Brookings: Topics - India

Premier Li Keqiang of China Goes to India

Tanvi Madan — Sat, 18 May 2013 14:00:00 -0400

On Sunday, Chinese premier Li Keqiang heads out from Beijing for his first visit abroad in that role. His first stop: India. He’s probably wishing the trip had taken place about a month and a half ago. At that time, there was a sense in India that the new leadership in China was reaching out to India for a number of reasons. Over the last month, however, temperatures rose in the Himalayas, as the long festering China-India boundary dispute flared once again. The good news for those interested in stable Sino-Indian relations: the two governments seem to have got past the recent incident. They continued to communicate throughout the crisis. Pre-scheduled China-India talks on Afghanistan were held in the midst of the crisis—their first such dialogue focused on the subject. Chinese and Indian military officers held a border meeting. The Indian foreign minister traveled to Beijing. And Li’s visit is going ahead. The bad news: The border incident reinforced the mistrust that many in India feel toward China and its intentions. Furthermore, it was a reminder that despite increased engagement, bilateral differences have the potential to stall, if not, reverse progress toward more stable relations. Li’s challenge: to get the relationship back on a positive trajectory and begin to convince a skeptical Indian public that the border incident was not representative of the new Chinese leadership’s approach toward India. Overall, the premier has his work cut out for him.

Before mid-April, many observers of Sino-Indian relations noted that under the new Chinese leadership there seemed to be an “upswing in relations.” Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed a five-point formula to improve ties with India. The two countries agreed to discuss Afghanistan. “Positive vibes” were detected at Xi’s subsequent meeting with Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Durban. The Chinese government indicated that Li soon planned to travel to India.

This trend did not surprise observers. After all, there were enough reasons for Beijing to seek a stable relationship with India: economic ties, cooperation in the multilateral realm and a desire to limit India’s burgeoning relationships with the U.S. and Japan (reports indicated that Chinese officials were eager for the premier to visit India before the Indian prime minister headed to Tokyo in late May), as well as other countries in the region. There were also reasons for the political leadership not to want the relationship with India to deteriorate: such as preoccupation with China’s eastern maritime disputes and the North Korean situation, as well as the need for stability in the region with the impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

What did surprise observers was the border incident. Former U.S. deputy secretary of state James Steinberg, who was in India as the crisis played out, said “I don't know what the Chinese leadership is up to…confronting India and Japan, especially when they have been trying to build strong bilateral relations...The Chinese leadership should understand, it will not benefit them in the long run.” The opacity of Chinese decision-making meant that various theories were floated about why Chinese troops had taken the unusual step of setting up camp across the Line of Actual Control (LAC): differing perceptions of the LAC; “a rush of testosterone by local officers;” in response to India building up its border infrastructure; the desire of the People's Liberation Army to assert authority; the result of an internal political power struggle; Chinese expansionism; or Chinese strategic designs against India. One observer contended that a clear motive was near impossible to pinpoint: that “Chinese foreign policy is an enigma wrapped in a mystery.”

Since the resolution of the crisis, Beijing has tried to press a “reset” button, trying to return the relationship to its pre-crisis trajectory. The Chinese ambassador to India unusually took to the editorial pages of an Indian newspaper to emphasize, “To strengthen good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation with India is China’s strategic choice and established policy which will not change.” Chinese officials indicated that greater efforts should be made toward a boundary settlement.

The Chinese government also signaled that the choice of India as the premier’s first stop was very deliberate and a sign of the importance Beijing placed in the Sino-Indian relationship. Hosting an Indian youth delegation, Li put a personal spin on the choice, noting the “the seeds of friendship sown” when he visited India 27 years ago—a trip that he said left a “lasting impact.” Beyond trying to win hearts and minds, he also seemed to want to appeal to Indians’ pocketbooks, talking about the economic benefits of greater ties. Finally, he pointedly mentioned experiencing the “warmth and hospitality of Indian people.”

That hospitality will certainly be forthcoming on the part of key policymakers in the Indian government. Delhi has its own reasons for seeking stable relations with Beijing. Thus, Indian officials had joined their Chinese counterparts in playing down the border incident and seeking to resolve it speedily. Since it’s been resolved, both sides have sought to highlight their success in defusing the crisis, pointing to that as a sign of progress in the relationship. During that visit, they will work toward agreement on certain issues. Expectations are that there will be developments on the economic front. China-India watchers will also be looking for any sign of progress on the border and Brahmaputra river issues.

Among the Indian public, the welcome for Li is likely to be cooler. The recent tensions at the border—heavily covered in the Indian media—reinforced negative impressions of China among many in the Indian public. Many—even beyond the public—will take with a larger grain of salt the new Chinese leadership’s assurance that it intends for China to rise peacefully, be a responsible state, and seek good relations with India. The crisis has reinforced the narrative that has prevailed in many quarters since the 1962 China-India war: that China only understands strength; that while Beijing’s leaders say China and India “must shake hands,” they cannot be trusted—that one hand held out might just be a precursor to the other stabbing one in the back.

The border incident has also kept the focus on bilateral differences and even beyond the border issues there are many of those: China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors, its Indian Ocean ambitions, the overall lack of trust, cyber-security concerns, Tibet, the diversion of the waters of the Brahmaputra, a trade imbalance and restricted market access in China for Indian companies, the sense that China does not respect India and/or that it will seek to prevent India’s rise and, significantly, China’s relationship with Pakistan, which, of course, is Li’s second stop.

The incident also seemed to strengthen the hands of those inside and outside government who are skeptical of China’s intentions towards India and weakened the voices of those urging engagement with that country. Furthermore, the crisis negatively affected the credibility of the Indian government on issues related to security broadly and China in particular. This matters because significant bilateral progress on crucial fronts will require concessions from both sides—concessions that might now be harder for the Indian government to sell on its side.

Overall, that’s a lot of mistrust and skepticism to turn around in one visit. But if Li Keqiang wants to see the relationship prosper, the trip is a good time to start trying on two fronts. First, substance: progress on key issues will go a long way in building trust. Second, style: Li should take the opportunity to introduce himself and reintroduce the new Chinese leadership not just to Indian government officials and private sector leaders, but also to the Indian public—for it might be tempting to dismiss public sentiments, but they will play a key role in setting the limits of the relationship.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Image Source: © China Daily China Daily Information Corp - CDIC / Reuters

John Kerry’s Indian Image: Moving American Policymakers Beyond "Pro" and "Anti" India

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 17 May 2013 15:17:00 -0400

Later this summer, US Secretary of State John Kerry will visit India for the US-India Strategic Dialogue. Before and during his visit, many observers in India will likely try to assess whether Kerry is "pro-" or "anti-" India. This is not surprising. In the narrative of US-India relations, there has always been a hall of fame and a hall of shame. Praise was heaped upon "heroes" — such as President John F. Kennedy and US ambassadors to India Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Blackwill — for being pro-India. President Richard Nixon and secretaries of state John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger found themselves on the anti-India "villains" list. More recently, Kerry and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel have been labelled anti-India or pro-Pakistan. However, this focus on whether policymakers are pro- or anti-India is limiting at best and harmful at worst. It can lead to an exaggerated view of the extent of the impact of one individual's personal bias and obscure more complex motivations and drivers of policymaking.

