Brookings: Topics - Darfur

Looking to the Future in Sudan

Roberta Cohen — Fri, 14 Jan 2011 00:00:00 -0500

This letter to the editor originally appeared in the New York Times on January 14, 2011.

President Obama is right to draw attention to the need for managing refugee returns to southern Sudan and also addressing the plight of Darfurian refugees in Chad. But attention must also be paid to the far greater number of internally displaced persons, those forcibly uprooted within their own country.

More than one and a half million southern Sudanese long displaced in the north have returned to unsustainable conditions in the south. In the north, there remain at least another 1.5 million displaced southern Sudanese, and hundreds of thousands more are uprooted in the south by interethnic violence, while in Darfur, more than two million displaced persons have been languishing in destitute camps since 2004. One of the reasons for this oversight is that there is no clearly defined senior focal point in the United States government for those internally displaced — not in the State Department, the United States Mission to the United Nations or the Agency for International Development.

A 2004 internally displaced persons policy of the United States aid agency is unknown to most of the government and is not uniformly applied. With all the Obama administration’s reorganization of humanitarian and development offices, it is time to ensure that the 27 million internally displaced persons in the world uprooted by conflict and human rights abuse receive their fair share of attention.

Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: The New York Times

The Sudan Referendum: Dangers and Possibilities

Wed, 13 Oct 2010 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 13, 2010
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Sudan’s north-south civil war was the longest conflict in African history and claimed more than two million lives. In 2005, the United States played a critical role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending that conflict and setting forth a roadmap for sustainable peace. Despite many lapses and some tragic violence, the agreement has held. As stipulated in the CPA, on January 9, 2011, a referendum will take place, allowing the southern Sudanese to vote on whether to remain part of Sudan or to gain independence. Whether the scheduled referendum proceeds peacefully on schedule is important for Sudan’s southerners, for Darfuris and the region.

On October 13, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion of the prospects for the Sudan referendum featuring Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ). Following the Congressman’s remarks, Mike Abramowitz, director of the Committee on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum joined him in a discussion examining the possible dangers and outcomes of the southern Sudan vote. Nonresident Senior Fellow Rich Williamson, President Bush’s special envoy to Sudan, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

After the program, the panelists took audience questions.

Video

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

The Honorable Donald Payne (D-NJ)

Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States House of Representatives

Mike Abramowitz

Director, Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Reconciling Responsibility to Protect with IDP Protection

Roberta Cohen — Thu, 25 Mar 2010 11:20:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

The concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) developed in large measure from efforts to design an international system to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The explosion of civil wars emanating from and following the Cold War brought into view millions of persons inside their own countries who were uprooted from their homes and in need of international protection and assistance. Many had little or no access to food, medicine or shelter and were vulnerable to assault, sexual violence, and all manner of human rights abuse. When first counted in 1982, 1.2 million IDPs could be found in 11 countries; by 1995, the number had surged to 20 to 25 million.[1]

The international system, however, set up after the Second World War, focused almost exclusively on refugees—persons who fled across borders to escape persecution. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided international protection to people who were outside their countries of origin and deprived of the protection of their own governments. As UNICEF’s Executive Director observed, ‘The world has established a minimum safety net for refugees,’ but ‘This is not yet the case with respect to internally displaced populations.’[2]

In the displaced persons camps set up after the Second World War in Europe, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, a predecessor of UNHCR, protected both refugees and IDPs. But during the Cold War, borders became sacrosanct and concepts of non-interference in internal affairs overrode most efforts to protect people inside their countries.[3] During the Biafra civil war in the 1960s, the High Commissioner for Refugees restricted help to IDPs with the explanation that: ‘my Office is not in a position to deal with situations affecting nationals who find themselves within a territory of their country.’[4]

It was not until the 1990s that this gap in treatment was challenged and the international community began in a concerted way to try to assist and protect people uprooted inside their countries. UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar pointed the way in 1991with these words: ‘We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.’[5] Concepts of human security, sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect developed in large measure in response to the need of IDPs and other affected civilians for protection from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated in civil wars and internal strife.

This article examines the origin of R2P from the perspective of IDP protection and identifies the problems that arise in applying the concept to displaced persons. It then offers suggestions for reconciling R2P with IDPs so that the concept may benefit displaced persons, as was intended.

[1] Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 3.

[2] James P. Grant, ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced and the Poor: An Evolving Ethos of Responsibility,’ address at the Round Table on the Papal Document, UNICEF, 9 March 1993.

[3] To be sure, the International Committee of the Red Cross had a special mandate to protect civilians in armed conflicts and beginning in the 1970s could explicitly act in non-international armed conflicts. But often it was denied entry and did not easily act in conflicts below the threshold of civil wars. UNHCR also began in the 1970s on a select basis to assist people displaced inside their own countries at the request of the General Assembly or Secretary-General. But by and large deference to traditional notions of sovereignty prohibited an international role with IDPs for much of the 20^th century.

[4] Adam Lichtenheld, From Exclusion to Expansion: Internally Displaced People and the Evolution of the International Refugee Rights Regime , Spring 2008 (unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, University of Wisconsin, on file with author).

[5] Javier Perez de Cuellar, as quoted in Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight , p. 1.

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Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: Global Responsibility to Protect

An African Solution to Internal Displacement: AU Leaders Agree to Landmark Convention

Andrew Solomon — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Meeting at the Special Summit of the African Union in Kampala, Uganda on 22-23 October 2009, African heads of state and government have undertaken significant commitments to solve one of the continent's (and the world's) most pressing humanitarian crises—the displacement of an estimated 11.6 million men, women, and children within the borders of their own countries. These commitments are reflected in the adoption of the first instrument to legally bind an entire region on matters of internal displacement.

By placing their signatures on the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, these leaders affirmed the leading role and responsibility of their national governments in protecting and assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) and preventing situations of internal displacement in the region as well as within their individual countries by addressing the phenomenon’s root causes.

Decades of recurrent armed conflict, combined with natural disasters and the effects of climate change, have given rise to sizable populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout the region. Although the total number of individuals currently suffering from internal displacement in Africa is the lowest in a decade, there is still a greater number of IDPs in this region than in any other in the world.

Three of the world’s top five countries with the largest populations of conflict-induced IDPs are in Africa; Sudan, with an estimated 4.9 million IDPs, tops the list. In addition, populations of internally displaced persons numbering over 1 million can currently be found in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia as well. Hundreds of thousands of IDPs can also be found in Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Overall, at least 20 African states are currently experiencing the internal displacement of their citizens.

