Brookings: Topics - Global Governance

Oil, Gas and Minerals for the Public Good: The Revenue Watch 2013 Resource Governance Index

Wed, 15 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Watch live streaming video from livefrombrookings at livestream.com

Trillions of dollars in resources lie buried in the backyards of many of the world’s poorest citizens. Oil, gas and minerals can, if managed effectively and accountably, stimulate economic development. Too often, however, secrecy, corruption and weak institutions obstruct this path. To advance the understanding of this challenge, the Revenue Watch Institute has produced the Resource Governance Index, a collection of research, rankings and analysis that measures the quality of governance in the oil, gas and mining sector of 58 countries. Together, these nations produce 85 percent of the world’s oil, 90 percent of its diamonds and 80 percent of its copper, generating trillions of dollars annually. The future of these countries, both developed and developing, depends on how well they manage their resources.

On May 15, Global Economy and Development at Brookings hosted a discussion on these concerns. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Kaufmann, president of Revenue Watch, presented the index findings, followed by a panel discussion on resource governance with Carlos Pascual, special envoy and coordinator for International Affairs, Bureau of Energy Resources, U.S. State Department, and Brookings Senior Fellow George Ingram with the Global Economy and Development program. Brookings Visiting Fellow Tamar Manuelyan Atinc moderated the discussion.

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Oil, Gas and Minerals for the Public Good: The Revenue Watch 2013 Resource Governance Index

Europe on a Slippery Slope

Thomas Wright — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the International Herald Tribune.

Throughout the euro crisis, observers have been asking if the euro zone will disintegrate — as if it is a decision that will be made by its leaders at some point in the future. This holds out the prospect of a great historic choice: Europeans can choose to properly unite and overcome their crisis or they can choose dissolution. We wait with bated breath for the next summit or the latest “most crucial month in the euro’s history,” which now seems to come several times a year.

But, this may be the wrong way of looking at the euro crisis. Integration and disintegration are not just the products of deliberate decisions. They are both processes, set in motion by actions regardless of the stated intentions of leaders. Once underway, each process takes several election cycles — probably a decade or so — to reach completion. Only one will prevail in the end, but it is possible that in the early stages these two processes can coexist even as each vies for supremacy.

Looked at this way, the euro zone is in serious trouble. The events of the past six months are consistent with a process of disintegration, while the process of integration has steadily weakened. The question is no longer, “Will Europe unravel?” We should be asking, “Can European disintegration be reversed?”

The trigger that brought integration to a halt and set disintegration in motion is surprising. In July 2012, the European Central Bank chief, Mario Draghi, declared that he would do whatever it takes to save the euro, and in August he kept his promise by introducing a program of Outright Monetary Transactions to finance troubled member states, thus bringing down the price of sovereign debt. The temporary lull led José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, to confidently declare that “the existential threat against the euro has essentially been overcome.”

But Barroso could not have been more mistaken. The E.C.B.’s actions, while welcome, had a major unintended consequence. European governments became complacent and stopped pushing the policies needed to save the euro. The German government now believes that a quantum leap toward deeper fiscal and political integration through treaty change (the only way it could be done) is no longer necessary. At the December summit meeting, it was taken off the table. Instead, the Germans will push for incremental steps to increase coordination. Banking union has been watered down to the point where it is grossly insufficient. The euro zone is proposing a common supervisory mechanism, but banking debt will remain primarily a national concern.

The optimists say that the small steps the euro zone has taken are the first in a long journey, but this assumes that it will be easier to accomplish extraordinarily difficult goals later. Unfortunately, European politics are becoming polarized in a way that makes further progress unlikely. The core member states have run out of patience with the periphery and do not want to take on new commitments, such as a real banking union. Voters in the periphery are turning toward politicians who will say no to German austerity, as Italians recently demonstrated.

As integration stalled, the euro zone experienced its first major act of disintegration. The spectacularly botched rescue of Cyprus formally created a two-tier euro zone. Deposits are safer in Germany than in the periphery and this has enormous implications. We should expect large-scale capital flight if markets fear that other states will need a bailout. With capital controls in place, Cyprus itself is half in and half out of the single currency.

The next decisive moment may be when a member state on the periphery elects a government with a cast iron mandate to say no to a German government that has a cast iron mandate not to buckle. This almost happened in Greece in June of 2012, and it may yet happen in Italy in a couple of months. This could cause a withdrawal of E.C.B. support and an escalation that will lead to new acts of disintegration.

Winston Churchill once said: “It is not enough that we do our best; sometimes we have to do what’s required.” All European leaders should have this advice engraved onto a plaque and then affix it to their desks. Throughout the euro crisis, they have sought credit for good intentions and effort. They continually point out that the euro zone has moved far further and faster than anyone could have imagined before the crisis.

They are right, but it is completely irrelevant.

There are other forces at work and at the moment they are prevailing. Europe’s leaders need to be honest about the steps necessary to reverse a long spiral of disintegration. If they can’t do that, they need to ask how they can manage the process in the least damaging way possible.

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Image Source: © Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters

Getting to Scale : How to Bring Development Solutions to Millions of Poor People

Laurence Chandy, Akio Hosono, Homi Kharas and Johannes F. Linn, eds. — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 240pp.

The global development community is teeming with different ideas and interventions to improve the lives of the world’s poorest people. Whether these succeed in having a transformative impact depends not just on their individual brilliance but on whether they can be brought to a scale where they reach millions of poor people.

Getting to Scale explores what it takes to expand the reach of development solutions beyond an individual village or pilot program, but to poor people everywhere. Each of the essays in this book documents one or more contemporary case studies, which together provide a body of evidence on how scale can be pursued. It suggests that the challenge of scaling up can be divided into two: financing interventions at scale, and managing delivery to large numbers of beneficiaries. Neither governments, donors, charities, nor corporations are usually capable of overcoming these twin challenges alone, indicating that partnerships are key to success.

Scaling up is mission critical if extreme poverty is to be vanquished in our lifetime. Getting to Scale provides an invaluable resource for development practitioners, analysts, and students on a topic that remains largely unexplored and poorly understood.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Laurence Chandy

Akio Hosono

Akio Hosono is the director of the Research Institute of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency.

Homi Kharas

Johannes F. Linn

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Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Beyond the Climate Impasse: How the Major Economies Forum Can Lead the Way

Timmons Roberts — Mon, 08 Apr 2013 12:50:00 -0400

During George W. Bush’s administration, the government was under pressure to act on climate change, but saw the U.N. as a dead end for negotiations. Instead of the cumbersome talks with almost 200 countries at the table, the Bush administration favored “minilateral” or “plurilateral” solutions with small groups of countries.

Now in 2013, with a new president in the White House who was feted by the Nobel committee for renewing multilateralism, the idea of smaller plurilateral solutions seems to have kept its currency. After two arduous decades of negotiations since the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit when the first climate framework treaty was penned, it’s time to reconsider whether these smaller groups can break the endless stalemate.

Although the negotiations have grown tremendously complex, the core difficulty is who has to act to reduce their emissions, how much and when. An “apple pie” phrase in the 1992 treaty is that countries should act according to their “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” It’s a pretty agreeable statement: everyone’s responsible for this global crisis, but some countries created much more of the problem so they should act, and especially those countries with the most funds. Developing countries see this as obligating the wealthy nations who have dumped the most carbon pollution into the atmosphere to act first and most aggressively to cut their emissions. Some key wealthy countries have resisted acknowledging “historical responsibility,” since doing so might mean damage to their economic competitiveness, or maybe even imply legal liability.

But the clock has been ticking these 20 years, and time is running out. We need a viable coalition for efficiently and adequately addressing emissions reductions, consisting of a group small enough to avoid the unworkability of full universal multilateralism and, at the same time, large enough to significantly address the issue. This could be the week for such a step, as the Obama administration hosts representatives from a group of countries assembled precisely for breaking this impasse.

