Brookings: Topics - International Affairs

Enlisting Iran On Syria Will Backfire

Michael Doran — Thu, 23 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

“There are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran.” So wrote Henry Kissinger in 2001. The sentence is more than just the assessment of one man. It expresses the deep longing of much of the American foreign policy establishment. For more than three decades the United States as been at odds with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout the entire period, however, a dream of cooperation has captivated even the most hard-bitten American realists.

This dream beguiled Ronald Reagan. He sent his national security adviser, Robert C. Macfarlane, to Tehran, carrying a key-shaped cake, which was meant to symbolize the unlocking of doors between the two countries. The very same vision also convinced Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 2000 to express regret for American meddling in Iranian politics back in 1953, at the time of the Eisenhower administration. The mea culpa was meant to elicit a reciprocal gesture from Tehran, which never materialized.

As Secretary of State John Kerry labors to organize the Geneva conference on Syria, he will undoubtedly hear advice from those who are captivated by the dream. The Russians, for their part, have explicitly called for Iranian participation in the conference, now scheduled for the second week in June. The French, by contrast, have flatly opposed the idea. "We do not want Iran," a foreign ministry spokesman said in Paris with admirable clarity. Meanwhile, Kerry and the State Department have remained mum. We must hope that their silence does not imply any agreement with the Russians. Any effort to enlist the aid of Tehran – direct or indirect – would backfire.

Violent sectarianism, Islamic extremism, and terrorism are stamped in the DNA of the Islamic Republic. It leads an anti-American coalition throughout the region. Its allies, Assad foremost among them, are the sworn enemies of the allies of the United States. Fruitful cooperation between Washington and Tehran is impossible.

More importantly, it is also harmful to American interests. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, entertains no reciprocal dream of friendship. He wisely recognizes that he is locked in a zero-sum game with the United States. He periodically responds to gestures of friendship from Washington, because he knows that sitting down with the Americans, if only to scorn them, is an effective asymmetric tactic. It allows him to affirm key planks of Iranian propaganda: that the United States is a country in decline, that it is searching for the exits in the Middle East, and that it has no choice but to cut a deal with Iran, the rising power. The Islamic Republic’s message to America’s Arab friends is crystal clear: “Obama is intent on courting us. He will sell you down the river just to get into our good graces.”

The Islamic Republic is the primary external enabler of Assad’s murderous policies. By seeking Tehran’s help, if only indirectly, at the Geneva conference, the United States would simply be embracing the role that Iranian propaganda has assigned it.

The Geneva conference itself is already being read in the Middle East as a sign of American backsliding. When Assad ignored explicit American red lines on chemical weapons, the Obama administration responded by calling on the Syrian opposition to sit down with his representatives. It reacted, that is, with what everyone in the Middle East sees as a gesture of renewed respect for a murderous regime.

Many in the Middle East see America’s erasing of its own red lines as part of a pattern of capitulation to Iran. Assad is Tehran’s best ally, so it is only natural that the Arab friends of the United States read American policies toward Syria against the background of the Iran problem. Over the last decade Tehran has repeatedly ignored explicit warnings regarding its nuclear program. But the West has greeted each transgression with a tacit acceptance of the fait accompli. No one today believes that the United States will actually deny Iran the complete nuclear fuel cycle. With or without Iranian participation, the Geneva conference already appears as yet another example of American retreat in the face of aggressive Iranian policies.

Authors

Michael Doran

United Nations Global Education First Initiative's Youth Advocacy Group

Jenny Perlman Robinson — Thu, 23 May 2013 12:42:00 -0400

In September 2012 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched a five-year education campaign, the Global Education First Initiative, to put every child in school, improve the quality of learning and foster global citizenship. To advise and support the implementation of the initiative, the Global Education First Initiative convened a Youth Advocacy Group of 15 young leaders from around the world. I sat down with two of the Youth Advocacy Group members, Joseph Munyambanza of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Anna Susarenco of Moldova, to discuss the group’s mandate and their personal commitment to education for all.

To see more videos about the Global Education First Initiative, please visit our YouTube page.

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The YAG Provides Grassroots Knowledge to Decision-makers On Improving Education

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Bringing Mentoring to the Refugee Camp

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Authors

Jenny Perlman Robinson

The Future of Transatlantic Trade and Investment: Opportunities and Challenges

Thu, 23 May 2013 13:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 23, 2013
1:30 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On May 23, the Center on the U.S. and Europe (CUSE) and Global Economy and Development at Brookings, with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, hosted German Vice-Chancellor Philipp Rösler for an address on the prospects for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In his remarks, Dr. Rösler explored the direction of EU-U.S. negotiations on TTIP and the current state of transatlantic economic relations in an increasingly globalized world.

From 2001 until 2003, Dr. Philipp Rösler worked as a doctor and medical officer of the Federal Armed Forces. In 2003, Dr. Rösler was elected to the state parliament of Lower Saxony and remained a member of this parliament and chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) state parliamentary group until 2009. At the beginning of 2009, he was appointed minister of Economics, Labor and Transport and deputy minister-president of the State of Lower Saxony. In October 2009 he joined the federal government as federal minister of Health. He has been federal minister of Economics and Technology, federal chairman of the FDP and vice-chancellor since May 2011.

Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Audio

The Future of Transatlantic Trade and Investment: Opportunities and Challenges

Growing the Global Internet Economy by Ensuring the Free Flow of Data Across Borders

David Dreier and Joshua Meltzer — Thu, 23 May 2013 15:32:00 -0400

Digital connectivity is the most powerful driver of social and economic change the world has seen. The Internet will connect an estimated 5 billion people by 2020. That many already use cell phones. Connectivity is reshaping the landscape we inhabit, changing the ways we communicate, learn and do business. It is behind the world’s most transformative trends, including an unprecedented empowerment of the individual.

The free flow of data is a core element of the Internet that has underpinned this growth in connectivity, innovation and productivity. This freedom has been vital to the growth of digital trade in goods and services, a quickly growing share of global GDP. Its importance is evident every minute as citizens, businesses and governments access global services such as cloud computing, and health and education opportunities. Entrepreneurs in developing countries benefit from free flow as they sell their products globally over the Internet, using international financial data transfers to process transactions. It has also been a critical factor in the explosive growth of access to information and human opportunity.

We are, however, only at the beginning of the digital age. It is hard to grasp the enormity of what this advance portends. More data was created and exchanged last year than in all of human history. The growth in the use and exchange of data is accelerating exponentially--fueling massive new economic activity, enabling major advances in scientific research, analysis of big data, and providing tools to help address existential challenges to human well-being such as climate change.

There are, however, some major speed bumps that threaten this advance as governments around the world are increasingly seeking to restrict or control the flow of data.

No question about it, the Internet is disruptive. That’s why it’s not hard to understand the impulse to control it. But, as with everything, there is a balance to be sought. For example, efforts to prevent cyber crime, or maintain the privacy of personal data should avoid unnecessary restrictions on the free flow of data across borders. Attempts by government to limit data flows to restrict market access or provide unfair commercial advantages to domestic businesses reduces international trade. This is discriminatory and trade-distorting, and should be prohibited.

Many governments are already restricting the free flow of data. These attempts are most blatant in repressive and authoritarian countries, but evident even in open societies. Across the world governments are grappling with how to reconcile the freedom of the Internet with the need to address some of the harms associated with its use.

But as government interference in the free flow of data multiplies, we may be reaching an inflection point that could determine kind of Internet the world ends up with. It could become truly global, open and accessible to all. Or, the Internet could become increasingly balkanized and closed, with a loss of economic and social potential that harms all.

International trade forums are starting to discuss how to find the right balance between the free flow of data and action to address legitimate concerns about harmful use of the Internet. In fact, cross border data flow is quickly emerging as an important 21st century trade issue. It is not adequately regulated under the rules of the World Trade Organization and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is the first trade agreement to try to address issues related to cross-border data flows. The issue is also part of negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership and will figure prominently in talks for a projected EU-U.S. trade agreement.

