Brookings: Topics - Human Rights

Internal Displacement and Development Agendas: A Roundtable Discussion with Sadako Ogata

Tue, 14 May 2013 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 14, 2013
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

St. Louis Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Around the world today, there are more than 15.5 million refugees and over 28.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by conflict, in addition to some 32.4 million displaced in 2012 from their homes due to natural disasters. These displacement crises are not simply humanitarian concerns, but fundamental development challenges. Forced migration flows are rooted in development failures, and can undermine the pursuit of development goals at local, national and regional levels.

Linking humanitarian responses to displacement with longer-term development support and planning is not a new concern. Beginning in 1999, for example, the “Brookings Process” – under the leadership of Sadako Ogata and James Wolfensohn – sought to bridge humanitarian relief and development assistance in post-conflict situations. But the challenge remains unresolved, and has acquired new urgency as displacement situations are becoming more protracted, and situations such as the Syrian crisis show no signs of resolution.

The Brookings Global Economy and Development Program and the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a roundtable on these issues on May 14, 2013 with Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, former Director of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, and Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Megan Bradley, Fellow with the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, facilitated the roundtable, which followed Chatham House rules.

The roundtable addressed several key topics including:

The relevance of the concept of human security to addressing displacement and development challenges
Displacement as a development challenge in fragile states
Protracted displacement
Contrasts in the approaches and processes adopted by humanitarian and development actors

The event report provides a brief overview of the discussion.

Event Materials

Brookings IDP Roundtable with Sadako Ogata May 14 2013

Participants

Panelists

The Kampala Convention: Entry Into Force

Chaloka Beyani — Mon, 13 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

The world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) number in the tens of millions; the majority of them are in Africa. IDPs are often profoundly vulnerable and must contend with homelessness, hunger, human rights violations and violence. For years, the African Union has sought to help mitigate the plight of IDPs and now with the entry into force of the Kampala Convention, they have formulated and adopted a legally-binding instrument that can do more to help this population. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, says that the convention will also promote good governance, peace, stability and security.

Video

The Kampala Convention: Entry Into Force

Authors

Chaloka Beyani

Transitions and Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons: 21 Reasons for Optimism

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Presentation at the Transitions and Solutions Roundtable, organized by UNHCR and UNDP, Amsterdam, April 18-19, 2013.[1]

For at least thirty years, there has been talk of the need to bridge the ‘relief-to-development gap’ or, as it has been more recently described, the ‘transition from humanitarian action to development.’ The need to overcome the institutional divisions in the way we work has been tackled through many programs, initiatives, statements of commitment, meetings and speeches.[2] It has spawned a whole litany of terms and acronyms, from the ‘integrated zonal development approach’ to ICARA I and II, Quick Impact Projects, the Brookings process, the 4Rs, early recovery, etc. While there have been good analyses of the obstacles to overcoming this division,[3] it is hard not to feel cynical about the possibility of ever overcoming the divide between humanitarian and development actors.

But I’m going to step out of my comfort zone this morning and suggest that there are, indeed, reasons for optimism. In particular, I have come up with 21 reasons[4] why this might be the best time in 30 years to achieve progress in building bridges between humanitarian and development actors to work on solutions for displaced populations. I don’t think that any one of these reasons would be sufficient to drive major progress in addressing the gap or transition this time around. But taken together, these reasons suggest that this is a good time to be working on this issue and give grounds for optimism.

Twenty-one reasons for optimism:

1) Donor governments are taking the issue more seriously. Donors have always been interested in the issue, but this commitment seems to be becoming stronger – perhaps as a result of increased pressure on aid budgets and the increasingly protracted nature of humanitarian emergencies. This donor commitment is important for several reasons. Donors drive the international humanitarian system; when donors are interested in a particular issue, things can happen. Not only do donor governments influence the actions of multilateral institutions, but they also have large bilateral aid programs that can bring about change on the ground. In fact, one of the differences between development and humanitarian work is that multilateral institutions are much less important in development than in humanitarian work and thus bilateral programs of donor governments can have a direct impact on the ground. If donors can manage to get their own humanitarian and development departments to work together in supporting solutions to displacement in the field, things can change. Of course, while some governments are moving in this direction, in at least some donor government agencies, the gap between relief and development is alive and well.)

Donors are under increasing pressure to demonstrate results and to justify the large sums they are spending on humanitarian emergencies. The emphasis on demonstrating value for money and programmatic impact is increasing in part because of the economic difficulties facing many traditional donors. Foreign aid budgets among the traditional donors are almost all under pressure. There are questions of how long major humanitarian programs can be sustained – particularly as in cases such as Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya where there are now third-generation refugees. If these humanitarian expenditures are to be reduced, either responsibility needs to be transferred to development actors or solutions need to be found.

It’s still too early to tell, but the entry of more non-traditional donors (e.g. BRICS, Gulf states, military forces) also may be a positive sign in overcoming this divide, as many do not seem to draw the same distinctions between humanitarian and development assistance.[5] If this is indeed the case, then there is a need not only to engage with non-traditional donors but also to refrain from suggesting that they follow models where the divisions between humanitarian and development are tightly drawn.

2) The concept of resilience may offer common ground for development and humanitarian actors to work together, particularly in building local capacity to withstand adversity.[6] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee – the primary coordination body for humanitarian work – recently discussed its perspective on a resilience-based approach to humanitarian assistance with references to such issues as local ownership and integration, which seem to offer a common language for discussion between development professionals and humanitarians.[7]

3) There seems to be growing attention today to natural disasters and climate change in the humanitarian community. Given global trends in which disasters linked to climate change are likely to increase, we can expect that humanitarian actors will be called to respond to increasingly deadly – and costly – disasters in the future. In this field, there are better (though still imperfect) links between disaster risk reduction (DRR), response and recovery. At least there is widespread recognition of the importance of investing in DRR and of the need for development plans to include measures to mitigate the risk of disasters. Perhaps it is time for humanitarian agencies working in conflict situations to reach a similar recognition that working in concert with development actors can reduce the risk of future conflicts, stabilize post-conflict situations and contribute to durable solutions for displaced populations.

4) While it is difficult to draw many long-term positive lessons from the response to Haiti’s earthquake, the experience of many humanitarians clearly underscores the difficulties of finding solutions for displaced which don’t take into account broader development goals. Humanitarian agencies recognized that their ability to develop good humanitarian programs depended on development approaches such as the rule of law, poverty eradication, gender equity and environmental issues. As those involved in the Haiti response have moved on to work on other operations, we can only hope that they carry this lesson with them.

5) Humanitarian actors working with internally displaced persons (IDPs) often find themselves working more closely with development actors than when they are developing programs for refugees. National governments have a fundamental responsibility for the protection and assistance of those displaced within their borders and there is no way of bypassing those authorities to reach IDPs. In fact, a recent meeting to take stock of response to internal displacement agreed that a fundamental paradigm shift is needed to see IDPs as a development – and not exclusively – as a humanitarian issue.[8]

6) Within the humanitarian community, there is increasing interest in the situation facing refugees and IDPs living in urban areas.[9] Planning humanitarian response to displaced people living outside of camp settings perhaps inevitably involves working with a wider range of actors (e.g. urban planners, local governments, development agencies, multilateral development banks, etc.) than in camp settings. For example, providing water and sanitation in a refugee/IDP camp is often a very different task than ensuring that IDPs/refugees dispersed in a large city have access to clean water and to sanitation facilities. Assisting those displaced in urban areas usually means working with municipal authorities and investing in infrastructure and social services which benefit communities as a whole.

7) There is a growing realization that most of the world’s displaced are living in protracted situations lasting five, ten or more years. Dealing with long-term displacement (e.g. Darfur, Colombia, Pakistan) is a development issue. It is increasingly widely recognized that national development plans should take IDPs into account and that finding solutions for both IDPs and refugees requires the engagement of development actors. There are a few examples of national development plans that already include provisions on support for refugees and IDPs, which provide an important example for other states to follow. Finding solutions to displacement often involves issues such as restoration of livelihoods, the resolution of housing, land and property issues and the promotion of tenure security – all areas where development actors have more expertise.

