Brookings Topics - Defense and Security

Future War and the Defence of Europe

John R. Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, Julian Lindley-French — Mon, 17 May 2021 14:42:51 +0000

By John R. Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, Julian Lindley-French

Published by the Oxford University Press

Future War and the Defence of Europe offers a major new analysis of how peace and security can be maintained in Europe: a continent that has suffered two cataclysmic conflicts since 1914. Taking as its starting point the COVID-19 pandemic and way it will inevitably accelerate some key global dynamics already in play, the book goes on to weave history, strategy, policy, and technology into a compelling analytical narrative. It lays out in forensic detail the scale of the challenge Europeans and their allies face if Europe’s peace is to be upheld in a transformative century. The book upends foundational assumptions about how Europe’s defence is organised, the role of a fast-changing transatlantic relationship, NATO, the EU, and their constituent nation-states. At the heart of the book is a radical vision of a technology-enabling future European defence, built around a new kind of Atlantic Alliance, an innovative strategic public-private partnership, and the future hyper-electronic European force, E-Force, it must spawn. Europeans should be under no illusion: unless they do far more for their own defence, and very differently, all that they now take for granted could be lost in the maze of hybrid war, cyber war, and hyper war they must face.

Learn more about the book here »

Illiberal allies

James Goldgeier, Mark Hannah, Elmira Bayrasli — Wed, 12 May 2021 19:33:15 +0000

By James Goldgeier, Mark Hannah, Elmira Bayrasli

The Marine Corps and the future of warfare

Fri, 07 May 2021 14:24:04 +0000

The Marine Corps is pursuing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition, including implementing a new force design. Evolving technology, uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal environment, and accelerating innovation by America’s emerging competitors have forced the Marine Corps to adapt by reconfiguring itself to better address the nation’s future defense outlook. Much work, though, remains to be done.

On May 18, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger to discuss Marine Corps modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges of great power competition. Questions from the audience will follow the conversation.

Viewers can submit questions via email to events@brookings.edu or on Twitter using #MarineCorps.

Don’t expect an al-Qaida reboot in Afghanistan

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 04 May 2021 21:26:05 +0000

By Daniel L. Byman

U.S. troops are beginning the process of leaving Afghanistan, after almost 20 years of fighting. Announcing his decision to complete the U.S. withdrawal by September, President Biden declared: “I believed that our presence in Afghanistan should be focused on the reason we went in the first place: to ensure Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack our homeland again. We did that. We accomplished that objective.”

But al-Qaida — which, after 9/11, provided the U.S. rationale for invading Afghanistan — still has 400 to 600 members fighting with the Taliban, according to U.N. Security Council estimates. In a recent interview, al-Qaida operatives promised “war against the U.S. will be continuing on all other fronts.” Citing concerns about an al-Qaida resurgence, several members of Congress blasted Biden’s decision. More quietly, many of the president’s military advisers also opposed the U.S. move to withdraw.

Critics of Biden’s decision warn that al-Qaida remains strong — and that, if U.S. troops depart, the Taliban will allow it a haven, U.S. counterterrorism pressure will decline, the Afghan government will struggle and attacks on the United States from Afghanistan will occur. How valid are each of these concerns?

How strong is al-Qaida in 2021?

Although al-Qaida has fighters in Afghanistan, its ability to launch international terrorist attacks from there and from Pakistan, where the core organization has been based for almost 20 years, is limited. Al-Qaida core members haven’t successfully attacked the U.S. homeland since 9/11, despite numerous attempts, and have also been ineffective against Europe in the past decade. Affiliate groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula have conducted limited attacks, including a December 2019 attack that killed three people at a U.S. naval base in Florida, but they are not based in Afghanistan and Pakistan like the core. Indeed, in the past decade, al-Qaida has localized more, relying heavily on affiliates to keep its name alive.

The United States has killed numerous al-Qaida core leaders, and overall leader Ayman al-Zawahiri may be dead — the fact that we don’t know his status months after rumors of his death tells us something about his decreased relevance. Pressure from U.S. airstrikes and Special Forces raids have kept leaders on the run and have prevented the establishment of large-scale training camps akin to those that existed before 9/11.

And countries around the world remain focused on the al-Qaida threat, in contrast with the pre-9/11 era. The global intelligence campaign has made it harder for the group to communicate, send its operatives to reconnoiter or raise money, or otherwise prepare to conduct attacks.

The Taliban lies, but it has reasons to restrain al-Qaida

U.S. negotiators have pressed the Taliban for years to agree to prevent al-Qaida from using Afghanistan as a haven for international terrorist attacks. The Taliban claims to have accepted this demand, and al-Qaida members also claim they will honor this even as they attack the United States from other theaters. However, Taliban leaders have lied about the extent of their relationship with al-Qaida in the past, casting doubt on denials about the future relationship between the two.

However, drawing the line at international attacks is logical for the Taliban. While it gave Osama bin Laden sanctuary, the Taliban opposed many of al-Qaida’s attacks, including 9/11 — though it continued to cooperate with al-Qaida despite being angry with the decision to attack the United States in 2001.

Since then, the Taliban has learned the cost of opposing the United States, and its leaders may recognize that keeping al-Qaida personnel as fighters but drawing the line at anti-U.S. terrorist attacks satisfies the Taliban’s loyalty to its ally and desire for capable fighters while keeping Afghanistan out of U.S. crosshairs.

U.S. counterterrorism capabilities will diminish

The U.S. withdrawal will limit the U.S. ability to strike the al-Qaida core in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The lack of U.S. troops is likely to hinder efforts to strike al-Qaida directly — but also make it difficult to determine whether the Taliban is cheating on its commitment to halt al-Qaida from conducting international attacks.

U.S. troops on bases in Afghanistan also protected intelligence assets and conducted raids against al-Qaida, and the bases served as drone launching points. CIA Director William J. Burns recently testified that, after a withdrawal, “the U.S. government’s ability to collect and act on threats will diminish.”

However, the United States will be able to sustain at least some counterterrorism capacity outside Afghanistan and is already working on other basing options, including Qatar and Uzbekistan. These alternatives are farther away, however, which will make U.S. operations more difficult.

The Afghan government is likely to get weaker

“I am concerned about the Afghan military’s ability to hold on after we leave,” Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, commander of U.S. Central Command, testified last week. This military weakness exists despite billions of U.S. dollars in aid, massive military training efforts and other support over the past two decades.

In the aftermath of a U.S. departure, the Afghan government’s ability to go after al-Qaida may be limited at best. The operations of Afghan forces depended heavily on U.S. intelligence and military support. In addition, without heavy pressure or inducement from the United States, the Afghan government is more likely to focus on the Taliban and other immediate threats — it’s less likely to have the bandwidth to address small groups of terrorists setting up shop to conduct international attacks.

Pakistan, however, may have more of an incentive to separate out al-Qaida from the Taliban, its longtime ally. Greater Taliban influence in Afghanistan is a victory for Pakistan, but Islamabad has its own Islamist militant challenge. An al-Qaeda attack from Afghanistan on the United States or Europe would put renewed pressure on the Taliban — an outcome Pakistan would oppose.

Taken together, these factors suggest the U.S. troop withdrawal will ease pressure on al-Qaida, but the group is far from its pre-9/11 strength, and it faces many challenges. As a result, it is far from certain that international terrorist attacks are a likely consequence of the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

The death of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno threatens stability in the region

Alexandre Marc — Thu, 29 Apr 2021 17:43:50 +0000

By Alexandre Marc

The sudden death on April 19, 2021 of Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno is creating a very dangerous vacuum in Central Africa and the Sahel. Déby, who ruled Chad for 30 years, was killed while fighting rebels trying to overthrow his government.