Conclusions about policymakers' biases have often been based on one or more statements made or one or two high-profile decisions taken. It is crucial, however, to focus on individuals' track records. Take Nixon. He has often been tagged as anti-India. In the early-to-mid 1950s, when he was vice-president, Nixon indeed had little patience for non-alignment and was a proponent of military aid to Pakistan. By 1957, however, he was internally arguing for greater economic aid to India. He made his view public too, asserting that "what happens in India... could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin."

In 1967, long before people were talking about the next century being an Asian century, Nixon also laid out the importance of Asia and how that continent's future would largely be shaped by four "giants" — China, India, Japan and the US. Writing at a time when there was much pessimism in the US about India and the Indira Gandhi government, Nixon noted with sympathy that India's "present leaders at least are trying... in exceedingly difficult circumstances" to move forward and doing so in a democratic context. Once in power, his administration did make the infamous one-time exception to provide military assistance to Pakistan, but he vetoed recommendations for a larger, more sustained package.

The pro/ anti-India narrative also does little to explain change. Why, in 1972-73, did Nixon and Kissinger work to rebuild the relationship with an India they disliked? Or, why did policy towards India change over the course of the Clinton administration with a similar set of policymakers? The narrative also assumes individuals' views stem from an inherent dislike or love for India, rather than circumstances or worldviews. It does not often recognise that individuals can change — and that Indian words and actions can shape views of India. Biographers of Indira Gandhi proclaim, often approvingly, that she treated Nixon badly in 1967, without any consideration of whether that treatment might have affected his views of India and her.

Furthermore, the narrative cannot explain how policymakers can make some statements and decisions that are "pro" India and others that are not. As Rajeev Sharma has noted in the case of Kerry, and Dhruva Jaishankar on Hagel, one can identify instances when these supposedly "not-India-friendly" individuals have supported legislation helpful to India — the India-US nuclear deal, for example.

In narratives of India-US relations, these simplistic conclusions are not restricted to depictions of US policymakers. Nehru is often portrayed as anti-US, even though he was perhaps the first to use the term "natural partners" to describe the bilateral relationship. Others insist on identifying Indira Gandhi as pro-Soviet, ignoring instances such as her resisting for two years her advisers' entreaties to sign an India-Soviet treaty.

This is not to say that personalities don't matter. They do, but their role needs to be put in context. They can facilitate cooperation or exacerbate conflict. They can help determine the policy option chosen. Personal relationships, too, matter. However, personalities are not the only factor — or often the primary one — determining policy and consideration of their role should go beyond discussions of the pro- or anti-Indianness of particular policymakers.

The pro/ anti India narrative often neglects to consider whether and how much the "pro" or "anti" policymaker influences policy broadly, and policy towards in India in particular. Cabinet members' or ambassadors' roles and influence are not the same as those of presidents. Moreover, it sometimes overlooks actors involved in shaping policy and the policy debate outside the White House and state department.

Instead of focusing on whether key policymakers are anti- or pro-India, it would be more worthwhile to assess which individuals are making policy; their role and influence in the policymaking process, especially relative to other policymakers, and their proximity to the president; and the nature of interaction between policymakers. Furthermore, it is crucial to analyse the worldviews of key actors; their perception of US interests and preferred strategy for achieving them; whether they see a role for India in that strategy and, if they do, is it as potential spoiler or supporter. Finally, it is essential to think about what India can do to build enough constituencies for the relationship in the US and ensure its own importance so that bilateral relations do not depend on — and are not thought to revolve around — one or two individuals.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: The Indian Express

Image Source: © B Mathur / Reuters

Improving Education and Learning Outcomes in India

Mon, 06 May 2013 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 6, 2013
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

India has made laudable progress in increasing access to education and building a strong policy and planning framework for education. The next challenge is ensuring a quality education system which produces positive learning outcomes for all children in India. Estimates show that over 3 million children in the country are still out of school, and of those in school, civil society reports show that 53 percent are at least three years behind expected learning levels.

On May 6, the Center for Universal Education (CUE) at Brookings and the Central Square Foundation hosted a discussion on education reform in India, focusing on policy and practice that promotes equitable learning and on lessons learned from the U.S. experience. Panelists included: Ashish Dhawan, chief executive officer of the Central Square Foundation; Subir Gokarn, research director of Brookings India; Pooja Bhatt, regional portfolio manager of Accenture Development Partnerships at Accenture; and Brookings Nonresident Fellow Urvashi Sahni, founder and president of the Study Hall Foundation. CUE Associate Director Xanthe Ackerman moderated the discussion. Senior Fellow and CUE Director Rebecca Winthrop provided opening remarks.

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Ted Piccone

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Transforming the U.S.-Africa Commercial Relationship

Witney Schneidman — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 15:14:00 -0400

The U.S. can’t afford to ignore investment and trade with Africa now that countries like China and India are increasingly investing in African countries. Witney Schneidman argues that the U.S. must extend the African Growth and Opportunity Act beyond its 2015 expiration and proposes some new initiatives to help American firms do more business across Africa.

This chapter is part of Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States. Read the full report here and tell us why you think Africa matters to the U.S. Join the conversation on Twitter using #AfricaMatters.

The Priority

This 113th session of the U.S. Congress has an opportunity to transform U.S. trade and investment relations with Africa.

A key issue is the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), now set to expire in September 2015. The Obama administration and key members of Congress have pledged to work for an “early” extension of AGOA which, presumably, means that the legislation would be extended within the next 22 months. This extension needs to occur for a number of reasons.

For one, the African market is not on the radar screen of the American business community. In fact, the U.S. is effectively ceding the African marketplace to companies from China, India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, the European Union and elsewhere.

Apart from the natural resource sector and some recent investments by major companies such as GE, Symbion, Wal-Mart, Microsoft and Proctor & Gamble, only 1 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment worldwide is in Africa, and half of this is in extractive industries.[1]

At the same time, U.S. exports to Africa were just over $22 billion in 2012, or about 2 percent of U.S. exports worldwide. While the volume may be small, these exports support more than 100,000 jobs in the United States.[2] Not only is this trade transforming the U.S.-African commercial relationship into a more genuine partnership, it raises the immediate question of how to accelerate U.S. trade and investment with Africa so that more American workers and companies derive a direct benefit.

As Senator Chris Coons writes in the preface to his March 7, 2013 report, Embracing Africa’s Economic Potential, “Engagement with Africa is critical to America’s economic interests in the years ahead. Meeting Africa’s growing demand with American goods and services will strengthen our economy, help U.S. businesses grow and create jobs here at home.”