It is vital we get it right in these agreements. To do so we need a deeper and wider understanding of the value and stakes associated with the free flow of data across borders. The Annenberg-Dreier Commission and the Brookings Institution are trying to build that awareness, so vital to the world. We are partnering in a meeting next week—the start of a larger project—that will gather some of the top experts from the Asia Pacific region to examine the interests in play.

The aim of this project is to build greater understanding in this region on the importance of the free flow of data as a driver of international trade, economic growth and innovation. The U.S. has developed a thriving Internet industry with regulation that balances the free flow of data and access to the Internet with the need to protect legitimate interests such as the protection of intellectual property, fighting cyber crime and maintaining the privacy of personal data.

Other countries are also trying to capture the gains from the Internet economy. And while this should be encouraged, doing so with regulation that is discriminatory and restricts access to the Internet will harm trade, impede growth and is will be harmful to all. On the contrary, an open Internet that encourages access to data and fosters competition will deliver the most economic benefits globally.

Developing a common understanding of these challenges and charting a way forward may ultimately be key to global stability, security, and growth—in short, to building the collaboration necessary to sustain a world we’d want to live in.

Authors

Image Source: © Kacper Pempel / Reuters

Obama’s National Security Speech and Pakistan

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 22 May 2013 10:22:00 -0400

On Thursday, President Obama plans to deliver a speech on national security and counterterrorism issues. The speech comes at a particularly awkward time in Pakistan, the epicenter of the global jihad for more than a decade. Nawaz Sharif has just been elected for an unprecedented third term in a nation extremely unhappy with America's counterterrorism policies, especially the drone war fought in its skies from bases in Afghanistan.

President Obama faces the challenge of defending his policies and explaining why they are needed. He must do this without further alienating an angry Pakistan and its newly elected civilian government which is struggling to find its own way to deal with the terror Frankenstein that threatens the world and Pakistan itself. It may be mission impossible. Despite years of drone attacks and the death of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan remains the base for the top three most wanted terrorists on the U.S. Most Wanted list: al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri, Taliban chief Mullah Omar and Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT) boss Hafez Saeed.

In fact, Omar and Saeed enjoy the patronship and protection of Pakistan's army. More global terror plots have originated in Pakistan than anywhere else since 9/11. Without the drones, there would be little or no pressure on the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. Despite over $25 billion in American economic and military aid since 9/11, the Pakistani authorities cannot be relied on to fight the danger posed by al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or LeT. Obama recognized that fact when he sent the SEALs to kill bin Laden without telling any Pakistani official that we had found him hiding inside the highly secure Pakistani city of Abbottabad.

But Pakistan is also a victim of the terror monster it has coddled for decades. Over 45,000 Pakistanis have died in terror-related violence since 9/11, and dozens more died in the election campaign just ended. Sharif has pledged to seek a political solution to the violence. He has campaigned against the drones and faces a national consensus that wants them to end. His main opponent Imran Khan promised to shoot them down if elected (probably with American supplied F-16s).

Obama significantly expanded drone attacks in 2009 and many dangerous terrorists have been eliminated by them. The price has been to further alienate the Pakistani people. His speech this Thursday is not likely to please many in Pakistan. The already very difficult U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship is at a crucial juncture with the first ever transition from one elected Pakistani civilian government to another in the country's history after a full term in office. Reconciling our counter-terror mission with our interest in promoting democracy in Pakistan will not be easy. If it is impossible, then the fate of U.S. relations with the most dangerous country in the world is headed toward an even more deadly outcome.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

Lessons from America’s First War with Iran

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 22 May 2013 13:35:00 -0400

President Barack Obama has committed the United States to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran seems determined to acquire them. As the United States and Iran approach confrontation and possible war to halt Tehran’s nuclear program, it is useful to remember that America has already fought one war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the late 1980s, President Ronald Reagan intervened in the Iran- Iraq War in support of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein, ultimately leading to an Iraqi victory. The United States engaged in an undeclared yet bloody naval and air war, while Iraq fought a brutal land war against Iran. The lessons of the first war with Iran should be carefully considered before the United States embarks hastily on a second.

In hindsight, the central lesson of the war in the 1980s is that it is easy to start a conflict with Iran and very difficult to end it. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not easy to intimidate and is likely to retaliate asymmetrically. Another key lesson is to beware the advice of your allies, both Arabs and Israelis, who are prone to give irresponsible recommendations on how to deal with Tehran.

The Toll of the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War was devastating. It was one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars since the Korean War ended in 1953. A half million lives were lost, and perhaps another million were injured. The economic cost of the war exceeded one trillion dollars.1 Yet, the battle lines at the end of the war were almost exactly where they had been at the beginning of hostilities. It was also the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale.

Although the war ended in 1988, it led to numerous aftershocks that rippled throughout the region including the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the liberation of Kuwait a year later, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The bloody U.S. war that President Obama recently ended in Iraq was the finale in this march of folly. The seeds of multigenerational tragedy were planted in the Iran-Iraq War. The world will live with its consequences for decades, if not longer.

There were no “good guys” in the Iran-Iraq War, only two brutal dictatorships. Saddam Hussein was a megalomaniac who built enormous, ugly monuments to his ambitions and dreamed of becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, controlling the world’s oil supplies, and destroying Israel. At the end of the first Gulf War in 1988, Hussein waged genocide against his own Kurdish population. Ayatollah Khomeini created a theocracy in Iran which imprisoned and executed thousands of its own citizens, forced tens of thousands into exile, and even took American diplomats hostage.

U.S. Policy During the War

America had no natural partners in the Iran-Iraq War, but its interests dictated that the United States allow neither Saddam nor Khomeini to dominate the region and the world’s energy supply. For most of the war, it was Iran that appeared on the verge of victory, so Washington had little choice but to support Iraq.

For those who aspire to a national security policy built on the principles of the United Nations Charter or a moral high ground, Iran-Iraq was an immoral swamp. For American policymakers in the 1980s, there was a simple difference. When the war began, Iran held dozens of American diplomats hostage and even tortured some. Only after 444 days in captivity did Iran let the American hostages go. In contrast to Khomeini, many Americans hoped that the Iraqi leader was somehow redeemable and could be worked with as a difficult but manageable partner. We realize now that this was a mirage, but in the 1980s it was still a hope. Thus, America tilted toward Iraq, hoping it would hold back the “medieval fanatics” to the east from gaining control of the world’s oil reserves.

But “our side” kept breaking the rules. First, Iraq was the aggressor in September 1980. Certainly Iraq had been provoked by Iranian actions along the border, but the main act of aggression was carried out by the Iraqi army in the form of a massive attack. As long as Iraq held Iranian territory, Washington did not call for the restoration of the status quo ante as would be the norm for most international conflicts; only when the tables turned did the United States call for respect for the international border. Then Iraq began using chemical weapons—first, in a piecemeal and largely ineffectual fashion, but by the war’s end, on an industrial scale and with decisive effect. The threat of Iraqi chemical warheads on long range missiles cleared Tehran of many of its inhabitants in 1988, and Saddam began using chemical warheads to systematically kill his own people. Rather than fall silent, the guns of war merely changed theaters with the 1988 cease-fire, as the Anfal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds began, an act of pure genocide by the government that the United States had supported during the war.

The conflict was not President Ronald Reagan’s finest hour. At first he tilted toward Iraq, sending the CIA to Baghdad with critical intelligence in 1982 to thwart Iran’s war plans. It worked. Then Reagan tilted toward Iran, sending sophisticated arms to Tehran in an effort to get American hostages in Lebanon freed. It didn’t work. A few hostages were released but more hostages were taken. Then Reagan tilted back toward Iraq and Washington’s undeclared war followed in 1987 and 1988. The principal architect of the policy was Reagan’s Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey, who died before the Iran scandal forced his resignation and possible indictment.