8) There seems to be more concern about the role of affected governments in humanitarian response. For example, the Swiss government, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and ICVA are pursuing a dialogue between humanitarian actors and governments of disaster-affected countries.[10] Similarly, the IASC Principals have agreed on the importance of ensuring more effective engagement with governments in the cluster system as part of the Transformative Agenda.[11] If, in fact, humanitarian actors do make engagement with governments a priority, this could lead to the discovery of more common ground with development agencies who have emphasized the importance of local ownership and governmental buy-in as a basis for all their work.[12]

9) There are some interesting examples of good practice from Southern NGOs (e.g. Sarvodya in Sri Lanka[13]) that are development organizations by nature but became involved in disaster response in their own countries. These NGOs bring in their development expertise and sustain their engagement after international humanitarian agencies leave or reduce their presence. The growing experience and capacity of these NGOs is a cause for optimism. Local Southern organizations may be better placed to overcome some of the divides that characterize large international bureaucracies.

10) Stocktaking exercises undertaken by the World Bank have demonstrated that international development organizations have done more work with displaced communities and to generate/promote durable solutions than is often recognized.[14] By highlighting these experiences, we can recognize that the development community is not starting from scratch and that there is a foundation on which to build further cooperative efforts.

11) While humanitarian agencies often distance their work from broader migration debates, the current ongoing global discussions on migration and development offer a recognition that population movements are related to development.[15] Can we learn from such discussions about the relationship between displacement and development?

12) I think that there are signs that the development and humanitarian communities are making tentative steps toward speaking one another’s ‘languages.’ For humanitarian agencies, concepts of protection and human rights have long been central to both programs and discourse, but this is not a language that necessarily resonates with our development counterparts. However, concepts such as rights-based approaches to development and the previously-mentioned concept of resilience may offer possibilities of finding common ground for discussions between humanitarian and development agencies. For example, the UN Secretary-General has long emphasized the centrality of human rights in the UN’s development work,[16] the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has organized meetings on the right to development[17] and the IASC is engaging in discussions about the relationship of humanitarian work and human rights. There also seem to be signs of increasing possibilities for experts in humanitarian/human rights to contribute to discussions by development agencies.[18]

Three Issues of Growing Humanitarian Interest

13) Over the past 15 years or so, issues of housing, land and property (HLP) have come to be recognized in the humanitarian community as a critical concern, particularly in finding solutions for displacement. This is an area where the development community has long-standing expertise and there should be synergies to ensure that the HLP ‘solutions’ promoted for refugees/IDPs/returnees fit into broader tenure reform processes and land issues. I find it encouraging that UN Habitat is playing a more active role with humanitarian agencies, particularly around urban and protracted displacement. [19] The question arises as to whether humanitarian agencies should be developing expertise in these areas – or whether there is an opportunity to use the expertise that development agencies have acquired over many years?

14) Also over the past decade, there is growing recognition by humanitarians that the issue of livelihoods is central to humanitarian action[20] and I sense a certain ‘humility’ among staff of humanitarian agencies about their lack of expertise in this area. Income-generating projects are not the same as sustainable livelihoods. Again, the question is whether humanitarian agencies should devote the resources to acquire the necessary expertise to support livelihoods well – or if they should see this as an opportunity to learn from their development counterparts?

15) A third issue, emerging in the last 15 years has been growing interest – and perhaps even progress – in integrating displacement into transitional justice frameworks and ensuring that the displaced have the opportunity to participate in these processes.[21] At their core, issues of accountability and transitional justice are issues of governance and rule of law that fall into the broader development portfolio.

Three Upcoming Opportunities

16) In the development community, the wide-ranging debate and intensive consultation process about post-2015 development goals is an opportune moment to raise the concerns of the millions of displaced persons around the world who are often sidelined in development processes. At a time when many groups are mobilizing to build support for inclusion of their issues in these future goals, it may well be a timely opportunity for those working with refugees and IDPs to raise their voices in the debate.

17) Similarly, the fact that the UN Development Program is presently working on a four-year strategic plan offers an opportunity for a major development actor to recognize the importance of working on displacement as a part of its future development agenda.

18) And in yet another upcoming global initiative – the fact that the UN Secretary-General has announced that a humanitarian summit will take place in 2015 under the leadership of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – offers an opportunity to place on the agenda of that summit the issue of working more closely and more intentionally with development agencies in resolving displacement situations.

19) Recent research, for example by researchers such as James Milner, shows the value of investing in training, education and peacebuilding efforts (i.e. development work) among the displaced while they are still uprooted.[22] These investments have been shown to pay off in the pursuit of durable solutions (for example, the skills displaced persons gain while uprooted can facilitate reintegration, community development and state-building). Remember that when refugees returned in Central America, South Africa and Namibia, the skills of the returnees contributed to their communities and, at least in some cases, provided political leadership to their countries. Are development actors missing opportunities to build future leadership and capacity by not investing in refugees and IDPs while they are uprooted?

20) I sense a greater emphasis in the humanitarian world on evidence-based approaches and a search for indicators to measure the impact of humanitarian interventions and the effectiveness of different kinds of aid. This approach to humanitarian work – difficult as it is for many humanitarians to accept – could well bring them closer to development actors in the way they operate and assess their work.

21) Finally, I think it is a sign of hope that the international community is willing to try again, after so many failures, to bridge the gap! After so many efforts, there is now the Transitional Solutions Initiative being piloted in Colombia and Eastern Sudan and the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions, which is presently being implemented in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Ivory Coast.[23] And I suspect that there are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of good examples from around the world where development actors have engaged to support solutions for refugees and IDPs. We need to hold up these good examples and learn from them. Perhaps the main reason that we need to try again is that displaced people – whether IDPs or refugees – will benefit when we overcome our bureaucratic divisions to work together.

[1] With thanks to my colleague, Megan Bradley, for her comments.

[2] Jeff Crisp, Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, UNHCR Working Paper No. 43, May 2001, www.unhcr.org/3b309dd07.html; Bryan Deschamp and Sebastian Lohse, Still minding the gap? A review of efforts to link relief and development in situations of human displacement, 2001-2012, PDES/2013/01, February 2013, www.unhcr.org/512cdef09.html

[3] Ibid.

[4] My original presentation at the Roundtable included 20 reasons for optimism, but as a result of the discussions there, I added another reason and moved a few others around.

[5] Romilly Greenhill, Annalisa Prizzon and Andrew Rogerson, The age of choice: developing countries in the new aid landscape, Overseas Development Institute, January 2013, www.odi.org.uk/publications/7163-age-choice-developing-countries-new-aid-landscape

[6] See for example, DfID, Defining Disaster Resilience: What does it mean for DFID, 23 November 2011, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67451/Defining-Disaster-Resilience-summary.pdf; DfID, Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience, Policy paper, September 2011, www.gov.uk/government/publications/saving-lives-preventing-suffering-and-building-resilience; USAID, USAID Resilience Agenda: helping vulnerable communities emerge from cycles of crisis onto a pathway toward development, 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/ResilienceAgenda2Pager.pdf; USAID, Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance, December 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/ResiliencePolicyGuidanceBriefer.pdf

[7] IASC, “IASC Special Event: ‘Resilience: What does it mean in practice?’ - A Panel Discussion,” Feb. 2013, www.humanitarianinfo.org/IASC/pageloader.aspx?page=content-news-newsdetails&newsid=158

[8] Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, Taking Stock of Internal Displacement: Twenty Years On Report of consultation held at Château de Penthes, Geneva, 28-29 November 2012, November 2012,

[9] See for example: Crisp et al., “Displacement in urban areas: new challenges, new partnerships,” Disasters, vol. 36 Suppl 1, July 2012, pp. S23-S42; Jeff Crisp and Hilde Refstie, The Urbanisation of Displaced People, CIVIS, No. 5 — May 2011, www.urban-response.org/resource/6910; Eveliina Lyytinen, “A tale of three cities: internal displacement, urbanization and humanitarian action in Abidjan, Khartoum and Mogadishu,” New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR, 2009; Nassim Majidi, “Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan,” www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/Afghanistan/01_majidi.php; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani, 26 December 2011, A/HRC/19/54; UNHCR Policy on Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, 2009, www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4ab8e7f72

[10] See IFRC, “International Dialogue on Strengthening Partnership in Disaster Response: Bridging national and international support,” www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/meetings-and-events/past-events/international-dialogue-on-strengthening-partnership-in-disaster-response/

[11] IASC, IASC Transformative Agenda 2012, www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docId=5970

[12] OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf

[13] http://www.sarvodaya.org/

[14] See World Bank, Forced Displacement: Overview of the World Bank’s Portfolio, Social Development Notes, no. 122, 2009.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164201144397/Forced_Displacement_Overview_12-15-09.pdf

[15] See for example, relevant resources available at OHCHR’s website on the forthcoming October 2013 High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development:

www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/HighLevelDialogueonMigrationandDevelopment.aspx

[16] http://www.unssc.org/home/learning-product/human-rights-based-development

[17] http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/Pages/12thSession.aspx

[18] See for example, Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention: An Opportunity for Development Actors, Geneva: IDMC, 2012 http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/9FB27EB6E2D7E0ADC1257AF7003685A8/$file/WB-analytical-study-nov-2012-web.pdf

[19] See for example, the work of UN-HABITAT, www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=9

[20] See for example, Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees, Kumarian Press, 2005.

