Brookings: Topics - Gulf States

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

Authors

Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

Arab Spring Countries: Beyond Political Upheaval and toward Inclusive Growth

Thu, 31 Jan 2013 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Two years after the revolutions that changed the political landscape of the Arab world, countries in the region are still struggling to address the core political and socioeconomic issues behind the protests. Political unrest and an unfavorable international environment have led to economic stagnation and heightened short-term macro-economic risks. Little progress has been made toward achieving the revolutions’ objectives of better lives and social justice. In a series of papers, scholars from Brookings and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) address how these countries can move beyond the political upheaval and support economic and social development.

On January 31, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on how post-Arab Spring countries can move toward more inclusive growth. Brookings Senior Fellow Hafez Ghanem presented the overall recommendations from the papers and a group of experts discussed their thoughts on the papers and the broader issues. Panelists included: Inger Andersen, vice president of the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank; Andrew Baukol, deputy assistant secretary for Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Treasury; Heidi Crebo-Rediker, chief economist at the U.S. State Department; and Akihiko Koenuma, director-general of the Middle East and Europe Department at JICA. Vice President Kemal Derviş, director of Global Economy and Development, moderated the discussion.

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and The Prospect of A Nuclear Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

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Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

Toward a Strategic Partnership? The EU and the GCC in a Revolutionary Middle East

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Relations between the Gulf countries and the European Union have been tested by the events of the Arab Spring. Despite an alignment of interests on several fronts – from Syria to Yemen – the looming question of internal reform within the Gulf itself presents a growing challenge for EU-GCC ties. This comes alongside a range of other dilemmas, from disagreements within each bloc to the historic strength of bilateral over multilateral relations. What, then, are the prospects for a more strategic partnership between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the aftermath of the Arab Spring?

A new joint paper published by the Brookings Doha Center and FRIDE, Toward a Strategic Partnership? The EU and the GCC in a Revolutionary Middle East, explores the ties between the two blocs as they struggle to respond to the seismic changes affecting the region.

The paper draws on a roundtable discussion held at the Brookings Doha Center, with the support of the European Commission, which brought together academics, researchers, and diplomats from the Gulf region, the European Union, and the United States. It finds that despite a range of significant challenges, opportunities remain for a more substantive relationship between the EU and the GCC that furthers mutual interests while contributing toward more meaningful reform within the Gulf.

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Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Image Source: © STR New / Reuters

Revolution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

Bruce Riedel — Sun, 20 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdullah has complete authority to do as he likes. But while a revolution in Saudi Arabia is still not likely, the Arab Awakening has made one possible for the first time, and it could come in President Obama’s second term.

Revolutionary change in the kingdom would be a disaster for American interests across the board. Saudi Arabia is America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, a partnership that dates to 1945. The United States has no serious option for heading off a revolution if it is coming; we are already too deeply wedded to the kingdom. Obama should ensure the best possible intelligence is available to see a crisis coming and then try to ride the storm.

Still, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a proven survivor. Two earlier Saudi kingdoms were defeated by the Ottoman Empire and eradicated. The Sauds came back. They survived a wave of revolutions against Arab monarchies in the 1950s and 1960s. A jihadist coup attempt in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca but was crushed. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda staged a four-year insurrection to topple the Sauds and failed less than a decade ago. Saudi al Qaeda cadres remain in the kingdom and next door in Yemen.

Today the Arab Awakening presents the kingdom with its most severe test to date. The same demographic challenges that prompted revolution in Egypt and Yemen, a very young population and very high underemployment, apply in Saudi Arabia. Extreme gender discrimination, long-standing regional differences, and a restive Shia minority add to the explosive potential. In recognition of their vulnerability, the Saudi royals have spent more than $130 billion since the Arab Awakening began to try to buy off dissent at home. They have made cosmetic reforms to let women sit in a powerless consulting council.

Abroad they have sent tanks and troops across the King Fahd Causeway to stifle revolution in Bahrain, brokered a political deal in Yemen to replace Ali Abdullah Salih with his deputy, and sought closer unity among the six Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies. They also have invited Jordan and Morocco to join the kings’ club. But they are pragmatists too and have backed revolutions in Libya and Syria that fight old enemies of the kingdom.

The Saudis fear, probably rightly, that real power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. But we should plan very quietly for the worst.

If an awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia, it will probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and violent, have wracked the oil rich Eastern Province for more than a year. These are Shia protests and thus atypical of the rest of the kingdom. Shia dissidents in ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, also have used cyberwarfare to attack its computer systems, crashing more than 30,000 work stations this August. They probably received Iranian help.

Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in Sunni parts of the kingdom. These might start in the so-called Quran Belt north of the capital, where dissent is endemic, or in the poor Asir province on the Yemeni border. Once they begin, they could snowball and reach the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jeddah, Mecca, Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition has a vibrant information technology component that could ensure rapid communication of dissent within the kingdom and to the outside world.

The critical defender of the regime would be the National Guard. Abdullah has spent his life building this Praetorian elite force. The United States has trained and equipped it with tens of billions in helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful, especially at the start.

The succession issue adds another layer of complication. Every succession in the kingdom since its founder, Abdel Aziz bin Saud, died in 1953 has been to his brothers. King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman are the end of the brood; only a couple of possible remaining half brothers are suitable. Both the king and crown prince are ill, and both are often unfit for duty. If Abdullah and/or Salman die as unrest begins—a real possibility—and a succession crisis ensues, then the kingdom could be even more vulnerable to revolution.

As in other Arab revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda elements in the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to Shia, and the center becomes a jihadist stronghold.

For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would be a game changer. While the U.S. can live without Saudi oil, China, India, Japan, and Europe cannot. Any disruption in Saudi oil exports—whether due to unrest, cyberattacks, or a new regime’s decision to reduce exports substantially—will have a major impact on the global economy. In addition, the CIA war against al Qaeda is heavily dependent on the kingdom: Saudi intelligence operations foiled the last two attacks by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on the American homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest of its kind in the world. The Saudis also have been a key player in containing Iran for decades.

The other monarchs of Arabia, meanwhile, would be in jeopardy if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia. The Sunni minority in Bahrain could not last without Saudi money and tanks. Despite all their money, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are city states that would be unable to defend themselves against a revolutionary regime in what had been the kingdom. The Hashemite dynasty in Jordan would be at risk as well without Saudi and Gulf money and oil. Only Oman is probably isolated and strong enough to endure.

America has no serious options for effecting gradual reform in the kingdom. The Saudis fear, probably rightly, that real power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. But we should plan very quietly for the worst. The intelligence community should be directed to make internal developments, not just counterterrorism, its top priority in the kingdom now. We cannot afford a surprise like Iran in 1978, and we need to know the players in the opposition, especially the Wahhabi clerics, in depth. This will be a formidable challenge, but it is essential to preparing for a very dark swan.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: Huffington Post

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

Revolution in Riyadh

Bruce Riedel — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Revolution in Riyadh, the possible overthrow of the House of Saud, would represent a severe setback to America’s position in the region and provide a dramatic strategic windfall for Iran. Former veteran intelligence official Bruce Riedel drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How has the Arab Spring increased the risk of revolution in Saudi Arabia?
How would the overthrow of the Saudi Monarchy roil global oil markets?
What should the United States do to ensure stability in the Arabian Peninsula?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Bruce Riedel

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdallah has complete authority. A revolution in Saudi Arabia remains unlikely but, for the first time, due to the Arab Awakenings, it has become possible. The Saudi royal family has unique strengths and legitimacy; the Kingdom was founded in the 18th century as an alliance between the royal family and an austere Islamic preacher whose followers still partner with the House of Saud to govern the state. Almost alone in the Islamic world it was never conquered by European imperialism. The King is the Custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities. And it has the world’s largest oil company and the world’s largest oil reserves. This combination of religious piety and vast revenues has so far been sufficient to stave off the kind of unrest that has shaken much of the Arab world in recent years.

Nevertheless, revolutionary change in the Kingdom would be a disaster for American interests across the board. As the world’s swing oil producer, prolonged instability in Saudi Arabia would cause havoc in global oil markets, setting back economic recovery in the West and disrupting economic growth in the East. Saudi Arabia is also America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, a partnership that dates back to 1945; the overthrow of the monarchy would represent a severe setback to America’s position in the region and provide a dramatic strategic windfall for Iran. The small oilrich monarchies of the Gulf would be endangered, as would the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Recommendation:

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the stakes, the United States has no serious option for heading off a revolution in the Kingdom if it is coming. Since American interests are so intimately tied to the House of Saud, the U.S. does not have the choice of distancing the United States from it in an effort to get on the right side of history. Nevertheless, you should try to reestablish trust with the King and urge him to move more rapidly on his political reform agenda, while recognizing that this effort is likely to have limited results. In the meantime, you should ensure the best possible intelligence is available to see a crisis coming, put in place measures to limit the impact on the global economy of any disruption in oil supply, be ready to shore up the neighboring kingdoms and sheikhdoms, and then try to ride out the storm.