Lessons for Today

So what are the lessons of this war for America today? The first lesson is that we should expect to be blamed for all that goes wrong. Both Iraqis and Iranians came to believe the United States was manipulating each of them during the war. Ironically, and perhaps naively, the United States tried to reach out to both belligerents through the course of the war— in great secrecy both times—to try to build a strategic partnership. The disastrous arms-for-hostages policy, which came to be known as the Iran- Contra affair, convinced Iraqis rightly that the United States was trying to play both sides of the conflict. The result was that when the war ended, the Iraqi regime and most Iraqis regarded the United States as a threat, despite Washington’s support during the war. That support had taken the form of critical intelligence assistance to Baghdad, considerable diplomatic cover, and largesse from our Arab allies who loaned tens of billions of dollars to Baghdad to sustain Iraq’s war effort.

Iranians call the war the “Imposed War” because they believe the United States subjected them to the conflict and orchestrated the global “tilt” toward Iraq. They note that the United Nations did not condemn Iraq for starting the war. In fact, the UN did not even discuss the war for weeks after it started, and it ultimately considered Iraq to be the aggressor only years later, as part of a deal orchestrated by President George H.W. Bush to free the remaining U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon.

Although the war had tragic consequences for Iran, by portraying the conflict as a “David and Goliath” struggle imposed by the United States and its allies, Iranian leaders managed to consolidate the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Revolution was fairly short in duration and its cost was miniscule in comparison to the Iran-Iraq War. For the generation of Iranians who are now leading their country, including men like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the war was the defining event of their lives and a major force in shaping their worldview. Their anti-Americanism and deep suspicion of the West can be traced directly to their understanding of the Iran-Iraq War. We should thus expect the next war to make Iran more extreme and more determined to get the bomb.

Another lesson of the first war is that Iran will not be easily intimidated by the United States. By 1987, Iran was devastated by the war, many of its cities had been destroyed, its oil exports were minimal. and its economy was shattered. But it did not hesitate to fight the U.S. Navy in the Gulf and to use asymmetric means to retaliate in Lebanon and elsewhere. Even with most of its navy sunk by U.S. Naval forces, Iran kept fighting and the Iranian people continued rallying behind Ayatollah Khomeini.

Iran fought a smart war, avoiding too rapid and too dangerous an escalation. As General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has noted, Iranian behavior is rational, not suicidal.2 Iran will not take steps that endanger the revolution’s survival; the country will look to exploit America’s vulnerabilities in Afghanistan and Bahrain, as well as Israel’s in Lebanon and the Saudis’ in Yemen. In the 1980s, Iran created Hezbollah in Lebanon to attack American, French, and Israeli targets as punishment for American support of Iraq. Hezbollah then tried to assassinate the emir of Kuwait to punish that country for being Iraq’s outlet to the Persian Gulf. In essence, Iran expanded the battlefield of the Iran-Iraq War to other countries where it could exploit security vulnerabilities. We should expect the same in a future war, one for which Iran and Hezbollah have had decades to prepare. Indeed, Iran and Hezbollah are already waging a low intensity terror campaign against Israel from Bulgaria to India, and they have reportedly used cyber warfare against Saudi and Qatari oil companies.3

Another lesson is that ending a future war will be a challenge. In 1988, Iran sued for a cease-fire only after suffering catastrophic defeat on the ground against Iraqi forces and after Saddam Hussein threatened to fire Scud missiles armed with chemical warheads into Iranian cities.4 Iranians feared they would face a second “Hiroshima” if they did not accept a truce; indeed many evacuated Tehran in fear of an Iraqi chemical attack. For Khomeini, accepting the truce was like “drinking poison.”5 No two wars are identical, but history suggests that Iran will not back down easily.

The final lesson is to always scrutinize the advice of allies. Ironically, in the 1980s the closest U.S. partner in the region, Israel, pressed Washington hard and repeatedly to essentially switch sides and offer assistance to Iran. Israeli leaders, generals, and spies were obsessed by the Iraqi threat in the 1980s just as they are preoccupied by the Iranian threat today, and they longed to restore the cozy relationship they had with the Shah in the 1960s and 1970s. Through the Iraq-Iran War, Israel was the only consistent source of spare parts for the Iranian air force’s U.S.-made jets.6 Israeli leaders, notably Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, brought considerable pressure to bear on Washington for an American engagement with Tehran, and Iran-Contra was in many ways their idea. American diplomats and spies deployed abroad were told to turn a blind eye to Israeli arms deals with Tehran, even when it was official U.S. policy (in the Washington euphemism of the day) to “staunch” all avenues by which the Iranians might obtain weapons or other material needed for their war effort.7

America’s Arab allies provided equally bad advice. Egypt’s President Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussein, and Saudi King Fahd all urged support for Saddam and Iraq, while turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against his own people. Egypt sent arms, Jordan sent volunteers, and the Saudis bankrolled Saddam’s war, while telling America that he was a born-again moderate who could be worked with and trusted. It was not to be.

Looking back a quarter century after the war in 1988 is revealing and sobering. America accomplished its immediate goals in the first war: it halted Iran’s advance into Iraq, defended the tankers in the Gulf, and contained the war from spreading into the Arabian Peninsula. Khomeini did not conquer Basra and Baghdad and march on Jerusalem as he dreamed he would. But today, Iran is the dominant foreign power in Baghdad, thanks in large part to another war America fought in the Gulf. President George W. Bush toppled Saddam and ended his brutal dictatorship, but in doing so, Bush opened the door to a Shia majority government which is much friendlier to Tehran than to Riyadh or Amman, or Washington. These are sobering reminders of the unintended consequences of wars.

The first American war with Iran helped make Iran a more radical and extreme country. A second war may well do the same. Thus another war with Iran to stop its nuclear program may ultimately prove to be the catalyst that pushes Iran to acquire a dangerous nuclear weapons arsenal. Rather than stopping proliferation, it could incite it further.

History of course does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Lessons of old wars should be carefully considered before entering new ones. Many Americans have forgotten the lessons of our undeclared war in the 1980s. We have fought so many other wars since: in Iraq (twice), in Afghanistan, and in Libya. While it may be easy for Washington to forget, no Iranian has.

This article was originally published by The Fletcher Forum.

Endnotes
1 Janet Lang et al, Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988 (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), ix.
2 Fareed Zakaria, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: We are of the opinion that the Iranian regime is a ‘rational actor,’” CNN Pressroom, February 21, 2012.
3 Nicole Perlroth, “In Cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back,” New York Times, October 23, 2012.
4 Lang, 169.
5 Lang, 196.
6 Lang, 89.
7 Lang, 90.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Fletcher Forum

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

After 50 Years of the OAU-AU: Time to Strengthen the Conflict Intervention Framework

Julius Agbor and Tatah Mentan — Wed, 22 May 2013 16:19:00 -0400

2013 marks 50 years since the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which became the African Union (AU) in 2002. This week, as the continent’s leaders and other Africanists meet to commemorate this special occasion, it is also the appropriate time to reflect on some of the principles, successes and shortcomings of the organization. In particular, we would like to consider why the organization has been particularly slow in intervening in situations where the “responsibility to protect” is clearly mandated. The “responsibility to protect” is a United Nations (U.N.) principle endorsed by the AU (in what has come to be known as the “Ezulwini Consensus”) and represents the right to intervene in a member states’ internal affairs in situations where citizens’ welfare has been significantly undermined. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Acts of the AU state that “[T]he Union has the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the general assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” While the AU has been lauded for its multilateral peace-keeping initiatives, notably in Sudan, its ambivalent, and at best muted, response to the humanitarian crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and, most recently, Mali—very similar to the OAU’s inaction in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia—has drawn much criticism. On the other hand, the AU has been quick to express reservations about the intervention of Western nations in its member states’ affairs, notably, with the recent French movements in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, and NATO in Libya. This controversy about the timing of international interventions suggests the need for a fine line to be drawn between the AU’s long cherished principle of non-interference (stipulated in Article 4(g) of the Constitutive Acts) and the AU’s “responsibility to protect” framework, without which the continental body will increasingly lose its relevance. Following the AU’s inertia to respond to these situations, pundits have speculated on what would have happened to Côte d’Ivoire, Mali or Libya had France or NATO not intervened at all.