George W. Bush began a group called the “Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change” back in 2007, and upon arriving in the White House, President Obama renamed the group the “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.” The new “MEF” was officially launched in March 2009 “to facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies [and] help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual U.N. climate negotiations.”

The group has met 14 times since then, and will next meet this week from April 11-12, 2013 in Washington. Its members include Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU-27, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and the U.S. If you add them all up, over four-fifths of all contributions to fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions in the world are represented. A reasonable deal within this group would be nearly five times more effective than the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which only covers 15 percent of global emissions.

In a recently published Brookings’ paper, Marco Grasso of the University of Milan-Bicocca and I propose a compromise by which the MEF could break the climate negotiations impasse. Markedly, our approach requires all key players to compromise on some demands in order for their own to be met. The goals are fairness and feasibility.

First, we suggest the use of ‘consumption-based accounting,’ which counts emissions where products are consumed, not produced. This would be fairer and beneficial for China, the leading current emitter and third highest emitter historically. China is the ‘workshop of the world’ and essentially the place to which other countries have outsourced their highly polluting stages of manufacturing. Because of its diverse economy, which includes significant resource extraction and primary processing of those resources, this kind of accounting also doesn’t hurt the U.S. significantly.

Second, we create a ‘carbon budget,’ based on the total amount of emissions that can still be released while keeping us below a 25 percent chance of the world warming above 2 ˚C on average. That’s the level at which the climate change is expected to worsen to the point of unpredictable and unacceptable impacts. Also central to the compromise, to apportion the carbon budget we propose a ‘short horizon polluter pays principle,’ which calculates responsibility for climate change from past fossil fuel emissions, but only from 1990 to 2010. India, China and other developing nations have demanded that the wealthy countries be obligated to act based on their long histories of emitting and their capability to pay, and our short horizon polluter pays principle and use of national income as an indictor of capability address their concern. However, limiting the responsibility for past fossil fuel emissions to a 20 year horizon is a compromise for the U.S., EU and other wealthy countries with far longer emissions histories. While developed nations must acknowledge some responsibility, this proposed compromise only requires that they do so from the point that climate change emerged as a concern and global negotiations on the issue were underway.

This minilateral compromise within the Major Economies Forum may be the only way to avoid the disasters that lie ahead. In this deal, all actors must bend to some demands of the other key players in order for their own to be met, as with any true compromise. The MEF can lead us down a new road by exploring this approach.

Authors

Timmons Roberts

Image Source: © Stringer China / Reuters

The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:20:00 -0400

A high wire act played out over a 12-hour session of the General Assembly last week at the Organization of American States (OAS): Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out unless their demands were met. Considerable tensions existed within the Hall of the Americas as the foreign ministers witnessed another threat to the organization’s integrity. This time, the contest was over the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Since 1959, the IACHR has taken up and defended the rights of children, of women, of indigenous communities, of sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberty, afro-descendents, people with disabilities, migrants, defenders of human rights: in short, people in vulnerable situations. The IAHCR and its judicial arm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have continued to denounce and sanction violations of human rights. Throughout the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian military dictatorships of the 1970s and early 1980s, the commission and the court played key roles in making visible the victims of abuse. Despite perennial criticisms of the OAS for its failure to defend democratic institutions, the IACHR and the court are considered to be the main collective achievements in defending the rights of individual citizens in the Western Hemisphere.

On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the United States suffered critical attacks, the OAS General Assembly reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed on this historic day in U.S. history. In its Article 8 it gave the right to “any person who consider that his or her human rights have been violated may lodge a complaint or petition before the inter-American system for protection and promotion of human rights.” Individual citizens were recognized as legitimate actors in the consolidation of democracy.

It was therefore disturbing when in 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela raised three complaints about the IACHR: the budget should be limited to contributions from member states and not from observer nations and civil society; the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression should receive less funds and no more than the amount granted to other OAS rapporteurs; and, third, the headquarters for the IACHR should move out of Washington, preferably to Argentina.

The demands of Ecuador and Venezuela were discussed for over 22 months and through 37 meetings of IACHR and 29 working groups, the presentation of 98 documents from civil society, five academic meetings, three hemispheric audiences and one Extraordinary Session of the OAS. When the sought-for reforms were raised at the 44th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly last week, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out if their demands were not addressed.

Ecuador and Venezuela – with Bolivian and Nicaraguan support – called to limit the IACHR budget. This was an effort both to limit outside influences on the human rights commission as well as to reduce, even further its effectiveness. Currently, 55 percent of the IACHR’s budget comes from the OAS, the remaining 45 percent comes from member countries, observer nations and civil society. In 2012, the IACHR had an annual budget of $10 million with which to pay rapporteurs, attorneys and staff. With only 34 attorneys for 35 member countries and 31 other staff members, the work of investigating the 448 complaints submitted in 2012 is already inadequate because it enables consideration of only 10 percent of the complaints. Rather than reduce further the IACHR budget, the commission has requested doubling its budget to $20 million in order to hire more attorneys and consider more complaints.

The second complaint was more serious, namely a reduction in the budget for Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. The work of this office is dedicated to preserving “the right to seek, receive, and disseminate information and opinions freely.” (Declaration of Principles on the Right to Freedom of Expression). The call to reduce the budget for this office was a demand to limit, if not curtail its effectiveness. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, the press has been censured, and in certain cases closed, because of stories critical of the government.

The third complaint requesting that the IACHR move out of Washington did not receive the same objection. Both Costa Rica and Peru offered to host the commission, should it have to leave the OAS building and support structure thereof.

It is noteworthy that Mexico, which has received more complaints before the IACHR in the last two years than any other nation within the OAS, rejected the demands of Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia, which during its civil war with the FARC had been the object of criticism from numerous, alleged victims of human rights, also rejected the demands. While Bolivia and Nicaragua joined in the Ecuadoran demand, the Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) did not do so; nor did Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, Canada and the United States. The four ALBA continental nations were marginalized and on this occasion failed to modify the rules and process of the OAS. Only Argentina prevented the walk-out of Ecuador and Venezuela by presenting a motion that enabled the OAS to continue debating the three reforms.

The contest will continue and Ecuador will seek to lead its ALBA allies in rejecting liberal democratic concepts, such as human rights and press freedom. The significance of the 44th Extraordinary General Assemblyof the OAS is that the ALBA countries failed to undermine the democratic principles of the Inter-American system. If anything, the criticism has strengthened the resolve of the Western Hemisphere to retain its ideals and maintain a process by which individuals can bring complaints before an international body that accepts the sovereignty of the people, not the governors.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

UK's Euroscepticism Could Cost Britain Power

Thomas Wright — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The idea that Britain should use its influence to remake the European Union is not an unreasonable one. There is a strong argument that the EU is on an unsustainable path — the eurocrisis is creating a dangerous divide between the periphery and core, the eurozone is encroaching upon the EU, there is a yawning gap between the people and their leaders, and Europe has much to do if it is to be competitive in a world dominated by the US and China. Britain is a country with the diplomatic skill and heft to move the EU in the right direction.

Unfortunately, this idea is not on the table. What prime minister David Cameron has offered is a referendum that strikes many international observers as diplomatically irrational.

Regardless of the pros and cons of membership, the four-year wait till a vote is held creates immense uncertainty about the British economy and Britain's role in the world. Investment decisions, diplomatic engagements and countless other initiatives will be placed on hold as long as it is unclear whether Britain will be in or out.

However, there is an even greater risk with the prime minister's approach. It is much more likely to lead to an exit than his publicly stated position suggests. Cameron has promised a vote if he renegotiates the terms of Britain's membership with the European Union. This way, he can have it both ways — rail against the status quo, but claim he is in favour of membership.

By implication, he has not promised a vote if he is unable to renegotiate the terms of membership. This is a rather gaping loophole. From the perspective of the rest of the EU, the easiest path is to refuse to renegotiate — hence, no referendum and no risk of Britain leaving. And it appears as if this is exactly what is happening.