Background:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a proven survivor. Two earlier Saudi kingdoms were defeated by the Ottoman Empire and eradicated. But the House of Saud came back. They survived a wave of revolutions against Arab monarchies in the 1950s and 1960s. A jihadist coup attempt in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca but was crushed. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda staged a four-year-long insurrection to topple the royal family and failed less than a decade ago. Nevertheless, al Qaeda cadres remain in the Kingdom and next door in Yemen.

Today, the Arab Awakenings pose the most severe test for the Kingdom since its creation. The same demographic challenges that prompted revolution in Egypt and Yemen apply in Saudi Arabia: a very young population and very high underemployment. Extreme gender discrimination, highly restricted freedom of expression, longstanding regional rivalry with revolutionary Iran across the Gulf, and a restive Shia minority add to the explosive potential. In recognition of their vulnerability the Saudi royals have spent over $130 billion since the Arab Awakenings began to try to buy off dissenters at home. Abroad they have sent troops across the King Fahd Causeway to stifle revolution in Bahrain, brokered a political deal in Yemen replacing Ali Abdallah Salih with his deputy, and sought closer unity among the six Gulf Cooperation Council sheikhdoms. They have also invited Jordan and Morocco to join the “kings club.” But they are also pragmatists and have backed revolutions in Libya and Syria that undermine longstanding enemies of the Kingdom, especially Iran.

So far, they have helped ensure that revolution has not unseated any Arab monarch. However, Bahrain and Jordan have become the weakest links in the royal chain. The King of Bahrain is failing to suppress a prolonged rebellion against his rule; the King of Jordan could be next. Unrest in Jordan would threaten the peace with Israel. But the United States – and Israel – can cope with instability in both small states. Not so in Saudi Arabia.

If an Awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia it will probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and violent, have wracked the oil-rich Eastern Province for over a year. These are Shia protests and thus atypical of the rest of the Kingdom because Shias represent only 10 percent of the population. Shia dissidents in ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, have also used cyber warfare to attack its computer systems, crashing over 30,000 work-stations this past August. They probably received Iranian help.

Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in Sunni parts of the Kingdom. These might start in the so-called Koran belt north of the capital where dissent is endemic or in the neglected Asir province on the Yemeni border. Once they start they could snowball and reach the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jidda, Mecca, Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition is well-armed with mobile phone technology, which could ensure rapid communication of dissent within the Kingdom and to the outside world.

The critical defender of the regime would be the National Guard. King Abdallah has spent his life building this Praetorian elite force. The United States has trained and equipped it with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful, especially at the start.

The succession issue adds another layer of complication. Every succession in the Kingdom since its founder Abdel Aziz bin Saud died in 1953 has been among his brothers. King Abdallah and Crown Prince Salman are, literally, the end of that breed and both are in frail health; after them there are only two remaining half brothers that might suit and then there is no clear line of succession in the next generation. If Abdallah and/or Salman die as unrest unfolds, and a succession crisis ensues, then the Kingdom could be even more vulnerable to revolution.

Like in other Arab revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda and Wahhabi elements in the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to Iranbacked Shia and the center becomes a jihadist stronghold.

For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would be a game-changer. While the United States can live without Saudi oil, China, India, Japan and Europe cannot. Any disruption in Saudi oil exports either due to unrest, cyber attacks or a new regime’s decision to reduce exports substantially will have major impacts on the global economy. The CIA war against al Qaeda is heavily dependent on the Kingdom; Saudi intelligence operations foiled the last two al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attacks on the American homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the Kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest such mission in the world. The Saudis have also been a key player in containing Iran for decades. King Abdallah was the author of the Arab peace plan that bears his name.

The other monarchs of Arabia would inevitably be in jeopardy if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia. The Sunni minority in Bahrain could not last without Saudi money and tanks. Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are city-states that would be unable to defend themselves against a Saudi revolutionary regime, despite all their money. The Hashemite dynasty would be at risk as well without Saudi and Gulf money and oil. Only the Sultan of Oman is probably isolated and strong enough to endure. Despite the stakes, the options are as unappealing as those President Carter faced in dealing with the end of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran. And unlike the Shah who tried half-hearted reforms, the Saudi royal family has shown no interest in sharing power or in an elected legislature.

The United States has no serious options for effecting gradual reform in the Kingdom. The King fears, probably rightly, that power sharing is impossible in an absolutist state. In Bahrain, the Saudis showed clearly their view that opening the door to political pluralism will doom a monarchy. And the King will be distrustful of your counsel on this matter because of the stance that you took against his friend and fellow authoritarian, Hosni Mubarak.

Nevertheless, it is important to try to reestablish trust with the King, who continues to need the United States to counter the external threat he perceives from Iran, and to encourage him quietly to accelerate reforms that he has already indicated a willingness to undertake. But, at the same time, you should plan for the worst. The intelligence community should be directed to make internal developments, not just counter-terrorism, its top priority in the Kingdom now. The U.S. cannot afford a surprise like 1978 and you need to know the players in the opposition, especially the Wahhabi clerics, in depth. You should also take steps to help shore up Saudi Arabia’s smaller neighbors who are staunch allies of the United States and to limit the impact of a disruption of Saudi oil supplies. This will be a formidable challenge but it is essential to preparing for what could be a very black swan.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

A People’s Agenda for Gulf Co-operation

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Gulf Co-operation Council’s (GCC) 33^rd annual summit, held in Bahrain on December 24-25, 2012, was meant to address economic issues and further regional integration. In practice, however, these concerns were largely overshadowed by the other main agenda item – security.

While the summit managed to touch on banking co-operation and electricity and water linkage, the main headlines that emerged from Manama centred on a warning to Iran and the creation of a unified GCC military command. Participants, including Saudi Crown Prince Salman, expressed disappointment and frustration at the summit’s failure to make more progress on GCC integration and related issues. This is nothing new, however.

Since its founding in 1981, the GCC’s accomplishments have largely been realized in spite of diverging political visions, and security concerns have frequently crowded out non-security areas of co-operation that would realize more tangible benefits for Gulf citizens.

Amid a Middle East influx, it seems clear that Gulf leadership must now focus more seriously on meeting the needs of the region’s citizens and residents. The GCC’s founding came against a backdrop of regional chaos and upheaval, perhaps most notably the Iran-Iraq War and the threat posed by the Iranian revolution. The body has since suffered from a search for identity.

Aspirations to economic union by the end of the 1980’s have moved forward only haltingly, while Gulf security has in many ways continued to define the GCC.

Still, the reality is that the GCC’s six member states face a set of shared domestic challenges in addition to external threats. All suffer from a dependence on hydrocarbon-related activities, bloated public sectors, and a reliance on imports of labor and basic foodstuffs.

All are looking to diversify their economies and encourage private sector employment, both in anticipation of the depletion of regional energy reserves and to accommodate their booming populations – low unemployment figures conceal much higher rates of joblessness among young Gulf nationals, and adding more jobs to an already bloated public sector is not a realistic long-term solution.

Greater Gulf states co-operation could be a forum to help meet these needs. The GCC could offer practical advantages for Gulf residents in the fields of transportation, employment, communications, education, training and food and water security.

In recent years, it has been proven that regional groupings can have a genuine impact in these areas. With the relatively small regional population for which the GCC is responsible, forward-thinking and innovative measures fostering greater co-operation could have a quite dramatic effect.

Most Gulf citizens and residents aren’t looking for revolutions, and they don’t want to tear down their regimes. They are, however, increasingly finding their voice, especially through their embrace of social media. While some would say that reforms administered, in part, through the GCC would run counter to the region’s prevailing rentier-state social contract, they should be better understood as a modernisation of that contract.

In the medium to long term, the Gulf monarchies’ path to stability lies in recognising and better meeting their peoples’ demands. By showing that they are more sensitive to the changing needs of their publics and more capable at meeting those needs, including through greater regional co-operation, Gulf states can effect a more progressive relationship between rulers and ruled. It is an incremental step, but a crucially important one.

To date, the GCC’s accomplishments have been limited. In 2012, the Gulf states completed the last phase of a shared electricity power grid that will allow them to better meet domestic energy demand, and efforts are being made to further simplify already-streamlined procedures for GCC nationals’ travel between member states.

GCC members have largely stood together in support of shared positions on Syria and Libya – based on interests but also, arguably, on some degree of principle – and they have helped apply effective pressure within the Arab League and the UN.

On a much longer list of measures, however, the GCC has thus far fallen short. Stymied by intra-GCC divisions and a requirement that all decisions meet with the six-members’ consensus, targets for general economic integration have been repeatedly missed.

A Gulf customs union was first launched for a three-year transitional period in 2003; it was meant to impose a common single-entry tariff on goods entering the GCC and to lift all tariffs on goods moved within the GCC. Problems related to revenues and general protectionism delayed the union’s implementation, and it is now slated to go into effect in 2015.