Although it is probably too early to pass judgment on the efficacy of the AU’s revised peace and security framework, the evidence over the past two decades does not suggest the pan-African body has been effective at mitigating humanitarian crisis on the continent. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of AU’s intervention are both ideological and logistic. On the ideological front, it seems that the principle of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs has had a preponderant influence on the organization’s decision-making process, and for genuine reasons. Many African states have weak governance structures, and cases of widespread human rights violations are still rampant on the continent. The evidence suggests that civil wars and most of the parameters which define a failed state are the result of poor governance. Similarly, Africa is the only continent that continues to experience famines in the 21st century, and the evidence linking famines to poor governance is compelling. Unfortunately, the AU lacks oversight over most of its member states with respect to governance, which continues to be treated as a domestic affair. As evidence, only 26 of its 54 member states have ratified the protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights—the arm of the AU charged with ensuring the protection of human and peoples’ rights on the continent. This fact suggests that arriving at a consensus decision to intervene in a member state is often problematic. Thus, at the level of the AU general assembly, when it comes to voting in favor of or against an intervention to avert a humanitarian crisis, it can be expected that the overwhelming majority of governance-deficient AU member states would oppose such an intervention, even if the need is glaring. This difficulty in achieving consensus partly explains why the AU has been less proactive in mitigating conflicts and also why its response to crisis situations has been sluggish. Thus, a more proactive conflict prevention, mitigation and management strategy necessarily involves early warning monitoring, which includes the ability to identify governance failures and systematically address them. A good point of start in upholding continental best practices in governance could be by imposing on its member states the requirement that presidential term limits must not exceed two terms of a maximum of seven years each.

Logistical issues linked to inadequate resources, lack of technical know-how and poor planning have also impaired the AU’s ability to respond in a timely manner in order to avert humanitarian crises. To be able to prevent civil wars, there is need for a credible assessment of war signals. Also, a built-in system for evaluating success and failure has to be designed into the intervention process. Further, part of the problem with intervention in African conflicts is poor planning: An inadequate assessment of what it takes to succeed in each particular intervention often leads to huge casualties and resentment from member states to support future initiatives. Poor planning is also evidenced in unrealistic timetables for intervention. Sometimes, it is the lack of a critical diagnosis of the root cause of a conflict that hinders effective intervention. Considering the U.N.’s superior resources and comparative advantage in early monitoring, evaluation and conflict mitigation in general, the AU stands to gain from continued collaboration with the U.N. Sudan and the DRC are clear cases of the benefits of such collaboration. Of course, these examples do not necessarily suggest that the U.N. should take the front role in crisis prevention in Africa. Rather, the AU must be at the forefront of this prevention by stengthening the role of its regional economic communities (RECs) in transparently providing early warning signals. With proper coordination and collaboration, the RECs have proven to be an effective channel of intervention in conflicts as was seen in the recent case of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) intervention in the Central African Republic.

The case for strengthening the AU’s conflict intervention framework is further buttressed by the fact that, in Africa, transnational corporations (TNCs) compete with state institutions in the economic, political and social spheres. With increasing globalization, TNCs with more and more power and influence may be problematic for individual African states to handle in isolation. For instance, TNCs have been big players in fueling conflicts in mineral-rich African countries. Also, a recent phenomenon that is yet to be acknowledged is the potential role of big TNCs’ tax haven practices in further weakening the governance capabilities of African states, which would in turn nurture future conflicts. For instance, an investigation headed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has concluded that the practice of tax havens by TNCs is costing Africa $38 billion a year in lost revenue. Such activities clearly undermine the quality of life of African citizens, and therefore some structured intervention by the AU is warranted given the limited ability of individual African states to effectively address them.

In conclusion, although it is difficult to envision an AU where every domestic issue would be discussed and picked apart, there are certainly areas where some structured regional intervention is mandated. For this continental body to remain relevant, it will have to transparently restructure and strengthen its intervention framework to allow it to swiftly respond to humanitarian crises as well as enable it to cope with new challenges posed by a globalizing world economy.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Tatah Mentan

Image Source: © Joe Penney / Reuters

Civil Wars and Syria: Lessons From History

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Sean Zeigler — Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Most of the international debate about Syria policy focuses on how to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.

Options for NATO states and key Arab League partners include everything from enlisting Russia’s help in a diplomatic approach, with a conference now envisioned for early June, to arming the rebels to perhaps even supporting them with limited amounts of airpower. Removing Assad, however, would no more end the Syrian conflict than overthrowing Saddam Hussein in 2003 brought stability to Iraq. The United States must create a more integrated overall strategy.

Not just the Iraq example, but broader scholarly studies on civil war onset and recurrence suggest that should the House of Assad fall, the likelihood of continued bloodshed in Syria will remain uncomfortably high.

Studies indicate that more than a third of all civil conflicts have some form of relapse after they end. Though there is much disagreement about the particular causes of war renewal, certain factors are widely recognized as relevant. Many are present in the current Syrian context.

First, the human cost of the Syrian conflict is already high. To date, roughly 80,000 deaths are attributed to the war. In contrast to the “war weariness” adage that longer and bloodier conflicts are eventual precursors to peace, violence tends to beget more violence. The more intense a conflict, the greater the risk it will reignite down the road, according to a host of literature on the subject.

This argues against the likelihood that, even if Assad falls or flees, remaining partisans will quickly make peace among themselves.

Second, so-called existential wars are hard to stop. Fights for regime change and control of the state can quickly evolve into all-or-nothing contests. Even if different groups pledge to work together and share power once an ancien regime is displaced, it is difficult for them to trust each other, given the high stakes they are fighting for. Contesting the government’s legitimacy can also shrink any potential scope for future bargaining and compromise.

Third, weak political institutions do not bode well for a country’s chances of stability in the wake of a civil war. The Syrian government, built around the Baath party and the Assad family, does not have a great deal of institutional depth. While the effect of political structures on war recurrence is debated, there is some agreement that only more consolidated democracies can avoid renewed conflict. Political participation often lowers the likelihood that disaffected citizens will take up arms once wars are over. Autocracy, therefore, is generally more associated with both civil war onset and recurrence.

Finally, when wartime coalitions are tenuous and factionalized, the odds of conflict recurrence increase considerably. This is particularly true in Syria, with its dozens if not hundreds of insurgent groups.

These factors indicate that supporting the overthrow of the Syrian regime, perhaps through directly arming rebels, may invite sectarian conflict to widen, not subside. Understanding these complicating factors is key to building any chances of peace.

So where to go from here? There are a number of options beyond the increasingly unspeakable – standing aside while Assad’s forces try to win the war, or at least take back most of the country.

One option is to acknowledge all the above, accepting the brutal logic of civil warfare and deciding not to do much about it. This could mean relegating Syria to become the next Somalia, if and when Assad falls.

Over time, the huge number of insurgent groups now operating in Syria might merge into a more modest number. But the warfare could resemble the protracted militia combat witnessed until recently in Somalia – or in 1990s’ Afghanistan. Beyond its disastrous humanitarian implications, this approach would also allow a sanctuary for terrorists to develop in the heart of the Levant and on the borders of five countries now crucial to the United States — Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq.

A second option is to go in strong with a multinational ground invasion force, capable of imposing consolidation on the opposition and order on the country. But as we learned in Iraq, this is easier said than done – and is likely to involve more than 100,000 foreign troops, taking casualties at a likely rate of dozens a month for several years. It is a nonstarter.

The most amenable strategy, therefore, is some form of political settlement followed by deployment of a smaller (but significant) international force to help monitor the deal and cement the peace. This could involve a simple power-sharing formula with a strong central government, as well as a guarantee of safe passage out of the country for Assad.

Given the degree of sectarian animosity and distrust now prevalent in Syria, this peace accord might have to resemble the Bosnia model, with a relatively weak central government and autonomous regions. Each region would be run predominantly by one confessional group or another, but with strong protections for minority rights. Multiethnic major cities in the country’s center would have to remain multiethnic in any case.

Accepting a number of foreign boots on the ground will be asking much of the international community. Yet there is probably no other way to do it given where Syria is today and what we know about civil wars.

The alternative, if not a regionalized war, is some type of victor’s justice followed by a distinct possibility of conflict renewal.

Done right, the multinational approach would not have to require more than 10,000 to 20,000 Americans, as perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent of a total force starting in the range of 50,000 or so. It should have large contributions from Turkey, Arab League states, NATO Europe and possibly Russia too.