Few sub-Saharan African countries have the regional reach of Chad, and this is due essentially to its army — an army Déby was visiting when he was killed in a firefight, as Chadian troops battled with rebels from Libya. Chad has one of the most effective armies in sub-Saharan Africa and has, over the last 20 years, appeared on all fronts of the war against jihadist groups in the Sahel. It has also been involved in some neighboring civil wars, notably those in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), and more indirectly in Libya.

Chad’s powerful army gives it a formidable footprint in the region

Déby built Chad’s powerful army for a few reasons: to protect his regime from the constant ethnic rivalries and ambitions of various warlords from the country’s north; and also to achieve international recognition, credibility, and leverage in order to manage internal politics and use economic resources without interference. Déby always received strong backing from the West, particularly France and the U.S., despite his autocratic rule and rampant government corruption.

Chad has been the strongest supporter of Barkhane, the French military operation to fight jihadist groups in the Sahel. It has repeatedly sent expeditionary forces into the region and has just positioned more than 1,000 troops in the tri-border region of Liptako-Gourma, where a bloody jihadist insurgency is wreaking havoc on the population and national armies. Chad is also widely recognized as an essential pillar of the G5 Sahel — a military alliance between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, and heavily supported by France and the U.S. — to fight the region’s powerful jihadist insurrection. The Chadian army is very familiar with the terrain, as its troops were critically involved in the 2013 French-led military operation to defend Mali from a takeover by well-organized Islamic armed groups. Chad is also one of the top troop contributors to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the peacekeeping operation set up in 2013 in Mali in response to the insurrection.

Chad’s military presence in the region is not limited to the Sahel. In 2015, along with troops from neighboring Niger, it played a major role in dislodging Boko Haram from Northern Nigeria. It liberated some large Nigerian cities that had been under the terrorist organization’s control for months, and struck a near-fatal blow to the organization. In doing so, it shamed the Nigerian army — one of the largest in Africa — that had been paralyzed by Boko Haram for years. Chad continues to fight Boko Haram in and around Lake Chad. Recently, it lost around 100 men in clashes with Boko Haram and one of its splinter groups, the Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP). In response, it mounted a massive offensive and destroyed the camps of these organizations, supposedly killing more than 1,000 militants. At that time, Déby complained bitterly that his army was the only one taking on militants in this region, and threatened to pause all support for the war against terrorist groups outside of his country. These threats were a recurrent strategy to remind the world of Chad’s centrality and to gain support and recognition from Western nations.

Chad also played a role in the conflict in CAR. A few years ago, it got involved with armed groups in CAR’s northeast, assembled under a loose association called Seleka that occupied part of the country. Chad played a role in ending the conflict. Following the 2013 CAR civil war, Chad participated in the U.N. peacekeeping operation, contributing 850 troops, but left after being accused of human rights abuses and of being partial to the Muslim population. The situation was further complicated by members of the Chadian army having commercial interests in CAR linked to cattle raising and trading. In CAR, the Chadian army’s role varies: Sometimes it plays a stabilizing role, and at others it clearly contributes to violence and exactions.

Déby always kept an eye on Darfur, and more broadly on Sudan — mostly for internal security reasons, but Chad also had a strong impact on its neighbor at times. His Zaghawa ethnic group (and of some of his most trusted generals) represents less than 5% of the Chadian population, but is one of the most populous groups in Darfur. Some Chadian Zaghawa people based in Darfur had long been Déby’s most vigorous armed opposition group. To manage his opponents, he made efforts to please Khartoum, while always showing that he could influence the civil war that was ravaging the west of the country through his ethnic and family connections. He did this with the Justice and Equality Movement (MJE), one of the main armed groups opposing President Omar al-Bashir. In 2005, tensions between the two countries became heated, with armed clashes at the border. Twice, armed groups coming from Sudan to overthrow Déby nearly reached the capital, N’Djamena. In response, Déby sent his troops to track the rebels and reached the suburbs of Khartoum, clearly showing that he could bring Chad’s military might to bear.

By the same logic, Déby tried to manage his relations with Libyan groups, and it is understood that he had a good relationship with General Khalifa Haftar. Today, the most active military opposition to Déby’s regime comes from southern Libya (the Fezan), where some Chadian rebels helped General Haftar and where the Goran tribe — which constitutes the majority of the rebels — are active in illicit trading activities. The group that entered Chad and ended up killing Déby last week came from southern Libya; they built up an impressive arsenal, probably through their involvement in the Libyan civil war.

A well-financed, powerful, and unusually-structured army

Déby’s powerful army is an interesting mix of rebel groups and a modern army, making it very powerful but also highly dependent on Déby’s personal involvement. Most of the high-ranking officers and elite troops are recruited from the northern tribes — principally the Zaghawa, but also the Goran and other groups more broadly known as Toubous. They possess very old and solid combat traditions, excellent knowledge of the desert, an astonishing physical endurance, and a lot of courage. The elite units are often comprised of family and clan members who know each other well. At the same time, the army uses well-trained technicians such as helicopter and combat plane pilots who benefit from heavy support from France and other Western countries. Oil revenues fund generous salaries for officers and elite troops, as well as an impressive arsenal of relatively sophisticated equipment, including combat aircraft and helicopters. The International Crisis Group estimates that 40% to 50% of Chad’s budget goes to the country’s defense and security expenses.

In 2000, Chad started to exploit relatively important oil reserves situated in the country’s south. Worried about corruption, the World Bank and a number of development partners set up a complex mechanism by which they would finance an essential pipeline to export the oil to the coast, on the condition that the revenue would be channeled to a special fund monitored by donors. This mechanism was set up to ensure that resources would be used for development and poverty alleviation. At that time, this mechanism was hailed as a great innovation in good governance. But starting in 2006, Déby managed to change the original system to channel significant oil revenues to his army and to large public work programs of his choice, which did not always benefit the poor. Given the regional geopolitics, however, Western donors averted their eyes and accepted the situation.

Many instability risks that need careful management

Despite its strength, the Chadian army also has significant weaknesses that could feed instability. First, the way the army acts toward the civilian population, with frequent exactions, limits its capacity to build up trust in ways that are essential for stability. Second, the army is marred by internal rivalry between commanders. Family rivalries or clan-based rivalries often extend inside the army. The fact that so many of the elite soldiers are northerners means that they also tend to have strong connections to some of the rebel movements based in Sudan or Libya, which are often comprised of former soldiers of the Chadian army. Also, Déby’s strong involvement in the army — which he often commanded directly in the field — is probably the biggest risk. He kept the army’s internal cohesion through personal negotiations, meaning that many loyalties are to him and not to other high-ranking officers.

An additional source of instability is Chad’s tense and fragmented political landscape. Just days before his death, Déby was reelected for a sixth consecutive term, with 80% of the vote; however, his hold on power was largely seen as a parody of democracy. His regime was autocratic, and while a decade ago he was making efforts to accommodate opponents and had some pretense of inclusiveness, his regime is now opaque, with most decisions made by a small group of friends and relatives. Just after his death, a Transitional Military Council was established, with 15 generals all very close to Déby; it is chaired by his son, a 37-year-old general.

These are very delicate times for Chad and the entire region. The personalization of Déby’s regime has left the country with extremely weak institutions.

The council has suspended the constitution and declared an 18-month transition period. One of the main reasons for the move is certainly the fear that the army could disintegrate, but it is also to ensure that the clan of Déby keeps control of the army and the country. The political opposition and civil society have called the move a military coup and called for protests, as did the African Union. Neither France nor the U.S. said anything immediately, but after protesters died during demonstrations, they weighed in with condemnation of the killing.