[21] Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Center for Transitional Justice, Transitional Justice and Displacement, June 2012 (www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/transitional-justice/tj-report).; see also, Roger Duthie, ed., Transitional Justice and Displacement (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2012), www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/transitional-justice/tj-book.

[22] James Milner, “Refugees and the peacebuilding process,” UNHCR Research Paper No. 224, November 2011

[23] Jeff Crisp, Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, May 2001; UNHCR, Concept Note - Transitional Solutions Initiative UNDP and UNHCR in collaboration with the World Bank, October 2010, www.unhcr.org/4e27e2f06.html; UN Secretary-General, Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions, 4 October 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1265299949041/6766328-1265299960363/SG-Decision-Memo-Durable-Solutions.pdf

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters

Camps are Not the Answer to Syria’s Displacement Crisis

Megan Bradley — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 13:48:00 -0400

A few years ago, I visited some of the Palestinian refugee camps scattered across Lebanon. After spending some time in Bourj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut, I travelled to Wavel -- a highly impoverished but comparatively spacious camp in the rural Beqaa valley, where a Palestinian refugee boy asked me a question: Can you see the sky in Bourj al-Barajneh? I was surprised by this question, but upon reflection realized it is perfectly reasonable. Bourj al-Barajneh is notoriously overcrowded. After more than 60 years of displacement, tents have been replaced by packed apartment blocks and narrow concrete alleyways. Without permission to expand the boundaries of the camp, residents have had to build in and up, so that there are indeed many places in Bourj where you can stand outside and yet barely see the sky.

Despite these cramped conditions, residents of Bourj al-Barajneh and other camps have opened their doors to the 36,000 Palestinian refugees who were living in Syria, but have now fled to Lebanon. Thousands of Lebanese families, many with little room to spare themselves, are sheltering scores of the 400,000 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon. In Jordan as well, "host families" are making a critical contribution by accommodating many of the 1.3 million refugees who have fled Syria since the uprising started in March 2011. Within Syria, the UN reports that approximately four million people are now displaced. Untold thousands have found shelter - however precarious - with extended family members, or even strangers.

Read the entire article here >>

Authors

Megan Bradley

Publication: The Atlantic

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Authors

Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Recurring Disasters: Are We Learning Lessons?

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

For the past three years, we’ve compiled an annual review of natural disasters, highlighting not only overall trends for the year but drawing out lessons to prepare for future disasters. Given the fact that the frequency, intensity and unpredictability of natural disasters is expected to increase as a result of climate change, it is more important than ever that we learn from the past.

In looking back at 2012, we were struck by the ‘recurring disasters’ which occurred in different parts of the world. Hurricane Irene hit the northeastern United States in 2011 and then a little over a year later, Hurricane Sandy hit the same area. Typhoon Washi/Sendong in the Philippines was followed a year later by the deadly Typhoon Bopha/Pablo. And Pakistan experienced its third straight year of widespread flooding. When recurring disasters strike the same communities – communities which haven’t yet recovered from the previous disaster – the results can be devastating. The resilience of affected individuals and communities is undermined. Particularly when the communities are poor and marginalized (who tend to be more affected by disasters in any case), it can be hard to muster the energy and the resources to start over again. The devastation caused by recurring disasters in 2012 highlights the need for increased commitment and investment in disaster risk reduction. But we also know that it’s always easier to mobilize support for responding to a disaster than for taking measures to reduce the risk of future ones.

Statistically, 2012 was an ‘average’ year for disasters without the mega-disasters we saw in 2010 (Haiti) or 2011 (Japan). The deadliest disaster of 2012 was Typhoon Bopha/Pablo in the Philippines; the most expensive disaster was Hurricane Sandy in the US and Caribbean; and the disaster which affected the most people was the drought/food crisis in the Sahel region.

In this year’s review, we also looked at the role of regional organizations in disaster risk management – which is part of a larger research project we’re undertaking. Regional organizations seem to be playing an increasingly important role in the complex world of disaster risk management but have received very little attention. Regional organizations, we found, come in many sizes and shapes and they are involved in different kinds of work with disasters. For example, we found that all regions have developed framework agreements on disaster risk reduction or response. In most regions technical cooperation mechanisms – such as early warning systems – have been established. But few regional bodies provide the means for channeling financial assistance after a disaster.

We also looked at one particular type of disaster – wildfires. As evident in Australia, Russia and the United States, wildfires can destroy large swathes of forest. And yet, wildfires are not very significant in the overall scheme of disasters (with only 156 wildfire disasters reported over the past decade resulting in only 0.07 percent of global disaster fatalities.) But the combination of urban sprawl and a hotter and drier climate because of climate change in many parts of the world make it likely that we’ll see more wildfires in the future.

Finally, we looked at the gender dimensions of natural disasters. Natural disasters and climate change often exacerbate existing inequalities and discriminations, including those that are gender-based and can lead to new forms of discrimination. But women are not just victims; they play significant roles in disaster risk management. They are often at the frontline when disasters occur and they bring valuable resources to risk reduction and recovery efforts. When they are able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, their families, and their communities, women have much to offer.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © Lucas Jackson / Reuters

Democracy and Poverty: A Lesson from Mongolia

Nyamosor Tuya — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Later this month, Mongolia will host the 7^th ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies (CD), an intergovernmental forum of democracies formed in 2000 at the initiative of Bronislaw Geremek of Poland and Madeleine Albright of the United States. Several civil society events will accompany it.

The CD was launched at a conference in Warsaw in 2000, and its goals were announced in the Warsaw Declaration: strengthening democratic values and institutions, protecting human rights, and promoting civil society. The effort was to be undertaken both at the national level, by supporting one another in these endeavors, and at the global level through collaboration on democracy-related issues in international and regional institutions. The Warsaw Declaration also emphasized the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy.

After 2000, however, despite a sustained schedule of meetings and statements, the CD never really took off. Democracy’s progress worldwide had slowed in subsequent years, as noted in a number of surveys, including one by Freedom House. Celebrating its 10^th anniversary in Krakow in 2010, the CD acknowledged this state of affairs and through its Act of Recommitment to the Warsaw Declaration pledged to intensify its efforts to transform itself “into a unique forum for the world's democracies to promote and strengthen democracy on a global basis.” To meet this objective, the CD began to retool itself by creating a permanent secretariat, launching a partnership initiative that focuses on assistance to specific countries and, on top of civil society, bringing young people, businesses, and parliamentarians into its dialogue on democracy.

The April 2013 conference in Ulaanbaatar will be an occasion for the CD to further reinvigorate its agenda. Mongolia, which currently holds the CD presidency, offers a number of lessons to offer that could contribute to the organization’s recommitment to its objectives, especially emphasis on the interdependence between poverty, development and democracy. This emphasis is important both as an immediate goal for the host country and as a larger goal for the CD as a whole.

The case of Mongolia on poverty and democracy is instructive. The country started transitioning to democracy over twenty years ago and, for almost as long, the rate of poverty has stood at 30 percent and above. In the 1990s, much of it could be attributed to the disruptions caused by changes in its political and economic system. Harsh weather has been an intermittent factor, too. But no significant progress has been registered in later years, when the economy has grown at an annual average of 9 percent in the past decade. The latest available figure (2011) shows that poverty still stands at 29.8 percent, despite the double-digit economic growth in the past two years. The gap between poor and rich has continued to grow, and infrastructure has languished in a chronically decrepit state. Corruption, on the other hand, has continued to increase. Between 1999 and 2011, while the economy was growing, the country’s corruption ranking has managed to drop from a place where it was comfortably ahead of some of its fellow post-communist countries in Europe to a dismal 120th place out of some 180 countries surveyed by Transparency International. The implications for democracy were grave: most reforms stalled, vote buying became a serious concern, and public trust in the institutions of democracy was shaken. In a survey conducted in June 2012, over 80 percent of respondents believed that government policies were “always” or “often” failing to solve their concerns, chief among them unemployment and poverty.