Getting to this kind of deal may require more military help for the opposition in the short term. But President Barack Obama’s reluctance to provide arms or airpower support is understandable in the absence of a strategy that considers the question of what comes after Assad has fallen.

We need to fashion that strategy. Scheduling a conference, reasonable though it may be, and hoping for the best is not enough.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Sean Zeigler

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Building New Democracies: Institutional Reform after the Arab Spring

Wed, 22 May 2013 01:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2013
9:00 AM - 11:00 AM AST

Doha Ritz Carlton, Doha, Qatar

On May 23, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a plenary discussion on the challenge of institutional reform after the Arab Spring as part of the 13th Doha Forum. Speakers discussed how the countries of the Arab Spring could build new, representative governments, as well as how they could best balance demands for change with the requirements of an inclusive and successful transition. The discussion featured Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian Ambassador to the United States and founding Dean of the American University in Cairo’s School of Public Affairs; Dr. Rafiq Abdessalam, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia; Dr. Bernardino Leon, European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean; Nikolay Mladenov, former Foreign Minister of Bulgaria; and Michael Posner, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh.

The panel opened with speakers taking stock of the situation of the countries of the Arab Spring, and Egypt and Tunisia in particular, more than two years after 2011’s revolutionary wave. Both Fahmy and Abdessalam pointed to the challenges their countries faced. “It’s impossible to deny that almost everybody [in Egypt] is frustrated at this point,” Fahmy said. He told the audience that he remained optimistic over the long term but was, over the short term, “quite disturbed.” For his part, Abdessalam acknowledged that Tunisia’s transition had been difficult. At this point, he said, the goal of the Tunisian “Troika” was to steer the country through this period “at the least possible cost” with an approach based on partnership and consensus.

These challenges reflected the scope of the change underway in these countries. Fahmy asserted that what is happening in Egypt is a “societal” transition, not merely an institutional one – an argument that Abdessalam seconded. Egyptians, Fahmy said, are now defining an Egyptian political identity for the 21st century. Mladenov identified this as a key point of difference between earlier transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and those in the Arab world: whereas the end goal in European transitions may have been relatively clear, in the Arab world it is still in the making.

In order to best conduct this societal dialogue, Mladenov emphasized the “roundtable” approach Bulgaria had taken to arrive at a consensus vision for the future. This had parallels with the Tunisian approach, which Abdessalam said was based on a recognition that no single faction could bear these burdens alone. Fahmy, meanwhile, expressed unhappiness that Egypt had entered the political process before setting its constitutional ground rules, a decision he blamed for Egypt’s polarization. When politics are put first, he said, political forces “pull you apart rather than push you forward.” Posner was also critical of the Egyptian case, and in particular what he saw as a “very flawed” constitution – both the drafting process and the resulting document.

Participants worked to put forward an approach that was forward-looking but also workable. Leon laid out the key points on which he had counseled these transitioning countries. He advocated a transition that held accountable those responsible for excesses and dramatically reformed fiscal structures and the security services. At the same time, he argued for retaining the personnel and institutions of the state and broadly accommodating officials not implicated in crimes as part of the former regime. Fahmy warned that by too-aggressively dismantling everything that had come before the revolution, you risked “destroy[ing] the core of the country,” while Mladenov cautioned against not going far enough – he said that old regimes “have a tendency to come back from the ashes.” Leon read the successes of al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt as evidence of a desire for change – but said that support for Ahmed Shafiq in Egypt’s presidential election and Beji Caid Essebsi in Tunisia showed the need for a process that was respectful to and inclusive of all parties.

Any solution, of course, has to match up with the aspirations of the peoples who overthrew their dictators. As Posner put it, these are “young societies” whose people want economic opportunity and a political stake in the future of their countries. Fahmy argued that people need to see real progress on reform and improving their quality of life if they are to remain committed to the transition.

Participants touched on different ways that the West could support these transitions and reform processes. Mladenov raised as examples both European efforts to assist political party formation and the EU Endowment for Democracy. Still, Leon said that it is “very important to listen to what these societies want.” Posner and Mladenov agreed that any process had to be domestically driven, given the particularities of any given country case; looking at examples as diverse as Argentina, Serbia, and East Germany, they rejected a one-size-fits-all model.

In a discussion of the Gulf role in supporting these transitions, Abdessalam praised Qatar’s role but condemned some other Gulf states’ fear of change and “pessimistic depiction” of what is now going on in Egypt and Tunisia. Fahmy said that the Gulf should continue to provide support for these transitions, but not for one party over another. Posner, for his part, was sharply critical of the Gulf states’ position on the uprising in Bahrain. Bahrain should have been a model for a managed transition to a constitutional monarchy, he said, but instead the Gulf had been silent as the Bahraini government declined to implement key recommendations of the “Bassiouni Report.” Mladenov and Leon, on the other hand, were much more positive about the support of the Gulf for the Arab transitions and the Gulf countries’ role as a partner for the West. Mladenov did warn, however, that the Gulf faced possible blowback from its involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Dr. Yassin Said Noaman, Secretary-General of the Yemen Socialist Party and former Prime Minister of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, had been meant to represent the Yemeni experience in the discussion but was ultimately unable to attend. Fortunately, Yemeni Minister of Information Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Minister of Industry and Trade Saad al-Din bin Taleb were able to contribute during the panel’s question-and-answer session. They discussed the progress on and hopes for Yemen’s national dialogue and, in the case of bin Taleb, highlighted how previous regimes’ corruption and self-serving contracts had left their countries with an unsustainable economic burden.

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy

Barack Obama and China's Xi Jinping to Meet In California

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 21 May 2013 11:37:00 -0400

Yesterday, the White House announced that President Obama will meet with China’s President Xi Jinping on June 7-8 in California. The announcement said that the two will hold “in-depth discussions on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues, . . . review progress and challenges in U.S.-China relations over the past four years and discuss ways to enhance cooperation, while constructively managing our differences, in the years ahead.”

Yet the purpose of this meeting is not to bargain or to solve specific problems, but to set a tone and create a sense of shared fate between the two leaders by allowing Obama and Xi to firmly establish a good personal relationship, a precondition for the successful conduct of their bilateral relations. The two got a start on that task last February, when Xi visited Washington as China’s vice-president. Two days in California allows both more time and an informal environment for each to talk about his domestic challenges and visions for the future, about his country’s role in the international system and how US-China relations fits with all of this.

Such an interchange is particularly important because each president sits atop a complex and sprawling governmental system that is not easy to monitor or control. This is one of the reasons for recent frictions between the two countries. Their California encounter meeting provides Xi and Obama the opportunity to identify and enlarge the areas of overlap in the interests of their two countries, and then, when they return to their capitals, to set priorities in their systems accordingly. Having seen the value of creating this opportunity, they should seize it.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Challenges and Opportunities: Aviation Emissions and the European Cap and Trade System

Joshua Meltzer — Tue, 21 May 2013 11:42:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This article was originally published in the Winter/Spring 2013 edition of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: The Future of Energy.

On January 1, 2012, the European Union extended its cap and trade system, the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), to include CO2 emissions from all airlines arriving in and departing from EU airspace. The EU has claimed that this unilateral action was in response to the slow progress towards reaching a global deal. However, the EU remains committed to reaching a global solution to the problem of aviation emissions and hopes that including international aviation in the ETS will spur action.

These additions to the ETS led the EU to take positions on a number of important policy issues that remain unresolved in the international climate change negotiations. These include issues such as how to attribute CO2 emissions from aviation to countries and how to operationalize the environmental principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) – the notion that developed countries will do more to reduce their CO2 emissions than developing countries. Moreover, as many of these issues are also applicable to the broader UN climate change negotiations, the success or failure of the ETS approach to international aviation could affect progress in the wider climate change negotiations.

This article outlines how the EU has designed its system to address these challenges. It also provides an overview of the challenges to reaching a global deal on regulating CO2 emissions from international aviation. The final part of the paper considers the current state of international negotiations over avia- tion emissions and suggests pathways forward.