The lives of these IDPs and others like them elsewhere around the world that have been forced from their homes and arbitrarily displaced within their own countries are fundamentally transformed and shattered by their displacement. Displacement not only violates an individual’s dignity but can also amount to a violation of their human rights, including inter alia their rights to life, shelter, food, an adequate standard of living, property, equality, and non-discrimination. It also often exposes the most vulnerable among them, women and children in particular, to illness, destitution, exploitation, gender-based violence, and forcible recruitment into armed groups.

The African leaders who endorsed the Convention in Kampala have explicitly recognized the link between promoting peace, security, and development on the continent and the need to mitigate the plight of those forced to flee their homes and communities because of armed conflict, human rights abuses, and other threats, including natural disasters. In contrast to refugees, who cross an internationally recognized boundary, IDPs are not protected under international law and often fall through the protection gap at the domestic level. Many can remain in limbo, marginalized, and vulnerable to human rights violations for extended periods.

The Convention demonstrates the commitment of African governments to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons, facilitate durable solutions to displacement, and ensure that millions of people are no longer excluded from society as a whole. In this sense, the Convention contributes to Africa’s overall security and development architecture in addition to serving as the centerpiece of regional responses to displacement.

Strengthening the Protection Framework: The AU Contribution to the Law of Internal Displacement

The new IDP Convention makes a significant contribution to the law of internal displacement. Its adoption at the Kampala Summit represents the culmination of a five-year, African-led process of consultations, drafting, and negotiations that can be traced to a July 2004 decision of the African Union’s Executive Council that IDPs in Africa should be provided with an adequate framework at the regional level for protection and assistance.

What emerged from this process is a legally binding instrument for all of Africa, one that references and simultaneously reinforces existing international standards for protecting the human rights of IDPs established by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. By doing so, the Convention has contributed to the Principles’ universal authority and their evolution from “soft law” to “hard standards.” It can also serve as a model instrument for other regions and individual countries experiencing internal displacement to consider adapting to their own conditions.

Among its many provisions, the Convention affirms the panoply of rights enjoyed by IDPs under human rights and humanitarian law, including the right of all persons to be protected from arbitrary displacement and the right of those displaced to seek protection and assistance. However, as a protection instrument, the Convention is focused first and foremost on elaborating the obligations of States parties during all phases of internal displacement—from prevention through protection of individuals during displacement and efforts to facilitate their sustainable return, local integration, or relocation.

In addition to categorically prohibiting displacement and its use as a means of warfare, i.e. ethnic cleansing, the Convention requires States parties to criminalize acts of arbitrary displacement. Notably, national authorities bound by the Convention are also obliged to ensure that individuals who commit acts of arbitrary displacement are held responsible for these acts. This obligation extends to holding non-state actors, such as insurgencies and rebel groups, private military contractors, and multinational corporations, accountable for arbitrary displacement.

In the same vein, the Convention requires armed groups that are distinct from those of the state to protect and assist internally displaced persons in areas under their effective control. Moreover, armed groups—like formal States parties to the Convention—are called upon to provide humanitarian organizations with access to the displaced and facilitate the delivery of relief supplies to those in need. Assistance to local communities that host internally displaced persons is also called for by the Convention.

The Convention’s Signatories have stipulated to a number of concrete measures to be taken at the national level in order to prevent displacement and protect and assist those who are arbitrarily displaced. These range from complying with international human rights and humanitarian law to developing early warning and disaster management systems.

Signatories to the Convention have also agreed to designate institutional focal points on internal displacement in each of their countries to facilitate coordination among relevant government agencies and with local and international partners. The Conventional also obliges governments to provide compensation and other reparations to remedy the harm suffered by persons as a result of their displacement.

Together, these measures will go a long way toward fulfilling each State party’s national responsibility to address internal displacement and respond to the needs of those displaced. Combined with provisions calling for cooperation among States parties and with international organizations, humanitarian agencies, and civil society organizations to protect IDPs, the Convention is a potentially effective instrument.

No international treaty is perfect, and the AU IDP Convention does have a few weaknesses. Concerns over the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and insufficient guarantees for equality and non-discrimination have been raised. Similarly, there is some question regarding the extent to which non-state actors and armed groups called upon by the Convention to protect IDPs can be bound by its provisions. Nevertheless, the Convention, which has benefited from the input of international experts, is considered to be generally consistent with international standards such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

The task ahead for the Signatories and the Convention’s supporters is to implement its provisions in a timely fashion and in a manner that makes a real difference to the lives of persons affected by internal displacement in the region, including host communities.

Ratification and Implementation: From Paper to Concrete Protections

The first step forward should involve a process of national dialogue and civic education aimed at securing the Convention’s ratification and implementation by the States parties. This process can provide a good opportunity for all stakeholders at the national level to carefully review and consider the nature and scope of the rights and obligations set forth in the Convention.

The role of civil society and national human rights institutions will be key to transforming the commitments made by those who gathered in Kampala into concrete protections for the internally displaced. These actors, which include law societies, faith-based organizations, civic associations, and IDPs themselves, can play important roles in promoting greater awareness about the Convention, advocating for its ratification, and working on implementation issues. Their participation in the drafting of implementing legislation required by the Convention will be of particular importance.

In addition to providing legal and humanitarian assistance to IDPs directly and advocating on their behalf, civil society will also be able to provide national authorities with additional capacity and expertise to carry out reforms that are necessary to implement the Convention This includes assisting in efforts to facilitate property dispute resolution, strengthening political participation, supporting measures to unify families separated during displacement, and monitoring compliance with the Convention.

The Convention will enter into force as a legally binding instrument once it has been ratified by 15 states. When this takes place, Africa will affirm its position at the forefront of efforts to develop regional frameworks to protect internally displaced persons. Other regions will hopefully follow their lead.

Authors

Andrew Solomon

Publication: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

Mass Displacement Caused by Conflicts and One-Sided Violence

Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng — Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Massive displacement of people within countries and across borders has become a defining feature of the post-cold war world. It is also a major feature of human insecurity in which genocide, terrorism, egregious human rights violations and appalling human degradation wreak havoc on civilians. The need of internally displaced persons (IDPs), people forcibly uprooted in their own countries, for international protection from conflict and one-sided violence was one of the factors that prompted a shift in global policy and security thinking. Over the past two decades, a strictly state-centred system in which sovereignty was absolute has evolved into become a matter of international concern and scrutiny. This evolution largely grew from the efforts of the human rights movement, which had long championed the view that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that the international community must hold governments to account when they fail to meet their obligations. It also arose from the efforts of the humanitarian community to reach people in need. The deployment of large numbers of relief workers and peacekeeping operations in the field to protect civilians reflects this new reality as do preventive and peacebuilding efforts.

Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect remain far ahead of international willingness and capacity to enforce them. The failure of states to protect their citizens has too often met iwth a weak international response. It is therefore critical that the United Nations, concerned governments, regional bodies and civil society assist states in developing their own capacities to prevent mass atrocities while also pressing for the development of the tools needed to enable the international community to take assertive action when persuasive measures fail and masses of people remain under the threat of violence and humanitarian tragedy.

This chapter examines the challenges posed by mass displacement caused by violence. Section II looks at the scale and nature of displacement, presents examples of states' failure to protect their citizens and discusses the consequences of displacement. Section III focuses on the political, legal and operational steps needed to provide greater protection for displaced populations and other civilians caught up in massive violence. Section IV presents conclusions and recommendations for the way forward.

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Publication: International Security, Armaments and Disarmament in 2008, SIPRI Yearbook 2009

The Impact of Timing of International Criminal Indictments on Peace Processes and Humanitarian Action

Jacqueline Geis and Alex Mundt — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

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Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo’s July 2008 request to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue an arrest warrant for President al Bashir of Sudan on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide sparked a firestorm of praise, criticism, anxiety, and relief in equal measure among peacekeepers, aid workers, diplomats, and human rights activists. Opponents of the Prosecutor’s move argued that it amounted to a call for regime-change and would imperil any future peace negotiations and the still-incomplete deployment of peacekeepers. At the same time, human rights organizations hailed Ocampo’s courage and lauded the request as a bold and long-overdue step towards challenging impunity for state-sponsored violence against civilians. And between these two camps, thousands of aid workers on the ground in Darfur worried about further access restrictions and harassment by government authorities.

The potential reach of the ICC poses new dilemmas for humanitarian actors operating in tense politicized conflicts, where aid workers are often on the frontlines. For example in Darfur, the government’s tight control over access to its territory has put aid workers in the uncomfortable position of serving as primary eyewitnesses to alleged atrocities and, subsequently, the primary targets of government suspicion. Aid agencies have been forced to walk a careful line between adherence to humanitarian principles and supporting abstract notions of accountability and justice without explicitly collaborating with the UN-mandated war-crimes investigators. Given President Bashir’s demonstrated sensitivity to international humiliation, the consequences of an ICC indictment are potentially devastating to the aid agencies and the 2.5 million IDPs they regularly assist.

The Bashir indictment is the latest—and most controversial—chapter in Ocampo’s effort to establish the court as a legitimate actor and a credible deterrent force. Only a successful track record of interventions and subsequent prosecutions would bolster support for the court among signatories and prove its value to wavering countries, most notably the United States, which withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2002. Since 2002, the Prosecutor has issued criminal indictments in Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic, and Sudan, carefully navigating turbulent national and international political waters. In each case, the timing of the indictments has elicited much comment and controversy, particularly regarding their potential impact on delicate peace agreements or ongoing negotiations. At issue is a fundamental debate over whether peace and justice can be pursued simultaneously. Proponents of the Court insist that justice can and should prevail, citing as examples the arrests and prosecutions of President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and former Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. However, a closer examination of the complexities of these two examples shows that the interests of peace superseded justice, at least in the short term. Furthermore, the cases suggest that certain pre-conditions – strong, unified international pressure and the ability to impose real costs for non-compliance – are necessary for indictments to have an impact on peace negotiations.

Prompted by the international reaction—both in favor of and opposed to— the indictment of Bashir and its potential effects on the conflict in Darfur, this study examines what impact, if any, the timing of international criminal indictments has on fostering peace and improving humanitarian conditions on the ground. An analysis of the court’s trajectory, from its first indictments in Northern Uganda to the controversial indictment of the Sudanese President, highlights the delicate challenges of pursuing justice in the midst of international efforts to resolve some of the world’s most complex and deadliest conflicts. Although the Taylor indictment does not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, it is included in this study because it often serves as a reference point for those arguing in favor of the court as an instrument to promote durable peace. After an examination of the Taylor indictment, the cases of northern Uganda, the DRC and Sudan are then looked at in chronological order, with a specific focus on the timing of the Prosecutor’s indictments and the evolution of the court’s strategy as a result of lessons learned.

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Jacqueline Geis
Alex Mundt

Publication: World Congress of Humanitarian Studies

The Scouting Report: Humanitarian Crises in Iraq and Darfur

Wed, 25 Mar 2009 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 25, 2009
12:30 PM - 1:30 PM EDT

Online
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

President Barack Obama recently announced plans to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of August 2010. Additionally, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes. What do these decisions mean for the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Iraq and Darfur?

Brookings expert Elizabeth Ferris and Senior Politico Editor Fred Barbash took questions in this week’s edition of the Scouting Report, a series on online web chats.

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Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

0325_chat_transcript

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Moderator

Fred Barbash

Senior Editor
Politico

Panelists

Displacement in the Muslim World

Hady Amr and Elizabeth Ferris — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Throughout the Muslim world, millions of people have been forced to flee their homes and communities for many reasons: civil wars, interstate conflicts, U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, tsunamis, earthquakes, and a multitude of other disasters. Many have crossed national borders and live in nearby countries as refugees. Many more remain within the borders of their country as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some are displaced only temporarily and are able to return to their communities when conflicts are resolved or flood waters have receded, but most live many years as refugees or IDPs. For some, displacement has lasted for generations. The statistics are detailed in the appendix to this paper.

This massive dislocation of people affects both national development plans and individual human development. It impacts national security and personal security. It affects relationships between neighboring countries, UN Security Council discussions, and peace processes. In short, understanding—and resolving—displacement is central to development, peace, and security.

A widespread phenomenon

Sudan stands out as the country with the highest number of displaced people—over half a million refugees and a staggering six million IDPs. Sudanese have fled multiple civil wars and the devastating effects of climate change including floods, droughts, and famine. In the western region of Darfur alone, two million people are internally displaced by the conflict and most are highly dependent on external humanitarian assistance for survival.

One of the world’s largest and most protracted displacements is that of the Palestinians. Beginning in 1948, the flight of Palestinians from their towns and villages—either by force or out of fear—led to the establishment of refugee camps throughout the region. It also spurred the creation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA, an agency which, to this day, provides relief and development assistance to over 4.6 million displaced Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.[1] The issue of Palestinian refugees has been central to peace negotiations for decades—an issue which remains unresolved.