Why is it Important for the U.S.?

The U.S.’s lack of attention to Africa’s commercial opportunity comes at a time when the region is poised for an economic takeoff. Six of the world’s 10 fastest growing economies (according to data from the International Monetary Fund for 2001-2010) are in sub-Saharan Africa, and a middle class of nearly 350 million individuals, rivaling that of China and India, has emerged across the continent.[3] Moreover, according to the McKinsey Global Institute, by 2020 Africa’s consumers—in areas such as financial services, tourism, telecommunications and retail— are projected to contribute more than five times as much revenue to the region’s economic growth as the natural resource sector.

A key element of Africa’s economic growth has been an improvement in governance. While leaders in some countries continue to remain in office too long, and Freedom House has found that the percentage of “partly free” countries in sub-Saharan Africa has grown from 43 percent to only 47 percent between 2002 and 2012, the increased frequency of elections has led to an expansion of democracy across the continent. In addition, the emergence of civil society, social media and, in many countries, a robust press has contributed to greater accountability of government officials at the national, state and local levels.

The Opportunity for the U.S.

In extending AGOA, therefore, Congress needs to make it more balanced so that the U.S. is doing as much to support the expansion of American trade and investment on the rapidly changing continent as it does to support African exports to the U.S.

From the perspective of the 40 African AGOA beneficiary countries, the extension of the legislation represents a critical opportunity to strengthen and deepen their commercial relationship with the U.S.

To achieve that objective, several critical questions need to be addressed: Why have only an estimated 300 of the eligible 6,400 product lines been utilized; why have only a small group of countries benefitted from the export of apparel and manufactured products; and what other products should be added to make AGOA more relevant to African producers and manufacturers?

There are other issues. Rosa Whitaker, former assistant U.S. trade representative for Africa, estimates that AGOA has created 300,000 new jobs in beneficiary countries.[4] How can this number be increased?

AGOA was never intended to be permanent, so how far past 2015 should the legislation be extended: five years, 10 years, longer? And is it time to graduate certain countries, such as South Africa, or can AGOA be a stepping stone to a more mature trading relationship, as it was intended to be?

The AGOA Forum that is tentatively scheduled to be held in Ethiopia at the end of May 2013 provides an important opportunity for the U.S. and African nations to exchange recommendations on how AGOA can be strengthened.

AGOA continues to be the cornerstone of the U.S.-African commercial relationship but it must do more to help U.S. companies win market share on the continent. As Congress begins deliberations on how to strengthen AGOA, here is one suggestion:

Since its inception, USAID has played a critical role in providing resources for trade capacity building, including the $200 million African Global Competitiveness Initiative, from 2006-2011, and, more recently, the African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Initiative. This support is vital to the trade hubs in Ghana, Botswana and Kenya, and the satellite office in Dakar, and it has been critical in assisting African businesses exporting to the U.S. under AGOA.

The problem is that the U.S. government provides virtually no support for American businesses seeking to trade or invest in Africa.

The Foreign Commercial Service of the Commerce Department, which should be playing a lead role, has been reduced to a skeletal presence in Africa and has officers only in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa (the Pentagon now has U.S. troops in five African countries: Djibouti, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Kenya and Niger). Increasingly, U.S. embassies are playing a more active role, and one of Hillary Clinton’s most important legacies as secretary of state was to integrate commercial statecraft into core U.S. diplomatic responsibilities.

Given the size, complexities and differences among the many markets on the continent, the U.S. government has to do a better job supporting American companies in Africa, a market with which they have little experience. China has an estimated 155 commercial attachés in the region, or more than three per country in sub-Saharan Africa. Other countries such as Brazil, India, Russia and Turkey have dramatically increased their commercial presence on the continent as well.[5]

To address the situation, Congress should encourage USAID to restructure trade hubs as U.S. trade and investment centers that would work as closely with American companies coming into the African market as they do supporting African companies exporting to the U.S. under AGOA. The trade and investment centers should utilize foreign service nationals throughout sub-regions to keep U.S. companies informed of market developments, among other services. The cost to staff these centers to work with U.S. companies would be minimal, and companies could pay for services. A restructuring of the trade hubs would significantly enhance the ability of American companies to win market share throughout the continent.

There are other critical issues to consider, such as local content requirements, regional integration and tax incentives for U.S. companies to invest in Africa’s productive sectors. A good place to start, however, would be to help American businesses understand the complexities—and opportunities—of the African market. As Senator Coons writes, “Now is the time to invest in economic engagement with Africa.”

Endnotes

[1] Vivian C. Jones and Brock Williams, “U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the African Growth and Opportunity Act”, Congressional Research Service Report RL31772, November 14, 2012

[2] “U.S. Export Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, May 2011 Export Statistics Released July 12, 2011

[3] Ncube, Mthuli, C. L. Lufumpa, and D. Vencatachellum. “The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa.” African Development Bank, Tunis, 2011

[4] Witney Schneidman and Zenia A. Lewis, “The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Looking Back, Looking Forward,” Brookings Institution, June 2012

[5] Mwangi S. Kimenyi, “Economic Statecraft: Increasing American Jobs through Greater U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment”, Testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 25, 2011

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Witney Schneidman

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When India’s Foreign Policy Is Domestic

Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard Schaffer — Tue, 02 Apr 2013 11:06:00 -0400

Editor's note: Teresita Schaffer has started work on a book called India at the International High Table. The book, co-authored with Howard Schaffer, will examine how India sees its role in the world, and how this translates into India’s negotiating style. This article, co-authored as well, discusses the impact on Indian foreign policy decision-making when an international issue becomes a factor in domestic politics.

In the past six months, passionate domestic politics have twice taken over India’s foreign policy process, complicating its relations with neighboring countries. The most recent case involved a resolution on Sri Lanka adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which led an important coalition partner to leave the government. The earlier crisis, in September 2011, scuttled two major features of India’s proposed expansion of relations with Bangladesh. When India’s foreign policy becomes domestic, decisions tend to escalate, coalition politics intensify, and the fallout affects both politics and policy.

The Sri Lankan story began in 2012, when Washington sponsored a resolution intended to press for accountability for the anguishing events that took place at the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war. The text was very mild, recommending that Sri Lanka take a number of measures that it had already more or less pledged. India’s surprising “yes” vote reflected pressure not so much from the United States as from a handful of politicians from the southern state of Tamil Nadu, who were concerned about Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority. Indian foreign policy professionals were unhappy over this departure from their normal practice of not voting for country-specific resolutions.

The second act took place at the March 2013 UNHRC meeting. The United States sponsored a somewhat sharper Sri Lanka resolution. “Requests” became “urgings” and the text called on Sri Lanka to heed not just the recommendations of its own government-appointed Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission but also reports from the United Nations.

