Brookings: Topics - Georgia

Europe’s Eastern Frontiers: A Conversation with Javier Solana

Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 13, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Stability in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, already precarious, is being further strained. The political prospects of several countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia, remain unclear. The region is grappling with the fallout of the economic crisis, and Russia and Turkey, in particular, are threatened by the turmoil in the Arab world.

On April 13, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana for a discussion on how the European Union (EU) and NATO should engage with Europe’s strategic partners in the East and Southeast. As a former secretary general of NATO and secretary-general of the Council of the European Union, Solana offered insight into the prospects for future EU and NATO enlargement, the potential impact of the eurozone crisis on the region and how Europeans should attempt to cooperate with their neighbors in tackling global challenges.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Video

Participants

Panelists

From National Responsibility to Response – Part II: Internally Displaced Persons' Housing, Land and Property Rights

Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark — Wed, 22 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The first part is available here.

This post continues our discussion of the study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement" recently released by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

Addressing housing, land, and property (HLP) issues is a key component of national responsibility. Principle 29 of the non-binding but widely accepted Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement emphasizes that competent authorities have a duty to assist IDPs to recover their property and possessions or, when recovery is not possible, to obtain appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

The 2005 Framework for National Responsibility – which set the benchmarks we applied in our current study – reaffirms this responsibility (in Benchmark 10, “support durable solutions”) and flags a number of the challenges that often arise, such as IDPs’ lack of formal title or other documentary evidence of land and property ownership; the destruction of any such records due to conflict or natural disaster; and discrimination against women in laws and customs regulating property ownership and inheritance. The Framework for National Responsibility stresses that, “Government authorities should anticipate these problems and address them in line with international human rights standards and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.”

The extent to which a government has safeguarded HLP rights, including by assisting IDPs to recover their housing, land, and property thus was among the indicators by which we evaluated the efforts of each of the 15 governments examined in our study. Our findings emphasized the importance of both an adequate legal and policy framework for addressing displacement related HLP issues and the role that bodies charged with adjudication and monitoring can play in ensuring implementation.

HLP Law and Policy Frameworks

One of the most encouraging signs of governments taking seriously their responsibility to address internal displacement has been the development, adoption and implementation in all regions of the world of specific laws and policies that respect the rights of IDPs. Some of the countries surveyed have developed laws, decrees, orders, and policies that protect IDPs’ HLP rights, but these measures are also not without their limits and challenges. A few examples are presented below.

In Colombia, while Law 387 on Internal Displacement (1997) stipulates the right of IDPs to compensation and restitution (Article 10), the government has been hard-pressed to establish measures enabling them to realize that right (see further, below). In Colombia, the constitutional complaint process – the acción de tutela petition procedure – has made the government accountable to IDPs and has influenced government policy toward IDPs, including the policy of allocation of government assistance such as housing subsidies.

In Georgia, the legal framework for IDP protection includes a property restitution law for IDPs from South Ossetia, adopted in 2007, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution and Compensation; however, this body never became operational and the status of the law is unclear following the August 2008 conflict. The State Strategy on IDPs, also adopted in 2007, protects IDPs against “arbitrary/illegitimate eviction” and sets out a large-scale program for improving the living conditions of IDPs in their place of displacement, all the while reaffirming their right to property restitution.[1]

Displaced families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the August 2008 received $15,000 from the government to rebuild their homes, although many IDPs have held off reconstruction efforts due to concerns about insecurity. The RSG on IDPs recommended in 2009 the established of a comprehensive mechanism for resolving HLP claims for both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, in 2010, Georgia adopted procedures for vacating and reallocating IDP housing, which, among other things, addresses those cases in which removal of IDPs from a collective center is ordered by the government and may require an eviction, and spells out safeguards for guaranteeing the right of IDPs.[2]

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution protects Iraqis against forced displacement (Article 44(2)). Through its Property Claims Commission, formerly the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes established by Order No. 2 (2006), Iraq has sought to recover property seized between 1968 and 2003, although significant gaps and challenges remain. For those internally displaced between 2006 and 2008, Prime Ministerial Order 101 (2008) sets out a framework for providing property restitution for registered IDPs with a view to encouraging and facilitating their return to Baghdad governorate, the origin of the majority of post-2006 IDPs and the location of the majority of post-2006 returnees. However, there have been few claims; many IDPs lack the necessary documentation, do not trust government institutions, fear retribution or cannot afford the requisite costs.[3]

In Afghanistan, where national authorities have not yet defined “internally displaced persons,” property and land rights of IDPs are either specifically addressed or generally implicated in substantive and procedural provisions found in a series of executive acts that have been issued since 2001, including the most IDP-specific of them, Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2005). This decree sets forth a basic framework for distributing government land to both IDPs and returnees as a means of addressing their housing needs. However, IDPs seeking access to land are required to provide their national identity cards (tazkera) and documentation proving their internal displacement status—documentation which they may have lost. Moreover, the decree does not recognize other fundamental rights or needs of the internally displaced; it is valid only in areas of origin; and its implementation has been marred by inefficiency and corruption within the very weak ministry that is tasked with its implementation.

Although the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal included a commitment to return occupied land and property and to allow for the return of displaced persons, four years after the peace agreement (and three years after the adoption of a national policy), between 50,000 and 70,000 people remained displaced. Nearly half of the returnees interviewed by the Nepal IDP Working Group reported serious land, housing and property problems. Of the more than 10,000 claims for compensation for property filed in 2007 only 2,000 families had received support to reconstruct or repair their houses by 2009. It is widely reported that IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been the least likely to recover land and property.

In Turkey, the government has yet to take full responsibility for displacement caused by its security forces against a largely Kurdish population. In its Law 5233 on Compensation of Damages That Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terror (27 July 2004) and its Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program, displacement is defined in terms of “terrorism” or the “fight” against it. This law does not specifically focus on internal displacement, but it does benefit IDPs among other affected populations. Law 5233 and its related amendments and regulations compensate for “material damages suffered by persons due to terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror” between 1987 and 2004. Compensation is provided for three types of damage: loss of property; physical injuries, disabilities, medical treatment, death and funerals; and inability to access property due to measures taken during “the fight against terrorism.”

According to the law, compensation is to be determined by damage assessment commissions (DACs) at the provincial level, with funding provided by the Ministry of the Interior. From 2004 to August 2009, the commissions received just over 360,000 applications. Of those, over 190,000 claims were decided: 120,000 were approved and the claimants awarded compensation; the remaining 70,000 were denied. Around $1.4 billion in compensation was awarded, of which close to $1.1 billion has been paid.[4] The existing legal and policy framework do not adequately address the obstacles to return, including the village guard system, insecurity and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

In Kenya, the government’s promotion of return included a National Humanitarian Emergency Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims of 2007 Post-Election Violence which was to meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But in practice, the government has been criticized for promoting return before conditions were safe. The government has also tended to focus on IDPs who own land and to attach durable solutions to land; there is no clear strategy for dealing with landless IDPs, such as squatters and non-farmers.

Awareness among IDPs as to their housing, land, and property rights under existing law – where there is law addressing those rights – is inadequate in many instances. For example, in Turkey, about half of IDPs surveyed in 2006 were not aware of their entitlements under the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program or the Law on Compensation. [5]

National Human Rights Institutions and Constitutional Courts

In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and constitutional courts have a critically important role to play in supporting as well as in holding governments accountable to guarantee the rights of IDPs. In a number of the countries our study examined, the work of NHRIs on internal displacement has included a focus on HLP issues.

In Georgia, for example, the Public Defender has been actively monitoring and reporting on the country-wide housing program begun in 2009 and has raised concerns about evictions of IDPs and the quality of housing in relocation sites. The Public Defender’s office also has undertaken a study on the conditions of the hidden majority of IDPs living in private accommodation rather than in collective centers.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported on and raised concerns about the large number of IDPs living in urban slums and informal settlements and about the fact that many IDPs were unable to return to their homes due to disputes over land and property.

Constitutional courts have in some instances played a role in strengthening the national legal framework for protecting the property rights of IDPs. Notably, Colombia’s activist Constitutional Court, in its Decision T-821 in October 2007, ordered the government to ensure respect for IDPs’ right to reparation and property restitution. In January 2009, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to comprehensively address land rights issues and to establish mechanisms to prevent future violations.

Subsequently, the government has sought to ensure these rights by adopting in 2011 the historic and ambitious Law 1448, known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. In this law, government acknowledges for the first time ever the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and recognizes as “victims” those individuals or communities whose rights were violated under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The law regulates reparations for all victims of the armed conflict since 1985 – numbering over 5 million – including through land restitution or compensation for IDPs which is to occur over the next decade.