These are very delicate times for Chad and the entire region. The personalization of Déby’s regime has left the country with extremely weak institutions. There is a real risk of serious infighting inside the army and the circles of power, even inside Déby’s own family. Also, tensions with the political opposition are rapidly increasing. It seems clear that suspending the constitution will only make things worse. France, the European Union, and the U.S. — the main donors to Chad — should put strong pressure on the Transitional Military Council so that it engages in a more substantive dialogue with political factions and civil society than it has done so far. The council should also show that it is serious about organizing elections, as it said it would, much earlier than in 18 months, as announced. Under pressure, the council has just nominated a civilian prime minister. This is a good step. It should also nominate a government sufficiently representative of the country’s different social groups, particularly ethnic groups from the south and center that have been marginalized. It would also be important for Western nations to pressure the new Libyan authorities, particularly General Haftar, to rapidly improve their control of various militias and armed groups in Libya. The ceasefire in this country has created opportunities for highly armed groups to look for opportunities abroad, as was the case when the Gadhafi regime fell.

An asymmetric defense of Taiwan

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 28 Apr 2021 20:15:31 +0000

By Michael E. O'Hanlon

In recent months, as China’s threats against Taiwan have mounted, strategists and policymakers have been debating whether it is time for a change to the somewhat tortured method by which the United States has sought to preserve stability across the Taiwan Strait since the late 1970s. The current policy of “strategic ambiguity” seeks to keep everyone guessing as to whether America would militarily counter a Chinese attack on its much smaller neighbor. Washington’s specific response would depend on how a crisis began and unfolded. That is because America has had multiple, sometimes conflicting goals—to deter China from attack, to preserve good U.S.-China relations, and to discourage pro-independence forces within Taiwan all at once. Some now favor discarding this elaborate balancing act in favor of an unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s security.

There is just one problem with this way of thinking. A promise by America to defend Taiwan does not mean that it could defend it. That is especially the case if one considers a protracted Chinese blockade of the island, and imagines that the United States would try to break the blockade directly. Such an attack would employ China’s quiet submarine fleet and perhaps some use of precision missiles. The goal would likely be to strangle Taiwan into capitulation, as Germany almost did twice against Britain in the world wars. Taiwan has just increased its military budget 10 percent, to about $15 billion a year, but it is dwarfed by China’s total, which is more than fifteen times as great. At that level of investment, Taiwan may be able to fend off an outright Chinese invasion attempt with a “porcupine” defense featuring sea mines, anti-ship missiles launched from shore batteries and helicopters, and concentrated resistance wherever China tries to come ashore. But it would likely fare less well against a more indirect Chinese strategy.

American advantages in fifth-generation combat aircraft and modern attack submarines would give the United States and its partners in the operation a significant edge in a campaign designed to break the blockade. However, China would clearly have the edge in geography; crucially, it also now possesses a fleet of very good attack submarines and a large inventory of precision-strike missiles too.

The essence of the problem is that America cannot reliably find Chinese attack submarines before they get off one or more shots at ships, including possibly U.S. aircraft carriers, in the region. Worse, if they use long-range missiles against U.S. ships, then it may not be possible to find the submarines after such attacks. The only truly reliable way to counter the threat would be to attack the submarines in port when they refuel and rearm. In other words: the United States would need to attack the Chinese mainland, with all the enormous risks of escalation that could portend.

The challenge is similar in regard to China’s inventory of more than one thousand precision-strike missiles. They can be fired from many locations in southeastern mainland China against airfields, ports, and other infrastructure on Taiwan—and against ships at sea. U.S. missile defenses might be able to neutralize some. But in a saturation attack, and given the state of the offense-defense balance in regard to such missiles, many would surely get through. Again, America’s likely recourse would be to search for and attack the missile launchers on mainland Chinese soil.

Meanwhile, both sides would have strong incentives to take down or jam each other’s satellites, hack command and control systems, cut fiber-optic communications cables, and otherwise seek to create mayhem in order to blind and cripple the adversary. It is distinctly possible the United States could lose thousands of sailors and other personnel in the course of such a conflict. That is why defense strategist and former John McCain aide Chris Brose reports that in Pentagon wargames over Taiwan, China often defeats us. Even if China started to lose such a war, given how strongly it feels about Taiwan, it would have powerful incentives to introduce the use of tactical nuclear weapons into the equation, targeting aircraft carrier battle groups and bases on Japan with these weapons.

Just where this foreboding path would end is hard to predict. Countries at war tend to do irrational or escalatory things when the tide of battle does not at first go their way and when they consider their survival as a nation to be at stake. Losing Taiwan would go far towards invalidating the legitimacy of communist rule in China, as its leaders surely know. They would be extremely reluctant to accept defeat in this kind of war.

There must be a better way. Strategist Bridge Colby has recently sketched out part of the right strategy with his call for a massive U.S. airlift effort to keep Taiwan afloat in the course of any such boa constrictor strategy by the People’s Republic of China, modeled after the Berlin airlift of Cold War times. But also, America needs a better offensive campaign plan. The most promising strategy would center on all-out economic warfare against China. The United States should cut off all trade with China at the outset of any such war, and pressure U.S. allies to do the same. That strategy necessitates numerous preparatory measures now to increase America’s collective resilience to such a scenario.

In addition, unless the crisis is quickly resolved, the United States should consider using its military superiority in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf regions to go after China’s economic lifelines there, attacking shipping that is likely headed to Chinese destinations using U.S. attack submarines, long-range bombers, and other stealth aircraft based throughout the region. China gets half or more of its energy from the broader Persian Gulf and African theaters, so its vulnerability here is great. And because the crews of most modern ships number in the dozens, the human stakes here while serious are far less than in war that could quickly involve Chinese and Japanese territory. (Indeed, America should try to develop improved nonlethal ordnance to incapacitate ships without sinking them.) Even after these military attacks begin, the goal of course should remain a negotiated outcome. It is not credible to envision with any confidence a decisive, permanent military victory in any U.S.-China war—unless the two countries collectively wind up in Armageddon.

And yes, the United States can realistically commit to this kind of strategy now. That will especially be the case if it continues to reduce its collective western dependencies on key Chinese exports, like rare Earths, by stockpiling supplies and developing alternative sources. America and its allies are overdue in making such efforts. Thankfully, there is reason to think that U.S. collective insouciance is starting to end on the economic side of the ledger. Now, the Pentagon, along with the U.S. Treasury Department and the rest of the government, need to take advantage of this situation and develop a better integrated, asymmetric strategy for protecting Taiwan.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard — April 2021

Tue, 27 Apr 2021 21:30:13 +0000

Welcome to the eleventh edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe — overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions — as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted April 6 to 9, 2021. The experts’ analyses are complemented by a timeline of significant moments over the previous three calendar months and a snapshot of the relationship, including a tracker of President Biden’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