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Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Politics.co.uk

Image Source: © Reuters TV / Reuters

U.S.-China Study Group on G-20 Reform

Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:34:00 -0500

The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the Center for American Progress, and the Stanley Foundation formed a study group in late 2011 to evaluate the role of the G-20 in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and the influence of the relationship on the G-20 and to propose recommendations that could improve the efficacy of this important body. The Chinese and American experts listed below held two conferences over the course of 2012, in Santa Monica, in February and in Beijing in October. At the end of these meetings, participants in the group agreed to 20 recommendations.

Read the U.S.-China Study Group's recommendations » (PDF)

Participants in the G-20 Study Group

Tim Adams, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and former Sherpa and Undersecretary of the Treasury under President George W. Bush

Sabina Dewan, Director of Globalization and International Development, Center for American Progress

DU Yanjun, Director of the Department of International Exchanges, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)

Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Matthew Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Director for International Economics in the Obama White House

Nina Hachigian, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Adam Hersh, Economist, Center for American Progress

HUANG Ying, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of World Economic Studies

Bruce Jones, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order (MGO) project at the Brookings Institution and Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University

LI Zheng, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

LIN Hongyu, Director of the Department of International Politics at the China University of International Relations

LIU Bo, Deputy Director of the Department of International Exchanges, CICIR

Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations

Keith Porter, Director of Policy and Outreach, the Stanley Foundation

QIAN Liwei, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

David Shorr, Program Officer, the Stanley Foundation

Randy Schriver, Armitage International

WANG Wenfeng, Deputy Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

YUAN Peng, Assistant President, CICIR and Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHAI Kun, Director of the CICIR Institute of World Political Studies

ZHANG Wenzong, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHU Feng, Deputy Director, Center for International & Strategic Studies, Peking University

ZHU Liqun, Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University

Publication: Center for American Progress, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and The Stanley Foundation

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

The Thistle and the Drone : How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam

Akbar Ahmed — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2013 424pp.

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On March 14, Brookings hosted the launch of The Thistle and the Drone with a presentation by author and Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Akbar Ahmed, and a panel discussion with Sally Quinn, editor-in-chief of the Washington Post’s "On Faith," and former Pakistani minister Mowahid Shah. See video clips from the launch event»
You can watch an introductory video to the March 14 launch featuring commentary by Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Diplomat in Residence at American University, and Khalid Aziz, Former Chief Secretary North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan. You can also read coverage of the event in The Nation. Watch the video here »
For more from Akbar Ahmed on The Thistle and the Drone, read his post on Brookings Up Front Blog.

The United States declared war on terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. More than ten years later, the results are decidedly mixed. In The Thistle and the Drone, world-renowned author, diplomat, and scholar Akbar Ahmed reveals a tremendously important yet largely unrecognized adverse effect of these campaigns: they actually have exacerbated the already-broken relationship between central governments and the tribal societies on their periphery.

As this groundbreaking study demonstrates, it is the conflict between the center and the periphery and the involvement of the United States that has fueled the war on terror. No one is immune to this violence—neither school children nor congregations in their houses of worship. Battered by military or drone strikes one day and suicide bombers the next, people on the periphery say, “Every day is like 9/11 for us.”

In the third volume of his trilogy that includes Journey into Islam (2007) and Journey into America (2010), Ahmed draws on forty current case studies for this analysis. The United States, dominated by ideas of a “clash of civilizations” and “security,” has become directly or indirectly involved with these societies. Although al Qaeda has been decimated, the U.S. is drifting into a global war against tribal societies on the periphery of nations. Beginning with Waziristan in Pakistan and expanding to similar tribal societies in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere, he offers an alternative and unprecedented paradigm for winning the war on terror.

WATCH: Professor Ahmed traces the history of tribal Pakistan »
Listen to Professor Ahmed discuss The Thistle and the Drone with Steve Inskeep on NPR »
Listen to an interview with Maureen Fielder and Professor Ahmed, on Interfaith Voices »

Praise for The Thistle and the Drone:
“In the end, I was close to tears. Lagrimas caudales or “flowing tears,” to use the apposite phrase of Blas de Otero, seems to be what the book’s conclusions lead to. Thus lagrimas for the tribes, for the soldiers, and for the United States. Professor Ahmed gives us the only way out of this dangerous dilemma, a way to coexist with the thistle without the drone.”—Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell and Professor of Government and Public Policy at the College of William and Mary

"The Thistle and the Drone is a must read. It unveils what few understand and demythologizes the war on terror for what it is; a failed, overly simplified response to the highly complex role that tribalism plays in America's war on terror."—The Right Reverend John Bryson Chane D.D., The 8th Episcopal Bishop of Washington DC, Senior Advisor, Interfaith Relations, Washington National Cathedral

"Professor Ahmed combines a clear professional anthropological expertise with an equally clear, critical and humane moral perspective. This is an unusual and groundbreaking book, which should be compulsory reading for Western governments."—Dr. Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury and Master of Magdalene College, University of Cambridge, UK

“Yet another brilliantly written masterpiece—a must-read for all, particularly Muslims who have an interest in understanding the roots of the conflicts that go back in history but have become accentuated since 9/11. Only Akbar Ahmed can give us these insights into the post-modern era we live in and the conflicts that bedevil our times through this highly readable and deeply engaging narrative."—Jafer Qureshi, Co-convenor of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs

"In this groundbreaking and startling book, Akbar Ahmed bravely uncovers an inconvenient truth, a fearful reality which endangers us all and in which we are all implicated. It should be required reading for those working in the media, policy-making and education—and, indeed, for anybody who wishes to understand our tragically polarised world."—Karen Armstrong, author of The Case for God

Read about The Thistle and the Drone at The Washington Post »

Read about The Thistle and the Drone at Time »

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Akbar Ahmed

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Looking at the Neighborhood: Regional Organizations and Disasters

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 28 Feb 2013 16:35:00 -0500

While there seems to be growing awareness of the threat of natural disasters – and the role of national governments and international agencies in responding to them – much less attention has been directed toward the potential contributions of regional organizations. And yet these organizations, such as the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are becoming increasingly active players in the world of disaster risk management.

Geographically, regions are likely to face similar natural hazards and environmental threats – a factor which can increase the benefits of technical cooperation in areas such as tsunami early warning systems. They often share similar experiences, cultures and languages, which facilitates collaboration. Regional organizations may not only be able to respond more quickly than international ones, but may also more politically acceptable than those coming from far away. When Cyclone Nargis killed a quarter of a million people in 2008, the government of Myanmar and aid agencies were unable to agree on how international assistance should be provided. It was ASEAN that provided the diplomatic breakthrough and an effective tripartite mechanism that unblocked the logjam. In some regions, there are innovative and effective forms of regional collaboration which might serve as models for other regions. For example, in Central America, the Center for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America organizes regional training initiatives while in the Caribbean there are joint protocols for the use of military assets for a clearly-defined period after a disaster strikes. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility provides emergency liquidity for countries hit by hurricanes or earthquakes and while the amounts are not huge, the more than $7.7 million Haiti received after its 2010 earthquake were the only funds the Haitian government received directly in the initial weeks after the disaster.

Our recently-completed study opens a window into the work of these organizations in the three phases of disaster risk management: disaster risk reduction, response and long-term recovery. In this study, we look at the work of more than 30 regional organizations involved in disaster risk management, drawing comparisons and generalizations about 13 of them through the use of specific indicators.

As might be expected, we find that regional organizations are a varied group with differing capacities, experiences, and expectations. In some cases, regional bodies are already playing important roles in disaster risk management. In other cases, sub-regional initiatives have been limited by political differences in the region. International initiatives such as the UN’s International Strategy for Risk Reduction have played important roles in supporting the development of regional platforms for mitigating the risks of natural hazards. Regional cooperation between military forces can facilitate a coordinated response when disasters do occur. There has been much less regional involvement in long-term recovery and reconstruction efforts.