At the GCC’s 2007 Doha summit, the organization resolved to establish a Gulf common market that would remove administrative and regulatory barriers to regional trade. As of today, though, this has yet to be fully implemented, and its attendant gains for regional business and entrepreneurship have gone unrealized.

A plan to establish a Gulf monetary union has stalled. Oman and the United Arab Emirates withdrew from a plan to adopt a shared currency in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Kuwait, meanwhile, dealt a blow to the region’s shared dollar peg when, under inflationary pressure, it shifted from a dollar linkage to a currency basket in 2007.

In 2009, the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia signed the Monetary Union Agreement and the Basic Statute of the Monetary Council, a precursor to a GCC central bank. Since then, however, there has been little progress.

Changes that are arguably more mundane but that would make a real difference for Gulf residents have met similar fates. A railway project connecting the GCC member states was announced at the organisation’s 24^th summit in 2003, but has been repeatedly delayed.

The rail line, which would run from Oman to Kuwait and would offer more choice for regional movement and trade, was meant to be completed in time for last week’s Bahrain summit. While Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to allow Qatar Airways and Gulf Air access to its airspace is a step in the right direction, protectionism and a lack of economic and political integration have stymied the sort of “open skies” policies that would drive down Gulf airfares.

Studies on European liberalization have shown increased competition cut European fares by a third and doubled the rate of growth in the market. Efforts to bring the Gulf’s relatively high mobile roaming charges in line with more developed markets, meanwhile, have only just started to show results.

Within the region, much of the discussion has revolved around the establishment of a “Gulf Union”. The Union likely would not entail the dissolution of any GCC member states or a common presidency or flag; rather, it would function as a confederation establishing common policy on economics, foreign relations, and defense.

Saudi Arabia, which announced plans for the Union at 2011’s summit in Riyadh, has been a vocal advocate of the plan, as has Bahrain.

It is seen as a means of ending Gulf reliance on a resource that is rapidly being depleted and on a Western security umbrella, particularly as the US becomes less reliant on the Gulf for its energy needs. Some in the Gulf are resistant, however, fearing that union would basically amount to Saudi Arabia swallowing its smaller neighbours. There are also concerns that a union would be premised entirely on immediate security concerns rather than broad popular support and meaningful reforms.

In the medium term, we may see a two-tiered GCC, in which there exists a union on a bi- or trilateral basis, but anything more substantial would require compromises and sacrifices from all GCC member states.

Ultimately, though, these discussions are degrees removed from the experience of the people of the Gulf. Issues of GCC consensus are not just theoretical; instead, they should centre on delivering concrete gains to Gulf states’ citizens and residents. Growth rates are high for the moment, but they are driven by strong global energy markets.

There is no guarantee that hydrocarbon revenues will continue to allow GCC members to escape economic realities, especially with youth unemployment high and some states are already or on the verge of running budget deficits. Looking forward, the GCC’s member states need to rethink the organization’s structures, especially its emphasis on inter-governmentalism and its crippling consensus decision-making.

The GCC needs a more viable model for benefiting the people of the Gulf. If the organization’s members can overcome past divisions, however, and co-ordinate on practical improvements to Gulf quality of life, then together they could be a powerful force for development in the region.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Gulf Times

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's Evolving Human Rights Framework

Turan Kayaoğlu — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is uniquely well placed to advance human rights in the Muslim world, but has repeatedly failed to fulfill that potential. Under the reformist leadership of Ekmelledin Ihsanoğlu, can the organization’s rights agenda move beyond traditional obstacles, namely members’ focus on state sovereignty and the debate over the role of sharia? Could the recently established Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights (IPCHR) form the basis of a robust international human rights regime for the Muslim world?

In a new paper published by the Brookings Doha Center (BDC), former visiting fellow Turan Kayaoğlu discusses how the OIC can become a more effective proponent of human rights. The paper, A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Evolving Human Rights Framework, describes the changing approach and tenor of the OIC’s rights policy.

Based on extensive interviews with senior OIC officials, the paper takes a close look at the organization’s various human rights instruments and notes a shift in its approach. Recent mechanisms – most importantly the IPHRC – have dropped a former emphasis on the centrality of sharia. The OIC’s traditional understanding of state sovereignty, however, has remained intact and led to important shortcomings in the new body. This paper demonstrates how the IPHRC can nevertheless grow into an effective promoter of human rights, and offers recommendations on how the international human rights community can assist in that process.

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Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Old Friends, New Neighborhood: The United States, the GCC, and their Responses to the Arab Spring

Shadi Hamid — Sun, 30 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Shadi Hamid's article says the widening policy gap between America and its GCC allies in response to Arab Spring uprisings is the result of differing threat perceptions. Hamid says that “stability” from a U.S. perspective does not mean what it used to, or what Saudi Arabia still thinks it means. For stability to be maintained, U.S. officials believe, governments must respond to the substantive demands of their people and provide them with a real stake in the political process. So while U.S. and Saudi interests do align on a number of issues, they do not align on the broader, philosophical question of how to manage political change.

However, Hamid says there are no ready replacements for the United States in its critical role as the Gulf’s security guarantor. On this basis, Hamid argues the United States and the GCC, despite apparent public tensions, will continue to find ways to work with each other. Neither, for now at least, is in a position to do otherwise.

Hamid concludes that the current nature of American-GCC relations will ultimately dampen any bold U.S. initiative to support greater democratization in the region, particularly in the conservative monarchies of Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan.

Read the article, which is part of the German Marshall Fund's paper series on "The GCC in the Mediterranean in Light of the Arab Spring" »

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Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

Book Review - The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations

Ahmet T. Kuru — Sat, 06 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

One may argue three law-like generalizations in political science: “no bourgeois, no democracy,” “democracies do not go to war with each other,” and “natural resources are a curse.” Although each of these highly contested arguments is important, the last one has the broadest impact—the negative effects of oil, natural gas, and mineral production go beyond authoritarianism and have economic, military, and societal consequences. Recently, some important publications have challenged the “resource curse” argument, creating doubts about these negative effects. In this regard, Michael Ross’ book[1], The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton University Press, 2012) is an extremely timely work. It not only responds to these critiques but also provides a consistent set of explanations about oil and its effects on authoritarianism, patriarchy, inter-state and civil wars, and economic underdevelopment.

Ross has already written path-breaking articles on these issues and this magnum opus brings together his previous contributions with updated data, revised arguments, and fresh perspectives. Unlike his earlier publications, Ross’s analysis focuses on oil and natural gas, sometimes referring to both as only “oil,” and consistently leaves mineral production aside. His data show how the importance of oil will persist, if not increase, in the near future: “the global market for oil and other liquid fuels will rise from 86.1 million barrels a day in 2007 to 110 million barrel a day in 2035; the market for natural gas will rise from 108 to 156 trillion cubic feet” (p. 251).

Regarding the scope of "Insight Turkey," it would be meaningful to begin with the importance of the book for studies on the Middle East, in particular, and the Muslim world, in general. According to Ross, the Middle East is regarded as exceptional for becoming wealthier “without becoming democratic” and “without making much progress toward gender equality.” Some scholars and pundits blame Islam for these conditions, but Ross links these problems to oil: “most of the world’s petroleum is found in countries with Muslim majorities…; in 2008, Muslim-majority countries—making up about 23 percent of the world’s sovereign states—exported about 51 percent of the world’s oil and held 62 percent of its petroleum reserves” (p. 231).

Ross particularly concentrates on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region when analyzing patriarchy. He argues that oil is the main reason for gender inequality in MENA countries. His general argument draws on the counterfactuals from other regions where patriarchy has been weakened, such as in East Asian cases, as a result of women’s participation in the industrial labor force. In contrast to agriculture, which is mostly a maledominated family business, work in the industrial sector has resulted in women’s increasing participation and influence in economic, social, and eventually political life. In most Middle Eastern countries, however, oil income has resulted in the weakening of export-oriented manufacturing industries, due to the appreciation of national currency, in addition to other negative effects such as increased spending (collectively what is referred to as the “Dutch disease”). This development has minimized the need and opportunity for women to work because the oil sector is not labor intensive. Ross cites Saudi Arabia as an example: “…oil and gas account for 90 percent of the country’s GDP. Yet the entire petroleum and mineral sector employs just 1.6 percent of the active labor force, and 0.35 percent of the total population” (p. 45). Moreover, in oil-rich countries, government allocation of rents to families and high salaries for husbands who work for government have also diminished the financial incentive for women to work. There is also minimal material motivation in the service sector, which provides lower salaries to mostly immigrant male workers. The result is the persistence of patriarchy in oil-rich MENA countries. Ross also clarifies this argument by comparing oil-rich Algeria and oil-poor Morocco; he shows that Algeria has higher gender inequality despite the fact that it has had several progressive socialist governments and higher GDP per capita and that Morocco has a traditional monarchy and lower GDP per capita.