Most recently, the displacement of Iraqis—both internally and across Iraq’s borders—has dramatically impacted the Muslim world. While Iraqis were subjected to mass attacks and displacements under the regime of Saddam Hussein, the ethno-sectarian violence and general insecurity which flourished under the U.S. occupation has led to unprecedented numbers of Iraqi families fleeing their homes and sometimes the country. Today, roughly two million Iraqis are refugees and another 2.8 million are IDPs.

South Asia has also been particularly affected by large-scale displacement. In terms of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate (i.e. other than Palestinians), Afghanistan was the leading country of origin at the end of 2007 with 3.1 million refugees hosted mainly by Pakistan and Iran.[2]

An additional 200,000 Afghans are displaced inside the country; many have been displaced multiple times and are unable to return to their communities due to the lack of security. It should be noted that the combined number of Iraqi and Afghan refugees in 2007 account for nearly half of UNHCR’s global refugee population.

In addition, there are a considerable number of IDPs throughout the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) states as well. Aside from Sudan and Iraq, which host a combined 8.8 million IDPs, countries like Turkey, Uganda, and Somalia each have close to 1 million IDPs, while Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, and Côte d’Ivoire are home to over half a million. Many communities throughout the Muslim world are hosting large refugee populations as well. The top three refugee-hosting countries in the world at the end of 2007 were all OIC members: Pakistan, Syria, and Iran.[3] All told, there are nine to ten million refugees in the Muslim world, and at least 14 million internally displaced. This means that one in 140 people living in the Muslim world is a refugee and one in 100 is internally displaced. If this was the case in the United States, there would be two million refugees and three million American internally displaced persons.

Displacement, security and hospitality

The forced movement of these millions of people is critical to issues of security and development in the regions in question and the Muslim world as a whole. Firstly, refugees, IDPs, and host communities face enormous challenges in terms of meeting humanitarian and development assistance needs. In many situations, displaced persons cannot access education, health care, or the job market, with major implications for the individuals and families concerned, but also for broader development initiatives.

For refugees, one’s livelihood is intimately tied to legal status. While 37 of 60 countries in the Muslim world, particularly in Africa, are parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 protocol, there are significant gaps elsewhere in the Muslim world. States which are not parties to the convention include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei-Darussalam, Comoros, Eritrea, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE, and Uzbekistan. It should be noted, however, that many of these countries, such as Pakistan, Jordan, and Syria, have quite large refugee populations, particularly from Palestine and Iraq, and have been very generous in allowing refugees to stay, albeit without the status of refugees.

In addition to signing the 1951 Convention, several states, including Iraq, Turkey, and Uganda, have incorporated the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into national laws or policies. Of course, despite recognition of these frameworks, there are often discrepancies in terms of how refugee and IDP rights are upheld on the ground.

While the Convention, Protocol, and Guiding Principles provide a framework of protection for displaced people, Islam—as interpreted by various scholars—could also offer a potential framework and innovative solutions for displaced persons. For example, the right to asylum is thought by many to be recognized in Islam. The faith promotes humanitarian principles and views the granting of asylum as a duty of political leaders within the Muslim community.[4]

Within the Muslim world, there is a “wealth gap” in responding to refugees. In many cases, it is the low- and middle-income countries—like Jordan and Syria—that have accepted the most refugees and provided them with the greatest legal rights, while the number of refugees admitted to some of the OIC’s wealthiest states does not even register on global surveys, and their legal status tends to be dubious at best.

Since 2001, refugees and IDPs in the Muslim world have been seen by the U.S. and others through the lens of the Global War on Terror. Moreover, two of the Muslim world’s largest current humanitarian crises are to a large extent the result of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Human Development and Security

Today, in the face of rising food prices and the global financial crisis, the situation of refugees and IDPs is becoming more desperate. Increased short-term humanitarian assistance is needed. But even more urgent is the need to focus on finding durable solutions for those displaced by violence and disasters. The protracted displacement of Palestinians, Sudanese, and Afghans cries out for international response and a development of new and innovative solutions.

The remainder of this report will be composed of two chapters. The first on refugees from Iraq. The second on refugees from Afghanistan.

[1] See UNRWA’s official homepage: http://www.un.org/unrwa/english.html.

[2] UNHCR, 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (June 2008), p. 8. (This is based on the total number of externally displaced Afghans, some of whom are not formally identified or registered as refugees).

[3] UNHCR, 2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (June 2008), p. 8.

[4] Elizabeth G. Ferris, Beyond Borders: Refugees, Migrants and Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1993, p. xxxiv-xxxv. For more on Islamic perspectives on displacement and asylum, see Refugee Survey Quarterly vol. 27, no. 2 (2008) “Islam and Asylum”.

Authors

Publication: Human Development Task Force, U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Durable Solutions for IDPs in Protracted Situations: Three Case Studies

Alex Mundt and Elizabeth Ferris — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, studies have been carried out, campaigns have been launched, and considerable thought has gone into how to resolve protracted refugee situations.[1] Academics and practitioners alike have grappled with the difficulties in finding solutions for refugees who have lived in camps for far too long.

While millions of IDPs, like refugees, have languished in camps for extended periods of time, protracted IDP situations have received virtually no attention from academic researchers. There are important similarities in the impact of prolonged displacement on the lives of IDPs and refugees, but there are also significant differences in their situations – particularly when it comes to solutions. This paper begins by suggesting a definition for protracted IDP situations and then discusses similarities and differences between protracted refugee and IDP situations. The study then examines three case studies of protracted internal displacement: Colombia, Georgia, and Darfur with a particular focus on the role of IDPs in negotiations to resolve the conflict, the involvement of key international actors in influencing the situation on the ground and the possibilities for durable solutions. While return is often the desired solution for both IDPs and political actors, the paper argues that local integration and return should not be seen as mutually exclusive alternatives. IDPs can be encouraged to build new lives elsewhere without having to give up the possibility of eventual return when conditions warrant.

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[1] See for example, Loescher and Milner 2005; Loescher, Newman, and Troeller forthcoming; Smith 2004; Milner 2005; Crisp 2003; UNHCR 2004b; UNHCR 2004d; UNHCR 2006a: 105-127.

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Alex Mundt
Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Enhancing Protection of Civilians in Protracted Conflicts, ARC/Austcare Symposium

The Potential Impact of the Indictment of Bashir on Darfur’s Humanitarian Situation

Elizabeth Ferris — Fri, 26 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400

“Whenever the Save Darfur Coalition launches a new campaign, we feel it on the ground,” a representative of an operational humanitarian NGO told me. “They may be right in trying to address the causes of the conflict, but it’s our people that get beaten up on the ground.”

