Brookings: Topics - Iran

Iran’s Presidential Election Puts Populism to the Test

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani — Wed, 15 May 2013 17:25:00 -0400

Economic issues are paramount on the minds of Iranian voters as they ponder the long list of candidates registered for president: who among them is likely to survive the vetting by the Guardian Council, and, of those, who offers the best plan to get Iran’s economy out of the rut it has been in for the last several years?

Since the last election in 2009, the economy has stopped growing, more people are unemployed, prices have skyrocketed, and the currency has lost more than half of its value. Not all of these are the fault of outgoing President Ahmadinejad — sanctions have tightened considerably since he started his second term in 2009. But for the last several months the economic debate in Iran has been dominated by both his conservative and reformist critics who charge that his populist policies have brought economic ruin.

Three large programs define this populist legacy of redistribution. The first was a large $40 billion lending program for small enterprises, known as the “quick-returns projects”, which started in 2006 and was already widely considered a colossal failure before the 2009 election. The 2011 census revealed zero net jobs added to the economy since the program’s inception. Meanwhile, the public banks that were forced to lend to these projects have been left with huge unpaid loans. This large expansion of credit that failed to bring much additional output spurred the inflationary spiral that would later define the Ahmadinejad presidency.

The low-cost housing scheme, known as Maskan Mehr, also turned out to be highly inflationary because it relied on public lending to low-income people, forcing the banks to increase their borrowing from the Central Bank by about $40 billion and adding even more to liquidity.

The third, and most controversial, is the subsidy reform program, which redistributed some $70 billion worth of energy subsidies — most of which benefited people in middle- and upper-income groups — more equitably by replacing them with cash transfers. It also proved inflationary because the amount of cash distributed exceeded the cost of the energy subsidies that had been removed by an estimated $15 billion per year. The last two programs are still ongoing and have come under sharp attack, from both reformists and conservatives.

There seems to be a widespread perception among Iranian voters that Mr. Ahmadinejad has failed to deliver on his promise, first made in the 2005 elections, to “bring the oil money to the dinner table.” But this does not mean that the public is ready to give up on redistribution. If there is a program that promises them what they are looking for – redistribution without inflation – they will support it. But such a program is not currently to be found among the plans of any of the declared candidates.

Mr. Rafsanjani’s dramatic entrance into the election fray last Saturday is in part motivated by the hope that after eight years of redistributive policies, a majority of voters are now ready to view the type of pro-growth and pro-market policies that he spearheaded as president from 1989 to 1997 with more sympathy. He has certainly already won the support of the left-leaning reformers who, ironically, heavily criticized his structural-adjustment policies then.

Mr. Mashai’s equally dramatic registration on Saturday (with President Ahmadinejad at his side) is to convince voters that with more time populists will deliver on their promises. They should be assured of sizeable support from lower-income people, especially those who have benefited from his cash transfers.

The subsidy reform has been putting 450,000 rials per person per month in individual bank accounts since January 2011. While the value of this transfer has declined due to inflation – when it started it was worth about $45 but is now worth less than half as much — it amounted to about 50% of the per capita expenditures of the poorest 10% of the population in 2011. With unemployment at record levels, they would find themselves in extreme poverty if this transfer is substantially reduced or eliminated. As much as half of the country’s total population are net beneficiaries of the cash transfer program because the energy subsidies they replaced were highly regressive.

Mr. Rafsanjani’s put-down of cash transfers in 2008 as “fostering beggars” is unlikely to endear him to the poor and the jobless. Convincing them that they would do better with real economic growth makes economic sense but will be a hard sell politically to this group. He may not need them, however, because the middle- and upper-income classes for whom the cash transfer matters little — for the top decile, it makes up only 5% of their expenditures — account for some 40% of the electorate.

Candidates from conservative factions, known as “Principlists”, have so far gotten away with simply pointing out what they are against – inflation, unemployment, and bad implementation of good policies by the current administration. They have been careful to stress their commitment to continue the two remaining programs – subsidy reform and low-cost housing – but manage them better.

But the arrival of Mssrs. Rafsanjani and Mashai on the electoral scene will force them to define more precisely how they plan to bring about economic growth while continuing the most important policies of the Ahmadinejad administration. If the Guardian Council, which has the final say on who can run, allows this election to become a three-way race between populist, pro-growth, and Principlist philosophies, the conservative candidates will have to say more clearly what they are for, not just what they are against. Without it, they are likely to find themselves squeezed between the two better-defined alternatives.

Authors

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani

Publication: Lobe Log

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

And They’re Off: The Campaign for a New Iranian President Has Begun

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 13 May 2013 09:26:00 -0400

The race to replace Iran’s deeply polarizing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, officially opened last week with the registration of prospective candidates, and already the campaign promises an utterly fascinating ride through the unpredictable politics of the Islamic Republic. The shock and awe surrounding the last-minute decision by Iran’s iconic former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, to throw his hat into yet another race has only been topped for drama by the latest antics of the current incumbent aimed apparently at elevating a controversial protégé to succeed him. At least at the outset, these sensational developments have overshadowed the emerging shape of the real race among an array of regime functionaries, most notably nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.

With 686 would-be candidates and an array of insidious regime mechanisms for influencing the outcome, it is literally impossible to predict today who the ultimate contenders will be, much less who will win the race. However, what is clear is that Iran’s presidential election represents the opening salvo in another historic turning point in the volatile evolution of the revolutionary theocracy.