However, restitution of land does not guarantee returnees’ security and may even endanger people given that land disputes and seizures remain a driving force of displacement. Aiming to prevent further victimization of returnees as a result of insecurity and violence, the government established a new security body, the Integrated Center of Intelligence for Land Restitution (Centro Integrado de Inteligencia para la Restitución de Tierras, also known as CI2-RT) within the Ministry of Defense. Additional participants include the Office of the Vice President, the Ministry of Justice and Interior, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Social Action (Acción Social), Incoder, and organizations representing victims of violence. Time will tell how successful the implementation of this ambitious law will be.

In Georgia, the Constitutional Court has also played an important role by recognizing the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status or in any way jeopardizing their right to return.

Conclusion

Securing HLP rights for IDPs is, of course, a key component of finding durable solutions to displacement. The study found that land and property disputes are almost always sources or manifestations of lingering conflict and often an obstacle to IDPs’ free exercise of their right to return. While some governments have made efforts to provide mechanisms for property restitution or compensation, those mechanisms have rarely been adequate to deal—at least in a timely manner—with the scale and complexity of the problem. National human rights institutions and constitutional courts can play a key role in holding governments accountable for HLP and other rights and freedoms of IDPs.

[1] Government of Georgia, State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, Chapter V.

[2] The Standard Operating Procedures for Vacation and Reallocation of IDPs for Durable Housing Solutions (2010) (www.mra.gov.ge)

[3] IDMC, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis Remain Internally Displaced: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 4 March, 2010, p. 240 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[4] IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 12, citing correspondence with the government of Turkey, 17 September 2009 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[5] Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, "Findings of the Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey," press release, 6 December 2006, cited in IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 11 (www.internal-displacement.org)

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Erin Mooney
Chareen Stark

Publication: TerraNullius

From National Responsibility to Response – Part I: General Conclusions on IDP Protection

Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The second part is available here.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement recently released a study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement." The study examined 15 out of the 20 countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

According to estimates, these 15 countries represent over 70 percent of the world’s 27.5 million conflict-induced IDPs. Wherever possible, we also tried to include government efforts to address internal displacement by natural disasters. But in this and the subsequent blog post, we will focus on our main general conclusions as well as particular issues around housing, land and property (HLP) rights that emerged from our analysis (see Part II of this posting).

The study looks at how governments have fared in terms of implementing 12 practical steps (“benchmarks”) to prevent and address internal displacement, as outlined in the 2005 Brookings publication entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility." The 12 benchmarks are as follows:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Stepping back from HLP issues (to be addressed in a subsequent set of comments in Part II of this guest posting), we drew several key observations on our overall findings.

The study found that political will was the main determining factor of response to internal displacement. Governments cannot always control the factors that cause displacement, or may themselves be responsible for displacement, but they can take measures to improve the lives and uphold the rights and freedoms of IDPs. Internal displacement due to conflict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are affected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection offered to different (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of efforts by international organizations to provide protection and assistance to IDPs.

While none of the governments surveyed was fully protecting and assisting IDPs, four stand out in particular—Colombia, Georgia, Kenya and Uganda—for implementing their responsibility toward IDPs while three others—Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen—had particular difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs. In Myanmar, the obstacles were primarily political while in Yemen and the Central African Republic, as in many of the countries surveyed, the limitations appear to arise primarily from inadequate government capacity.

The other eight countries were somewhere in between. For example, some, such as Nepal, have demonstrated a significant commitment at one particular point in time but have failed to follow through. Others, such as Sri Lanka, have at times demonstrated blatant disregard for their responsibility and have moved swiftly to try to bring an end to displacement. Sudan, Pakistan, and to a certain extent, Turkey, have very problematic records with respect to preventing displacement in one part of the country yet have supported efforts to bring an end to displacement in others. In some cases, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the continuing conflict and the role of nonstate actors (and in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign militaries as well) have made it difficult for the government to respond effectively to internal displacement.

Prevention of internal displacement is paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken in the countries assessed, which all had large IDP populations. Given the scale of displacement in the fifteen countries surveyed, it was to be expected that these governments would not have been successful in preventing displacement. Nearly half of the fifteen countries assessed had adopted some preventive measures on paper, but all fifteen have fallen short of actually preventing displacement in practice.

Moreover, many national authorities themselves have been or are perpetrators of violence or human rights abuses that have led to displacement, and many states foster a culture of impunity for alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Further, the presence of foreign military forces and/or non-state armed actors limits the ability of many states to exercise full sovereignty over their territory and therefore to prevent the conditions that drive people into displacement. Some countries have taken steps to prevent displacement due to natural disasters or development but not due to conflict, indicating that the former is perhaps less politically taboo and/or practically less difficult to implement than the latter.

Sustained political attention by the highest authorities is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for taking responsibility for IDPs. Nearly all of the governments surveyed, at least at some point, have exercised their responsibility to IDPs by acknowledging the existence of internal displacement and their responsibility to address it as a national priority, for example, by drawing attention to IDPs’ plight. However, government efforts to raise awareness of internal displacement through public statements was not always a useful indicator of a government’s commitment to upholding the fundamental human rights and freedoms of IDPs.

Among the five countries with laws on or related to internal displacement, there were notable limitations to the scope of the laws and gaps in implementing them. Legislation was quite comprehensive in scope in at least two cases and was narrow in others, addressing specific rights of IDPs or a phase of displacement. Other countries lacked a national legislative framework on IDPs but had generic legislation relevant to IDPs. Still others had laws that violated or could violate the rights of IDPs. Laws on internal displacement must be viewed in the context of other legislation and administrative acts applicable to the general population (e.g., those related to documentation, residency, housing, land and property, and personal status), which this study reviews to the extent possible, particularly in the case studies on Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Africa, the region with the most IDPs, states have recognized in legally binding instruments the importance of addressing internal displacement by incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic legislation and policy.

Many of the governments surveyed have adopted policies or action plans to respond to the needs of IDPs, but adequate implementation and dissemination were largely lacking. Nine of the countries surveyed had developed a specific policy, strategy or plan on internal displacement, implemented to varying degrees; those in six of these countries were still active at the time of writing. In addition, at least two countries had national policies in draft form, and one country that does not recognize conflict-induced displacement had a plan for mitigating displacement by cyclones and a plan on disaster risk reduction, although it did not discuss displacement. While in some cases positive steps had been taken, by and large implementation of policies on internal displacement remains a challenge and has, in some cases, stalled. Available information indicates that efforts to raise awareness of IDP issues and policies have largely been inadequate.

It is difficult to assess governments’ commitment of financial resources to address internal displacement, but some trends were identified. Addressing internal displacement, especially over time, is a costly venture. While it was difficult to obtain a full picture of a country’s expenditure on IDPs, several countries allocated funds to assist IDPs, including a few that had no national laws or policies on IDPs. In at least two countries, funds for assisting IDPs seemed to diminish in recent years. In many countries, difficulties arise at the district or municipal levels, where local authorities bear significant responsibility for addressing internal displacement but face many obstacles, including insufficient funds, to doing so. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of funds intended to benefit IDPs at certain points has been observed in some of the countries assessed. Some countries seem to rely on international assistance to IDPs rather than national funds.

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) contribute invaluably to improving national responses to internal displacement in a number of countries. In recent years, an increasing number of NHRIs around the world have begun to integrate attention to internal displacement into their work. NHRIs have played an important role in raising awareness of internal displacement, monitoring displacement situations and returns, investigating individual complaints, advocating for and advising the government on the drafting of national policies to address internal displacement, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of national policies and legislation. In particular, the NHRIs of six of the countries surveyed stand out for their efforts to promote the rights of IDPs in their countries. Interestingly, almost all of their work with IDPs is funded by international sources, raising the question of whether national governments themselves should not be doing more to increase their funding of NHRIs in order to support their engagement with IDP issues.

International actors are valuable resources for efforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. In many cases, the past Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (RSGs) mandated to study the issue of internal displacement (Francis Deng and his successor Walter Kälin) and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (Chaloka Beyani) had exercised significant influence on governments in encouraging and supporting action on behalf of IDPs. Along with these actors, UNHCR and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement have provided technical assistance to support governments’ efforts to develop national legal frameworks to ensure IDPs’ access to their rights.