At first glance, the reaction of humanitarian actors on the ground in Darfur to potential indictments of the Sudanese president Omar Bashir seems pretty obvious. Darfur’s 2.5 million internally displaced people, the 4.2 million in need of food assistance and the 17,000 or so humanitarian workers would make easy targets for an angry Sudanese government. Humanitarian staff are keeping a very low profile these days. They have learned that those who speak out about atrocities in Darfur can be targeted by the Sudanese authorities.[1]

But like everything in Darfur, the situation is more complicated than it seems at first glance. Let me add some nuances to this discussion:

The conflict in Sudan has become much more complicated than it was in 2003 when it first came to the world’s attention. It has evolved over the past five years – we can now speak about several wars in Darfur: between Darfur rebel movements and the government, between the rebel movements themselves, a proxy war between Chad and Sudan in which governments are supporting each other’s rebel forces with civilians being caught in the middle. And there are localized conflicts over resources and land. For example, in August, 70 Arab tribesmen were killed in armed clashes over water and grazing land in South Darfur. As one news report said “everyone has Kalashnikovs there.”[2]

As we have seen in many different conflicts, the war itself has created its own confusing dynamic. By most estimates, the Sudanese government and its allied groups are still the major cause of attacks on civilians, but they are certainly not the only ones. Even if the Sudanese government were to halt all of its military operations tomorrow, it is likely that the violence would still continue. This calls into question just how much control the government of Sudan currently exercises over the bands of militias that it supported in the earlier stages of the counterinsurgency. And Darfur has become a militarized region; some of the IDP camps, for example, are highly militarized.

A recent report by the Small Arms Survey reported that it is hard to tell who is responsible for the violence in the camps. Attackers are most often identified as ‘armed men.’ The term janjawid has become imprecise, referring to any Arab bearing arms.[3]

The issue of humanitarian access is already very bad. According to the latest UN reports, humanitarian agencies are only able to access 70% of Darfur’s affected population. Attacks on humanitarian workers, kidnappings, and especially carjackings have become so commonplace that in one sense it is hard to see how things could get worse.

The number of security incidents affecting humanitarian workers and their assets has increased dramatically in 2008 in comparison to previous years. As of 27 July, 11 humanitarian staff members have been killed in 2008, compared to five during the first seven months of 2007. In the same period of 2008, 183 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked, compared to 85 during the first seven months of 2007. During these hijackings, 146 humanitarians were abducted so far in 2008 compared to 106 in the first seven months of 2007. Armed men assaulted 87 humanitarian premises so far in 2008, compared to 50 in the period January to July 2007.[4]

A few weeks ago the World Food Programme (WFP) said that they may have to cut back on deliveries of food as more than 100 vehicles carrying WFP food aid have been hijacked in Darfur this year with 43 drivers and 63 trucks still missing.[5] This comes on top of the WFP cutting rations in May when truck convoys could no longer deliver sufficient food. Because of the frequent seizures of road vehicles, some humanitarian agencies have started renting, rather than owning, vehicles and have tried to travel by helicopter – but the number of attacks on helicopters (four in the past month) and the insufficient number of civilian helicopters makes this an unattractive alternative.

The situation has become so bad that some major agencies are pulling out, most recently German Agro Action which suspended food distribution to 450,000 people in North Darfur because of insecurity. MSF has stopped work in some areas.

Some maintain that the Sudanese government will adopt a cautious approach towards the humanitarians in this period before indictments are issued and will devote its energy to working with the international community for alternative measures. The Sudanese government will not want to lend credence to Ocampo’s indictment by proving it correct on the ground. The government has also found considerable support within the Arab League and Africa for their opposition to the indictments and does not want to jeopardize that support. Certainly that has been the case on the ground thus far.

But it is important to remember that Sudan benefits from all of this international assistance pouring into its country. Although it is intended as short-term relief, in fact, it is yielding tangible benefits to the Sudanese government. Moreover, the presence of the humanitarians allows the Sudanese government to do other things with its funds than provide life-sustaining aid to its citizens. If the humanitarians were to leave and the government did not step into the void, then potentially millions of people would die, creating pressures for the international community to intervene more forcefully. It is in the Sudanese government’s interest to allow the humanitarians to operate in its territory but not to allow them to take actions that might fundamentally change the situation.

The long-term prognosis for Darfur is pessimistic. As of July 2008, there were 4.27 million people in need of food assistance, of whom 2.5 million are IDPs. UNICEF reports that in the course of 2007, there were 250,000 new – or re-displaced - populations. Assistance agencies report that coping mechanisms in the camps are stretched – in part because the food isn’t getting in because of the horrific insecurity situation.

There are fundamental problems with this situation. In the absence of a political settlement and in the face of rampant insecurity, the prognosis for the medium and long-term future is grim. Internally displaced persons living in IDP camps are better off than those who are not living in camps; standard health indicators are better – a fact which serves as a pull factor for needy people. They are unable to be self-reliant in the camps and must rely on international assistance.

But what are the long-term consequences of the international community feeding more than 3 million people? How long can this be sustained? What are the global costs – in terms of missed opportunities to serve other populations – of keeping up this monumental aid effort to Darfur? In spite of the more than $1 billion per year spent on humanitarian assistance in Darfur,[6] the situation isn’t getting better for Darfur’s displaced, either inside Darfur or for the 230,000 or so in neighboring Chad. Food prices have increased – by 150% in some locations.[7] Security is not improving. Is the international community prepared to continue this massive assistance to Darfur’s victims indefinitely?

And then there’s UNAMID and the potential impact of indictments on the peacekeeping forces. Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir has said that he will ask the UN-AU forces in Darfur (UNAMID) to leave the country if the ICC issues an arrest warrant for him.[8] This is pretty clear – actually much clearer than the issue of the humanitarians.

Like the humanitarians, UNAMID has been attacked by armed groups allied with the Sudanese government and by the janjiweed. In July, former rebels detained 38 peacekeepers while patrolling an IDP camp. But UNAMID is largely seen as ineffective and excessively cautious – not only by the international community but also by the IDPs. UNAMID was supposed to have 26,000 police and soldiers, but only 140 Bangladeshi police and a smattering of others have arrived – the rest of the 8,000 or so troops are holdovers from the African Union mission. UNAMID’s lack of effectiveness is in part the result of the lack of commitment by the international community to provide the troops, helicopters and supporting materials to the peacekeepers. It is in part due to the intransigence of the Sudanese government which has created delays and bureaucratic obstacles galore for the peacekeepers.[9] In the Secretary-General’s report of 28 August 2008 on UNAMID deployment, he mentions the worrying increase in violence, the continuing air strikes. But there is a more fundamental problem: the international community has focused almost all of its attention on the peacekeepers, with little political energy left for the necessary political processes. And the mission is failing. This was foreseen by Jean-Marie Guehenno who asked:

“Do we move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a difference, that will not have the capacity to defend itself and that carries the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the UN and tragic failure for the people of Darfur?”[10]

There could also be consequences for humanitarian funding and for humanitarian access if UNAMID were to collapse or be further marginalized as a result of government actions following an indictment. While neither UNAMID nor its AU precursors have had much impact in enlarging humanitarian space or in protecting aid workers or conflict victims, a sudden withdrawal of UNAMID forces – which was, after all, one of the signature diplomatic achievements – could lead to donor fatigue. This would also test the ability of the advocacy coalition to keep Darfur on the agenda in a relevant way. Although the peacekeepers have not enlarged the humanitarian space, the question is would its demise lead to a significant decline in accessible territory? Or to human rights violations on the ground or in the camps?