Although the analysis of patriarchy depicts oil as a barrier to the advancement of the industrial sector, the chapter on development shows that oil does not prevent GDP growth. Instead, oil states, where oil income per capita is over $100, “have grown at about the same rate as other countries” (p. 221). The puzzle, Ross notes, is “why the oil states have had normal growth rates, when they should have had faster than normal economic growth, given their enormous natural wealth” (p. 189). In terms of GDP per capita, oil-producers show by and large slower growth rates due to their rapidly growing populations. Ross links this fact to his argument about patriarchy: oil production consolidates patriarchy, and this leads to high fertility and population growth.

The role of oil is more clearly visible in conflicts and authoritarianism. In his analysis of oil and armed conflicts, Ross stresses the importance of civil wars, because, from 1989 to 2006, out of 122 conflicts in the world, 115 were civil wars (p. 146). In his words, “Since the early 1990s, oil-producing countries have been about 50 percent more likely than other countries to have civil wars” (p. 145). Examining authoritarianism, Ross emphasizes that until 1980, oil-rich developing countries were very similar to their oilpoor counterparts, in terms of having authoritarian regimes. Today, however, the oil-rich countries “are 50 percent more likely to be ruled by autocrats” (p. 1). Oil even makes low-income democracies more likely to move to authoritarianism. The only exception is Latin America, where oil-rich several countries became democratic. Ross points to the fact that these countries already had democratic experiences before massive oil production began. Yet it is also important that the amount of oil income generated in Latin American countries is smaller in comparison to the leading oil states. Therefore, “no country with high levels of oil and gas income successfully became a democracy between 1960 and 2010” (p. 74).

To explain the causality behind this clear correlation, Ross claims that “oil has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spending, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption and incompetence,” (p. 63) because oil revenues are “unusually large, do not come from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden” (p. 6). Ross primarily focuses on the last factor—secrecy. He claims that citizens’ attitude toward the government is primarily based on its spending-to-revenue ratio. In oil-rich countries, governments can hide some of the oil revenues. Given this misinformation, citizens’ perception of governments’ spending-to-revenue ratios become higher than they actually are. This perception is a reason for citizens’ relatively higher satisfaction for and lower opposition to oil-rich governments.

Among Ross’s insightful empirical discussions, the Soviet case, where oil income per capita declined from $3,100 in 1980 to $1,050 in 1991, is particularly noteworthy. In his words, “Oil accounted for 80 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings between 1973 and 1985… After oil prices peaked in 1980, they fell by over 70 percent over the next six years; so did Soviet oil revenues, producing the economic and political crisis that ultimately led to the Soviet government’s collapse” (pp. 83-5).

My main reservation with this important book is about its attempt to replace the causal mechanisms between oil and authoritarianism Ross elaborated in an earlier article[1] with new alternatives. In this seminal article, Ross had explained five mechanisms—taxation, spending, group formation, repression, and modernization effects. Later, he critically re-examined some of these effects in an unpublished paper (“Oil and Democracy Revisited,” 2009), noting a lack of statistically significant relationships with authoritarianism when updated data was used. Thus he ignores most of these effects in the book and instead offers secrecy and governments’ perceived spending/revenue rates as new alternatives to explain how oil production causes authoritarianism (p. 105). I do not think these two can replace the causal relations explained by Ross’s 2001 article for three main reasons.

First, Ross’s 2009 paper did not find statistically significant relations between authoritarianism and two effects—repression and modernization—and did not reach a conclusion on the group formation effect. Rather than neglecting them, the book could have revised these effects. Group formation refers to the fact that in many rentier states (where oil and natural gas constitute over 40 percent of government revenues), there is no bourgeoisie, political society, or media independent of the government. This effect can be assessed with new measurements and data on economic associations, political parties, and media outlets. It is true that rentier states are no different from other autocracies in terms of using repressive police and military forces. Yet the book could still have linked the chapter on authoritarianism to that on conflicts, and showed how oil leads to both armed conflicts and authoritarianism. I agree that oil does not prevent schooling, urbanization, and some other criteria of modernization. Nevertheless, the modernization effect still helps us understand why many rentier states have a very high level of GDP per capita while having moderate or low levels of schooling and health conditions (as documented by UNDP’s Non-income Human Development Index).

Second, although Ross’s 2009 paper revealed taxation and spending effects as statistically significant, the book undermines them by employing an absolute measurement (oil income per capita), unlike in the 2001 article that more correctly used relative measurements—the rates of oil rents vs. taxes in government revenues for the “taxation effect,” and government spending as a ratio of GDP for the “spending effect.” In the analysis of economic development and probably conflicts, where GDP is a dependent variable, I agree that oil income per capita is a better measurement than relative measurements, which can create endogeneity problems (since underdevelopment and arguably conflicts are not separate from lower GDP). Yet in analyzing authoritarianism, relative measurements are much better to test the dominance of oil revenues over state revenues and over the economy. The former is important in order to examine a government’s financial independence from society, and the latter is significant in assessing society’s financial dependence on the government through the distribution of rents. Oil income per capita does not explain any of these two. Regarding the book’s primary measurement, Norway has a higher oil income per capita than Brunei, but this undermines the fact that oil only constitutes over 20 percent of government revenues and over 10 percent of the GDP in Norway, whereas in Brunei it accounts for nearly 90 percent of government revenues and 40 percent of GDP (p. 21, p. 32). There is a categorical difference between oil’s impacts on these two countries’ political regimes, which is not seen in their amounts of oil income per capita. In fact, absolute and relative measurements can be seen as complementary analytical tools. Oil income per capita, which documents the amount of oil revenue per person as an exogenous factor, is crucial for the analysis of development and conflicts, while oil revenue as percentage of government revenue and GDP helps evaluate the role of oil in statesociety relations and authoritarianism.

Finally, the book overemphasizes the role of financial secrecy and the ratio of government spending to perceived government revenues. It is not clear whether these two variables are causes or effects of authoritarianism. Moreover, the second variable is highly subjective: if revenue is calculated with an emphasis on “perception,” why not calculate “perceived spending” too? Aren’t perceptions of government revenues and spending also important in oil-poor and democratic states, such as Greece? Moreover, the difference between oil-rich and oil-poor countries regarding the details of government revenues only exists for experts. Most of people do not know these details in any state. For the recent Occupy Movement in the United States, the idea that the top one percent of the population controls the economy and politics was sufficient for the activists; no further details were needed. In oil-rich countries, the luxurious lifestyles of dynasties/rulers and the costly construction of government buildings are highly visible and widely known. People are aware of the enormous oil revenues spent by corrupt rulers. What people primarily lack is not the details of oil revenue, but the political might to challenge the asymmetrically powerful state machine. People cannot use taxation as leverage against the government, are dependent on government’s spending, do not have independent associations and media, are controlled by the security forces, and lack socio-economic complexity. Secrecy and a perceived revenue/spending ratio cannot replace the causal effects coined by Ross’s 2001 article. On the issue of authoritarianism, that article should still be read and taught as an addendum to the book.

The Oil Curse is a landmark book that brings together explanations about the impacts of oil on various key issues from authoritarianism to patriarchy, from conflict to development. It combines qualitative and quantitative methods in a truly interdisciplinary tour de force of political, economic, and social analyses. The book is an excellent source for policymakers as well as scholars of various disciplines, especially Middle East studies.

Note:
[1] Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, April 2001.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Insight Turkey

The EU and the Gulf after the Arab Spring: Strategic Partners?

Thu, 06 Sep 2012 09:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 6, 2012
9:30 AM - 4:30 PM EDT

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

The Brookings Doha Center and FRIDE co-hosted a roundtable workshop on September 6 that was sponsored by the EU Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks (GR:EEN) project and titled "The EU and the Gulf after the Arab Spring: Strategic Partners?" The event featured three sessions, which dealt with reform and foreign policy in the Arab world and elements of strategic partnership between the European Union and the Gulf. The private event was convened according to Chatham House Rule, and so the names of participants have been eliminated from the below program. A full write-up of the event is to follow.

Program

09:30 Opening remarks

09:45 Session 1: Geopolitical challenges after the 'Arab Spring'

How have the 2011 democratic uprisings and the ensuing changes of government shifted the balance of power in the region? What is the impact of the 'Arab Spring' on existing geopolitical challenges? Which new challenges and opportunities has it triggered?

11:15 Coffee break

11:30 Session 2: Political reform and domestic drivers of foreign policy

What is the state of 'political reform' in the GCC countries? What are the links between domestic attitudes in these states and their foreign policy, now that foreign policy is becoming less insulated from public opinion?