Durable solutions: Return was the durable solution most often supported by the governments assessed. The Framework for National Responsibility identifies three durable solutions—return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. However, the fifteen countries surveyed herein reflect a global tendency to emphasize return, often excluding the other durable solutions. Yet for solutions to be voluntary, IDPs must be able to choose among them, and local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country may in fact be some IDPs’ preferred solution. Especially in situations of protracted displacement, those may be the only feasible solutions, at least in the near future.

The most difficult benchmarks to analyze were those whose underlying concepts are very broad and those for which data was seemingly not publicly available. Chief among these were the benchmarks on preventing internal displacement (Benchmark 1), raising national awareness (Benchmark 2), promoting the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking (Benchmark 9), and allocating adequate resources (Benchmark 11). Analysis on all other benchmarks also faced data constraints as in many cases data were outdated or incomplete or simply were not available. Nonetheless, we found that the twelve benchmarks all directed attention to important issues in governments’ responses to internal displacement.

We also found that while protection is central to the Framework, the issue is of such importance that there should be a benchmark explicitly focused on it—and specifically on protection as physical security, provided to IDPs during all phases of displacement. This benchmark would also underscore the responsibility of governments to protect the security of humanitarian workers engaged with IDPs.

Overall, the study found that the Framework for National Responsibility is a valuable tool for analyzing government efforts to prevent displacement, to respond to IDPs’ needs for protection and assistance and to support durable solutions. But this study also reveals certain limitations to using the Framework as an assessment tool, particularly in terms of accounting for the responsibility of nonstate actors; accounting for national responsibility for protection, particularly during displacement; and accounting for causes of displacement other than conflict, violence and human rights violations.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Erin Mooney
Chareen Stark

Publication: TerraNullius

"From Responsibility to Response" Report Launch

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 5, 2011
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Stein Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

On December 5, 2011, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a private launch event for its report, From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, which examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. The analysis presented in the report is based on the first ever systematic use as an assessment tool of the document, Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, developed by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2005 to provide guidance to governments in their response to internal displacement.

Roberta Cohen (nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and former co-director of the Project) moderated the event, which featured remarks from the co-authors of the report, Elizabeth Ferris (senior fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement), Erin Mooney (senior IDP and protection adviser at the United Nations and former deputy director of the Project) and Chareen Stark (senior research assistant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement). In attendance were representatives from the US Department of State and international NGOs, as well as researchers from think tanks and universities.

Cohen opened the event by discussing the background and significance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. From the very beginning of discussions about internal displacement, there was an emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of national governments to protect and assist those displaced within their territory. And yet over the years there has been an awareness that international actors also have a role to play. She noted the positive strides that have occurred over the past twenty years in regards to government response to internal displacement. Country visits by the UN experts on IDPs—the Representatives of the Secretary-General on IDPs—have been instrumental to improving government response, in some instances leading governments to address internal displacement for the first time. Today, most governments understand their obligations and responsibilities to protect and assist IDPs; the challenge is often translating that understanding into concrete actions.

Elizabeth Ferris gave an overview of the Framework for National Responsibility, which was used to assess government response in each of the fifteen countries in the report (Afghanistan, The Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen). The Framework outlines twelve minimum steps—or benchmarks—that governments can take to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons within their territory, from preventing displacement to appointing a focal point on IDP issues, to facilitating the work of the international community. She explained the methodology used in the study and described the challenges the authors faced in conducting the research. For example, basic data on various aspects of government response was lacking in many instances and it was often difficult to determine the impact of a particular government policy in addressing internal displacement. In addition to analyzing the response of the fifteen governments on each of the twelve benchmarks, the study included four extended case studies commissioned for this report: Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya and Sri Lanka. Ferris discussed some of the overall findings of the study, noted that the Framework had proven to be a useful assessment tool for examining national responses to displacement, and suggested a number of areas where further research is needed.

Erin Mooney briefed the audience on benchmark seven—designating an institutional focal point on IDPs—and benchmark ten—supporting durable solutions for IDPs. Mooney noted that designating a governmental focal point for addressing internal displacement is important for clarifying institutional responsibilities and, therefore, for increasing governmental accountability. Of the 15 countries assessed, all but one had designated a national institutional focal point for addressing internal displacement. She discussed some of the challenges institutional focal points often face, including a lack of funding and a lack of political clout which often challenge their ability to coordinate across government agencies. Benchmark ten, the achievement of durable solutions, was one of the most complex and politicized areas of government action, and is arguably the one in which government commitment to addressing displacement becomes most apparent. Governments tend to emphasize return as the primary solution to displacement, but, in situations where return has occurred, there is usually little information about whether IDPs have in fact achieved a durable solution. Mooney discussed some of the challenges the fifteen governments faced in finding durable solutions, noting that in none of the countries have durable solutions to displacement been fully achieved.

Chareen Stark discussed the report’s findings on benchmark one—the prevention of arbitrary displacement—and the study’s overall recommendations. Given that the study assessed governments already experiencing large-scale displacement and, in most instances, multiple waves of displacement, Stark said it was obvious that all fifteen governments had failed to prevent displacement. There were three major limitations to governments’ ability to prevent displacement: many of the governments are themselves parties to conflict; many of the governments assessed do not exercise effective sovereignty over all of their territory, due to the presence of nonstate armed actors and/or foreign militaries; and all of the assessed countries face financial and human capacity limitations. She explained that the study found that nearly half of the countries assessed had developed some sort of preventive measures (at least on paper), including several governments that had taken measures to prevent displacement from natural disasters but not conflict. Stark discussed some of these laws, policies and institutional mechanisms as well as the challenges to their effective implementation. She also outlined the report’s recommendations to governments of countries with IDP populations, such as developing and implementing laws and policies in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and devoting adequate resources at the national and local levels.

Concluding the discussion, the panel responded to questions from the audience on issues such as incentives for governments to address internal displacement using the Framework for National Responsibility and challenges in data reporting and analysis. Specific questions were also raised on benchmarks five (laws on internal displacement), six (policies on internal displacement), three (designating an institutional focal point for IDPs) and twelve (working with the international community).

Event Materials

From Responsibility to Response Nov 2011doc

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Erin Mooney

Senior IDP and Protection Adviser at the United Nations

Chareen Stark

Senior Research Assistant, The Brookings Instution

From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement

Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Launched at a December 5, 2011 event at Brookings, this study is based on a publication developed in 2005 by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement: Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is a central tenet of international law that states bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons within their borders, including the internally displaced. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain entitled to the full protection of rights and freedoms available to the population in general, they face vulnerabilities that nondisplaced persons to not face. Therefore, in order to ensure that IDPs are not deprived of their human rights and are treated equally with respect to nondisplaced citizens, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to their particular vulnerabilities. Reflecting these key notions of international law, the rights of IDPs and obligations of states are set forth in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter, “the Guiding Principles”).

Using the Guiding Principles as a departure for analysis, this study examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen. The analysis seeks to shed light on how and to what extent, if any, governments are fulfilling their responsibility toward IDPs, with a view to providing guidance to governments in such efforts. In so doing, this study also seeks to contribute to research and understanding regarding realization of the emerging norm of the “Responsibility to Protect.” To frame the analysis, the introduction to this volume examines the connections among the concepts of national responsibility, “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The comparative analysis across the fifteen countries, presented in chapter 1, is based on a systematic application of the document Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility (hereafter, “Framework for National Responsibility,” “the Framework”). Seeking to distill the Guiding Principles, the Framework outlines twelve practical steps (“benchmarks”) that states can take to directly contribute to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of internal displacement:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decision making.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Downloads

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Erin Mooney
Chareen Stark

From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: A Statesman's Forum with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia

Thu, 17 Mar 2011 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 17, 2011
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia has grappled with the many challenges of building a modern, Western-oriented state, including implementing political and economic reforms, fighting corruption, and throwing off the vestiges of the Soviet legacy. On the path toward a functioning and reliable democracy, Georgia has pursued these domestic changes in an often difficult international environment, as evidenced by the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.

On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss Georgia’s approach to these challenges. A leader of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia in January 2004 and reelected for a second term in January 2008.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion. After the program, President Saakashvili took audience questions.

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From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience

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Mikheil Saakashvili

President
Georgia

Human Rights, Democracy and Displacement in Georgia

Fri, 19 Nov 2010 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 19, 2010
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EST

Root Room
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

Since the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, violence has erupted several times in Georgia, most notably in August 2008. Large-scale human rights violations characterized the August 2008 war, including the displacement of almost 150,000 people. By the time the fighting ended, Georgia had lost the last areas it controlled in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Russia subsequently recognized the independence of both. While most of those displaced in the August 2008 war have returned, over 200,000 people from earlier conflicts remain displaced.

