Following opening remarks from Brookings President John R. Allen, Representative Meng discussed the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, which aims to strengthen hate crime reporting by expediting the review process of COVID-19 hate crimes and addressing reporting problems at the local level. The act, championed by her and Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI), passed both the House and Senate earlier that week. Representative Kim then detailed his experience with discrimination in his previous role at the State Department, including being banned from working on issues related to Korea due to being Korean American. He urged viewers to consider how U.S. foreign policy affects Asian Americans, and how improperly handling the U.S.-China rivalry can usher a new era of xenophobia in America.

Following the keynote addresses, Nicol Turner-Lee, senior fellow in Governance Studies and director of the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, moderated a panel on domestic policy, which consisted of Frank H. Wu, president of Queens College; Willow Lung-Amam, nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies at Brookings; and Janelle Wong, professor of American Studies at the University of Maryland. The conversation explored the spike in anti-AAPI hate incidents, the compounding historical circumstances surrounding these incidents, and the breadth of the AAPI community’s experiences and impact on American history.

Wu provided historical context by positing that the Black and white racial paradigm in the United States overshadows the Asian American experience. He further explained the history of the term “Asian American” as one of solidarity with the struggles of other minority groups in the country. Wu pointed to the new awareness of the long-time systemic issues that the AAPI community faces but noted that much of the denial of the racial nature of hate incidents remains.

Lung-Amam argued that the model minority myth is a product of white supremacy that pits non-white groups against each other. She also challenged the construction of the AAPI community as monolithic and homogenous, cautioning that it pits Asian Americans against other non-white, minority groups and perpetuates intra-ethnic discrimination within the broader AAPI community. Lung-Amam discussed the discriminatory practices of racial zoning as one of the many threads connecting the AAPI and African American civil rights movements that is lost when these narratives of the model minority myth and the AAPI community dominate.

Wong presented several statistics highlighting the significant political presence of the AAPI community. Specifically, she emphasized the high rates of reports of racial discrimination from members of the Pacific Islander community and explained how colonialism plays a role in why Pacific Islanders and Native Americans continue to experience discouraging rates of discrimination and hate incidents.

The three panelists also called out anti-Black sentiments within the AAPI community and emphasized the need for coalition-building through solidarity and an understanding of shared histories. Wong urged Asian Americans at the forefront of dismantling equity programs, such as affirmative action and the integration of magnet schools, to stop and work toward solidarity for the sake of all minority groups.

Following the domestic policy panel, Cheng Li, senior fellow in Foreign Policy and director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, moderated a panel on foreign policy, which consisted of Diana Fu, associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto and nonresident fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute; and Jessica Lee, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute. The panelists emphasized the challenge of confronting China’s antagonistic actions while simultaneously preventing the escalation of the U.S.-China rivalry from negatively impacting Asian Americans at home.

Fu began by commenting on the roots of Canada’s anti-Asian history and the current rise in anti-Asian sentiments, highlighting the internationality of the challenges Asians and Pacific Islanders face. She urged against the anti-solidarity positions on Chinese social media, particularly from older generations of the Asian community in the U.S., Canada, and elsewhere, who sought to deter Asians from standing in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protestors following the murder of George Floyd.

Hsiao asserted that U.S. foreign policy impacts U.S. domestic conditions, and vice versa. He argued that anti-Asian sentiment in the domestic sphere, coupled with anti-China sentiment in the foreign policy sphere, go beyond partisan politics, and that both sides of the political spectrum have a role in remedying these respective tensions.

Lee commented on how rising tensions with China, heightened during the Trump administration, directly impacted the job environments for Asian Americans. She implored future administrations to de-escalate tensions with China, while appropriately engaging and criticizing human rights abuses in ways that don’t foster misplaced hatred toward Asian Americans and the Asian diaspora.