The application period is a deliberately chaotic process, designed to justify the pretense behind the clerical vetting process and bolster the credibility of the nominees who are ultimately tapped by Iran’s Guardians’ Council, a 12-member unelected clerical oversight body. There is also a keen dimension of political theater, as the prospective candidates seek to gauge their relative prospects and the leadership endeavors to maintain an uneasy balance between galvanizing popular interest in the campaign and inciting the kind of electoral exuberance that has generated instability in the past. Over the course of the next 10 days, the field will be narrowed from several hundred to a mere handful who are assessed to meet the constitutional standards for the office.

This time around, the chaos has been intensified by the lingering memories of the upheaval that ensued in 2009, when an implausibly rapid vote-count and wide margin in favor of Ahmadinejad’s reelection instigated the largest and most sustained protests in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. The ensuing crackdown left Iran’s burgeoning reform movement estranged, imprisoned or scurrying into exile. Predictably, however, no sooner had the conservative wing of the Iranian political spectrum achieved uncontested dominance than deep fissures emerged within them. For the past two years, frictions among Iranian hard-liners have been directed, full bore, at Ahmadinejad himself, which greatly heightens the significance of the current contest to succeed him.

Cue Ahmadinejad’s first electoral adversary, Rafsanjani, whose entrance has sparked an intense debate about his motivations as well as about the competition to come. In a prospective field comprised mostly of second-tier Iranian political figures, mostly former ministers and parliamentarians, he is vastly better known and boasts a political machinery that spans factions and decades. For many within Iran’s dispirited reformist and opposition ranks, the former president offers their best hope of political redemption and national salvation, a hint of their own marginalization given their past differences with him. Rafsanjani’s reputation for pragmatism is well-earned; he was tasked by Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s founder, with ending the futile war with Iraq and later endeavored against stiff opposition to rehabilitate the country and reform its economy. He has carefully navigated fidelity to the system while critiquing both Ahmadinejad and the 2009 election, and his return to the presidency would likely revive now-dormant diplomatic fantasies in Europe and perhaps even Washington.

However, the former president faces powerful impediments that had persuaded many observers that his recent hints about the race were just a tease. Mostly notable is his age – almost 79 – which raises questions of capacity but also may undermine his appeal in a country with a disproportionately young population. More problematic is the unfortunate reality that he appears to have a more effusive constituency in the Western media than in Iran. Among the Iranian establishment, Rafsanjani is widely perceived as wildly corrupt and ideologically untrustworthy, and the population at large rejected his bid for a parliamentary seat in 2000 and favored Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential run-off. Now his unexpected entrance has incited a firestorm among the most doctrinaire of the hardliners, who have accused him of conspiring to delegitimize the system by daring the clerical supervisors to reject his candidacy.

Whatever happens, though, the calculations of the politician nicknamed “The Shark” (a reference to his lack of facial hair as well as his wily political skills) have already upended a race expected to rely on a motley array of second-tier Iranian political figures. His close ally, former nuclear negotiator Hassan Ruhani, had previously pledged to quit if Rafsanjani ran; Ruhani is a sharp-elbowed politician who has been an early and consistent critic of Ahmadinejad’s nuclear diplomacy and economic policy. So far that withdrawal has not come, despite much Twitter speculation to the contrary, and other similar pacts among conservative contenders also appear to be fraying under the weight of a suddenly reconfigured competition.

The Rafsanjani wild card is only one novelty in a race replete with interest. The other aspirant whose registration on Saturday has electrified Iranian poll watchers is Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Mashaei, a close advisor to Ahmadinejad, has long been the focus of fierce clerical ire as a result of his eclectic religious and political views. He was forced out of a vice presidential slot in 2009 and is routinely scorned as the mastermind of a ‘deviant current’ that has infiltrated the Islamic Republic in an effort to undermine it. Mashaei’s ambitions have been telegraphed over many months through increasingly unsubtle efforts of Ahmadinejad to stack the deck in his favor, culminating in the tandem appearance at Mashaei’s registration. That move prompted a legal complaint against the president – either a quaint nod at legalism in a patently manipulated electoral framework or the first step in a process of silencing the unpredictable Ahmadinejad via intimidation or imprisonment.

The calculations of Rafsanjani, Mashaei and Ahmadinejad are compelling in their own right, and they will no doubt influence Iran’s future. However, the drama associated with them has diverted attention from the likely electoral landscape, which features a less thrilling but still significant roster of contenders. For several months, some speculation has centered on former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, a pediatrician by original training whose entire 32-year political career is the product of patronage by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Others have long fixated on Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guards commander who has assiduously restyled himself as a moderate, modernist problem-solver. Another dark horse to watch closely Gholamali Haddad Adel, a parliamentary leader and literature professor whose daughter is married to Khamenei’s powerful son Mojtaba.