On November 19, the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement will host a discussion of current issues around human rights, democracy and displacement in Georgia. The event will feature a presentation by Tinatin Khidasheli, international secretary of the Republican Party of Georgia, and Giorgi Chkheidze, executive director of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Following their remarks, Sam Patten, senior program manager for Eurasia at Freedom House, and Nadine Walicki, country analyst for the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, will join the discussion.

Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-Bern Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

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Human Rights, Democracy and Displacement in Georgia

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Participants

Panelists

Tinatin Khidasheli

International Secretary
Republican Party of Georgia

Giorgi Chkheidze

Executive Director
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association

Sam Patten

Senior Program Manager, Eurasia
Freedom House

Nadine Walicki

Country Analyst
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Election-Related Rights and Political Participation of Internally Displaced Persons: Protection During and After Displacement in Georgia

Andrew Solomon — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

Guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate in public and political affairs for all citizens is an important responsibility. Given the precarious position that IDPs can find themselves in and considering the extent to which they may need to rely on national authorities for assistance, IDPs have a legitimate and a heightened interest in influencing the decisions that affect their lives by participating in elections.

Internally displaced persons often exist on the margins of society and are subject to a number of vulnerabilities because of their displacement. For instance, IDPs face an immediate need for protection and assistance in finding adequate shelter, food, and health care. Over time, they can suffer discrimination in accessing public services and finding employment on account of being an IDP from another region or town. IDPs also face an especially high risk of losing ownership of their housing, property, and land, something which can lead to loss of livelihoods and economic security as well as physical security. Women and children, who often make up the majority of IDP populations, face an acute risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.

In addition to influencing public policy, elections can also be about reconciliation and addressing divisions and inequities that exist within society. For these reasons and others, IDPs should be afforded an opportunity to fully participate in elections as voters and as candidates.

As noted in a press release of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following an official mission to Georgia in December 2005,

“[IDP] participation in public life, including elections, needs promotion and support. Supporting internally displaced persons in their pursuit of a normal life does not exclude, but actually reinforces, the option of eventual return. … Well integrated people are more likely to be productive and contribute to society, which in turn gives them the strength to return once the time is right."[1]

[1] United Nations Press Release - U.N. Expert Voices Concern for Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, 27 December 2005, available at http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/RSG-Press-Releases/20051227_georgiapr.aspx.

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Authors

Andrew Solomon

Publication: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

The Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons

Walter Kälin — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Chairperson, Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come to New York from Kampala where I attended last week’s African Union Special Summit of Heads of State and Government on refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons in Africa. There, I witnessed the historic moment of the adoption of the AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The importance of this Convention cannot be underestimated. Building on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement it is the first legally binding IDP-specific treaty covering an entire continent. The Convention is a tremendous achievement and a beacon of hope for the almost 12 million people in Africa internally displaced by conflict and the many more internally displaced by natural disasters, and hopefully serves as a model for other regions, too.

I commend the African Union for its leadership in developing this Convention. I urge all African states to ratify it and implement its provisions, and I call on the international community to seize this momentum and to lend all support needed to its implementation.

Mr. Chairperson,

Reflecting on my mandate’s activities over the past 12 months, I would first like to highlight three topics: climate change and natural disasters, internal displacement and peace processes and the search for durable solutions for internally displaced persons.

Climate Change and Internal Displacement

Climate change increases the frequency and magnitude of climate related disasters, both sudden-onset disasters like flooding and hurricanes and slow-onset disasters such as desertification. The negative impact of these disasters can be mitigated by adopting disaster risk reduction measures. Yet, it is expected that the number of persons displaced by climate related disasters will increase. Most of these people will remain within their own country; hence they will be internally displaced persons to whom the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement apply. It is therefore crucial to enhance capacities of governments and humanitarian actors to provide protection and assistance to these persons. I strongly call on states to ensure that the adaptation and risk management regime of the new UNFCCC framework agreement covers forced displacement.

Internal Displacement and Peace Processes

Finding durable solutions for internally displaced persons is an essential element of a successful peace process. The way the issue is addressed in peace agreements often predetermines how internal displacement is dealt with in the aftermath of conflicts. Many peace agreements reflect the issue of internal displacement insufficiently or haphazardly. Therefore, over the past 18 months and in close cooperation with the Mediation Support Unit of the Department for Political Affairs of the UN and humanitarian, human rights and mediation experts, I developed a guide on internal displacement and peace processes for mediators. This guide provides advice on how to consult with internally displaced persons and engage them in the different phases of a peace process even if they do not sit at the negotiation table and on what kind of key displacement-specific issues should be addressed in the text of a peace agreement. It will be published later this year.[1]

I deepened my engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission through a country-based engagement on Central African Republic. I am pleased to see that the country specific strategic framework reflects many of the recommendations that I submitted on the basis of a working visit to this country last February. I plan to remain engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission in the course of the coming year.

I call on all actors presently involved in peace and peacebuilding processes to adequately address the specific needs of IDPs in the aftermath of armed conflicts.

Durable Solutions for IDPs

In the many missions I carried out over the past five years, I noticed that finding durable solutions for IDPs is always a tremendous challenge. It is a multi-faceted, long, complex and often expensive process, which requires the coordination and cooperation of a variety of actors from among national and local authorities, and the humanitarian and the development communities. With policy guidance such as that provided by the Framework for Durable Solutions—a document developed by my office and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement a few years ago and presently being revised in close cooperation with relevant stakeholders[2]—we know what should be done, but we must improve on the ground. Too often the coordination between humanitarian and development actors is insufficient, the funding for early recovery activities is lacking or IDPs are simply not a priority in recovery, reconstruction and development plans resulting in gaps jeopardizing the sustainability of returns or local integration of the displaced when the humanitarian actors phase out and the development partners are not yet able to show tangible progress in restoring infrastructure, services and livelihoods. Based on my observations in many countries, I have come to the conclusion that the practical problems in this area are a consequence of systemic failures in bringing humanitarian and development actors together to work hand in hand at an early stage of recovery. In addition to differences in approaches and cultures, these failures can to a large extent be attributed to a lack of flexible funding mechanisms for early recovery and reconstruction in spite of some recent steps in the right direction, including the creation of the peace-building fund.

Country Situations

Mr. Chairperson,

The second pillar of my mandate is the engagement in a constructive dialogue with governments. I am grateful that with a few exceptions the countries that I approached during this reporting period were open to engage with my mandate.

Allow me to provide you with an update on important developments since the completion of my written report to the General Assembly:

I carried out a mission to Somalia from 14 – 21 October. Lack of humanitarian access, security risks for humanitarian workers, and the sharp decline in donor contributions exacerbate this long-standing humanitarian crisis, and international attention to the plight of IDPs is largely insufficient. I was shocked by the degree of violence the civilian population and in particular internally displaced persons in South and Central Somalia suffer. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are committed in an environment of impunity. Such acts are a major cause of the displacement of 1.5 million persons, the majority of whom are women and children. They remain highly vulnerable and exposed to serious human rights violations, in particular sexual violence, during flight and in IDP settlements. Many of the displaced try to reach safety in Puntland or Somaliland, where the high number of internally displaced persons puts enormous strain on the limited existing resources and basic services available. Reception capacities for new internally displaced persons must be strengthened and basic services expanded to reduce the burden on host communities. Further robust development interventions are needed to transform humanitarian action into sustainable livelihoods and investing into education and job opportunities for the youth is a must in an environment where recruitment by radical forces is often the only opportunity offered to them. Present efforts by the authorities, humanitarian, development and human rights actors are largely insufficient to bring urgently needed change. I urgently call on the international community to strengthen these efforts and to reaffirm its commitment to Somalia.

I was twice in Sri Lanka over the past six months; in April, shortly before the end of hostilities, and again in September at a time the security situation had vastly improved, although over 250,000 internally displaced were still held in closed camps. Restoration of their freedom of movement has become a matter of urgency, and immediate and substantial progress in this regard is an imperative for Sri Lanka to comply with its commitments under international law. I discussed a three-pronged strategy for decongesting the camps with the government, which is based on returns of IDPs to their homes, release of IDPs to host families and transfer of IDPs to small open welfare centers in the region of return as a transitional solution until return is possible. I urged the Government to pursue these options in parallel with highest priority, to speed up the screening procedures, and to immediately release those not deemed to pose a security threat. Since my visit, this process has started. I acknowledge the progress made so far in demining and reconstructing returnee areas and releasing and returning a good number of displaced people to Jaffna and Mannar, Trincomalee and Batticaloa as well as to Vavuniya and Killinochi. I underline that this return needs to happen according to international standards. At the same time, I continue to reiterate that the ultimate goal is the restoration of freedom of movement and finding durable solutions for all IDPs.