Likewise, the panelists described the escalating discourse by U.S. policymakers toward China as reminiscent of the Cold War era and argued that it has contributed to cyclical antagonism between the two superpowers, leaving the AAPI community vulnerable to collateral damage. The panelists finished with an earnest discussion about the responsibility of policymakers to conduct policy that mends the tensions between the United States and China and stands firm against China’s abuses, while also addressing the damage that this hostile rhetoric against China has done for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States, Canada, and around the world.

      

No African issue has absorbed as much time in the early months of the Biden administration as has the ongoing—and avoidable—tragedy in Ethiopia’s Tigray province. President Biden was forceful and correct in calling for an end to the “large-scale human rights abuses” occurring in Tigray, including the widespread sexual violence and the need for Eritrean and Amhara forces to withdraw from the province. Now, the administration is stuck in the tough position of considering sanctions that would cut off funding to the country from the U.S., its allies, and the multilaterals, which could risk further delegitimizing and destabilizing an already fragile government.

Nonetheless, the decision to impose visa restrictions on Ethiopian and Eritrean officials who are responsible for the atrocities in Tigray is an appropriate action, and a watershed given Ethiopia’s long-standing role as a key regional ally. There is clearly scope for ratcheting up the sanctions if Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Peace prize in 2019, does not deescalate the conflict and follow through on his commitments to senior American officials, including Senator Chris Coons and Special Envoy Jeffery Feltman.

A next step could be along the lines recently advocated during Congressional testimony by John Prendergast, the human rights activist and co-founder of the Sentry, in which he called for carefully targeted Magnitsky sanctions. Such sanctions would include asset freezes on Ethiopian and Eritrean officials and their national and international networks through which they perpetuate the conflict and benefit personally.

The principal dilemma for the Biden administration is how to mobilize pressure on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to induce him to end the conflict and the suffering without turning Ethiopia—the largest recipient of American development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa—into a pariah nation.

A pariah nation?

The principal dilemma for the Biden administration is how to mobilize pressure on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to induce him to end the conflict and the suffering without turning Ethiopia—the largest recipient of American development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa—into a pariah nation.

In addition to the visa sanctions, the administration has shown a willingness to walk a diplomatic tightrope of pressuring the Ahmed government, reportedly imposing cuts in security and economic assistance and extending $350 million in food aid in hopes of fending off starvation in Tigray.

Perhaps the most difficult decision facing the administration is whether it should cancel a $500 million investment that the board of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) approved in January that enabled the Vodafone Group Plc to win a new mobile-phone license issued by the Ethiopian government last month. It would be a mistake for the Biden administration to cancel this financing.

The award of the first telecoms license for $850 million is the largest foreign direct investment in the country’s history, according to a tweet by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The winning consortium, led by Kenya’s Safaricom along with Vodafone and South Africa’s Vodacom, plans to invest $8.5 billion in their network in the coming decade. They have also committed to creating 1.1 million jobs in 10 years and covering the country with a 4G service by 2023. The U.K. development finance institution CDC and Sumitomo Corporation will also provide financial support this effort in addition to the USDFC.

A bid of $600 million for a second telecoms license was rejected by the Ethiopian government for being too low. This bid was made by the MTN Group Ltd of South Africa and a Chinese state investment group, the Silk Road Fund. The license apparently will be retendered. The government also plans to privatize 45 percent of the state monopoly, Ethio Telecom.

Opening of the economy

A key question surrounding the tender of the licenses was whether the government would permit the cellphone companies to offer mobile money services. The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia controls about half of the country’s banking sector, which limits the prospect for the development of mobile financial services. This would obviously impact the commercial viability of the investment. Mobile services are projected to contribute to nearly 10 percent of Africa’s GDP by 2023, and this will inevitably be an important growth sector in Ethiopia’s economy. Another uncertainty was whether the cell companies could build their own infrastructure or whether they would be required to lease it from Ethio Telecom. On both issues, the consortium apparently received assurances that gave them the confidence to move forward.

In addition to driving skills development and job creation among Ethiopia’s large youth population, the internet will be a vital tool for enhancing transparency and accountability, especially as it concerns elections and human rights.