The bottom line: if arrest warrants were to be issued for President al-Bashir, the situation for both the humanitarians and the peacekeepers would get worse, but is unlikely to become cataclysmic. If the humanitarians were forced out, Darfur’s internally displaced persons would likely try to flee in larger numbers to neighboring countries, thus increasing the refugee numbers. And the humanitarians would likely expand operations there. But not everyone would be able to escape. The deaths, particularly among the very young and the very old, would be high.

But their situation is already so precarious that the impact would likely be a difference in degree rather than a complete catastrophe.

[1] For example, Care, NRC, Oxfam, Save the Children, and MSF have all had staff expelled from Sudan because of differences with the Sudanese government.

[2] Reuters, 21 August 2008.

[3] Clea Kahn, “Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur’s IDP Camps,” Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2008.

[4] Human Rights Council. “Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention; addendum Report prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan on the status of the recommendations compiled by the Group of Experts mandated by the Human Rights Council in resolution 4/8 to the Government of the Sudan for the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 4/8 pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 6/34. A/HRC/9/13/Add.1, 2 September 2008

[5] World Food Programme, Press release 7 September 2008)

[6] According to Fabrice Weissman, Humanitarian Dilemmas in Darfur, MSF: July 2008, the budget for operations run by UN agencies was over $800 million in 2007 – a figure which dos not include aid from ICRC or NGO contributions which would certainly push the amount over $1 billion. US assistance to Darfur in FY 2008 was almost $770 million.

[7] USAID, 1 August 2008)

[8] “Sudanese president makes first public threat to expel peacekeepers,” Sudan Tribune, 22 August 2008.

[9] Washington Post, 4 July 2008.

[10] Joint NGO Report, “UNAMID Deployment on the Brink: The Road to Security in Darfur Blocked by Government Obstructions,” (Human Rights Watch: New York, December 2007) http://www.hrw.org/pub/2007/africa/unamid1207web.pdf [September 23, 2008].

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Searching for Peace and Justice in Sudan: The Role of the International Criminal Court

Searching for Peace and Justice in Sudan: The Role of the International Criminal Court

Fri, 26 Sep 2008 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 26, 2008
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC

Despite several attempts at a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Darfur, the peace process has stalled. In July, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), submitted an application for an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, accusing him of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. If the indictment is issued, some critics warn that it will have a detrimental impact on prospects for peace in Darfur. Proponents argue that issuing the indictment would give the international community increased leverage over the Sudanese government. At the heart of this issue is the struggle to balance the search for justice for those atrocities already committed with the search for peace and reconciliation to prevent those atrocities that have yet to occur.

On September 26, the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement will host a discussion of the effect of the possible indictment on peace and justice, and potential impact on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Darfur and on the ICC itself. After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

John Prendergast

Co-Chair, ENOUGH Project

Cecile Aptel

Senior Fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice

Lee Feinstein

Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Peace in Sudan: Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Fri, 27 Jun 2008 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 27, 2008
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

While the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought new hope for southern Sudan, many barriers remain to the Agreement’s successful implementation three years on—-as recently illustrated by the fighting around Abyei, Sudan. The creation of the agreement and the deployment of a joint military force have calmed most of the violence, but the continuing Abyei border issue and disputes over the control of oil revenues remain as potential threats to sustainable peace.

On June 27, the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement hosted a discussion to examine Sudan’s 2005 peace agreement and to explore the ways in which it has been successfully implemented and the areas in which challenges still exist. Participants included representatives from the Sudanese government; Lynn Fredriksson, Africa advocacy director for Amnesty International USA; and Pamela Fierst, a member of the Sudan policy group at the State Department.

Khalid Koser, deputy director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. After the program, panelists took audience questions.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20080627_sudan

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Dr. Mudawi AlTurabi

Parliament Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Government of Sudan

Dr. Lam Akol

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, SPLM National Liberation Council

Pamela Fierst

Senior Desk Officer, Sudan Programs Group
U.S. Department of State

Lynn Fredriksson

Africa Advocacy Director
Amnesty International USA

Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur: Taking Stock

Elizabeth Ferris — Wed, 07 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400

Darfur has been on the international agenda for the past four years and despite the advocacy campaigns, the growing public awareness, the large and expensive relief operations, and (eventual) Security Council action, the war is far from over. In this presentation, I would like to review some of the things we know about Darfur, highlight the complexities of the situation and explain some of the consequences of Darfur for Darfur, Sudan, and the international community. Unfortunately, I can say at the outset that I’m not going to come up with solutions for Darfur. There simply aren’t any easy answers.

Let me begin by highlighting what we know about Darfur.

According to the best available estimates, between 300,000 and 400,000 Darfurians have been killed since the violence began in early 2003.[1] Whether or not this constitutes genocide has been the subject of heated debate, but it is absolutely certain that too many people have died and that the killing continues.[2]

At the present time, almost 2.4 million Darfurians are internally displaced – about one-third of the population.[3] Around 250,000 Darfurian refugees are living in refugee camps in Chad, with additional thousands living in villages inside the Chadian border and dispersed throughout the country.[4] In addition, there are an unknown number of Darfurians who have been displaced outside of Darfur throughout Sudan which have received very little attention, in part because of traditional labor migration patterns. And there are around 180,000 internally displaced Chadians and approximately 25,000 Chadians who have sought shelter in Darfur.[5] Most of the humanitarian assistance and most of the news has focused on the Darfurian IDPs living in camps, but as we know from other situations, those who are displaced within communities are not only invisible, but often underserved.

Looking back

The violence began in early 2003, with attacks by the government-supported Janjaweed on villages throughout Darfur. But it took the international community a long time to respond to the emergency. In fact, in the initial phases, almost everything went wrong:

The response was slow, in part because the Sudanese government made it difficult to get entry into the country and access to the affected people, but in part because the international community was slow to recognize the scale of the violence.