During my visit to Georgia of last autumn, I reiterated that there should be no discrimination between different persons internally displaced in Georgia’s different waves of displacement. The approximately 220,000 individuals who have been displaced over the long-term in Georgia should be able to avail themselves of the same possibilities to improve their living conditions as are enjoyed by those more recently displaced. I welcome that in the meantime the government has adopted an action plan to improve the housing situation of the long-term displaced and started to implement it. I am also grateful that a solution was found allowing me to visit the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia region next week.

I remain engaged on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In March 2010, six other special procedures and I will report to the Human Rights Council on progress the DRC made in implementing a series of recommendations we previously made on how to tangibly improve the situation on the ground. Despite encouraging returns of 110,000 persons in North Kivu Province over the last two months, I remain concerned about the overall deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to the continued attacks on civilian populations carried out by LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) militias and the impact of the military operations against the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda) armed group and the FDLR’s reprisals against the civilian population triggering new displacements.

My working visits to Uganda and Serbia had a special focus on durable solutions. In Uganda, I was impressed to see that the majority of the formerly 1.8 million internally displaced persons have returned to their villages and I expressed my appreciation to the Government for its continued efforts. Sustaining returns remains a challenge that must be addressed by quick impact recovery and development activities, which requires stronger action by development agencies and support of donors. Despite the huge progress made thus far, the fate of a considerable number of particularly vulnerable individuals left behind in camps or living in transit sites as well as a general lack of synchronicity between the phasing out of humanitarian assistance and the increase of development activities in returnee areas continue to be a source of concern.

Many of the 200,000 persons internally displaced from and within Kosovo (I am using the term in accordance with the U.N. position of strict neutrality on the status question) have not yet found a durable solution. I note with appreciation that all relevant authorities in Pristina expressed their commitment to facilitate returns of displaced persons, regardless of their ethnicity. However, due to entrenched patterns of discrimination in every sector of life and also a lack of support, in particular at the municipal level, there have only been a few sustainable returns. At the same time, I wish to reemphasize that the right for a dignified life and the right to return are not mutually exclusive. In this respect, I would like to commend the increased efforts of the Government of Serbia to improve the living conditions of internally displaced persons who have not returned.

Mr. Chairperson,

This is my last report which I present personally in my capacity as Representative of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Over the past five years, I have seen encouraging trends. The UN Guiding Principles are now firmly rooted as the relevant framework for the protection of internally displaced persons, legislation and policies have been developed at national and regional level and the cluster approach has led to an improved humanitarian response. Overall, states and humanitarian and developmental actors are better prepared and equipped today to address the plight of the more than 50 million persons displaced within their countries. This is badly needed as the effects of climate change will lead to new displacement. At the same time, it is worrying to see that armed conflict are conducted with utter disregard for the civilian populations in several parts of the world, the humanitarian space is shrinking in many countries, and many displacement situations that were protracted when I assumed this mandate remain unchanged.

A new mandate-holder will be named next summer and I trust that he or she will also benefit from the particular strengths that currently characterize my mandate. As a Representative of the Secretary-General, I enjoy excellent access to Governments and other important stakeholders, I receive remarkable support of the relevant entities of the United Nations and from donors, and my participation as a standing invitee to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is key to reach out to the wider humanitarian community.

Thank you.

[1] The guide will be published by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the United States Institute for Peace.

[2] The revised Framework is expected to be published as an addendum to my next report to the Human Rights Council, tentatively scheduled for its 13^th session (March 2010).

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: United Nations General Assembly

Delivering Tough Love to Ukraine, Georgia

Steven Pifer — Fri, 24 Jul 2009 12:00:00 -0400

Steven Pifer joined Bernard Gwertzman to discuss Vice President Joseph Biden's recent trip to Ukraine and Georgia and how it was meant to balance President Barack Obama's Moscow summit earlier in the month.

Bernard Gwertzman: Vice President Joseph Biden has just completed a trip to Ukraine and Georgia to reassure both of those former Soviet republics that the American desire to "reset" relations--Biden's words in Munich last February--with Russia were not meant at their expense. But he also had what one Biden aide called "tough love" for both of them. Could you elaborate on this trip?

Steven Pifer: That was the first point of the trip: to reassure Kiev and Tbilisi that the United States remains interested in robust relations with Ukraine and Georgia, and that we will work to keep open their pathways to Europe and the North Atlantic community. When I was in Ukraine about five or six weeks ago, what I heard from the Ukrainians was a concern--and I suspect there is a parallel concern in Georgia--that the effort to reset relations with Russia would somehow come at Ukraine's expense. So part of the trip by the vice president was to assure both Ukraine and Georgia that the United States is not going to undercut relations with those two countries as it tries to develop relations with Russia. You've seen points made by this administration, indeed going back to the Munich speech itself, saying the reset of relations would not mean recognition of a Russian "sphere of influence" over the former Soviet states, and then repeated assurances that the United States supports the rights of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia as sovereign states to choose their own foreign policy course.

Gwertzman: What was also interesting to me was that in his speech in Ukraine, Biden was virtually demanding that the Ukrainian leadership get their act together. In Georgia, I don't think he was publicly as tough. Can you elaborate on the "tough love" part of the visits?

Pifer: Let me start with Ukraine. Certainly the primary goal of the visit was to reassure Ukraine, but there was also a tough message there. In Ukraine, it's not only due to the presidential election, but you've had a situation in the past year and a half where the government really hasn't functioned because of infighting between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. It's meant that Ukraine has passed up opportunities to accomplish some important things. A big part of the vice president's message in Kiev was to say, "You need to put aside political differences, come together as mature political leaders, find compromises, and get things done."

He also singled out the importance of Ukraine getting serious about reforming its energy sector. This is a huge national security vulnerability for Ukraine because they have a distorted price structure where people buy natural gas at prices that don't begin to cover the cost of the gas that Ukraine buys from Russia. As a result, Naftogaz, the national gas company, is perpetually in debt to Russia and on the verge of bankruptcy. That creates vulnerabilities for Ukraine.

Part of the vice president's message was, "You need to get serious about this." Part of the problem in Ukraine is if you are a household, you are probably paying a price that amounts to less than 30 percent of the actual cost of the gas bought from Russia. It's no wonder why Naftogaz is always in financial straits. But it's not just an economic problem because of the way it factors into the Ukraine-Russia relationship. It creates a national security issue for Ukraine. So there are two aspects to the tough message: One, the need for political leaders to get together, compromise, and produce good policy; and second, the special importance of tackling this energy security issue.

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Steven Pifer

Publication: Council on Foreign Relations

The Political Crisis in Georgia: Prospects for Resolution

Wed, 17 Jun 2009 16:15:00 -0400

Event Information

June 17, 2009
4:15 PM - 5:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

The government and opposition in Georgia remain locked in political stalemate. The opposition continues to hold rallies and to call for President Saakashvili to step down, and the opposition and government thus far have found no common basis for moving forward. All this plays out against a backdrop of lingering tensions in relations between Georgia and Russia in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict.

On June 17, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Irakli Alasania, former Georgian permanent representative to the United Nations and currently the head of the Alliance for Georgia opposition group, for a discussion on the political crisis in Georgia and the prospects for resolution. After a decade of important positions in the Georgian government, Ambassador Alasania resigned from his position at the United Nations in December 2008 and has since been actively involved in the Georgian opposition. Brookings senior fellow Carlos Pascual introduced Ambassador Alasania and moderated the discussion.

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Irakli Alasania

Head, Alliance for Georgia

Tackling NATO's Challenges

Mon, 30 Mar 2009 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 30, 2009
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

As President Barack Obama and NATO leaders join on April 3 and 4 to celebrate the Alliance’s 60th anniversary, they also must confront the daunting challenges facing NATO today. How should the Alliance proceed in Afghanistan, its largest ever military operation? How can NATO broaden its restored relationship with Russia while continuing to deepen its links with Ukraine and Georgia? As the Alliance begins to devise a new strategic concept, how should it balance its focus between preparing for expeditionary operations and meeting its collective defense obligations? How will France’s full return to NATO’s integrated military structure add to Alliance capabilities?