The lesson to be drawn from this experience is that, early on in the transition process, new democracies should put economic liberty and transparency on a par with other democratic values such as regular elections, rule of law, human rights, freedom of association and freedom of speech. Otherwise, a callous and corrupt government, sometimes voted in through dubiously “free and fair” elections, can use the trappings and rhetoric of democracy as a façade while behind the scenes they engage in rent-seeking practices that can lead to a systemic entrenchment of corruption. In such a system political power is used for economic gain and economic gain is used for buying political influence. Few or no dividends go to the general populace. This results in persistent poverty among a large percentage of the population coupled with poor social services. Public enthusiasm or support for democracy wanes, democracy is eroded, therefore human rights are violated, and eventually democracy breaks down. Such scenarios are an early and real threat to democracy because the impoverished populace does not have the necessary tools―such as education or access to information―to fight back and, in most cases, is simply unfamiliar with the concept of demanding government accountability and responsiveness.

Early on, the CD emphasized this problem by stating in Warsaw that eradication of poverty is an “essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development” (2000). This emphasis should now be renewed. To do so, recommitment to the concept of interdependence between democracy and poverty found in the Santiago Commitment (2005) is essential. The Commitment stressed that democracy cannot be sustained without persistent efforts to eliminate extreme poverty and, vice versa, that the strengthening of democratic governance was “an essential component” of the efforts to alleviate poverty. Rooting out corruption that “corrodes democracy,” as stated in Warsaw, is a central element of these efforts, and this stance was reaffirmed in the Krakow Plan for Democracy (2010). Poverty is as much a threat to a democracy as poor institutions in that it deprives people of their political voice preventing them from holding their governments accountable and responsive, and eroding public trust in the emerging institutions of democracy. The CD’s Bamako Consensus (2007) addressed the issue of public trust: “persistent inequality and poverty can lead to low public trust in political institutions and vulnerability to undemocratic practices both of which are threats to democracy.” Poverty is also an assault on human dignity which is why the Bamako Consensus also emphasized that democracy, development and human rights were mutually reinforcing.

This body of reasoning serves as a good foundation for the CD to contribute to the ongoing global debate on the post-2015 development agenda. This debate presents the CD with an opportunity to pursue its position that eradication of poverty and the consolidation of democracy are interdependent. The thematic session on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that is planned for the CD’s meetings in Ulaanbaatar could therefore be seized as an occasion to launch substantive discussions on collaboration, in the coming years, with international organizations and civil society on ways to incorporate democratic governance in the post-2015 development agenda, or mainstream anti-corruption efforts into it, and ensure that this agenda adopts a human rights-based approach, addresses inequality and promotes social inclusion. Discussions could revolve around the issues raised in papers and notes by UN bodies and agencies and other actors, especially civil society, that call for encompassing human rights, democracy and good governance in an inclusive development agenda focused on poverty eradication. The ideas expressed at the global consultation on governance and the post-2015 framework could also be taken up.

The experience of Mongolia could also be looked at. Mongolia is one of two countries that have voluntarily added a ninth goal to its MDGs: Strengthen Human Rights and Foster Democratic Governance. While a welcome initiative, Mongolia’s MDG 9 has not been a successful undertaking either in terms of its design and implementation; one of its targets, “zero tolerance for corruption,” has been, for too long, an embarrassing slogan given the deteriorating realities on the ground. The initiative did not target such central principles of democratic governance as government accountability, transparency and participation. Neither has the mutually reinforcing nature of the goals to reduce poverty, promote gender equality and improve governance been duly highlighted in the national MDGs framework. Mongolia’s case strongly suggests that the design of governance goals and the methodology of assessing and monitoring their progress should be given careful consideration. The country’s experience also suggests that it is important for national leaders in new democracies to fully embrace and own the goals and targets of poverty reduction and democratic governance -- and to lead. And they should be held accountable for the failures in the implementation.

The impending Community of Democracy discussions in Ulaanbaatar will provide Mongolian leaders both in government and in civil society with an opportunity to reflect on the current status of the country’s MDGs on poverty reduction and democratic governance and commit to their acceleration. It should be noted that the latest poverty figure shows a decrease―29 percent in 2011 versus 39 percent in 2010―but it is yet to be determined if this is attributable to government’s untargeted cash handouts of the past three years, or whether it points to a trend. Whichever the case, sustaining economic growth and expanding the opportunities offered by it, especially by reducing youth unemployment, will be essential if the country is to meet its goal of reducing poverty to 18 percent by 2015. The discussion will also help the thinking on the best ways to incorporate the “unfinished business,” or any unmet MDGs, into the country’s post-MDGs goals in a way that is mindful of the importance of the wider governance context for any success in the key areas of poverty, gender equality and environment.

After years of stalled reform that threatened to jeopardize the country’s democratic gains, it appears that the Mongolian government is now more willing to tackle its outstanding governance issues. It has laid out its plans to reform the civil service, judiciary and police, the institutions most frequently cited in past surveys as the most corrupt; wider policy deliberation and citizen feedback and participation are encouraged, including through the use of new technologies; democracy education is being debated; efforts to address corruption have been stepped up and a more robust national strategy to combat it is in the works. A recent survey showed a slight increase in the level of confidence that people place in the ability of the country’s anti-corruption agency to tackle the issue. In a promising sign, in a single year, the country moved up 26 places in its ranking of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (the effect of changes in methodology and lesser number of countries surveyed is unclear). The government has also expressed its intent to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multilateral transparency initiative involving governments and civil society. Its OGP Action Plan is scheduled to be presented later this month.

The government’s commitment to accountability and transparency will be put to the test by its handling of the case of a former finance minister, whose failure to disclose his offshore company and a secret Swiss bank account, holding $1 million at one time, was brought to light last week by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).

If sustained, reform should improve government effectiveness and create an enabling governance environment for focusing on poverty eradication which should remain the government’s first priority. In the years ahead, the country’s significant extractive wealth will also have to be managed in an exemplary way so that its benefits go to the entire population in an equitable way. The CD’s position that eradication of poverty is essential for a healthy democracy should serve as a guiding principle for the Mongolian government for it to regain public trust and produce outcomes that ensure prosperity, justice and security for the people.

Since the next CD ministerial will take place in 2015, only a couple of months removed from the global gathering on development, the Ulaanbaatar CD ministerial is an opportunity for democracies to start working together to include the democratic principles of accountability, transparency and participation into the post-2015 poverty eradication agenda. A reaffirmation of the CD’s belief in the mutually reinforcing nature of democracy and development can also help re-shape the debate in Mongolia in a way that integrates eradication of poverty, equity and social justice into the broader project of democracy.

Authors

Nyamosor Tuya

Image Source: © Stringer China / Reuters

How The Hague Courts and Tribunals Protect Human Rights

Thu, 04 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 4, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the last twenty years, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has given a voice to victims as it prosecuted those accused of grave human rights abuses in the Yugoslav conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established just over ten years ago, also plays a vital role in holding violators responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. These anniversaries provide a valuable opportunity to reflect on the past and look to the future of international courts and tribunals and how they promote and protect human rights globally.

On April 4, the Managing Global Order Project at Brookings and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hosted a discussion to take stock of the ability of the ICTY, the ICC, and other international and regional justice mechanisms to hold leaders accountable for grave human rights abuses. Panelists included: Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court; Theodor Meron, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its successor the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; and Ambassador Stephen Rapp, ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks. Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, moderated the discussion.

The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:20:00 -0400

A high wire act played out over a 12-hour session of the General Assembly last week at the Organization of American States (OAS): Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out unless their demands were met. Considerable tensions existed within the Hall of the Americas as the foreign ministers witnessed another threat to the organization’s integrity. This time, the contest was over the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Since 1959, the IACHR has taken up and defended the rights of children, of women, of indigenous communities, of sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberty, afro-descendents, people with disabilities, migrants, defenders of human rights: in short, people in vulnerable situations. The IAHCR and its judicial arm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have continued to denounce and sanction violations of human rights. Throughout the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian military dictatorships of the 1970s and early 1980s, the commission and the court played key roles in making visible the victims of abuse. Despite perennial criticisms of the OAS for its failure to defend democratic institutions, the IACHR and the court are considered to be the main collective achievements in defending the rights of individual citizens in the Western Hemisphere.