13:00 Lunch

14:30 Session 3: The EU and the Gulf: elements of strategic partnerships

As the region's power center is moving to the Gulf, the European Parliament has underlined the need for the EU to broaden and deepen its relations with the GCC countries. Which are the elements of common interest such a strategic partnership could build on? How could deeper EU-Gulf ties help strengthen security, prosperity, and democracy governance in the region?

16:00 Concluding remarks

16:30 End of roundtable

Participants

Panelists

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Deputy Director, Brookings Doha Center

Shadi Hamid

Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Pakistan’s Place in the World

Thu, 31 May 2012 17:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 31, 2012
5:30 PM - 7:00 PM EDT

Doha
Brookings Doha Center

Doha, Qatar

On May 31, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted Pakistani Foreign Minister H.E. Hina Rabbani Khar as part of its Distinguished Lecture Series. The event, held at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Doha, focused on Pakistan’s role and ambitions in its regional sphere and the broader shifting global order. Khar’s address was followed by a lively discussion with attendees from Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic, and media communities, and was moderated by BDC director Salman Shaikh.

Khar began by laying out her “hopes and fears” for Pakistan’s place in the world. While she feared that Pakistan and its religion would continue to be “misrepresented” globally, her hope was that the sacrifices made by her country in its efforts to reform would be recognized on the world stage. Khar called on global leaders to apply a “common lens of humanity” to allow Pakistan and its allies to “work through problems together.”

Speaking of the challenges facing Pakistan today, Khar said that her government’s goal was to improve the opportunities of the individual citizen. Progress has been made in that regard, and lessons learned. In particular, she cited the introduction of universal education as an important step. Individual opportunity and prosperity cannot be guaranteed without peace and stability in the regional sphere, however, Khar added. She emphasized that the spillover of conflict from Afghanistan had an “instantaneously destabilizing effect on Pakistan,” and that Islamabad is now reaching out to Kabul to build trust and “move into a new realm of brotherly relations.”

Improving relations with India, meanwhile, is a greater challenge, Khar said. In the past, both India and Pakistan have “invested a great deal of intensive hostility” in their relationship. The foreign minister stressed that it is now important that these two neighbors see each other as “common citizens of the same region” and build trust in areas that can be developed. One important endeavor prioritized by Khar was the normalization of trade relations with India, on hold since 1975.

Speaking about Pakistan’s relations with the West, the foreign minister commended European countries for recognizing the sacrifices that Pakistan had made in its efforts to pursue democratic reform. In return for those sacrifices – which included $7 billion spent, a near 50 percent drop in FDI, and great human loss caused by the militant backlash – Pakistan is seeking preferential trade agreements. A summit-level dialogue between the EU and Pakistan has now started negotiations in that regard. Khar emphasized, however, that Pakistan does not seek material support in its democratization efforts, which must be pursued in a spirit of popular ownership.

Relations with the United States have been more troubled, Khar said, adding that 2011 in particular had been “a very tough year.” The United States and Pakistan have longstanding ties, and share the same objective of achieving regional peace and stability. Recently, however, there have been too many U.S. actions that violate the terms of what is acceptable to Pakistan. Khar expressed shock at what she called the “demonization of Pakistan,” simply for being unwilling to send its soldiers to fight militancy. She called for an environment of mutual trust, and the establishment of tools to fight insurgents, which “aren’t counterproductive and do not provide fuel for further militancy.” It is unreasonable, Khar stated, for Washington to pursue unilateral interests in ways that cause internal damage to Pakistan, while forcing it to bear the costs. On top of that, blaming Islamabad for incidents such as the recent attacks in Kabul, was in her view “preposterous, counterintuitive, and counterproductive.”

In response to a question about the Pakistani government’s ability to control bilateral military relations with the United States, Khar said that 60 years of military rule had left a degree of disunity among the different branches of power. She stressed, however, that there is now a “broad maturity” in Pakistani governance, and the different branches have been able to unite on matters of national interest. She added that a current parliamentary review on relations with the United States offers an important opportunity to clarify the relationship and “put it right this time.” Part of improving the relationship, she said, should include looking at preferential market access.

Asked about efforts to build new relationships to promote growth, Khar stressed that Pakistan had been spearheading regional development through a number of joint initiatives. She said that building these “connectivities” – such as the Iran-Pakistan pipeline or a transit trade agreement with Afghanistan – encourages a “common future for the region where stability is key.” Ever-improving relations with Gulf states, including through the establishment of free trade agreements, are also central to efforts for greater regional integration. GCC countries have been an important partner in trade, as well as a source of income through remittances, Khar added.

On the subject of her approach to ongoing uprisings in the Arab world, Khar emphasized that Pakistan would “continue to engage with newly democratic states.” She stated, however, that external actors must “respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity” of these countries. Change must be internally driven, she said; imposing it from the outside “can have serious and catastrophic results.” Where there is a conflict between nations’ sovereignty and the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians, the charter of the UN, in her view, “should remain and be respected” until a new consensus is reached.

One audience member asked whether rapprochement with India could include nuclear disarmament, and whether military spending could be more usefully directed toward development efforts. Khar stressed that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “developed in reaction to a threat” and that Islamabad would “never be the first-mover in an escalation.” Mentioning past failed efforts to reach an agreement on de-militarization, she said that the political costs of such measures are huge and that there was a need for more courage in moving forward. While an improved environment for relations with India was a welcome development, it was not an end in itself, she stated, and more tangible action would be needed in the future.

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Hina Rabbani Khar

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Iraq in the Middle: Iraq’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council

F. Gregory Gause, , III — Wed, 23 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with Robert Tollast, F. Gregory Gause III discusses the foreign policy future of Iraq.

Can Iraq become an outward looking nation on the international stage or will it remain doomed to play out its neighbours proxy wars?

Many of us would like to forget about the Iraq conflict. The fact remains however, that the country sits atop an estimated 43 billion barrels of crude oil and straddles a sectarian fault line that looks likely to simmer on the brink of serious violence for some time to come. Therefore, how Maliki’s government can act diplomatically with its neighbours is of importance when trying to understand the increasingly sectarianized politics of the region. This interview asks F. Gregory Gause III about the direction Iraqi foreign policy is heading, and asks if we are doing enough to avert future crisis.

Rapprochement

Robert Tollast (RT): In February, there was some excitement at the prospect of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq when Saudi Arabia reopened their Iraqi Embassy, even though it will be based in Amman. It was enough for Iraq’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Labeed Abbawi to hail “a new phase of bilateral co-operation and an exchange of visits." Looking at the current controversy surrounding Bahrain and Saudi concerns over Iranian plans in the region, one could surmise that this rapprochement is not based on good will, but realpolitik. Iraq is looking to reopen an oil pipeline with the capacity to export nearly 1.5 million barrels per day to the Saudi port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, thereby reducing dependence on the Straits of Hormuz. There is also the issue of Saddam era debt cancellation and the fact that in February the Iraqis were desperate for Arab delegations to attend the Baghdad Summit, so were rapidly trying to mend fences. Do you think the Iraqis are reaching out to Saudi Arabia for their own ends, or do you think this might reflect something more genuine, ie good will? If it is good will, then maybe the Arar border crossing could see as much commerce as it does Hajj pilgrims...

Gregory Gause (GG): I think that the talk about improved relations was a blip, basically generated by Iraq’s desire to get a good turnout at the summit and Saudi technical issues in terms of summit prep. Of course, the Saudi presence at the summit was very low-level, which was a pretty clear signal to the Iraqi government that Riyadh was not in much of a mood to make nice. On the Iraqi side, I think that the outreach was more genuine. I do not think that Maliki wants to be a client of Iran. No politician really wants to be anybody’s client. I think that he wants to have better relations with Saudi Arabia to give him some options vis a vis Iran. But the Saudis are stonewalling until they see him take some very significant steps to demonstrate his independence from Iran.

A common enemy?

RT: Going back to the dark days of 2007 in Iraq, around 40% of foreign fighters infiltrating into the country were Saudi Arabian. The situation is so different in Iraq now partly because al-Qaeda’s uncompromising approach in western Iraq was ultimately rejected by Iraqi Sunnis. Much credit has to go to the Saudis, following the entreaties of Ryan Crocker and Dell L. Dailey to curb extremism and secure their borders.

However, despite Saudi progress in combating extremism and their much vaunted extremist rehabilitation programmes, the damage to Saudi Arabia’s image in Iraq has been extensive. Fanar Haddad has documented in his book Sectarianism in Iraq, how the Sadrists have frequently referred to terrorists in Iraq not as Salafi or Irhabeen (terrorists) but Wahabis, which not only implies Saudi origin but also evokes the historical memory of the sacking of Karbala in 1801. Likewise, it was only a few years ago that King Abdullah called Maliki “an Iranian agent.” As AQ’s leader once again urges the toppling of the House of Saud, do you think Iraq and Saudi Arabia can build bridges to fight the common enemy? For example, Maliki’s media advisor Ali al-Musawi recently stated that “Both countries are facing threats from al-Qaeda. And it is necessary to cooperate and to exchange information.”

