Brookings: Topics - Egypt

The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

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Authors

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Morsi and the Muslims

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Many Americans -- and many Egyptians -- are souring on the Muslim Brotherhood. Some are rather smugly saying, "I told you so." From the American and Arab liberal perspectives, the Brotherhood seems run by hyper-charged Islamists bent on imposing their will on the Egyptian people. Like most things in politics, though, it depends on what exactly you're comparing them to. More than two years into the Arab revolts, Islamists are weighing the virtues of moving more aggressively to implement their agenda versus the benefits of proceeding cautiously in an attempt to placate their critics and opponents.

There is little doubt that the Brotherhood has veered to the right. The real debate within the group is whether they've veered far enough. With Egypt as polarized as ever, the Brotherhood has effectively given up on reaching out to liberals and leftists, focusing instead on closing ranks and rallying its base. During the presidential race, Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood's original candidate, chose a Salafi-leaning council of scholars for his first campaign event, where he affirmed that the application of sharia law was his ultimate goal and that he would form a committee of scholars to help parliament achieve that goal. After Shater's disqualification, Mohammed Morsi -- a weaker, less convincing candidate -- doubled down on Shater's back-to-basics message. "Needless to say," Morsi said, "[I am] currently the only contender who offers a clearly Islamic project."

After winning the presidency, Morsi took a brief stab at rising above his partisan origins. But the tragic events of Dec. 4, when anti-Brotherhood protesters and government supporters clashed outside the presidential palace, rendered such efforts moot. The violence of that night -- provoked by the Brotherhood when it called on supporters to confront protesters -- claimed "martyrs" on both sides. For many in the opposition, this was the point of no return -- blood had been spilled.

Read the full article on Foreign Policy »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Can Egypt’s Transition and Economy Be Saved?

Hafez Ghanem — Wed, 01 May 2013 12:19:00 -0400

The Egyptian economy is unlikely to collapse suddenly. However, in the absence of a serious macroeconomic stabilization program it will continue to deteriorate gradually, with low growth and increasing unemployment and inflation. Even corruption appears to be on the rise. The Egyptian people are also feeling the pinch in terms of higher prices and shortages of some imported necessities. If this continues, the transition to democracy could be jeopardized. On the other hand, politics in Egypt is so polarized that it is difficult to see how serious economic reforms could be implemented without first reaching compromises on some thorny political issues. Perhaps the recent agreement on a coalition government in Italy could serve as a model for Egyptian politicians.

There are signs that the democratic transition is in danger. Loud grumblings can be heard all over Egypt. There is even nostalgia for autocratic rule and some are calling for a return of the military. According to the Pew Center’s “Global Attitudes Project” more than 70 percent of Egyptians are unhappy with the way the economy is moving, 33 percent feel that a strong leader is needed to solve the country’s problems, and 49 percent believe that a strong economy is more important than a good democracy. The number of people disillusioned with the revolution is likely to increase as the economy weakens further.

In addition to freedom and dignity, the young people who started the Egyptian revolution on January 25, 2011 were demanding better living conditions and greater social justice. Their demands are far from being met as economic growth has declined and unemployment has risen (figure 1). Industrial growth which was at a healthy 5-7 percent a year before the revolution has fallen to about 1 percent, and the official unemployment rate rose from 9 to 12.5 percent. About 95 percent of the unemployed are youth with at least a secondary education. Nearly three-quarters of those who are lucky enough to find jobs end up working in the informal sector where wages range between $2.60-3.70 per day.

The Egyptian government’s fiscal policy has not been conducive to growth and employment generation. Figure 1 shows that the government deficit rose from about 8 percent of GDP in 2010 to nearly 11 percent in 2011. It could exceed 12 percent of GDP in 2013. The increasing deficits have been financed almost entirely domestically, and the public domestic debt rose from some 60 percent of GDP in 2010 to 70 percent in 2012. At some point in 2012, the Egyptian government was paying 16 percent interest on its short-term domestic debt. That is, the government has been sucking liquidity from the domestic financial system and crowding out the private sector; discouraging investment, growth and employment creation.

Surprisingly, corruption seems to have increased after the revolution. Ending corruption has been a key demand of the revolutionaries, and the country witnessed more than 6,000 corruption investigations and several high profile incriminations since February 2011. Investigations and police action send a political signal, but they do not constitute an effective anti-corruption program. In 2010, Egypt was ranked 98th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Its ranking deteriorated to 112th in 2011 and 118th in 2012. Data for 2011 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) also shows deterioration in corruption control. The WGI 2012 data is not yet available.

Falling tourism and foreign direct investment, together with increasing capital flight, led to a decline in foreign reserves from more than $35 billion in 2010 (covering 7 months of imports) to less than $15 billion in 2012, which covers less than three months of imports (figure 2). As a result foreign exchange has become scarce and the Egyptian pound started depreciating rapidly. It has depreciated against the US dollar by about 15 percent in the past three months. Moreover, a black market in foreign exchange has emerged. In addition, Egypt’s credit rating suffered a setback as Moody’s downgraded Egypt’s debt to “caa”, which means it is of poor standing and entails very high risk.

Imports are becoming more expensive and increasingly difficult to procure. Egypt is highly dependent on the imports of many necessities, including food and fuel. The Egyptian pound’s depreciation means that domestic prices for imports are rising; which affects millions of poor and middle class families. Scarcities of some imported goods (e.g. diesel fuel) are appearing as foreign exchange is increasingly difficult to obtain, and foreign banks are wary of providing credit to Egyptian importers. Some businessmen complain that it now takes more than six weeks to open a letter of credit, while it only took three days before the revolution.

It’s clear that Egypt is facing an economic crisis, and needs to implement credible reforms to stabilize the economy, control corruption, and lay the foundations for inclusive growth. Such reforms would normally include a reduction in the fiscal deficit to bring the domestic debt under control and a further depreciation of the Egyptian pound to encourage exports and tourism. The Egyptian government is negotiating with the IMF to obtain support for such a stabilization program. IMF support is desirable because it would open the doors for increased assistance from other bilateral and multilateral donors, and thus help ease the pain of stabilization.

