Brookings: Topics - Election Reform

Policy Leadership and the Blame Trap: Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate

R. Kent Weaver — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: This paper is part of the Governance Studies Management and Leadership Initiative.

Negative messages about political opponents increasingly dominate not just election campaigns in the United States, but the policymaking process as well. And politics dominated by negative messaging (also known as blame-generating) tends to result in policy stalemate. Negative messaging is attractive to politicians because people tend to pay more attention to negative information than positive information, and they are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains. Political polarization, competitive, nationalized elections, increased fiscal stress and changes in campaign law and practice have all exacerbated pressures to engage in negative messaging in recent years. There are a number of strategies that allow politicians to maneuver around the “blame trap” and avoid policy deadlock in some circumstances, including passing the buck to non-elected bodies and putting in place triggering mechanisms that generate politically unpopular policy changes in the future. All of these strategies have limitations and disadvantages, however, so both blame-generating politics and policy stalemate are likely to be the “new normal” in American politics in the near future.

There are several strategic options for avoiding policy stalemate in a political environment dominated by negative messaging. Each of these options has distinctive advantages and limitations, and risks. None is suitable for all situations, but together they offer some important opportunities to avoid policy stalemate.

Passing the Buck: A first strategy that politicians can use to try to avoid the blame trap is to pass the buck to non-elected bodies—often temporary commissions—to reach deals behind closed doors without the pressure of staking out and defending partisan and ideological positions.
Grand Deals and Circling the Wagons: A related strategy to passing the buck is for Democratic and Republican leaders to negotiate behind closed doors to try to strike a grand deal on an issue like budgets and taxes or immigration, which they then sell jointly to the public and to rank-and-file legislators (“circling the wagons”) as the best deal that is achievable—and better than no deal at all.
Government by Autopilot: Another strategy for making difficult decisions is to set up a procedure under which reaching some trigger (e.g., deficit levels, or Social Security deficits) leads automatically to programmatic adjustments according to a formula set up in the original legislation unless Congress agrees to overturn it.
Feet to the Fire: This strategy starts with the same mechanism as policy by auto-pilot: policymakers set up an automatic mechanism that will trigger politically painful policy changes without politicians themselves pulling the trigger.
Experiment: On some policy issues where parties are divided, it may be possible to try out different approaches to policy before making a firm choice at the national level. This can be done in several different ways. One is to give more authority to states and localities to experiment with new policy options rather than having a uniform national policy.
Executive Action: If a hyper-partisan and divided Congress is unable to break policy stalemates, what about executive action as an alternative? There certainly are some opportunities for breaking stalemate through executive action, as President Obama showed in June 2012 when he suspended deportation of young illegal immigrants who had entered the country illegally.
Compromise: A final strategy for overcoming the blame trap is the oldest and simplest one: politicians can split the difference with their partisan foes and meet them halfway.

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R. Kent Weaver

An Evidence-Based Path to Disability Insurance Reform

Jeffrey B. Liebman and Jack A. Smalligan — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 08:00:00 -0500

In this policy proposal — part of The Hamilton Project's 15 Ways to Rethink the Federal Budget — Jeffrey Liebman and Jack Smalligan propose a path to improve our disability insurance system, through demonstration projects and administrative changes, that could potentially increase employment and economic engagement among workers with disabilities and provide more rapid and reliable resolution of disability insurance claims for those who cannot work.

IMPACT

Deficit Reduction (10-year): $10billion to $20 billion

Broader Benefits: Potential to increase employment and economic engagement of workers with disabilities and provide more rapid and reliable resolution of disability insurance claims for those who cannot work. Results of pilots would inform broader reforms of the disability insurance system, leading to additional longer-term benefits.

INTRODUCTION

Disability insurance is the leading edge of the demographic tsunami that is starting to flood U.S. social insurance programs. Americans who are between the ages of fifty and sixty-five are four times more likely than those between the ages of twenty and forty-nine to be receiving disability insurance benefits. For the past decade, the same baby boomers who are just beginning to create fiscal challenges for Medicare and Social Security have been in their peak years of disability insurance receipt. Spending on disability benefits through the federal Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) programs has increased from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1980 to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2013. Spending on Medicare and Medicaid benefits for DI and SSI recipients is also slightly more than 1 percent of GDP.
The good news is that spending on disability cash benefits appears to have peaked. With baby boomers transitioning off disability benefits and onto Social Security retirement benefits, and with the next cohorts slightly smaller than the baby boomers, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that spending on DI will fall by 0.1 percent of GDP between now and 2022 (CBO 2012).

But even though the fiscal burden of disability insurance is not expected to worsen, the program is in significant need of reform. This policy note summarizes the conclusions of a year-long research project designed to establish an evidence-based path to disability insurance reform. Our complete findings are available in Liebman and Smalligan (2013). The project was motivated by the observation that, while a consensus is emerging that changes are needed to the U.S. disability insurance system, there is no agreement around any specific reforms, nor does there appear to be a path in place that will lead to such agreement. Moreover, in most cases we lack the evidentiary base necessary to judge whether specific reforms would do more good than harm.

We therefore recommend a path that identifies promising reforms that are administratively realistic, pilots them or otherwise acquires the evidence necessary to judge their merits, and then rolls them out more broadly if proven benefits are established.

Two immediate steps are needed to start down this path. First, Congress should authorize three demonstration projects centered around early intervention. The key to reducing disability insurance costs is to intervene as early as possible to assist individuals in remaining at work. Waiting until after an individual has been approved for benefits is too late. Second, Congress should give the new Social Security commissioner the tools necessary to improve the disability determination system. Most important, funding for state disability determination services should be placed on the mandatory, rather than the discretionary, side of the budget. This will allow the Social Security Administration (SSA) to make investments in administrative capacity that will reduce spending on benefits—for example, by reducing the backlog of continuing disability reviews.

Like reforms to other social insurance programs, these changes will have a relatively small budget impact over the next ten years, but have the potential to produce much larger savings in later years. A package with these two reforms could save $10 billion to $20 billion over the coming decade, mostly through more thorough initial reviews. If the early intervention pilots are successful and taken to scale, annual savings of as much as 0.1 percent of GDP would be possible. ^[1].

^[1] We reach this estimate by assuming that roughly one-third of DI recipients are potentially able to be targeted for employment services and that the services enable one-third of that one-third to work rather than receive benefits. Net of the cost of the employment services, the savings would be around 0.1 percent of GDP.

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Jeffrey B. Liebman
Jack A. Smalligan

Publication: The Hamilton Project

Image Source: Keith Brofsky

Lebanon and its Multiple Challenges

Thu, 31 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2013
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On January 31, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion on the state of Lebanon at a time when the country faces grave challenges from within and without. Speakers discussed Lebanon’s failing governmental institutions and the possibility of reform, as well as the long shadow cast over Lebanese politics and society by the Syrian conflict. The panel featured Ziad Baroud, former minister of interior and municipalities; Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri and former minister of finance; Ali Hamdan, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Lebanon’s Amal Movement; and Rami Rayess, spokesman of the Progressive Socialist Party and media advisor to Walid Jumblatt. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business, and media communities.

Even as the discussion opened on Lebanon’s domestic challenges — namely, costly and unreliable electricity, underdeveloped infrastructure and high unemployment — it almost immediately turned to the Syria crisis. While moderator Salman Shaikh challenged participants to address the Lebanese government’s historic failure to deliver real services to its citizens, participants were ready to defend the current government as having maintained Lebanon’s stability amid what Mohamad Chatah called a “perfect storm in the region.” Ali Hamdan stressed that Lebanon “is not an island” and that this government, led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati, came to power amid regional “turbulence.” Rami Rayess, also from the March 8 bloc, said that, given events in Syria, the government’s effort was “good enough.” Even though Chatah, of the opposition March 14 coalition, offered some stinging criticisms of the March 8 government, he nonetheless emphasized that Lebanon is “lucky” not to be at war.

When the debate delved into the real dysfunction of Lebanese politics, however, participants found blame in the very nature of Lebanon’s political system. Rayess, for instance, pointed the finger at a political community that approaches issues in the narrow terms of how its members can secure gains for their constituents. Chatah attributed that to a Lebanese system “filled with moral hazard” – a system that drives politicians and leaders to act sectarian or else risk missing a promotion or being punished by their constituents. Chatah said that this dysfunctional system could probably be traced back to the birth of Lebanon, a sentiment seconded by Hamdan, who said that since its independence, Lebanon had failed to build up a real government and concept of citizenship. The result, he said, was a level of trust that was negligible and led the country’s parties to constantly level accusations against one another. Ziad Baroud, a political independent, said that the same problems had been going on for decades but still bemoaned what he saw as a purely reactive approach to dealing with Lebanon’s worsening social and economic problems.