The real heavyweight in the pack, however, is Jalili, who was virtually unknown beyond a small circle of the Iranian leadership until his appointment as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in 2009. In leading the contentious negotiations with the international community over Iran’s nuclear program, he has personified Iran’s quixotic mix of defiance with occasional bursts of pragmatism. One of his early forays in the high-stakes talks featured a discursive lecture on the Prophet Mohammad’s diplomacy, the subject of his doctoral dissertation. But Jalili was also responsible for signing onto a Western confidence-building step in 2009 that was quickly disavowed by Tehran. He survived the ensuing outcry among conservatives unscathed, a testament to his primary patron, Khamenei, whose office he directed for four years. Of all the would-be aspirants for the presidency in this round, Jalili appears to benefit from an air of ordination, and already talk has emerged among other conservatives of withdrawing in order to bolster his competitiveness.

Setting aside the personality politics, the most astonishing, and important, dimension of the campaign is simply that we care at all. Four years ago, many observers – including myself – argued the blatant orchestration of Ahmadinejad’s reelection had all but extinguished the relevance of the electoral dimension of Iran’s convoluted governing system. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and many academics forecast that Iran was descending into a military dictatorship. So many of these predictions now appear off the mark, as external analysts and politicians all too often find when interpreting Iran.

Let’s be clear – the 2013 ballot will be rigged to a greater or lesser extent depending on how the campaign evolves, and the winner will undoubtedly benefit from unabashed assistance from the institutions, including the Guard. However, as the initial maneuvers of the 2013 presidential race underscores, politics in Iran remain competitive, unpredictable, and captivating. So stay tuned, and watch this space. One week from today, Brookings will be launching Iran @ Saban, a new blog that will focus on political and economic developments within Iran as well as the threats posed by its current policies and the strategic responses of the international community. The blog will showcase the deep bench of Brookings scholarship on the Middle East and issues such as proliferation, terrorism and, of course, electoral politics and the future of Iran.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Stringer Iran / Reuters

Israel’s Three Gambles in Syria

Daniel L. Byman and Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

Read the full article »

Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Obama's Foreign Policy in his Second Term

Martin S. Indyk — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with ABC Lateline's Tony Jones, Martin Indyk discusses the challenges that President Obama faces in dealing with the chaos in Syria and the rise of Iran. Read an excerpt below.

Tony Jones: Here is our guest, and as I said earlier, Martin Indyk gave a wide-ranging speech at the Lowy Institute today on U.S. President Obama's emerging global strategy and the many challenges he faces.

Second-term presidents look to their legacy, and with the U.S. worn out by failures in the Middle East, the two longest wars in its history, Obama's main game has been the pivot to Asia, in which Australia has a key role to play.

But while pivoting away from the Middle East, the President must still face the rise of Iran and its nuclear weapons program and the prospect that Syria may be degenerating into a failed state. And again, in Syria, the question of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons in this case, could be the game changer.

So what lies ahead for the U.S. President?

Martin Indyk is the vice president and director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He's a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and he joins us now.

Thanks for being here.

Martin Indyk: Nice to see you again, Tony. Thank you.

Jones: Now, you began your speech today by saying that we're in a plastic moment in international affairs. What do you mean by that?

Indyk: Well, there is I think an emerging global order in which rising powers, particularly China and India in this part of the world, are pushing for a role on the international stage and it's a moment in which there's a certain malleability to the shaping of that order in which I think the United States has a critical role to play, just as it did after the Second World War, in supporting a liberal international order, the kind of order that the United States and Australia share in common with so much of the Western world. And that's the challenge for President Obama, because in his next four years, no longer needing to worry about getting re-elected - he cannot run again - he has a chance to bend history in the direction of a more peaceful, more prosperous, more liberal international order.

Jones: Yeah, OK. So you describe Obama's pivot to Asia as the closest thing we may ever see to an Obama Doctrine. It has very big implications for Australia. How radical a shift is it in reality?

Indyk: I think it's more of a recognition that for 10 years, the previous 10 years, the previous decade, the United States has been preoccupied with the war on terrorism and bogged down in these two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and basically has taken its eye off the ball. A lot of other things are going on in other parts of the world, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. And the United States simply wasn't paying attention; it was basically absent from the arena. Now it is paying attention and the President's pivot, as he calls it, to the Asia Pacific region is an indication of a strategic shift because of the recognition of the challenges and opportunities that lie here in this part of the world for the United States.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: ABC Lateline

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

NATO and the Costs of Star Wars

Clara M. O'Donnell — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Over the last decade, the US has spent tens of billions of dollars constructing a shield to stop nuclear missiles from North Korea or Iran reaching its soil. So far, the shield does not work. Fortunately for the Americans, neither Pyongyang nor Tehran has nuclear missiles that could hit the US. Unfortunately, however, America's missile defence programme has upset China and Russia, two countries that do have nuclear arsenals that could reach its homeland. America's European partners in NATO should try to convince Washington to scale back its missile defence ambitions for the next few years. Not only would this allow the US government to spend its shrinking defence budget on more pressing military needs. It would also improve European security by reducing tensions between NATO and Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been increasingly worried about nuclear attacks by 'rogue' states. In 1998, a study group chaired by Donald Rumsfeld predicted that North Korea and Iran could field intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years. Today, however, Iran has neither intercontinental missiles nor a nuclear bomb. In March of this year, a report from the Pentagon's intelligence agency (erroneously declassified) assessed "with moderate confidence" that Pyongyang could build a nuclear device that fits on a missile. But there is still no evidence that North Korean missiles are sophisticated enough to reach the US.

