Brookings: Topics - Humanitarian Affairs

The Kampala Convention: Entry Into Force

Chaloka Beyani — Mon, 13 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

The world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) number in the tens of millions; the majority of them are in Africa. IDPs are often profoundly vulnerable and must contend with homelessness, hunger, human rights violations and violence. For years, the African Union has sought to help mitigate the plight of IDPs and now with the entry into force of the Kampala Convention, they have formulated and adopted a legally-binding instrument that can do more to help this population. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, says that the convention will also promote good governance, peace, stability and security.

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The Kampala Convention: Entry Into Force

Authors

Chaloka Beyani

Mitigating Natural Disasters, Promoting Development: The Sendai Dialogue and Disaster Risk Management in Asia

Fri, 10 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 10, 2013
10:00 AM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 (3/11) had both immediate and long-term consequences. Over 20,000 people lost their lives in the triple disaster, hundreds of thousands were displaced and the economic costs were the highest ever to result from a natural disaster. Since the disaster, however, both Japan and the international community have sought to learn from this tragedy by drawing lessons for preventing, responding to, and rebuilding after natural disasters. Specifically, the Government of Japan and the World Bank launched the Sendai Dialogue in October 2012 as a way to re-conceptualize the role of disaster risk management (DRM) in development strategies, emphasizing the importance of building resilience against natural disasters.

On May 10, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement co-hosted a discussion featuring experts on natural disasters and disaster risk management from the United States and Asia. Panelists representing the private, public, and international sectors sought to refine some of the topics considered at the Sendai Dialogue. They identified the lessons learned from 3/11; how these lessons can be applied to overseas economic assistance programs, focusing on DRM; the specific challenges of disaster risk management among Asian countries; and how DRM can be integrated and mainstreamed into development assistance across different platforms.

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Management: Keeping a Proper Balance

Jibum Chung — Tue, 07 May 2013 12:16:00 -0400

Counter-terrorism strategies and tactics are rightly in the consciousness of officials and civilians in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing. While preventing future attacks should be a leading priority for government at all levels, officials must take care not to focus only on the threat of terrorist attacks. Doing so could diminish the resources, preparation, and skills needed for management of other disasters, and therefore result in greater risk to the population.

Psychology of terrorism

The major characteristic of contemporary terrorism is its unexpectedness. The time and manner of attacks are unpredictable and catch targeted communities – normally innocent civilians – by surprise. In the past, targets of were often political and symbolic figures, not the general public, and the perpetrators proudly notified who they were and why they had acted. The purposes and targets of contemporary terrorism, on the other hand, are often very unclear. Terrorists attack innocent civilians indiscriminately without prior notification, making attacks more difficult to prevent.

Even though the physical damage from terror attacks is normally smaller than that from large natural disasters, the psychological damage of such terror attacks is significant. Early research performed by Paul Slovic and others in 1980s delved into this concept of psychological damage. Using psychometric methodologies, they defined several important characteristics of many different forms of risk. At that time, in the wake of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant accident in 1979, their main research target was nuclear power plants. Slovic underlined the importance of psychological effects of risk stating that “despite the fact that not a single person died (in the TMI accident), … no other accident in our history has produced such costly societal impacts.”[1] Reminiscent of today’s terror attacks, they concluded that the nuclear risk is unknown, dread, uncontrollable, involuntary, and likely to affect future generations, so it has a very critical impact on the minds of the general public. Contemporary terrorism shares many of these characteristics: it is usually unknown, frightening, uncontrollable, involuntary, and also indiscriminately fatal to even children (future generations). It surely has significant psychological effects on people’s minds.

Terrorism and media

For the news media, terrorism is a very strong “product” which easily attracts a lot of viewers. Most media aggressively sell the product, terrorism, and help sow fear as people enthusiastically consume the product. In a seminal work on the “social amplification of risk,” Roger Kasperson and colleagues[2] described how the public perception of risk interacts with social and cultural systems (such as the media) and can be amplified during the information delivery process, sometimes resulting in “institutionalized fear.” This amplification process can eventually generate certain public behaviors, some negative and some positive, and may result in disruptions in society. Obviously, some risks are more likely to be amplified than others. Terrorism, because of its special characteristics, is easily amplified. Also, today’s social network communication technologies, such as Facebook and Twitter, can accelerate and strengthen the amplification process.

Thus, the media focus and public concerns create political pressure, and national emergency management policymakers prioritize counter–terrorism, or “civil defense,” over other forms of risk management, such as “civil protection” against all hazards including natural disasters.

Civil defense again?

Culturally and historically, “civil defense” is quite different from “civil protection.” Civil defense, “born out of wartime efforts to organize air-raid precautions, sheltering arrangements and alarms for non-combatants,” has military origins and focuses on protection against foreign military attacks.[3] Civil protection, on the other hand, has disaster origins and focuses on many forms of natural and man-made disasters and other public safety issues. In the Cold War era, civil defense against nuclear attack was the main objective of national emergency management in the United States. At that time, nuclear attack was an “institutionalized fear” made by media and government authorities. Many American homes and public buildings prepared nuclear fallout shelters, illustrating this fear very clearly.

Following the end of Cold War and recognition of the increasing trend of large man-made and natural disasters, “civil protection” gradually replaced the term “civil defense” in most countries. Civil protection focuses more on generic disasters than on the armed aggression, and administratively it is more decentralized than civil defense. In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979. It was mainly a civil defense organization during the Cold War, but in the last two decades has worked to redirect some resources toward the management of various disasters (civil protection). James Witt, director of FEMA under President Clinton, clarified this change of direction. As the FEMA website explains, “the end of the Cold War also allowed Witt to redirect more of FEMA's limited resources from civil defense into disaster relief, recovery and mitigation programs.”[4] FEMA also introduced an “all hazards approach,” recognizing the many different kinds of disasters that may require mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The September 11, 2001 terror attack dramatically changed the direction of emergency management in the United States. After the attack, the United States hastily constructed the Department of Homeland Security and downgraded FEMA, whose main duty was civil protection. This attracted criticism from some public administration experts that the U.S. government concentrated too much on terrorism, perhaps because of the “social amplification” of the risk in the wake of the attack, despite the many other critical risks facing U.S. citizens. Basically, the critics charged, the United States changed the direction of its emergency management from civil protection back to Cold War-style civil defense.