But macroeconomic stabilization requires implementing unpopular measures such as reducing subsidies and raising taxes. The government, which is already facing stiff opposition and unrest, is, understandably, reluctant to adopt such measures. It has so far been able to postpone difficult decisions by getting exceptional financial support from regional allies. However, this has not been enough to turn the economy around.

The Egyptian government appears to be in a no-win situation. Implementing reforms could lead to greater unrest and political instability and jeopardize the democratization process. On the other hand, doing nothing will imply a deepening economic crisis and more hardship. This will also lead to unrest and instability, and ultimately jeopardize the transition process.

How then can Egypt’s transition be saved? A national consensus needs to be reached and the reforms have to be broadly owned and accepted. The opposition (which itself is divided between liberals, Nasserists and Salafists) will have to buy into the economic reform program. This is unlikely to occur unless a consensus is also reached on outstanding political issues (e.g. election law, revision of the constitution, reform of the judiciary, etc.). Both government and opposition will have to make compromises. But do they have the required level of political maturity to do that?

Authors

Hafez Ghanem

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

As Mubarak Sits in a Cage, Egyptians are Moving On

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National.

A few months after the beginning of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, I was in Washington DC, addressing a group of Egyptian expatriates on the situation in Egypt.

They asked me about the trial of Hosni Mubarak - a trial that I thought, at the time, might not even take place. When they asked me if it should happen, I paused, thought about some consequences that had little to do with the justice involved in such a trial, and replied "no".

The response was lively and engaging, as it would have been anywhere Egyptians gathered.

But this week, as a new trial started - and just as quickly stopped, with the presiding judge recusing himself - the most intriguing development is that very few people seem to care about it.

I answered "no" to the question in 2011 because I thought the powers that be would never let Mr Mubarak take the stand freely, for fear that he might spill the beans about many state and international secrets. I thought counter-revolutionary actors might start all sorts of trouble to forestall a trial, and that, I believed, would be counterproductive for Egypt.

A brutal autocratic dictator he may have been, but I did not think he was worth the trouble a trial would bring, particularly as he seemed likely - at 82 and sickly - to meet his maker soon in any case.

Two years later, Egypt has moved on from Mubarak. Most Egyptians, whether for him or against him, do not appear to be particularly engaged in the process of his new trial. They are being kept busy with other matters. If they are interested in politics, it will be in the failings of Mohammed Morsi's government, the inept nature of the opposition, the machinations of the "deep state" and its supporters or the inability of the revolutionary camp to translate lofty ideals into practical plans.

That last aspect of the political arena is probably the most striking when it comes to Mubarak. The revolutionaries fought, obviously, for his overthrow. But they also wanted the restructuring of the entire Egyptian state. Not only have they not seen that so far, but the revolution for which they continue to fight has been forgotten by many who initially supported it.

Indeed, for many, it is "politics as usual" - government versus opposition, and so on. Many who were in Tahrir Square in those brave days are now attacking revolutionaries who did not vote for Ahmad Shafiq in the presidential elections - the same Ahmad Shafiq whom Mubarak appointed prime minister at the height of the uprising.

That cannot be simply dismissed or swept under the rug. The reality is that many who dreamt that the revolution would bring about sweeping changes by now have been bitterly disappointed, and now consider that Mr Shafiq might have been the lesser evil after all.

It is difficult to square any support for the revolution with support for such a counter-revolutionary, who would have crushed the Tahrir uprising in its infancy if given the chance, and who calledMubarak his "role model" even after the revolt.

A year ago, at the Egyptian-American Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, Mr Shafiq said he would use executions to restore order to Egypt, and would provide Omar Suleiman, the infamous and brutal head of military intelligence, with a job if a suitable one could be found.

All of that is now forgotten - forgotten in large part because Mr Shafiq never had the opportunity to make good on any of those plans, and also in large part because the victor, Mr Morsi, has been an utter disappointment to the overwhelming majority of Egyptians.

A year after Mr Morsi's victory, the fact that Mr Shafiq represented a full return to Mubarak's system has been left by the wayside by many who fought against that system - because Mr Morsi's government has proven to be so unsatisfactory.

As I passed Mubarak's military hospital on the day his new trial was to have begun, I saw a small crowd of his supporters outside.

I found this demonstration ironic, considering that under Mubarak such a protest, in defence of someone so clearly unsupportive of the ruling regime, would never have been allowed.

More than that, however, it was to me downright bizarre that there was a crowd there - and that passers-by were waving in support. It was not support for Mubarak I sensed, but rather opposition to Mr Morsi, and to the desperate economic situation that Egyptians now find themselves living in.

There is another way to look at this, however. Perhaps the biggest irony is that a Morsi government is actually a strategic win for the revolution, in spite of Mr Morsi.

Had Mr Morsi not been elected, he would not be in power to show the Egyptian nation how utterly bankrupt the Muslim Brotherhood is. Under a Shafiq government, the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity would probably have broken all records by now.

Under Mr Morsi, Mr Shafiq's supporters do exist and may even increase in number. But really no non-Brotherhood leader could reveal the policy impoverishment of the Brotherhood project better than Mr Morsi is doing.

Mubarak may think he has been proven right (and judging by the smug grins in court this week, he does). But in the end it is he who is in a cage. Egyptians are now free to take on not only him and his system, but also the Brotherhood - a struggle that had to happen at some point, if only to show that Egypt has other options, better than either the Brotherhood or a return to dictatorship and autocracy.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The National

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters

Sectarianism Spreads to Egypt

Geneive Abdo — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

Considering Egypt's wide-ranging political and economic crises, a recent national dispute might seem minor in the scheme of things, but it says volumes about the Middle East in the era of the Arab uprisings.