On March 30, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings held a public event to preview President Obama’s first NATO summit. Daniel Hamilton, professor at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Brookings experts Steven Pifer, Jeremy Shapiro and Justin Vaisse described the challenges facing the president and NATO. Brookings Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Carlos Pascual gave introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Daniel Hamilton

Professor, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

2009: Year of Challenges and Opportunities for Georgia

Thu, 26 Mar 2009 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 26, 2009
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

In the period since its conflict with Russia last year, Georgia has experienced new economic challenges, ongoing security concerns and internal political tumult. Some opposition factions now call for the resignation of President Mikheil Saakashvili, promising to hold ongoing political protests from April 9 until Saakashvili steps down.

On March 26, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament, David Bakradze, for a public discussion of the challenges currently facing Georgia.

Prior to his appointment as chairman, Mr. Bakradze served as minister of foreign affairs, state minister of Georgia on conflict regulation issues, member of parliament from the United National Movement (UNM) and chair of the Euro-Integration Committee. He has held a number of positions at the National Security Council of Georgia and began his political career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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David Bakradze

Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia

The Future of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Walter Kälin — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Although it is hard to take an objective view on an enterprise in which you have been closely involved, it is fair to say that over the last ten years the Guiding Principles have demonstrated their utility and impact but also their limitations.

In Burma, they have been used to raise awareness about displacement and mobilise humanitarian assistance but have offered little diplomatic or political leverage to influence the national authorities. During elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, the Principles focused attention on IDPs' political rights but across the world IDP political participation remains inconsistent. They have helped inspire the peace process in Nepal but the country still lacks an effective IDP strategy. They have informed the ongoing process of drafting the African Union Convention for the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection of and Assistanct to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa but -- assuming it is approved by the African Union at a special summit[1] -- its effectiveness will depend on the degree of compliance and monitoring. The Principles were issued to Georgian civil servants designated to provide assistance to those displaced by the recent conflict but the response of the government to Georgia's latest displacement crisis has been criticised. They form the basis for Uganda's National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons but there is still a very significant implementation gap.

Read the full article »

This article appears in a 40-page special issue of FMR that reflects discussions at the international conference on the Ten Years of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – GP10 – held in Oslo on 16-17 October 2008. It will be available in English, Arabic, French and Spanish. The English edition is now online at http://www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples10.htm

[1] http://www.unhcrrlo.org/Conference_Special_Events/2008AUSpecial
Summit.html

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Walter Kälin

Publication: Forced Migration Review

Don't Rush Georgia and Ukraine into NATO

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 12:00:00 -0500

According to press reports, the Bush administration is pursuing a final bold foreign policy move in its last weeks. Bypassing normal procedures, it wants European allies and Canada to agree to offer Georgia and Ukraine rapid membership into NATO.

This is a singularly bad idea, much more likely to worsen U.S.-Russia relations and increase the risk of war than to do any real good for the new democracies of Central Europe.

The idea might seem a natural response to Russia's brutal invasion of Georgia in August, by any measure a disproportionate and unwarranted action in response to tensions over the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But as most now realize, Russia's aggression, while unjustified, was not unprovoked. Among other things, Georgia had fired artillery rounds carelessly into disputed regions at the outset of the crisis. President Mikhail Saakashvili's desire to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia back into Georgia proper, while understandable at one level, has been pursued with wanton disregard for the role of the international community and for the need to pursue this goal carefully and peacefully. Future policymaking must seek to deter not only Russia, but other regional actors, from the kind of irresponsible behavior that pushed the Caucasus toward all-out war just three months ago.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates are experienced Russia hands. But they seem to operate too much from a classic deterrence model of international relations. By quickly putting Georgia and Ukraine under NATO's Article V security guarantee, they seem to hope Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia would back off, recognizing that to pick a fight with Georgia or Ukraine would be to pick a fight with the United States.

If Russia today was like Adolf Hitler's Germany, or Josef Stalin's Soviet Union, or we might have little choice in the matter. But few would argue such a model explains Russia's current behavior. Perhaps the logic is that, even if Russia is only bent on reasserting its sphere of influence among the former Soviet republics and vassal states, it is still better to nip any bullying in the bud. That is a fair enough hypothesis - even if one can debate whether the stakes are high enough to warrant an implicit threat of war against a nuclear-armed state in its own backyard in response. But will it work using NATO membership as our primary policy tool?

To answer that important question, it is worth going back to the exact language of Article V of the NATO Charter. Its precise wording is as follows: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Here's the problem with Article V. It has long been presumed to constitute an implicit threat to use force nearly automatically in the event allies are threatened - and there is a very real danger that President Saakashvili of Georgia would interpret it that way, feeling even more unbound to challenge Russia once inside the alliance.

But in fact, Article V does not requirea military response, and wily characters like Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev would likely figure that out. Even if they did not want to challenge us blatantly by overthrowing Mr. Saakashvili in the future, they could quite likely pick future fights with him over borders, or the treatment of minorities, or other such issues - calculating that American and other alliance leaders would not risk nuclear war over small parts of central Eurasia that few Americans had ever heard of. And they would probably be right. By this analysis, the net effect of premature NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine could well be to make war morelikely, not less likely. And once we were on this slippery slope in a future crisis, with Article V gradually losing its credibility, there could also be a risk of NATO overreaction, as we sought to shore up our international credibility by forcing a direct showdown with Russia from which no one would benefit.

NATO has a membership path that is well-designed and well-conceived. Among other things, it calls for the clear establishment of democratic rule among aspiring member states, as well as a policy of settling territorial disputes without the use of force. Today, neither Georgia nor Ukraine (nor Russia) qualifies based on these criteria. We should stick to the established policy, and slow things down.

The United States in particular must not foster an attitude among Russians that NATO is designed explicitly to weaken them, or that other key foreign policy initiatives such as the planned missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic are pursued at their expense. Alas, two decades into the post-Cold War era, we have not succeeded in this task. To be sure, cynical and ruthless Russian politicians are the primary problem here. But they are not going away anytime soon. And we are doing just enough to feed their worldview - such as White House Press Secretary Dana Perino's regrettable comment in August that our decision to firm up plans for the Poland and Czech missile defense system in the midst of the Georgia crisis was "mostly coincidental," after we spent years telling Russia it was not in any way designed against it. Moscow will interpret suspending normal NATO membership rules for Georgia and Ukraine as punishment, not statesmanship.

The best Russia policy now is to avoid further unnecessary provocation on all sides, and give President-elect Obama a chance to work with NATO allies to devise a more patient Russia strategy next year. This is the kind of calming advice we tend to give to other countries in crises like the current one. We should heed our own counsel.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Washington Times

Protracted Displacement in Europe: Perspectives and Solutions

Walter Kälin — Wed, 26 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500

Madame Chairperson of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population,
Distinguished Members of the Committee,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a particular pleasure for me to welcome you here. Since assuming my mandate I have cooperated with the Council of Europe in fruitful ways and a variety of contexts. I fondly remember your last seminar on internal displacement here in Geneva. I appreciated the invitation by the Council’s Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons to contribute to the development of Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on internally displaced persons of 5 April 2006. This recommendation is arguably the most authoritative statement on the protection of internally displaced persons in Europe. I also appreciated Chairperson Jonker’s forceful statement recently in Oslo at the celebration of the 10^th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Last but not least, your Commissioner on Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, and I continue our long-standing cooperation and reinforce our messages on specific situations very effectively.

While Africa could be considered the continent of internal displacement because it has more than 12 of the roughly 25 million displaced by armed conflict worldwide, Europe, with its estimated 2.5 million internally displaced persons, could be called the continent of protracted displacement. While the armed conflict in Georgia in August of this year has tragically reminded us that the threat of war remains a reality in Europe even in the 21^st century, 99% of Europe’s remaining displaced fled their homes some 15 to 25 years ago as a result of conflicts arising from rejected independence claims and territorial disputes. In recent years some governments have taken important steps to improve their situation, but overall the situation of most internally displaced people remains a cause for concern.

What, then, is protracted displacement? UNHCR has defined a protracted refugee situation as ”one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo, “ i.e., a situation in which “[t]heir lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.”[1] By analogy, experts participating at a seminar organized by UNHCR and the Brooking-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in June 2007 concluded that protracted IDP situations, in addition to their prolonged nature, exhibit two key characteristics: (1) the process for finding durable solutions has become stalled, and (2) the displaced are marginalized by disregard for or failure to protect their human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights.