The drama in India, however, was substantially greater than last year. The absence of any significant movement toward national reconciliation left Indian foreign policy professionals frustrated (like their U.S. counterparts), and the release of film footage reportedly showing the killing of the Tamil rebel leader’s twelve-year-old son, created widespread revulsion in India. But what really drove events was the rivalry between two Tamil parties that alternate in running the state government. The Sri Lanka conflict is deeply embedded in this contest, and both parties use their alliances and disputes with the party in power in Delhi to further their quest for state primacy. The DMK, allied with the central government but opposed to the state government, mounted a full-court press to demand that India not just vote for the resolution, but amend it to accuse the Sri Lankan government of “genocide and war crimes.” This fit in with the DMK’s traditional sympathy for the now-defeated spearhead of Sri Lanka’s Tamil uprising, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It also was an opportunity for the DMK to outdo its rival, the AIADMK, in support for their brothers in Sri Lanka.

The DMK took its campaign on the road. A debate in the national parliament produced no consensus, but drew public statements blasting Sri Lankan anti-Tamil “atrocities” from a parade of government ministers as well as Sonia Gandhi, president of the ruling Congress party. The Government of India cancelled the upcoming India-Sri Lanka defense dialogue. A DMK-led organization reportedly lobbied foreign embassies in Delhi to toughen the resolution. The DMK then pulled out of the government coalition, citing the U.N. resolution. This put the government’s existence in technical danger, though the DMK hinted that it would not bring the government down. Not to be outdone, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu (from the other major Tamil party, the AIADMK), banned Sri Lankan cricket players from participating in an upcoming match in Chennai.

Unusually, India’s UNHRC representative was summoned to Delhi, and returned to Geneva with instructions – evidently from the top – to try to toughen the resolution. This last-minute effort went nowhere. On March 21, the resolution passed with 25 positive votes, 13 negative ones and 8 abstentions – compared to last year, one more yea, and two fewer nays. India had once again overridden its normal distaste for country-specific resolutions, and India and Sri Lanka were left with some difficult fences to mend. Last year’s Sri Lankan anger was mostly against the United States; this year, India was the principal target. There is every likelihood that the same issues will be back again at next year’s UNHRC meeting.

The Bangladesh case also involved a regional party and former ally of the Indian government, and was in some ways even more dramatic. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Bangladesh in September 2011. In preparation, the two governments had worked out a package of agreements to resolve many of their oldest and most complex disputes. These included settling a border that includes nearly 200 enclaves on both sides that are under the sovereignty of the other, division of the waters of one of their shared rivers, transit for India to areas east of Bangladesh, and expanding trade. The Indian government thought it had the acquiescence of the provincial government in West Bengal, headed by the feisty Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamool Congress, mercurial former allies in the central government coalition.

They reckoned without Banerjee. A week before the prime ministerial visit, she denounced the water sharing agreement. The central government dispatched a star senior diplomat, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon, to pour oil on the troubled waters in Kolkata. He failed. Among many competing explanations, two stand out: Menon had no authority to provide sweeteners for the financially strapped West Bengal; and he was not an elected politician, much less one Banerjee would consider her equal. In addition, it is not clear that he could help Banerjee address the local impact of the proposed agreement within West Bengal.

Banerjee’s opposition nearly scuttled the whole trip, to both sides’ great embarrassment. The overture to India was Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s signature foreign policy issue. She reluctantly agreed to implement the salvageable parts of the program. The two governments continued to work on the water issue and the transit agreement that Bangladesh had withheld in retaliation. In February, Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid visited Bangladesh and opined that the problems would be resolved. He was followed by President Pranab Mukherjee, India’s most senior Bengali politician.

Bangladeshis of different backgrounds and politics tend to blame the Indian bureaucracy for their problems with India, and hope that politicians – especially Bengali ones, and especially Mukherjee – will provide solutions. The view from Delhi and Kolkata is more complicated. The personalities of the political leaders in Kolkata and in Dhaka emerge as a critical factor. The long-time Communist chief minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, had his state’s politics in the palm of his hand. Political observers in Kolkata told us that this enabled him to take a statesmanlike view, as he had in shaping the 1996 India-Bangladesh water agreement. Banerjee is less secure in her political hold on the state. She is also a “street fighter,” determined to eliminate any threat to her West Bengal power base, either from the communists or from her former allies in Congress. This makes for a natural tension with New Delhi.

Indian observers ruefully agree that the next move is up to New Delhi. The government faces an uphill task in obtaining parliamentary assent to the constitutional amendment it needs to implement the border agreement. Obtaining the support of the West Bengal government for the water and transit deals is probably becoming more difficult.

Despite their different dynamics, these cases have important features in common. Both featured high-octane local political leaders in India, and both had deep roots in state politicians’ volatile relations with the central government. Domestic politics swept aside the normal foreign policy process, making decisions and follow-up unpredictable. When foreign policy issues are taken up by party politics, decision-making rockets to the top of India’s power structure. Domestic deal-making becomes the primary requirement. India’s foreign policy machinery cannot control that – or the international bargaining that goes with it. India’s foreign policy institutions are starting to maintain stronger state level contacts in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. However, as we saw in both these cases, when there is a political dispute over policy toward Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, contacts between senior officials or ambassadors and the state government are mainly useful as an early warning system. They are unlikely to be able to resolve problems.

Some foreign policy issues get caught up in party politics without the direct local identification that marked these two cases. Recent examples include the U.S.-India nuclear deal, frozen for nearly a year because of the leftist parties’ objections, and the Indian government’s initial decision to permit foreign direct investment in retail trade. Such issues are less likely to revolve around one high profile opponent, like Tamil Nadu’s Karunanidhi or West Bengal’s Banerjee. But they share the other characteristics of the boundary between foreign and domestic politics, including escalating the locus of decisions. They will become more frequent as India’s economy grows and its integration with the global economy becomes more important.

Authors

Teresita C. Schaffer
Howard Schaffer

China Needs Political Capacity, Courage to Force Change

Kenneth G. Lieberthal — Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Business Standard, Kenneth Lieberthal explains what talks about the changes China is likely to see under the new leadership, the prospect of China-India relations and China’s relations with its neighbors. Read an excerpt below.

Business Standard: What does the change of guard in China mean for the nation internally? What does it mean for the outside world?

Kenneth Lieberthal: There's been a 70 per cent turnover of the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), government and military in November last year and March this year. They have a good idea about the challenges China faces. But whether the new leadership has the political capacity to meet these challenges is the question.

The leadership understands that the development model on which China has been operating its economy for the last few decades is no longer viable: it was a natural resources-intensive model that has led to deepening inequalities, environmental destruction and corruption.

The assumptions on which the model was based are no longer valid. The assumptions were that China can develop based on continuing to expand exports rapidly, leveraging a large, cheap, young and flexible pool of labour, and counting on social tolerance of various problems such as inequality, corruption, and pollution as the inevitable costs of transitioning from plan to market.