On April 1, more than 50 tourists from Iran visited Egypt— perhaps the first to do so since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when ties between the two countries were severed after Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. The decision to welcome Iranians into the country was backed by President Mohamad Morsi and the Minister of Tourism, but fiercely opposed by Salafist groups and others. As leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party explained, when I was in Cairo two weeks ago, it was a pragmatic decision: Egypt needs tourists to aid its failing economy, and the Iranian market is not only virgin territory, but Iranians are not afraid to visit, no matter the chaos.

But for Salafists group, allowing Muslims who are Shi’a into the country risks they will try to convert Egypt’s majority Sunni population to their Islamic sect. At least this is what many Salafists told me. The issue has created so much controversy over claims of a “Shi’a invasion,” that on April 9, Egypt’s presidential spokesman said tourist flights from Tehran to Cairo would be suspended until June. He made the statement after a series of protests organized by Salafist groups, who clashed with police.

As someone who has been researching the escalating Shi’a-Sunni divide for more than a year (you can read my new paper here), I think this is a significant development. It is understandable that countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarianism has had a long and sordid history, would be immersed in the conflicts we are seeing today. But why Egypt, where there is virtually no history of such sectarian sentiments, at least not among Muslims?

There are a few reasons sectarianism has now sparked emotion, fear, and political dilemmas in Egypt: Some Salafists consider Shi’a Muslims to be heretics, since the split in Islam occurred and Shiism became a separate doctrine in the ninth century. As a result, there is a perception among Salafist groups, not only in Egypt but in Lebanon and other countries, that Iran intends to invade Sunni lands, now that Syria could fall from Alawite control to Sunni domination. In other words, in anticipating the loss of Syria, the Salafists believe Iran is now looking to make other conquests.

Iranian officials have tried to assure the Egyptians this is not their objective. Iran's charge d'affaires, Mojtaba Amani, said in comments carried by the Egyptian state news agency MENA after a Salafist protest at his home in Cairo, that allegations Shiism was being spread in Egypt were a "major lie."

But the Salafists think otherwise. “We have evidence the Shi’a plan to marry Sunni women and promise them a better life and then they will have to convert,” one Salafist leader told me.

And it is not only the Salafists who are nervous about President Morsi’s warm overtures toward Iran. Some religious scholars at Al Azhar, the mosque and university complex that is the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims, also told me they feared Iran was trying to spread Shiism in the Sunni world.

The feelings expressed by the Egyptians reflect alarm across the region— which perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and Iran itself. One only needs to read the statements in the Iranian-state run media each day laying claim to all Muslims and praising what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls the "Islamic awakening" when referring to the Arab uprisings. But what Khamenei fails to acknowledge is that many Sunni Muslims have no intention of embracing Iranian overtures and, in fact, as the war in Syria rages on, animosity toward Iran, President Bashar al Assad’s main patron escalates, and the sectarian divide deepens.

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

Authors

Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

U.S. Embassy Learns a Hard Lesson About Twitter

Cynthia P. Schneider — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Old and new diplomacy clashed in the flare-up between Egypt and the United States over the arrest and interrogation of Bassem Youssef -- considered the "Jon Stewart of Egypt" -- who skewers politicians of all stripes on his popular TV show, El Bernameg.

In the world of traditional diplomacy, governments had more control over what was said about them and by whom. As the Egyptian and U.S. governments discovered the hard way, that control is long gone in the world of 21st century diplomacy with its 24/7 social media and powerful nongovernmental voices.

When Youssef, accused of insulting President Mohamed Morsy and Islam, was summoned for questioning by the Morsy-appointed prosecutor general, this latest repressive action by the Muslim Brotherhood government sparked an international outcry.

The response from the United States came in two forms. First, the State Department expressed "concern" about Youssef's detention, citing it as "evidence of a disturbing trend of growing restrictions on the freedom of expression" in Egypt. Then, Jon Stewart mounted an eloquent -- and humorous -- defense of Bassem Youssef and freedom of expression through that well-known diplomatic channel, "The Daily Show."

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Authors

Cynthia P. Schneider

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

Martin S. Indyk and Javier Solana — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With a range of critical issues confronting the U.S. and the international community today, Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk discuss some of the most pressing challenges, from the war in Syria to the Euro crisis to Iran’s nuclear program.

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A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

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A World in Turmoil: My Conversation with Javier Solana

Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

There are many tensions and problems facing the world today. Distinguished Fellow Javier Solana and I discussed some of the most challenging issues in the current geopolitical landscape, including the Euro crisis, the war in Syria, and Iran's brinksmanship.

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A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

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A World in Turmoil: An Exploration of Issues Affecting Today's Global Order

Women in a Changing Middle East: An Address by Under Secretary of State Tara Sonenshine

Thu, 04 Apr 2013 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 4, 2013
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Click here to watch the event online at cspan.org.

As Arab citizens struggle to rewrite the rules defining their societies, the role and status of Arab women is a sharp focus of debate. Arab women have been at the forefront of change, but have also faced unprecedented challenges. How central is women’s empowerment to the success of Arab societies, and how important are women’s rights in the struggle for democracy? What is the U.S. doing to help Arab women (and men) to advance women and girls in their societies?

On April 4, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Tara Sonenshine for an address on women in the Middle East. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate a discussion with Under Secretary Sonenshine after her remarks.

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Bassem Youssef: A Valuable Egyptian Voice That Will Not Be Silenced

H.A. Hellyer — Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was published by Tahrir Squared.

Early on Saturday morning, I received a message that Bassem Youssef, the Arab world's answer to 'Jon Stewart', had been issued a compulsory summons and arrest warrant by the prosecutor-general. The prosecutor-general's office wanted to investigate two charges against him: 'insulting Islam' and 'insulting the president'. All I could do was smile -- because I knew that was exactly what Bassem would be doing as soon as he heard the same.