Balance collapsed in emergency management

The cost of that shift in priorities was on full display when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, easily destroying the weak levee system and submerging much of New Orleans under water. Federal and local governments’ mitigation, response and recovery to the Hurricane Katrina were mostly inadequate – resulting in the most severe disaster damage in U.S. history at that time. Due to budget cuts, the Army Corps of Engineers had been unable to strengthen the levee system protecting New Orleans. After the flooding and other damage occurred, the governments’ disaster situation awareness was poor. Communication among authorities and between authorities and civilians was broken. Assistance from the federal government was delayed and insufficient, and people died while awaiting rescue or other assistance. Critics also charged that too many government officials were not familiar with the “National Response Plan” which was implemented in December 2004 after 9/11 terrorist attack. Planning and training for large natural disasters were insufficient after the implementation of the plan. In short, too great a focus on counter-terrorism undermined capacities for natural disaster mitigation, response, and recovery in the post-9/11 United States.

This not only the case in the United States, however. The United Kingdom experienced a similar transition after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, in which suicide attacks by four home-grown terrorists killed 55 civilians. In response, the U.K. government introduced several measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Critics said that some responses to the attacks were anti-liberal, militarizing, and centralizing, and were in the wrong direction from the viewpoint of an all hazards approach. The problem, as one observer wrote, was that “too great a focus on one type of threat and on institutional preparedness can divert attention away from other problematic areas and distance the public.”[5]

In South Korea, the provocations of North Korea can divert the direction of national emergency management. South Korea had been under a thorough civil defense-oriented culture since the end of the Korean War in 1953. All citizens, for example, must participate in compulsory civil defense training preparing for military attacks from North Korea, and there is a military service requirement for men.

The mood of reconciliation that developed on the Korean Peninsula during the post-Cold War Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations (1998-2008) changed the direction of Korean emergency management policies, highlighted by the 2004 establishment of the South Korean National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) by the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Large disasters such as Typhoon Rusa in 2002 and the Daegu subway accident in 2004 demanded a comprehensive emergency management system that can manage the all types of hazards, not only a military attack by North Korea. South Korea is gradually replacing its civil defense culture with one of civil protection. The Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) established the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) in 2008. MOPAS enlarged the scope of disaster management to include fostering a safety culture and anticipating future disasters induced by climate change. The Ministry has proposed civil protection strategies such as promoting public safety awareness, strengthening leadership of local governments, and promoting participation of private companies in disaster preparation and mitigation. Also, MOPAS pushed ahead several projects like the “Safe City” initiative that tries to enhance the safety level of local communities by encouraging the participation of various local stakeholders in preparation, mitigation, and response planning an activities. This means that the civil protection ideals and an all hazards approach were widely adopted as a government policy direction at that time.

However, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean forces in November 2010, which was unexpected and resulted in four deaths, changed this trend back again. After the Yeonpyeong Island bombardment, most projects for disaster and safety management were canceled and delayed because the highest priority was placed on national defense against North Korea. To some extent, this mirrors the experiences of the United States after 2001 and the United Kingdom after 2005. Although the deaths by Yeonpyeong Island bombardment were relatively few compared 209 deaths in Typhoon Rusa and 192 deaths in the Daegu subway accident, the political impact on the Korean government was huge.

Keeping a balance in emergency management

Civil protection and an all hazards approach are vital to maintaining preparation and the best possible response to major natural and man-made disaster. But they can be weakened if governments focus too heavily on national security (including civil defense against terrorism). And that can result in the other large disasters. Keeping balance in emergency management planning, and implementing an all hazards approach are crucial to effect public administration in this area.

The United States is at risk from a diverse range of natural and man-made disasters. Climate change will produce historically strong hurricanes like Katrina and Sandy more and more frequently. There is a high possibility of large earthquakes and outbreaks of new pandemic diseases. As indicated by the recent Texas fertilizer plant explosion, man-made disasters can also have big impacts. To cite another area where civil protection should not be neglected, the number of road fatalities per one million inhabitants was 111 per million inhabitants – or, well over 30,000 individuals – in the United States in 2009. This rate is almost three times Japan’s rate of 45 fatalities per one million inhabitants, and higher than the European Union average of 70 fatalities per one million inhabitants.

How do we keep balance in emergency management? Though officials in democratic countries such as South Korea and the United States must respond to public opinion, approaches to emergency management should be decided neither by public opinion, which can be easily agitated by shocking incidents, nor by the news media which tend to follow sensational events. Although the number of casualties in the Boston terror attack was much smaller than Texas explosion, the psychological impact and news attractiveness of Boston were much higher. Indeed, the news of the Texas fertilizer plant explosion was almost swept away in an ocean of news about Boston. Instead, priorities in emergency management should be decided based on the scientific evidence, accurate statistics, and rational policy planning.

Counter-terrorism is necessary and obviously very important. Governments must take policy measures to prevent terrorism, but they should resist contributing to institutionalized fear. They must also remember that human beings are surrounded by a plethora of risks, many of which cause more physical damage than terrorism. Governments should prepare policy measures for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery for all hazards we can encounter, and should keep a balance based on sciences and accurate statistical data.

For this purpose, a number policy measures are appropriate. First, we need a clear cost-benefit analyses of the current policies in emergency management. According to research conducted by John Mueller and Mark G Stewart and published in 2011,[6] the United States has spent over $1.1 trillion on homeland security after 9/11; Mueller and Stewart evaluate the effectiveness of this massive spending as very low. If this money, or some of it, had been applied to other public safety areas, such as climate change mitigation or industrial safety management where the cost effectiveness is high, the United States could be a safer place.

Second, people should know what the real risks are. The well known risks such as traffic accidents, industrial accidents, and floods kill far more people in America than terrorism does. According to several psychological research studies, familiarity can reduce the level of the public’s risk perception. So, there is a much smaller sense of urgency about many of the risks that surround us every day. Science and statistics on risks, and governmental efforts to provide information and education about risks, can help individuals and local communities effectively increase their overall safety level.

[1] Slovic, P. “Perception of Risk,” Science, Vol. 236, No. 4799 (1987): 283.