As we consider the probability that climate change is likely to lead to both more frequent and more severe disasters, it is important to consider ways of strengthening all actors’ engagement in disaster risk management, including regional bodies. But there may be other positive consequences to enhancing regional cooperation in disasters. At the level of global governance, regional initiatives are multiplying like wildfires. As Louise Fawcett argues, “the regional momentum has proved unstoppable, constantly extending into new and diverse domains.” Perhaps by working together to confront the threat of natural hazards, regional organizations can become more effective actors in related areas such as water management, land use, and migration. And by providing a way to respond jointly to common threats, regional organizations may also contribute to a more peaceful and collaborative world.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Can Kerry Fill Clinton’s Shoes?

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

When I was in college studying politics, a senior male professor was my valued mentor. One piece of his advice, way back then, always stuck in my craw: Even if I wasn't interested in professional sports, he urged, I should learn a bit about it and read the sports page in the paper every day. Why? So that I would be able to join in the male chit-chat before the big meetings started.

I took his advice, for a while, and found that he was right: The big boys always did seem to talk about the football game before the meeting, and knowing something about sports gave me a way to join in. But it always felt forced, and a little risky, too -- after all, what if I said something ignorant? But though it was uncomfortable, it was what I had to do to make a place for myself in what was still, in the early 1990s, mostly a man's world.

As a younger scholar, I attended my share of meetings and conferences where I was the only woman in a room full of male experts. Although I saw more younger women entering graduate school, hoping to work in foreign policy and international affairs, not all of them made it out the other end of the pipeline. Too many female students and junior faculty I met were agonizing about whether they could afford to take time out for maternity leave before they got tenured. One older professor told me, when he learned I was pregnant, "A dissertation is a baby, too, you know." If that were true, then I produced three babies in three years (two delightful humans, one that "lives" on a shelf) -- while getting and holding a full-time job at a think tank.

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Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Gary Cameron / Reuters

Establishing Good Governance in Fragile States Through Reconstruction Projects: Lessons from Iraq

Seiki Tanaka and Masanori Yoshikawa — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 15:49:00 -0500

Countries in transition often go through periods of upheaval and weak governance and Iraq is a prime example. Usually donor agencies hesitate to increase their support as they face two key problems in post-conflict or post-revolution situations: (1) high security risk for transparent implementation; and (2) poor government effectiveness, marred by corruption, ethnic tensions and economic stagnation. But this is precisely the time when donor engagement is needed most. By using the experience of JICA projects in Iraq, we argue that donors should not withdraw their support in difficult post-conflict situations. The paper proposes three mechanisms – information; social recognition; and mediation mechanisms – to solve such difficulties in a post-conflict society. The empirical analysis shows that more intensive communication between donor and government officials especially leads to a positive impact even in war-torn Iraq.

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Authors

Seiki Tanaka
Masanori Yoshikawa

Image Source: © Atef Hassan / Reuters

A New Year of Global Conflict

Javier Solana and Ian Bremmer — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In today’s world, identifying and managing hotspots is not simply a matter of pulling out a map, spotting the wildfires, and empowering diplomats to douse the flames. To understand today’s major conflicts and confrontations, we must recognize important ways in which global political conditions enable them.

Conflicts are much more likely to arise or persist when those with the means to prevent or end them cannot or will not do so. Unfortunately, this will be borne out in 2013.

In the United States, barring a foreign-policy crisis that directly threatens national security, President Barack Obama’s administration will focus most of its time, energy, and political capital on debt reduction and other domestic priorities. In Europe, officials will continue their struggle to restore confidence in the eurozone. And, in China, though the demands of economic growth and job creation will force the country’s new leaders to develop new ties to other regions, they are far too preoccupied with the complexities of economic reform to assume unnecessary costs and risks outside Asia. That is why the world’s fires will burn longer and hotter this year.

This does not mean that the world’s powers will not inflict damage of their own. Today, these governments are more likely to use drones and special forces to strike at their perceived enemies. The world has grown used to US drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, but recent news reports suggest that China and Japan are also investing in unmanned aircraft – in part to enhance their leverage in disputes over islands in the East China Sea. By lowering the costs and risks of attack, these technological innovations make military action more likely.

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Authors

Javier Solana
Ian Bremmer

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Andrew Burton / Reuters

A "Plastic Juncture" in World Affairs

Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan — Mon, 21 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As President Barack Obama enters his second term, the state of the world is unsettled. The leading powers are beset with economic crises or are in various states of political transition or gridlock. The Middle East is undergoing political upheaval. Tensions are rising in Asia. The world’s institutions — whether the United Nations, the Group of 20 or the European Union — are weakened and dysfunctional. The liberal world order established after World War II is fraying at the edges.

This time of uncertainty and instability is a moment of opportunity for Obama. When the United States entered World War I, the philosopher John Dewey observed that the world was at a “plastic juncture.” Many progressives believed the unsettled world of their day offered the United States a chance to remold the international system into something better. Americans walked away from that challenge and would embrace it only after a second catastrophic breakdown of world order. Today, we are at another plastic juncture and the president has a unique opportunity to strengthen and extend the liberal world order from which Americans and so many others around the world have benefited.

There is not a lot to show for Obama’s first four years. In fairness, the economic crisis that he inherited made steady concentration on foreign policy more challenging. His predecessor badly bungled the two wars Obama inherited in the Greater Middle East, at great cost in lives and treasure and to America’s reputation. Obama began to restore that reputation, raising America’s profile and deepening its engagement in East Asia.

But most of the major challenges are much as Obama found them when he took office — or worse: from the stalled Middle East peace process and turmoil in the Arab world to Iran’s continuing march toward a nuclear weapons capability to China’s increasing assertiveness. The president’s recent preoccupation with re-election has left much of the world wondering, where is the United States?

For all the talk of American decline, Obama is actually well-positioned to assert global leadership. If he can strike the necessary compromise with the U.S. Congress to address America’s fiscal crisis, the United States could well emerge as one of the world’s most successful and dynamic economies. America enjoys unique advantages: a natural gas revolution that promises soon to make it a net exporter of energy, a superior university system, and an open and innovative economy. The United States remains the only world power with global reach, uniquely capable of organizing concerted international action and serving as a source of security and stability to nations facing threatening neighbors.

How then to take advantage of this plastic moment?

In the security realm, Obama’s primary “big bet” must be to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. The collapse of the nonproliferation regime that would follow Iran’s successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would strike a devastating blow to the international security order. Conversely, if Obama can succeed in achieving meaningful curbs on Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations, he will do much to strengthen nonproliferation as a fundamental pillar of the new liberal global order.

In East Asia, the president’s primary big bet should be on promoting a regional order that encourages China’s new leadership to take a peaceful and productive direction, away from greater reliance on military power in favor of continued economic and political development at home and increasing integration abroad. This will also require deepening America’s Asian alliances and playing a major role in supporting regional cooperation. With India, the world’s largest democracy and the other major rising power in Asia, the next four years will be critical in building a partnership that can serve as another pillar of a new liberal order.

Obama needs to do more to strengthen the liberal economic order. Concluding free-trade agreements with the Asia-Pacific region and Europe would boost U.S. exports and global economic recovery while promoting a broader consensus on the necessary standards to promote free trade and investment. Encouraging the export of American natural gas to key allies and partners in Europe and Asia will help reduce their dependence on Russia and Iran. Leveraging America’s hydrocarbon bonanza to encourage more effective efforts to counter climate change will help promote a greener global order.

Strengthening the liberal political order will require increased efforts to enlist the support of emerging democracies. Nations like Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Mexico have become increasingly influential economically. But they are struggling to find their identity as democratic powers on the international stage. Some are drifting toward a worldview that actually undermines the liberal nature of the global order. At the same time, powerful autocracies like Russia have staked out positions that are antithetical to liberal values — on Syria, for instance. They need to understand that the democratic international community is ready to move on without them.