Almost a year ago, Egyptians went to the polls for their first free presidential election -- the first round delivered what was a nightmare of a result. A representative of the former regime, Ahmad Shafiq, which did nothing but signify a return to the status quo that existed during Hosni Mubarak – and a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that had shown little commitment to the Egyptian revolution, save as an opportunity to gain power. The day those results came out, I was in Bassem's office. Many of his team were simply stunned at the result. Bassem, on the other hand, just expressed slight surprise -- at all of us. As far as he was concerned, the result just meant one thing -- that they'd have a lot of material for political satire. And the revolution would go on.

That’s Bassem.

A few weeks later, we travelled across the United States together, as we prepared the new show, ‘America in Arabic’ -- the combination of a reality show looking at America through Arab-American and Arab immigrant eyes, and a political satire. There, I understood why Bassem was not so concerned about the presidential results – because for him, the revolution went beyond that. Several times, he was asked in public, ‘what will you do in the second round?’, which took place while we were actually in the U.S. on tour. He never replied directly. Instead, he said,’ I’m not sure, but it would be really difficult for me to vote for Ahmad Shafiq.’ Did that mean he’d vote Morsi? Or boycott? That’s something only Bassem can answer.

But none of that really mattered - what mattered was how he responded to the question. As soon as he confessed his reluctance to vote for a representative of the former regime, he would always follow up with two important points. The first was, ‘But I understand why people who will vote for Ahmad Shafiq will vote for him - and while I may disagree, I can understand it.’ That sort of generosity of spirit, with a clear commitment to the revolution that he himself had fought in, was what made, and makes, Bassem Youssef one of the most consistent, and principled, Egyptian public figures today.

The second thing he said, which comes from the same impetus that this very website was borne out of, was the following. “Whether Shafiq wins, or Morsi wins – the revolution continues. Whoever it is, or whoever else it could have been: the revolution continues.”

I’ve never forgotten he said that. Hearing him say that in crowds in San Francisco, Virginia, New York and Los Angeles, the effect of it was always the same – shivers. His commitment to the revolution of the 25th of January was unwavering – and I believe remains as such. That commitment wasn’t about a particular president, or lack thereof – it was about the changing of Egypt for the better. He understood, and understands, that Egypt’s struggle is still ongoing – and will continue for quite some time. For him, the revolution wasn’t about removing a political figure from power – or indeed, putting another one in place. The revolution was about changing Egypt – and that would take time, and effort.

For the life of me, I cannot really fathom the sense of summoning him to the prosecutor-general. But then, much of what has been applied by the Egyptian state in the past couple of years has been bizarre and peculiar. This government does not seem to understand one crucial point: Bassem Youssef, and all that he does, is actually completely in its benefit. The criticism that Bassem does is more valuable than every single laudatory article that comes out in Ikhwanophilic media – because it is genuine, and it is honest. If Bassem Youssef was to disappear from the airwaves, as it seems many supporters of the government desire, this government would not be stronger – it would be far, far weaker.

Bassem Youssef isn’t an enemy of the Egyptian presidency – he is simply an Egyptian patriot. For that, he ought to be congratulated by supporters of the government – not chastised. If tomorrow morning, when Bassem shows up at the courthouse, he is arrested by the Egyptian state, it will not be Bassem Youssef that loses out. It is going to be this government, and its supporters – because all it is really likely to do, in the final analysis, is give Bassem yet more material. Because one way or the other, he will walk out a free man – and his commitment to the 25th of January revolution will just be more intense.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Tahrir Squared

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

No Fear: Morsi’s Rule of Law

H.A. Hellyer — Sun, 10 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Why should I respect the judges? My own president doesn’t.
[Protestor, Port Said]

As though anyone needed another reminder. As though anyone had not quite received the message when prisons were stormed in Port Said, after the judges pronounced a suspicious verdict. As though anyone had not realised that the institutions of Egypt are being weakened – and Egyptian citizens would pay the price if they were weakened further. Yet, after the Administrative Court of Egypt cancelled the parliamentary elections due to begin next month, it seems that many do indeed need that reminder. The question is – how many reminders will it take?

Under now deposed president Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian state had its pillars. One of them was brought down in the January 25th uprising – the ‘pillar of fear’. Regardless of the botched nature of this transition, the Egyptian revolution has accomplished at least one thing – it has ripped to shreds the curtain of fear.

That, no-one can deny, was a good thing. However, there is a corollary to consider here – if the ‘pillar of fear’ was so strong in Mubarak’s Egypt, then what has filled in the void that it used to occupy? Or did it not serve a purpose to begin with?

The reality is – it did serve a purpose, by creating a purpose. When a state apparatus is so absolute, and fear is so prevalent, it does ensure that individuals do not step out of certain predefined norms. In countries where such an apparatus does not exist, something else fills in that void. Civil society institutions; respect between the state and the citizen; a social contract; and so forth.

Filling the void

When the pillar disappeared, a void did emerge – and in the last two years, no one in Egypt’s ruling elite has tried to fill it. The military council that governed Egypt for 18 months was uninterested in doing so – it left it empty, and it left the other institutions alone. Neither was satisfactory – the state’s institutions needed to be reformed after the revolutionary uprising, not left to their own devices. This is particularly the case if fear, which animated so much of Egyptian society prior to the uprising, was no longer the tool of the state.

When the Muslim Brotherhood presidency began, it also did not try to fill in the void which fear had formerly occupied. However, it arguably did a worse job than the military council in that regard. While the military council had left other pillars, such as the ministry of the interior, the judiciary, and the media, alone, President Mursi’s government progressively managed to weaken them. The fight with the judiciary during the November presidential decree period managed to systematically damage the standing of the judiciary in the country, at a very critical time in Egypt’s transition.