[2] Kasperson, R., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. and Emel, J. “Social Amplification of Risk: a Conceptual Framework,” Risk Analysis, 8(2), (1988): 177-187.

[3] Alexander, D. “From Civil Defense to Civil Protection--and Back Again,” Disaster Prevention Management, 11(3), (2002): 209.

[4] FEMA, about the agency, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency.

[5] O'Brien, G. “UK Emergency Preparedness: A Step in the Right Direction?” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2006): 79.

[6] Mueller, J. and Stewart, M.G., Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Authors

Jibum Chung

Image Source: © Kim Kyung Hoon / Reuters

When Bombing Syria, Remember Lebanon

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 07 May 2013 16:23:00 -0400

For more than two years, Israel has wisely kept a low profile as civil war has engulfed its northern neighbor Syria. But this past week, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent his air force to strike targets in and around Damascus, significantly raising Israel’s profile in the conflict. As Israel and America consider their next steps in that unstable environment, it would be wise to remember how Israel gradually got engaged in the Lebanese civil war and found nothing but frustration and failure as its well intentioned policies yielded unanticipated effects and unintended consequences.

Syria and Lebanon share the same bitterly sectarian politics. Both are the creations of French imperialism. And both were misruled too long by minority sects that spawned vicious and violent civil wars. Israel began interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs in the 1960s when the Palestinian movement built its headquarters there. Starting with an air attack on Beirut International Airport in 1968, successive Israeli governments got more and more sucked into the swamp of Lebanese politics and warlord conflict.

In 1978, Israeli built a proxy army in south Lebanon and created a security zone to defend northern Israel from terror attacks. Similarly, there is talk now in Israel of a security zone in Syria and perhaps a Druze collaboration partner. In 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to create a “new Middle East” that would destroy the PLO and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria. Instead, Operation Peace for Galilee led to the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the Marine barracks bombing, two attacks on the American embassy, an eighteen-year-long insurgency in south Lebanon, the awakening of Lebanese Shia militancy and creation of Hezbollah.

Peace for Galilee was followed by Operation Accountability in 1993, Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1995 and finally Israel’s complete and unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. Israel’s Lebanese allies were abandoned to their fate. But the war continued across the border. In 2006, a half million Israelis were displaced from their homes during the thirty-four-day war with Hezbollah. Today Hezbollah has more weapons than ever before.

Read the full article »

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Sana Sana / Reuters

Displacement and Migration Policies: Exploring the Interconnections

Tue, 07 May 2013 13:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 7, 2013
1:30 PM - 3:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

People leave their communities and their countries for many reasons. Sometimes they are forced to flee because of conflict or disasters; in some cases they cross an international border and are recognized as refugees. More often, they remain within the borders of their country and are known as internally displaced persons (IDPs). At the same time, even larger numbers of people leave their communities in search of economic opportunities or to join family members. Their positive contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of both sending and destination countries is today widely acknowledged. The international system distinguishes between those who are displaced and those who migrate voluntarily and between those who move within or across national borders. But in practice, the lines aren’t so clearly drawn, posing challenges to governments and human rights advocates.

On May 7, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement analyzed the interconnections between displacement and migration with reflections of U.S. and Swiss policy by Anne Richard, assistant secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. Department of State and Ambassador Claude Wild, head of Human Security Division at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, offered comments based on his observations in the field. Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, moderated the discussion.

Mr. Obama, Don’t Draw That Line

Daniel L. Byman — Sat, 04 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

“The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable,” President Obama warned Bashar al-Assad’s government last December. “If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.”

This threat followed the president’s earlier warning that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” This red line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence community assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrians had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.

The administration’s ultimatum now seems like cheap talk, and it illustrates the risks of carelessly drawing red lines and issuing highly public threats that won’t be enforced.

So far, at least, the Obama administration has put off both consequences and accountability and simply pushed for further investigation. Meanwhile, Mr. Assad has not blinked, and the president’s political opponents, like Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, argue that Iran and North Korea will draw the wrong lessons if the president lets Mr. Assad call his bluff.

Red lines can be attractive tools of foreign policy, deterring foes from ethnic cleansing, genocide or, in the case of Syria, using chemical weapons. Part of the reason to go public, as one administration official put it last year regarding Syria, is to have a “deterrent effect.” By threatening to act in advance of a problem, you stop the problem and don’t have to act. Issuing a red line can also reassure allies or placate domestic critics.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: New York Times

Image Source: © Yazan Homsy / Reuters

Transitions and Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons: 21 Reasons for Optimism

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Presentation at the Transitions and Solutions Roundtable, organized by UNHCR and UNDP, Amsterdam, April 18-19, 2013.[1]

For at least thirty years, there has been talk of the need to bridge the ‘relief-to-development gap’ or, as it has been more recently described, the ‘transition from humanitarian action to development.’ The need to overcome the institutional divisions in the way we work has been tackled through many programs, initiatives, statements of commitment, meetings and speeches.[2] It has spawned a whole litany of terms and acronyms, from the ‘integrated zonal development approach’ to ICARA I and II, Quick Impact Projects, the Brookings process, the 4Rs, early recovery, etc. While there have been good analyses of the obstacles to overcoming this division,[3] it is hard not to feel cynical about the possibility of ever overcoming the divide between humanitarian and development actors.

But I’m going to step out of my comfort zone this morning and suggest that there are, indeed, reasons for optimism. In particular, I have come up with 21 reasons[4] why this might be the best time in 30 years to achieve progress in building bridges between humanitarian and development actors to work on solutions for displaced populations. I don’t think that any one of these reasons would be sufficient to drive major progress in addressing the gap or transition this time around. But taken together, these reasons suggest that this is a good time to be working on this issue and give grounds for optimism.

Twenty-one reasons for optimism:

1) Donor governments are taking the issue more seriously. Donors have always been interested in the issue, but this commitment seems to be becoming stronger – perhaps as a result of increased pressure on aid budgets and the increasingly protracted nature of humanitarian emergencies. This donor commitment is important for several reasons. Donors drive the international humanitarian system; when donors are interested in a particular issue, things can happen. Not only do donor governments influence the actions of multilateral institutions, but they also have large bilateral aid programs that can bring about change on the ground. In fact, one of the differences between development and humanitarian work is that multilateral institutions are much less important in development than in humanitarian work and thus bilateral programs of donor governments can have a direct impact on the ground. If donors can manage to get their own humanitarian and development departments to work together in supporting solutions to displacement in the field, things can change. Of course, while some governments are moving in this direction, in at least some donor government agencies, the gap between relief and development is alive and well.)