Although the American mainland is not currently under threat, every president since George H.W. Bush has sought to deploy nation-wide defences against a limited attack by ballistic missiles. Reviving some of President Ronald Reagan's 'star wars' ambitions, the US has had missile interceptors deployed in Alaska and California since 2004. Both the George W Bush and Obama administrations have also had various plans to deploy interceptors against intercontinental missiles at bases in Europe. (The Obama administration, working with NATO, has also been deploying interceptors in Europe to protect Europeans and US troops in the region against shorter-range missiles from Iran – a threat which does exist.) In March, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel announced that because of technical problems and budgetary constraints, the US is suspending its efforts to build Europe-based strategic interceptors. He also said that in response to the bellicose attitude of North Korea's new leader, the US will add 14 missile interceptors in on its West Coast, and perhaps deploy a few more on the East Coast, too.

The Obama administration has been wise to cancel the European leg of its strategic missile defence plans. Several recent studies had highlighted significant shortcomings in the programme. For example, a 2012 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the interceptors planned for Europe would have been too slow to stop an incoming missile. But the US would be ill advised to increase the number of interceptors on the West – and possibly East – Coast. Studies have shown that the interceptors in Alaska and California do not work well either. According to Congress' Government Accountability Office, ten out of the 30 interceptors rely on technology which has never intercepted a missile during tests. The GAO estimates that it will take several years to repair this technology, costing the US taxpayer an additional $700 million. Hagel has promised to fix these glitches before the new interceptors are deployed. But the Pentagon does not yet have a solution to another big problem. None of its interceptors can distinguish between an incoming warhead and debris or decoys. (Ballistic missiles can easily carry decoys in addition to warheads.)

America's strategic missile defence efforts have made the US taxpayer fund a weapon that does not work to tackle a threat that does not exist. They have also antagonised China and Russia. Both countries worry that US technological breakthroughs could undermine their strategic deterrents. Moscow has been most displeased. The Kremlin has been asking for legal guarantees that the US would not direct its missile defences against Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. To reassure Russia, the Obama administration has encouraged Moscow to co-operate with NATO's defence programme against Iranian short and long-range missiles. (Moscow is less worried about NATO's defences against Iranian short-range missiles because the interceptors used would be too slow to stop a Russian strategic missile.) Washington has also been willing to provide Moscow political guarantees that its nuclear deterrent is not under threat.

But so far, the Obama administration has refused to give Russia legal guarantees. The US has made such commitments in the past. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established limits on what Moscow and Washington could do in this area from the 1970s until 2002. President George W Bush then withdrew from the agreement in order to pursue America’s missile defence ambitions unhindered. The Obama administration fears that Republican senators – who are keen on missile defence – would not ratify a treaty that would constrain the US. As a result, missile defence has become one of the most contentious issues in a troubled US-Russia relationship. Moscow has refused to negotiate further cuts in its nuclear arsenal until the issue is resolved. Last year, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces threatened to attack the European NATO countries hosting US missile defences. And according to press reports, Russian bombers have been simulating strikes against American missile defence installations.

Now that Hagel has cancelled the European leg of US strategic missile defences, there is a chance that NATO and Russia could end their dispute. Senior American and Russian officials have resumed talks about Russia co-operating with NATO's missile defence efforts. US policy-makers have also been encouraging Moscow to negotiate new bilateral nuclear reductions – a top priority for President Barack Obama. According to some Russian officials, President Vladimir Putin may be open to an agreement when he meets President Obama at the G8 in June or at their bilateral summit in September. But the Russians still want legal guarantees on strategic missile defences.

Europeans welcome the possibility of improved NATO-Russia ties. Most of them have never been convinced of the need for, or feasibility of, strategic missile defences and many disliked Washington's decision to leave the ABM treaty. Germany and others have been keen for Russia to co-operate with NATO's missile defence programme as a way to alleviate tensions. To maximise the chances of a deal between Washington and Moscow, Europeans should now encourage their American allies to include legal guarantees on missile defence in a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution point out in their book 'The opportunity' that treaty limits could still allow the US to deploy all its planned defences against North Korea and Iran: the US and Russia could for example agree to each having a maximum of 125 interceptors capable of engaging intercontinental missiles. (The ABM treaty initially allowed for 200.) The treaty could also be limited to ten years, so that both sides could reconsider its ceilings in light of how the threats from North Korea and Iran evolve.

The White House, and Europeans, would struggle to convince some Republican senators to ratify such a treaty. But without it, Russia is unlikely to reduce its numerous tactical nuclear weapons – an arsenal that worries both Democrats and Republicans. Europeans should also discourage their US counterparts from deploying additional interceptors against strategic missiles until tests have shown them to be effective. The risk of wasting large sums of money at a time of savage defence cuts should help senators to reassess their views on missile defence.

As Greg Thielmann, a former senior US state department intelligence official, remarks, Europeans have "tamed ill-considered American instincts" in the past: in the 1980s, Europeans encouraged a reluctant Reagan administration to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For the benefit of NATO-Russia relations and global arms control, the Europeans should encourage their ally to reassess its stance again.

Authors

Clara M. O'Donnell

Publication: Centre for European Reform

Image Source: © Yves Herman / Reuters

Could al-Qaeda Direct a Canadian Plot From Iran?

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 15:30:00 -0400

The revelation of an alleged plot to attack the Canada-U.S. train system by a small cell somehow connected to al-Qaeda’s presence in Iran has sparked interest in the relationship between the Sunni Muslim terror group and the Shia Muslim Iranian government. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda has a presence in Iran – but how it relates to the Tehran regime has been murky for years.

The relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been shrouded in mystery and secrecy for years. Al-Qaeda operatives have transited through Iran regularly before and after Sept. 11, 2001, and some found sanctuary in Iran after fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001, although the circumstances of their status in Iran was always unclear. But the hints of occasional operational co-operation between al-Qaeda and Tehran are mostly outweighed by the very considerable and public evidence of the deep animosity between Sunni-extremist al-Qaeda and Shia-extremist Iran.

Antipathy for each other is at the root of their ideologies and narratives. It has been most visible in their competition for influence in Iraq, and now also in Syria.

The Sept. 11 plot is a good place to start if we wish to understand the mystery. The 9/11 Commission report concluded that there was evidence of contacts between Osama bin Laden and Iran (through its Lebanese Hezbollah ally) dating back to his years in Khartoum in the mid 1990s.

Read the full article »

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Globe and Mail

Image Source: © Jon Blacker / Reuters

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

Martin S. Indyk and Javier Solana — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With a range of critical issues confronting the U.S. and the international community today, Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk discuss some of the most pressing challenges, from the war in Syria to the Euro crisis to Iran’s nuclear program.

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A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

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A World in Turmoil: My Conversation with Javier Solana

Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

There are many tensions and problems facing the world today. Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and I discussed some of the most challenging issues in the current geopolitical landscape, including the Euro crisis, the war in Syria, and Iran's brinksmanship.

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Negotiating with Iran: How Best to Reach Success

Mon, 01 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 1, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Negotiators from the P5 plus 1—Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States plus Germany—will sit down with their Iranian counterparts on April 5-6 for another round of talks regarding Iran’s nuclear program. These talks take place as concern grows in the international community that Tehran is nearing the point where it could acquire nuclear weapons capability, and against the backdrop of increasingly biting sanctions on Iran’s financial sector and broader economy.

On April 1, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore what lessons international negotiators should bear in mind when facing the Iranian delegation. Brookings Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana, who led the European Union’s negotiations with Iran in his capacity as EU high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Gary Samore, who as National Security Council coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction had principal responsibility at the White House on the Iranian nuclear question, described their experiences in dealing with Iran’s negotiators and what factors might lead to a successful outcome. Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

Steven Pifer — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with WKAR on the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Steven Pifer, co-author of The Opportunity, discusses prospects for future international arms negotiations as well as the stability of the U.S. and Russian bombs, submarines and planes. Read an excerpt below.

WKAR: Before we get into the details, can you give us a sense of the scale we’re talking about here? I’m sure the exact number is a guarded secret but about how many nuclear warheads does the U.S. maintain?

Steve Pifer: Well actually it’s not a secret. In 2010 the United States released a number and said that as of September 2009 the total American stockpile was 5,113 weapons.

WKAR: Okay

Pifer: Which is a huge decrease from the Cold War, at the height of the Cold War there were 25,000- 30,000 weapons. But you still have to ask the question; does that number make sense twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union?

WKAR: What about the dollar cost of maintaining that arsenal?

Pifer: The dollar cost in terms of maintaining them, on a day to day status, is estimated at say thirty to forty billion dollars a year. So it’s a part of the defense budget…

WKAR: Wow

Pifer: But where the costs get really big is if you look, say five or seven years down the road, where the Navy’s going to have to start building a new ballistic missile submarine to replace the Ohio class submarines which have to be retired in about 15 years and then you’re talking about an estimate of $6 to $7 billion dollars, per boat, not counting the missiles or torpedoes.

Listen to the audio »

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: WKAR

Image Source: © Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters

Noruz and the Unofficial Start of the Iranian Presidential Election

Suzanne Maloney — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 17:17:00 -0400

Happy Noruz to all.

For many Iranians, this holiday marks not simply the start of spring (and an extended vacation and shopping period!) but also the unofficial launch of the 2013 presidential election. Although formal campaigning will not begin for months, and the application and vetting process is also a ways away, the alienation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from much of the establishment has intensified the early discussions around the question of who will succeed him. Several individuals have already tipped their hands, others are simply presumptive candidates based on past experience. There are a few other names out there in addition to these (former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki), and of course it's entirely possible that someone will be pressed into service who is not currently considered in contention. Khatami is the most often referenced name in such a scenario, but there are no doubt others as well whose candidacy might become appealing as the time grows closer. Note: for the first time, Rafsanjani is out of the running for sure since (among other reasons) the parliament passed an age limit (70) for the post.

To the best of my ability, I've identified the array of candidates in this graphic published earlier this week in Baztab (the website run by Mohsen Rezai), starting from the top running left to right. There can be no favorite at this stage, or even likely matchups- it's all far too fluid for any serious predictions other than to say it will be interesting. It's worth noting that all 3 of the former and current nuclear negotiators are on the list of prospective candidates; if any or all actually run, we could be looking at an open referendum on the standoff with the West. (Note: I think that outcome is highly unlikely; it's not even clear to me that Rouhani would necessarily receive Guardians' Council approval.)