Disrespecting the judiciary

When President Mursi gave his decree in the way he did, he was essentially telling the Egyptian public, “I am the president, and I have the right to suspend the rule of law, even though I just barely won the presidential election.” That in itself has consequences – consequences that supporters of the president argued were only theoretical, as President Mursi hadn’t used his supra-judicial powers (much). Port Said erupting, however, has put a question mark on how inconsequential his action was. How did Egyptian citizens see their president disrespect the institution of the judiciary, and not allow that to affect how they saw the same institution?

One would have hoped that the government might have realised that, indeed, Egypt needs all the strength its institutions can muster – and that any changes to them must be enacted carefully, and through the prism of consensus-based reform. In this highly polarised environment, this is hardly possible without a successful effort from the political ruling establishment to bridge the gaps.

Instead, however, it seems that the lesson has not yet been learned. When the Egyptian senate was proposing the election law, the constitutional court said it was legally flawed on a number of points. Judicial review of such a key legal tool demands that the court send such an assessment, and then also assess whether or not the legislature has fully complied. Instead, the senate changed the law, and assessed its own compliance. That is not how judicial oversight works – checks and balances in any normally functioning political system are precisely designed to ensure accountability of one branch by another. When one branch is given the ability to hold itself to account, without oversight, the system is brought one step closer to autocracy.

Political acumen?

The administrative court last week rejected the law, and in so doing, nullified the presidential decree to hold elections next month (based on the rejected elections law). The fact that the president’s office even issued such a decree calls into question the legal advice that his own advisors are providing, considering that this legal eventuality was easily foreseeable. None of that is good news for the presidency; the polarization in the country questions the political acumen of this presidency, and the ensuing economic trauma questions its financial expertise. With this latest debacle, the legal proficiency within the presidency cannot be taken for granted either.

The opponents of the presidency will likely take this as a sign that the judiciary is fighting back – and with so many of the opposition’s political forces agitating for an electoral boycott, it works neatly with their agenda. The supporters of the presidency will likely interpret it in the same fashion – a partisan move that is designed to weaken the president and strengthen the opposition. However, the fundamental reality of the court’s decision in this regard is that it was legally inevitable. Had the court not halted the electoral process, it would have essentially handed over judicial overview voluntarily – which only weakens Egypt’s institutions further.

It is a rather basic facet of modern political systems – the division between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. This is about the division of power – and the hope that these different parts of the governing structure will hold each other to account. At least, that is the idea – someone ought to remind the Egyptian political establishment of that. Egypt’s institution need to be strengthened through reform – not further weakened through partisanship or incompetence.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Al Arabiya

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

“The Revolution Continues” - No Longer a Slogan in Egypt

H.A. Hellyer — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

When the crowds swelled in the Square of Liberation in January 2011, the chant of al-sha’ab yurid isqat al-nidham (‘the people demand the fall of the regime’) was a pithy slogan. By the time Hosni Mubarak was pushed out of power eighteen days later, Tahrir Square had become much more than simply a place where people demanded his fall.

Two years on, and at a critical point where the transition is likely to enter a very difficult stage, the challenges in front of the revolution and the strategies of the revolution, ought to be considered in light of the importance of those days.

Egyptians have now divided into camps vis-à-vis those original eighteen days. There were always going to be those who thought that the revolution produced those days, and they culminated in the downfall of Hosni Mubarak. In other words, for this camp, those days are essentially irrelevant to the present or the future.

Yet, there were others who believed that those eighteen days were special, and formed the basis of hope for a better future. They’ve since changed their minds and decided: not really. For them, those eighteen days might have been special, but they probably were not as special as the revolutionaries want Egyptians to believe.

As far as they are concerned, the revolution is over – it failed, and that’s that. Moreover, as the argument goes, it is irrelevant – Egyptians have a different battle ahead of them now against the Islamists, and they will have to work with people who were against the eighteen days in order to forge forward against this new enemy.

And then: there are others.

Those others recognise three things. The first is that the initial eighteen days were not a deviation from what Egyptians are – but a reflection of what is deeply Egyptian. This is what they achieved, when left to their own devices – a pluralistic civil society where diversity was respected, and a standard of ethical behaviour was maintained.

These were Egyptians from all walks of life and backgrounds – and this is what they accomplished. Everyone in that square recognised what was happening in those eighteen days as very much indigenous – but for many, it was an Egypt they had only seen glimpses of before.

In those eighteen days, Egyptians did not create a utopia or something akin to an imaginary place – they saw an Egypt that every Egyptian would recognise as real and representative of the best of Egyptians.

On the one hand, this was a vanguard of Egyptians, in that they refused to accept that Egypt was terminally condemned to the state it was in – but on the other, it was a vanguard that was nonetheless representative of all social and economic classes of Egyptian society. It was not the elite of Egyptians – it was only elitist in that they believed in the right of Egyptians to believe that Tahrir was possible.

The safest place in Cairo during those eighteen days was Tahrir Square – no-one who was there can forget that. The place where women were shown the most respect was that square; the place where differences of political opinion were most cherished was that square; religious harmony was most strong in that square.

The strength of a free and open civil society was shown, and proven, in that square. Those there built something very real – something organic, and not induced by outside pressures. In so doing, they reminded themselves that this was Egypt.

The second is that in society at large, for a variety of reasons, Egypt’s spirit, as reflected in those days, has taken a beating. If anything, Egypt on the whole has regressed tremendously. That ‘Tahrir Effect’ has not thrived – it remains and exists, but it is scattered and dispersed.

In such a situation, with the economic situation getting worse and worse, social problems are becoming more and more entrenched – which translates into political problems. Egyptians are not saints – they are human beings that at their best create environments like the Tahrir of January 25th, 2011. They are also human beings that at their worst create environments like the Tahrir of January 25th, 2013, where women were targeted in sexual attacks.

The fact of the matter is that while sexual harassment didn’t happen in the square, it does now – very, very, very often, and often progresses to sexual violence. They are also human beings where sectarianism and identity politics, strategically utilised and instrumentalised, can be harnessed to incredibly deleterious effects.