January

January 1: The United Kingdom officially left the European Union (EU) Custom Union and the EU single market, and Gibraltar joined the Schengen Area under Spanish sponsorship. In Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s new year’s address, he stated “we have our freedom in our hands and it is up to use to make the most of it.” French President Emmanuel Macron countered in his new year’s address and stated, that Brexit “was the child of European malaise and of many lies and false promises.”
January 1: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey issued a presidential decree to appoint Melh Bulu, a politician from Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), as the rector of Boğaziçi University, launching a months-long, student-led protest movement.
January 4: Portugal began its sixth month presidency of the Council of the European Union with the motto “time to deliver: a fair, green and digital recovery.”
January 4: The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had resumed 20% uranium enrichment at the underground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. The Council of the European Union later urged “Iran to refrain from further escalation” and called on the U.S. and Iran to return to full JCPOA compliance.
January 6: The European Medicines Agency (EMA) reccomended the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine for authorization in the EU.
January 6: While members of Congress were certifying the results of the November 2020 presidential election, a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol. European leaders expressed deep concern over the events. EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated, “This is not America,” and German Chancellor Angela Merkel condemned President Trump’s response to the November 2020 election, stating “A basic rule of democracy is: After elections, there are winners and losers. Both have to play their roles with decency and a sense of responsibility, so that democracy itself remains the winner.”
January 8: In response to the events of January 6, Twitter permanently banned President Trump due to “the risk of further incitement of violence.” Across the Atlantic, Twitter’s decision raised questions of technology, social media regulation, and freedom of speech. High Representative Borrell stated that the European Union needs “to be able to better regulate the contents of social networks,” and European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton called for a restoration of “trust in the digital space” in order to guarantee the “survival [of] our democracies in the 21st century.” Chancellor Merkel considered Twitter’s move “problematic,” with her spokesman saying that she viewed the right of free speech as having “fundamental importance.”
January 13: In response to allegations of corruption, Jüri Ratas resigned as Prime Minister of Estonia and head of the Center Party. Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid tapped Leader of the Reform Party Kaja Kallas to start talks to form a new government, which would be completed two weeks later with the formation of a coalition cabinet consisting of the center-right Reform Party and the left-leaning Center Party. Kaja Kallas became the first female Prime Minister of Estonia.
January 13: The U.S. House of Representatives impeached President Donald Trump, making him the first president in U.S. history to be twice impeached. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas stated that the impeachment was “nothing other than the expression of the American people’s need to ensure that there are consequences for damaging their democratic institutions.”
January 14: The German Bundestag approved the German Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – “GWB”), a comprehensive overhaul of Germany’s antitrust laws. The GWB provides the German government with the necessary regulatory tools to address abuses of competitive dominance, including abuses in the digital realm.
January 16: Armin Laschet, the minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia was elected the new chairman of Germany’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), beating his more conservative rival Friedrich Merz by 521 to 466 votes in a runoff.
January 17: Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny returned to Moscow from Germany, where he was recovering from a suspected poisoning by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Upon his return, Navalny was detained and held by the prison services. On February 2, a Moscow court would rule that Navalny violated the terms of his probation for an old criminal charge that was previously deemed by the European Court of Human Rights to have lacked a fair trial. Navalny was sentenced to more than two and a half years in prison.
January 18: Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte won a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of 321 to 259. The next day, he survived a vote of confidence in the Italian Senate but was short 161 votes in the parliament and thus did not secure an overall majority. He would resign as prime minister on January 25.
January 19: The European Commission announced a goal of having “a minimum of 70% of the adult population” vaccinated by Summer 2021.
January 19: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo determined that China is “committing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.” During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-nominee Antony Blinken agreed, stating “the forcing of men, women, and children into concentration camps; trying to, in effect, re-educate them to be adherents to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide.”
January 20: Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the United States, and Kamala Harris was sworn in as the 49th vice president of the United States.
January 21: Hungary approved SputnikV, the Russian-produced coronavirus vaccine, for use, becoming the first EU member state to independently authorize a COVID-19 vaccine.
January 22: AstraZeneca announced that its first deliveries of the COVID-19 vaccine to the European Union would be “lower than initially anticipated,” leading the European Commissioner for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides to state that the EU Commission and member states were deeply dissatisfied with the delivery delays.
January 23: President Biden spoke with Prime Minister Johnson and discussed NATO, “the importance of cooperation, including through multilateral challenges such as combatting climate change, containing COVID-19, and ensuring global health security,” and shared foreign policy concerns, including China, Iran and Russia.
January 24: President Biden spoke with French President Emmanuel Macron and discussed NATO, the importance of cooperation through multilateral organizations, and foreign policy priorities, including China, the Middle East, Russia, and the Sahel.
January 27: Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, suspended operations in Hungary after the European Court of Justice ruled that Hungary violated EU law by denying protection for asylum-seekers.
January 29: The EMA approved the AstraZeneca vaccine for use. In response to fears that the newly approved vaccine would be imported to the United Kingdom by way of Northern Ireland, the European Union attempted to trigger Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol, a provision of the treaty that allows for one party to unilaterally instate trade controls between the European Union and Northern Ireland. However, the European Union quickly revoked the decision and instead implemented an export authorization scheme, that would block all COVID-19 vaccine exports to about 100 countries worldwide.
January 30: Following the resignation of Prime Minister Conte, Italian President Sergio Mattarella tasked the speaker of the lower house and member of the 5Star Movement Robert Fico to build a new government.
January 31: European Commission President von der Leyen announced that AstraZeneca would deliver 9 million more doses to EU countries by the end of March, for a total of 40 million total doses.

February

February 3: The United States and Russia agreed to extend the New START treaty for five years, ensuring verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026. In support of the agreement’s renewal, the EU stated “[b]y increasing predictability and mutual confidence amongst the two largest nuclear weapon States, this Treaty limits strategic competition and increases strategic stability.”
February 3: Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) unveiled a media advertising tax against independent television and radio stations, print outlets, and media companies. Sen. Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, issued a statement expressing concern, stating “this measure could undermine the financial viability of Poland’s independent media, a necessity for any democracy.”
February 5: EU High Representative Josep Borell traveled to Moscow and met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. In a tense joint press conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov called the European Union an “unreliable partner,” accused European leaders of lying about Alexei Navalny’s poisoning, and called EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea “unilateral and illegitimate restrictions […] imposed under false pretenses.” During a working lunch following the press conference, Russia expelled three European diplomats from Germany, Sweden, and Poland. In a blog post published two days later, High Representative Borrell stated “[a]n aggressively-staged press conference and the expulsion of three EU diplomats during my visit indicate that the Russian authorities did not want to seize this opportunity to have a more constructive dialogue with the EU.”
February 8: Germany, Poland, and Sweden each expelled a Russian diplomat in response to Russia’s decision to expel three of their diplomats from Moscow.
February 9: Following High Representative Borrell’s visit to Moscow, more than 70 members of parliament signed a letter drafted by Estonian European People’s Party MEP Riho Terras calling on Borrell to resign.
February 13: Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank, was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Italy. After the resignation of former Prime Minister Conte and a failed attempt by Roberto Fico of the 5Star Movement to form a new government, Silvio Berlusconi broke center right unity and the 5Star movement voted in favor of Draghi’s government, resulting in the successful formation of a new Italian parliament. Draghi would go on to win votes of confidence in Italy’s upper and lower chambers on February 17 and 18.
February 14: European Health Commissioner Kyriakides announced that COVID-19 vaccines that “have been upgraded by the manufacturer based on the previous vaccine to combat new mutations will not have to go through the whole approval process,” in effect shortening the previous EU vaccination approval process.
February 15: The Hungarian Media Council stripped Hungary’s last major independent radio station Klubrádió of its broadcasting license, forcing the station to operate solely online.
February 17: U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin joined his first NATO defense ministers meeting to discuss NATO2030, burden-sharing, enhanced deterrence and defense, NATO-EU relations, emerging and disruptive technologies, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, Secretary Austin wrote, “We are ready to consult together, decide together and act together. We are ready to revitalize our alliances. We are ready to lead.”
February 18: The U.S. Department of State announced the imposition of a third round of visa restrictions against 48 “Belarusian individuals responsible for undermining Belarusian democracy, making them generally ineligible for entry into the United States,” including justice officials, law enforcement leaders, and academic administrators.
February 19: The Group of Seven (G7) met to discuss cooperation on COVID-19, reaffirming the group’s support for COVAX and the World Health Organization (WHO) and agreeing to work with the WHO and the G20 to “bolster global health and health security architecture for pandemic preparedness.” This marked President Biden’s first G7 meeting.
February 19: Secretary Austin spoke with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Andrii Taran and reaffirmed the U.S.’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Minister Taran emphasized his commitment to bringing Ukraine’s defense sector in line with NATO principles and standards. Following the discussion, NATO representatives from the U.S., Canada, Lithuania, Poland, and the U.K. met with Ukrainian officials to discuss sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a focus on the Black Sea.
February 19: President Biden of the United States, Chancellor Merkel of Germany, President Macron of France, Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, and EU Commission President von der Leyen spoke virtually at the 2021 Munich Security Conference. President Biden declared “America is back, the trans-Atlantic alliance is back,” and Chancellor Merkel argued that while she had “no illusions” that the United States and Europe will always be in agreement, it is important for the United States and Europe to cooperate on China and Russia.
February 20: After being sentenced to more than two and half years in prison for violating probation rules, Alexei Navalny was called back to court on an additional charge of defaming a World War II veteran. He was ordered to pay a fine of 850,000 rubles ($11,500).
February 22: U.S. Secretary of State Blinken participated in the EU Foreign Affairs Council where he highlighted the U.S.’s commitment to U.S.-EU relations and stressed that the United States remains committed to cooperating with the European Union on issues such as democracy, human rights, and multilateralism. Secretary Blinken also welcomed the EU’s decision to sanction Russia in response to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.
February 23: Nikanor Melia, leader of Georgia’s main opposition party United National Movement, was arrested and detained on charges of inciting violence during the June 2019 street protests. The U.S. Department of State released a press statement, stating “polarizing rhetoric, force and aggression are not the solution to Georgia’s political differences,” and an EU statement noted that, “this polarization risks undermining Georgia’s democracy.”
February 23: Secretary Blinken spoke with Polish Foreign Minister Rau on NATO, democratic values, media freedom, and respect for civil rights.
February 25: Secretary Blinken spoke with Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok and discussed the desire to intensify U.S.-Dutch cooperation “to manage key global challenges, including those posed by China, Russia, and Iran.”
February 26: On the seventh anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, President Biden and Secretary Blinken released statements of support for Ukraine, stating, “we affirm this basic truth: Crimea is Ukraine.” Both statements condemned Russia’s violation of international law, and the Department of State declared that U.S. sanctions on Russia would remain in place “unless and until Russia reverses course.” In his capacity as President of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, German Foreign Minister Maas reaffirmed “unequivocal and unwavering support for the independence, and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” and called on Russia to comply with international law and human rights standards.