On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the United States suffered critical attacks, the OAS General Assembly reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed on this historic day in U.S. history. In its Article 8 it gave the right to “any person who consider that his or her human rights have been violated may lodge a complaint or petition before the inter-American system for protection and promotion of human rights.” Individual citizens were recognized as legitimate actors in the consolidation of democracy.

It was therefore disturbing when in 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela raised three complaints about the IACHR: the budget should be limited to contributions from member states and not from observer nations and civil society; the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression should receive less funds and no more than the amount granted to other OAS rapporteurs; and, third, the headquarters for the IACHR should move out of Washington, preferably to Argentina.

The demands of Ecuador and Venezuela were discussed for over 22 months and through 37 meetings of IACHR and 29 working groups, the presentation of 98 documents from civil society, five academic meetings, three hemispheric audiences and one Extraordinary Session of the OAS. When the sought-for reforms were raised at the 44th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly last week, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out if their demands were not addressed.

Ecuador and Venezuela – with Bolivian and Nicaraguan support – called to limit the IACHR budget. This was an effort both to limit outside influences on the human rights commission as well as to reduce, even further its effectiveness. Currently, 55 percent of the IACHR’s budget comes from the OAS, the remaining 45 percent comes from member countries, observer nations and civil society. In 2012, the IACHR had an annual budget of $10 million with which to pay rapporteurs, attorneys and staff. With only 34 attorneys for 35 member countries and 31 other staff members, the work of investigating the 448 complaints submitted in 2012 is already inadequate because it enables consideration of only 10 percent of the complaints. Rather than reduce further the IACHR budget, the commission has requested doubling its budget to $20 million in order to hire more attorneys and consider more complaints.

The second complaint was more serious, namely a reduction in the budget for Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. The work of this office is dedicated to preserving “the right to seek, receive, and disseminate information and opinions freely.” (Declaration of Principles on the Right to Freedom of Expression). The call to reduce the budget for this office was a demand to limit, if not curtail its effectiveness. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, the press has been censured, and in certain cases closed, because of stories critical of the government.

The third complaint requesting that the IACHR move out of Washington did not receive the same objection. Both Costa Rica and Peru offered to host the commission, should it have to leave the OAS building and support structure thereof.

It is noteworthy that Mexico, which has received more complaints before the IACHR in the last two years than any other nation within the OAS, rejected the demands of Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia, which during its civil war with the FARC had been the object of criticism from numerous, alleged victims of human rights, also rejected the demands. While Bolivia and Nicaragua joined in the Ecuadoran demand, the Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) did not do so; nor did Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, Canada and the United States. The four ALBA continental nations were marginalized and on this occasion failed to modify the rules and process of the OAS. Only Argentina prevented the walk-out of Ecuador and Venezuela by presenting a motion that enabled the OAS to continue debating the three reforms.

The contest will continue and Ecuador will seek to lead its ALBA allies in rejecting liberal democratic concepts, such as human rights and press freedom. The significance of the 44th Extraordinary General Assemblyof the OAS is that the ALBA countries failed to undermine the democratic principles of the Inter-American system. If anything, the criticism has strengthened the resolve of the Western Hemisphere to retain its ideals and maintain a process by which individuals can bring complaints before an international body that accepts the sovereignty of the people, not the governors.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

The Fear That Drives Russia's Support For Syria's Assad

Fiona Hill — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Fiona Hill discusses how Vladimir Putin’s fear of state disintegration influences his actions on Syria. Read an excerpt below.

Neal Conan: Repeated American attempts to work with Russia on Syria have floundered on a fundamental difference. Vladimir Putin insists on a deal that includes Bashar al-Assad as part of Syria's future. So the civil war grinds on and the situation of civilians there grows ever more dire. So why? Arms exports? Access to the port of Tartus? Standing up for old allies?

In a recent article in foreign affairs Fiona Hill argues that Putin looks at Syria and sees his old fears of Chechnya brought back to life. Fiona Hill was co-author of "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin," and joins us now on the phone from Florida near Miami. Good to have you with us today.

Fiona Hill: Hi. Thank you, Neal. Thanks for having me.

Conan: So how can Mr. Putin look at a civil war in Syria and she - a nightmare for him, the old rebellion in Chechnya?

Hill: Well, this is a prism that he's brought to looking at most conflicts like the conflicts in Syria that threatened the sanctity of his state. Mr. Putin actually came in to the presidency if you can recall back in '99, 2000 in Russia, just as the second war in Chechnya was starting off. And he saw that as his biggest challenge of keeping the Russian state together, so it didn't fall down the same path as the Soviet Union into collapse. And Putin was really brutal in pursuing the war in Chechnya. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in that holocaust of conflict including many civilians.

The capital city of Grozny in Chechnya was reduced completely to rubble, and Putin felt that this was worthwhile because it kept the state together. And over the course of the conflict in Chechnya it morphed in the same way that we've actually seen in the war in Syria. It went from a conflict that was mostly focused on political secession from Chechnya, from the Russian Federation and over time, really took on more of an extremist element, more of Sunni extremist groups who moved in to exploit the conflict and also many people who came from outside including from Syria to fight in Chechnya.

And Putin is now pretty much concerned that we're going to see a repetition, the collapse of the states in Syria, knock-on effect for conflicts at home for him as well as (unintelligible) across the hall in the Middle East. And yet again, another collapse of the state, that is something that he would like to see avoided at all costs.

Conan: Now Russia, a state with considerable resources was able to pacify, I think that's probably the right word - Chechnya. It is a completely different situation in Syria.

Hill: Neal, I'm very sorry. I didn't hear that. Could you repeat it, please?

Conan: I was saying that because of its enormous resources, Russia was able to pacify Chechnya, at least for the time being. Syria seems to be a very different situation.

Hill: That's very much the case. Yes. Mr. Putin has a lot of things that he was able to draw upon that Mr. Assad has not. He was able to take out the Chechnyan position, both at home and also abroad. In 2004, the Russians assassinated one of the top leaders of the Chechnyan opposition, Mr. Yandarbiyev, who had been an acting president and he was in Doha in Qatar at the time and was killed in a car bomb explosion.

Also other members of the opposition were picked off in other cities including in Europe. And Mr. Putin brought the full weight of the Russian army against the Chechnyans. And also he was able to perceive the war for such a long time quite ruthlessly because the Chechnyan opposition, generally, because of the number of very high level terrorist attacks and this infiltration of extremists lost any kind of support among the population.

So it was a very different conflict. It was very much confined to one region of Russia although there were terrorist attacks and spillover across the whole of the Russian Federation. But it wasn't at all like Syria where it's a full-blown civil war. And Mr. Assad is actually, at this point, seemingly perhaps not outgunned but certainly outnumbered by the number of opposition that are arrayed against him.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: NPR

Image Source: © Rogan Ward / Reuters

The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa: A Human Rights Milestone

Tue, 26 Mar 2013 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 26, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On December 6, 2012, the world’s first regional treaty on internal displacement came into effect. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, known as the Kampala Convention, breaks new ground in articulating the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the responsibilities of states, regional organizations, and other actors to uphold them. With almost ten million people internally displaced across twenty-one sub-Saharan African states, the continent is home to one third of the world’s IDPs. Hopes are high that the Kampala Convention will make a concrete contribution to improving the wellbeing of IDPs across Africa, but this depends on the effective implementation of the Convention. How will African states, civil society organizations, and their international supporters respond to this challenge?

On March 26, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement hosted a discussion on this landmark achievement, its implications for IDP protection in Africa, and strategies to support the effective implementation of the agreement. Panelists included Chaloka Beyani, UN special rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement; Niels Harild, lead social development specialist (displacement) with the World Bank; and Andrea Lari, director of programs at Refugees International. Megan Bradley, fellow with the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, moderated and provided introductory remarks.

Audio

The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa: A Human Rights Milestone

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130326_kampala_convention_transcript

The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad

Fiona Hill — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 12:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by Foreign Affairs.

Few issues better illustrate the limits of the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia than the crisis in Syria. For more than a year, the United States has tried, and failed, to work with Russia to find a solution to end the violence. Moscow has firmly opposed international intervention to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, arguing that the conflict must be resolved through negotiations and that Assad must be included in any transitional arrangement leading to a new government. Although the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reached out recently to the leaders of the Syrian opposition, these talks produced no indication that the Kremlin is seriously recalibrating its positions on Syria. And that’s hardly surprising: the main obstacle to any shift in Russia’s calculations is President Vladimir Putin himself, whose aversion to forcible regime change is intense and unwavering.