GG: This would be an excellent basis for improved relations, if the Saudis saw their domestic al-Qaeda tendency as their biggest threat. But right now they see Iran as their biggest geopolitical and, potentially, domestic threat. And they see the Maliki government as being very closely aligned with Iran. Bahrain is both a domestic and a regional issue for the Saudis, and I think it is at the top of the Saudi priority list right now. They see Iraq as basically supporting Iranian positions on Bahrain and Gulf issues more generally.

Human Rights Watch

RT: The last Human Rights Watch report on Iraq report details how security forces detained as many as 1500 Iraqis under suspicion of being Ba’athists or “terrorists” in recent months. The bulk of the latest detaining campaign happened in western suburbs of Baghdad, so we can assume that most of the terror/ Ba’ath suspects were of Sunni origin (as with many similar campaigns in the past.) Perhaps the only time hundreds of Shia were rounded up by the ISF was during Operation Charge of the Knights in 2008, which won Maliki some short lived respect from the Saudis.

But the recent ISF campaign will appear sectarian to many (some of those on ISF arrest lists had been dead for several years) while many Shia in Iraq continue to be outraged at discrimination towards Saudi Arabia's Shia minority, something highlighted as still persistent in the latest Human Rights Watch report on Saudi Arabia and clearly apparent in the form of hunger striking Shia activist Mohammed Saleh al-Bajady.

The US has made some quite limited attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia and Iraq to improve their human rights, or at least curtail abuses, but colossal arms sales go ahead, even as the latest State Department country report on Saudi Arabia shows the US government is not in denial over their human rights record. Could our failure to reprimand these two nations on the issue of the rights of minorities be emboldening those with a sectarian agenda, increasing mistrust and ultimately paving the way for conflict?

GG: I do not think that the American position here has much causal weight on either side. Even if the US were more forthright about human rights issues with both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and was willing to hold up other aspects of the relationship unless there were improvement on the treatment of sectarian minorities, I do not think it would make that much difference. Both governments have defined their internal and regional threats in sectarian ways, it seems, and once a government has defined its biggest threat, it takes quite a bit of pressure to move it off that position. So, for all the obvious reasons, the US is not going to make sectarian minority human rights issues a big part of the bilateral relationship with either Riyadh or Baghdad (maybe a bit more with Baghdad, but more in political stability than human rights terms). Even if it did, I do not think it could move the two governments off their current policies in this regard. In the end, I think that the only thing that could move Saudi Arabia on the sectarian issue would be improved relations with Iran. That would also loosen things up regarding Saudi-Iraqi relations. But it does not look like that is in the cards anytime soon.

A united GCC policy toward Iraq?

RT: The approach toward Maliki’s Iraq has differed somewhat between the GCC countries. Kuwait, for example has shown some genuine warmth to the nation that once sent its troops to pillage Kuwait City, despite the dispute over the Mubarak and al-Faw ports. Likewise, the UAE has been happy to do business with the new Iraq and Qatars national oil company,Woqod has won various service contracts. But other tensions, such as the situation in Bahrain and the Tariq al Hashemi saga seem like a major stumbling block. Do you think the GCC countries are too different to follow a joint foreign policy toward Iraq? It seems like the GCC countries most open to reform are happiest to build bridges with Iraq.

GG: I would disagree on the reform point. Neither Qatar nor the UAE is all that keen on real political reform. But neither is as obsessed about sectarian politics as is Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait has taken some interesting steps here, including having the Amir attend the summit. But the core issues in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship (the “debt”, reparations, Chapter 7, border, etc.) are tied up with Kuwaiti parliamentary politics, and it will be harder to get issues seen as “pro-Iraqi” through the parliament. The government could take more steps toward Iraq, but parliament will put a stop to moves on these key issues, I think. At least any Kuwaiti minister contemplating moves in this direction has to think about the parliamentary reaction. This is the only GCC state where this is true.

I think that you are right about the GCC states being too different to have one comprehensive policy toward Iraq. This was true in the last years of Saddam’s rule, and it remains true now. The UAE and Qatar will do business with Iraq happily (Oman, too, but not as much money there). Bahrain will follow Saudi Arabia, for which the sectarian issue and relations with Iran will continue to determine the nature of Saudi-Iraqi relations. Kuwait will be cautious but not confrontational.

The end of Assad

RT: America and Europe have essentially warned that sending arms to Syria is a bad idea while supporting the odd grey area of “non lethal aid,” in the form of equipment such as secure radios so that the FSA can talk to each other safely while planning their next lethal attack. This seems like an oddly indecisive policy. Meanwhile, the US entreaty to Saudi Arabia and Qatar not to send arms to the fight looks increasingly feeble, and so far we have managed to persuade Iraq (who have virtually no control over their airspace) to politely ask Iran to stop sending arms flights to Syria. Alas, the Iraqi Minister of Transport Hadi al-Amiri is head of the Badr Organisation, and claimed the flights were “US lies.” Can we do more with our use of leverage to stop what you termed the "sectarianization" of regional balance of power conflicts in the Middle East?

GG: I am not sure that the US can do more on this score. As you said in the question, our opposition to arms shipments to the Syrian rebels is pretty half-hearted, maybe even one-quarter-hearted. I do not think that the Saudis and the Qataris feel any real push-back from the US on this. Our influence with Iran on this is, of course, negligible. As long as Iran wants to do it, I doubt that the Iraqi government would be able to summon the political will and internal unity to say “no.”

The only steps the US could take on this score would be big steps toward ending its confrontation with Iran, not only on the nuclear file but on a range of regional issues. That would change the regional environment quite a bit, and other pieces could fall into new places, including Iraqi-Iranian and Saudi-Iranian relations. (At least initially, the Saudis would not be so pleased with the US if a US-Iranian rapprochement were reached, either.) Perhaps that is a possibility, but right now I remain skeptical that it can happen. A breakthrough on the nuclear issue can lead to something different, but we need to see that breakthrough happen. Even if Iran were willing to compromise on the nuclear file, it does not seem willing to abandon Assad, and that remains the key geopolitical struggle for regional influence right now.

Authors

F. Gregory Gause, III

Publication: Small Wars Journal

Brookings Doha Energy Forum 2012 Policy Paper

Tue, 22 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This report documents the proceedings of the inaugural Brookings Doha Energy Forum, a platform intended to foster debate, dialogue, and outcome-oriented research around one of the major geopolitical trends of the 21st century. The Forum convened a private, high-level meeting of senior government officials, senior energy company executives, and world-class energy analysts from the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the United States.

LETTER FROM THE CONFERENCE CONVENERS

Dear Colleagues,

It is our pleasure to release the proceedings of the inaugural meeting of the Brookings Doha Energy Forum, a platform intended to foster debate, dialogue, and outcome-oriented research around one of the major geopolitical trends of the 21^st century.

The predominant international energy relationships of the past 50 years have been between the supplier states of the Middle East and the consumer states of the industrialized countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In recent years, however, a range of economic, political, technological, and environmental factors have begun to challenge the status quo. New demand centers in South and East Asia and a leveling out of demand in the United States and Europe have tilted the global energy landscape eastwards, giving increasing market power to emerging economies. The recent discovery and development of unconventional sources of oil and gas has accelerated this shift, and has begun to fragment the positions of traditional consumer nations. Rising energy demand in China and India has been accompanied by a wave of strategic energy investments by those countries as they seek to maximize energy security.

Systemic shifts in the global balance of supply and demand are coinciding with a period of rapid and unprecedented change in the Middle East. Whether or not unrest spreads in the Gulf, its leaders will have to navigate between meeting the increasing demands of domestic populations and meeting rising global demand for energy. The emergence of new governments in other parts of the region and fears of revolutionary “contagion” are already having an impact on oil prices, investor confidence, and energy security considerations among consumer nations.

This combination of global structural shifts and local political transitions has the potential to lead to a fundamental transformation of the region’s role and the global politics of oil and gas, and gives rise a number of critical questions:

What will be the strategic and economic implications of an eastward shift in focus by Middle East suppliers?
What will changes in the domestic policies mean for short and long-term stability of global energy markets?
As emerging markets become more important consumers and investors, how will the investment balance change between host and home countries?
What will the changing nature of supplier-consumer relationship mean for governance and transparency in producer nations?

The Brookings Doha Energy Forum, a collaboration between the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and the Brookings Energy Security Initiative, was created to address these questions. At its inaugural meeting in February 2012, the Forum convened a private, high-level meeting of senior government officials, senior energy-company executives, and world-class energy analysts from the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the United States. The two-day meeting, which was opened by His Excellency Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, provided an opportunity for an open dialogue on the changing global energy landscape, the impact of a revolutionary Middle East on global energy markets, and the future of energy investments in the Middle East. The findings of the conference are reflected in this report.