Access to the internet will be another spinoff of the successful tender. Even though the country is the second-most populous in Africa, its 110 million people are among the most digitally isolated on the continent. The country’s internet penetration of 18 percent is just below Guinea and above the Democratic Republic of the Congo—a remarkable contrast to neighboring Kenya where the internet penetration rate is 85 percent and in Nigeria, where it is 73 percent.

In addition to driving skills development and job creation among Ethiopia’s large youth population, the internet will be a vital tool for enhancing transparency and accountability, especially as it concerns elections and human rights. The recent instances where the Ethiopian government has tried to block internet usage, not only related to the violence in Tigray but in 2020 after the killing of the activist singer Hachalu Hundessa and in 2019 following an alleged coup attempt in the Amhara region, underscore the importance of having networks not controlled by the government.

The region saw the downsides of such control earlier this month when, after Twitter took down a tweet of President Buhari, the government suspended the company in response. Activists and civil society members continued to use virtual private networks to evade the ban in an effort to hold their government accountable, as they did during the EndSARS campaign nine months ago.

The Biden administration needs to stay fully engaged in Ethiopia not only to end the conflict in Tigray but to help the country recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and to ensure that its June 21 elections will be as successful as possible. There is a role for both American pressure and investment in ensuring that the Ethiopian government meets its many challenges.

      

On June 11, as President Biden embarked on his first overseas trip to the United Kingdom to participate in the G-7 Leaders’ Summit, the Center on United States and Europe at Brookings hosted two panel discussions on these questions, as well as a keynote conversation with former U.K. Foreign Secretary and current CEO and President of International Rescue Committee David Miliband.

This event was part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative, which aims to build up and expand resilient networks and trans-Atlantic activities to analyze and work on issues concerning trans-Atlantic relations and social cohesion in Europe and the United States.

Viewers submitted questions for speakers by emailing events@brookings.edu or joining the conversation on Twitter using #BBTI.

      

On May 5, Noha Aboueldahab joins the American University in Cairo for a discussion on transitional justice for the war on terror.

      

Since the global pandemic struck just over a year ago, evidence strongly points toward a deterioration of already worrisome trends regarding the rule of law worldwide. This matters because the rule of law is the essential foundation for ensuring accountability of both government and private actors, just laws that protect fundamental rights, open government, and accessible justice.

At the intersection of these twin crises of public health and rule of law stand four main concerns: constraints on government powers, fundamental rights and discrimination, corruption, and access to justice.

In each of these areas, there is cause for alarm. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic seriously risks further erosion of constraints on government powers, as leaders with an authoritarian bent amass new powers through emergency measures, and courts, legislatures, and other institutional and citizen checks are hampered in carrying out their constitutional duties and rights. New measures criminalizing the spreading of misinformation about the virus or censoring reports about government missteps have been used to silence or attack journalists and opposition critics. Striking evidence has emerged of discriminatory enforcement of lockdown measures and curfews on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, legal status, and gender identity.

Corruption in the health sector has worsened as governments rush supplies and resources to those in need, short-cutting procedures designed to prevent waste and fraud. Moreover, the severe economic fallout of the pandemic is generating even more justice needs, particularly among poor and marginalized communities, many of whom lack legal identity, housing, or formal employment and therefore may not be able to access emergency assistance. Meanwhile, chronically under-resourced justice institutions, many of them operating at reduced capacity due to the pandemic, risk falling even further behind.

According to recent analysis by Freedom House and the University of Gothenberg’s Varieties of Democracy project, freedoms of expression, association and the media have all suffered in the last year. A particularly pernicious inequity has arisen against health workers who already face dire risks by virtue of their occupations.

For workers around the world, this deterioration in the rule of law raises obvious concerns. A stable rule of law system creates an environment by which their rights to organize and bargain collectively are protected; it shields them from discrimination; it provides a regulatory framework for workplace safety; and provides mechanisms for resolving workplace disputes and harms. Research also shows that rule of law correlates positively to economic growth, improved health outcomes, less inequality, and higher levels of education.