Read the full article »

Authors

Joshua Meltzer

Publication: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Image Source: © Darren Staples / Reuters

How Arab Public Opinion Is Reshaping the Middle East

Tue, 21 May 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 21, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The Arab awakening that began in 2011 is transforming the Middle East in ways that continue to surprise seasoned observers. As new political leaders and movements struggle for power and work to shape the region’s future, one thing is clear: public opinion is more consequential now than it has arguably ever been. How Arabs view themselves and the world around them will have enormous consequences for the region and the larger international community in the years ahead. How are changes in Arab public opinion shaping the changes occurring across the region? Have the U.S. and its allies done enough to understand and support the voices of Arabs seeking greater representation and opportunity?

On May 21, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, as part of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, hosted the launch of The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East (Basic Books, 2013), the latest book by Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami. Kim Ghattas, BBC’s State Department correspondent, engaged Dr. Telhami in a discussion of the book and the issues it raises. Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks.

America and Iran: Wrestling with Ghosts

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 20 May 2013 20:56:00 -0400

One of the very few feel-good stories in the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations came to an unexpectedly abrupt end last week, when Iranian authorities cut short a series of wrestling exhibition matches in the United States. The first round, held in New York last Wednesday, drew large, boisterous crowds and buoyant media coverage, helping to animate a three-nation campaign (with Russia) to sustain wrestling as an Olympic sport and raise funds for youth wrestling programs. No sooner had the applause in New York died down, however, than Tehran opted to ditch a planned Los Angeles stop on the tour, and the Iranian wrestlers quickly returned to Tehran on Saturday.

So far, the rationale for the decision seems vague, and there are discrepancies between the statement of the exhibition’s American sponsor, USA Wrestling, and the official Iranian press agency's rendition. News reports referenced Iranian concerns about security provisions, and rumors circulated of anticipated protests by members of the large Iranian diaspora living in Southern California. Whatever the explanation, the hasty truncation of the American-Iranian wrestling tour is unfortunate but not entirely unexpected. For all sunny sentiments associated with cultural diplomacy, managing the political and logistical complexities of people-to-people exchanges between such longstanding adversaries can be fraught with potential minefields.

I should know; as a graduate student in the late 1990s, I participated in several of the first academic exchange programs between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I experienced first-hand the excitement as well as the issues that go along with such efforts. Thanks to funding from both governments and the coordination and contacts of the American Institute for Iranian Studies, I was able to study Persian at the Dehkhoda Institute in Tehran, travel widely throughout the country, and conduct research for my doctoral dissertation on Iran's Foundation for the Oppressed and other parastatal organizations. Fumbling my way around a country that I had studied extensively but never visited was an amazing experience. Iranians treated me and my fellow American interlopers with the hospitality for which the country rightly used to be legendary and the curiosity that inevitably accompanies three decades of official estrangement.

However, I also came to appreciate how precarious these enterprises can be. The problem with people-to-people diplomacy is, well, the people. Amateur ambassadors can be mighty difficult to manage, particularly with the limited oversight of what are ultimately low-priority programs. Inserting a gaggle of grad students, or wrestlers or any of the other professional groups that have sought to overcome official estrangement through bilateral exchanges, creates endless opportunities for normal human interactions to explode into diplomatic incidents. I'll never forget the combination of exhaustion and anxiety on the face of the one of the many Iranian handlers when a few Americans unexpectedly found ourselves in the midst of a gun battle between police and drug runners in the southeastern city of Kerman. We had arrived in Iran just as the regime unleashed its repression of the July 1999 student protests, and now this real-time brush with the country's low-intensity drug war was just the kind of mess that could cost our minder his job and his future. "I am having a nervous breakdown," he confessed as he alternated between tea and chain smoking.

I suspect that there are a number of program officers within the State Department who can sympathize. During the Bush Administration's second term, then-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns spurred a good-faith effort to expand educational and cultural exchanges with Iran. Artists, doctors, athletes and scientists from Iran crisscrossed America, sharing expertise and experience in subjects as diverse as earthquake science and engineering and AIDS treatment and education. Publicly, the programs often appeared to be blazingly successful in their stated goal of enhancing mutual understanding between Americans and Iranians. Behind the scenes, however, the story was often more complicated, thanks to Tehran’s paranoid conviction that these innocuous opportunities were the leading edge of a Washington-sponsored ‘soft revolution.’ A number of Iranians who participated in these exchanges found their passports seized or their professional advancement threatened; some feared returning home, and several were ultimately imprisoned after permitting their stories to be featured prominently in a major American newspaper.

I believe deeply in the mission and purpose of people-to-people exchanges. What little I understand about contemporary Iranian politics is grounded in the months I spent there over the course of 1998 and 1999, as well as the skills, contacts, and subsequent opportunities to visit Iran that I acquired as a direct result of that early immersion. Surely, the benefits for my fellow American participants— as well as the hundreds of Iranians who have been able to interact with their professional counterparts in the United States— have been at least as meaningful.

Still, people-to-people diplomacy is no substitute for official diplomacy, and it frequently offers as much complication as illumination. Back in 1999, my fretful Iranian minder won an early reprieve when our exchange program was unexpectedly curtailed upon the order of the State Department. A call from the Swiss ambassador, whose embassy serves as the protecting power of Americans in the absence of official relations, initiated a flurry of bureaucratic maneuvers to hasten our departure, and a few days later we were gone. I subsequently heard a range of rumors explaining the episode, including one focused around the efforts of the Clinton administration to establish back-channel cooperation with then-President Mohammad Khatami on counterterrorism efforts. Whatever the truth, nothing ever came of that initiative, and fourteen years later, the wrestlers' unfortunately early exit underscores the steep obstacles that remain in bridging the American-Iranian divide.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Premier Li Keqiang of China Goes to India

Tanvi Madan — Sat, 18 May 2013 14:00:00 -0400

On Sunday, Chinese premier Li Keqiang heads out from Beijing for his first visit abroad in that role. His first stop: India. He’s probably wishing the trip had taken place about a month and a half ago. At that time, there was a sense in India that the new leadership in China was reaching out to India for a number of reasons. Over the last month, however, temperatures rose in the Himalayas, as the long festering China-India boundary dispute flared once again. The good news for those interested in stable Sino-Indian relations: the two governments seem to have got past the recent incident. They continued to communicate throughout the crisis. Pre-scheduled China-India talks on Afghanistan were held in the midst of the crisis—their first such dialogue focused on the subject. Chinese and Indian military officers held a border meeting. The Indian foreign minister traveled to Beijing. And Li’s visit is going ahead. The bad news: The border incident reinforced the mistrust that many in India feel toward China and its intentions. Furthermore, it was a reminder that despite increased engagement, bilateral differences have the potential to stall, if not, reverse progress toward more stable relations. Li’s challenge: to get the relationship back on a positive trajectory and begin to convince a skeptical Indian public that the border incident was not representative of the new Chinese leadership’s approach toward India. Overall, the premier has his work cut out for him.

Before mid-April, many observers of Sino-Indian relations noted that under the new Chinese leadership there seemed to be an “upswing in relations.” Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed a five-point formula to improve ties with India. The two countries agreed to discuss Afghanistan. “Positive vibes” were detected at Xi’s subsequent meeting with Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Durban. The Chinese government indicated that Li soon planned to travel to India.

This trend did not surprise observers. After all, there were enough reasons for Beijing to seek a stable relationship with India: economic ties, cooperation in the multilateral realm and a desire to limit India’s burgeoning relationships with the U.S. and Japan (reports indicated that Chinese officials were eager for the premier to visit India before the Indian prime minister headed to Tokyo in late May), as well as other countries in the region. There were also reasons for the political leadership not to want the relationship with India to deteriorate: such as preoccupation with China’s eastern maritime disputes and the North Korean situation, as well as the need for stability in the region with the impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

What did surprise observers was the border incident. Former U.S. deputy secretary of state James Steinberg, who was in India as the crisis played out, said “I don't know what the Chinese leadership is up to…confronting India and Japan, especially when they have been trying to build strong bilateral relations...The Chinese leadership should understand, it will not benefit them in the long run.” The opacity of Chinese decision-making meant that various theories were floated about why Chinese troops had taken the unusual step of setting up camp across the Line of Actual Control (LAC): differing perceptions of the LAC; “a rush of testosterone by local officers;” in response to India building up its border infrastructure; the desire of the People's Liberation Army to assert authority; the result of an internal political power struggle; Chinese expansionism; or Chinese strategic designs against India. One observer contended that a clear motive was near impossible to pinpoint: that “Chinese foreign policy is an enigma wrapped in a mystery.”