With revolutions in the Arab world and change afoot in Myanmar, it is time to place the United States again at the vanguard of the global democracy movement. This is not only because democracy is consonant with American values. Across the globe, the United States has strategic, political and economic interests in the spread of stable, liberal democracies. Although democracies in transition can be fractious and unstable, in the end they are more reliable supporters of the liberal world order that Americans seek.

Obama should do more to support the difficult struggle for democracy in the Arab world, including holding the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government to democratic standards and more actively leading the effort to bring about a peaceful democratic outcome in Syria. America’s relationship with Russia should be shaped not only by arms agreements but also by respect for the desires and aspirations of the Russian people. The president should work to strengthen those forces in Russian society that favor economic and political modernization.

Finally, the United States needs a global strategy. It cannot focus on one critical region to the detriment of others. While Obama was right to increase American attention to the vital Asia-Pacific region, there is no safe alternative to continuing to play the key security role in the Middle East and Europe. In the Middle East, many nations look to the United States for protection and assistance. But Europe too deserves continued American attention. Everything the United States wants to accomplish in the world can be better accomplished with the help and cooperation of our European allies.

At the end of World War II, the United States led the way in shaping an international order that, for all its flaws, served the American people, and much of the world, remarkably well. With sustained attention, personal engagement, and a clear vision of a multilateral global order that reflects American liberal values and progressive ideals, President Obama now has the opportunity once again to shape world affairs to the benefit of the United States and mankind.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Scaling Up Programs for the Rural Poor: IFAD's Experience, Lessons and Prospects (Phase 2)

Fri, 18 Jan 2013 11:55:00 -0500

The challenge of rural poverty and food insecurity in the developing world remains daunting. Recent estimates show that “there are still about 1.2 billion extremely poor people in the world. In addition, about 870 million people are undernourished, and about 2 billion people suffer from micronutrient deficiency. About 70 percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas, and many have some dependency on agriculture,” (Cleaver 2012). Addressing this challenge by assisting rural small-holder farmers in developing countries is the mandate of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), an international financial institution based in Rome.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development is a relatively small donor in the global aid architecture, accounting for approximately one-half of 1 percent of all aid paid directly to developing countries in 2010. Although more significant in its core area of agricultural and rural development, IFAD still accounts for less than 5 percent of total official development assistance in that sector.1 Confronted with the gap between its small size and the large scale of the problem it has been mandated to address, IFAD seeks ways to increase its impact for every dollar it invests in agriculture and rural development on behalf of its member states. One indicator of this intention to scale up is that it has set a goal to reach 90 million rural poor between 2012 and 2015 and lift 80 million out of poverty during that time. These numbers are roughly three times the number of poor IFAD has reached previously during a similar time span. More generally, IFAD has declared that scaling up is “mission critical,” and this scaling-up objective is now firmly embedded in its corporate strategy and planning statements. Also, increasingly, IFAD’s operational practices are geared towards helping its clients achieve scaling up on the ground with the support of its loans and grants.

This was not always the case. For many years, IFAD stressed innovation as the key to success, giving little attention to systematically replicating and building on successful innovations. In this regard, IFAD was not alone. In fact, few aid agencies have systematically pursued the scaling up of successful projects. However, in 2009, IFAD management decided to explore how it could increase its focus on scaling up. It gave a grant to the Brookings Institution to review IFAD’s experience with scaling up and to assess its operational strategies, policies and processes with a view to strengthening its approach to scaling up. Based on an extensive review of IFAD documentation, two country case studies and intensive interactions with IFAD staff and managers, the Brookings team prepared a report that it submitted to IFAD management in June 2010 and published as a Brookings Global Working Paper in early 2011 (Linn et al. 2011).

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Authors

Arntraud Hartmann
Homi Kharas
Richard Kohl
Johannes F. Linn
Barbara Massler
Cheikh Sourang

Image Source: © Andrew Biraj / Reuters

Big Bets and Black Swans: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

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A Foreign-Policy Cheat Sheet for Obama

Martin S. Indyk — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama begins his second term at a volatile juncture in history and world affairs. However, this time of uncertainty and instability presents the president with a range of opportunities: By making a series of “big bets,” Obama can shape the emerging global order in transformational ways and define his own historic legacy. However, he will need to avoid a number of “black swans”—low-probability but high-impact events—that could derail his intended agenda and come to dominate his second term.

Here is the list of top-10 picks from our foreign-policy experts:

BIG BETS

1. Turning Tehran

The persistent and intractable challenge of Iran—the world’s most dangerous state—presents the Obama administration with an epic threat and a historic opportunity. Iran’s negative influence, through its nuclear program and support for Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, has helped inflame sectarian tensions and undermined prospects for peace in a region already beset by upheaval.

The president should seek a deal with Iran to resolve the nuclear crisis. Such an initiative would include pursuing a quick stop-and-swap deal to end Iran’s 20 percent enrichment, pressing for an intensified schedule of negotiations with Iran, and developing a comprehensive proposal of sequenced Iranian nuclear concessions and sanctions relief. A meaningful nuclear deal with Iran would represent a major step forward for nuclear nonproliferation.

2. An Obama Doctrine on New Rules of War

In its first term, the Obama administration worked hard to roll back one of the signature weapons of the 20th century: the nuclear bomb. Yet over the last four years, the United States also broke new ground in the use of new, revolutionary military technologies that may well become signature weapons of the 21st century. These encompass both physical systems, like unmanned aircraft (“drones”) and a new class of virtual weaponry, malware that can conduct a cyberattack with real-world consequences.

Obama now has an opportunity to establish new international norms for these new weapons of war by enunciating how the United States will deploy and use them. He will need to address accountability, the applicability of existing rules of war, limitations on development or use, future scenarios, and the prospects for international cooperation. The effort to create a doctrine should draw upon past lessons from comparable situations such as Cold War nuclear doctrine.

3. Energy and Climate: From Black to Gold to Green

The hydrocarbon bonanza in the United States gives Obama a significant opportunity. The administration can help strengthen the American economic and geopolitical position by taking a leadership role in the battle to address climate change.

By adopting policies that encourage the development and export of American oil, coal, and gas, the administration can take advantage of the rising demand in developing and emerging economies around the world.

As a condition of greater exploration, production, and trade, the U.S. government should impose a modest but meaningful carbon-based tax on production, with revenue allocated specifically to the development of climate-change-fighting technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration.

4. The Road Away From Damascus

Syria is standing on a precipice. The regime will likely fall, but the prospect now is one of a failed state that produces a toxic culture of extremism and lawlessness. If the United States does not take on a more active leadership role, the trend toward warlordism and sectarian fragmentation will likely prove inexorable, generating spillover that could impact the security interests of neighboring U.S. allies Turkey, Jordan, and Israel.

The Obama administration should change its approach to one of active intervention to ensure a more stable transition to a post-Assad order. Specifically, the administration should provide assistance to the Syrian opposition in the form of weapons, forge a genuine national dialogue that includes Alawites and Christians, and create an international steering group to oversee and lend support to the transitional process, including the creation of an international stabilization force to protect Syrian civilians. The president should engage directly with President Vladimir Putin to get the Russians onboard.

5. Free-Trade Game Changer

Protectionism is on the rise everywhere. The Doha round is essentially dead. But the United States and Europe need to stimulate their economies without resorting to increased spending. One way forward is for the United States to promote dramatic new free-trade agreements.

Achieving both a transpacific partnership and a transatlantic free-trade agreement is the most effective way to reclaim U.S. economic leadership and make progress toward the Obama administration’s promised goal of doubling U.S. exports. Signing these agreements would also have deep strategic implications, reaffirming liberal norms and a leading U.S. role in setting the global rules of the road.