The new model is significantly different. It sees a bigger contribution to the Chinese economy from services - versus manufacturing - and visualises a bigger contribution by the Chinese private sector. It envisions a much bigger social safety net, accelerated urbanisation and an increase in domestic consumption as a driver in the domestic economy. It wants to see the Chinese economy become innovative and high quality.

Today, while everyone knows what the objectives are, if the political capacity is missing, these objectives cannot be achieved. Will the changes in the political leadership produce the necessary changes in the economy?

Authors

Kenneth G. Lieberthal

Publication: Business Standard

Image Source: © Jacky Chen / Reuters

India and America, Batting Together in Asia

Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard Schaffer — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: Teresita Schaffer has started work on a book called "India at the International High Table." The book, co-authored with Howard Schaffer, will examine how India sees its role in the world, and how this translates into India’s negotiating style. This article, originally published in The Hindu, one of India's leading English language newspapers, discussed U.S.-India interaction in East Asia.

On a table in the office of a senior Indian diplomat sits an unusual piece of memorabilia: a baseball bat. It is signed not by members of the official’s favourite baseball team, but by the U.S. officials who participated in the inaugural session of the now well-established consultations between India and the United States on East Asia, in 2010. This bat and the similarly adorned cricket bat kept by the Indian diplomat’s American counterpart are an apt symbol of how the United States and India have deepened their common understanding of the strategic stakes in this critical region. Now they need to deepen their economic ties across the Pacific.

The geopolitical shifts that shaped the expanded U.S.-India relationship changed the way both related to East Asia. India’s Look East policy expressed New Delhi’s intention to expand its footprint in East Asia, after decades of thin relations with China and relative neglect of the rest of the region. India’s economic opening to the global economy made its Asian orientation a tangible reality. India has signed three free trade agreements, all with East Asian partners: Japan, Korea, and ASEAN. Participation in several ASEAN-centred institutions underscored the political dimension of India’s Asia-wide ties.

Three indicators

The Obama administration has intensified a decades-long shift toward Asia in U.S. economic and foreign policy. The heart of U.S. Asia policy traditionally lay in the military anchor in Japan, the security challenge of China, and the enormous economic relationship with both. These factors are still important. But with the “pivot” or “rebalancing” that administration spokesmen have been talking about for the past two years, look for three new markers: deeper U.S. engagement with Asian regional institutions; a modest shift in the centre of gravity of U.S. military assets toward the Indo-Pacific region; and, significantly, the decision to treat India as part of a larger Asian region, a decision made more important by the growing prominence of U.S.-India ties.

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Authors

Teresita C. Schaffer
Howard Schaffer

Publication: The Hindu

Can the Poor Be Organized? Evidence from Rural India

Raj M. Desai and Shareen Joshi — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 14:32:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

There is significant evidence of the role collective action plays in reducing poverty. Effective coordination by the poor has been shown to strengthen property rights (Baland and Platteau 2003; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009), increase bargaining power in labor markets (Bardhan 2005), improve access to fi nancial markets (Karlan 2007) and increase public investments in poor communities (Alesina et al. 1999; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).

In light of this evidence, governments, aid donors and international NGOs have sought to expand their support to collectives in poorer communities. At the World Bank alone, more than $50 billion has been spent in the past two decades on “community-driven development” projects that expand participation of the poor in the design, implementation and evaluation of development (Mansuri and Rao 2012).

The question of where social capital originates remains poorly understood. Most analyses of how poor communities resolve coordination problems focus on simple, group-devised solutions that restrict access to common resources (Bowles 1998; Ostrom 1998; Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom 2000; Ostrom and Ahn 2009). Others examine “socialization” effects for group members in fostering collective action (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Overall, this research suggests that, in the absence of common preferences, collective action is likely to emerge when individuals have low costs of information, the opportunity to coordinate their actions, the opportunity to engage in repeated interaction and the power to reward contributors and punish free-riders. Given that these constraints are often binding for the poor, it follows that almost everywhere, the poor demonstrate lower levels of organization and collective action (Narayan et al. 2000; Gugerty and Kremer 2008).

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Raj M. Desai
Shareen Joshi

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BRICS Leadership Will Be Tested by Syria

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is probably the most serious crisis facing the world today. And yet, the international community is struggling to find a way forward. With more than four million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and three million internally displaced – a conservative UN estimate based on surveys of 6 out of 14 governorates in Syria – the humanitarian response to the plight of civilians so far has been entirely inadequate. A recent UNICEF report highlighted the two million children maimed, orphaned, and suffering from malnutrition as a result of the conflict – an entire generation “scarred for life”. Meanwhile, over one million refugees are seeking asylum in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This number will likely hit the three million mark by the end of 2013 – a ticking bomb for countries based on delicate social, ethnic, and sectarian balance.

Humanitarian access in opposition-held areas, where assistance is most urgently needed, is extremely limited. The humanitarian policy dilemma has shown what a mess we are currently in. Under General Assembly resolution 46/182, the United Nations cannot operate inside rebel-held territory without the explicit consent of the Syrian government. As that government’s authority is waning, however, many wonder whether we should be bound by the sovereignty of a tyrannical regime that continues to aggravate the crisis. Others, meanwhile, are advocating for direct humanitarian cross-border action in coordination with the internationally recognized Syrian National Coalition. With the election of Ghassan Hitto as the interim prime minister of a transitional government in “liberated” areas, this call will no doubt grow louder.

It is time for the international community to overcome this obstacle and allow for a more effective humanitarian response in Syria – whenever and wherever it may be required. One way forward would be for key countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India to support a more aggressive effort to ramp up the UN’s cross-border aid operations inside the country. Such an opportunity presents itself at the forthcoming 2013 BRICS summit in Durban next week. These countries should use their influence to secure a Security Council endorsement of this approach, principally by applying pressure on Russia and China.

Furthermore, they should use their direct channels with Assad to insist that the regime allow for cross-border operations and give full humanitarian access to all areas of the country.

Why the BRICS? Given their rising prominence on the world stage, it’s become clear that these nations play a key role in steering the international response to this crisis. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Assad, travelled to South Africa last week to deliver a message to President Zuma, urging BRICS nations to intervene to stop the violence in Syria and encourage the opening of a dialogue. Three weeks ago, she was in India, doing the same. It goes without saying that such cynical diplomacy on the part of the regime should be met by more purposeful calls to spare the lives of civilians. This is a strategic opportunity for the BRICS to use their influence and play a more decisive, helpful role.

There is no time to lose. To date, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to protect the Syrian population. Even with regard to the funding of UN humanitarian operations, only 20% of the $ 1.5 billion pledged by international donors in Kuwait in January has been honored. International inaction in Syria will leave a lasting legacy of insecurity and suffering, while the spillover effects of this humanitarian crisis will only contribute to the growing instability in Syria’s neighborhood and across the greater region. The BRICS nations, along with the international community, have a responsibility to act now.