These systemic problems have now helped shape the debate over the law governing Lebanon’s June parliamentary elections. Baroud described a situation in which there is no stable legislation for the country’s electoral law, which means that political parties simply draft a new electoral law from which they expect to benefit. Both Baroud and Hamdan complained that Lebanon was still hashing out the same legal issues that had supposedly been resolved with the 2008 Doha Agreement. Baroud, Chatah, and Hamdan all expressed sympathy with the Christian demands for more effective representation that have underpinned the proposed “Orthodox Gathering” electoral law. Baroud said, though, that the issue was less one of numbers than of the role Christians can play in building modern Lebanon.

Rayess emphasized that the dispute over the electoral law should not be an excuse to delay elections. Lebanon has been holding elections for the past 60 years, he said, and at a time when other Arabs are making sacrifices to realize democracy at home, Lebanon cannot be seen to go backwards. If Lebanon does not go to elections, Baroud asked, who guarantees that the country’s system will not collapse? And if it does, who guarantees that the country will get another system – and at what price?

In part, these fundamental issues return to disparate readings of the country’s constitution and what Chatah referred to as its “constructive ambiguity.” Both Chatah and Rayess pointed to the establishment of a bicameral system, with a Lebanese senate alongside its parliament, as a possible way out of the country’s political deadlock. Hamdan warned against a reliance on quick fixes. He said that the country’s problem lay in the selective implementation of the Taif Accord, which itself calls for the eventual establishment of a senate. Baroud said that, whether the solution was a senate or anything else, the real challenge lay in establishing mechanisms to “make diversity function” in Lebanon.

Of course, the discussion was not without some partisan back-and-forth. Chatah in particular made some sharp allegations against the country’s March 8 government. The government, he said, had come to power after its predecessor was toppled by the threat of force and sectarian war, and government figures had repeatedly shielded the assassins (attempted or otherwise) of March 14 leaders. He pointed to the assassination of Wisam al-Hassan, who had just uncovered an alleged Syrian plot to assassinate prominent Christian and Sunni leaders, as what finally forced March 14 to withdraw from any negotiations or dialogue.

Hamdan nonetheless called for a return to the national dialogue that began in 2006, a dialogue that has lately centered on Lebanon’s national defense strategy – that is, state authority over Hizballah’s arms. Even though Hamdan agreed that the dialogue had yet to show solid results, he said that even if the Lebanese wasted time in dialogue, it was better than boycotting. Rayess also thought that national dialogue is a necessary exercise and should be kept open at all costs. While he expressed appreciation for Hizballah’s liberation of Lebanese land from Israeli occupation, he said that the state had to monopolize military power. The faster Lebanon built a consensus on a national defense strategy, he said, the sooner it could build capabilities to confront Israeli aggression. Chatah, however, rejected Lebanon’s national dialogue as essentially pointless; the dialogue could only go in circles, he said, given that Hizballah’s sole objective was to maintain the status quo. He called the dialogue a “sham” and a “charade,” complaining that Hizballah’s “declared” strategic link with Iran means that Lebanese are left to wait for their next war, one whose timing will be decided by others. Still, Baroud said that the dialogue seemed to be the only remaining political alternative. He said that some factions had made the mistake of thinking they could defeat others outright; consensus, he stressed, is “how Lebanon functions.”

The conversation eventually returned to the Syria crisis, which Hamdan described as “the greatest threat” to Lebanon in its history. He praised the June 2012 “Baabda Declaration,” according to which Lebanon announced a clear policy of “disassociation” or “positive neutralism.” As he put it, the Lebanese have no other choice; Lebanon can do nothing to affect the situation in Syria, while the war’s spread into Lebanon would consume the country.

For his part, Chatah was willing to take sides – rhetorically. Those socially and ethnically closest to the Syrian people in Lebanon, he said, were among the foremost adversaries of the regime. He said that some in Lebanon, and in the North in particular, had been subjected to the sort of bombing and killing 25 years ago that can be seen in Syria today. Syria’s Lebanese allies, meanwhile, are those with a “strategic link” with the Syrian regime. Chatah nonetheless emphasized, in the same terms as Hamdan, that Lebanon should not be involved in Syria; he praised the Baabda Declaration, saying it was “historic” and should be enshrined in the country’s constitution.”

Participants voiced fears, however, that Baabda might not be enough, or that some were willing to flout it. Rayess warned that the commitment of the document had to be reinforced, as the presence of Lebanese fighters in Syria and other provocations like Hizballah’s Ayoub drone had threatened to destabilize the situation. Chatah likewise warned that sending fighters or amassing weapons for Syriainside Lebanon could only put the country in harm’s way.

At the time of this discussion, the previous night’s Israeli airstrike on a Syrian target had only complicated the Syria situation. Chatah, the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime among the participants, said that Lebanese were without exception against the Israeli action. If Israel thinks it can buy credibility with the Syrian rebels, he said, it is wrong. Hamdan complained of daily Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, land, and sea, and warned that Israel was waiting for the weakening and division of Arab power so it could act again. Chatah discounted the possibility that the Israeli air attack on Syria was a signal of a broader campaign, as, in his reading, Israeli “aggression” is never declared or signaled in advance. Still, he said, the Israeli action drove home the need for the Lebanese to be united on this issue.

When asked about how the international community could help Lebanon, answers differed. Chatah said that the influence of the international community has “waned” and that there is “a lot of exaggeration” of the impact of international action. Still, he flagged Lebanese calls for international technical assistance in monitoring the country’s Syria border, but said that such help was hamstrung by strong opposition from Hizballah. Baroud reiterated Lebanese requests for international funding assistance in absorbing the country’s new refugee burden, and Rayess said that dealing with the humanitarian situation is the best way to preserve Lebanon’s stability.

In the diplomatic realm, Hamdan asked that the international community not adopt a double standard in dealing with Israel and its Arab neighbors, and Baroud and Hamdan warned against plans for a “new Sykes-Picot” that would divide Syria and the wider region. Rayess called for international consensus on the June 2012 Geneva agreement, while Chatah asked that the international community affirm and act on Lebanon’s declaration of neutrality. If the world treats Lebanon as a staging ground for Syria’s war, he said, the country will be in grave trouble.

Among those who spoke at the event’s end was special guest Miguel Moratinos, former foreign minister of Spain. He said that, after 20 years of dealing with Lebanon, he was optimistic for the country. There was no comparing the Lebanon of today with the Lebanon of 15, or even five, years ago, according to Moratinos; he could not imagine the Lebanon of previous years not being totally engulfed by the Syria issue. He expressed his hopes that the Syria crisis would be a moment for the Lebanese to take their destiny in their own hands; this time, he said, the Lebanese could have a dialogue in Beirut, not Doha or Taif.

This sort of forward-looking change may need to start now. As Chatah pointed out, in the coming decade Lebanon faces two milestones: the centennial of its founding in 2020 and the first returns from the country’s Mediterranean natural gas reserves. If Lebanon sees a huge influx of money into a government that continues to be dysfunctional or corrupt, real reform may be put off indefinitely. The Lebanese people’s ability to come together over the next few years, then, stands to determine whether Lebanon begins its second century with political change or with more of the same.

Voting for Change: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of First Elections in Arab Transitions

Ellen Lust — Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Elections that follow dramatic downfalls of authoritarian regimes present policymakers with difficult choices. They are an opportunity to establish a sound basis for democratization, putting in place institutions and strengthening actors that help guarantee free and fair elections. Yet such elections are part of a high-stakes conflict over the future that takes place in a context of enormous uncertainty, as new actors emerge, old elites remake themselves, and the public engages in politics in new and unpredictable ways.

Assisting elections in the Arab world today is made more challenging by two factors that have thus far distinguished the region from others. First, transitions are made more difficult by extraordinarily strong demands to uproot the old regime. Fears that former regime elements will undermine ongoing revolutions along with demands for justice after decades of wrongdoing invariably create pressures to exclude former elites. In other regions, reformers within autocratic regimes, like Boris Yeltsin and South Africa’s F.W. DeKlerk, split from hardliners to spearhead reforms, muting demands for excluding old regime allies writ large. In the Middle East, however, old regime elites have been unable to credibly commit to reforms, partly given decades-long histories of empty promises and oppositions that remain largely determined to accept nothing less than Ben Ali-like departures. Room for compromise is difficult to find.

Second, for an international community hoping to support Arab transitions, widespread distrust of outside forces compounds these problems. Such distrust is inevitable in all post-colonial states; however, skepticism is particularly high in the Arab world, especially toward the United States. Cynicism about American intentions has been fed by U.S. support for Israel, its continued backing of Arab autocrats for nearly two decades after the Cold War, and, more recently, its unwillingness to take stronger stands against Mubarak, Asad, and others early on in the uprisings. Even if transitioning elites believe international expertise can help smooth the election process and enhance faith in the outcomes, they find it difficult to embrace in the context of heightened nationalism and a strong desire to assert sovereignty.