BLACK SWANS

1. China in Revolution and War

There are many serious problems in China that could trigger a major crisis, including slowing economic growth, widespread social unrest, vicious elite infighting, rampant official corruption, heightened Chinese nationalism generated by territorial disputes, and even the potential for military conflict with neighboring countries. Such a crisis could take the form of a domestic revolution or foreign war.

Either would be very disruptive, severely impairing global economic development and regional security in the Asia-Pacific region. A combination of the two would constitute one of the most complicated foreign-policy problems of the president’s second term.

The best way to prepare in advance is for the White House to cultivate a deeper relationship with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his new leadership team, to reach out directly to the Chinese people, and to use U.S. influence to dissuade any country in Asia from resorting to force to settle disputes.

2. Revolution in Riyadh

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy and the world's largest oil supplier. The Arab awakening confronts the royal family with its most severe test. Demographic challenges, high underemployment, and restrictions on freedom make it even more vulnerable.

The overthrow of America’s oldest ally in the Middle East would be a severe setback to the U.S. position in the region and provide a dramatic strategic windfall for Iran. The small oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would be endangered.

The president should try to reestablish trust with the king and urge him to move more rapidly on his political-reform agenda while recognizing that this is likely to have limited results. The administration should also ensure the best possible intelligence is available to predict if a crisis coming, put in place measures to limit impacts on the global economy, be ready to support neighboring kingdoms and sheikhdoms, and then try to ride out the storm.

3. Euro-Zoned Out

The euro crisis has been ongoing for three years now, and the EU is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But the underlying causes of the crisis have not yet been addressed. The politics are diverging from the solution as populations on the periphery suffer from austerity measures and see no end in sight, while those in the core feel exploited.

As long as a more comprehensive solution remains elusive, the risks of failure will continue to loom large. If failure occurs, it could be devastating to the U.S. economy, surpassing the crisis of 2008. A related black swan is the fragmentation of the European Union, which would also damage U.S. strategic interests. The United States should work closely with EU leaders to prevent new dangerous design flaws in reforms to the euro zone. The administration should also oppose the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

4. The End of the Palestinian Authority

The collapse of the Palestinian Authority would represent the final nail in the coffin of the Oslo peace process that began in 1993. The Palestinian Authority’s demise would eliminate the single most tangible expression of efforts to achieve a two-state solution—all but destroying chances for a peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians for the foreseeable future.

Over the immediate term, the collapse could lead to large-scale Palestinian civil unrest and perhaps even a total breakdown in law and order in the West Bank, increasing the chances of a violent Palestinian uprising against Israel, a full Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, or a takeover by extremist elements.

The immediate priority is to prevent the financial collapse of the Palestinian Authority, then an effort should be made to convince Israel to lift its restrictions that hamper economic growth, and make a renewed push to promote political progress through negotiations.

5. The Big Thaw

Global warming is happening faster than scientists predicted. Temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are melting, and extreme weather is more frequent and intense. If these trends continue, the consequences will be monumental and far-reaching over time. If the warming accelerates more dramatically, and the polar ice melts even faster, the results could be catastrophic.

A significant rise in sea levels throughout the world would have particularly devastating impacts on the concentrated populations living in low-lying coastal areas, affecting the local economy, politics, community life, and security. But perhaps the biggest impact will be climate-induced migration and displacement, placing strains on infrastructure and pressure on governments to deliver services.

The United States can help mitigate these risks by giving climate change a higher priority in international and domestic policymaking—promoting new multilateral initiatives and increasing mitigation and adaptation.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: The Daily Beast

A Plastic Moment to Mold a Liberal Global Order

Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In the next four years, President Obama has a choice about whether to make democracy building and a liberal world order key tenets of his foreign policy plan. Martin Indyk and Robert Kagan wrote this memorandum to the President as part of the Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

Will America turn inward and away from an increasingly unstable world?
How can American take advantage of this plastic moment to mold the emerging global order to best serve the United States and humankind?
Will America launch a new effort to strengthen and extend the liberal world order?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

Editor's Note: An adapted version of this Big Bets and Black Swans memo was published in the New York Times on January 21, 2013.

TO: President Obama

FROM: Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan

As you enter your second term, the state of the world is remarkably unsettled. The leading powers are beset with economic crises or are in various states of political transition or gridlock. The Middle East is in a state of political upheaval. Tensions are rising in East Asia. The world’s institutions, whether the United Nations, the G-20, or the European Union, are weakened and dysfunctional, and seem to be pulling apart in the absence of concerted leadership. The liberal world order established after the Second World War — characterized by a free, open international economy, the spread of liberal democracy, and the deepening of liberal, peaceful norms of international behavior — is fraying at the edges.

It is a time of uncertainty and instability for the world, and for the United States; but it is also a moment of opportunity. Almost a century ago, when the United States entered the First World War, the philosopher John Dewey observed that the world was at a “plastic juncture.” He and many other progressives believed that the unsettled world of their day offered the United States and the other democratic powers a chance to remold the international system into something better. Americans walked away from that challenge and would embrace it only after a second catastrophic breakdown of world order. Today, we are at another “plastic juncture.” Will America turn inward and away from an increasingly messy world? Or will we launch a new effort to strengthen and extend, both geographically and temporally, the liberal world order from which Americans and so many others around the world have benefited?

The answer depends very much on how you choose to make use of your next four years in office. Unfortunately, there is not a lot to show for your first four years. In many respects, this is understandable. The economic crisis that you inherited made steady concentration on foreign policy more challenging. The two wars you inherited in the Greater Middle East had been bungled by your predecessor and cost the United States dearly, both materially and in terms of reputation. You began to restore that reputation through your own global appeal and the efforts of your Secretary of State.

You have done especially well in raising America’s profile and deepening our engagement in East Asia. However, so far it is hard to list many durable accomplishments. Most of the major challenges are much as you found them when you took office, or worse: from the stalled Middle East peace process and turmoil in the Arab world to Iran’s continuing march toward a nuclear weapons capability to China’s increasing assertiveness in East Asia. Your understandable preoccupation with reelection has left much of the world wondering: Where is the United States?

For all the talk of American decline from certain quarters, the United States is actually well-positioned for a new era of global leadership. If you can strike the difficult but necessary compromise with Congress that begins to address America’s fiscal crisis, the United States could well emerge as among the world’s most successful and dynamic economies. America enjoys unique advantages in the international economic system: a natural gas revolution that promises soon to make it a net-exporter of energy, a superior university education system and an open and innovative economy that continues to attract the world’s best and most creative young minds. On the international stage, the United States remains the only world power with global reach, uniquely capable of organizing concerted international action and serving as a source of security and stability to nations and peoples facing threatening neighbors.

Recommendations:

How then to take advantage of this plastic moment to mold the changing global order to best serve the United States and humankind? We believe that in the next four years you will have a unique opportunity to shape a multilateral global order that will continue to reflect American liberal values and progressive ideals. This will require your sustained attention, personal engagement, and direction of the national security agencies of the U.S. government. The reward could be a transformational and lasting impact on the international system, which will redound to the benefit of future generations.

In the security realm, your primary “big bet” must be to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. It is hard to imagine a bigger blow to the international security order than the collapse of the nonproliferation regime that would follow Iran’s successful acquisition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, if you can succeed in achieving meaningful curbs on Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations and reinforce this by negotiating another nuclear arms reduction agreement with Moscow, you will do much to strengthen non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as a fundamental pillar of the new liberal global order.

In East Asia, your primary big bet should be on promoting a regional order that encourages China to develop in a peaceful and productive direction. You have already formulated a credible strategy; now you will need to encourage China’s new leadership away from greater reliance on military power in favor of continued economic and political development at home and increasing economic and political integration abroad. This will mean continuing to deepen America’s Asian alliances, especially with the new leaderships in Tokyo and Seoul; building new partnerships with the nations of the region; and playing a major role in supporting regional cooperation. You should ensure that the rebalancing effort in East Asia goes beyond the military to include all aspects of American power. With India, the world’s largest democracy and the other major rising power in Asia, you have laid a strong foundation but the next four years will be critical in building a partnership that can serve as another pillar of the emerging liberal geopolitical order.