Since the resolution of the crisis, Beijing has tried to press a “reset” button, trying to return the relationship to its pre-crisis trajectory. The Chinese ambassador to India unusually took to the editorial pages of an Indian newspaper to emphasize, “To strengthen good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation with India is China’s strategic choice and established policy which will not change.” Chinese officials indicated that greater efforts should be made toward a boundary settlement.

The Chinese government also signaled that the choice of India as the premier’s first stop was very deliberate and a sign of the importance Beijing placed in the Sino-Indian relationship. Hosting an Indian youth delegation, Li put a personal spin on the choice, noting the “the seeds of friendship sown” when he visited India 27 years ago—a trip that he said left a “lasting impact.” Beyond trying to win hearts and minds, he also seemed to want to appeal to Indians’ pocketbooks, talking about the economic benefits of greater ties. Finally, he pointedly mentioned experiencing the “warmth and hospitality of Indian people.”

That hospitality will certainly be forthcoming on the part of key policymakers in the Indian government. Delhi has its own reasons for seeking stable relations with Beijing. Thus, Indian officials had joined their Chinese counterparts in playing down the border incident and seeking to resolve it speedily. Since it’s been resolved, both sides have sought to highlight their success in defusing the crisis, pointing to that as a sign of progress in the relationship. During that visit, they will work toward agreement on certain issues. Expectations are that there will be developments on the economic front. China-India watchers will also be looking for any sign of progress on the border and Brahmaputra river issues.

Among the Indian public, the welcome for Li is likely to be cooler. The recent tensions at the border—heavily covered in the Indian media—reinforced negative impressions of China among many in the Indian public. Many—even beyond the public—will take with a larger grain of salt the new Chinese leadership’s assurance that it intends for China to rise peacefully, be a responsible state, and seek good relations with India. The crisis has reinforced the narrative that has prevailed in many quarters since the 1962 China-India war: that China only understands strength; that while Beijing’s leaders say China and India “must shake hands,” they cannot be trusted—that one hand held out might just be a precursor to the other stabbing one in the back.

The border incident has also kept the focus on bilateral differences and even beyond the border issues there are many of those: China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors, its Indian Ocean ambitions, the overall lack of trust, cyber-security concerns, Tibet, the diversion of the waters of the Brahmaputra, a trade imbalance and restricted market access in China for Indian companies, the sense that China does not respect India and/or that it will seek to prevent India’s rise and, significantly, China’s relationship with Pakistan, which, of course, is Li’s second stop.

The incident also seemed to strengthen the hands of those inside and outside government who are skeptical of China’s intentions towards India and weakened the voices of those urging engagement with that country. Furthermore, the crisis negatively affected the credibility of the Indian government on issues related to security broadly and China in particular. This matters because significant bilateral progress on crucial fronts will require concessions from both sides—concessions that might now be harder for the Indian government to sell on its side.

Overall, that’s a lot of mistrust and skepticism to turn around in one visit. But if Li Keqiang wants to see the relationship prosper, the trip is a good time to start trying on two fronts. First, substance: progress on key issues will go a long way in building trust. Second, style: Li should take the opportunity to introduce himself and reintroduce the new Chinese leadership not just to Indian government officials and private sector leaders, but also to the Indian public—for it might be tempting to dismiss public sentiments, but they will play a key role in setting the limits of the relationship.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

John Kerry’s Indian Image: Moving American Policymakers Beyond "Pro" and "Anti" India

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 17 May 2013 15:17:00 -0400

Later this summer, US Secretary of State John Kerry will visit India for the US-India Strategic Dialogue. Before and during his visit, many observers in India will likely try to assess whether Kerry is "pro-" or "anti-" India. This is not surprising. In the narrative of US-India relations, there has always been a hall of fame and a hall of shame. Praise was heaped upon "heroes" — such as President John F. Kennedy and US ambassadors to India Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Blackwill — for being pro-India. President Richard Nixon and secretaries of state John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger found themselves on the anti-India "villains" list. More recently, Kerry and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel have been labelled anti-India or pro-Pakistan. However, this focus on whether policymakers are pro- or anti-India is limiting at best and harmful at worst. It can lead to an exaggerated view of the extent of the impact of one individual's personal bias and obscure more complex motivations and drivers of policymaking.

Conclusions about policymakers' biases have often been based on one or more statements made or one or two high-profile decisions taken. It is crucial, however, to focus on individuals' track records. Take Nixon. He has often been tagged as anti-India. In the early-to-mid 1950s, when he was vice-president, Nixon indeed had little patience for non-alignment and was a proponent of military aid to Pakistan. By 1957, however, he was internally arguing for greater economic aid to India. He made his view public too, asserting that "what happens in India... could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin."

In 1967, long before people were talking about the next century being an Asian century, Nixon also laid out the importance of Asia and how that continent's future would largely be shaped by four "giants" — China, India, Japan and the US. Writing at a time when there was much pessimism in the US about India and the Indira Gandhi government, Nixon noted with sympathy that India's "present leaders at least are trying... in exceedingly difficult circumstances" to move forward and doing so in a democratic context. Once in power, his administration did make the infamous one-time exception to provide military assistance to Pakistan, but he vetoed recommendations for a larger, more sustained package.

The pro/ anti-India narrative also does little to explain change. Why, in 1972-73, did Nixon and Kissinger work to rebuild the relationship with an India they disliked? Or, why did policy towards India change over the course of the Clinton administration with a similar set of policymakers? The narrative also assumes individuals' views stem from an inherent dislike or love for India, rather than circumstances or worldviews. It does not often recognise that individuals can change — and that Indian words and actions can shape views of India. Biographers of Indira Gandhi proclaim, often approvingly, that she treated Nixon badly in 1967, without any consideration of whether that treatment might have affected his views of India and her.

Furthermore, the narrative cannot explain how policymakers can make some statements and decisions that are "pro" India and others that are not. As Rajeev Sharma has noted in the case of Kerry, and Dhruva Jaishankar on Hagel, one can identify instances when these supposedly "not-India-friendly" individuals have supported legislation helpful to India — the India-US nuclear deal, for example.

In narratives of India-US relations, these simplistic conclusions are not restricted to depictions of US policymakers. Nehru is often portrayed as anti-US, even though he was perhaps the first to use the term "natural partners" to describe the bilateral relationship. Others insist on identifying Indira Gandhi as pro-Soviet, ignoring instances such as her resisting for two years her advisers' entreaties to sign an India-Soviet treaty.

This is not to say that personalities don't matter. They do, but their role needs to be put in context. They can facilitate cooperation or exacerbate conflict. They can help determine the policy option chosen. Personal relationships, too, matter. However, personalities are not the only factor — or often the primary one — determining policy and consideration of their role should go beyond discussions of the pro- or anti-Indianness of particular policymakers.

The pro/ anti India narrative often neglects to consider whether and how much the "pro" or "anti" policymaker influences policy broadly, and policy towards in India in particular. Cabinet members' or ambassadors' roles and influence are not the same as those of presidents. Moreover, it sometimes overlooks actors involved in shaping policy and the policy debate outside the White House and state department.