Why has Putin offered such steadfast support to Assad? On the surface, Moscow seems to profit from exporting arms to Syria, and it depends on the regime’s good will to maintain Russian access to a naval facility at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. But these are marginal and symbolic interests. Putin is really motivated to support the Assad regime by his fear of state collapse -- a fear he confronted most directly during the secession of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Chechnya, which he brutally suppressed in a bloody civil war and counterinsurgency operation fought between 1999 and 2009. (In Russia, the republics are semi-autonomous federal units comprising the historic territories of the country’s non-ethnic Russian groups.) In a series of interviews he gave in 2000 for an authorized biography, Putin declared that “the essence of the ... situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist.... I was convinced that if we did not immediately stop the extremists [in Chechnya], then in no time at all we would be facing a second Yugoslavia across the entire territory of the Russian Federation -- the Yugoslavization of Russia.” And we know how Putin feels about the demise of the Soviet Union; in 2005 he called it “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century,” a comment that was meant to bemoan the collapse of the Soviet state rather than the demise of communism.

For Putin, Syria is all too reminiscent of Chechnya. Both conflicts pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups. In Putin’s view -- one that he stresses repeatedly in meetings with his U.S. and European counterparts -- Syria is the latest battleground in a global, multi-decade struggle between secular states and Sunni Islamism, which first began in Afghanistan with the Taliban, then moved to Chechnya, and has torn a number of Arab countries apart. Ever since he took office (first as prime minister in 1999 and then as president in 2000) and was confronted by the Chechen war, Putin has expressed his fear of Sunni Islamist extremism and of the risks that “jihadist” groups pose to Russia, with its large, indigenous, Sunni Muslim population, concentrated in the North Caucasus, the Volga region, and in major cities such as Moscow. A desire to contain extremism is a major reason why Putin offered help to the United States in battling the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. It is also why Russia maintains close relations with Shia Iran, which acts as a counterweight to Sunni powers.

The conflicts in both Chechnya and Syria pitted the state against disparate and leaderless opposition forces, which over time came to include extremist Sunni Islamist groups.

In the case of Chechnya, Putin made it clear that retaking the republic from its “extremist opposition forces” was worth every sacrifice. In a speech in September 1999, he promised to pursue Chechen rebels and terrorists even into “the outhouse.” He did just that, and some opposition leaders were killed by missile attacks at their most vulnerable moments. The Chechen capital city of Grozny was reduced to rubble. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, along with jihadist fighters who came into Chechnya with the encouragement of extremist groups from the Arab world, including from Syria. Moscow and other Russian cities endured devastating terrorist attacks. Putin’s treatment of Chechnya became a cautionary tale of what would happen to rebels and terrorists -- and indeed to entire groups of people -- if they threatened the Russian state. They would either be eliminated or brought to their knees -- exactly the fate Putin wishes for today’s Syrian rebels.

After two decades of secessionist strife, Putin has contained Chechnya’s uprising. Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel who switched his allegiance to Moscow, now leads the republic. Putin granted Kadyrov and his supporters amnesty and gave them a mandate to go after other militants and political opponents. Kadyrov has rebuilt Grozny (with ample funds from Moscow) and created his own version of an Islamist and Chechen republic that is condemned by human rights organizations for its brutal suppression of dissent.

For the past two years, Putin has hoped that Assad would be able to do what he did in Chechnya and beat back the opposition. Based on the brutal record of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in suppressing uprisings, Putin anticipated that the regime would have no problem keeping the state together. But now Assad seems to have failed, and Putin is not one to back a losing horse. He and the rest of the Russian leadership are well aware that their staunch support for Assad has damaged Russia’s standing in the Arab world, but they have no alternative plan to get out of the stalemate. Putin is still not ready to sanction an intervention that could lead to the dismantling of the Syrian state and to risk creating a situation akin to that in Afghanistan in the 1990s, when warring groups of extremists fought each other and created a breeding ground for global jihadism. In Putin’s view, lawless post-Qaddafi Libya, which has become an exporter of guns, fighters, and refugees to its neighbors, only further underscores the dangers of international intervention.

Before abandoning Assad, Putin will need to have answers to some pressing questions: Who will be responsible for the fallout from the regime’s collapse? Who will keep Sunni extremists in check? Who will keep extremists away from the North Caucasus and other Russian regions with large Sunni Muslim populations? And finally, who will ensure the security of Syria’s chemical weapons? Putin certainly does not trust the United States to play this stabilizing role: as he sees it, when the United States pulled out of Iraq, it left behind a Shia strongman, Nouri al-Maliki, to suppress the Sunnis; the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is leaving only uncertainty in its wake. In short, Putin doubts that the United States and the international community can deliver stability to Syria, so he continues to stand by the flailing regime as the only means of avoiding the collapse of the state altogether.

Although Putin looks at Syria and sees Chechnya, the situations are quite different. All of Syria is in the throes of civil war, and Assad does not have the same resources that Putin had in dealing with Chechnya. He cannot eliminate key representatives and supporters of the opposition abroad as Putin did with the Chechens, including by assassinating the former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004 to stop his fundraising and recruiting activities. Unable to crush or co-opt the opposition, Assad has taken Syria over the precipice. Syria is also bristling with conventional weaponry along with an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that pose a significant threat to neighboring states. Those neighbors -- Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, and Iran farther afield -- have been engulfed in the conflict. In contrast, in spite of the flows of money and men into Chechnya and the spillover of refugees and terrorist acts into the rest of Russia (and sometimes into Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), there was no similar proliferation threat in the Chechen war, and no outside powers ever became heavily involved. Chechnya is in a bad neighborhood, but Syria is in a terrible neighborhood, and the effects of the Syrian conflict cannot be contained in the way that Chechnya’s were.

Neither these differences nor the scale of the humanitarian tragedy will convince Putin to change his mind on Syria. The Russian president will continue to hold out against intervention and insist that negotiations with Assad must be part of the way forward, until some strongman can be found to restore a semblance of order to Syria’s chaos. If, by some miracle, Syria does not turn into a full-scale regional disaster, Putin will pat himself on the back and say it was thanks to him because he prevented an intervention. If the more likely scenario plays out, Putin will blame Washington. He will hold the United States responsible for destroying Syria and empowering Sunni Islamist extremists by championing democracy and the Arab revolutions. Meanwhile, Putin’s obstinacy is already turning his worst nightmare -- the fracturing of a geopolitically important state -- into a reality.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: Foreign Affairs

North Korea Faces Heightened Human Rights Scrutiny

Roberta Cohen — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On March 21, 2013 the United Nations Human Rights Council, a body of 47 states, adopted by consensus a resolution to establish a commission of inquiry (COI) into North Korea’s “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights.”[1] The commission is to be composed of three experts who will intensively investigate for a period of one year the human rights violations perpetrated by North Korea’s government with a view to ensuring "full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity" [emphasis added].

The establishment of the commission reflects long overdue recognition that a human rights ‘emergency’ exists in North Korea. Commissions of inquiry at the United Nations have mainly been directed at situations like Syria, Darfur or Libya where conflicts, atrocities and destruction are clearly visible and in the headlines. Adding North Korea to the list suggests a new look at what a human rights crisis might be. In contrast to other situations, North Korea has always managed to hide its crimes. Most prison camps are in remote mountain areas, access to the country is barred to human rights groups, and rigid internal controls make it impossible for anyone who does manage to visit to talk with North Koreans about human rights. Indeed, the lack of access and the UN’s inability to form an “independent diagnosis” of the situation has long contributed to the reluctance of its senior officials to speak out strongly about North Korea.[2] Even the US State Department’s human rights report for 2011, published in 2012, contained the caveat that no one can “assess fully human rights conditions or confirm reported abuses” in North Korea.[3]

The change in attitude also reflects an international willingness to move beyond mere censure in addressing North Korea’s human rights violations. For more than eight years, the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council have adopted annual resolutions expressing “very serious concern” at North Korea’s systematic, widespread and grave violations. Now, the international community is viewing North Korea’s violations as possible crimes against humanity for which North Korean leaders could be held accountable. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared for the first time in 2013 that North Korea’s “rampant” violations “may amount to crimes against humanity.”[4] And in his report to the Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, Marzuki Darusman, identified nine specific areas where North Korea might be committing crimes against humanity. These include: food policies leading to starvation; prison camps; arbitrary detention; the use of torture and inhuman treatment; enforced disappearances and abductions; policies of discrimination; and violations of freedom of expression and movement, and of the right to life through executions and extensive use of the death penalty.[5]

According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, crimes against humanity are among the most severe human rights violations, constituting one of the four core international crimes (in addition to war crimes, genocide and the crime of aggression). Murder, enslavement, unlawful imprisonment, torture, sexual violence and disappearance are considered crimes against humanity when they are perpetrated as part of “a widespread or systematic attack” against the civilian population.[6]

Since 2006, non-governmental organizations have argued that North Korea’s human rights violations constitute crimes against humanity.[7] Now for the first time, senior UN officials and many governments are beginning to view North Korea’s violations as possible international crimes as well.