When UN and non-governmental relief agencies did begin to deploy staff to Darfur, they found recruitment difficult and tended to send junior staff who lacked experience to manage complex programs.

While the UN’s collaborative response to internally displaced persons (IDPs) was the prevailing system at the time – in which the three protection-oriented UN agencies (UNHCR, OHCHR, and UNICEF) were supposed to agree on which agency would be responsible for caring for IDPs – the collaborative approach did not work in Darfur. None of these three agencies wanted to take the lead in protecting IDPs in Darfur. In fact, the failure of the collaborative approach and the slow international humanitarian response was the impetus for the move to reform the international humanitarian system – a process we are presently living through.[6]

The situation improved in 2004 and by mid-2004, there were over 100 NGOs working in Darfur. Although the violence had subsided from 2003, the 10^th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the outspoken comments of efforts of then-Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland were factors leading many organizations to scale up their humanitarian response. Today there are an estimated 14,000 humanitarian workers in Darfur (about 1,000 of whom are international staff). However, from the very beginning security was the major issue – security for IDPs, security for civilians affected by the violence, security for humanitarian workers. NGOs were often thrust into playing a protection role although there was no commonly agreed strategy about what that meant.[7]

In 2004, the African Union deployed 2,341 troops, 450 observers, and 815 police, known as the African Union Mission in the Sudan II (AMIS II)[8] to protect the displaced civilians living in camps. Although poorly resourced, AMIS was successful in the initial years in providing some measure of protection to some of the IDPs in Darfur.[9] In particular, their patrols to escort women in their task of gathering firewood outside the camps were acknowledged as having helped prevent some of the attacks on them. However, by 2006, AMIS was largely ineffective; there were simply not enough soldiers and not enough support. As they came under attack by rebel groups, they tended to stay on their bases, leading to a lack of support for them by the IDP community.

The Conflict(s)

Although it has been over-simplified in the media, there are in actuality, several wars in Darfur:

A series of attacks by rebel groups which did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006
A 4-year old war between the Darfur rebel movements and the government
A proxy war between Chad and Sudan which is being fought by the two governments by hosting and supporting the other’s rebel groups
Localized conflicts centering on land tensions between sedentary and nomadic tribes
And, as is common in situations of protracted conflict, a number of armed groups have emerged who are led by warlords (or bandits) in search of personal gain.

In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed, but it was flawed from the beginning. There was poor consultation with the range of actors involved, the main rebel groups were not parties to the negotiations, and it was rushed through with an unrealistic deadline. Today, peace negotiations continue through a joint UN-African Union process, but reaching a meaningful peace agreement seems to be a distant aspiration. The number of rebel groups has proliferated and there are now at least 50 armed groups, with questions about how representative they are of the population they purport to lead.

In 2007, by Security Council resolution 1769, the Security Council agreed to deploy a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force of 26,000 troops, known as the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).[10] The process of deploying the troops has been painfully slow. Right now UNAMID is at 40% of its capacity and still needs equipment, and helicopters to allow troops to respond to incidents quickly. The slow implementation of UNAMID’s mandate is due to a number of reasons, mostly stemming from the reluctance of the Sudanese government to allow UNAMID to function effectively. For example, there have been long delays in working out the basic terms of reference for UNAMID’s operations; however, other governments have been slow to commit troops or provide resources for necessary supplies. Some have noted that governments are understandably reluctant to make these commitments for an operation which is perceived to have little chance of success.[11] On the ground, there has been some reported improvement in certain areas where troops can carry out patrols; however, the patrols are undermanned and their net impact on Darfur is quite minimal. For the average person in Darfur, life remains unchanged; the violence continues, sexual violence continues to be rampant, and Darfurians face daily security risks. The full deployment level of UNAMID troops is not expected until 2009.

On both the political level and the level of humanitarian response, the situation in Darfur raises serious challenges to the international community.

On the level of humanitarian response, Darfur raises a number of issues:

Access to communities in need is worsening for humanitarian workers as evidenced by the growing number of attacks on convoys and the hijacking of vehicles. As Paul Miller from Catholic Relief Service, recently characterized it. “We’re engaged in hit and run humanitarianism…” and unable to access communities very often.[12] Similarly Gonzalo Vargas-Llosa, UNHCR protection officer in West Darfur noted that access to many of the camps is available only by helicopter and there are only 2 helicopters available in West Darfur.[13]
Security is the biggest problem in the camps. While it is the responsibility of the Sudanese government to provide security, this is hampered by both lack of resources (sometimes police forces lack even bicycles, much less vehicles to try to track down armed groups) and by lack of political will to provide the needed support.[14]
While relief assistance is being provided to IDPs in camps, needy civilians who do not live in camps are almost totally ignored. Similarly, both displaced and non-displaced Arab communities are not receiving assistance. In fact, there are equity issues as IDP camps have lower mortality than those who are not living in camps. Few NGOs and UN agencies have been able to venture out of the camps to provide assistance in non-displaced areas which might have prevented displacement.
The proliferation of small arms means that many of the camps are militarized.
The current crisis of high food prices is also affecting life in Darfur. The World Food Program is cutting back its distribution of food in the region – although this seems to be due as much to the terrible security situation on the ground as it is to the increasing prices.[15]

Those who are operational in providing humanitarian assistance in Darfur are acutely aware of the need for a political solution. Yet they are constrained from speaking out because public advocacy carries a risk for humanitarian staff on the ground. This has led to a sometimes difficult relationship between advocacy groups, such as the Save Darfur Coalition and human rights groups speaking out about the violence in Darfur and operational NGOs. A recent report by the Humanitarian Policy Group demonstrates that operational NGOs have tended to use private advocacy, collective advocacy and indirect advocacy to address some of the larger issues.[16]

On the political – and human – level, the costs are very high.

Most of all, for the Darfurians, the lack of a long-term political solution means that the violence and insecurity continues.

The stakes are also very high for the Sudanese people and concern is growing concern about the impact of the war in Darfur on the January 2005, Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Southern Sudan. Not only is Darfur drawing attention and resources away from Southern Sudan at a time when the situation is still very fragile, but Darfurian groups oppose the census which is a key component of the CPA. They are concerned that they will not be accurately counted since a majority of Darfurians live in IDP camps that are inaccessible because of poor security and many are living as refugees outside the country.[17] Thus, the validity of the census is at stake, but as the CPA provides for elections, Darfur could well be underrepresented in the national government. The conflict in Darfur is also delaying post-conflict development in the country. And if the peace agreement does not address the root causes of displacement, a resurgence of the conflict will remain a possibility, especially if implementation lags, comes too slowly, or does not have total buy-in.