Instead of focusing on whether key policymakers are anti- or pro-India, it would be more worthwhile to assess which individuals are making policy; their role and influence in the policymaking process, especially relative to other policymakers, and their proximity to the president; and the nature of interaction between policymakers. Furthermore, it is crucial to analyse the worldviews of key actors; their perception of US interests and preferred strategy for achieving them; whether they see a role for India in that strategy and, if they do, is it as potential spoiler or supporter. Finally, it is essential to think about what India can do to build enough constituencies for the relationship in the US and ensure its own importance so that bilateral relations do not depend on — and are not thought to revolve around — one or two individuals.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: The Indian Express

Mukhisa Kituyi to Head the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Thu, 16 May 2013 11:26:00 -0400

The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has appointed Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi to be the next secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). An UNCTAD press release on May 16, 2013 stated that Dr. Kituyi will serve a four-year term beginning September 1, 2013. Dr. Kituyi has held several senior positions including Kenya’s minister of trade from 2003-2008. He is currently a nonresident fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution and was a resident scholar in 2011. Dr. Kituyi is well versed in the global trading system and, in the past, was considered a potential candidate to head organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and UNCTAD, but instead opted to join politics. A dynamic politician and intellectual, Dr. Kituyi is an excellent choice to head UNCTAD.

For AGI, the appointment of Dr. Kituyi is significant not only because he is one of our fellows but also because AGI has been emphasizing the need to increase informed African voices in global governance. We believe that African interests are not effectively represented in major global institutions, and this deficiency has contributed to the broader marginalization of the continent in global affairs. Dr. Kituyi should be an effective voice in representing Africa and other developing countries. And, as I know him, I believe this is one informed voice that the international community is unlikely to ignore.

But it will not be a smooth ride for the new secretary-general; a host of challenges await him in Geneva. First, more than in most global organizations, UNCTAD requires effective management and intellectual leadership. An internal report published last year—the Joint Inspection Unit Report—showed that UNCTAD has been suffering from a lack of effective governance. It is important that Dr. Kituyi focus on raising the bar in terms of professionalism at UNCTAD. This task will require looking into the recruitment and promotion of employees strictly based on merit. Dr. Kituyi will need to carefully evaluate personnel issues and provide the necessary motivation to ensure that the organization delivers on its mandate. Most importantly, he will have to steer the organization towards more transparency, rewarding performance instead of simple loyalty to senior management. The new secretary-general will also need to offer the intellectual leadership necessary to guide the institution through a time of major global economic change and a shifting of economic power to the South. He must therefore lead intellectually in offering alternative ideas to those emerging from traditional development institutions.

An even a more daunting challenge that the new secretary-general will face is to ensure that UNCTAD remains relevant and credible. Over the past few years, questions have been raised as to what should be the institution’s focus. Some have gone to the extent of insisting that UNCTAD should not be involved in macroeconomic and financial areas. But as its name suggests, UNCTAD was created to deal with issues relating to trade and development with a particular emphasis in developing countries. There is no doubt, therefore, that macroeconomics and finance squarely fit in the institution’s mandate. Indeed, UNCTAD used to be the forum where these issues would be negotiated in order to ensure some balance in the global economy. However, since the creation of the WTO, UNCTAD has experienced a progressive erosion of its voice. It will be the responsibility of Dr. Kituyi to reverse this trend so that UNCTAD can play its rightful role in the global economic policy scene. The new secretary-general must also position UNCTAD to better address the imbalance and unfairness in the multilateral trading rules that have shaped globalization. In UNCTAD, it is often the case that developing countries feel bullied by their developed country partners. It will be imperative for Dr. Kituyi to identify the best way to navigate issues that have come to divide developed and developing regions.

The secretary-general must also position UNCTAD so as to assist developing countries in seizing the opportunities presented by the global economy. With all the changes taking place in the world, UNCTAD has to focus on how developing countries can reap the benefits and minimize the negative effects arising from trade and globalization. This focus requires that UNCTAD take on the hard topics that are of particular interest to developing countries, including investment policy, trade in services and commodities—which it has always done—but it should also come out clearly on what path developing countries should follow. Likewise, we are likely to see an acceleration of regional trade arrangements. Most challenging are agreements involving Northern and Southern partners who cannot be considered equal partners when they negotiate. The jurisprudence on the rules governing such agreements is not commonly agreed upon. Hence, there is a need for UNCTAD to demonstrate, based on evidence, how to ensure that balanced development is achievable, especially in respect to North-South agreements.

With an incoming director general at the WTO and Dr. Kituyi at UNCTAD, the global environment offers an opportunity for the two institutions that drive trade and development to establish the missing dialogue. For this to happen, UNCTAD needs to be credible when articulating its voice in this changing global economy. This is the greatest challenge that Dr. Kituyi faces.

Authors

Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's U.S. Agenda

Kemal Kirişci — Thu, 16 May 2013 10:46:00 -0400

Editor's note: On May 17, 2013 Brookings hosted Prime Minister Erdogan for an event on U.S.-Turkish relations.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is visiting Washington this week and will meet with President Obama today. This is his first visit to the United States since December 2009. But the world and the Middle East have changed dramatically since then. Thus, the agenda for Erdogan’s talks with Obama will be a very crowded one. Four topics in particular are likely to stand out.

1. The Situation in Syria

Erdogan arrives in Washington at a time when there is growing pressure on the Obama administration to change its course on Syria. Secretary of State John Kerry has already taken some steps to increase nonlethal support for the opposition in Syria while putting growing pressure on the moderate opposition to tighten their ranks and distance themselves from radical Islamist groups. These measures are unlikely to satisfy Erdogan. He has long been a vocal critic of the international community, the United Nations Security Council and the United States for idly “watching the tragedy” unfolding in Syria.

He is likely to remind Obama quite loudly that the butchery of civilians by the Assad regime has reached levels that makes it unethical not to respond to and that, as the car bombs that exploded in Turkish border town of Reyhanli last weekend demonstrate, Turkish national security is being directly affected. He will also offer facts and figures to show how the humanitarian situation is fast deteriorating and becoming untenable with an ever expanding flow of refugees and displaced people. He will not miss the opportunity to share with Obama the evidence collected from refugees arriving in Turkish hospitals that the Syrian regime is using chemical weapons. Erdogan may go as far as to push Obama to support the idea of creating a no-fly zone along the Turkish border.

Read the full article »

Authors

Kemal Kirişci

Publication: The National Interest

Oil, Gas and Minerals for the Public Good: The Revenue Watch 2013 Resource Governance Index

Wed, 15 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Watch live streaming video from livefrombrookings at livestream.com

Trillions of dollars in resources lie buried in the backyards of many of the world’s poorest citizens. Oil, gas and minerals can, if managed effectively and accountably, stimulate economic development. Too often, however, secrecy, corruption and weak institutions obstruct this path. To advance the understanding of this challenge, the Revenue Watch Institute has produced the Resource Governance Index, a collection of research, rankings and analysis that measures the quality of governance in the oil, gas and mining sector of 58 countries. Together, these nations produce 85 percent of the world’s oil, 90 percent of its diamonds and 80 percent of its copper, generating trillions of dollars annually. The future of these countries, both developed and developing, depends on how well they manage their resources.

On May 15, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on these concerns. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Kaufmann, president of Revenue Watch, presented the index findings, followed by a panel discussion on resource governance with Carlos Pascual, special envoy and coordinator for International Affairs, Bureau of Energy Resources, U.S. State Department, and Brookings Senior Fellow George Ingram with the Global Economy and Development program. Brookings Visiting Fellow Tamar Manuelyan Atinc moderated the discussion.

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Oil, Gas and Minerals for the Public Good: The Revenue Watch 2013 Resource Governance Index

American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

Tue, 14 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 14, 2013
9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the past decade, a debate has raged about the future of American power and foreign policy engagement. In his new book, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2013), Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Vali Nasr questions America’s choice to lessen its foreign policy engagement around the world. Nasr argues that after taking office in 2009, the Obama administration let fears of terrorism and political backlash confine its policies to that of the previous administration, instead of seizing the opportunity to fundamentally reshape American foreign policy over the past four years. Meanwhile, China and Russia – rivals to American influence globally – were quietly expanding their influence in places where the U.S. has long held sway. Nasr argues that the Obama administration’s foreign policy decision making could have potentially dangerous outcomes, and, what’s more, sells short America’s power and role in the world.

On May 14, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Vali Nasr for a discussion on the state of U.S. power globally and whether American foreign policy under the Obama administration is in retreat. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan joined the discussion, which was moderated by Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy.

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American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

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