The fact of the matter is that while sectarian sentiments were subsumed in the square, they are not now – and it is progressively becoming an epidemic. The fact of the matter is that the pluralistic, open civil society that animated the square is certainly not what Egyptians live in now.

The third is that those challenges – all of those challenges – can be addressed, and are not insurmountable. Because the original eighteen days were not extraordinary, but a manifestation of what Egyptians are capable of; they can do something like that again. Not in terms of another square of protest to bring down such a ruler – that’s another issue – but in terms of inculcating such behaviour, where such a ruler becomes irrelevant by force of right.

That is precisely the point behind why those eighteen days in that square remain so critical to forming and informing perspectives on the challenges facing Egypt today. A particular standard was set in those days – and the success of the revolution can only be claimed when that standard is met. All of this remains relevant to those who believe in the revolution – because it serves to define strategy, as well as the types of alliances that can be engaged in to bring it to fruition.

There are two dangers in front of those who believe in the revolution in this period. The first is that they underestimate the scale of the problems that face Egypt now and how far Egypt has gone from the spirit of the Square in those eighteen days – no-one can afford to be naïve about the depth of those issues.

The second is that they underestimate the importance of commitment to that Square in those eighteen days. That becomes a question of strategy that faces many of the opposition forces now, as they consider alliances with other forces that stood against the revolution as it began in order to stand against the Islamists in this phase.

If those forces are now truly committed to the revolution, and would have stood in that Square in retrospect, that is one thing. If they would not, then where are the principles that brought people out in the first place? Where is that commitment to that change that took place, when they would have been quite happy for the Square to have fallen under the boot of oppression?

‘The Revolution Continues’ is no longer a slogan or a chant. It is a firm commitment to recognising that what happened in the Square in those 18 days is a snapshot of what Egypt actually is at its core – and what this revolution will fight to make all of Egypt, far beyond the square, once again. Insisting upon that is not failing to see the challenges – it is an expression of confidence that those challenges can be met, and overcome. That is the promise of the revolution of the 25^th of January.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Daily News Egypt

The Forecast for Egyptian Politics: Overcast

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 04 Mar 2013 15:33:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In this article, first published in the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore's Insight series, H.A. Hellyer examines Egypt's political landscape in advance of the country's upcoming parliamentary elections.

As Egypt’s April parliamentary elections draw closer, many analysts are being asked for their outlook and predictions for the future of this critical Arab country. Initial observations from the more seasoned of Egypt watchers point to overcast skies. The state of being overcast, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization, occurs when clouds obscure all of the heavens. As commentators attempt to make sense of the murky current political situation, it is appropriate to first speak of the sky before the clouds began to cover it.

The sky was clearest at the beginning of Egypt’s new phase. Those first 18 days in Tahrir Square beginning on 25 January 2011 were astounding, particularly in regard to how individual citizens and groups of citizens materialized and changed the course of political history. One of the most famous figures of the uprisings was Emad Effat, a scholar from al-Azhar, who is known for having said, “The first time I walked into Tahrir Square was the first time I saw Egypt.” The possibility of a united Egypt is what brought the crowds to Tahrir day after day, rather than Mubarak per se.

Yet that possibility of unification, now two years on, seems a naïve wish. Many forces who were in Tahrir, as well as those who did not come, have broken off from one another.

The most organized political body was—and is—the Muslim Brotherhood. Soon after Mubarak was forced out of power in February 2011, it looked as if the group would be judicious in how it played the political game. It would not run for more than a minority of the parliamentary seats, it said, and it would not propose a presidential candidate. Essentially, it would continue along a path of gradual change as opposed to a power grab.

It must be said that the Brotherhood enjoyed a great deal of goodwill from the populace after a long history of persecution by the Mubarak regime. But it then decided to run for not 30 percent but 50 percent of parliament, and it separated from other forces that had initially supported the overthrow of Mubarak, instead establishing its own special relationship with the military. It ran not one, but two, presidential candidates. One, Muhammad Morsi, who went up against Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak’s last prime minister, barely won.

In November 2012, Morsi managed to destroy any goodwill that remained outside of close Brotherhood allies via his constitutional declaration, which placed presidential decisions beyond judicial review. His rush through the constitution—a document whose flaws were criticized by many observers inside and outside of Egypt —also did not go unmissed.

The Brotherhood knows that voter turnout for the upcoming parliamentary elections is likely to be low. Indeed, it was incredibly low for the December 2012 constitutional referendum—less than a third of registered voters. For the parliamentary elections, the turnout is likely to be around the same amount, if not less. Such a situation will benefit the Brotherhood because the group’s core supporters are likely to vote.

However, a narrow victory does not mean success for the Brotherhood overall. Morsi has the mandate of someone who only barely won against a member of the old regime. This position, which lacks the consensus that would expand his mandate, creates difficulty for him as he seeks to change the institutions of the state. While Morsi may hold his presidency together, and while the Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, may control parliament, the power they have will be less than what they need to make any real changes to the system.

As for the military, it is clear that it is not interested in ruling Egypt. On the contrary, the reason Muhammad Tantawi and Sami Annan were forced out in August 2012 is likely due precisely to the military’s broad desire not to be bogged down with governance issues (unlike Tantawi and Annan). And the military doesn’t need to rule, as it by and large received everything it desired in the last constitutional arrangement, including independence from oversight of its budget, its own courts, and control over defense and war. The military will only intervene if it feels that its interests are threatened by instability in the country—such as what occurred with the downfall of Mubarak. If it feels that such a situation is again taking place, it will probably act. However, with a Brotherhood government in charge, intervention could come at quite a cost, as it would likely be met with a forceful and perhaps violent rebuttal from the forces that support the government.