March

March 1: The U.S. Department of Defense announced a new $125 million defense package for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, consisting of patrol boats, defensive lethal weapons, medical equipment, and training support.
March 1: European Council President Charles Michel traveled to Georgia to meet with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and the speaker of the Georgian parliament Archil Talakvadze. Following private meetings, President Michel presided over negotiations between Prime Minister Garibashvili and opposition politicians.
March 2: European Council President Michel met with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv to discuss COVID-19, ongoing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian domestic political, judicial, and economic reform. In a press statement, Michel stated that “Russia is a party to [the conflict in eastern Ukraine,] and not a mediator,” and noted that Russia continues to violate the Minsk Agreements and as such, EU economic sanctions against Russia will remain in place.
March 2: Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced coordinated sanctions against Russian government officials involved in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The United States sanctioned seven individuals and added 14 entities involved in the proliferation of Russia’s weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons programs to the Entity List. Under the new EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, the European Union and the United Kingdom sanctioned four government officials.
March 2: Secretary Blinken spoke with Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide and discussed efforts to deepen cooperation on the UN Security Council, climate change, human rights, and transatlantic security, among other issues. In addition, the United States and Iceland held their annual strategic dialogue and discussed the Arctic, climate change, human rights, and democracy.
March 2: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke with Luigi Mattiolo, Diplomatic Advisor to the Italian Prime Minister to discuss Italy’s G20 presidency priorities, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
March 3: After 148 MEPs voted in favor of new rules that would allow for the European People’s Party (EPP) group to vote for the exclusion of “a Member or Members of the Group,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced that MEPs from his political party, Fidesz, would resign their EPP memberships.
March 3: Following the release of the U.S. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance report, Secretary Blinken, in his first major speech as Secretary of State, outlined the Biden administration’s eight foreign policy priorities: pandemic response, economic recovery, strengthening democracy, immigration reform, revitalizing alliances, climate change and energy, technology, and China.
March 3: The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence service, placed the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) under surveillance as a suspected threat to the country’s constitution. Shortly thereafter, a court in Cologne ruled that the BfV could not yet label the AfD as a suspected threat or treat it as such due to an ongoing court case initiated by the AfD which alleged that the BfV’s actions would infringe upon the party’s right to a fair electoral campaign.
March 3: In response to criticism of EU’s vaccine procurement and distribution, European Council President Michel published a letter attempting to “set out some facts which show that Europe is not lagging behind in a spring, but is well placed to lead the field in a marathon.” President Michel highlighted that the European Union “was the driving force and leading donor” in the development and production of several COVID-19 vaccines and pushed back against “accusations of ‘vaccine nationalism’,” stating, while the United Kingdom and United States imposed “an outright ban on the export of vaccines,” the European Union “has simply put in place a system for controlling the export of doses produced in the EU.”
March 3: The Czech Republic sent a request to President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping requesting deliveries of the Chinese Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine, making the Czech Republic the second EU member state, following Hungary, to independently procure vaccines from China.
March 4: Secretary Austin spoke with Georgian Minister of Defense Juansher Burchuladze and reaffirmed U.S. support for Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity and U.S. commitment to helping Georgia develop defense capabilities in the face of Russian aggression and malign influence.
March 4: Under the export authorization scheme implemented in January 2021 and with approval from the European Commission, Italy blocked a shipment of 250,000 Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine doses en route to Australia.
March 5: Following a call between President Biden and EU Commission President von der Leyen, the United States and European Union decided to suspend all retaliatory tariffs imposed in the Airbus and Boeing disputes for a four-month period. A press release following the call noted that President Biden and President von der Leyen also discussed the climate crisis, democracy, and regional issues, including China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans.
March 8: The United States and the European Union finalized a two-year long negotiation on new post-Brexit agriculture quotas. The parties agreed to maintain original import quota volumes and divide imports between the European Union and the United Kingdom.
March 10: The Russian government announced it would slowdown access to Twitter after the company failed to comply with a 2006 law that bans Internet providers from hosting content related to suicide, child pornography, and the use of narcotic drugs.
March 10: U.S. Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry traveled to Brussels, Paris, and London, where he met with EU Commission President von der Leyen, European Commission Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans, President Macron of France, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom, among other U.K. government officials, to discuss climate goals ahead of the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26).
March 11: Following reports of blood clotting from the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine, several European countries, including Italy, France, Germany, and Denmark, suspended its rollout. Denmark stopped administering all AstraZeneca jabs, while Italy placed restrictions on one delivery batch. The EMA would later announce that “the benefits of the vaccine…continue to outweigh the risk of side effects,” and that “the vaccine is not associated with an increase in the overall risk of blood clots.”
March 11: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States Italy released a joint statement in support of the interim Government of National Unity in Libya. In an additional joint statement, the group condemned sustained Houthi attacks in Yemen and reiterated their commitment to “the security and integrity of Saudi territory.”
March 11: The EMA approved the Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) COVID -19 vaccine for authorization, becoming the fourth vaccine authorized for use in the European Union.
March 12: The G7 foreign ministers and EU High Representative released a joint statement, expressing “grave concerns at the Chinese authorities’ decision fundamentally to erode democratic elements of the electoral system in Hong Kong” and calling on “China to act in accordance with the Sino-British Declaration and its legal obligations and respect fundamental rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, as provided for in the Basic Law.”
March 14: The German states of Badan-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate held elections. In Badan-Württemberg, The Green Party won with 32% of the vote, and in Rhineland-Palatinate, the Social Democrats won, securing 34.5% of the vote. Support for the CDU in both states dropped by several percentage points compared to the 2016 election.
March 16: The National Intelligence Council released an unclassified report, “Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” that assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized “influence operations aimed at denigrating President Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US.”
March 15: After the United Kingdom released plans to unilaterally delay the introduction of post-Brexit custom checks at Northern Ireland’s ports in early March, the European Commission launched legal action against the British government “for breaching the substantive provisions of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, as well as the good faith obligation under the Withdrawal Agreement.”
March 16: EU Commission President von der Leyen announced that BioNTech/Pfizer would accelerate deliveries to the European Union and supply an additional 10 million doses, bringing the total delivery of BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine doses to more than 200 million in the second quarter of 2021.
March 17: The European Commission released its official proposal to create a Digital Green Certificate, a vaccine certification that would assist with facilitating safe, free movement inside the EU during COVID-19 by verifying that an individual has been vaccinated, recently tested negative, or recently recovered from COVID-19.
March 17: The chief prosecutor of the Turkish Supreme Court filed a case asking the court to ban the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). The case alleged that the HDP was acting effectively as an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a claim President Erdoğan has long made. The Supreme Court would reject the case on March 31, citing procedural deficiencies. In addition, Turkey’s parliament stripped Ömer Faruk Gergerlioglu, Member of Parliament for the HDP, of his parliamentary seat. Both the European Union and the United States released statements of concern and called on Turkey to respect international obligations, including respect for democracy and human rights.
March 17: President Biden hosted his first virtual bilateral meeting with Irish Taoiseach (PM) Micheál Martin. In a joint statement following the meeting, the leaders “called for the good faith implementation of international agreements designed to address the unique circumstances on the island if Ireland.”