Donors are under increasing pressure to demonstrate results and to justify the large sums they are spending on humanitarian emergencies. The emphasis on demonstrating value for money and programmatic impact is increasing in part because of the economic difficulties facing many traditional donors. Foreign aid budgets among the traditional donors are almost all under pressure. There are questions of how long major humanitarian programs can be sustained – particularly as in cases such as Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya where there are now third-generation refugees. If these humanitarian expenditures are to be reduced, either responsibility needs to be transferred to development actors or solutions need to be found.

It’s still too early to tell, but the entry of more non-traditional donors (e.g. BRICS, Gulf states, military forces) also may be a positive sign in overcoming this divide, as many do not seem to draw the same distinctions between humanitarian and development assistance.[5] If this is indeed the case, then there is a need not only to engage with non-traditional donors but also to refrain from suggesting that they follow models where the divisions between humanitarian and development are tightly drawn.

2) The concept of resilience may offer common ground for development and humanitarian actors to work together, particularly in building local capacity to withstand adversity.[6] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee – the primary coordination body for humanitarian work – recently discussed its perspective on a resilience-based approach to humanitarian assistance with references to such issues as local ownership and integration, which seem to offer a common language for discussion between development professionals and humanitarians.[7]

3) There seems to be growing attention today to natural disasters and climate change in the humanitarian community. Given global trends in which disasters linked to climate change are likely to increase, we can expect that humanitarian actors will be called to respond to increasingly deadly – and costly – disasters in the future. In this field, there are better (though still imperfect) links between disaster risk reduction (DRR), response and recovery. At least there is widespread recognition of the importance of investing in DRR and of the need for development plans to include measures to mitigate the risk of disasters. Perhaps it is time for humanitarian agencies working in conflict situations to reach a similar recognition that working in concert with development actors can reduce the risk of future conflicts, stabilize post-conflict situations and contribute to durable solutions for displaced populations.

4) While it is difficult to draw many long-term positive lessons from the response to Haiti’s earthquake, the experience of many humanitarians clearly underscores the difficulties of finding solutions for displaced which don’t take into account broader development goals. Humanitarian agencies recognized that their ability to develop good humanitarian programs depended on development approaches such as the rule of law, poverty eradication, gender equity and environmental issues. As those involved in the Haiti response have moved on to work on other operations, we can only hope that they carry this lesson with them.

5) Humanitarian actors working with internally displaced persons (IDPs) often find themselves working more closely with development actors than when they are developing programs for refugees. National governments have a fundamental responsibility for the protection and assistance of those displaced within their borders and there is no way of bypassing those authorities to reach IDPs. In fact, a recent meeting to take stock of response to internal displacement agreed that a fundamental paradigm shift is needed to see IDPs as a development – and not exclusively – as a humanitarian issue.[8]

6) Within the humanitarian community, there is increasing interest in the situation facing refugees and IDPs living in urban areas.[9] Planning humanitarian response to displaced people living outside of camp settings perhaps inevitably involves working with a wider range of actors (e.g. urban planners, local governments, development agencies, multilateral development banks, etc.) than in camp settings. For example, providing water and sanitation in a refugee/IDP camp is often a very different task than ensuring that IDPs/refugees dispersed in a large city have access to clean water and to sanitation facilities. Assisting those displaced in urban areas usually means working with municipal authorities and investing in infrastructure and social services which benefit communities as a whole.

7) There is a growing realization that most of the world’s displaced are living in protracted situations lasting five, ten or more years. Dealing with long-term displacement (e.g. Darfur, Colombia, Pakistan) is a development issue. It is increasingly widely recognized that national development plans should take IDPs into account and that finding solutions for both IDPs and refugees requires the engagement of development actors. There are a few examples of national development plans that already include provisions on support for refugees and IDPs, which provide an important example for other states to follow. Finding solutions to displacement often involves issues such as restoration of livelihoods, the resolution of housing, land and property issues and the promotion of tenure security – all areas where development actors have more expertise.

8) There seems to be more concern about the role of affected governments in humanitarian response. For example, the Swiss government, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and ICVA are pursuing a dialogue between humanitarian actors and governments of disaster-affected countries.[10] Similarly, the IASC Principals have agreed on the importance of ensuring more effective engagement with governments in the cluster system as part of the Transformative Agenda.[11] If, in fact, humanitarian actors do make engagement with governments a priority, this could lead to the discovery of more common ground with development agencies who have emphasized the importance of local ownership and governmental buy-in as a basis for all their work.[12]

9) There are some interesting examples of good practice from Southern NGOs (e.g. Sarvodya in Sri Lanka[13]) that are development organizations by nature but became involved in disaster response in their own countries. These NGOs bring in their development expertise and sustain their engagement after international humanitarian agencies leave or reduce their presence. The growing experience and capacity of these NGOs is a cause for optimism. Local Southern organizations may be better placed to overcome some of the divides that characterize large international bureaucracies.

10) Stocktaking exercises undertaken by the World Bank have demonstrated that international development organizations have done more work with displaced communities and to generate/promote durable solutions than is often recognized.[14] By highlighting these experiences, we can recognize that the development community is not starting from scratch and that there is a foundation on which to build further cooperative efforts.

11) While humanitarian agencies often distance their work from broader migration debates, the current ongoing global discussions on migration and development offer a recognition that population movements are related to development.[15] Can we learn from such discussions about the relationship between displacement and development?