The state of the rule of law before Covid-19

Unfortunately, the global pandemic arrived at a time of a marked but steady slide in respect for the rule of law around the world. As documented in the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2020 — which measures the rule of law worldwide based on in-country household and expert surveys — more countries’ rule of law scores declined than improved for the third year in a row. We see this trend in established democracies as well as in less free states and in every region of the world. The persistent decline is particularly pronounced in the areas of government accountability, fundamental rights, and corruption. For example, more countries have declined in their fundamental rights score than any other rule of law factor both over the previous year and the previous five years surveyed.

In the area of labor rights, there is a more mixed picture.

The questions covered in the survey include freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the absence of discrimination with respect to employment, and freedom from forced labor and child labor (Index subfactor 4.8).

Over the most recent five-year period of data collected by WJP, the number of countries that improved or decreased on this sub-factor is about the same, with 53% increasing and 42% decreasing, and around 5% not seeing significant changes. When analyzed on a population-weighted basis, the improving group of 54 countries represents 64% of the world’s population, while the declining group of 43 countries represents only 23% of the world’s population. In other words, during that five-year period, labor rights generally improved for more people around the globe.

A closer look at the numbers underscores a mixed picture of both progress and regression. On the positive side, historically weaker rule of law countries have seen significant improvements in their labor rights score. However, many of these countries have labor rights scores that fall far below the global average (e.g. Tanzania, Afghanistan, Egypt), indicating that while some improvements have been seen over the last few years, countries are still struggling to adequately protect and uphold labor rights. On the other hand, some weaker rule of law countries have also seen large declines on labor rights (e.g. Belize, Brazil, Turkey), proving again that there is no clear, one-size-fits-all picture regarding labor rights and its correlation to rule of law performance more broadly.

Some signs of hope

Trade unions, NGOs, journalists, and citizens have responded bravely to the unfolding pandemic crisis through both direct humanitarian assistance and other services to victims. WJP’s World Justice Challenge 2021, a global competition to recognize innovative projects responding to the rule of law challenges posed by the pandemic, has identified a number of inspiring examples of direct support to workers affected by the crisis.

In Kenya, the Dhobi Women Network launched the Inua Mama Fua project to provide food, personal protective equipment (PPE), psychosocial and access to justice services for women domestic workers in Nairobi who are currently unable to fend for themselves due to the ongoing pandemic that saw their employers send them home. The Guatemalan Women’s Association in Spain pursued strategic litigation and other legal tools to protect migrant workers’ ability to work and receive social benefits during the pandemic. In Nepal, in response to the heightened vulnerabilities of migrant labourers, People Forum provided free legal aid to victims, prepared policy papers, and recommended repatriation and reintegration of returning migrant workers.

In sum, the COVID-19 crisis has eroded the rule of law environment around the world. In response, societies are beginning to acknowledge and tackle the deep structural inequities of current economic and rule of law conditions. The next WJP Rule of Law Index, to be released by October 2021, will provide additional data to help inform unions, activists, governments and the private sector on what priorities need attention and resources as we build a more just recovery from the pandemic.

      

Ambassador of the Netherlands André Haspels and Deputy Mayor of The Hague Saskia Bruines provided opening remarks, alongside video remarks from Justice Stephen Breyer, who stressed the importance of the rule of law. Drawing upon Albert Camus’s “The Plague,” he argued that external threats to democracy are ever-present, and only by working consistently to uphold democratic principles will it survive.

Tsikhanouskaya then gave a keynote address, explaining that the crackdown by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko against the political opposition is “a crisis of unprecedented proportions worsening by the day.” The rule of law has “collapsed,” Tsikhanouskaya said; this is “repression Belarusians haven’t known since the Stalinist times.”

