increased, and in some countries, it has become more polarized. Censorship, by different means, still exists, and this was evident in a recent banning of a film called, Jews of Egypt. How can free societies emerge without less control on free speech? We have seen the rising to prominence of radical religious voices that are extreme, if not violent.

The radical voices are loud and have been pushing people forward in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Sectarianism between different religious groups shows up in the most unexpected places. Pro-revolutionary activists like Alaa Abdel-Fattah and Mona Seif in Egypt have, along with others, been summoned for investigation by the Egyptian prosecutor general in a move that is being interpreted by opposition figures as the Muslim Brotherhood government clamping down on dissent.

Yet, in the midst of all of these challenges, there are great signs to be optimistic about the future. The reality of the uprisings and revolutions is that they may have begun two years ago, but they are grappling with decades of trauma and turmoil. None of this should have been assumed to be easy, but the real success story is where in spite of these challenges, very powerful moves are taking place.

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Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The Atlantic

Bassem Youssef: A Valuable Egyptian Voice That Will Not Be Silenced

H.A. Hellyer — Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was published by Tahrir Squared.

Early on Saturday morning, I received a message that Bassem Youssef, the Arab world's answer to 'Jon Stewart', had been issued a compulsory summons and arrest warrant by the prosecutor-general. The prosecutor-general's office wanted to investigate two charges against him: 'insulting Islam' and 'insulting the president'. All I could do was smile -- because I knew that was exactly what Bassem would be doing as soon as he heard the same.

Almost a year ago, Egyptians went to the polls for their first free presidential election -- the first round delivered what was a nightmare of a result. A representative of the former regime, Ahmad Shafiq, which did nothing but signify a return to the status quo that existed during Hosni Mubarak – and a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that had shown little commitment to the Egyptian revolution, save as an opportunity to gain power. The day those results came out, I was in Bassem's office. Many of his team were simply stunned at the result. Bassem, on the other hand, just expressed slight surprise -- at all of us. As far as he was concerned, the result just meant one thing -- that they'd have a lot of material for political satire. And the revolution would go on.

That’s Bassem.

A few weeks later, we travelled across the United States together, as we prepared the new show, ‘America in Arabic’ -- the combination of a reality show looking at America through Arab-American and Arab immigrant eyes, and a political satire. There, I understood why Bassem was not so concerned about the presidential results – because for him, the revolution went beyond that. Several times, he was asked in public, ‘what will you do in the second round?’, which took place while we were actually in the U.S. on tour. He never replied directly. Instead, he said,’ I’m not sure, but it would be really difficult for me to vote for Ahmad Shafiq.’ Did that mean he’d vote Morsi? Or boycott? That’s something only Bassem can answer.

But none of that really mattered - what mattered was how he responded to the question. As soon as he confessed his reluctance to vote for a representative of the former regime, he would always follow up with two important points. The first was, ‘But I understand why people who will vote for Ahmad Shafiq will vote for him - and while I may disagree, I can understand it.’ That sort of generosity of spirit, with a clear commitment to the revolution that he himself had fought in, was what made, and makes, Bassem Youssef one of the most consistent, and principled, Egyptian public figures today.

The second thing he said, which comes from the same impetus that this very website was borne out of, was the following. “Whether Shafiq wins, or Morsi wins – the revolution continues. Whoever it is, or whoever else it could have been: the revolution continues.”

I’ve never forgotten he said that. Hearing him say that in crowds in San Francisco, Virginia, New York and Los Angeles, the effect of it was always the same – shivers. His commitment to the revolution of the 25th of January was unwavering – and I believe remains as such. That commitment wasn’t about a particular president, or lack thereof – it was about the changing of Egypt for the better. He understood, and understands, that Egypt’s struggle is still ongoing – and will continue for quite some time. For him, the revolution wasn’t about removing a political figure from power – or indeed, putting another one in place. The revolution was about changing Egypt – and that would take time, and effort.

For the life of me, I cannot really fathom the sense of summoning him to the prosecutor-general. But then, much of what has been applied by the Egyptian state in the past couple of years has been bizarre and peculiar. This government does not seem to understand one crucial point: Bassem Youssef, and all that he does, is actually completely in its benefit. The criticism that Bassem does is more valuable than every single laudatory article that comes out in Ikhwanophilic media – because it is genuine, and it is honest. If Bassem Youssef was to disappear from the airwaves, as it seems many supporters of the government desire, this government would not be stronger – it would be far, far weaker.