12) I think that there are signs that the development and humanitarian communities are making tentative steps toward speaking one another’s ‘languages.’ For humanitarian agencies, concepts of protection and human rights have long been central to both programs and discourse, but this is not a language that necessarily resonates with our development counterparts. However, concepts such as rights-based approaches to development and the previously-mentioned concept of resilience may offer possibilities of finding common ground for discussions between humanitarian and development agencies. For example, the UN Secretary-General has long emphasized the centrality of human rights in the UN’s development work,[16] the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has organized meetings on the right to development[17] and the IASC is engaging in discussions about the relationship of humanitarian work and human rights. There also seem to be signs of increasing possibilities for experts in humanitarian/human rights to contribute to discussions by development agencies.[18]

Three Issues of Growing Humanitarian Interest

13) Over the past 15 years or so, issues of housing, land and property (HLP) have come to be recognized in the humanitarian community as a critical concern, particularly in finding solutions for displacement. This is an area where the development community has long-standing expertise and there should be synergies to ensure that the HLP ‘solutions’ promoted for refugees/IDPs/returnees fit into broader tenure reform processes and land issues. I find it encouraging that UN Habitat is playing a more active role with humanitarian agencies, particularly around urban and protracted displacement. [19] The question arises as to whether humanitarian agencies should be developing expertise in these areas – or whether there is an opportunity to use the expertise that development agencies have acquired over many years?

14) Also over the past decade, there is growing recognition by humanitarians that the issue of livelihoods is central to humanitarian action[20] and I sense a certain ‘humility’ among staff of humanitarian agencies about their lack of expertise in this area. Income-generating projects are not the same as sustainable livelihoods. Again, the question is whether humanitarian agencies should devote the resources to acquire the necessary expertise to support livelihoods well – or if they should see this as an opportunity to learn from their development counterparts?

15) A third issue, emerging in the last 15 years has been growing interest – and perhaps even progress – in integrating displacement into transitional justice frameworks and ensuring that the displaced have the opportunity to participate in these processes.[21] At their core, issues of accountability and transitional justice are issues of governance and rule of law that fall into the broader development portfolio.

Three Upcoming Opportunities

16) In the development community, the wide-ranging debate and intensive consultation process about post-2015 development goals is an opportune moment to raise the concerns of the millions of displaced persons around the world who are often sidelined in development processes. At a time when many groups are mobilizing to build support for inclusion of their issues in these future goals, it may well be a timely opportunity for those working with refugees and IDPs to raise their voices in the debate.

17) Similarly, the fact that the UN Development Program is presently working on a four-year strategic plan offers an opportunity for a major development actor to recognize the importance of working on displacement as a part of its future development agenda.

18) And in yet another upcoming global initiative – the fact that the UN Secretary-General has announced that a humanitarian summit will take place in 2015 under the leadership of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – offers an opportunity to place on the agenda of that summit the issue of working more closely and more intentionally with development agencies in resolving displacement situations.

19) Recent research, for example by researchers such as James Milner, shows the value of investing in training, education and peacebuilding efforts (i.e. development work) among the displaced while they are still uprooted.[22] These investments have been shown to pay off in the pursuit of durable solutions (for example, the skills displaced persons gain while uprooted can facilitate reintegration, community development and state-building). Remember that when refugees returned in Central America, South Africa and Namibia, the skills of the returnees contributed to their communities and, at least in some cases, provided political leadership to their countries. Are development actors missing opportunities to build future leadership and capacity by not investing in refugees and IDPs while they are uprooted?

20) I sense a greater emphasis in the humanitarian world on evidence-based approaches and a search for indicators to measure the impact of humanitarian interventions and the effectiveness of different kinds of aid. This approach to humanitarian work – difficult as it is for many humanitarians to accept – could well bring them closer to development actors in the way they operate and assess their work.

21) Finally, I think it is a sign of hope that the international community is willing to try again, after so many failures, to bridge the gap! After so many efforts, there is now the Transitional Solutions Initiative being piloted in Colombia and Eastern Sudan and the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions, which is presently being implemented in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Ivory Coast.[23] And I suspect that there are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of good examples from around the world where development actors have engaged to support solutions for refugees and IDPs. We need to hold up these good examples and learn from them. Perhaps the main reason that we need to try again is that displaced people – whether IDPs or refugees – will benefit when we overcome our bureaucratic divisions to work together.

[1] With thanks to my colleague, Megan Bradley, for her comments.

[2] Jeff Crisp, Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, UNHCR Working Paper No. 43, May 2001, www.unhcr.org/3b309dd07.html; Bryan Deschamp and Sebastian Lohse, Still minding the gap? A review of efforts to link relief and development in situations of human displacement, 2001-2012, PDES/2013/01, February 2013, www.unhcr.org/512cdef09.html

[3] Ibid.

[4] My original presentation at the Roundtable included 20 reasons for optimism, but as a result of the discussions there, I added another reason and moved a few others around.

[5] Romilly Greenhill, Annalisa Prizzon and Andrew Rogerson, The age of choice: developing countries in the new aid landscape, Overseas Development Institute, January 2013, www.odi.org.uk/publications/7163-age-choice-developing-countries-new-aid-landscape

[6] See for example, DfID, Defining Disaster Resilience: What does it mean for DFID, 23 November 2011, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67451/Defining-Disaster-Resilience-summary.pdf; DfID, Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience, Policy paper, September 2011, www.gov.uk/government/publications/saving-lives-preventing-suffering-and-building-resilience; USAID, USAID Resilience Agenda: helping vulnerable communities emerge from cycles of crisis onto a pathway toward development, 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/ResilienceAgenda2Pager.pdf; USAID, Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance, December 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/ResiliencePolicyGuidanceBriefer.pdf

[7] IASC, “IASC Special Event: ‘Resilience: What does it mean in practice?’ - A Panel Discussion,” Feb. 2013, www.humanitarianinfo.org/IASC/pageloader.aspx?page=content-news-newsdetails&newsid=158

[8] Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, Taking Stock of Internal Displacement: Twenty Years On Report of consultation held at Château de Penthes, Geneva, 28-29 November 2012, November 2012,

[9] See for example: Crisp et al., “Displacement in urban areas: new challenges, new partnerships,” Disasters, vol. 36 Suppl 1, July 2012, pp. S23-S42; Jeff Crisp and Hilde Refstie, The Urbanisation of Displaced People, CIVIS, No. 5 — May 2011, www.urban-response.org/resource/6910; Eveliina Lyytinen, “A tale of three cities: internal displacement, urbanization and humanitarian action in Abidjan, Khartoum and Mogadishu,” New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR, 2009; Nassim Majidi, “Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan,” www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/Afghanistan/01_majidi.php; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani, 26 December 2011, A/HRC/19/54; UNHCR Policy on Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, 2009, www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4ab8e7f72