In light of these challenges, this paper explores how the international community can best engage in “founding” elections in the Arab world. Examining Egypt and Tunisia, the first two Arab states to hold elections, it focuses on challenges in leveling the playing field, managing electoral processes, and creating just and sustainable outcomes. These cases are undoubtedly unique in many ways and – as in any transition – remain in flux. Nevertheless, examining their early experience yields insights into how international actors can best approach those cases that may follow (e.g., Libya, Syria, and Yemen).

Most notably, these cases suggest that the democracy promotion community should approach first elections differently than it does subsequent ones. It should prioritize different goals and activities, in some cases even leaving off the agenda well-intentioned and generally constructive programs in order to focus on more urgent activities critical to strengthening electoral processes. Recognizing the enormous fear and uncertainty with which democrats approach first elections, international actors should resist the understandable urge to seek immediate, permanent democratic arrangements and “favorable” electoral outcomes. They should also encourage revolutionary forces to resist understandable, but counterproductive, urges to exclude allies of the former regime from new democratic processes. Rather, democracy promoters should suggest interim measures, encourage tolerance toward “unfavorable” results, and, in so doing, support democrats as they make their way through a long, imperfect process.

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Ellen Lust

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Image Source: Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

@Brookings Podcast: The Influence of Super PACs on the 2012 Elections

Anthony Corrado — Fri, 09 Mar 2012 16:20:00 -0500

Super PACs have already spent tens of millions of dollars in the race for the GOP presidential nomination, with more to come. Expert Anthony Corrado says that the unlimited spending by the PACs, made possible by two Supreme Court decisions, is giving wealthy individuals unprecedented influence in the 2012 elections.

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Russians' Declining Faith In Putin's Motives

Fiona Hill — Thu, 01 Mar 2012 13:47:00 -0500

This weekend’s presidential election in Russia will likely return Vladimir Putin to the office he held just four years ago. With his anti-American campaign rhetoric, an uncertain political system, an economy in need of reform, and a populace that is wary about his return, Putin’s presidency will present Washington and the world many challenges to contend with, says Senior Fellow Fiona Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe.

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Campaign Finance in the 2012 Elections: The Rise of Super PACs

Thu, 01 Mar 2012 09:30:00 -0500

Event Information

March 1, 2012
9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

From “American Crossroads” to “Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow,” so-called "super PACs" have emerged as the dominant new force in campaign finance. Created in the aftermath of two landmark court decisions and regulatory action and inaction by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), these independent spending-only political action committees are collecting unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations and unions to advocate for or against political candidates. The legal requirements they face—disclosure of donors and non-coordination with the candidates and campaigns they are supporting—have proven embarrassingly porous. Increasingly, super PACs are being formed to boost a single candidate and are often organized and funded by that candidate’s close friends, relatives and former staff members. Their presence is most visible in presidential elections but they are quickly moving to Senate and House elections.

On March 1, on the heels of the FEC’s February filing deadline, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted a discussion exploring the role of super PACs in the broader campaign finance landscape this election season. Anthony Corrado, professor of government at Colby College and a leading authority on campaign finance, and Trevor Potter, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a former chairman of the FEC and lawyer to Comedy Central’s Stephen Colbert, presented.

After the panel discussion, the speakers took audience questions. Participants joined the discussion on Twitter by using the hashtag #BISuperPAC.

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Anthony Corrado

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Governance Studies
Professor of Government, Colby College

Army May Be Real Winner in Egypt

Khaled Elgindy — Tue, 13 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

At the end of the first round of voting in Egypt's historic elections, Islamist parties appear headed for a decisive majority in the first freely elected parliament since the ouster of former dictator Hosni Mubarak.

So far, the Freedom and Justice Party operated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the country's largest and best organized political movement, has won nearly 40% of the vote, followed by the ultraconservative Salafist parties with another 25%.

The "Islamist tsunami," as some have dubbed it, has raised eyebrows in the West and raised concerns in Egypt over the future status of women, secular-minded Egyptians and the country's substantial Christian minority.

The Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to reassure anxious Egyptians and foreigners alike and are reframing their imminent victory as a win for Egypt's nascent democracy.

As one Brotherhood leader recently wrote in The Guardian, "There will be winners and losers. But the real—and only—victor is Egypt."

Indeed, many democracy advocates inside and outside Egypt had long seen the elections as the surest way to force the ruling military council to cede power to a civilian-led government. While a democratic outcome may still be possible in the long run, for now the real winners may be neither the Islamists nor the Egyptian people but the country's interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Once universally viewed as a pillar of stability for a country in transition, the SCAF's foot-dragging on basic reforms and its increasingly repressive tactics against all forms of dissent, including the trial of some 12,000 civilians before military tribunals and the use of deadly violence against young protesters in Tahrir Square in the lead-up to the elections, have convinced most Egyptians of the need to end military rule as quickly as possible.

SCAF has already violated its pledge to hand over power within six months and has made clear it wants to remain the power behind the power. The military says it will cede power to a civilian president by July 2012, but at the same time it seeks to preserve its myriad social, economic and political benefits, including its immunity from governmental oversight and its highly secretive shadow economy, estimated at around one-third of the national economy.

Despite SCAF's attempts to cast itself as politically neutral, it has aggressively manipulated the political scene throughout the transition process in a bid to protect its interests. Indeed, Egypt's military rulers have demonstrated a shrewd, almost Machiavellian, ability to keep the opposition weak and fractured, especially when it comes to exploiting decades-old animosities between Egypt's Islamist and secular forces.

After having promoted the Islamists throughout most of the transition period, the unlikely alliance finally broke down in the weeks leading up to elections over the military's attempts to usurp the incoming parliament's authority in appointing a constituent assembly to draft the country's next constitution. Up until then, both the Brotherhood and the Salafists had been relatively accommodating of the military, largely shunning mass protests and resisting calls for the military to cede power, which further helped inflame Islamist-secularist tensions.

The existing climate of social and political polarization is likely to be compounded by the unrepresentative nature of the new parliament, where liberal forces won only 18% of the vote.

The biggest losers in the electoral process have been the revolutionary youth groups that spearheaded the uprising in January and have been at the forefront of the democracy movement ever since. But they have largely shunned electoral politics in favor of continued street protests. In addition to the marginalization of the youth, much of it self-inflicted, a decisive Islamist majority will probably, as feared, leave groups such as women and Christians severely underrepresented as well.

All this comes at an especially sensitive moment in Egypt's transition.

The Brotherhood's electoral dominance cements its position as the chief power broker of the transitional period. In particular, the process of writing the country's first post-revolutionary constitution will require consensus-building among Egypt's disparate constituencies.

The Brotherhood's ability to forge an alliance with secular liberal parties, which it says it prefers, will prove difficult in light of the deep mistrust on both sides. At the same time, a coalition with the Salafists may prove equally unworkable, if only because it would embody the worst fears of many Egyptians and foreigners alike. An all-Islamist parliamentary alliance could force Egyptian liberals into the arms of SCAF while providing the military with the perfect pretext to put off civilian rule. Indeed, SCAF officials wasted no time in minimizing the outcome of the elections, even suggesting the parliament's role in writing the constitution would be severely curtailed.

Either way, the Brotherhood is likely to preside over a deeply divided parliament with vaguely defined powers. This is also to the advantage of SCAF, as any political stalemate, especially one marked by deepening social divisions, is likely to prolong military rule and forestall serious democratic reforms.

The Islamists' parliamentary victory will no doubt fuel fears of an "Islamist takeover." However, American and other Western policy makers should not lose sight of the big picture.

Although there may be reason to question the democratic credentials of Islamist groups, they have thus far played by the rules. The same cannot be said of Egypt's military rulers, however, whose growing repression and desire to remain above the law pose a far more real and tangible threat to Egyptian democracy. Rather than fretting over an outcome whose implications are not yet known, the United States should pressure the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces to disentangle itself from the political process, respect the outcome of the elections, and return to the barracks as soon as possible.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: CNN

Congo's Crucial Crossroads

Anthony W. Gambino and Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 07 Dec 2011 14:34:00 -0500

Last week, millions of people turned out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to vote in Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Unfortunately, because of myriad mistakes in the run-up to the polling, the elections themselves were marred by disorganization, fraud, and violence. And Congolese, as well as the world community, now face a fraught moment.

The electoral dysfunctionality comes on top of Congo’s other huge problems that have put it dead last in the UN’s World Development Index. It now risks another round of violence—and perhaps even civil warfare—in a country that has already seen more war-related deaths than any other on Earth since the Cold War ended. Beyond the humanitarian stakes, Congo is quite literally the crossroads of Africa, the continent’s second largest and third most populous country, bordered by nine other states including Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Much of the continent’s future hinges on what happens here.