Looking to the future, Tsikhanouskaya remarked that international cooperation with a new democratic Belarus will be “based on universal values of democracy, rule of law, respect for human dignity, and equality.” However, she pointed out that anti-democratic tendencies are currently “deeply entrenched in the fabric of [the] political system and this system has mastered the art of manipulating public opinion and election rigging.”

To sustain the protest movement and facilitate a peaceful transition of power, Tsikhanouskaya concluded that the international community should remain consistent, “true to its own principles, priorities, and policies,” and focused on “flexible, prompt, [and] action-oriented” solutions. She further advocated for placing targeted sanctions with strict conditionalities on the Lukashenko regime and on “Lukashenko’s wallets” — oligarchs in his inner circle — to increase the pressure needed to bring him to the negotiating table. Finally, Tsikhanouskaya urged the international community not to sign agreements with the Lukashenko regime, and to consider revising or voiding prior agreements.

Following her remarks, Stelzenmüller asked Tsikhanouskaya how the Belarusian Liberation Plan will bring Lukashenko to the negotiating table. Tsikhanouskaya explained that although Lukashenko “cares only about himself,” individuals within the government are eager to see the formation of a democratic Belarus. She emphasized that international organizations could pressure Lukashenko to stop what she called a “political and humanitarian crisis” and hold new elections. Considering what advice she would give the citizens of Western democracies, Tsikhanouskaya urged not to “forget about how valuable [democracy] is.” Do not “spoil the meaning of democracy,” she said. Instead, to “try to improve what you have.”

After their conversation, Bob Deen, senior research fellow and coordinator of the Russia and Eastern Europe Center at the Clingendael Institute, opened the panel discussion by pointing out that the current pro-democracy movement in Belarus is stronger and more resilient compared to the 2006 Jeans Revolution and 2017 street protests, and has shown that Lukashenko no longer remains a legitimate leader. Deen argued that the biggest hurdle facing the Belarusian democracy movement now is that Russian support for the Lukashenko regime outweighs international support for the pro-democracy movement.

Kara McDonald, deputy assistant secretary at the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, rejected the idea that “values and interests are at odds or a zero-sum game” and noted that in addition to working closely with the pro-democracy movement, the United States has pushed the Belarusian government to respect human rights and to release all political prisoners.

Gerard Steeghs, director of Multilateral Organizations and Human Rights in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underscored that democracy promotion cannot be done solely through punitive actions or lecturing. Rather, democratic governments must have positive messaging, “making very clear why democracy as a system of government, however imperfect, is able to unlock the potential of society – in the political sense, in the cultural sense, [and] in the economic sense.”

While Stelzenmüller noted that intergovernmental organizations such as NATO have no legal mechanisms to hold illiberal members accountable for anti-democratic behavior, Thomas Wright, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, stressed that “it is very simple to change” the NATO alliance. It could even “be done unilaterally by the United States,” he said, because NATO is just “an interpretation of Article 5 of the founding treaty.”

Concluding the panel, Stelzenmüller said that democracy promotion today is not about creating a “hegemony of Western-style democracies,” but a “practical solidarity with nations and civil society who seek freedom, self-determination, and democracy on their own terms.”

      

في شهر ديسمبر الماضي، اعتقلت الأجهزة الأمنية المغربية المعطي منجب، وهو مؤرّخ مغربي وزميل باتكن سابق في مشروع ديمقراطية وتنمية الشرق الأوسط في معهد بروكنجز، في خلال تناوله الغداء في مطعم في الرباط. وقد اتُّهم منجب، وهو ناقد بارز منذ زمن للحكومة وناشط معروف عالمياً في مجال حقوق الإنسان، بتبييض الأموال. وقال المعلّقون والوسائل الإعلامية الموالون للحكومة إنّ السلطات اتّبعت الإجراءات القانونية الصحيحة، وفي يناير، حكمت عليه محكمة مغربية بالسجن لمدّة سنة بتهمة “المسّ بسلامة أمن الدولة الداخلي وبالاحتيال”.