In the parliamentary elections of 2012, the major Salafi political party, Hizb al-Nour, performed well, achieving a fifth of the seats. It is doubtful that al-Nour will repeat such success. The party’s leadership is now split; in fact, most of its leadership departed and started another party, al-Watan. There are also a myriad of Salafi parties now, so the vote will be split even further among them. Finally, the Brotherhood will likely fight even harder than before for seats at the expense of the Salafi parties.

The other parliamentary political force is not particularly well defined but is generally described as the “liberals” or the “left.” Regardless of these labels—which are labels of identity rather than ideas—this group performed rather poorly in the previous parliamentary elections. These players are now generally described as the “political opposition” and are identified with the National Salvation Front (NSF), headed by Muhammad ElBaradei—though there are still key opposition forces, such as Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh’s Strong Egypt Party, that are not part of the NSF.

The National Salvation Front has become the group that misses no opportunity to miss an opportunity. The forces that comprise it could have chosen a single candidate in the presidential elections and would likely have won against Morsi and Shafik. They did not; they split the vote between Aboul Fotouh, Hamdeen Sabahi, and Amr Moussa. When the constitutional referendum came about, they could have organized immediately for a no vote. They did not; rather, they only officially pushed for a no vote approximately 48 hours beforehand. They also could have used the huge protests and disaffection against the constitution to deepen their base across the country; they did not. To this day, the NSF is still unknown, or is not trusted, by a majority of Egyptians.

Hence, while it is clear that the country has lost a great deal of respect for the Muslim Brotherhood, it is equally clear that most Egyptians have a lack of regard for the NSF. Indeed, as mentioned, neither the Brotherhood nor the NSF could mobilize a majority of the population for or against the constitutional referendum. The NSF’s latest move, in which it called for the downfall of the regime and trials for Morsi and his interior minister, was a politically bizarre but also embarrassing move—because virtually no one paid any attention to it at all. The NSF has declared that it will boycott the upcoming elections, potentially rendering the group even more marginal.

This discussion now leaves us with three other political forces to consider. The first are the revolutionaries, for lack of a better word; they are those that regardless of their political affiliation have been agitating for the success of the revolution’s goals of social justice, freedom, and dignity. They themselves have become divided into different groups, as while many have pushed for deep engagement with the political arena, others have become disillusioned. A number of these revolutionaries ironically operate within the second level of leadership in many political forces, such as the Dostour Party; as such, we may see their agendas come to fruition in the future. But for the moment, they are not a political force to be reckoned with.

The second force consists of the “remnants” of the Mubarak regime, which the Brotherhood often casts as the enemy that is holding it back from progress. While the deep state is not strong in terms of political organization, within the institutions of the state there are forces that still remain aligned in thought, if not in leadership, with the former regime. Many—not simply the Brotherhood—are concerned. The reality is that these remnants can only be dealt with through a consensus of political forces that provides the government with a mandate to enact serious restructuring and reform; otherwise, they will continue.

The third force is everyone else. People describe this group as “Hizb al-Kanaba,” or “The Party of the Couch.” Up until relatively recently, this portion of the country, which is probably the majority, was not deeply politicized one way or the other. These citizens were cautious about the revolution but supported the overthrow of Mubarak. Many of them are still at home, though some have opted to go into the streets as they have grown more concerned about the dominance of the Brotherhood. Will they decide to come out for the parliamentary elections, and will that make a difference? No one knows yet for sure—but if they do, they could cause quite an upset.

Thus Egypt’s political future is very uncertain, and too many have tried to predict it to no avail. The reality is that we are still very much in a time of transition and flux. What is clear, nevertheless, is that Egypt remains incredibly important and that the region’s—as well as the world’s—powers cannot afford to let it slip. In the meantime, the situation is likely to get more difficult. We must wait to see where and when the clouds will part.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

Politicizing Security Sector Reform in Egypt

Omar Ashour — Sun, 03 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A couple of weeks ago, Egypt’s renowned intellectual Dr. Fahmy Howeidy summarized a study I conducted earlier on security sector reform (SSR) in Egypt. Howeidy was trying to highlight an important fact: the availability of the SSR “know-how” in Egypt, whether in this study or in others. What Dr. Howeidy probably did not know was that the study and other related initiatives were earlier submitted to several Egyptian officials. Interest in such studies/initiative was definitely there. Capacity to implement them is another story.

It is well-established by now that tourism, foreign direct investments, political stability, social justice, and probably the success of Egypt’s democratic transition, rest on the security conditions in the country. The two questions usually asked: is the security sector effective in containing real threats? And is that sector accountable to the people, represented by their elected civilians? So far, the answer in Egypt is probably a “no” to both questions.

‘Ikhwanization’

The presidency’s approach to SSR was so far gradual, not revolutionary; working within the rules of the system rather than fundamentally altering them. Far from “ikhwanization” (Brotherhoodization) of the Police, President Mursi appointed General Khaled Tharwat, as the new head of the National Security Apparatus (NSA) in October 2012. General Tharwat comes from the very core of the notorious State Security Investigations (SSI). He used to head “Internal Activity,” the general administration in charge of monitoring and investigating civil society groups, political parties, and media outlets. At one point, he was also heading the “Countering Brotherhood Activity” group, in charge of neutralizing the Muslim Brothers.

Moreover, far from Tunisia, where the first Interior Minister was a civilian, torture-victim from al-Nahda Party, the first Interior Minister under the first-ever civilian, democratically elected Egyptian President was General Ahmed Gamal al-Din, a figure known to be loyal to the criminally convicted, General Habib al-Adly, Mubarak’s Minister of Interior. Gamal al-Din was a hardliner during negotiations to release political prisoners following the success of the revolution, as well as during the talks to end the Mohammad Mahmoud street clashes of November 2011. He was also a witness in the “Giza Officers Trial,” in which 17 policemen were accused of killing and injuring protesters in January 2011. He defended the policemen, claiming that the victims had been killed in “self-defence.” Officers but Honourable Coalition, an unofficial organization of police officers who are pushing for internal reforms, accused Gamal al-Din of being a member of a powerful anti-reform faction in the ministry, dubbed “al-Adly’s men” (after former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly). Overall the Mursi administration did not make any major steps in SSR, probably due to very cautious political calculations.