[10] See IFRC, “International Dialogue on Strengthening Partnership in Disaster Response: Bridging national and international support,” www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/meetings-and-events/past-events/international-dialogue-on-strengthening-partnership-in-disaster-response/

[11] IASC, IASC Transformative Agenda 2012, www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docId=5970

[12] OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf

[13] http://www.sarvodaya.org/

[14] See World Bank, Forced Displacement: Overview of the World Bank’s Portfolio, Social Development Notes, no. 122, 2009.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164201144397/Forced_Displacement_Overview_12-15-09.pdf

[15] See for example, relevant resources available at OHCHR’s website on the forthcoming October 2013 High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development:

www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/HighLevelDialogueonMigrationandDevelopment.aspx

[16] http://www.unssc.org/home/learning-product/human-rights-based-development

[17] http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/Pages/12thSession.aspx

[18] See for example, Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention: An Opportunity for Development Actors, Geneva: IDMC, 2012 http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/9FB27EB6E2D7E0ADC1257AF7003685A8/$file/WB-analytical-study-nov-2012-web.pdf

[19] See for example, the work of UN-HABITAT, www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=9

[20] See for example, Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees, Kumarian Press, 2005.

[21] Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Center for Transitional Justice, Transitional Justice and Displacement, June 2012 (www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/transitional-justice/tj-report).; see also, Roger Duthie, ed., Transitional Justice and Displacement (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2012), www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/transitional-justice/tj-book.

[22] James Milner, “Refugees and the peacebuilding process,” UNHCR Research Paper No. 224, November 2011

[23] Jeff Crisp, Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, May 2001; UNHCR, Concept Note - Transitional Solutions Initiative UNDP and UNHCR in collaboration with the World Bank, October 2010, www.unhcr.org/4e27e2f06.html; UN Secretary-General, Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions, 4 October 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1265299949041/6766328-1265299960363/SG-Decision-Memo-Durable-Solutions.pdf

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia

Syria, Chemical Weapons, And The Intervention Question

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with NPR’s On Point program, Shadi Hamid calls for American intervention in Syria on the basis of humanitarian grounds, as well as rising levels of anti-American sentiment and radicalization on the ground. Hamid says a lot of damage has already been done with regard to radicalization in Syria and that the country’s future is bleak. Despite this reality, Hamid concludes it remains important for the United States to intervene.

The Assad regime will fall regardless of American intervention, Hamid says. The questions, then, are how long the United States waits to intervene and how many people die in the process. On this basis, Hamid supports a military intervention which doesn’t involve putting boots on the ground, but rather uses surgical air strikes and safe zones to diminish the regime’s ability to kill its own people. Hamid says to alternately depend on channels such as the United Nations or wait for a verification process regarding the regime’s use of chemical weapons will take time and delay action, thereby exacerbating existing problems, whether inside Syria or involving anti-American sentiment in the region.

Hamid says the idea that the international community can nurture a perfect Syrian opposition before committing to military action is misguided. He says the fighting forces in Syria are not primarily secularist, and more accurately reflect varying shades of Islamism. Hamid points out extremists tend to gain prominence during situations of war because they generally have better access to weapons and support, and that in Syria these extremists have already come to the fore.

Considering radicalization and rising levels of anti-American sentiment inside Syria, Hamid notes there is an issue of American credibility at stake not just in Syria but in the broader region. Hamid says American intervention in Syria will show the United States sides with the Syrian people and will make a difference in the longer-term of American-Middle Eastern relations. Hamid suggests the world, including Syrians, still look to the United States for moral and political leadership.

Hamid says the American public is historically receptive to foreign policy action in light of humanitarian crises. If the Obama administration wanted to explain the Syrian case clearly, Hamid suggests there would likely be public willingness for American engagement. However, Hamid also says the Obama administration has demonstrated it does not want to get involved in Syria and has a lot of wiggle room to avoid following up on prior-delineated “red lines” on the use of chemical weapons.

Listen to the full On Point program »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: NPR

Is Obama’s Red Line a Green Light?

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime was finally blown open last week. In a letter to U.S. lawmakers, the White House stated that U.S. intelligence agencies believed "with varying degrees of confidence" that Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on a "small scale." The letter followed others sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by Britain and France alleging the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and similar assessments by Israeli military intelligence in the last few weeks.

Still, President Barack Obama's administration sounded a cautious note. Asked whether Assad crossed the "red line" Obama drew last year that could spur American intervention, a U.S. official replied, "we're not there yet." The White House continues to contend that the evidence is not "airtight," and that it needs further corroboration. In meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on Friday, Obama stated that "there are a range of questions around how, when, where these weapons may have been used."

While these are important questions, especially a decade after the intelligence failure in Iraq, the evidence already gathered by Western countries from inside Syria provides significant evidence of chemical-weapons use by the Assad regime. Here is what I have learned about the regime's use -- and logic for the use -- of chemical weapons over the past six months.

The Assad regime's scientists have been experimenting for more than a year with mixtures of toxic and poisonous gasses that could be used to "cleanse areas" of what it calls "terrorists" -- the rebel forces it is fighting. Its security and military apparatus has sought to devise methods to use artillery shells or aircraft to deliver chemical weapons in "localized ways" -- in areas of one or one and a half square kilometers.

The regime's logic was that the relentless bombardment of rebel-controlled areas, including in the neighborhoods around the main cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, had forced most civilians to leave. Civilian casualties, in this warped thinking, could therefore be kept to a minimum if chemical weapons were used in these areas. This was important if the regime was to avoid the attention of the international community, especially the United States, which clearly did not want to intervene in Syria.

I first heard this frightening information in the late summer and fall of last year. It came from a small number of privileged Syrians who often travelled to and from Damascus. I had gotten to know and trust them, especially as their information was often corroborated later by other sources and events. All spoke often to current and former senior security officers and regime personalities from the Assad regime's feared security forces, including the presidential guard, Syrian military intelligence, and Syrian air force intelligence -- people they had known in some cases since childhood.

Listening to them, it was clear to me that the regime had the intention to use these horrendous weapons -- and that it would do so as it came under further pressure in key strategic areas, especially the major cities in the west of the country.