The Carter Center, which observed the Congo elections, stated in its Preliminary Post Election Statement: “The level of disorganization prevailing in some polling stations led our observers to give a poor evaluation in 16 percent of cases.” This sense that voters at roughly 15-20% of polling places encountered severe difficulties is widely shared. In addition, there were credible reports of ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and other electoral violations.

On Tuesday, the President of the Congolese Electoral Commission, Reverend Daniel Mulunda-Nyanga, is expected to announce the interim results of the Presidential election (we won’t know the results of the Parliamentary elections until next year). As expected, the race is between two men, the incumbent President, Joseph Kabila, and longstanding Congolese opposition figure, Etienne Tshisekedi.

Rev. Mulunda is closely tied to President Kabila. This relationship, and Mulunda’s actions and statements during the electoral period, mean that he has little credibility as an impartial actor among Congolese. Many in the international community also doubt his impartiality. Therefore, if Mulunda declares that the interim result shows President Kabila defeating Tshisekedi, his statement is certain to be greeted with great skepticism by many Congolese and others. Furthermore, the finalization of results by the Congolese Supreme Court also is a process that many Congolese deeply mistrust, since the Court is packed with Kabila loyalists and has no record whatsoever of impartiality.

Adding to these serious problems, because of all the mistakes and difficulties around these elections, it will be exceptionally difficult to ascertain the actual winner of a close election. With up to 20% of polling places subject to irregularities, including election violations, with the counting process also filled with irregularities and disorganization, and with little confidence in the neutrality and impartiality of the central Congolese organizations responsible for certifying the elections how can the Congolese ever establish in a reasonable fashion who they chose to be their next President?

Doing so is urgent, since there is widespread fear that the Congo could descend into another round of horrible violence, with massive demonstrations by Tshisekedi’s supporters violently repressed by President Kabila’s security forces – and perhaps hundreds of people massacred in the streets of the Congo. Such violence could lead to further instability, greater violence, and another descent into chaos in a country which has seen millions of unnecessary deaths due to war and chaos over the last fifteen years—but which at the moment is truly ungovernable only in some isolated parts of the east.

That state of affairs could soon change for the worse. The international community, and President Kabila, should bear in mind the stakes. One lesson of 2011 is that people’s movements for change, once begun – and then opposed by government force, tend to lead quickly either to the regime’s downfall or to its international ostracism. Neither prospect should appeal to anyone with any interest in a country so desperate for aid, trade, recovery, and a return to normalcy as is Congo today.

Luckily, there is a process required by Congolese law that the most trusted institution in the Congo, the Catholic Church, as well as the Carter Center and other actors agree on: providing data on election results disaggregated by each polling place. As the Carter Center stated: “The publication of election results by polling station as required by the electoral law (is) the single best means to ensure that the elections reflect the will of the people.” This focus on transparency, long called for by the U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, James Entwistle, and others, is essential to establishing some validity for the election results.

Once these credible results are available and verified, a further problem could arise if the margin between the two candidates is so narrow that fraud and/or disorganization could have affected the outcome. A credible mediation mission, perhaps involving neutral arbiters from other African states, should be put in place to help the Congolese find fair ways to resolve such problems as they arise. The United States must strongly support such efforts.

In 2006, the election came down to two men: President Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba. Many Congolese mistrusted the process, yet the Carter Center was able to say the following: “The Carter Center election observation mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo is confident the results announced by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) are consistent with the results obtained in the polling stations. The provision of original tally sheets to candidate witnesses, combined with the publication of results by polling station, introduced a strong measure of transparency that virtually eliminated the possibility of significant fraud after the ballots were counted.”

This process must urgently be replicated as rapidly and transparently as possible to give the people of the Congo reasonable confidence in the results of the election and to prevent yet another Congo catastrophe. The world must also avoid the temptation to paper over election irregularities and tolerate another Kabila term, even if won by hook and by crook, simply because that seems the path of least resistance. Our reading of Congo’s current politics leads us to conclude that such a strategy will not be stabilizing and could prove incendiary. While international leverage is still reinforced by the presence of 19,000 U.N. troops, and while the year 2011 remains the year of political awakenings and hope from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya to Ivory Coast to Burma and beyond, this would be a terrible moment to allow a new form of autocracy to take root in the heart of Africa.

Authors

Anthony W. Gambino
Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: CNN.com

Image Source: Â© Stringer . / Reuters

Assessing Egypt's Parliamentary Elections

Shadi Hamid — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In a video debate on Bloggingheads.tv, Shadi Hamid and Robert Wright discuss the first round of voting in Egypt's parliamentary elections.

SHADI HAMID: I just got back from Cairo last night and I was there for about 2 weeks. I was just going to cover the elections but what I got instead was that Egypt really seemed on the verge of implosion for a few days there, so it was fascinating to see the shift in mood over the course of those 2 weeks—from stagnation to despair to some degree of optimism.

ROBERT WRIGHT, BLOGGINHEADS.TV: But the funny thing is, now, at least as it is being viewed in the U.S., we are back to despair, because now that the first round of elections have taken place and the early reading on the elections is that the islamists have done better than many people had expected (although you actually predicted in a Foreign Policy piece a few weeks ago that they were going to do quite well). So it sounded like the Muslim brotherhood would take somewhere in the vicinity of 40%. And then in addition, and more surprisingly, they’re thinking another 25% may go to a party that’s even more conservative or religious party—the Salafists. So together, if you imagine these two forming a majority coalition, that would be a pretty conservative one, right?

HAMID: Yes. Of course, it depends on how you define conservative but yes, I think this caught people by surprise. What I’ve always said is that elections aren’t about popularity; they’re about organization, strategy and manpower. And on those three counts, no one does it better than the Islamists. So people shouldn’t read too much into this and say Egyptians love Islamists. It’s a little bit more complicated than that. But the Salafis, who are the more let’s call them “literalists” of the islamists or the ones with the more uncompromising view of Islamic law, they did better than almost anyone expected. I mean most estimates were around 10% but it looks like they might get closer to around 20%. But I will say this is just the first round of elections. There are still two more and God knows what could happen. There could be a shift in support. So we shouldn’t get too ahead of ourselves but yes, the preliminary indications show Islamists are dominating in Egypt.

WRIGHT: In theory, if you imagine this coalition actually having power (Muslim brotherhood plus the Salafis), do you have any sense for what kinds of laws they would want to govern Egypt that are different from the laws that govern Egypt now?

HAMID: Yes, we have to make a big distinction between the brotherhood and the Salafis. They’re both Islamists in orientation but they’re very different in how they see things around them. The brotherhood is not ideologically rigid. It’s a very pragmatic organization that I would put in the center-right of the Egyptian political spectrum. They are probably where most Egyptians are. They like Islam, they like Islamic law, they’re religiously conservative. Whether we like it or not, all the polling suggests that’s where most Egyptians are. But they are very pragmatic and they have really shown their ability to compromise on their ideas and ideals for political gain. And they’ve done that time and time again. And to be honest, they’re kind of flip floppers too. One day, they’ll be trying to get closer to the military, other times they’ll be attacking the military and trying to undermine military control. Sometimes they’ll move to the right and try to make nice with the Salafis. Other times, they’ll try to move to the center and gain the support of independents and liberals. The brotherhood can be everything to everyone. That’s the way it sees itself. It’s very flexible in that regard. But that actually causes problems for them sometimes because what liberals will say is that, even though they have nice rhetoric and they have a moderate face, you can’t really trust them because they go with the political winds and do whatever it takes to preserve their organizational interests. But I think the main point here is that these are not irrational fanatics. These are people who know how to play politics; they’ve been doing it for decades. And you can talk to them. The U.S. can have a rational, productive conversation with them. It may be contentious and there will be serious points of disagreements but they’re a known quantity. I think by now there’s enough scholarship and research done on the brotherhood. It’s not this mysterious organization anymore. The Salafis though are a bit different because they only came onto the political scene in the past nine months. Before Egypt’s revolution, salafis did not participate in elections because they thought that only God should pass laws, not an elected parliament. So they had theological objections to it. They’ve engaged in some creative gymnastics to justify their entry into the political scene now. But they are new, they’re political novices and that’s why it’s so surprising that after having no presence in elections for decades, they’ve been able to be the second largest block.

WRIGHT: What would the Salafis like Egypt to look like?

HAMID: They like Islamic law, they want to implement it, they believe in legal coercion. That’s the big difference. The brotherhood believes more in leading by example and not necessarily imposing things aggressively. They have a much more gradualist approach to Islamic law. They’re not in a rush. The brotherhood is very patient, very cautious. They can wait.

WRIGHT: So what they have in common, by virtue of the definition of Islamists, is that they think that the country should be run according Islamic law. But you’re saying their conceptions of Islamic law differ.

HAMID: They’re conceptions are different but there’s a difference between believing that the country should be governed according to Islamic law or by Islamic law.

WRIGHT: What is the difference?