“I got 186 dead officers and more than 800 injured so far, petty-officers blocking security chiefs from entering their offices, a presidential palace getting torched on weekly basis by a hundred kids or so … and Egypt’s largest government complex was blocked for four days, when will I have time to reform? … When these political polemics end,” said the new Interior Minister, General Mohammed Ibrahim February 19, 2013. It was one of the rare times an incumbent minister speaks out publically about the limitations of the security forces and the reform process. And, more worrying, he was not lying about the facts or the numbers. A collapse of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) at the moment can have disastrous consequences in Egypt.

The Interior Ministry’s Catch-22

The violence on the streets and the politicization of the SSR by rival politicians had negative consequence on the reform process and its credibility. On talk-shows, opposition figures call for SSR to be implemented and for police brutality to end. At the same time, the very same political figures praise security generals and corrupt judges/prosecutors known for their support of brutal tactics and faking charges. Some politicians even call for them to intervene in the political process, by cracking down on their rivals. In that sense, the MoI is in a “catch-22.” On the one hand, it is responsible for defending state institutions, constantly under attack by violent groups from various backgrounds. On the other hand, if any of these protestors were killed or injured, the MoI will be accused of brutality. Add to that the limited experience in non-lethal tactics of riot control. “All what they [activists] tell you is lies…the pattern we got here is that the officer gets attacked with shotguns and Molotov cocktails. If he flees, he gets accused of negligence and then he gets tried. If he fights back, he gets accused of brutality and then he gets tried as well. What exactly is he supposed to do?…” told me a major in the Central Security Forces, who witnessed the attacks on the presidential palace last January.

In all cases, no democratic transition is complete without targeting abuse, eradicating torture, and ending the impunity of the security services, with effective and meaningful civilian control of both the armed forces and the security establishments. Those objectives were at the core of the Egyptian revolution of 2011. They cannot be attained in the current extreme polarization in Egypt; nor in the middle of constant attempts to manipulate the security sector by political rivals. As shown in other comparative cases, the unity of political forces on that particular demand is key for the success of both security sector reform and democratization.

Authors

Omar Ashour

Publication: Al Arabiya English

What the U.S. Can Do for Egypt

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 13:56:00 -0500

Two years after the Police Day demonstrations that forced former President Hosni Mubarak from office, Egypt's political transformation has only just begun. The uncertainty that necessarily accompanies this change presents particular dilemmas for the United States, for whom partnership with Egypt has been a bedrock of regional policy for decades. Bedeviled by uncertainty and mutual mistrust, U.S.-Egyptian ties have been fraught since the revolution -- and on both sides there are those who say it's time to cut the cord. Yet these two countries still have many core interests in common and, as the November 2012 Gaza crisis proved, they can work together effectively to advance them.

For the United States, Egypt's revolution presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a more robust and reliable strategic partnership than was ever possible before, based on mutual interests with a government rooted in the consent of the Egyptian people and accountable to them. But realizing this opportunity will require an adroit, long-term approach, one that eschews transactional bargains with specific Egyptian actors in favor of a consistent commitment to supporting the emergence of a pluralistic Egyptian political system.

U.S. policy toward Egypt since the revolution has rested on two pillars: preserving Egyptian-Israeli peace and the security of their shared border, and trying to support and stabilize a teetering Egyptian economy. The first has led the U.S. government to keep U.S. military aid to Egypt and other security ties as unchanged as possible; the second has led to a diligent if ineffective effort to provide economic assistance (stymied by poor Egyptian decision making, as well as political and budgetary dysfunction in Washington).

Read the full article »

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Foreign Policy

The Windy Road of Arab Transitions and Europe’s Weak Hand

Ruth H. Santini — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Once again the Middle East is taking a series of unpredictable detours where, seemingly, nothing goes as planned.

Tunisia, considered a trailblazer in the region, origin of the Jasmine Revolution, symbol of a smooth transition process, characterized by consensus and inclusiveness, is torn by ideological cleavages, political violence, economic crisis and a broader lack of confidence in its own capacity to overcome the current stalemate.

Egypt, considered the bad boy of the revolutions, is continuing its bumpy road towards a new form of government and state-society relations. The new constitution, after being analyzed carefully, is less revolutionary than it might seem. While not extremely dangerous in terms of limiting civil liberties, including minority and women’s rights, according to many it will likely create problems given its vagueness and juxtaposition of articles and norms which fail a consistency test. The economy, which until recently seemed on the verge of salvation through an IMF loan, is now set to derail (given the quickly decreasing monetary reserves within an overall economic fragile context) if an agreement is not negotiated.

One thing the Egyptian and the Tunisian transitions have in common is the criticism their ruling Islamist parties are receiving in terms of delivering the public goods they were entrusted with providing. Often cited is the lack of competence, the inexperience, the divisions, found within these parties. Personal charisma of the newly elected leaders in neither country suffices to placate public discontent and discomfort. Both countries show the difficulties of changing political cultures and adapting to new ones: while contestation has become much more widespread than before the revolutions, it has by no means become a standard accepted practice. The Egyptian independent trade union, created after the start of the revolution, struggles to operate and some of its members have been persecuted. Cleavages take many forms in both countries but are not limited to the one between secularists and Islamists of various stripes, or those between urban and rural areas, or even the cross-cutting ones, for example on socio-economic issues. There, unexpectedly, Egyptian Muslim Brothers defend their free market, neo-liberal world view, while the Tunisian Ennahda adheres less strictly to this paradigm.

Read the full article at aspeninstitute.it »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

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What the U.S. Can Do for Egypt

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The Windy Road of Arab Transitions and Europe’s Weak Hand

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