March 17: Ahead of U.S.-China talks in Anchorage, Alaska, U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan previewed the meeting, in a joint call, to his French, German, and British counterparts and, in a personal call, to Secretary General Stoltenberg.
March 18: The G7 foreign ministers and EU High Representative released a joint statement to reaffirm “support and commitment to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Further, the ministers opposed “Russia’s continued destabilization of Ukraine, especially Russia’s actions in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, disregarding the commitments it made under the Minsk agreements” and called on “the Russian federation to stop fueling the conflict by providing financial and military support to the armed formations it backs in eastern Ukraine.”
March 18: The U.S. Department of State warned that “any entity involved in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should immediately abandon work on the pipeline.”
March 18: China, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States held an extended “Troika” meeting with Qatar, Turkey, and representatives from the Afghan government and the Taliban on the intra-Afghan peace process. After the meeting, China, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States called on the Taliban “not to pursue a Spring offensive, so as to avoid further casualties and to create an environment conducive to reaching a negotiated political settlement.”
March 19: The Dutch People’s Party of Freedom and Democracy (VVD) won the Dutch general elections, leaving Prime Minister Mark Rutte in office. Following the election, the Democrats 66 (D66), a social liberal political party, became the second largest party in the Netherlands, and 17 political parties would be represented in the 150-seat Dutch parliament in total.
March 19: EU Commission President von der Leyen and European Commission President Michel held a videoconference with President Erdoğan of Turkey, where they “underlined the importance of sustained de-escalation and of further strengthening confidence building to allow for a more positive EU-Turkey agenda.”
March 20: Turkish President Erdoğan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention. A White House statement called Turkey’s decision a “disheartening step backward for the international movement to end violence against women globally.”
March 22: The European Union, under the Global Magnitsky framework, sanctioned eleven individuals and four entities connected with serious human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang, China; North Korea; Libya; Russia, South Sudan, and Eritrea. In coordination, the United States and United Kingdom announced additional sanctions against Chinese individuals connected to gross human rights abuses and violations in Xinjiang Province. Hours later, the Chinese government announced retaliatory sanctions against eight European parliamentarians, two European scholars, and four entities, including The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in Demark, the Council of the EU’s Political and Security Committee, and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights.
March 22: After raising interest rates to counter a rise in inflation, Naci Agbal, Turkish central bank governor, was fired by President Erodgan of Turkey. Sahap Kavcioglu, a former parliamentarian in President Erdoğan’s AKP, replaced Agbal.
March 22: The European Council officially established the European Peace Facility (EPF), a fund worth approximately €5 billion intended to “enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflict, preserve peace and strengthen international stability and security.”
March 24: Secretary Blinken traveled to Brussels for the NATO Foreign Ministerial. In addition to speaking at NATO headquarters, Secretary Blinken met individually with EU Commission President von der Leyen, EU High Representative Borrell, and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, participated in two joint meetings – one with his French, German, and British counterparts and one with the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – and met on the margins with Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio and German Foreign Minister Maas. In a joint statement following Secretary Blinken and High Representative Borrell’s meeting, the two parties announced they had “decided to re-launch the bilateral dialogue on China, as a forum to discuss the full range of related challenges and opportunities” and “acknowledged a shared understanding that relations with China are multifaceted, comprising elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry.” With Foreign Minister Maas, Secretary Blinken emphasized U.S. opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
March 24: Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 16 additional countries, signed a joint statement to support the Establishment of the International Accountability Platform for Belarus (IAPB), an organization that “has taken on the responsibility of the collection, consolidation, verification and preservation of information, documentation and evidence of serious violations of international human rights law committed in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and its aftermath.”
March 24: Amid growing trade tensions and export control talks, the European Union and United Kingdom released a joint statement on COVID-19 vaccines, stating that “openness and global cooperation of all countries will be key to finally overcome this pandemic and ensure better preparation for meeting future challenges.”
March 25: Greece celebrated its 200th anniversary of independence from Ottoman Turkish rule. To honor Greece’s bicentennial, President Biden spoke with Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and “conveyed his appreciation for our growing defense cooperation, including the U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay.” The two also discussed climate change, economic recovery, energy security, and regional issues, including the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia, China, and the Western Balkans.
March 25: President Biden virtually joined the European Council video summit, marking the first time in 11 years a foreign leader joined a regular Council meeting. In opening remarks, Council President Michel stated that Biden’s Presidency is “a historic opportunity to re-energize [U.S.-EU] cooperation. And deepen our historic bond.”
March 25: Secretary Blinken met with Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophie Wilmes. In remarks to the press, Secretary Blinken stated: “Whether it’s climate, whether it’s COVID, whether it’s the challenge of emerging technologies, all of these things that actually have an impact on our people’s lives, not a single one of them can be dealt with effectively by any one country acting alone.”
March 25: Members of European Parliament voted in support of future EU integration of Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. A press release following the vote noted that membership negotiations with North Macedonia should begin as soon as possible.
March 26: The U.S. Department of State announced that the United Kingdom and the United States “completed an exchange of diplomatic notes to bring the U.S.-UK Air Transport Agreement (‘the Agreement’) into force.” The Agreement serves as the basis for U.S.-U.K. air services relations, including unrestricted capacity and frequency, open routes, code-sharing opportunities, a liberal charter regime, and market-determined pricing.
March 26: The Ukrainian military reported that four Ukrainian soldiers were killed and two were injured by Russian-backed separatist in southeast Ukraine, near Donetsk.
March 27: Chiefs of defense from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States released a joint statement “calling on the military junta in Burma – also called Myanmar – to follow international standards of military professionalism.” The statement came after reports that over 350 people, including more than 20 children, had been killed in the aftermath of the February 1 military coup.
March 29: U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan spoke with Ukraine’s Head of Presidential Office Andriy Yermak and “affirmed the United States’ unwavering support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” The two also discussed President Zelenskyy’s “plan to tackle corruption and implement a reform agenda that delivers justice, security, and prosperity to the people of Ukraine.”
March 29: In an unusual peak of flights over the Atlantic, North Sea, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea, NATO intercepted six different groups of Russian military aircrafts in the span of less than six hours.
March 30: President Macron of France, Chancellor Merkel of Germany, and President Putin of Russia held a joint videoconference and discussed Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine, Alexei Navalny, and regional issues, including recent events in Ukraine. France, Germany, and Russia emphasized that the 2015 Minsk peace deal brokered by France and Germany remains the only viable solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. President Putin placed blame on Ukraine, expressing “serious concern about the escalation of armed confrontation on the contact line being provoked by Ukraine.”
March 30: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Ruslan Khomchak announced a buildup of Russian troops in southeast Ukraine. In response, it was reported that the U.S. military’s European Command raised watch levels to the highest level. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke with both his Ukrainian and Russian counterpart and U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan spoke with Ukraine’s Head of Presidential Office Andriy Yermak to affirm U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Snapshot

Europe on the line

Between January 1 and March 31, 2021, President Biden spoke on the phone with British Prime Minister Johnson twice (January 23 and March 26), French President Macron once (January 24), German Chancellor Merkel once (January 25), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg once (January 26), Russian President Putin once (January 26), European Commission President von der Leyen once (March 5), and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis once (March 25).