The Brookings Doha Energy Forum relies on the expertise and support of stakeholders in the public and private sectors, both in the Middle East region and in the broader international community. We look forward to working with together within Brookings and with our partners to ensure the continued success of the project.

Sincerely,

Salman Shaikh
Director
Brookings Doha Center

Charles L. Ebinger
Director
Brookings Energy Security Initiative

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Publication: Brookings Doha Center and Brookings Energy Security Initiative

What Obama Should and Shouldn’t Do About High Gas Prices

William A. Galston — Fri, 16 Mar 2012 09:26:00 -0400

During his press conference on March 6, Barack Obama remarked that there’s “no silver bullet” to stem rising gas prices in the short term—and in the view of most energy experts, he’s right. The problem, though, is that the American people don’t agree. In the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal survey, made public the day before the president spoke, 55 percent said that the government has a “great deal” or “quite a bit” of control over gas prices. Instead of trying to convince them otherwise, Obama should be doing everything he can to prove that this is high on his priority list.

Here’s what won’t work. As long as gas prices remain elevated, Obama should downplay his standard mantra about conservation, efficiency, and alternative fuels. Right now the people are in no mood to be told that they should buy expensive electric cars and $50 LED lightbulbs. It will just make them receptive to the Republican charge—which Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal pressed in a March 12 Wall Street Journal op-ed—that he’s giving his environmental commitments priority over lower energy costs.

He should also stop reciting statistics about increased oil production and decreased dependency on foreign oil. While they’re absolutely true, they are unlikely to move the public. I’ve been in six presidential campaigns, and I cannot recall an instance in which statistics trumped voters’ direct personal experience.

Finally, Obama should resist advice to tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which was created after the 1973 Arab oil embargo to protect the United States against severe supply disruptions. When Al Gore proposed that step in the fall of 2000, he was accused of playing politics with energy security, and the voters reacted adversely. As tensions with Iran rise and the threat of war or an interruption of crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz escalates, tapping the reserve for non-emergency purposes would leave the president open to the kinds of charges that hurt Gore’s campaign. Politically seasoned Democrats such as House Minority whip Steny Hoyer have counseled against it, and the president should listen to them.

So what can he do about high gas prices? His best chance to defuse the issue is to dramatize his active engagement and concern. Make sure people know that he cares, and that this is on his agenda. His administration has already taken the first step: Energy Secretary Steven Chu reversed his stance of 2008 that gas prices should rise to “the levels in Europe,” declaring that “I no longer share that view.”

But the president doesn’t have to stop at mere rhetoric. As he indicated in his press conference, he can ask the Department of Energy to find feasible ways of preempting production bottlenecks in refineries—for example, by waiving the shift from winter to summer gasoline blends that contributes to higher prices. In addition, he can direct the Justice Department to crack down on oil market speculation, which many experts believe exaggerates the price impact of relatively modest supply/demand imbalances.

Other political moves will be tougher for Obama to make, but make even more of a difference in the public eye. For example, he could declare that “my administration is not conducting a war on fossil fuels.” To make that claim credible, he could expedite consideration of the revised Keystone XL pipeline route and approve it sometime this summer. He could make it clear that absent compelling scientific evidence to the contrary, his administration will not prevent the use of hydrofracking, a technique that has spurred the development of natural gas reserves. He could indicate his administration’s interest in pursuing new technologies for using coal cleanly and efficiently. And he can make sure that no new “Tier 3” motor vehicle emission and fuel standards go into effect until the gas price spike subsides and the economic recovery is strong enough to absorb new rules.

These positions may make some environmentalists unhappy, but they will mute the discontent of millions of average families who are struggling to get by in the face of rising prices and stagnant wages. And to the extent that they prevent the gas price surge from going as far it otherwise would, they will help insulate the economic recovery from reduced demand for household expenses other than gas.

To be sure, high gas prices may not spell political death for Obama. Smart analysts such as political statistician Nate Silver and political scientist Alan Abramowitz have uncovered no direct correlation between gas prices and incumbents’ approval ratings. But does Obama really want to bet his presidency on their findings?

Authors

William A. Galston

Publication: The New Republic

After the Arab Spring: What’s Next for the Economies of the Middle East and North Africa

Fri, 23 Sep 2011 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 23, 2011
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

With many countries in the Arab world experiencing popular protests and regime change, much of the focus of the international community and media has been the region’s political transition from autocratic rule to democracy. However, the economic transition that many of these countries now face is also critical for the future growth and development of their economies and the prosperity and well-being of their citizens. The international community and Arab leaders must now closely examine what reforms these countries need to take on in order to ensure an economic transition that creates jobs, attracts investment and turns these nations into globally competitive economies.

On September 23, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on the economic transition of Middle East and North African countries post-Arab Spring and the role that Arab governments and the international community have guiding these economic reforms. Mustapha Nabli, central bank governor of Tunisia and Ahmed Galal, managing director of the Economic Research Forum, made opening remarks on the efforts needed to spur economic growth in the region. Gunilla Carlsson, Sweden’s minister for international development cooperation and Dirk Niebel, Germany’s minister for economic cooperation and development, responded with their perspective of the efforts of the international community. Vice President Kemal Derviş, director of Global Economy and Development, moderated the discussion.

After the program, the participants took audience questions.

Video

Audio

After the Arab Spring: What’s Next for the Economies of the Middle East and North Africa

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20110923_arab_spring_economics

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Ahmed Galal

Managing Director
Economic Research Forum

Mustapha Nabli

Governor
Central Bank of Tunisia

Gunilla Carlsson

Minister for International Development Cooperation
Kingdom of Sweden

Dirk Niebel

Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development
Federal Republic of Germany

What Tiny Qatar Stands to Gain in Libya

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 29 Aug 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with NPR's Robert Siegel, Ibrahim Sharqieh discusses the role that Qatar has played in supporting the Libyan uprising — and what it stands to gain.

ROBERT SIEGEL, NPR: The Libyan rebels received decisive air support from NATO. But there was another, less publicized, smaller-scale but equally remarkable foreign involvement in support of the uprising, the involvement of Qatar.

Qatar is a peninsula, a little smaller than Connecticut. It juts north into the Persian Gulf. On the south, it borders Saudi Arabia. It is rich in oil and natural gas. Its population is only about 900,000. And while it is an Arab country, a monarchy ruled by the al-Thani family, the majority of its residents are non-Arabs, non-citizens from India and Pakistan. Qatar is also home to the TV channel Al Jazeera. It will host soccer's World Cup and it was an important player in Libya.

Ibrahim Sharqieh is deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center. Doha is the capital of Qatar. And, Ibrahim, first, what did the Qataris do in support of the Libyan rebels?

IBRAHIM SHARQIEH: That Qataris' support to the Libyan rebels has been politically, diplomatically and militarily. We had about five Qatari fighter jets. In Qatar, we had about the training of Libyan rebels. And Qatar also played an important role in developing an Arab League support through the military intervention in Libya, which this Arab League support actually has provided the umbrella for the NATO intervention and for the military intervention and provided the legitimacy that, for example, was missing in Iraq.

SIEGEL: Why? What are the motives behind Qatar's involvement in Libya and some of its broader ambitions in the region?

SHARQIEH: Oh, there are many theories. The one that makes the most sense in my view is that Qatar is supporting the revolution for humanitarian reasons. And in addition to this, Qatar is working and supporting the revolution is they're strictly with its vision for its role in the region and in the world.

SIEGEL: One thing we should note, though, in this year of the Arab Spring, one thing Qatar isn't is it isn't a democracy. It isn't an elected parliamentary republic.

SHARQIEH: Well, there is very high level satisfaction of the people here in the country, of the political system and of its leadership. So there haven't been - we haven't seen any cause for change or any protests or any different types of complaints. So the system seems to work and we seem to have a stable country. That distance itself very far away from the protests that are happening in the region.

Listen to the full interview or download the transcript at npr.org »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: NPR

China–Gulf Energy Relations

Erica S. Downs — Mon, 01 Aug 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: The following article originally appeared in China and the Persian Gulf, a publication by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Introduction:

Energy, especially oil, lies at the heart of China’s relationships with Persian Gulf countries. As China’s oil demand and imports have grown, so have China’s trade and investment ties with the states of the Persian Gulf. However, the nature of China’s energy relationships with major powers in the region varies dramatically. While Chinese officials and oil executives regard Saudi Arabia as a very reliable oil supplier and Iraq as a land of tremendous upstream opportunities, Iran is viewed as a tempting but tough place to do business. The new unilateral international sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States, the European Union, and other countries are likely to reinforce these perceptions.

Saudi Arabia: A Very Reliable Partner

China regards Saudi Arabia as a very reliable supplier of crude oil. Over the past decade, the Saudis have repeatedly told the Chinese that they can count on Saudi Arabia to provide China with the oil it needs for continued economic growth. They have also matched their words with deeds. Saudi Arabia has been China’s largest supplier of crude oil since 2002, providing China with one-fifth of its crude oil imports in 2009.