في الواقع، يشكّل اعتقال منجب والحكم عليه من دون الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة انعكاساً للتراجع المستمرّ في حقوق الإنسان في المغرب وعودة للسلطوية في شمال أفريقيا.

ليس الأوّل، ولن يكون الآخر

ترك منجب، وهو ناشط يساري في خلال حكم الملك حسن الثاني، المغرب لإتمام شهادة الدكتوراه وعاد إليه في بداية حكم الملك محمد السادس للعمل في منصب أكاديمي في جامعة الرباط. وعلى غرار الكثيرين من الناشطين المغربيّين في المنفى، عاد عندما استلم الملك محمّد السادس العرش في العام 1999 ووعد بعصر جديد من الشفافية وحقوق الإنسان. وبعدما تبيّن أنّ كلام الملك لم يتماشَ مع الواقع، تعالى صوت منجب أكثر فأكثر في انتقاده النظام، قائلاً إنّه ينبغي عليه رفع الصوت بسبب “تعدّيات النظام على حرّيات المواطنين وحقوقهم وقمعه للصحافة الحرّة واعتقال الناشطين الاعتباطي”.

وفيما كان منجب راضياً عن الانفتاح السياسي الذي شهده المغرب في العامَين 2011 و2012 عقب الانتفاضات العربية، عرف أنّه في النهاية استمرّ الملك والدولة العميقة، المعروفة باسم المخزن، بالتحكّم بزمام الأمور في الخلفية. وقال منجب في ورقة لمعهد بروكنجز في العام 2011 إنّه إن لم تنخرط الحكومة المغربية بعملية إصلاح شامل، ستواجه تهديدات لموقعها وسلطتها. ومع أنّ منجب لا يحبّذ الإسلاميين، قال إنّه ينبغي الاعتراف بالأحزاب الإسلامية كأحزاب سياسية شرعية وحمايتها من تضييق الشرطة.

وبالفعل، كان الإسلاميون أكبر الكاسبين من الانفتاح في العام 2011، ففازوا بعدّة انتخابات منذ تلك الفترة. وقد سُمح لحزب العدالة والتنمية، الذي وصفه أحد الأكاديميين بأنّه “إسلاميو الملك”، باستلام الحكم شرط عدم تخطّي الخطوط الحمر التي يضعها القصر. (ترفض حركة إسلامية أخرى في المغرب تدعى جماعة العدل والإحسان العملية الانتخابية). وتخطّي هذه الخطوط الحمر للصحافيين والناشطين مثل منجب، وآخرين مثل هشام المنصوري وهشام المرآة ومحمّد صبير وعبد الصمد عيت عيش، يجعلهم أهدافاً للنظام.

حراك العام 2016 وعودة السلطوية

أعلنت التغييرات الدستورية التي أحدثها الملك في العام 2011 بداية فترة من الهدوء النسبي في المجال السياسي المغربي. لكن هذا الهدوء تحطّم في العام 2016، مع احتجاجات الحراك التي طالبت بإنهاء التهميش في منطقة الريف في المغرب. ورأى بعض المحلّلين المغربيين هذا الحراك استمراريةً لحركة 20 فبراير التي انطلقت في العام 2011، وردّت الحكومة بقمع قاسٍ للناشطين والمحتجّين.

ومنذ العام 2016، تابع النظام المغربي إجراءاته القمعية على مختلف التحديات المتصوَّرة لسلطته. فتمّ اعتقال طلّاب وناشطين ومواطنين عاديين لتعبيرهم عن وجهات نظر ناقدة على وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي مع عمل النظام على إحكام سيطرته على المجال الرقمي. ويقبع عمر الراضي، وهو صحافي وناشط بارز آخر، في السجن منذ العام 2019 وهو متّهم بالتجسّس بعد نشر عدد من المقالات حول استيلاء مسؤولين فاسدين على بعض الأراضي.