HAMID: You could argue that the vast majority of laws on the books of Egypt now do not explicitly contradict Islamic law. That’s fine. The Salafis have a more affirmative notion of the role of Islamic law. Things have to actively be done to push Egypt in that direction. And the other thing too…I’ve been meeting with brotherhood activists and leaders since 2006 on a regular basis and I’ve had very interesting conversations with them about what they consider to be Islamic law. They’re not entirely sure. I mean a lot of this is them learning as they go along. They’ve been in the opposition for 80 years. They’ve never given a lot of thought to what it means to govern. So in a sense, this is a very new realm for them. And if you ask them: “what does it mean to implement Islamic law in Egypt’s current context?” you’ll get very different answers from brotherhood members and they won’t always be coherent. They do have a general desire for Egypt to become more Islamic or “Islamized” but they don’t necessarily have a clear roadmap of how to get there.

Watch the full discussion at bloggingheads.tv »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Bloggingheads.tv

Egypt Needs a New Road Map, Not Just Elections

Khaled Elgindy and Leila Hilal — Fri, 25 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Seven days of upheaval in Cairo's Tahrir square and other cities across Egypt have left 41 protesters dead and more than 3,000 wounded and jeopardized long-awaited parliamentary elections just days away. In a bid to quell the growing anger on the streets, the country's ruling military authorities have appointed a new prime minister and offered to hold presidential elections by June 2012, while insisting on moving forward with parliamentary elections scheduled to begin in three days.

The concessions are not insignificant, but as today's massive protest in Cairo's Tahrir Square and other Egyptian cities demonstrates, they are not enough to stem the mounting resolve of protesters to see Egypt's military rulers go following months of SCAF mismanagement and overreach. As hundreds of thousands of Egyptians across the country gather to demand an end to military rule, there is a desperate need to reset the country's transition, starting with a postponement of elections and an immediate handover to an independent civilian authority.

The country faces a dangerous split between the military and its supporters and an emerging opposition. Some are still persuaded by the concern that delaying elections could lead to a complete unraveling of the country's democratic prospects. There are real risks associated with postponing the elections, but the dangers of holding them under present conditions outweigh any potential damage that would be caused by a temporary delay.

Practically, of course, it will be impossible to hold elections in the midst of running battles between protesters and security forces, particularly if casualties continue to rise as they have over the past several days. The atmosphere remains extremely tense and volatile on top of a pre-existing absence of law and order. But justifications for putting off elections go well beyond the current crisis.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Khaled Elgindy
Leila Hilal

Publication: Foreign Policy

Egypt: The Military, Elections, and the Hope for Reform

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 10:52:00 -0500

With some of the worst clashes since its revolution—and at least 20 protesters dead—Egypt is in danger of being lost. Meanwhile, Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood continue to prepare for the November 28 elections. With an unparalleled electoral machine, they will likely dominate. Two of my chapters in our new Brookings book—The Arab Awakening—focus on the rise of Islamists and the state of reform in Egypt. The subtitle of the Egypt chapter is "The Prize," which I think is appropriate. It's a cliché by now, but it is difficult to overstate the importance of "getting Egypt right."

Earlier today, I was in Tahrir Square, this time transformed into a war zone, with heaps of rubble, barricades, and tear gas fumes. The mounting tension and anger is the product of a ruling military council that has woefully mismanaged the country since it assumed power on February 11. But, this time, what is important is not only the scale of violence but the fact that it is happening now. Elections are scheduled to be held next week. The calls for either boycotting or postponing elections have grown among some in the opposition.

It is easy to imagine a spiraling of unrest and violence if elections are perceived as illegitimate by a significant number of Egyptians or, worse, delayed altogether. Since its revolution, Egypt has not had even one national body with real legitimacy. Legitimacy requires elections, which is why the upcoming polls are so critical for both Egyptians and everyone else who wishes to see Egypt move toward democracy and some modicum of stability.

One could list the mistakes and miscalculations Egypt's military council has made. They were not trained to govern. Often, it seems as if they are making it up as they go along. But if much of the blame lies with their failures, at least some of it lies with the international community and particularly the United States—one of Egypt's closest allies and its largest single donor—for failing to think creatively about the role it can and should play.

To their credit, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have publicly urged the military to loosen its grip on power, warning that instability may arise if it does not. But private and public exhortations no longer suffice, and the stakes are simply too high to just muddle through. The United States, the European Union, as well as rising regional powers like Turkey should coordinate positions and state their unequivocal support for a timely transfer of power to civilian leadership.

So far, U.S. leverage has not appeared to work with Egypt's military rulers. This is at least partly because they do not believe the Obama administration will withhold, or even credibly threaten to withhold, the $1.3 billion of annual military assistance. That amount makes up at least 20 percent of Egypt's military budget. It is time—a week before landmark elections—for the United States to condition assistance on a clear timetable. That means that presidential elections cannot happen in late 2012 or in 2013, as is now the case, but significantly sooner, preferably in April. This must be a red line.

Egypt, though, is just one flashpoint among many. Other countries—which have seen revolutions, near-revolutions, and failed revolutions—are struggling with their own "transitions," or threatening to fall apart altogether. Our book looks at nearly all the major Arab countries and, importantly, the role that outside powers are playing. In another chapter titled “Making Reform Credible,” I and coauthors Ken Pollack, Stephen Grand, and Sarah Yerkes consider creative and practicable ways for the United States and its allies to use their power and influence to support Arab democratization.

The Arab Awakening cannot be reversed but it can be undermined—at great cost to the United States and, of course, the courageous Arabs who are fighting, and dying, for freedom and dignity. In the shadow of Egypt's elections, now is a good time for all of us who care about the region to reflect and—more importantly—to act.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 14 Oct 2011 15:11:00 -0400

The Democratic Republic of the Congo doesn't get enough attention. It is sub-Saharan Africa's largest country in size and its third largest (after Nigeria and Ethiopia) in population. It is also the continent's geographic, ecological and environmental heartland.

It has suffered the continent's only true regional war in post-colonial history. This has resulted in perhaps the highest overall mortality figure from the direct and indirect effects of war (some 3 million fatalities) as well as the worst sexual violence of any state in that calamity-prone continent. To my mind, it is also the most beautiful place on Earth of anywhere I've visited (full disclosure: I was a Peace Corps volunteer there from 1982 through 1984) with some of the kindest and most positive people I know.

On November 28, the Congolese are supposed to go to the polls to vote in their nation's second presidential elections since the demise of President Mobutu and the mayhem of the 1990s. Eleven candidates are running for president, with the incumbent Joseph Kabila viewed as the frontrunner. A simple plurality will decide the winner. 500 parliamentary seats are up for contention too and there are 19,000 candidates vying for these positions.

All this political news sounds exciting but there are huge problems, of course. At a general level we know that elections can help or hinder a country's progress towards peace and moderation—unhappy examples from Iraq in 2005 to Gaza in 2006 to many other cases and places drive home that point. The second election of a young democracy is particularly fraught, as it can require the peaceful transfer of power. Here, Kabila is likely to win reelection, but that underscores the importance of making sure the election process is seen as fair so that angry voters whose candidates lose will not resort to violence out of frustration.

That latter point was underscored at a Brookings event today by Tony Gambino, former AID mission director in Congo, in a panel discussion that also featured John Mbaku of Brookings and Mvemba Disolele of Stanford's Hoover Institute as well as the Eastern Congo Initiative. Gambino and Disolele wrote a longer paper as well sponsored by the Eastern Congo Initiative (Ben Affleck's brainchild). They are concerned about all the delays in election preparations—formats for ballots have not even been agreed to, for example, with adequate allowances for Congo's many illiterate voters who will soon be doing the choosing from those 19,000+ candidates. Once the ballots are printed, they then have to be distributed—by prop plane, helicopter, land rover, riverboat, pirogue and on foot—to Congo's many remote regions and villages. It is highly dubious this can happen on schedule.

The Obama administration is putting more than the average college try into supporting these elections. Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero also spoke at Brookings today—after a trip to Congo last week—and the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Johnnie Carson, is headed to Congo next week. But it is no longer clear that the timetable for elections is achievable and a delay of several months' time may now be more prudent.

That is one issue, and the most immediate one. The broader issues about Congo include, among other things, whether the international community has enough military capability in its 18,000-strong United Nations force to stabilize the country's east and train Congolese armed forces to take on that job someday themselves. We probably need more international forces. For the Congress, as it seeks to reduce the nation's deficit, this kind of case should remind everyone that while all belts need to be tightened in America's federal budget, foreign aid accounts that fund security, democracy and development in places like Congo must not be decimated in the process.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: CNN.com

Cameroon’s Presidential Election: Will the Votes Count?

Melvin Ayogu — Thu, 06 Oct 2011 09:49:00 -0400

On October 9, Cameroon will hold a presidential election. The agency entrusted with this task is Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) established in 2006. The question on the minds of many Cameroonians is whether ELECAM will deliver a fair election as a first step towards substantive democracy, but many fear that a rigged campaign will trigger a bloody civil unrest.