Testimony of Former Prisoners

One reason for the change in attitude is the testimony of prison camp survivors. Among the 25,000 North Koreans who have made their way to South Korea over the past decade, hundreds have been former prisoners and have come forward to give their accounts. Published and well disseminated in the West, they have created a stir. One of the first was The Aquariums of Pyongyang by Kang Chol Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot which described former prisoner Kang’s 10 year experience in a camp.[8] Published in France in 2000, the account is credited with having influenced the French government to press the UN Commission on Human Rights (predecessor to the Human Rights Council) to adopt its first resolution on human rights in North Korea in 2003.[9] The following year, after President Bush read the book and met with Kang, the US gave its strong support to the establishment of a UN special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea.[10]

Drawing on the testimony of prison camp survivors, David Hawk wrote the first in depth study of the prison labor camp system in 2003, Hidden Gulag, published by the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.[11] The updated version in 2012 contained the accounts of 60 former prisoners and prison guards. Most instructive was that the accumulated accounts began to corroborate one another, giving them a ‘factual’ basis even though there was no direct access to the country or its prisons. And the testimonies were reinforced by satellite imagery from Google Earth and by prisoners’ drawings,[12] making them far more difficult to dismiss. As a result,[13] North Korea’s denial of the camps and dismissal of victims’ accounts as the “unfounded” falsehoods of defectors seeking to betray their country increasingly failed to persuade.

The book, Escape from Camp 14 by Washington Post reporter Blaine Harden attracted extensive publicity in 2012 and is said to have encouraged officials inside the UN to press for the commission of inquiry. Navi Pillay was reportedly moved when she met with Shin Dong Hyuk, the subject of the book, and another survivor.[14] In simple but powerful prose, the book describes the experiences of Shin who was born in the camps and who has been going from country to country with the book, now translated into a number of languages, to tell what was done to him by the prison camp system.[15]

By speaking out, North Korea’s former prisoners regularly put themselves at risk and also may jeopardize their family members, colleagues and friends left behind. (Both Shin and Kang have enlisted the help of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to assist them in finding out information about their father and sister, respectively.) To reduce the number of North Koreans telling their stories, Pyongyang has been intensely cracking down at its border with China to prevent North Koreans’ departure for the South. The total number of North Koreans who have reached South Korea in 2012 was 1,509, about half the number from the year before.[16] But North Koreans continue to come forward, using their only weapon against the regime—information.

Patience Wears Thin

Another reason for the commission of inquiry is that the international community reached a limit in its patience for tolerating North Korea’s failure to cooperate with the UN in the human rights area. For ten years the High Commissioner for Human Rights has tried to establish a dialogue with the North Korean government and develop technical cooperation agreements—an arrangement the Office has with more than 50 governments. But year after year, Pyongyang failed to cooperate. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon even instructed his Special Envoy to Pyongyang in 2010 to urge North Korea to cooperate with the High Commissioner.[17] But by 2013, High Commissioner Pillay announced, “I don’t think the world should stand by and see this kind of situation, which is not improving at all.”[18] “For years now,” she said, “the Government of DPRK has persistently refused to cooperate with successive Special Rapporteurs…or with my Office.”[19] She waited, she said until after Kim Jong Un took over from his father in 2011, but when no reforms were forthcoming, she decided to take a “firmer step.”[20] UN General Assembly resolutions similarly expressed concern with North Korea’s failure to cooperate with the High Commissioner, the Special Rapporteur and the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of North Korea.[21] The UN, it can be said, reached a tipping point, perhaps abetted by North Korea’s rocket and nuclear tests and continued provocative threats.

Although North Korea has claimed that the commission of inquiry is part of a “political plot” of “hostile forces,[22] it is noteworthy that those in the forefront of the UN system in support of the commission are not Westerners. High Commissioner Pillay, the senior most UN official to publicly call for the commission, is a South African of Indian origin. Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur, who issued the 2012 report which served as the foundation for the call, was the former Attorney General of Indonesia. He built on the work of his predecessor, Thai law Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, in telling the Human Rights Council that “the violations in the DPRK have reached a critical mass,” and that “many, if not all, of the nine patterns of violation, identified in my present report, may amount to crimes against humanity.”[23] Although North Korea calls the material on which the report is based “faked,” [24] the report issued by Darusman is well documented, lawyerly and based on considerable research, as could be seen from the annexes to the text.

Other parts of the UN human rights system have joined in to express support for the commission of inquiry. Drawn from countries like Argentina, Senegal and South Africa, the UN’s independent experts on torture, arbitrary detention, disappearances and extrajudicial executions issued a joint statement together with Darusman endorsing an international inquiry.[25] This joint action on behalf of the commission occurred after the rapporteurs received no response from North Korea to a query they made about the prison labor system.

Most significantly, governmental support has increased for bringing North Koreato account. When the UN General Assembly first adopted a resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation in 2005, 88 states voted for the resolution. By 2011, the number of states supporting the resolution had gone up to 123. In 2012, the 193-member General Assembly adopted the resolution by consensus, that is, without a vote, with states like China, Cuba and Venezuela comprising a minority who disassociated themselves from the text after its adoption. Last year, the Human Rights Council also adopted its annual human rights resolution onNorth Korea by consensus, suggesting the development of a greater unanimity aboutNorth Korea’s human rights record. At this session, the resolution creating a commission of inquiry was adopted by consensus.

Another strong player which North Korea must reckon with is an NGO coalition of more than 40 organizations. In 2011, the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity (ICNK) in North Korea was formed.[26] ICNK has lobbied governments, published opeds, and worked the corridors at the UN to press for the creation of a commission of inquiry. Although NGOs can be competitive and even undercut each other’s work, the more than 40 groups that have banded together have shown remarkable unity and effectiveness. The coalition includes the major international human rights NGOs as well as groups from a variety of Asian and other countries. It is now heavily invested in the success of the commission’s work.

Indeed, a worldwide effort will be needed to help bring forward information to the commission so that it can produce the best and most well documented report. The Council’s resolution calls upon UN specialized agencies, regional bodies, UN rapporteurs, experts and NGOs to cooperate with the commission. But governments should be expected to cooperate as well, in particular to provide relevant information, sometimes on a confidential basis, including satellite information that might be more precise than what is currently available to NGOs.

An Overall Strategy

The commission of inquiry should not be seen as an end in itself but rather as part of a larger strategy to promote human rights inNorth Korea. A strategic plan should be developed and led by the Secretary-General together with the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It should have definite goals like achieving a dialogue with North Korea; disseminating to its schools, government offices and institutions Korean translations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; gaining international access to the penal labor camps; bringing an end to the prison system and forced labor; and allowing freedom of movement for North Koreans across borders. A strategic plan would bring together the myriad UN offices and agencies involved with North Korea, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Program, the International Labor Organization, the UN Department of Public Information, UNESCO, the World Food Program and other humanitarian organizations so that the entire system can be tapped and work together. Humanitarian groups in particular should be consulted about causes of starvation in the country and access to those in need. They should be reminded that “the most vulnerable” in the population include the 100,000 to 200,000 political prisoners held in camps on starvation rations. In sum, a comprehensive strategy needs to be developed.