I also find it interesting that until/unless Khatami is dragged into the action, all the prospective reformist candidates are really centrist technocrats. This might be reassuring from the point of view of Iran's economic crisis but has not served the reformists well in the past as an electoral strategy. On the other hand, the principalists are themselves bitterly divided along multiple lines, and while they have demonstrated that they can coalesce successfully around slates of parliamentary candidates, it's hard to imagine any of prospective candidates on this list bridging the factions and offering a strong coherent leadership for a country in crisis. Then again, Iranian elections are all about surprises, so stay tuned.

Government Officials
Transportation Minister Ali Nikzad
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi
Government spokesman Gholam-hossain Elham
Presidential advisor and former chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei

Traditional Conservatives
Former Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi
Parliamentary speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani
MP and deputy speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar
Head of the Chamber of Commerce Yahya Al-e Eshaq
Former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian

Hard-line Principalists
Former health minister Kamran Bagheri-Lankarani
Ayatollah Mohammad Bokiri Kherrozi, head of Iranian Hezbollah and little known outside revanchist provocations
Former parliamentary speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel
Nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili

Moderate Principalists
Former Commerce Minister Mohammad Shariatmadari
Tehran mayor and former head of the national policy Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf
Expediency Council Chairman Mohsen Rezai
Former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati
Former Housing minister Mohammad Saeedikia (has held cabinet portfolios under every IRI president)

Reformists
Former MP Mostafa Kavakebian
Former minister of mines and industries Eshaq Jahangiri
Former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani
Former first VP Mohammadreza Aref

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Why Is Obama Going to Israel—Now?

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 16:30:00 -0400

President Obama’s visit to Israel this week is a big deal. Not because it is expected to lead to a breakthrough in the stalled Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, nor to a unified U.S.-Israeli position on the Iranian nuclear challenge. It is a big deal, simply because it is happening.

A presidential visit to Israel is not routine. Quite the contrary. Since its birth in 1948, only four American presidents have visited Israel—Nixon, Carter, Clinton and Bush II. Obama will be the fifth. Truman, first to recognize Israel, never visited the state; nor did Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Reagan or Bush I.

Israel is hailed as America’s closest ally in the Middle East, but obviously such rhetorical affection, even esteem, has not translated into an Obama visit. Not till now. For example, several months into his first term as president, Obama traveled to Egypt, where he delivered a major speech about American-Arab relations, but then, foolishly, chose not to stop in near-by Israel. That slight, or so it was interpreted in Israel, proved to be a major diplomatic blunder.

So, why go to Israel now? Considering the president’s huge economic and political problems at home, it would surely make more sense for Obama to stay in or near the White House than to whisk off to the Middle East and spend the better part of a week in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. But off he goes. The president now realizes that if he is to achieve progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, if he is to persuade Iran, through diplomacy, not to build nuclear weapons, if he is to come up with a realistic policy toward crumbling Syria, he must first develop a good, solid, working relationship with Israel, meaning with Israel’s recently-re-elected prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Everyone knows that Obama’s relationship with Netanyahu has been frayed and unusually testy, and it needs dramatic improvement—and needs it now. Trust, so clearly in short supply between these two leaders, must be developed. Commonality of views and policies must be nurtured. Time is of the essence--so fragile is the balance between war and peace in the Middle East. The dangers and differences are obvious.

On Iran: Netanyahu believes that Iran will be able to produce the ingredients for a nuclear bomb late this spring or summer. Obama thinks Iran needs at least another year. The Iran danger requires a coordinated policy, and at the moment that does not exist.

On Syria: Netanyahu wants the U.S. to bomb Syrian rockets on their way to Hezbollah in Lebanon, even if that escalates the already dreadful conflict in Syria. The U.S. appears ready to use its military force in Syria only when President Assad decides to commit his chemical and biological weapons to his war against the insurgents—only, in other words, as truly a last resort. Syria looks like a hot firecracker about to explode and envelop the region, and the U.S. so far remains on the sideline.

On the chronic Palestinian conundrum: Obama’s White House has already made it clear the president will not be carrying any plan for a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, and that’s fine with Netanyahu, who does not seem eager to move on this front anyway.

Obama’s aim on this trip will be to persuade as many Israelis as possible that he is their friend and supporter in any possible conflict with Iran or Arab opponents, and that if the Israelis reach an agreement with the Palestinians, the U.S. will back it fully. This is his hope, his way of extending a hand of friendship and cooperation and reducing the distrust and disappointment many Israelis have felt towards Obama ever since he stiffed them in 2009 after his Cairo speech.

It is often said of Obama that Israel has been, for him, an acquired taste. He did not, and probably still does not, feel an instinctive sympathy for Israel. But he knows now, if he did not earlier, that it is very hard, if not impossible, for an American president to reach across the chasm of Israeli-Arab hostility and arrange an agreement between the two belligerents without first establishing a beachhead of sympathy and understanding with Israel. There is no guarantee that Obama will be able in his second term to midwife a Palestinian-Israeli agreement; but if he is to do so, he knows he must first improve his relations with Israel. Basically, that’s what this journey is all about.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Prepare for the Unknowns: India's Black Swans

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Imagine the breaking news headline: Revolution in Riyadh. The scenario: The House of Saud, which has ruled Saudi Arabia for years, has been overthrown. Closer to home, think about what China going off the rails would look like-and portend for India. These are just two of the "Black Swans" that foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution recently identified as deserving the attention of the U.S. government, along with a series of Big Bets that the administration should make in President Obama's second term. These black swans are low-probability, high-impact events that can have a dramatic impact on the plans and policies of a country. The idea behind this project was to identify potential events, suggest ways to prevent them if possible and prepare for them if they occur. With American involvement in a number of countries in the world, it might seem natural to undertake such exercises in the United States. It is essential, however, that such thinking take place in India -- whose global interests and involvement are growing -- as well.