There are several reasons for this apprehension. Since independence, Cameroon has been led by two presidents, Ahmadou Ahidjo, for 21 years, and Paul Biya, for 29 years. Ahidjo, who was designated by the French to take over Cameroon at independence, held five terms as president of a single-party democracy with no political rivals. In November 1982, due to ill health, Ahidjo transferred power to his constitutional successor, Paul Biya. Since 1982, five Presidential elections have taken place in Cameroon—two under a single-party system and three under a multi-party system—all of which were won by Paul Biya. The last two presidential elections in 1997 and 2004 witnessed extraordinarily low voter participation, partly reflecting voter apathy with the previous government body, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, charged with organizing these elections. The October 2011 Presidential election will be the first test of ELECAM’s ability to conduct elections in Cameroon; Cameroonians and the global community are paying very close attention to the process as it unfolds.

In Cameroon, the political system is relatively open. In fact, the system as it currently exists, has been criticized for its ultra-openness by setting a low bar for individuals and parties to vie for elected positions. Critics argue that it has been deliberately designed to engender too many political parties, which results in a highly fragmented opposition. Therefore, the system cannot be faulted on the basis of erecting discriminatory barriers to entry. I will examine several other aspects of the process that result in unfair campaigns, as entry is just the first step.

Although the freedoms of expression and assembly are enshrined in the constitution, these guarantees are frequently abridged by the state’s restrictions on political content and assembly. The State owns all advertisement billboards and charges exorbitantly for their use. In Cameroon, billboards are a crucial campaign apparatus because they are highly effective in their reach, providing impressionable alternatives in environments where television set ownership and electricity distribution is very limited. Furthermore, the government imposes restrictions in urban areas with regard to where campaign posters can be posted. Campaigning is a crucial aspect of any party competition. If some contestants are de facto blocked because they are not able to campaign freely, supporters of those groups may feel despondent and, thus, opt not to participate in the voting process. Schemes that induce low voter turnout reinforce existing patters of participation and favor incumbents.

Intimidation of political opponents mainly through kidnappings and arbitrary arrests by the state often occurs; well known cases are Jean Jacques Ekindi and Kah Walla, both who were presidential contenders. Generally, when people cannot make their views known or voices heard because civil rights — freedom of speech, assembly and press — are abridged, the information necessary to induce widespread voter participation is again diminished.

Although many apparatus exist that inhibit voter turnout, political patronage can encourage voter participation, although for the wrong reasons. A democratic process is not inclusive when it is embedded in socioeconomic arrangements that control resources needed for basic survival. Patronage politics is pervasive in Cameroon, which is regularly ranked as a highly corrupt country by Transparency International in its annual TCI index. Therefore, it is easy to understand how 50 years of patronage politics in the midst of economic vulnerabilities can force people to use voting as a means of accessing resources. The political parties understand this game; in West African parlance: “You vote for us, you eat; no vote, take your chances; wrong vote, no chop money”. In such a setting, votes count for something other than electing officials food. However, one can argue that such an outcome, which may seem as hopeless at face value, has long run benefits because it carries the seeds of liberation. Over time, the strategy of selling votes for bread will backfire because it unwittingly provides incentives necessary to achieve broad voter participation one credible way to change the corrupt cycle.

In addition to poor voter turnout and patronage politics, the integrity of institutions, determined by laws and administrative arrangements that underpin the electoral process, are inherently flawed. ELECAM may not have been set up to deny Cameroonians a fair selection process for their elected representatives, but it certainly has enough loopholes to allow for abuse. There are at least three ways in which this key institution can be exploited by the government: (i) Membership appointments to the election board are made by the president of Cameroon, who can deliberately frustrate any member who refuses to protect his interest in the board. This is made possible by the fact that all remuneration and allowances for ELECAM board members are discretionarily determined by the President of Cameroon. Furthermore, should any ELECAM board member resign for whatever reason, the law allows the president to fill such vacancy without any consultation with political parties. (ii) Reassignment of civil servants to ELECAM on the request of the Director General can be another avenue for interfering with ELECAM’s autonomy, although ostensibly it can also be a source of strengthening ELECAM’s administrative capabilities. However, if this were to be the true intention, a clear strategy for stopping this practice when ELECAM stabilizes needs to be in place. (iii) Through the strategic supply of information, ELECAM autonomy is reduced by its close association with the Territorial Administrative Authority (MINATD). According to Section 40(2) of Law N° 2006/011 of 29 December 2006 establishing ELECAM, “The minister in charge of territorial administration shall ensure permanent liaison between government and Elections Cameroon… the latter shall submit copies of minutes and progress reports to him.” As the state security apparatus, MINTAD’s numerous functions include “drafting and implementation of rules and regulations relating to civil liberties, the monitoring of political organizations, religious movements, and public order maintenance together with specialised forces.” These powers make the Territorial Administrative Authority’s permanent liaison with the Electoral Commission a concern, as those powers could be abused to influence election outcomes.

Through clever administrative arrangements in structure and process, the Government of Cameroon has morphed ELECAM into an instrument of political control over the democratic process. As section 40(2) of the enabling legislation shows, ELECAM is not structurally independent. Furthermore, those running the agency have no autonomy from powerful political parties. Their career incentives align with that of political leaders. For example, they hold a four-year term with an option to renew indefinitely, only at the behest of the president. However, a single term of the ELECAM chairperson does not span the term of a president, meaning the chairperson’s position is subject to the president’s discretionary appraisal. Additionally, the internal rules of the agency make it easy for the chairperson to rule all board decisions, which are determined by a simple majority vote.

So, what can be done to reduce the anxiety over the integrity of the electoral process? First the electorate must make their voices heard—go out and vote on election day. As part of the government’s strategy of intimidating voters and inhibiting the free exchange of information, the Cameroon Minister for Communications has banned twitter as of February 2011 and threatened to block other social networking devices. By this panicky reaction to voter awareness, the government clearly signals its alarm at the implications of democratic consciousness and vigilance—vox populi. Therefore, continued vigilance over the activities of ELECAM and cognate agencies such as Territorial Administrative Authority (MINATD) is an important monitoring role, which also empowers the public.

Given the institutional set-up that confers decisive advantage to the incumbent president, it is unlikely that the election will be fair, resulting in the reelection of the incumbent. Assuming the 2011 race is a lost cause, what further steps can ensure future fair elections? Two issues must be addressed: The institutional deterrents to voter turnout and ELECAM reform.

By ensuring its independence, the following recommendations will strengthen ELECAM and enable the agency to deliver fair future elections:

Establish ELECAM’s independence from the state: Decouple ELECAM from MINATD by repealing section 40(2) of Law Nº 2006/011 (ELECAM enabling legislation).
Amend the conditions of service for electoral commissioners: electoral commissioners should be appointed for an irrevocable term of service which should span, at minimum, the length of a single term of the presidency.
Amend the appointment process for electoral commissioners: Appointments to the electoral board due to resignations should follow the same process as with initial appointments, instead of presidential discretion as is currently the case.
Amend the span of ELECAM’s mandate: A revamped ELECAM should be entrusted with the entire electoral process including the declaration of results currently vested in the Constitutional Council.

These recommendations can improve the electoral process in Cameroon. However, the commitment to a credible reform must originate from the people, as it is not in the interest of an incumbent government to initiate reforms that dilute its stronghold on power.

Authors

Melvin Ayogu

Reforms to Improve Local Accountability in Nigeria

Nelipher Moyo and Olumide Taiwo — Tue, 06 Sep 2011 12:00:00 -0400

Nigeria’s president, Goodluck Jonathan, appears to have placed good governance at the forefront of his political agenda. He is considering a constitutional amendment that would limit governors and presidents to a single longer term in office. This proposal is aimed at reducing the violence and political jockeying associated with elections in Nigeria by ensuring a candidate only stands for one election with a longer ‘breathing space’ between elections. President Jonathan is said to be considering an additional set of reforms, the most effective of which is to do away with the State-Local Council joint accounts and to grant Nigeria’s 774 local governments financial autonomy. Local councils in Nigeria represent the third layer of government after the federal government and state governments. Federal and state government allocations to local councils are deposited into special “State Joint Local Government Accounts.” Through these accounts, local governments are supposed to finance primary, adult and vocational education; agriculture and natural resource development, as well as health services.