وقد مَثَلَ منجب أمام المحاكم عشرين مرّة منذ العام 2015، لكن لم يبُتّ الحكم بحقّه حتّى هذه السنة. وقد خضع لمراقبة غير قانونية لسنوات، فبحسب تقرير أصدرته منظّمة العفو الدولية في العام 2019، كان هو وناشطون آخرون أهدافاً لبرمجيّات تجّسس صمّمتها شركة أن أس أو الإسرائيلية وتستعملها دول عربية أخرى لمراقبة المعارضين.

إدارة بايدن والمغرب: بين القيم والمصالح

لقد عقّدت صفقةُ الرئيس ترامب في اللحظات الأخيرة مع المغرب للاعتراف بسيادتها على الصحراء الغربية مقابل التطبيع الجزئي مع إسرائيل مقاربةَ إدارة بايدن تجاه المغرب.

فقد وُصف الاعتراف الأمريكي بالمزاعم المغربية بالفخّ الذي تركه ترامب لبايدن، وهو يضع إدارة بايدن في مأزق: تأييد هذا التحوّل في السياسة الأمريكية أو عكسه. وفي الشهر الماضي، كتب 27 عضواً في مجلس الشيوخ يحثّونه على عكس قرار ترامب “الخاطئ” بشأن الصحراء الغربية.

ولطالما كان المغرب حليفاً قوياً للولايات المتّحدة، لذا تخاطر إدارة بايدن بإبعاد المغرب في حال عكست الصفقة المُبرمة مع إدارة ترامب. وسيتأثر الناشطون المغربيون مثل منجب والراضي وغيرهم للأسف بهذه المسألة، وستستعملهم المملكة كأدوات تفاوض.

سينبغي على إدارة بايدن أن توازن بين الدبلوماسية المرتكزة على القيمة وتلك المرتكزة على المصلحة في المغرب. وهذا ليس بأمر بسيط، ولا سيّما أنّ القوى الأخرى مثل الصين وروسيا تنوي تأدية دور أكبر في أرجاء الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا. ومن غير المرجّح أن تعكس الولايات المتّحدة مسارها بشأن الصحراء الغربية، نظراً إلى أنّه سيكون لذلك أثرٌ على اتفاقية التطبيع الإسرائيلية المغربية التي تأمل الإدارة الأمريكية التعويل عليها.

لقد وضعت إدارة بايدن حقوق الإنسان من جديد على جدول الأعمال في تعاملاتها مع الدول في الشرق الأوسط وانضمّت من جديد لمجلس حقوق الإنسان في الأمم المتّحدة. وعلى الرغم من السياسة الواقعية في العلاقات بين الولايات المتّحدة والمغرب، ينبغي على الإدارة دعم خطابها عن حقوق الإنسان بالأعمال وجعل حقوق الإنسان وإطلاق سراح المساجين أولوية في نقاشاتها مع المغربيّين. وينبغي على الحكومة المغربية، من جهتها، أن تطلق سراح منجب والراضي والسجناء السياسيين الآخرين لأنّ الاعتقالات المستمرّة تدمّر ما بقي من سمعة المغرب التقدمية.

      

Last December, Maati Monjib — a Moroccan historian and former Patkin Fellow in the Middle East Democracy and Development Project at Brookings — was arrested by Moroccan security services while having lunch at a restaurant in Rabat. Monjib, a prominent and long-time critic of the government and an internationally known human rights activist, was charged with money laundering. Pro-government outlets and commentators have argued that the authorities followed correct legal procedures, and in January, a Moroccan court sentenced him to one year in prison for “undermining the internal integrity of the state and fraud.”

In reality, Monjib’s arrest and sentencing without due process is a reflection on the continued retreat of human rights in Morocco, and resurgent authoritarianism in North Africa.