According to my interlocutors, Assad and those closest to him had been emboldened by the international community's weak response to his bloody military campaign. The United Nations claimed in February that the death toll from the fighting in Syria was well over 70,000 people, while, during that same month, a lieutenant from Syrian military intelligence informed one of my Syrian interlocutors that the regime estimated that around 85,000 civilians had been killed, with many more thousands "missing."

Successive statements from Obama and senior U.S. officials, these interlocutors said, had been interpreted by the regime as a "green light" to continue its campaign. The exclusive focus on political and diplomatic solutions, as well as the international community's rising fear of Islamic jihadists, further reinforced the regime's belief that "the U.S. and its Western allies did not mind the current military operations," according to a retired general in Damascus. "Like any war, there are political and diplomatic efforts, while it is the winner that dictates terms in the end."

In the eyes of the regime, therefore, Obama's "red line" prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- first drawn last August, in the midst of an election campaign -- had to be tested.

Read the full article »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Syria's Humanitarian Crisis Has No End in Sight

Elizabeth Ferris, Megan Bradley and Shelly Pitterman — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Political leaders seem to be unable to bring the violence and carnage in Syria to an end. As a result, the quality of life for those who struggle to survive in the midst of this war continues to deteriorate. With more than five million displaced persons and seventy thousand casualties, the situation is devastating. Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, Elizabeth Ferris examines the growing crisis with Shelly Pitterman, the Regional Representative for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Fellow Megan Bradley.

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Syria's Humanitarian Crisis Has No End in Sight

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Trends in Natural Disaster Response and the Role of Regional Organizations

Mon, 22 Apr 2013 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 22, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Global demographic trends suggest that more people are living in areas vulnerable to sudden-onset natural disasters even as scientists predict that the frequency and intensity of these disasters are likely to increase as a result of the effects of climate change. These trends, coupled with recent high-profile mega-disasters like Hurricane Sandy and the drought in the Sahel, are raising global awareness of the need to build the capacity of national governments, civil society organizations and international actors to prevent, respond to and recover from natural disasters. The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement’s third annual Review of Natural Disasters outlines these major disasters in 2012 and key response opportunities, in particular the role of regional organizations. Although regional mechanisms are playing increasingly important roles in disasters, there has been remarkably little research on their role in disaster risk management.

On April 22, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement hosted the launch of its new report, “In the Neighborhood: The Growing Role of Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management” and its Annual Review of Natural Disasters for 2012 “The Year of Recurring Disasters.” Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement introduced the Annual Review of 2012 and moderated a discussion about the role of regional organizations in disaster risk management. She was joined by Rosa Malango from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ian O’Donnell from the Global Disaster Preparedness Center of the American Red Cross, and Cletus Springer, director of the department of sustainable development at the Organization for American States.

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Trends in Natural Disaster Response and the Role of Regional Organizations

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Event Materials

20130422_natural_disaster_trends_transcript

Camps are Not the Answer to Syria’s Displacement Crisis

Megan Bradley — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 13:48:00 -0400

A few years ago, I visited some of the Palestinian refugee camps scattered across Lebanon. After spending some time in Bourj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut, I travelled to Wavel -- a highly impoverished but comparatively spacious camp in the rural Beqaa valley, where a Palestinian refugee boy asked me a question: Can you see the sky in Bourj al-Barajneh? I was surprised by this question, but upon reflection realized it is perfectly reasonable. Bourj al-Barajneh is notoriously overcrowded. After more than 60 years of displacement, tents have been replaced by packed apartment blocks and narrow concrete alleyways. Without permission to expand the boundaries of the camp, residents have had to build in and up, so that there are indeed many places in Bourj where you can stand outside and yet barely see the sky.

Despite these cramped conditions, residents of Bourj al-Barajneh and other camps have opened their doors to the 36,000 Palestinian refugees who were living in Syria, but have now fled to Lebanon. Thousands of Lebanese families, many with little room to spare themselves, are sheltering scores of the 400,000 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon. In Jordan as well, "host families" are making a critical contribution by accommodating many of the 1.3 million refugees who have fled Syria since the uprising started in March 2011. Within Syria, the UN reports that approximately four million people are now displaced. Untold thousands have found shelter - however precarious - with extended family members, or even strangers.

Read the entire article here >>

Authors

Megan Bradley

Publication: The Atlantic

How Effective Are Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management?

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 12:00:00 -0400

Regional organizations are playing an increasingly important role in disaster risk reduction and management, but how effective are they? Leading up to our event on April 22 (Earth Day), I'll continue to share with you some additional interesting findings from my annual disasters review with Daniel Petz and Chareen Stark.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Disasters2012.

While regional organizations are playing an increasingly important role in disasters, there has been remarkably little research on their role in disaster risk management. In an effort to address this gap, Daniel Petz and I examined thirteen regional organizations, to see how they stack up against one another according to 17 indicators of effectiveness.

Here are our results (a glossary of acronyms appears at the end of this blog post):

As you can see above, the landscape of regional organizations is complex and diverse.

In most regions, governments and other actors see value in working together to prevent disasters and—to a lesser extent—to respond to disasters occurring in their respective regions. At the same time, regional organizations have worked out different mechanisms for encouraging collaboration, including frameworks for disaster risk reduction, regional military protocols, joint training exercises and regional insurance schemes. Also, technical cooperation mechanisms—such as early warning systems—have been established, but few regional bodies provide ways of channeling financial assistance after a disaster.

*Here are the acronyms for key terms we used above:

DRM = disaster risk management
DRR = disaster risk reduction
DM = disaster management

CCA = climate change adaptation
IDRL = international disaster response laws, rules and principles

and for the regional organizations we studied:

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU = African Union
CAN = Andean Community of Nations
CARICOM = Caribbean Community
CoE = Council of Europe
ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States
EU = European Union
LAS = League of Arab States
OAS = Organization of American States
SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC = Southern African Development Community
SICA = Central American Integration System
SPC = Secretariat of the Pacific Community

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Hurricanes, Typhoons and Floods: Recurring Disasters in 2012

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 12:00:00 -0400

Hurricanes Sandy and Irene, typhoons in the Philippines, and floods in Pakistan are striking recent examples of recurring natural disasters. Leading up to our event on April 22 (Earth Day), I'll continue to share with you some additional interesting findings from my annual disasters review with Daniel Petz and Chareen Stark.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Disasters2012.