Unfortunately, the existing joint account framework has been particularly vulnerable to abuse. Local council chairmen are typically nominated by political party “kingmakers” who help to finance their election campaigns. Because politicking in the country is quite expensive, federal allocations to local councils have become the means of paying back “kingmakers” for supporting their election campaigns. Keeping the political party happy is often at the forefront of councilmen’s agenda and addressing the needs of the local constituents - who have very little say in who stands for election - comes second. By the time the political party elites receive their share of the funds and the council chairmen remove their “entitlement,” there is very little left for local council development programs. Local council leaders are beholden to the entrenched interests of their political parties and those who refuse to “share” federal government allocations are often not nominated for re-election. Some devastating consequences of this misuse are demonstrated in the country’s high infant mortality and low literacy rates: Nigeria is ranked among the top 10 countries with the highest infant mortality rate in the world (91.54 deaths/1,000 live births) and it has an adult literacy rate of only 61 percent. These outcomes are likely to improve if local governments are given greater financial autonomy.

Granting local government’s financial autonomy is necessary to facilitate local development by creating the space for local leaders to invest in their constituents and to limit the opportunities for abuse by political parties. Critics of the proposal to eliminate State-Local Council joint accounts point to a few instances of success as justification for maintaining the status quo. The most commonly cited “success” case is in Lagos State, where Governor Babatunde Fashola has facilitated significant local development by managing resources prudently. However, Mr. Fashola particularly stands out because he is an anomaly ; very few governors have managed their state’s resources as prudently Mr. Fashola. Local development should not only be possible when “accidental altruists” become state governors because, frankly, such leaders are rare.

The World Bank’s Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS) of Nigeria’s health care sector found evidence of widespread leakage in public resources in the delivery of primary health services by local governments. In one state, 42 percent of health staff had not been paid for 6 months due to public resource leakages. One key recommendation from that study is to provide Nigerians with greater information about the resources and responsibilities of their local representatives so that the public can hold leaders accountable.

There is a valid concern that financial autonomy for local governments will not necessarily reduce theft or mismanagement. Evidence suggests that councilmen’s fortunes change dramatically within months of assuming office in ways that their salaries and allowances cannot support. Nigeria needs strong institutions that impose constraints on leaders so that outcomes are not dependent on the characteristics of leaders, but rather on the institutions themselves. In order to institute good governance in the country, President Jonathan must find ways to ensure council financial autonomy is accompanied by credible instruments that make the council chairmen answerable to local constituents.

Historically, one of the most common accountability mechanisms was for people to “vote with their feet” in protest of poor or corrupt leadership. Constituents would simply move elsewhere to escape bad leadership. This is not realistic in modern states with fixed borders. In advanced democracies, local councils have functioned well because of effective checks that balance political party objectives and local constituency interests. However, these checks are weak or non-existent in Nigeria. Elsewhere in West Africa and particularly in Ghana, political parties are, by law, not involved in local elections. Local constituents vote for candidates not based on party affiliation but on visible credentials. Barring political parties from participation in local government elections would remove the stronghold political parties have on local councilmen. While a plan to adopt this system is unlikely to receive high-level support, it is certainly worth consideration.

In addition to providing more information about local government budget allocation and use, we recommend the Nigerian constitution be amended to allow the people to recall non-performing elected local government officials. It is not enough to simply provide more information to the public, there needs to be mechanisms for citizens to act on that information. The power to recall officials will ensure elected officials prioritize the needs of their local constituents and deliver promised goods and services.

Ultimately, average Nigerians do not care about how long the president or governor is in office, they care about a system that can effectively deliver the necessary goods and services, needed for their wellbeing. Strategies to improve governance in Nigeria should be centered on how to design a system that is more accountable to people at this level.

Authors

Nelipher Moyo
Olumide Taiwo

Why New Attempts to Reform Brazil’s Electoral System Will Fail

Marcus André Melo and Carlos Pereira — Tue, 28 Jun 2011 13:44:00 -0400

The British refused to approve the reform of their electoral regime a few weeks ago, and this was no surprise. Most likely, the Brazilian electoral reform will face the same outcome. Conventional wisdom says that electoral reforms are unlikely to succeed given that they have to be proposed and approved by legislators elected under current rules. Electoral reforms usually take place in the wake of an external shock. However, this does not apply to the current situation in Brazil.

Generally, an external shock to a country or its political system may not be a sufficient condition, but it is the necessary condition to produce a real electoral regime change. In the British case, the shock came out of the need to form the first coalition government in the United Kingdom since World War II. In order to join the Conservative coalition, the Liberal Democrats required a mechanism to reduce the seat-to-vote distortion, which has historically penalized the party that has received more than one-fourth of the votes but has rarely held more than 5 percent of the seats.

In most cases, electoral reforms follow one specific direction— toward the implementation of proportional representation (PR) or mixed-member systems. This was exactly what happened in Brazil, which emulated British single member model during the most part of the period the country was a monarchy (1822-1891). Later, when Brazil became a Republic, the country adopted the PR in 1932 as an attempt to constrain the power of the executive.

A few authoritarian governments, however, followed an inverse path. For example, France adopted a PR system in the 1970s for about a decade, but it abandoned it shortly afterward. The creation of a mixed-member system in 1949 by the Germans was a reaction to the external shock represented by the rise of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. The PR system introduced during the Weimar Republic was deemed responsible for the rise of the extremist power in Germany. Since then, the mixed system has become the “ideal” model, which has been followed by several countries such as Italy, New Zealand, Venezuela, etc.

In 2002, the number of consolidated democracies around the world that use some sort of mixed or pure PR electoral system equaled the number of countries that maintained a majoritarian or first-past-the-post electoral systems like the United Kingdom and the United States. Today, 30 countries use a mixed-member system, 49 countries use a majoritarian system, and 72 countries use a proportional representation system. Practically all-new democracies have adopted the PR or mixed systems.

The external shock in Italy that led to the adoption of the mixed system in 1993 was the Tangentopoli (“bribesville”) scandal, which led to the Mani Pulite (“clean hands”) campaign by the Italy’s Judiciary. The affair caused the country to initiate a referendum on political reform and the electoral consequences were quite significant. As a result of moving to a mixed system, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) was wiped out from the electoral politics; they did not even meeting the minimum threshold for representation. The voting share of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which together with PSI had been governing Italy since the World War II, took a huge tumble from 40 percent to 5 percent of votes.

In New Zealand, where a referendum introduced a mixed system 1992, the shock was actually the victory of the “wrong winner”. That is, the party that got the second place in the general election obtained a majority in parliament, forming the government.

In Venezuela, the shock that brought the adoption of a mixed system in 1993 was the “Caracazo”— a massive popular protest in which 250 people died— and the scandal that culminated in the impeachment of President Carlos Andrés Peres.

In Brazil, what would be an external shock capable of spurring comprehensive reform in the country’s electoral system toward a mixed-member model? The Mensalão scandal? The election of a political outsider like the illiterate clown Tiririca in the state of Sao Paulo?

The landslide reelection of President Lula in 2006, in the wake of the Mensalão scandal, can be understood as electoral forgiveness of the president’s bad behavior. It might also suggest that the Brazilian Mani Pulite did not follow the Italians’ path of the Italians. Most importantly, despite the Worker’s Party mobilization for the introduction of the closed party list system and the PMDB´s proposal to introduce the single non-transferable vote for legislative elections, (the so-called “distritão”) there is no window of opportunity for such changes. These reforms would require an external shock. This is, indeed, the main paradox of political reforms. Since the president is the agenda setter in Brazil, reforms would have a better chance to be carried out with its initiative and leadership. However, PT governments especially at the federal level have a common characteristic of not promoting institutional reforms. Since 2000 – the year of the last meaningful institutional reform promoted in Brazil, the Fiscal Responsibility Law – no proposals for reforms have been presented (the reform of the judiciary in 2004 had been presented much earlier). The strategy is to minimize political costs, manage the coalition through horse-trading in Brazil’s Congress and surf on positive economic waves generated from the external environment. President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil has been in office for more than 100 days already and she has not proposed any major reform yet. The honeymoon is over. The strategy is to avoid decisions with highly concentrated costs even if diffuse benefits are abundant.

In fact, political reform was a major campaign issue in Brazil. However, the costs of non-reform can easily be shifted to the Congress. A key question is whether there are other windows of opportunity that will open in the near future or is Brazil foregoing unique opportunities to enact much needed structural reforms, such as reforms to social security system, labor codes, tax policy?

The slogan of the Italian 1993 political reform was “no to the Lottizzazione” (the massive politically motivated distribution of top positions in the public bureaucracy) and the end of the public campaign financing system. This slogan does not seem to resonate in Brazil’s proposed agenda of electoral reform. Political appointment is rampant in the Brazilian administrative machine while the country’s Congress is considering implementing public financing of electoral campaign. However, the ongoing proposals are more likely not to be approved, with the exception of the “anti-Tiririca measure”, which will mean the end of the coalitions in proportional elections for Brazil’s Congress.

Authors

Marcus André Melo
Carlos Pereira

Can Brazil's Electoral System Learn from South Africa's Mistakes?