Given the state of emergency on the ground, however, humanitarian cross-border access alone may not be sufficient. In order to protect civilians, guarantee the safe passage of relief organizations as well as refugees attempting to leave the country, there is a growing imperative for the establishment of humanitarian corridors and civilian safe areas along the sensitive borders of Syria. Make no mistake, such safe areas will have to be secured and protected by all means possible. Here, there will be much to learn from the UN’s experience in Bosnia in the 1990s – involving an assessment of what went right as well as wrong.

The BRICS and their international partners should be ready to endorse such measures. The situation demands it. Yet at a minimum, they must now demand that Assad allows the UN to cross Syria’s borders to reach civilians in need. The UN has the required institutional knowledge to deliver aid to fragmented areas making it the organization that is best placed to do so in Syria. Enabling the UN to undertake a country-wide response would help prevent the politicization of assistance as well as ensure a coordinated response in crucial sectors such as water, sanitation, infrastructure reconstruction, food assistance and education. The end goal would be to ensure that the UN is able to meet the basic needs of all civilians and upholding fundamental humanitarian principles in this bloody conflict.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Asharq Al-Awsat

Subir Gokarn, Former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Named Director of Research for Brookings India

Thu, 14 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

New Delhi, India – Subir Gokarn, who recently completed a term as deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India, has been named the first director of research for Brookings India in New Delhi, Brookings President Strobe Talbott announced today.

Dr. Gokarn, who will also serve as a Brookings senior fellow, was previously chief economist of Standard & Poor’s Asia-Pacific from 2007-09 and executive director and chief economist of CRISIL from 2004-07. He served as chief economist at the think tank National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in New Delhi from 1999-2002 and taught at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) in Mumbai from 1990-2000.

Dr. Gokarn earned his Ph.D from Case Western Reserve University (U.S.) in 1989. He received his B.A. (Hons) in economics from St. Xavier’s College in Mumbai in 1979 and his M.A. in economics from the Delhi School of Economics in 1981. He was awarded a Fulbright Research Fellowship in 1997, on which he spent an academic year at the Economic Growth Centre at Yale University (U.S.). He is currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board of India and a columnist with the Business Standard.

“Dr. Gokarn brings to the position both his credentials as an economist and his experience in leadership and decision-making roles in the private and public sectors,” said Vikram Singh Mehta, chairman of Brookings India. “This reflects the centre’s emphasis on combining high-quality research with effective dissemination to and communication with stakeholders.”

The recently established Brookings India will serve as a platform for cutting-edge, policy-relevant research and analysis on the opportunities and challenges facing India and the world. The center aims to provide high-quality and independent policy research on a variety of domains of critical importance to India’s development and global integration strategies. Indians will play the primary role in directing, staffing and funding the centre. Its work is based on the Brookings motto of "Quality, Independence, Impact," promoting in India its brand of independent, in-depth research and engagement in the policy debate. The Brookings Institution is one of the oldest independent think tanks, and for the fifth year in a row, it has been ranked as the most influential, most quoted and most trusted think tank in the world.

Prepare for the Unknowns: India's Black Swans

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Imagine the breaking news headline: Revolution in Riyadh. The scenario: The House of Saud, which has ruled Saudi Arabia for years, has been overthrown. Closer to home, think about what China going off the rails would look like-and portend for India. These are just two of the "Black Swans" that foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution recently identified as deserving the attention of the U.S. government, along with a series of Big Bets that the administration should make in President Obama's second term. These black swans are low-probability, high-impact events that can have a dramatic impact on the plans and policies of a country. The idea behind this project was to identify potential events, suggest ways to prevent them if possible and prepare for them if they occur. With American involvement in a number of countries in the world, it might seem natural to undertake such exercises in the United States. It is essential, however, that such thinking take place in India -- whose global interests and involvement are growing -- as well.

Just a glance at the black swans that Brookings scholars envisioned indicates how each of them could affect India's interests. The collapse of the Saudi monarchy would bring instability in a country that is India's largest oil supplier and critical to its economy. It is also the location of two of Islam's holiest sites. The spillover into other countries in the region that is not just the source of most of the crude oil and natural gas that India imports but is home to a large number of Indians, will also have major ramifications. A Eurozone collapse would have a significant impact on the Indian economy. A China-U.S. confrontation or especially a direct military conflict between them over Korea -- though seemingly distant from India's area of operations and interest -- would change the geopolitical context in which India is operating. A confrontational Chinese leadership, driven by popular nationalism and desire for regime survival into war, could have serious consequences for India. Domestic revolution in China could also affect not just India's geopolitical interests but its economic ones as well; it could also lead to significant changes in the Tibet dynamic. Finally, a dramatic rise in sea levels could devastate India's coastal areas where about a fifth of its population resides.

One could dismiss these scenarios as far-fetched, but ignoring such possibilities entirely can be risky. India itself has felt the brunt of black swans -- for instance, the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959 or the black swan triple whammy in 1990-91 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has also benefited from some black swans -- for example, from two crucial ones that Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who generated the black swan theory, laid out in his book The Black Swan: the development and spread of the computer and the Internet.

India could face black swans again: A serious and sudden deterioration of the situation in Tibet. A climate change-caused catastrophe in Bangladesh with thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people trying to cross over into India. A major cyber attack with uncertain origins. A disintegration in Pakistan with the "loose nuke" problem becoming real. A collapse in the price of gold. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement -- a black swan that could throw up challenges or opportunities for India.

Black swans are not always negative and do not necessarily have a negative impact. As my Brookings colleague Govinda Avasarala notes, a major breakthrough in grid-level battery storage developed in India that could make solar and other intermittent forms of energy instantly economic could be one such "positive" black swan. This development would not only change India's energy picture, it would change the debate on and the available solutions to the climate change challenge. It would also put India at the forefront of the next big technology revolution.

It is important to think about such black swans, consider ways of preventing them if they are negative ones and facilitating them if they are positive, and lay out ways of coping with them. Government agencies can do some of this thinking. Indeed, recently, at a talk organised by RAW, former president Abdul Kalam highlighted the need for the country's intelligence apparatus to be prepared for black swans. Policy planning staffs can also undertake such exercises. Government agencies, however, are often burdened or overburdened with day-to-day priorities, with little time, inclination or resources to undertake such thinking. Therefore it is outside government -- in think tanks, universities and the corporate sector -- that such thinking about black swans, as well as forecasting, scenario planning and war gaming can and must take place. Such exercises do not necessarily require classified information. They do require time, resources, expertise and, most importantly, imagination.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: India Today

International Women’s Day in India and Around the World: Progress and Strategies for Action

Urvashi Sahni and Xanthe Ackerman — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 09:00:00 -0500

International Women’s Day, March 8, is here again, and it is time to take stock of women’s lives in the world today. Great progress has been made in education and for women more broadly. Still, so much work remains to ensure that women are empowered, educated, safe, healthy and free to be fully participating members of equal societies. In India, the recent groundswell of support for women and girls speaks to the potential to overturn harmful gender norms. We need approaches, such as self-organizing and campaigning for women’s rights, gender-sensitive education, and including men in the fight for equality, that go beyond business as usual. At the global level, it is critical that the next set of development goals hold actors to better account for progress for women and girls.