Not the first, and won’t be the last

Monjib, a leftist activist during the reign of King Hassan II, left Morocco to complete his doctoral studies and returned at the beginning of the reign of King Mohammed VI to take up an academic position at Rabat University. Like many other Moroccan activists in exile, he returned when Mohammed VI took the throne in 1999, promising a new era of transparency and human rights. As it became more apparent that the king’s rhetoric did not match reality, Monjib became more and more outspoken in his criticism of the regime, arguing that he had to speak because of the regime’s “infringements on the freedoms and rights of citizens, the suppression of the free press, and arbitrary arrest of activists.”

While Monjib was pleased by the political opening that unfolded in Morocco in 2011-12 after the Arab uprisings, he understood that ultimately the king and the deep state, known as the mekhzen, continued to call the shots in the background. In a 2011 paper for Brookings, Monjib argued that if the Moroccan government does not engage in comprehensive reform, it risks threats to its position and power. While no friend of the Islamists himself, he wrote that Islamist parties should be recognized as legitimate political parties and should be protected from police harassment.

Indeed, it was the Islamists who gained the most from the 2011 opening, winning multiple elections since then. The Justice and Development Party, described by one academic as “The king’s Islamists,” were allowed to govern as long as they did not cross the palace’s red lines. (Another Islamist movement in Morocco, the Justice and Charity Movement, rejects the electoral process.) For journalists and activists like Monjib — and others like Hicham Mansouri, Hisham Almiraat, Mohamed Sber and Abdessamad Ait Aich — crossing those red lines would make them targets of the regime.

The 2016 hirak and the resurgence of authoritarianism

The king’s 2011 constitutional changes ushered in a period of relative calm in Morocco’s polity. That was shattered in 2016, with the hirak protests that demanded an end to marginalization in Morocco’s Rif region. Viewed by some Moroccan analysts as a continuation of the February 20 movement from 2011, the government responded with a hard crackdown on activists and protesters.

Since 2016, the Moroccan regime continued their crackdown on various perceived challenges to its authority. Students, activists, and everyday citizens have been arrested for expressing critical views on social media as the regime moved to tighten its control of the digital sphere. Omar Radi, another prominent journalist and activist, was arrested in 2019, released on probation, then arrested again in 2020 and charged with espionage, as well as rape, after publishing a number of articles about land grabs by corrupt officials.

Monjib had been brought to court 20 times since 2015, but never convicted until this year. He had been subject to illegal surveillance for years: A 2019 Amnesty  International report found that he and other activists were targets of spyware created by the Israeli firm NSO, which is also used by other Arab states to monitor dissidents.

The Biden administration and Morocco: Between values and interests

The Biden administration’s approach to Morocco is complicated by President Trump’s last-minute deal with Morocco to recognize its sovereignty over the Western Sahara in exchange for partial normalization with Israel.

Described as a “booby trap” left by Trump for Biden, the U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claims presented the Biden administration with a dilemma: whether to uphold this U-turn in U.S. policy, or reverse it. Last month, 27 senators wrote to Biden, urging him to reverse Trump’s “misguided” Western Sahara decision.

Morocco has been a strong ally of the U.S., and the Biden administration risks alienating it if it reverses the deal with the Trump administration. Jailed Moroccan activists like Monjib, Radi, and others will unfortunately be caught up in this, and will be used by the kingdom as bargaining chips.

The Biden administration will have to balance between value-based and interest-based diplomacy in Morocco. This is no simple task, especially as other powers such as China and Russia seek to play a larger role across the Middle East and North Africa. It is unlikely that the U.S. will reverse course on the Western Sahara, given that it will have an impact on the Israeli-Moroccan normalization agreement, which the administration hopes to build on.

The Biden administration has put human rights back on the agenda in its dealings with states in the Middle East, and has moved to rejoin the U.N. Human Rights Council. Despite the realpolitik in U.S.-Morocco relations, the administration should back up its human rights rhetoric with action and make human rights and the release of prisoners a priority in its discussions with the Moroccans. The Moroccan government, for its part, should release Monjib, Radi, and other political prisoners, as continued arrests are destroying what’s left of Morocco’s liberal reputation.