Just a glance at the black swans that Brookings scholars envisioned indicates how each of them could affect India's interests. The collapse of the Saudi monarchy would bring instability in a country that is India's largest oil supplier and critical to its economy. It is also the location of two of Islam's holiest sites. The spillover into other countries in the region that is not just the source of most of the crude oil and natural gas that India imports but is home to a large number of Indians, will also have major ramifications. A Eurozone collapse would have a significant impact on the Indian economy. A China-U.S. confrontation or especially a direct military conflict between them over Korea -- though seemingly distant from India's area of operations and interest -- would change the geopolitical context in which India is operating. A confrontational Chinese leadership, driven by popular nationalism and desire for regime survival into war, could have serious consequences for India. Domestic revolution in China could also affect not just India's geopolitical interests but its economic ones as well; it could also lead to significant changes in the Tibet dynamic. Finally, a dramatic rise in sea levels could devastate India's coastal areas where about a fifth of its population resides.

One could dismiss these scenarios as far-fetched, but ignoring such possibilities entirely can be risky. India itself has felt the brunt of black swans -- for instance, the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959 or the black swan triple whammy in 1990-91 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has also benefited from some black swans -- for example, from two crucial ones that Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who generated the black swan theory, laid out in his book The Black Swan: the development and spread of the computer and the Internet.

India could face black swans again: A serious and sudden deterioration of the situation in Tibet. A climate change-caused catastrophe in Bangladesh with thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people trying to cross over into India. A major cyber attack with uncertain origins. A disintegration in Pakistan with the "loose nuke" problem becoming real. A collapse in the price of gold. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement -- a black swan that could throw up challenges or opportunities for India.

Black swans are not always negative and do not necessarily have a negative impact. As my Brookings colleague Govinda Avasarala notes, a major breakthrough in grid-level battery storage developed in India that could make solar and other intermittent forms of energy instantly economic could be one such "positive" black swan. This development would not only change India's energy picture, it would change the debate on and the available solutions to the climate change challenge. It would also put India at the forefront of the next big technology revolution.

It is important to think about such black swans, consider ways of preventing them if they are negative ones and facilitating them if they are positive, and lay out ways of coping with them. Government agencies can do some of this thinking. Indeed, recently, at a talk organised by RAW, former president Abdul Kalam highlighted the need for the country's intelligence apparatus to be prepared for black swans. Policy planning staffs can also undertake such exercises. Government agencies, however, are often burdened or overburdened with day-to-day priorities, with little time, inclination or resources to undertake such thinking. Therefore it is outside government -- in think tanks, universities and the corporate sector -- that such thinking about black swans, as well as forecasting, scenario planning and war gaming can and must take place. Such exercises do not necessarily require classified information. They do require time, resources, expertise and, most importantly, imagination.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: India Today

Arab Perspectives on Iran’s Role in a Changing Middle East

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In this contribution to The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East series, a joint project of the Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace, Shibley Telhami examines Arab perspectives on Iran's role in the region. Read an except below or download a PDF of the full paper at wilsoncenter.org.

Since the start of the Arab uprisings, there has been much discussion about how the new strategic environment in the Arab world will affect both Iran’s role in regional politics and, more broadly, Arab attitudes toward Tehran. It was clear from the outset that the picture for Iran was mixed: on the one hand, there was the loss of key opponents, like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the empowerment of the Shi’a communities in neighboring Arab states, especially Bahrain; on the other hand, there were the troubles of Iran’s key allies in Damascus and the consequent pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Overall, there was a sense that the Arab uprisings presented more costs than benefits for Iran. Add to this a prevalent assumption that a democratic Egypt that could regain its popularity in the Arab world would ultimately erode non-Arab Iran’s influence—which is in good part a function of the vacuum of popular leadership in the Arab world—and Iran’s prospects look even weaker.

Worries among Gulf states, particularly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, about the expansion of the Arab uprisings to their own Shi’a populations have also increased these countries’ incentives to highlight a perceived Iranian threat. But this picture masks a far more complex reality in Arab attitudes toward Iran before and after the start of the Arab uprisings. This complexity is reflected not only in the gap of perception between the Arab people on the one hand and Arab governments on the other, but also in important differences on Iran across Arab governments. And even among Arab governments most threatened by Iran and most inclined to see it weakened, including militarily, their sense of threat and how to address it differs substantially from Israel’s sense of threat.

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Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: The Wilson Center and the United States Insitutes of Peace

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?

Tue, 19 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 19, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

After several years of increasingly punishing sanctions against its economy, there is hope that Iran is now prepared to resume negotiations with the international community to reach a solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. Many experts fear that Iran is quickly approaching the nuclear threshold, and that 2013 could be the last chance to avoid this outcome. If the international community cannot seize that opportunity, it may be left only with much worse alternatives.

On February 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine strategies for resolving the nuclear standoff. Panelists included former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-founder of The Iran Project, who presented the organization’s latest set of recommendations for addressing the nuclear issue, and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?