We track President Biden’s phone calls with the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, whether they had spoken or not, as well as other calls with European leaders of which we were aware. If we missed a conversation, please give us a ring. Sources: the White House.

Figures

The race to vaccinate citizens of the United States and Europe featured prominently in the trans-Atlantic discussion this quarter. Criticism of the European Union’s slow vaccination campaign was met with accusations that the Biden administration was exercising a form of nationalism by restricting exports of raw materials needed to produce vaccines.

As of March 31, vaccination rates in Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which, respectively, gave out nearly 116, 53, and 44 COVID-19 doses for every 100 citizens, stood in sharp contrast to the global average of less than 8 doses per 100 people. These numbers represent the total number of jabs administered – counting first doses and second doses separately in the case of Moderna and Pfizer/BioNTech. 61% of Israelis, 46% of Brits, and 29% of Americans and had received at least one shot at the end of March, while globally, that number stood at roughly 4%.

Since at least summer 2020, the European Union has firmly made the case for multilateral vaccine distribution and sought to position itself as a leader in this effort. As of early April 2021, just over $11 billion had been donated to the WHO’s Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A), the umbrella organization for COVAX, which seeks to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 treatment, including vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostic and personal protective equipment. Of that $11 billion, the total contribution from the European Union (member states and European Commission combined) came to nearly $3.9 billion, representing approximately 0.02% of the combined 2019 GDP of all EU member states. By contrast, the United States committed a total of $2.5 billion to ACT-A, 0.012% of 2019 GDP. Not only does this make the European Union’s contribution to ACT-A over 1.5 times larger than the United States’, but relative to GDP, the EU contribution is twice the size of the U.S. donation, while Germany’s alone is nearly 6 times the United States’ when pegged to GDP. Meanwhile, the WHO estimates that an additional $22 billion – twice the amount donated thus far – will be needed beyond the amount already given to meet the WHO’s vaccine delivery goals, bolster research to address COVID-19 variants, and ensure effective supply and usage of COVID-19 tests and PPE.

Ultimately, as WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in February 2021, without vaccines, money becomes “irrelevant.” From the onset of the pandemic through the first quarter of 2021, the United States focused existing vaccine doses on its population, even placing export controls on not only the vaccines themselves, but also the raw materials needed for their production.* Taking a slightly different approach to the United States, the European Union exported millions of vaccine doses to Britain and Canada, only placing export controls on vaccines in March 2021 in response to vaccine shortages and a rising third wave of cases in Europe.

On the other end of the spectrum sit China and Russia – two countries seeking to capitalize on the lackluster global vaccination effort. Despite slow domestic vaccination processes – as of March 31, China had only given out 8.32 shots per 100 people and Russia only 7.79 – both have promised millions of doses to countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. In both cases, actual deliveries have lagged markedly behind commitments, but, nevertheless, both countries have realized the potential benefits of being a first mover in vaccinating the world, or at least appearing to be. Unsurprisingly, then, China and Russia do not feature among the list of donors to ACT-A. In their cases, donating vaccines directly, perhaps to the detriment of their domestic population, is both easier and carries more weight than a multilateral initiative.

*N.B.This section was written based solely on the events of the first quarter of 2021. In April 2021, the United States announced its intent to share its entire stock of AstraZeneca vaccines – 60 million doses – with the world and to lift export controls on raw materials for the production of the AstraZeneca vaccine, marking a shift in U.S. contribution to the global vaccination effort.

What to Watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

I am delighted to share with you the eleventh edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

This is the second scorecard since the U.S. election last year. It has been a relatively quiet first few months in trans-Atlantic relations with most of the energy and innovation of the new administration being focused on the Indo-Pacific. However, a number of trips by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Europe, President Biden’s virtual participation in the March 25 European Council summit, and a series of dialogues with European nations on technology, taxation, and Iran are signs of a real improvement in trans-Atlantic cooperation. There are still differences of course, particularly over how to deal with China. The larger question that Europeans are asking is if the return to internationalism under the Biden administration is the aberration, not Trump. But this is not preventing their enthusiastic engagement with Washington.

A few points from this iteration of the survey are worth highlighting.

Large majorities of our survey pool (85% in each case) saw U.S.-Europe relations trending positively on political and security issues. The trend in economic relations was split between positive (45%) and neutral (50%). Of all bilateral relations, U.S.-Russia relations remain the weakest (at 2.3 out of 10), with U.S.-Turkish relations having increased slightly to 3.7 out of 10. Relations with most other countries hovered around 6 on the same 1 to 10 scale.

On the topical questions posed to our experts, almost half thought that the difficulties faced by the European Union in distributing the COVID-19 vaccine illustrate weaknesses of the European governance model with just over a quarter disagreeing. Almost 80% answered that Chinese sanctions against European parliamentarians and scholars will encourage the development of a common trans-Atlantic approach to China on issues like trade and human rights. Only 10% disagreed. Opinion was split over Nord Stream 2 with 40% saying that tensions over the pipeline will be a significant impediment to the United States and Europe developing a cohesive approach to Russia while 35% disagreed.

As we look ahead to late spring and early summer, we will be watching for President Biden’s first trip abroad, which will be to the G-7 and NATO summits in mid-June. We will be looking to see if the president articulates an affirmative vision of what his administration wants in Europe on these trips or on other occasions. We will also be watching to see if a summit takes place between President Biden and President Putin and if recent tensions between the United States and Russia continue.

Thank you again for reading the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard.

Biden’s Afghan gamble

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 27 Apr 2021 14:19:57 +0000

By Bruce Riedel

President Biden has made a big decision on Afghanistan, with significant risks. After much consideration, I believe he has done the right thing — but it’s a big gamble. It will have particularly serious consequences for Pakistani behavior.

A long history

I have been involved in U.S. policy vis-à-vis the wars in Afghanistan since Christmas Eve 1979, when I was in the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) operations center as the Russians invaded the country. The National Security Agency reported detecting 300 Russian flights that day from Soviet bases in Central Asia to Kabul, air-lifting an elite airborne division to the capital.

Washington was taken by surprise, but in less than a month President Jimmy Carter put together a strategy and an alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets that went on to win the final and decisive battle of the Cold War. Two weeks after the invasion, the CIA shipped the first weapons to Karachi for the mujaheddin.

We have made many mistakes in Afghanistan. We paid almost no attention to the country after the Soviets left, and it descended into a failed state that was misruled by the Taliban and hosted al-Qaida. President George W. Bush took his eye off the ball after the invasion in 2001 and let Osama bin Laden escape into Pakistan. By 2005, he was encased in his hideout in Abbottabad. With America bogged down in Iraq, al-Qaida regenerated.

By 2006, it was more dangerous than ever. The British foiled an al-Qaida plot that summer to simultaneously blow up a half-dozen airplanes en route from the United Kingdom to America and Canada over the Atlantic Ocean. Bin Laden had directed the plot from his hideout and used Pakistanis living in England as suicide bombers. It would have been worse than 9/11.

President Barack Obama’s so-called AfPak report in March 2009 identified the principal goal of America’s policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan to be “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida.” It recognized that it was Pakistan where al-Qaida was most entrenched. Obama ordered the CIA to ruthlessly destroy the organization with drones based in Afghanistan, operating across the border.