Perhaps the greatest reassurance the Chinese have received from the Saudis about their reliability as an oil supplier came during President Hu Jintao’s state visit in February 2009. While Hu was in Riyadh, the Saudis promised to guarantee the supply of crude oil to China at all times as part of a “gentleman’s agreement” between Saudi Aramco and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Nine months later, Ali Al-Naimi, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources repeated this pledge in Beijing in his acceptance speech for the honorary doctoral degree awarded to him by Peking University. Speaking about Saudi Arabia’s commitment to global market stability and supply continuity and reliability, he said, “let me be as explicit as possible: China can rely on Saudi Arabia to provide it with the oil it will need to continue its projected growth for the coming decades.”

Read the full chapter >>
(pages 62-78)

Authors

Erica S. Downs

Publication: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Options for Low-Carbon Development in Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council

Mon, 13 Jun 2011 13:48:00 -0400

Executive Summary

Over the next twenty years the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are likely to experience some of the fastest economic and energy-consumption growth rates anywhere in the world. Already almost exclusively dependent on hydrocarbons for their energy supply, the GCC member states face increasing environmental and economic costs from continued heavy reliance on oil and gas in their power-generation and industrial sectors. Several of the GCC countries have asserted their interest in diversifying their economies away from the export of raw materials and energy-intensive industry in order to achieve sustainable long-term economic growth and security. The extent to which such a diversification is likely to occur in the short-term should not be overestimated. The principal source of foreign-exchange earnings for the GCC countries is through rent on oil and gas exports and the exploitation of a comparative advantage in low-cost energy-intensive industry. Any large-scale switch away from energy-intensive economic activity is likely to act, at least in the short-term, to the detriment of the GCC countries’ competitiveness and terms of trade. However, there are opportunities for the countries of the GCC to achieve the parallel objectives of reduced carbon emissions, reduced domestic consumption of valuable oil and gas resources, and increased economic diversity without a major structural change to their economies and with significant potential net benefits both in terms of carbon-reduction and economic performance. These opportunities lie in the development and adoption of technologies and improved management systems in the areas of alternative energy, energy efficiency, and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).

In the field of alternative and renewable energy, the GCC countries have the potential to take greater advantage of their proven wind, solar and geothermal resource base in their power generation mixes. While there are several well-funded academic and research institutions in the region working on the development of technologies in these areas, there is large scope for the acceleration of renewable energy penetration through the implementation of policy goals, formalized networks and regional coordination. In addition to the potential for increased integration of established alternative energy technologies, the countries of the GCC have an opportunity to develop new renewable technology niches in applications suited for their climatic conditions, such as algal biofuels and dust-resistant solar photovoltaics. This strategic approach to alternative energy development could provide an important source of diversification for the region’s economies and a source of competitive advantage in a carbonconstrained global economy.

In CCS, the GCC countries have both the means and the motivation to be a leader in the development of a technology that will play a major part in achieving global emissions-reduction targets. With huge projected increases in their power sector capacities—most of which, notwithstanding the progress made on alternative energy sources, are likely to be met with natural gas—the countries in the region have the opportunity to serve as a platform for global development of carboncapture technology. With large amounts of available investment capital, economies optimized for energy-intensive industry, and a near-term economic incentive for the use of captured carbon- dioxide through enhanced oil and gas recovery, the GCC countries have a unique opportunity to invest in “first-mover” research and development to accelerate the commercialization of CCS.

In the area of energy efficiency, the countries of the GCC have great potential to institute technologies and systems that improve their performance at the firm and consumer levels. Through the development and implementation of efficiency standards for buildings and appliances, they have the ability to reduce their carbon-emissions profile at low—or even negative—net cost. They also have the ability to apply international best practice in energy efficiency and related management systems through partnership initiatives with the private sector. Any effort to seriously address the challenge of emissions reduction and increased adoption of non-carbon energy sources in the power-generation mix in the GCC must acknowledge the significant potential for pricing reform. Given the fragility of the current political situation in the region, however, it is unlikely that any major implementation of fiscal instruments for demand-side reduction is on the horizon. Instead, GCC energy planners have an opportunity to focus on greater investment in the development of domestic and regional research networks, the creation of standards and goals, and increased collaboration with the private sector for transfer of best practice, and the commercialization of technologies likely to be a source of competitive advantage.

At the regional level, the countries of the GCC face many of the most pressing challenges of the global economy in the 21st century: a selfinterested need to reduce carbon emissions while meeting increased energy demand and a desire to develop new technologies that will provide a source of long-term economic growth. Through adoption of policies that encourage the role of alternative energy, energy efficiency, and carbon capture and sequestration, the GCC can meet its own environmental and economic objectives and remain at the center of the energy economy for decades to come.

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Full Paper

Authors

Govinda Avasarala
Charles K. Ebinger
Nathan Hultman
Kevin Massy
Dylan Rebois

From the Arab Spring Comes a More Unified Gulf Cooperation Council

Shadi Hamid — Fri, 15 Apr 2011 00:00:00 -0400

For the Gulf countries, the ongoing Arab spring has meant a difficult period of adjustment. In recent weeks, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have grown increasingly assertive in the foreign policy arena, developing muscular responses to regional unrest.

Qatar has long charted an independent course, by steering a middle path between the duelling sides of the Arab Cold War. It has maintained its relationship with the United States while reaching out to members of the so-called "rejectionist" axis, such as Iran, with which it has a defence cooperation agreement.

Building on past successes - including winning the Middle East's first ever World Cup bid - Qatar has continued to distinguish itself. It was the first Arab country to recognise Libya's rebel government, and has made the most significant Arab contribution to the ongoing military intervention there.

All of this raises the question: what exactly does Qatar want? As the smallest Gulf state, Qatar has always been vulnerable. Hosting the largest pre-positioning US military base in the world offers protection. But unlike the rest of the region, Qatar has gone further, styling itself as one of the few Arab nations in tune with Arab popular opinion.

And as Al Jazeera - the Doha-based voice of the Arab revolutions - has risen in stature, so too have its Qatari sponsors. Qatar's foreign policy has put Qatar on the map, making it considerably more influential than many believe it has any right to be.

Increasingly, though, Qatar has some competition. Saudi Arabia has become the unofficial leader of the region's "counter-revolution". Saudi leaders were taken aback by America's unwillingness to stand by President Hosni Mubarak during his time of need. When Bahrain experienced massive protests - with nearly one out of every five citizens taking to the streets - another red line was crossed.

Saudi Arabia sees the uprisings as an unprecedented threat to regional security. Working through the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh has tried to devise a united Gulf response to a number of challenges.

First, the GCC put together a $20 billion (Dh73.4billion) aid package for Oman and Bahrain. On March 14, the GCC's Peninsula Shield Force, with troops from Saudi Arabia and police from the United Arab Emirates, entered Bahrain to help quell the protests there.

Not always known for seeing eye to eye on regional issues, the governments of the Gulf are coming together in the face of what they see as common security threats. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly accused Iran of fomenting instability in the region, particularly in Bahrain, which has a majority Shiite population. This was reflected in a statement issued by GCC foreign ministers on April 3, in which they charged Iran with meddling and "violating the sovereignty" of member states.

For the UAE, with its large expatriate Iranian population, the relationship with Tehran is particularly delicate, with the two countries long enjoying extensive economic ties.

Outside the Gulf, the GCC is also showing unity. The bloc backed a no-fly zone in Libya well before the US did, with the UAE joining Qatar in sending fighter jets. These joint efforts have laid the foundation for greater GCC cooperation.

While Saudi Arabia remains, by far, the most powerful regional player, it has recognised the need for more multilateral responses. In the process, the GCC, which often seemed less than the sum of its parts, may - like the Arab League - find itself playing a more active, varied role in the Gulf as well as the broader Middle East.

But a more coherent approach doesn't necessarily mean a more successful one. With the exception of Qatar, the Gulf nations have firmly put themselves in the pro-stability camp, at a time when the whole premise of Western-backed "stability" has been called into question. After all, the pre-revolutionary regimes of Egypt and Tunisia had always claimed that, despite all their faults, they could at the very least be counted on to stave off unrest and instability. But in the end, they couldn't.

With much of the GCC coalescing into a more coherent bloc, Iran and its proxies are not likely to stay quiet. Already, the troubling sectarian divide has grown more ominous. Meanwhile, with revolutionary Egypt adopting a more independent, nationalist foreign policy, a "non-aligned" axis - also including Turkey, Tunisia, and Qatar - seems to be emerging. In short, the Arab Cold War has not gone away, but it has become considerably more complex.

Domestic changes - in this case, the drive toward greater democracy - often have significant implications for foreign policy, and the Arab spring is no exception. With America's role in the region uncertain at best, the Gulf countries, for both better and worse, are going their own way. If stability is the intended destination, then they - and the rest of the region - may be in for an unpleasant surprise.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The National