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State of the World: Obama's Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges

Robert Kagan — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In a wide-ranging interview with U.S.News & World Report, Robert Kagan discusses the possible direction of U.S. foreign policy during the second Obama administration, and warns that the President’s agenda will be set by the other actors in the international system. Read an excerpt below.

U.S.News & World Report: What is the most imminent challenge of Obama's second term?

Robert Kagan: Syria is probably the thing that's going to be front and center. He obviously is trying to avoid any deeper involvement, but I think it's going to be very difficult to do so as things get worse in Syria and the price of not doing anything gets higher. Coming close on the heels of that is going to be Iran developing a [nuclear] capability.

U.S.News & World Report: How urgent is the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions?

Kagan: It's very urgent. I think the administration understands that they need to find some answer either diplomatically or otherwise. Secretary [of State John] Kerry said the clock is ticking, and I think that means it's ticking this year.

U.S.News & World Report: Should there be direct contact with the Iranian government?

Kagan: They should make clear that Iranians need to take seriously that the United States is willing to have a diplomatic settlement of this problem. If not, [Iran] ought to take very seriously the statements that the president and secretary of state have made about preventing them from having a nuclear weapon.

U.S.News & World Report: What changes should be made in global economic policy?

Kagan: One major goal should be to begin negotiating a free trade agreement with Europe, to broaden the free trade agreements in Latin America in the Western Hemisphere, and move ahead with the trans-Pacific partnership, which is free trade agreements in Asia.

U.S.News & World Report: How has the fiscal crisis affected the American reputation abroad?

Kagan: I do think that an inability to get some control of our fiscal difficulties will cause people around the world to worry whether that will limit our ability to act in the international system.

Read the full interview »

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: U.S.News & World Report

Egypt and Iran: A Rapprochement Is Unlikely

Bessma Momani — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 16:24:00 -0500

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Cairo to attend a meeting of the Organization of Islamic States has sparked speculation that a warming trend in Iranian-Egyptian relations could realign Middle East alliances.

After all, this week’s historic trip not only follows Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s first visit to Iran, which took place last August when he attended the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, but also Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s visit with Morsi in January. Both regimes claim inspiration from political Islam and presumably have a shared sympathy with the Palestinian cause.

The reality, though, is that their strategic interests are still worlds apart.

Diplomatic exchanges between Iran and Egypt were conspicuous by their absence for more than 30 years. After the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the new government in Tehran displayed great animosity toward Cairo for giving asylum to the deposed Iranian monarch, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. And as a key ally of the United States, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak shunned the Islamic Republic. Indeed, he often touted the strategic value of his government in keeping Islamists at bay, both at home and in the wider region.

When the Egyptian people demanded the overthrow of the western-backed Mubarak, the Iranian government relished the symbolic and historic irony that Mubarak fell in 2011 on the same date — Feb. 11 — that the Shah had been stripped of all power in 1979. Iran even took credit for Egypt’s Arab Spring revolution, preferring to call it an Islamic revolution. It claimed Mubarak’s overthrow was a defeat for western-backed governments in the Middle East and a victory for populist Islamists who took their cue from Iran. Thus for Ahmadinejad, the trip to Cairo has great symbolic value. He is the first Iranian leader to visit Egypt since the Islamic Republic was created and, to Ahmadinejad, the Egyptian revolution is his to claim.

But few Egyptians see their revolution as externally inspired. To them, it was a homegrown movement built on their socio-economic frustrations with a corrupt government. So while the Iranian press reported the warm reception extended to Ahmadinejad, the Egyptian press reported Morsi’s chiding of Iran for Tehran’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria.

Similarly, while the Iranian press reported that Ahmadinejad wanted to foster unity with Egypt to further the Palestinian cause, the Egyptian press reported that both the head of the leading Sunni Islamic seminary of Al-Azhar and the Egyptian prime minister warned Ahmadinejad not to undermine security in the Persian Gulf region. These differences are not just rhetorical, but speak to the divergent strategic interests these leaders have in the region and at home.

Ahmadinejad is an outgoing president who will not be allowed to stand for a third term. But his desire to influence the June 2013 election is strong, illustrated by his manoeuvring to weaken his political adversaries. For their part, Ahmadinejad’s opponents blame him — his governing style and his policies — for some of the economic hardship the Iranian people have endured. One way for Ahmadinejad to deflect domestic attention from the flailing economy is to claim ownership of the revolutions sweeping the Arab Middle East.

Egypt’s Morsi needs to quell real public anger over his consolidation of power and the new contentious constitution. With a foreign exchange reserve that is rapidly dwindling and a deteriorating economy highly dependent on tourism and trade in the Suez Canal, Morsi is turning to Egypt’s wealthy benefactors in the Gulf — players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar — while continuing to receive $1.3 billion in military and economic aid from the U.S. Furthering an alliance with Iran would do little to tame Egypt’s domestic economic troubles. And with Egyptians firmly in support of the Syrian people’s desire to overthrow Assad, Iran offers Morsi little ideological comfort.

So beyond the warm exchange of greetings for the cameras, the icy relationship between these two historic powers in the Middle East remains. Morsi and Ahmadinejad’s shared Islamist political ideologies will do little to change the hard strategic realities — at home and in the region — that keep them apart.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: Toronto Star