Bassem Youssef isn’t an enemy of the Egyptian presidency – he is simply an Egyptian patriot. For that, he ought to be congratulated by supporters of the government – not chastised. If tomorrow morning, when Bassem shows up at the courthouse, he is arrested by the Egyptian state, it will not be Bassem Youssef that loses out. It is going to be this government, and its supporters – because all it is really likely to do, in the final analysis, is give Bassem yet more material. Because one way or the other, he will walk out a free man – and his commitment to the 25th of January revolution will just be more intense.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Tahrir Squared

The Fear That Drives Russia's Support For Syria's Assad

Fiona Hill — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Fiona Hill discusses how Vladimir Putin’s fear of state disintegration influences his actions on Syria. Read an excerpt below.

Neal Conan: Repeated American attempts to work with Russia on Syria have floundered on a fundamental difference. Vladimir Putin insists on a deal that includes Bashar al-Assad as part of Syria's future. So the civil war grinds on and the situation of civilians there grows ever more dire. So why? Arms exports? Access to the port of Tartus? Standing up for old allies?

In a recent article in foreign affairs Fiona Hill argues that Putin looks at Syria and sees his old fears of Chechnya brought back to life. Fiona Hill was co-author of "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin," and joins us now on the phone from Florida near Miami. Good to have you with us today.

Fiona Hill: Hi. Thank you, Neal. Thanks for having me.

Conan: So how can Mr. Putin look at a civil war in Syria and she - a nightmare for him, the old rebellion in Chechnya?

Hill: Well, this is a prism that he's brought to looking at most conflicts like the conflicts in Syria that threatened the sanctity of his state. Mr. Putin actually came in to the presidency if you can recall back in '99, 2000 in Russia, just as the second war in Chechnya was starting off. And he saw that as his biggest challenge of keeping the Russian state together, so it didn't fall down the same path as the Soviet Union into collapse. And Putin was really brutal in pursuing the war in Chechnya. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in that holocaust of conflict including many civilians.

The capital city of Grozny in Chechnya was reduced completely to rubble, and Putin felt that this was worthwhile because it kept the state together. And over the course of the conflict in Chechnya it morphed in the same way that we've actually seen in the war in Syria. It went from a conflict that was mostly focused on political secession from Chechnya, from the Russian Federation and over time, really took on more of an extremist element, more of Sunni extremist groups who moved in to exploit the conflict and also many people who came from outside including from Syria to fight in Chechnya.

And Putin is now pretty much concerned that we're going to see a repetition, the collapse of the states in Syria, knock-on effect for conflicts at home for him as well as (unintelligible) across the hall in the Middle East. And yet again, another collapse of the state, that is something that he would like to see avoided at all costs.

Conan: Now Russia, a state with considerable resources was able to pacify, I think that's probably the right word - Chechnya. It is a completely different situation in Syria.

Hill: Neal, I'm very sorry. I didn't hear that. Could you repeat it, please?

Conan: I was saying that because of its enormous resources, Russia was able to pacify Chechnya, at least for the time being. Syria seems to be a very different situation.

Hill: That's very much the case. Yes. Mr. Putin has a lot of things that he was able to draw upon that Mr. Assad has not. He was able to take out the Chechnyan position, both at home and also abroad. In 2004, the Russians assassinated one of the top leaders of the Chechnyan opposition, Mr. Yandarbiyev, who had been an acting president and he was in Doha in Qatar at the time and was killed in a car bomb explosion.

Also other members of the opposition were picked off in other cities including in Europe. And Mr. Putin brought the full weight of the Russian army against the Chechnyans. And also he was able to perceive the war for such a long time quite ruthlessly because the Chechnyan opposition, generally, because of the number of very high level terrorist attacks and this infiltration of extremists lost any kind of support among the population.

So it was a very different conflict. It was very much confined to one region of Russia although there were terrorist attacks and spillover across the whole of the Russian Federation. But it wasn't at all like Syria where it's a full-blown civil war. And Mr. Assad is actually, at this point, seemingly perhaps not outgunned but certainly outnumbered by the number of opposition that are arrayed against him.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: NPR