My missions and visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia over the last years have placed a number of critical observations into stark relief:

Many of the protracted situations in Europe are the consequence of armed conflicts that had been marked by inter-ethnic violence or even ethnic cleansing. In some of these situations, internally displaced became political pawns. In the absence of a political settlement to the underlying conflicts, they were in some cases deliberately left in limbo and durable solutions or even temporary integration at the location of displacement were discouraged. In other cases, the reality of internal displacement was simply denied. Temporary housing arrangements, segregated schools or limited access to education for IDP children as well as economic and social marginalization are among the immediate consequences.
Housing, employment and access to quality education are typically the dominant concerns both during protracted displacement and after return. While resources often are scarce in the post-conflict transition phase, IDPs suffer disproportionately since they have to compete for these resources from a marginalized position. Particular difficulties stem from the fact that displacement often marks for IDPs the beginning of a rural to urban transition.
Protection of property left behind and, ultimately its restitution, are often ignored, hindering IDPs in their efforts to resume their lives and remaining a serious source of grievance and a trigger-point for future conflict.
Strict application of requirements for legal documentation, coupled with failure to replace or issue new documentation, prevents IDPs in some countries from accessing and enjoying a range of rights: to health, education, property, a livelihood. – and that often years after their initial displacement.
Where return or integration is agreed in principle, central governments at times fail to exercise sufficient control over reintegration processes at the local level to ensure its implementation. Without clear political signals from the highest levels of government, durable solutions are not prioritized at the local level where local political pressure may support a different result. Discrimination, harassment and denial of political participation by IDPs from minority communities frequently occurs at the local authority and local community level, and they are exacerbated if mixed signals are sent from the central level.
The absence of political settlements also negatively affects safety and security in return areas, including specific issues such as mine clearance.
The lack of IDP-specific policies and laws or their belated adoption often added to the problems.
IDPs subject to multiple discrimination face a level of problems and protection concerns not experienced by other IDPs. Ethnic minority groups not linked to a party involved in the conflict -- such as the Roma -- are often particularly affected. Donors and Government further fail to recognize vulnerabilities of marginalized groups in the recovery phase, e.g., by cutting funding for collective housing complexes, even though it is the most vulnerable such as the elderly or people with mental disabilities that tend to stay behind. Mental health issues, often rooted in conflict atrocities and exacerbated by the protracted nature of displacement, are frequently neglected and responses underfunded.
IDPs either are not involved in peace processes or they become an object of political manipulation, with the result that they cannot properly the agenda in accordance with their best interests, needs and rights.

In light of these problems, we have come together today to address the following three issues:

What are the challenges and the opportunities to enable durable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in protracted situations, in line with States’ human rights obligations and as spelled out in CoE Recommendation (2006)6?
In a protracted situation where durable solutions for displaced persons might not be feasible, how may we reconcile the right of IDPs to fully participate equally, as citizens or habitual residents of their country, in social and economic activities, in access to justice and protection from violence, with protection and preservation of their right to return?
What could be the role of the Parliamentary Assembly, and in particular its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, in advancing protection of the human rights of IDPs and placing the issue of protracted displacement as priority on the Council of Europe’s agenda in 2009?

This morning’s presentations will address these issues, and I sincerely thank my colleagues from the organizations represented here for having so graciously accepted the invitation to share their views with us.

Not wanting to duplicate what we will hear, I conclude by offering the following key principles to guide our critically-needed efforts to tackle protracted displacement situations in Europe:

Efforts to solve the frozen conflicts in Europe must be renewed. Real solutions for IDPs will remain elusive if conflicts linger on.
An absence of political solutions cannot serve as an excuse for failing to address protracted displacement situations. The government retains the primary responsibility to it citizens regardless of a frozen conflict and even in the absence of territorial control.
The point of departure for discussions about protracted situations must be the recognition first, that internally displaced persons remain -- despite their being displaced -- citizens of the country they have not left and, second, that as such, they are fully entitled to enjoy the full range of human rights available under the European Human Rights Convention, the two UN human rights Covenants and other applicable human right treaties. They must, therefore, enjoy the same level of protection and realization of these rights as the rest of the population, though respect of their rights may require specific and additional effort. In other words, the displaced have specific vulnerabilities and protection and assistance needs not shared by the rest of the population, and they are entitled to measures that address these needs. Where needed, they are therefore entitled to differential and preferential treatment and such treatment shall not be deemed “discriminatory”.
Actively addressing specific needs and vulnerabilities while respecting IDPs’ rights of participation and of non-discrimination means that internally displaced persons should be integrated into mainstream society to the fullest extent possible, even if chances for return remain. This necessitates investment into the provision of adequate housing, education, creation of livelihoods, and in some contexts measures to protect against discrimination. We must recognize, and reflect in our actions, that enabling the displaced to lead a normal life and protecting their right to return are not mutually exclusive. Rather, people who are in control of their lives and who are not hampered by continuing rights violations are more likely to go back and rebuild than are individuals or communities who have been marginalized and who suffer from dependency syndrome.
In all situations, there are categories of particularly vulnerable persons such as traumatized persons, single-headed households, persons with disabilities, or elderly persons without family support who continue to be in need of humanitarian assistance and support. Targeted attention and action will be necessary to enable them to find solutions.
When protracted conflicts are resolved by peace agreement or other means, the right of internally displaced persons to choose between return to their homes, local integration at the site of displacement, or resettlement to another part of the country must be respected. That choice must be voluntary and informed, and it must be a meaningful choice. That means that authorities have a responsibility to enable conditions for all three to be viable options, and not merely to favor one approach to the exclusion of the others.
Authorities must also take the necessary measures in a number of areas to ensure that the solution chosen will be sustainable in the long term. That means first: to ensure safety and security, particularly at locations of return. It also entails restitution of property and repair or rebuilding of houses and basic infrastructure. Finally, we must not overlook sustainability of return in economic and social terms, including non-discriminatory access to basic services and economic opportunities.
In all of this, internally displaced persons must be informed and consulted on all relevant steps, and to the extent possible, receive the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting them.

[1] Executive Committee on the High Commissioner’s Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, EC/54/SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004, para. 3.

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population

Ukraine, Georgia and MAP – Time for Plan B

Steven Pifer — Wed, 29 Oct 2008 10:57:22 -0400

At their April summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders instructed their foreign ministers to review the bids by Ukraine and Georgia for membership action plans (MAPs) when the ministers meet in December. The U.S. government strongly supports positive decisions. Unfortunately, it has become clear that Ukraine and Georgia have no chance for MAPs at the NATO ministerial meeting.

Rather than pursuing a quest certain to end in diplomatic failure, Washington needs a Plan B. It should aim to shape a December outcome that sends positive signals to Kyiv and Tbilisi while making clear that NATO does not concede Ukraine or Georgia to Russia’s geopolitical orbit.

In Bucharest, most allied leaders supported giving Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and a few others blocked the consensus sought by President Bush. They feared a negative Kremlin reaction and questioned the readiness of Ukraine and Georgia. They nevertheless agreed to a summit declaration stating “these countries will become members of NATO.”

Developments since Bucharest have only made the Ukrainian and Georgian MAP bids more problematic. The Russia-Georgia conflict in August has intensified worries about the Kremlin’s negative – indeed, hostile – reaction.

Political turmoil in Ukraine complicates Kyiv’s bid. President Yushchenko in October dissolved the parliament and has called for pre-term parliamentary elections. While Prime Minister Tymoshenko opposes elections, the odds are that, when NATO foreign ministers meet December 2-3, Ukraine will be in the run-up to elections. That means that NATO ministers will not know who will be the next prime minister, let alone whether he or she will support Yushchenko’s desire for a MAP.

As for Georgia, its case is now burdened by questions about the wisdom of President Saakashvili’s August 7 decision, however provoked, to send his army into South Ossetia. The speed of the Russian military response made clear that they were ready and awaiting a pretext, but the West’s confidence in Saakashvili has been shaken.

Merkel has already stated her opposition to MAPs for Ukraine or Georgia in December. Other European allies share this view. The Bush administration, limping along in its final days, lacks the diplomatic clout to force this issue.

Seeking MAPs in December, only to fall short, would not be good for Ukraine or Georgia or for their long-term NATO prospects. Likewise, it would not be good for the U.S. government to make a big diplomatic push to persuade allies to agree to MAPs – and fail again, as it did in Bucharest.

Washington thus needs a Plan B. The U.S. government should begin consulting now with Kyiv and Tbilisi on goals for December short of MAPs. The U.S. government should seek the following:

Secure language in the December NATO ministerial communiqué, and any parallel NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia statements, reaffirming that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO, and rejecting President Medvedev’s assertion for Russia of a sphere of “privileged interests” in the former Soviet space;
Build toward agreement that can be announced in December on a series of practical actions to deepen NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgian cooperation, including increased exchanges and exercises;
Obtain agreement from NATO allies on steps to strengthen their bilateral links to Ukraine and Georgia; and
Work with NATO members who also belong to the European Union to secure EU commitments to deepen EU-Ukraine and EU-Georgia cooperation (these could be announced by the European Union at about the time of the NATO ministerial).