The New Human Rights Landscape

Admittedly, heightened international scrutiny of North Korea’s human rights record may have little impact on the ground in the short term. It is likely North Korea will continue to defy efforts by the UN to establish dialogue and technical assistance programs. It may even crack down harder against its population and those seeking to flee across the border. But over the longer term, the growing number of states, including those from developing countries, as well as UN officials, experts and NGOs arrayed against North Koreabecause of its human rights record may give some North Koreans pause, especially since efforts will be made by UN officials to identify individuals and institutions to hold accountable in future. Moreover, the states which North Korea might turn to for talks and aid will be influenced as well. The United States, for example, long has separated its human rights concerns from its political and nuclear relationships with North Korea, but it also has felt pressured by the strong publicity coming out about the human rights situation. Glyn Davies, the Special Representative for North Korea Policy told the Senate on March 7, 2013, that “U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights” [emphasis added].[27] This perhaps suggests the beginnings of a more integrated policy on the part of theUS for dealing with North Korea. It is to be hoped that the idea will spread to other countries as well.

Even North Korea’s principal ally China is reported to be growing uncomfortable with the regime’s provocations and excesses. Although China has remained for the most part steadfast in its support of North Korea, North Korean officials can themselves read in the press that questions are arising in China about its policies in support of North Korea.[28] One article even pointed to public concerns in China about its own labor camps and whether they should be closed.[29]

It is not easy to predict when change will come. It was not foreseen that the Berlin Wall would fall when it did, that the Soviet Union would collapse, and that reforms would take place in Arab countries. But bringing down the information wall around North Korea and exposing its crimes against humanity may in time lead to change.

[1] UN Human Rights Council, Resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK (draft on file with author), adopted March 21, 2013.

[2] See Roberta Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea,” prepared for The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights’ book, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Conscience for the World (University of Nottingham, 2013) (forthcoming).

[3] US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: DPRK, “ENDNOTE: NOTE ON SOURCING,” at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eap/186279.htm.

[4] “Pillay urges more attention to human rights abuses in North Korea, calls for international inquiry,” News Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 14, 2013 [henceforth Pillay Statement 2013], at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E.

[5] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Marzuki Darusman, A/HRC/22/57, February 1, 2013, paras. 6, 25, 31.

[6] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimes_against_humanity#International_Criminal_Court. For discussion of crimes against humanity, see David Hawk, Hidden Gulag, second edition, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, pp. 154-167.

[7] See Vaclav Havel, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Elie Wiesel, Failure to Protect: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea,” U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and DLA PIPER, October 30, 2006, pp. ii, 11; see also Hawk, Hidden Gulag, 2012, pp. vii,173-174.

[8] Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (The Perseus Press, 2000) (French) later translated into English (Basic Books).

[9] See Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea.”

[10] Ibid.

[11] See David Hawk, Hidden Gulag, Committee for Human Rights inNorth Korea, 2003.

[12] See Hawk, Hidden Gulag, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012.

[13] See for example the annual White Paper on North Korean Human Rights, Database Center for North Korean Human Rights; and the Reports on political prisoners’ camps of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea. See also Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports.

[14] See Cohen, “The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and North Korea.”

[15] See Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14 (Viking, 2012); and CNN at http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/living/escape-camp-14-book-story.

[16] See Choe Sang-Hun, “Fleeing North Korea Is Becoming Harder,” New York Times, January 5, 2013.

[17] UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Situation of human rights in the DPRK, A/65/391, September 24, 2010, paras. 2, 46, 86.

[18] Tom Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’ to investigate the human rights record,” Reuters, March 11, 2013.

[19] Pillay Statement 2013.

[20] Pillay Statement 2013.

[21] See UN General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/67/L.50, 9 November 2012. At the Universal Periodic Review of North Korea in 2009-10, governments made 167 recommendations to improve human rights conditions but the North Korean authorities failed to identify one recommendation it would carry out. See “Human Rights Council adopts outcomes of Universal Periodic Review on Bhutan, Dominica and DPRK,” March 18, 2010.

[22] Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’”; and Jennifer M. Freedman, “North Korean Rights Abuses May Be Crimes Against Humanity,” Bloomberg News, March 12, 2013.

[23] “U.N. monitor accuses N.K of crimes against humanity,” The Korea Herald, March 12, 2013.

[24] See Miles, “North Korea slams U.N. ‘plot’”; and Freedman, “North Korean Rights Abuses May Be Crimes Against Humanity.”

[25] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN experts call for an international inquiry into North Korea human rights abuses,” News Release, February 27, 2013.

[26] See http://www.stopnkcrimes.org/about_01.php.

[27] Testimony of Glyn Davies, Special Representative forNorth Korea Policy, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,Washington, DC, March 7, 2013.

[28] See, for example, Deng Yuwen, “China Should abandon North Korea,” Financial Times, February 27, 2013; “‘Give up on Pyongyang,’ says China insider,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 2, 1013; Jane Perlez, “Some Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend,” New York Times, February 17, 2013; Fareed Zakaria, “A high-stakes game,” Washington Post, March 14, 2013; and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Re-think Chinese Policy Toward North Korea,” cited in The Nelson Report, February 13, 2013.

[29] William Wax, “In China, labor camps face an uncertain future,” Washington Post, March 4, 2013.

Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: 38 North

Protecting Mogadishu’s Internally Displaced Persons: Past Failures, Future Challenges

Wed, 20 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 20, 2013
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Zilkha Room
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

In 2011-2012 Somalia was affected by a devastating famine—caused by ongoing insecurity, an unrelenting drought, and restricted humanitarian assistance—which exacerbated the country’s ongoing displacement crisis. Hundreds of thousands of Somalia’s estimated 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) have sought shelter in Mogadishu, but instead of finding safe refuge there, many of the displaced have encountered a hostile and abusive environment.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and Human Rights Watch held a panel discussion about abuses of IDPs in Mogadishu, looking in particular at the interlinked security, justice, governance, and development challenges for the new government of Somalia. The session featured the presentation of a new report by Human Rights Watch on internal displacement in Mogadishu.

Meeting under Chatham House rules, over thirty participants from the U.S. government, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations contributed to the discussion. This followed presentations by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Human Rights Watch, and USAID on the evolving political and security situation in Somalia, abuses of IDPs, and the humanitarian response.

There is optimism for Somalia’s future as the new government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has had diplomatic successes and international support for his “six pillar policy.” But major concerns and challenges remain for the federal government as it does not have complete control within Mogadishu, let alone outside the capital. A heavy reliance on AMISOM and regional military continues. Clan conflicts and the development of a solid federal system remain major unresolved challenges as some authorities outside Mogadishu are at odds with the central government. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab is a shifting threat, as the organization plays a waiting game to see if political opposition to the new government will emerge in Mogadishu.

All this sets a precarious stage for the situation of the internally displaced in the capital. The government announced in January that it is planning to relocate Mogadishu’s tens of thousands of internally displaced people to the outskirts of the city, a proposition that raises significant human rights concerns, in addition to complex logistical and development challenges. Human Rights Watch’s new report details the existing serious abuses against IDPs, including physical attacks, restrictions on movement and access to food and shelter, and clan-based discrimination against the displaced in Mogadishu from the height of the famine in mid-2011 through 2012.

The Human Rights Watch report draws particular attention to the ways in which government forces, affiliated militia, and private parties, notably camp managers known as “gatekeepers” or “black cats,” prey upon vulnerable IDP communities. Rape and sexual abuse of displaced women and girls, including by government soldiers and militia members, has been an enormous problem in the unprotected environment of the camps. Gatekeepers and militias controlling the camps have also diverted and stolen food aid intended for famine-stricken camp residents, and in some cases have prevented IDPs from leaving the camps in order to attract greater humanitarian assistance for their own benefit. These abuses highlight the importance of systematically integrating protection and access to basic services into any relocation plans, and ensuring that the timeframe for the implementation of these plans is realistic.

The discussion highlighted the particular vulnerabilities facing IDPs from the Rahanweyn and Bantu communities, as well as those from minority groups within the predominant clans. Particularly in regions that were the most affected by the famine, lack of clan protection exacerbates IDPs’ physical insecurity, and their lack of access to key services. Clan membership, both of IDPs and of gatekeepers, must therefore be carefully taken into account in discussions of IDP protection. Participants also explored challenges surrounding security sector reform in Somalia, stressing the need for more in-depth donor engagement on this issue, and for international actors to exercise greater caution in determining which individuals and groups they support.

Event Materials

HRWsomaliaMarch2013

Participants

Panelists

Laetitia Bader

Researcher

Lawrence Meserve

Acting Deputy Asst. Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow for Africa, Institute for National Strategic Studies