Marcus Andre Melo and Carlos Pereira — Wed, 06 Apr 2011 11:37:00 -0400

At the beginning of every new administration, it seems the electoral reform tops the political agenda in Brazil. This time is no different. The most controversial proposal on the table of Congress is to replace the current open-list proportional representation system—in which voters define the order of the elected legislators—for a closed-list system—in which political parties pre-order the list of candidates and voters vote for a party label rather than individual candidates. The rationale of this reform, which has the Worker’s Party (PT) as the most important policy advocate, is to provide greater party control over the party members’ behavior in Congress. The question is whether Brazil would benefit from this reform. In this regard, the South Africa experience with a closed-list system could shed light on this potential electoral reform.

The greatest political scandal in the history of South Africa—and worldwide, given the large quantity of resources at play—was the “Arms Deal” affair that involved the Ministry of Defense’s purchase of jets, helicopters and submarines valued at 32 billion rands (approximately $6 billion) between 1996 and 2000. The firms involved, including the consortium British Aerospace-SAAB, Aerommachi and Thomson CSF, were large multinational weaponry companies, although other local suppliers also participated as sub-contractors.

The crisis began when the South African Congress received the report about the program of weapon acquisition, filed by the auditor general, in September of 2000. The report pointed out irregularities in the purchases, particularly with regard to the relations between the firms and the Department of Procurement of the Ministry of Defense; along with those between the latter and local suppliers, many of which were intimately linked to the African National Party (ANC)´s elite. The scheme had been commanded by then Vice President Jacob Zuma and by two of his advisors, the Shaik brothers. The report by the auditor general was used as a base for the powerful Special Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). In October 2000, this committee recommended that a special investigation should be conducted to probe the evidence about the unmet legal procedures regarding contract allocation.

Presided since 1999 by a legislator and professor of public finance from the small opposition party, the Inkatha National Party, the committee worked on the heated exchange of opinions by the ANC, which controlled more than two-thirds of the seats in Congress. Congress’ boycott to the workings of SCOPA took on various forms. As expected, the majority of committee members behaved according to the orientation of the ANC party’s leader whose fundamental goal was to minimize the political costs of the case. Isolated members of the committee, such as Andrew Feinstein, undertook personal crusades to guarantee the independence of their work. Due to his impressive engagement to both the cause and the technical training, Feinstein, an economist from Cambridge University, became the symbol of this crusade for the moralization of politics, which reverberated spectacularly in the media. Amid a formidable scandal, Zuma was obliged to resign.

Another form of boycott was the intense veto for the investigations to be undertaken by an independent unit for corruption control, the Heath Investigative Committee. As an alternative, the majority in Congress created a special committee over which there could be more control. Accordingly, a working group was created made up of the auditor general, the public protector, and the director of national prosecutions. The auditor general released various versions of the report that were far from the original. The most compromising aspect in terms of the auditor general’s independence was the fact that before presenting those modified version, he had discussed the content of the report with the president and leaders of the ANC.

It is important to note that it was the level of visibility reached by the work of the independent committee that led to the elaboration of various versions of the general auditor’s report. The media played a central role in maintaining the issue in the country’s agenda. Independent news outlets that follow an active line of investigative journalism kept their focus on the issue and were constantly bombarded by the ANC, which accused them of attempting a “mediatic coup.” The working group, of which the auditor general was part, presented his conclusions in late 2001, exonerating the defendants of any irregularity. Public opinion viewed this as a cover up.

Accused of having interfered in the work of the National Prosecuting Authority, President Mbeki resigned. After that, the evolution of the facts was quite suggestive: Zuma becomes president of the ANC and president of the country while Shaik and other accomplices went to prison (although they were released following Zuma’s personal involvement in the case). But where was Andrew Feinstein?

The lessons from the “Arms Deal” affair are multifaceted but it reveals what can occur with the utilization of close-lists electoral systems, especially for those who defend the public interest even when that implies turning their backs against the party. Andrew Feinstein, who became popular among the country’s middle class, was excluded from the party list of the ANC´s candidates in the following parliamentary elections and resigned from his post. Mr. Feinstein now lives in London and works for an NGO. After agreeing to an interview at the Johannesburg airport, he told that all doors in South Africa were closed for him, despite the personal support that he had received from Mandela.

Most importantly for the current debate about political reform that has taken place in Brazil, Feinstein stated “the big institutional problem in South Africa is the utilization of a closed-list.” In the current open-list electoral system adopted in Brazil, Feinstein would probably be reelected with a spectacular vote, consistent with his prestige and popularity! From that moment onward, he said, that would be one of his slogans.

Contrary to the widespread assumption by advocates of reform in Brazil, the closed-list system is not a solution to the problem of political corruption in the country. It is instead a mechanism that reduces citizen capacity to punish or reward their representatives. Nonetheless, the closed-list can bring about positive results, such as the increase of female representation in Congress. The closed-list system could also reduce the costs of campaigns. Yet, many normative values are at stake. Perhaps we would be better off choosing the capacity of making politicians accountable as the most important one in Brazil´s current political environment.

Authors

Marcus Andre Melo
Carlos Pereira

Beyond Libya: Activity Across the Middle East

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 00:00:00 -0400

As much of the world remains focused on Muammar Qaddafi, Ibrahim Sharqieh offers a look at the current situation in the Middle East beyond Libya. Sharqieh shares his insights in an interview with Patt Morrison of Southern California Public Radio.

Patt Morrison: First, let’s look at Egypt, where there was the first real election with real choices in a long time.

Ibrahim Sharqieh: That is true. This is very historical by all standards. The people are so excited about it. The entire region is excited about it. It hasn’t happened in a very long time. Probably over 50 to 60 years. So the success of holding a real election for the first time in 50 years in Egypt has been historical by all standards. And this is going to set a standard for the entire region. For the first time, we are getting real results.

Morrison: What are the new amendments [to Egypt's political process] designed to do?

Sharqieh: Basically, [their purpose is] to relax the standards that were set by the National Democratic Party in the past, that allowed only certain individuals that meet a certain standard [to run for election]. Candidates had to be approved by the parliament and the ruling party itself – the National Democratic Party. So from now on, we should have more free elections and many more people will be able to run for free elections as they wish.

Listen to the full interview at scpr.org »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Southern California Public Radio

2010 Midterm Elections Will Reshape the Political Landscape

William A. Galston — Mon, 25 Oct 2010 09:53:00 -0400

A week before the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans are poised for major gains, while Democrats are waging a defensive battle on their own turf.

The outlook is clearest in the House of Representatives. Barring major surprises in the waning days of the campaign, Republicans are odds-on favorites to regain a majority. Political scientists and pundits with good reputations for accuracy are predicting Republican gains in the neighborhood of 50 seats (roughly equaling their gains in 1994), which would bring them close to 240 and reduce Democrats to a minority of 205. But because so many districts now controlled by Democrats are in play, a surge of historic proportions remains possible.

The situation is murkier in the Senate. During the past two weeks, numerous races have tightened, and the possible outcomes now range from modest Republican gains to a new Republican majority. With but one exception, the contested seats—California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada , Nevada, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin—are now in Democratic hands.

Although the tea party insurgency has added energy to Republicans nationwide, it could end up costing the GOP control of the Senate in 2011. The uprising in Delaware that deprived popular veteran Mike Castle of the Republican nomination shifted that Senate seat from a probably Republican victory to all-but-certain defeat. Kentucky, normally safe territory for establishment conservative candidates, is competitive this year, largely because tea party favorite Rand Paul is seen as outside the mainstream. In Nevada, the nomination of Sharron Angle has given Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, given up for dead six months ago, a fighting chance to hold his seat.

If each of these races were an independent local event, Republican chances of regaining control of the Senate would be minute. But because they are affected to some extent by national currents, they will tend to move in tandem. In “wave” elections—1980, 1986 and 2006 are recent examples—the most closely contested Senate seats all fall in the same direction by small margins. If 2010 is another such year, a Republican victory in a normally Democratic West Coast state could put them over the top. Nonetheless, Republican strategists are saying—as they have from the beginning—that their party is more likely to regain control in 2012, when Democrats will have to defend twice as many seats as do Republicans.

In the states, Republicans are likely to gain a number of governorships and hundreds of seats in state legislatures. They appear especially strong in the Midwest: when the votes are tallied, they could end up seizing governorships in six states—Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa—now in Democratic hands. The Republican tide is especially significant because congressional redistricting will begin in 2011, and many Midwestern states are predicted to lose seats as population continues to shift to the south and west. (Texas alone may gain four House seats.) If so, long-established boundaries must be redrawn—a highly politicized process in which control of state houses makes a big difference.

Details aside, it seems all but certain that the 2010 midterm election will reshape the political landscape. Republicans will have to decide how to use their increased power, and Democrats must determine how best to defend what they accomplished in the 111th Congress. Whether the 112th Congress will yield only confrontation and gridlock, or a measure of compromise and achievement, depends substantially on how the American people will judge what they see in Washington next year.

Authors

William A. Galston