At the same time, Washington should also suggest that NATO consider a parallel dialogue with Russia on the Alliance’s enlargement policy. Sovereign states will always retain their right to enter into alliances of their choosing. But Russia has legitimate security interests in its neighborhood, and it desires to have those interests taken into account. Finding a mechanism that will respect Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty in general – and specifically with regard to NATO – while addressing Russian concerns will pose a challenge, but it is a necessary step for long-term stability in the region.

Washington, Kyiv and Tbilisi must accept that asking for MAPs in December is a recipe for defeat. They should adjust their sights accordingly and seek measures that would reaffirm the Euro-Atlantic community’s interest in Ukraine and Georgia, and make clear that NATO does not accept the Russian effort to draw a new red line through Europe.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Durable Solutions for IDPs in Protracted Situations: Three Case Studies

Alex Mundt and Elizabeth Ferris — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, studies have been carried out, campaigns have been launched, and considerable thought has gone into how to resolve protracted refugee situations.[1] Academics and practitioners alike have grappled with the difficulties in finding solutions for refugees who have lived in camps for far too long.

While millions of IDPs, like refugees, have languished in camps for extended periods of time, protracted IDP situations have received virtually no attention from academic researchers. There are important similarities in the impact of prolonged displacement on the lives of IDPs and refugees, but there are also significant differences in their situations – particularly when it comes to solutions. This paper begins by suggesting a definition for protracted IDP situations and then discusses similarities and differences between protracted refugee and IDP situations. The study then examines three case studies of protracted internal displacement: Colombia, Georgia, and Darfur with a particular focus on the role of IDPs in negotiations to resolve the conflict, the involvement of key international actors in influencing the situation on the ground and the possibilities for durable solutions. While return is often the desired solution for both IDPs and political actors, the paper argues that local integration and return should not be seen as mutually exclusive alternatives. IDPs can be encouraged to build new lives elsewhere without having to give up the possibility of eventual return when conditions warrant.

Read the full paper »

[1] See for example, Loescher and Milner 2005; Loescher, Newman, and Troeller forthcoming; Smith 2004; Milner 2005; Crisp 2003; UNHCR 2004b; UNHCR 2004d; UNHCR 2006a: 105-127.

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Authors

Alex Mundt
Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Enhancing Protection of Civilians in Protracted Conflicts, ARC/Austcare Symposium

Setting a Constructive Russia Agenda

Steven Pifer — Fri, 03 Oct 2008 12:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Bernard Gwertzman of Council on Foreign Relations, Steven Pifer said U.S.-Russian relations have "deteriorated significantly" since the Putin-Bush summit of 2002. Pifer believes the current state of relations has not left much in the U.S. diplomatic tool-kit to use against Moscow, and he suggests that the next administration try to return to negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

Bernard Gwertzman: Shortly after the fighting in Georgia began, I had an interview with a former colleague of yours, CFR Senior Fellow Stephen Sestanovich, who said that we'll know in a few months whether this turned out to be just a bump or fork in the road in relations between Western countries and Russia. How permanent do you think this conflict will be in U.S.-Russian relations?

Steven Pifer: Well, certainly the conflict has had an impact on U.S.-Russia relations. But I would wait before making a longer-term assessment until you see several months into the next administration, and see how either President Barack Obama or President John McCain deals with Russia.

Gwertzman: What do you think the Russians are looking for right now in the aftermath of Georgia?

Pifer: Well, I think there are a couple things going on here. First, the conflict with Georgia was not just about South Ossetia. It's also important to remember that-and this sometimes gets lost in the American narrative-that however badly he was provoked, on August 7, [Georgian] President Mikheil Saakashvili made a miscalculation when he sent his military into South Ossetia. The speed of the Russian response suggests to me that they were ready, prepared to go, and were just waiting for the pretext, and unfortunately that decision on August 7 gave them the pretext. But I think that the Russian message was not just about South Ossetia. That was a broader signal to Georgia, and to other neighbors, that Russia is serious about having influence in its neighborhood. That is going to be an issue that we're going to have to deal with.

Read the full interview »

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Council on Foreign Relations

Russia's Stock Market Fall: It's All About Oil

Clifford G. Gaddy — Tue, 16 Sep 2008 10:01:04 -0400

It's great fun to explain a sudden boom or bust in the stock markets after the fact by alluding to some unique event that happened to occur at just that time. Anyone can do it, and no one can refute you, since the experiment cannot be repeated. Normally, it's also an innocent exercise. In recent days and weeks, however, some people have carried this game into a more serious arena, that of geopolitics, and are using it to draw wrong policy conclusions.

It by now seems to be an article of faith for many people that Russia's invasion of Georgia on Aug. 8 caused a massive fall in the Russian stock market, as well as a crash of the currency and outflow of foreign capital. The serious misstep is when some people take this as evidence that Western governments don't have to worry about making tough decisions as to whether and how to react to Russia's actions in Georgia because "the markets are punishing it." Implicit in such thinking is that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin obviously did not realize what a penalty he would pay. Now that he does, Putin -- or the oligarchs who back him -- will be deterred in the future.

Is this at all credible? Let us look at some facts. Yes, the ruble has lost 6.9 percent against the dollar since Aug. 7. Then again, nearly all currencies have lost against the dollar recently. Maybe it would be better to ask how the ruble has fared against the euro. The answer is that the ruble now is stronger against the euro than it was on Aug. 7. And the foreign exchange impact? Again, there's some reality here. In the week following the invasion, the country's foreign exchange reserves dropped by $16.4 billion. But that is still less than 3 percent of the total of nearly $600 billion. Since then, the reserves have held more or less steady.

So neither the currency nor the foreign exchange situation seems particularly dire after the Georgia events. The Russian stock market is a different story. The fact that it is collapsing is indisputable. The market value of the country's main exchange, the RTS, is now down to barely half of what it was earlier this year. A lot of value has been lost, although commentators disagree on just how much. Anders Бslund wrote in The Moscow Times on Sept. 3: "Aug. 8 ... marks Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's greatest strategic blunder. In one blow, he wiped out half a trillion dollars of stock market value." Gideon Rachman adhered to the same figure in his Sept. 8 column in the Financial Times. But David Ignatius in The Washington Post on Sept. 10 wrote more cautiously that the RTS index lost "about $290 billion in value since Aug. 7."

To be precise, between Aug. 7 and Sept. 9, the RTS lost $183 billion. What is true, however, is that since its peak on May 19, the RTS has lost about $600 billion, or around 43 percent. The issue is when it lost that value, and why? Did it really happen, as Бslund wrote, "in one blow"? Most important, was it because of Georgia? Consider this: In the four weeks before the invasion, the RTS lost more value than in the four weeks after -- $192 billion before and $167 billion after. In fact, the Russian market has been declining since early July.

So if the Georgia events did not cause the decline, what did?

One alternative explanation is the worldwide decline in stock markets, which has had an especially strong impact on emerging markets like Russia. Another suggestion is that the Russian market has suffered from a general climate of distrust that has been growing over a longer period, highlighted first by the acrimonious dispute among the owners of TNK-BP and then by Putin's July 24 attack on the mining company Mechel and its CEO.

It may well be that all of these various factors, including the Georgia factor, have played into the market's fall. But if we are looking for a main cause, the best bet is to turn one's attention to the main driver of economic events in Russia since the 1970s -- namely global oil markets. After peaking in mid-summer at over $140 a barrel, the world oil price has steadily declined. From its high on July 14 to Sept. 8, the oil price dropped by 29.8 percent. Over that same period, the value of the Russian stock market fell by 29.3 percent. The extreme closeness of those two numbers is certainly a coincidence. But the stock market's general dependence on oil prices should not be a surprise.

I suspect that Putin and his advisers are smarter than the Western analysts on this one and are well aware of the oil factor. If so, the lesson for Putin and Co. will be that since the markets have imposed little penalty for the military action in Georgia, there is no reason to be deterred for fear of further such "punishment" in the future.

Meanwhile, Western policymakers would be wise to realize that spurious post hoc, ergo propter hoc explanations for stock market behavior do not take them off the hook. They still need to decide about how to react to Russia with real policy.

Authors

Clifford G. Gaddy

Publication: The Moscow Times