Strengthening the liberal economic order needs to be a higher priority in your second term. Concluding free trade agreements with the Asia- Pacific region and Europe would boost U.S. exports and global economic recovery while promoting a broader consensus on the necessary standards to promote free trade and investment in the global economy. Building the infrastructure and putting in place the policies necessary to export American natural gas to key allies and partners, especially in Europe and Asia, will help reduce their dependence on Russia and Iran. Leveraging America’s hydrocarbon bonanza to encourage more effective efforts to counter climate change can help promote a greener global order.

Strengthening the liberal political order will require increased efforts to enlist the support of emerging democracies. Nations like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey have become increasingly influential economically. But they are struggling to find their identity as democratic powers on the international stage and, in some cases, are punching below their weight. Some are drifting toward a worldview that actually undermines the liberal nature of the global order. At the same time, powerful autocracies like Russia have staked out positions at the United Nations and elsewhere that are antithetical to liberal values — on the issue of Syria, for instance. These autocratic powers need to understand that if they continue their obstructionism, the democratic international community will increasingly move on without them and they will be isolated.

In your first term, you were reluctant to make democracy a centerpiece of your foreign policy. However, with revolutions in the Arab world and political changes in Burma that you have supported, it is time to place the United States once again at the vanguard of the global democracy movement. This is not only because democracy is consonant with American values. In the Middle East, in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe, just as in Burma and the rest of Asia, the United States has strategic, political and economic interests in the spread of stable, liberal democracies. Although democracies can be fractious, and in times of transition unstable, in the end they are more reliable supporters of the liberal world order which Americans seek. The United States needs to do more in support of the difficult struggle for democracy in the Arab world too, including holding the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government to democratic standards, and more actively leading the effort to shape a positive democratic outcome in Syria and preventing it from descending into chaos or becoming a haven for jihadists and Iranian proxies. America’s relationship with Russia needs to be shaped by strategic arms agreements as well as by respect for the desires and aspirations of the Russian people. You should work to steer Russia in a positive direction, strengthening where you can those forces in Russian society that favor economic and political modernization.

Finally, the United States needs a global strategy. It cannot focus on one critical region to the detriment of others. While you were absolutely right to increase American attention to the vital region of the Asia-Pacific, the United States cannot and should not reduce its involvement in the Middle East or in Europe. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has played the key security role in all three regions at once; there is no safe alternative to that. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where many nations look to the United States for both protection and assistance. But even Europe deserves continued American attention and involvement. Everything the United States wants to accomplish in the world can be better accomplished with the help and cooperation of its European allies.

Conclusion:

At the end of World War II, the United States led the way in shaping an international political, economic, and security order which, for all its flaws, served the American people, and much of the world, remarkably well. Much is changing in today’s world, but the basic requirements of American foreign policy have not. Your great challenge is to seize this plastic moment and apply your leadership to the preservation and extension of the liberal global order for future generations.

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An Obama Doctrine on New Rules of War

Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Obama administration has an opportunity — perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use tactics such as drones and cyber attacks. Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What are the key strategic goals and ethics that should drive development of drones and cyber systems?
When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification?
How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright

Over the past four years, your administration worked hard to rollback one of the signature weapons of the 20th century, the nuclear bomb, which was one of the reasons why you were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet during this same period, the United States broke new ground in the use of new and revolutionary military technologies that may well become signature weapons of the 21st century.

There has been a game change in weaponry over the last several years, with a new generation of advanced technology that moves the point of critical human decision, both geographically off the battlefield and also, increasingly, chronologically away from the time of kinetic action. These encompass both physical systems, like unmanned aircraft (a.k.a. “drones”), and a new class of virtual weaponry, malware that can conduct a cyber attack with real world consequences.

The United States has been a leader in driving this revolution. Its military unmanned systems now number more than 8,000 in the air and 12,000 on the ground and are used daily in Afghanistan. The U.S. Cyber Command became operational in 2010 and military spending on cyber operations now measures in the billions of dollars.

At the same time, civilian intelligence agencies are increasingly using these technologies in a series of not-so-covert operations and so-called “secret wars” that have leaked into the press. There have been over 400 drone strikes into places like Pakistan and Yemen. The United States also deployed Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear development, the world’s first known use of a specially designed cyber weapon.

Such weapons seem advanced, but represent just the beginning. Technologies currently under development are far more effective and more autonomous, and capable of operating in a wider set of circumstances. We are at the onset of a decades-long technological revolution in warfare, comparable to the introduction of mechanization and airpower onto the battlefield or the advent of the atomic bomb.

Recommendation:

You now have an opportunity — and perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use these weapons. The goal should be to establish a framework for how the United States believes the evolution of these revolutionary new technologies should proceed. The effort to set the terms of the future debate and create a doctrine for guidance should draw upon past lessons from comparable situations and culminate in a major presidential speech.

Background:

These new weapons have become a hallmark of this administration’s foreign policy for good reason. They offered new options for action that have proven more accurate and proportionate, and less risky than previously-available alternatives. They have repeatedly been used in successful operations that have saved soldiers’ lives, eliminated key terrorist leaders, and offered a much-sought-after third way to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the situation surrounding these once science-fiction, then highly covert weapons has changed. First, there has been a global proliferation. The United States is leading the way, but many follow. At the end of 2012, 76 other countries have military robotics programs and over 100 have cyberwar capabilities.

Second, the international discourse and debate over them has risen significantly, increasing external pressure on U.S. policy interests. These range from international controversy over the drone strike campaign and the appointment of a U.N. special rapporteur to new NGO campaigns to preemptively ban the next generation of technologies under development.

Finally, after years of silence, the U.S. government has started to make efforts to establish policies and engage in the growing debate. These range from speeches by your aides finally acknowledging the use of such technologies in a counter-terrorism context to lesser noticed workinglevel documents, such as an attempt to establish the policy for the next, far more autonomous generation. These have been very good starts but they have been disjointed and preliminary. Most importantly, they are missing the stamp of your voice and authority, which is essential to turn tentative first steps into established goals and policy. Much remains to be done, and, more importantly, said out in the open.

What Would the Big Bet Entail?

Armed with a new revolutionary weapon in the 1940s and 1950s, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations engaged in a series of comprehensive reviews to understand better the technology, its best doctrine of use, and likely impact on geopolitics and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. These doctrines were not binding for all time. Nor did they solve all the problems of the nuclear age. But, the efforts proved valuable. Setting nuclear doctrine in public molded the strategic environment for the better, not just against adversaries, but also in relationships with allies. The discussions also helped set the terms of the discussion both internationally and domestically, helping to introduce Congress and the American public to a world of powerful new technology and important new responsibilities.

Today, the United States should embark upon a similar effort around the new generation of weaponry. This endeavor should answer where it stands on the key questions emerging now and soon to become central, including:

• What are the key strategic goals and ethical guidelines that should drive development of these new technologies? Are there any limitations that should be established or areas of the technology that should be preemptively banned?

• Is current international law sufficient to cover the development and use of these new technologies, or are there emerging gaps that should be filled?

• What is the dividing line between the military vs. civilian intelligence agency use of such technologies? What distinguishes a covert action using these technologies from an act of war?

• What is the proper role for Congress vs. the Executive Branch? When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification? Does the War Powers Resolution apply even in situations where no U.S. personnel are in harm’s way?

• Are there any key criteria for how the U.S. will similarly evaluate other nations’ use of the technology, including by potential adversaries?

• How does the United States plan to coordinate development and use doctrines with major U.S. allies?

• How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

There is a need to be realistic about what is possible. Much as with the early doctrines on nuclear weapons, the answers to these questions will not be set in stone. Rather, the goal is to set out a presidential level vision that will fill today’s gaps in the discourse and guide tomorrow’s policy.