After reviewing natural disasters in 2012, I was struck by the fact the several of the largest disasters of that year were preceded by similar events in 2011. In 2012, Hurricane Sandy followed on the heels of Irene on the U.S. East Coast; another destructive typhoon wreaked havoc in the southern Philippines, and Pakistan was hit by floods for a third consecutive year.

These recurring disasters were significant in terms of lives lost and numbers of people displaced...

... in terms of economic cost...

... and due to the sheer numbers of people who were impacted.

Recurring disasters undermine the resilience of affected individuals and communities, and call for long-term solutions that address livelihood issues and the welfare of those displaced. In addition, these disasters highlight the need for increased commitment to, and investment in, disaster risk reduction.

Implementing sound disaster (and displacement) policies can go a long way in mitigating the effects of recurring disasters, and in fostering the development of more resilient societies.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Recurring Disasters: Are We Learning Lessons?

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

For the past three years, we’ve compiled an annual review of natural disasters, highlighting not only overall trends for the year but drawing out lessons to prepare for future disasters. Given the fact that the frequency, intensity and unpredictability of natural disasters is expected to increase as a result of climate change, it is more important than ever that we learn from the past.

In looking back at 2012, we were struck by the ‘recurring disasters’ which occurred in different parts of the world. Hurricane Irene hit the northeastern United States in 2011 and then a little over a year later, Hurricane Sandy hit the same area. Typhoon Washi/Sendong in the Philippines was followed a year later by the deadly Typhoon Bopha/Pablo. And Pakistan experienced its third straight year of widespread flooding. When recurring disasters strike the same communities – communities which haven’t yet recovered from the previous disaster – the results can be devastating. The resilience of affected individuals and communities is undermined. Particularly when the communities are poor and marginalized (who tend to be more affected by disasters in any case), it can be hard to muster the energy and the resources to start over again. The devastation caused by recurring disasters in 2012 highlights the need for increased commitment and investment in disaster risk reduction. But we also know that it’s always easier to mobilize support for responding to a disaster than for taking measures to reduce the risk of future ones.

Statistically, 2012 was an ‘average’ year for disasters without the mega-disasters we saw in 2010 (Haiti) or 2011 (Japan). The deadliest disaster of 2012 was Typhoon Bopha/Pablo in the Philippines; the most expensive disaster was Hurricane Sandy in the US and Caribbean; and the disaster which affected the most people was the drought/food crisis in the Sahel region.

In this year’s review, we also looked at the role of regional organizations in disaster risk management – which is part of a larger research project we’re undertaking. Regional organizations seem to be playing an increasingly important role in the complex world of disaster risk management but have received very little attention. Regional organizations, we found, come in many sizes and shapes and they are involved in different kinds of work with disasters. For example, we found that all regions have developed framework agreements on disaster risk reduction or response. In most regions technical cooperation mechanisms – such as early warning systems – have been established. But few regional bodies provide the means for channeling financial assistance after a disaster.

We also looked at one particular type of disaster – wildfires. As evident in Australia, Russia and the United States, wildfires can destroy large swathes of forest. And yet, wildfires are not very significant in the overall scheme of disasters (with only 156 wildfire disasters reported over the past decade resulting in only 0.07 percent of global disaster fatalities.) But the combination of urban sprawl and a hotter and drier climate because of climate change in many parts of the world make it likely that we’ll see more wildfires in the future.

Finally, we looked at the gender dimensions of natural disasters. Natural disasters and climate change often exacerbate existing inequalities and discriminations, including those that are gender-based and can lead to new forms of discrimination. But women are not just victims; they play significant roles in disaster risk management. They are often at the frontline when disasters occur and they bring valuable resources to risk reduction and recovery efforts. When they are able to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, their families, and their communities, women have much to offer.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japan Foreign Aid Policies for Disaster Reduction

Goshi Tsukamoto — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The international community faces a variety of challenges caused by population growth, environmental problems, and an increase in the frequency of natural disasters in the last half century. In many parts of the world, calamities such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, storm surges, and tsunamis have caused a number of tragedies by creating socio-economic disorder, sometimes leading to unprecedented physical and human disruption.

Relatively well-governed countries have sufficient capabilities for rapid reaction and long-term recovery efforts, and are able to build resilience against adverse situations in their societies. Unfortunately, however, in a number of developing countries adequate social institutions and infrastructure have not been established to deal with such situations due to political, economic or historical factors. These regions remain relatively vulnerable to natural catastrophes, and their people are outside the circle of prosperity. [1]

In the global context, as described in 2011 in the initial Policy Framework document from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), providing assistance in disaster-stricken areas is a fundamental expression of common humanity, representing a visible manifestation of a common belief that is both morally right and strategically sound. [2] While nation states must take the primary responsibility for dealing with their own catastrophes, it is essential for the international community to help others help themselves, based on partnerships.[3] Large-scale disasters in developing countries inevitably cause enormous damage with wide-ranging and long-lasting effects, often eventually resulting in the deterioration of society as a whole. In relation to disaster reduction efforts in developing countries, the significance of international technical and financial cooperation is now shared as a global consensus. In fact, emergency relief and disaster reduction, particularly in developing countries, have become a main focus of international cooperation.[4] Donors have committed themselves to lending life-saving humanitarian assistance through rapid response to emergencies in poorer countries and sharing lessons and technologies to support adequate preparation for disasters. These new techniques and practices are expected to be institutionalized in recipient societies over the long term.

[1] They are more likely to suffer from extremely serious damage from natural disasters and may even be displaced nationally and internationally in some cases. It should also be noted that people in these nations additionally tend to suffer from secondary effects such as a deterioration in sanitary conditions and food shortages, which may last a long time.

[2] United States Agency for International Development, USAID Policy Framework, 2011-2015, p. 2; accessed February 26, 2013, http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.PDF.

[3] Looking at past catastrophic natural disasters, the international community has recognized the importance of disaster reduction and promoted international cooperation in and with vulnerable countries.

[4] In fact, numerous countermeasures against natural phenomena have been designed and implemented.

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Authors

Goshi Tsukamoto