In many countries, the situation for women is improving at the highest levels of leadership and among the poor, even if slowly. There are now 17 female heads of state around the world—almost twice as many as in 1990. According to UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report, the number of countries where girls face severe gender disparity—defined as having less than nine girls in primary school for every ten boys—has dropped from 33 countries in 1999 to 17 in 2010. Gender parity at the secondary level has improved and, when girls make it to the secondary level in most countries, their retention and progression is the same or better than boys. More women are receiving antenatal care and skilled assistance during delivery—one of the most critical times in the prevention of maternal mortality.

While the international community welcomes and celebrates these gains for women and girls, much more needs to be done to ensure women and girl’s equality, and to meet the goals set out by the first set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Women are still largely unsafe, unwanted and unequal in the developing world. There are 4 million missing women and girls each year in developing countries. They are killed in the womb, soon after birth or during their child-bearing years. Most countries will miss the Education For All goal of a 50 percent improvement in adult literacy—a challenge that disproportionately affects women, who make up about two-thirds of the 775 million adults who cannot read. In addition to addressing lagging progress in female mortality reduction and access to education and economic opportunity, the World Development Report 2012 calls for renewed efforts to increase women’s voice and agency in the home and society, and to limit the reproduction of gender inequality across generations. Gender-based violence also continues to plague women around the world. According to CARE’s Women and Empowerment report, at least 1 in 3 females has been physically or sexually abused, often repeatedly and by a relative or acquaintance. Violence rivals cancer as a top cause of morbidity and mortality for women of child-bearing age.

In India, the case for renewed commitment to women and girls is clear. The government has made significant efforts to improve conditions for women and girls, including creating a large-scale girls’ education program that provides schools and support for girls in rural areas and has already helped to narrow the gender gap. Still, much remains to be done by the government and all other stakeholders. The child mortality rate in India is the highest in the world and some estimate that 1 million girls are killed in the womb there each year. In terms of education, gender overlaps with other causes of marginalization, including poverty, location (rural vs. urban) and social factors, such caste and tribe to worsen access and outcomes. For instance, according to the World Inequality Database on Education, in 2005, 31 percent of women age 17-22 years had less than four years of school, compared to 16 percent of men. Among the poor in the poorer regions of India, the numbers were as high as 91 percent of women compared to 55 percent of men.

Of all the challenges that women and girls face, to some, having no voice is among the most intolerable. Heroines the world over who struggle to be free and to make their voices heard, even when confronting lethal consequences. Malala was shot because she voiced the right to education for women in Pakistan, and Nirbhaya in India was brutally raped and murdered because she expressed her right to travel freely. For any known story, there are millions of lesser known cases such as Khusboo. This young woman in Uttar Pradesh, India received an education—a gender-based education that made empowerment the central goal—and found the courage to voice her right to complete high school. She resisted her father’s attempt to marry her off at 16 and for that she was beaten mercilessly and cast out of his house. To share her story and her voice, she recently made an award-winning autobiographical video that showed the abuse she faced and the triumph of holding up the diploma she earned.

On International Women’s Day, let us celebrate women’s triumphs, but let us also consider what more can be done to confront the reality that so many women face. The following are strategies that show promise in India and can be replicated and scaled.

Strategy #1: Self-Organize and Challenge the Status Quo

Advocacy campaigns that demand gender equality, examine gender norms and address the inconsistency of patriarchal structures in democratic societies can be highly effective. On February 14, 2013, Valentine’s Day, millions of women and many men rose up against gender-based violence across the globe. In India, thousands of people of all ages and gender took to the streets with banners, slogans, songs, street plays and dances, celebrating women and supporting their right to control their lives, their right to a safe world, their right to a voice. The India’s Daughters Campaign represents a civil society effort along these lines and has used mobile technology to engage and organize youth in the most rural areas, including the students at 28 girls’ schools.

Campaigning as a part of the ongoing public outcry following the rape and death of Nirbhaya has resulted in the constitution of a high-level committee to review laws related to sexual crimes. The committee produced The Justice Verma Report in record-breaking time. The report makes several recommendations to the government including judicial, political, police and military reforms. The committee also recommended that the Parliament promulgate a special bill of rights for women to ensure a life of safety and dignity, including in marriage. For the first time there is mention of “sexual autonomy” for women, and there is some recognition of marital rape as a crime. Severe punishments for rape and for all sexual offences are recommended, including stalking and sexual harassment in the work place. The committee writes that all marriages should be registered, which will make it possible to identify and prevent child marriages, which are widely prevalent in India. In addition, it recommends that police be subject to punitive action for not registering cases of rape and other sexual crimes. Jody Williams, civil rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner for her work on the Campaign to Ban Landmines, states “impunity” as the single biggest reason that violence against women continues to exist in such large numbers. Accordingly, the Justice Verma Report tries to make the law more responsive.

People in India are demanding that the issue of women’s safety be taken seriously by the government, and the state has, in this instance, responded. Their actions pave the way for further progress. For instance, a recent budget declaration allocates $200 million for the “safety of women,” and civil society organizations now are organizing to understand how the Ministry of Women and Children will spend this money. The fact that the elections are only a year away could be a factor in government’s responsiveness to civil society demands. Even so, women are being taken seriously as a political constituency to be recognized and considered.

The movement that led to the Justice Verma Report has been hugely successful, but there is more work to be done. Advocacy efforts should focus not only on these issues and judicial responses, but also the administrative environment and ability for crimes to be redressed quickly. The Indian government passed an ordinance recognizing 90 percent of the recommendations, but left out two important ones. Marital rape has still been denied legal recognition, leaving women unsafe in the domestic space, and the armed forces have been left out of the punitive net. Both are grave omissions, and women’s organizations are contesting them strongly.

Strategy #2: Include Gender Education in the Curriculum

Since critical dialogues can lead to real change in society with positive outcomes for women and men, we must note that the education system can support these dialogues by introducing gender education in the curriculum to sensitize and empower both girls and boys. What is most significant in the recent events in India is that we have seen that girls and women (at least in urban areas) are finding their “voice” and raising it. Critical dialogues and discussions around gender are taking place all over, in the media, universities, government, policymaking halls of power, schools, cafes, homes, and on the streets. Gender has become, at least for now, an important issue. This transformation can and should happen in every school for every girl and boy. Even now, policymakers and civil society are considering the convening of a national-level working group in India to examine how education can promote positive gender norms.