He also ordered a full-scale hunt for bin Laden. In 2009, the search was stone-cold: The CIA had no idea where he was. After brilliant analysis, he was located less than a mile from Pakistan’s top military academy. Ten years ago — on May 2, 2011 — the Navy SEALs delivered justice. Al-Qaida has never recovered. It is still present in the region but it has been decimated and defeated. Last September, Ayman al-Zawahri — bin Laden’s successor — issued a statement on the anniversary of 9/11. No one noticed. It was a sign of how marginalized the group has become.

Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and civil war

Of course, the United States is also fighting in the Afghan civil war that escalated when the Russians left Kabul in 1989. The war against the Taliban is impossible to win as long as Pakistan provides sanctuary and safety, training, equipment, and funds for the Taliban. We cannot defeat Pakistan, which is a nuclear-armed state and has the fifth largest population in the world. As Obama wrote in his memoir “A Promised Land”: “The Riedel report made one thing clear: Unless Pakistan stopped sheltering the Taliban, our efforts at long term stability in Afghanistan were bound to fail.”

Our troops accomplished the top priority in 2011 by killing bin Laden. They cannot defeat the proxy army of the Rawalpindi generals. It is that reality that underscores Biden’s decision.

Unfortunately, our intelligence capabilities will be hurt without a military presence in the country; that is part of the gamble Biden has chosen. If al-Qaida does regenerate and plots an attack on the U.S., the intelligence community will have less capacity to uncover the plot and to block it. It’s a big gamble.

Moreover, Biden inherited a terrible deal from Trump’s feckless negotiators: a May 1, 2021 deadline to get out of Afghanistan or face renewed attacks on the more than 10,000 American and NATO troops. In return, the Taliban was to renounce al-Qaida and sever ties to the group. It did neither, but it has largely refrained from attacking American troops for the last year. Biden knew that if he ignored the May deadline, the Taliban would resume attacks on foreign forces. Indeed, they would be prime targets. He is gambling that the Taliban will accept his new timeline to withdraw by this September.

What happens next is unclear. The civil war will certainly escalate further. The Taliban will have little or no interest in the political process with the government in Kabul, but they have never been interested in it nor have they ever lived up to the obligations in the agreement with Trump. Whether the Taliban will keep from disrupting the NATO withdrawal is unclear.

The victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan is not inevitable. The Communist government in Kabul survived for three years after the Red Army left. It only collapsed when its top military commander, Abdul Rashid Dostam, defected to the side of the mujaheddin. He still runs his home province Jowzjan in the north. I have a lovely carpet from Dostam, when we met in the Pentagon; he is also a unrepentant gangster.

The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazari groups do not want to be governed by the Pashtun Taliban. Urban Afghans don’t want the medieval Islamic Emirate. Nearly three-quarters of Afghans are under 30 years old and have lived their lives in a relatively open society. The civil war will go on, most likely, with the Taliban seizing some cities in the south. We should continue to fund the Afghan army, as Biden has promised.

We should be proud of the very significant changes the last 20 years have brought to Afghanistan, especially for its women. They go to school now, they have jobs and opportunities that had been denied by the Taliban. The notion that the Taliban have mellowed in the last 20 years, or that they crave international recognition, is delusional.

The Pakistan piece

Pakistan is a winner again in Afghanistan. It has now outlasted two superpowers. The Pakistani army generals will be more hubristic and dangerous than ever. The army intelligence service known as the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) will be the one of the most dangerous patrons of terror in the world, especially with the Haqqani network.

Pakistan does not control the Taliban and it will suffer negative as well as positive consequences from their improved position. The Pakistan Taliban will be stronger and more inclined to strike inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban will become more independent.

We will need a coherent strategy to deal with Pakistan. Biden has so far failed to engage with Prime Minister Imran Khan, as my colleague Madiha Afzal has written. Only belatedly was Pakistan invited to the virtual climate change conference. Ignoring Pakistan is a mistake. It is not too late to repair. There is no simple way to change Pakistani behavior especially given its strong alliance with China. But engagement is better than isolation and sanctions.

The president should follow up the Afghan decision with the withdrawal of American combat troops from Saudi Arabia and a modest drawdown of forces elsewhere in the Gulf. The current force dispositions in Kuwait and other Gulf states are relics of our previous wars in Iraq and are no longer necessary. The militarization of American policy in the region needs to be reversed.

The NATO alliance will also need attention. Afghanistan is the alliance’s first significant out-of-area operation. Allies labored hard to support expeditionary forces in Central Asia. Some, like Canada, sustained heavy casualties. The perception of failure in Afghanistan will weigh heavily on future challenges and opportunities for the alliance.

Financing the fight: A history and assessment of Department of Defense budget formulation processes

Robert F. Hale — Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:08:16 +0000

By Robert F. Hale

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) needs a budget formulation process capable of creating budgets that meet national security needs effectively and efficiently. In 1947, the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, professed embarrassment regarding the budget formulation process he inherited because, at that time, each military service submitted its own budget without following overall guidance or checking for duplication. Forrestal and the DOD’s first comptroller, Wilfred McNeil, made important improvements in the formulation process. Then in 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his comptroller Charles Hitch implemented a major change, putting in place a system that has become known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

PPBES examined defense initiatives in program groups (e.g. strategic forces) to minimize duplication, applied analytic techniques to hold down costs while meeting key military requirements, and examined budgets over multiple years to take into account longer term effects. In the early 1970s Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made an important change to McNamara’s top-down, highly centralized PPBES. Laird provided the military services with fiscal guidance and broad planning guidance and then allowed them to create their own budgets, which Laird and his staff reviewed. This shift probably permitted PPBES to survive to the present day because, unlike McNamara, many secretaries would not have wanted to make most budget decisions themselves.

While the DOD still uses PPBES, it is much criticized. Critics assert that it fails to consider a sufficiently wide range of alternatives and that it creates too much work, in part because of the time spent seeking approvals from stakeholders. Unfortunately, history shows that efforts to streamline PPBES (such as biennial budgeting) have generally not succeeded. Critics also lament the time needed to navigate PPBES, which makes it difficult to integrate rapidly shifting technologies into DOD programs. But PPBES has also provided major benefits to the Pentagon. The system examines initiatives in broad categories which helps identify duplication. PPBES identifies costs of initiatives, measures benefits against broad guidance, and compares costs and benefits systematically over multiple years. PPBES also ensures that voices germane to the budget process have a chance to be heard.

Overall, history and the author’s experience suggest that PPBES has many useful features that should be retained because they clearly have improved DOD budget formulation, especially compared to the system in place in the 1950s and earlier. But PPBES needs improvements. Most critically, the Pentagon needs to persuade Congress to alter PPBES in ways that better accommodate rapidly changing technology initiatives, including budgeting for them in broader categories to provide more flexibility during budget execution.

The author’s advisory role at Booz Allen Hamilton is a paid, part-time position. This paper was not supported financially or otherwise by the company.

China’s Arctic activities and ambitions

Fri, 23 Apr 2021 13:59:38 +0000

New analysis reveals that China describes the Arctic as one of the world’s “new strategic frontiers” and is seeking to become a “polar great power.” Though it downplays this goal publicly, it has taken steps to exert greater influence in the region by joining its institutions, like the Arctic Council as a permanent observer, and engaging in high-level diplomacy. Likewise, it has increased its military investments, dispatched naval vessels to the Arctic, and built its first icebreaker. Chinese military texts treat the Arctic as a zone of future military competition, raising questions within NATO — which is also focused on Russia’s resurgent presence in the region — about how to ensure the Arctic remains stable and free from conflict.

On May 5, Foreign Policy at Brookings convened a panel of practitioners, academics, and policy experts to discuss a new report by Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang — “Northern expedition: China’s Arctic activities and ambitions” — which explores these themes and considers how the United States and its allies and partners should respond. Questions from the audience followed the discussion.

Viewers submitted questions via email to events@brookings.edu or on Twitter using #ArcticChina.