Accessing the Downside:

There is a counterargument that it is better to say nothing, for fear of tipping off rivals, unilaterally tying U.S. hands, or that no initiative will work unless all other countries sign on, which they won’t.

That is a mistake. The less you say, the more that vacuum will be filled by others, in harmful ways. Having already used the technologies, but without proper elucidation, the precedents the United States sets may be exploited. Other states and non-state actors will use these technologies in far more crude and non-discriminatory ways, but claim to be merely following in U.S. footsteps. Finally, the debate will not stop simply because the United States is not part of it. International organizations will push ahead with investigations and propose new treaties, which, while likely ineffective, will nevertheless isolate the United States and drain our soft power. And on the home front, the original foundations of congressional and public support for many of the covert uses of these technologies could erode as the United States moves further away from 9/11. Indeed, the administration recently won a court case to maintain the veil of semi-silence that surrounds the drone strike program, but the judge described continuing the policy of denial as having an “Alice in Wonderland” feel.

Conclusion:

Beginning this discussion is a modest step with no budget costs, but entails a big bet with enormous advantages over the alternative of remaining silent. You would lay out your vision, helping both to guide internal policy development across multiple agencies as well as assuage genuine concerns at home and abroad. Most importantly, the voice of a respected commander in chief, with a strong expertise in the law, would create the foundations of an international norm, allowing the United States to build a large coalition of the like-minded on these issues, making it easier to identify and isolate those who depart from this norm. It will help maintain U.S. influence over the future of these technologies, even as they proliferate and evolve beyond our control.

By speaking out now, you will not just set the terms of the debate but steer it towards more positive ends. It’s the kind of effort for which leaders win Nobel Peace Prizes, again.

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The Big Bet: New Rules of War

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The Big Bet: New Rules of War

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Maritime Security: Calming the Eastern Seas

Richard C. Bush III, Bruce Jones and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia that is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for resources is destabilizing the maritime domain in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What should the U.S. do to encourage China, Japan, and others to avoid conflict?
How can agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War serve as a guide for regulating interaction at sea?
How can cooperation in the Arctic serve as a model for multilateral cooperation in East Asia?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack

Maritime East Asia is becoming increasingly dangerous. The past 12 months have seen a series of crises and spats in the East China Sea and South China Sea that threaten to spiral out of control. The twin sources of danger are 1) how regional actors conduct maritime operations to assert and/or defend claims to territory and natural resources’ rights; and 2) their weak capacity to conduct crisis management under domestic nationalistic pressures. The United States risks becoming entangled in conflicts among countries that are its friends and partners.

Recommendation:

You have the opportunity to mitigate the danger of future physical clashes by mounting a concerted diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned jointly to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms in the near term and to promote more institutionalized risk-reduction measures in the medium term. This will both serve U.S. interests in avoiding unnecessary entrapment and foster an environment conducive to cooperative exploitation of resources.

This could be pursued both at the regional and international levels. During the Cold War, the United States concluded risk-reduction agreements with the Soviet Union to regulate the interactions of its naval ships and air force planes. There has been recent work by the United Arab Emirates, Australia and India to foster better exchange of lessons, build private and public sector capacity, and share information about crisis-mitigation tools at the international level; diplomatic efforts to build on this could provide useful context to regional efforts and minimize a sense that China is being singled out.

Background:

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for hydrocarbon, mineral and fishery resources among regional actors is destabilizing the maritime domain. For resource reasons, China, Taiwan and Japan each claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands northeast of Taiwan while China, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian countries claim various land forms in the South China Sea. Conflicts have become more intense in recent years because China is acquiring the seaborne capabilities to assert its own claims and challenge those of others. Growing nationalist sentiment in all countries pressures leaders to take strong stands and eschew compromise. Physical clashes have occurred, which have illustrated the weak crisis management capacity of the countries concerned. In this environment, the prospect for mutually-beneficial cooperation in the exploitation of resources is low (international energy companies, for example, are reluctant to undertake major projects in contested areas).

The United States takes no position on which country owns which land form. But Washington has strongly advocated the freedom of navigation for all countries, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and using international law in addressing questions of sovereignty and resource exploitation. China’s recent and more assertive behavior in defining and advancing its claims — still non-violent but decidedly coercive — has been contrary to those U.S. interests.

In addition, treaty obligations threaten to entangle the United States in specific ways. The U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty applies to all territories under Japan’s administrative control, which includes the Senkaku Islands. According to the long-standing American position, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines does not apply to land forms in the South China Sea, but it does apply to “Philippine vessels.” At a minimum, these legal commitments create the potential for a “tail wags the dog” situation. In a crisis, they entail the fundamental credibility of the United States to stand by allies.

The proximate source of the current danger is the physical clashes and standoffs between vessels of the claimant countries, which are growing more common. Although none has crossed the threshold of loss of life, that may be only a matter of time. Clashes at any level are not in the U.S. interest, because they force the United States to choose among countries with which it seeks good relations. Trying to mediate the underlying territorial disputes would be a fool’s errand, and your administration should not try. Nor should you try to facilitate resource-sharing agreements among the claimant countries as long as the current fevered environment continues.

But the United States has both the need and the opportunity to facilitate a reduction in the probability of physical clashes and the attendant tensions — to the benefit of all. Your administration should continue to counsel restraint among the contenders (China has deservedly become the main target of such demarches). In the near term, it should mount a diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms jointly. In the medium term, it should promote more institutionalized riskreduction measures to regulate the operations of their maritime agencies.

The United States created such mechanisms with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to regulate interaction at sea and in the skies over Berlin. Current and retired U.S. naval and air force officers are a repository of experience on how to conduct conflict-avoidance and risk-reduction measures. The United States should also explore ways to root these efforts in a global framework, drawing on lessons from the management of the Arctic, which has been something of a good news story for international cooperation in recent years.

At this juncture, Japan is quietly willing to develop a conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime for the East China Sea. The ASEAN states are committed to concluding a binding code of conduct with China for the South China Sea for that same purpose. But China has been reluctant and has erected obstacles to a cooperative and stabilizing solution. Beijing has insisted that it will not talk to Japan until Tokyo is prepared to acknowledge that a territorial dispute over the Senkakus exists (Japan is reluctant to do so because it fears that such acknowledgment will be followed by a Chinese demand for negotiations). Concerning the South China Sea, China has used its close ties with Cambodia to delay and deflect any action on a binding code.

Your administration can play a behind-the-scenes role in breaking these logjams. You should start with engaging Beijing’s new leader and stressing to them that China should have little interest in suffering the reputational effects of its coercive behavior or the problems that come with a true crisis. Instead, it is in China’s interests to step back from these conflicts and focus on what is really important. A conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime is a low-cost, face-saving way to do that. Second, as an inducement to China and in return for strongly supporting Japan on such a regime, you should urge Tokyo to bifurcate its position on the Senkakus: retain its de jure position that the islands are Japan’s (so no dispute exists), but acknowledge that de facto other states have their own positions which they are free to present in the course of negotiations on other issues. Concerning a South China Sea code of conduct, you should first firm up support among claimant and other like-minded countries for a code of conduct that is strong enough actually to avoid conflict and reduce risk. Next, with their concurrence, you should suggest to China that if it continues to block a code by splitting ASEAN, the claimant countries and others that support a strong code will, with the support of the United States and others, have no choice but to negotiate with China as a “coalition of the willing.”

Conclusion:

The United States has absolutely no interest in going to war to protect the honor of friends and allies over small rocks and islands. Should it become necessary to contend with China to protect U.S. interests in East Asia and to buoy the confidence of American friends, it should be over a more consequential issue. With a modest yet concrete effort, you have the opportunity to reduce the salience and danger of an issue that will only inflict more headaches. Stabilizing the situation in East Asian waters will mitigate the danger of future clashes and also foster an environment in which cooperative exploitation of resources is more likely.