Indeed, gender norms should receive special official focus in education systems, curricula and teacher training. Students must know the laws and recognize that women are entitled to an equal voice in the home and in society. Education helps girls and women develop their voice and the capacity to aspire to equality, based on the recognition of themselves as equal persons. We must include gender education in our core curriculum along with or as part of human rights education. This inclusion will help reduce one more gender gap—that of limiting the reproduction of inequality across generations—by enabling both boys and girls to examine gendered construction of identities and social norms, the underlying structures that perpetuate inequality, and to unlearn negative and harmful ideas about gender.

In order for gender education to be included in national curricula, it is necessary for ministries of education to approve and initiate a process whereby academics, gender experts, practitioners and educationists can work collaboratively to develop a graded curriculum for gender education, along with related teacher training courses. Schools provide an opportunity for intellectual discussions about gender roles, responsibilities and resulting power relations, which could help students gain a clearer perspective about what “equality” means in democratic societies. Making gender education a curricular subject will make the issue “official” and legitimate and create a generation of more egalitarian gender norms. A concerted effort is required by the international education and development community to influence policy at the country level in this direction.

Strategy #3: Include Men in the Conversation

If there is anything to rejoice and feel hopeful about for women on International Women’s Day, it is the support from men for the movement to better ensure women’s safety and opportunity, especially in India. Men’s participation is something that all of us, men and women everywhere, should tenaciously hold on to in the fight for gender equality. We need male champions in every sphere: national politics, business, civil society, in homes and in schools. We all stand to gain from a society where everyone has a voice. As we’ve learned, boys are open and willing to think about the issue seriously: The protests in India were led equally by young men and women.

The inclusion of boys and men in the struggle for gender equality is critical, and women and girls need them as allies. Women’s education, health and safety are not “women’s problems” to be dealt with for and by women alone. Boys must be engaged in serious discussions about the social construction of masculinity and feminity in their contexts with the resulting implications for gender equality.

Strategy #4: Ensure the Next Set of Global Goals Focus on Gender Equality

At the global level, we must all work to ensure that gender continues to play a prominent role in the next set of global development goals. Whether gender is a cross-cutting issue that runs through all goals, or whether there are one or more goals that deal specifically with gender, the commitment to measuring progress for women and girls and funding policies and programs that improve conditions for women is critical and must be increased. Goals, metrics and policies should recognize that progress for girls and women over all often masks the lack of progress for large swaths of the female population. Even when average conditions for women and girls are improving, the situation for those affected by multiple forms of disadvantage, such as extreme poverty, remote location, conflict, disability, domestic abuse, negative gender norms, often remain unchanged.

While on International Women’s Day we celebrate the goals accomplished by women and girls, and men and boys—we also take stock of all that is yet to be finished.

Authors

Urvashi Sahni
Xanthe Ackerman

The State of the Indian Economy: The Budget and Beyond

Mon, 04 Mar 2013 15:30:00 -0500

Event Information

March 4, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Over the last couple of years, India's economic growth rate has slowed. It remains one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, but the decline has caused concern within that country and outside of it. In the fall of 2012, the Indian government took measures to reverse the trend, but authorities acknowledge that much remains to be done. On February 28, P. Chidambaram, the Indian finance minister, will release the Union budget, which analysts will watch closely to determine the direction the government intends to take, especially with regard to economic reforms.

On March 4, the India Project at Brookings hosted a discussion of the state of the Indian economy, the highlights of the Indian budget, and prospects for further reforms and growth. Panelists also discussed the recently released International Monetary Fund annual staff report on India, which assesses Indian economic performance and lays out the risks and opportunities that lie ahead for the country. Panelists included Diane Farrell, executive vice president of the U.S.-India Business Council, Anne Krueger, professor of international economics at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Laura Papi, assistant director in the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF. Brookings Senior Fellow Eswar Prasad, the New Century chair in International Trade and Economics, moderated the discussion.

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The United States, India and Pakistan: To the Brink and Back

Tue, 26 Feb 2013 14:00:00 -0500

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February 26, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

India and Pakistan are among the most important countries in the 21st century. The two nations share a common heritage, but their relationship remains tenuous. The nuclear rivals have waged four wars against each other and have gone to the brink of war several times. While India is already the world’s largest democracy and will soon become the planet’s most populous nation, Pakistan has a troubled history of military coups and dictators, and has harbored terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. In his new book, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Brookings, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of Brookings Intelligence Project, clearly explains the challenge and importance of successfully managing America’s affairs with these two emerging powers while navigating their toxic relationship.

Based on extensive research and his experience advising four U.S. presidents on the region, Riedel reviews the history of American diplomacy in South Asia, the conflicts that have flared in recent years and the prospects for future crisis. Riedel provides an in-depth look at the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008—the worst terrorist outrage since 9/11—and concludes with authoritative analysis on what the future is likely to hold for the United States and South Asia, offering concrete recommendations for Washington’s policymakers.

On February 26, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted an event marking the release of Avoiding Armageddon. Bruce Riedel discussed the history and future of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and options for avoiding future conflagration in the region. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks, and Tina Brown, editor-in-chief of The Daily Beast and Newsweek, lead the discussion.

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Brookings India: A Conversation with Tom Friedman

Vikram Singh Mehta — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 15:30:00 -0500

India is the world’s largest democracy and a rising power with one of the fastest growing economies. It is also a dynamic and complex country facing a number of opportunities and challenges that are a matter of great interest across the world. With this in mind, we recently launched Brookings India—a center for public policy research based in New Delhi, which I am honored to serve as its chairman. At our first event in New Delhi, I was grateful to host and engage New York Times op-ed columnist and author Thomas L. Friedman in a wide-ranging conversation on topics such as U.S. domestic and foreign policy, education, democracy in the Middle East and energy and climate change.

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Brookings India Launches with a Discussion Featuring Thomas Friedman and Vikram Mehta

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Brookings India Launches with a Discussion Featuring Thomas Friedman and Vikram Mehta

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Vikram Singh Mehta

Recent Political Developments in India: The Other Leadership Transition

Thu, 14 Feb 2013 15:00:00 -0500

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February 14, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

While the world’s attention has been focused on leadership elections and selections in countries like China, Israel, Japan and the United States, recent political developments in the world’s largest democracy also warrant attention. Although national elections will not take place in India until 2014, recently there have been crucial state elections and party leadership changes, and elections in ten states are due over the next year. Rahul Gandhi has been elevated to the position of vice president of the Congress party, further stoking discussions about his role in the party and government. The potential impact of the recent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) presidential elections on the party’s direction over the next few years is still being debated. Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s third electoral victory in state elections has once again sparked questions about his prime ministerial aspirations and chances. Speculation also continues about the national political prospects of others like Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar and Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan.

On February 14, the India Project at Brookings hosted a discussion on these recent political dynamics in India, as well as their potential impact on the policy debate and political developments over the next year. Panelists included Sadanand Dhume, resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute, and Milan Vaishnav, an associate in the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brookings Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project, moderated the discussion.

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