The stakes are also very high at the international level. Obviously one of the difficulties in developing a response to Darfur has been the inability of the UN Security Council to unite around proposed action. The opposition of Russia, China and the Arab League has meant that the United Nations was terribly slow to act. This was, after all, the first opportunity for the UN to apply the new “Responsibility to Protect” which had, after all, been unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. The slow response of the Security Council to the widely-known crisis in Darfur demonstrated the shortcomings in international governance.

Many in the activist community have focused on the need to pressure China to use its influence with Khartoum to allow the peacekeeping mission to function, but so far, this has not yielded significant results – except to infuriate the Chinese government, particularly with discussions about the Olympics.

The issue of Darfur also raises questions about accountability. To what extent can those responsible for the atrocities in Darfur be held accountable? The International Criminal Court has issued indictments against two Sudanese government officials for their roles in carrying out atrocities in Darfur. Not only has the Sudanese government refused to turn them over to the ICC, but one has been promoted and is now head of the government’s humanitarian work.

The stakes for UN operations in Sudan are very high. The IDPs have very high expectations of UNAMID – probably far too high. If UNAMID is unable to meet these expectations, it will be more difficult for future UN work in the country.

Moving Forward?

Any peace process will need to have the ownership of Darfur's civilians. When talks resume it will be key to include representatives of the civilian population as a whole, including civil society groups and tribal leaders in order to prevent armed actors from hijacking the process for their own gains. The peace process will also need the unified support of the international community - especially the Security Council, in particular the US, UK, France, and China. These governments each have substantial bilateral capacity to influence the process, but if they act collectively to bring about a peace agreement and support its implementation, the results will be stronger. Support from the international community will also help to increase the trust of the Darfurian civilians and their representatives in the negotiation process as presently there is a sense that the Government of Sudan has an unfair advantage in negotiations.

But beyond the political negotiations, there is an urgent need to deal with collapse of pastoral agricultural systems throughout the Horn of Africa. The conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are likely to worsen in the coming period – and not only in Darfur.

[1] “Darfur deaths ‘could be 300,000’,” BBC News, 23 April 2008. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361979.stm and “Death toll of 200,000 disputed in Darfur: Former U.N. chief says his estimate in 2006 is too low, Sudan says too high,” Associated Press, 28 March 2008. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23848444/

[2] Roberta Cohen, “Darfur Debated,” Forced Migration Review #29 (December 2007), 55.

[3] “Sudan: Population Figures and Profile,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, November 2007. Available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/CA38A0F0F269546F802570B8005AAFAD?OpenDocument

[4] “UNHCR transfers 5,400 Sudanese refugees to Chad camps,” UNHCR, 18 April 2008. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4808a35d4.html

[5] “Chad-Darfur Humanitarian Crisis,” UNHCR, October 2007. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/chad?page=intro

[6] “Humanitarian Reform: Fulfilling its Promise?” Forced Migration Review Issue #29, December 2007.

[7] Sorcha O’Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano, “Protective Action: Incorporating civilian protection into humanitarian response,” Humanitarian Policy Group Report 26 (December 2007), 19.

[8] “Background and Chronology,” African Union Mission in the Sudan. Available at: http://www.amis-sudan.org/history.html

[9] William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, DC. November 2005.

[10] Roberta Cohen, “Will Security Council Resolution 1769 Make a Difference in Darfur?” The Brookings Institution, 9 August 2007. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0809humanrights_cohen.aspx

[11] Transcript, “Protecting Darfur’s Internally Displaced,” Briefing at The Brookings Institution with Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, Thomas-Jensen, and Paul Miller, 5 February 2008, 12-13. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0205_darfur.aspx

[12] “Protecting Darfur’s Internally Displaced,” 19.

[13] Ibid, 8.

[14] Ibid, 12-13.

[15] “Driver for World Food Program killed in Darfur,” International Herald Tribune, 24 April 2008. Available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/04/24/africa/AF-GEN-Sudan-Darfur-Driver-Killed.php

[16] “Humanitarian advocacy in Darfur: the challenge of neutrality,” Humanitarian Policy Group, Policy Brief 28 (October 2007).

[17] “Darfur rebel JEM calls for boycott of Sudan census and elections,” Sudan Tribune, 30 March 2008. Available at: http:/www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26557

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: National Conference of the Ethiopian Community Development Council

'Hard Bargaining' Necessary with Sudan on Darfur Peacekeeping Force

Roberta Cohen and Stephanie Hanson — Wed, 06 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500

Roberta Cohen discusses the UNAMID peacekeeping force for Darfur with Stephanie Hanson from the Council on Foreign Relations.

HANSON: This is Stephanie Hanson for CFR.org. In August 2007, the UN Security Council authorized a 26,000 strong joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force for Sudan’s Darfur region. Many observers hoped the force would help quell the violence in Darfur, but delays and difficulties have plagued its deployment. I’m speaking with Roberta Cohen, an expert on humanitarian issues at The Brookings Institution.

HANSON: Roberta, there are only 9,000 troops deployed in the joint UN-AU force thus far. A good portion of these were already on the ground with the African Union force and just re-hatted. When this force was authorized, there were statements that there were enough troop pledges for 26,000 troops. What happened, where are the rest of these troops?

COHEN: There’s very little capacity. The Sudanese government has so obstructed this deployment of the force that the land and the water for barracks have not been fully worked out. There’s no status of force agreement yet. This is a basic agreement between the government and those providing the troops. There’s no agreement because there have been so many restrictions put up, conditions by the government of Sudan that there isn’t the readiness yet to deploy the rest of these troops.

The other reason is that the Sudanese government has insisted that the troops be not only predominantly, but almost all, from African countries. And African countries have a limited pool of experienced, trained, and well-equipped troops. And it’s not enough to have troops, you also have to have equipment. The Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping says that it will take most of 2008 to deploy the full force.

Listen to full interview>>

Authors

Publication: Council on Foreign Relations

Protecting Darfur’s Internally Displaced

Tue, 05 Feb 2008 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 5, 2008
2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Over one-third of Darfur’s population has been displaced since the region erupted into violence over five years ago. While the United Nations has approved the creation of an international peacekeeping force (UNAMID), the deployment has gotten off to a slow start. As international efforts seeking a political solution to the conflict also have stalled, the displaced people of Darfur remain vulnerable and in need of protection. Eclipsed by current events such as the U.S. presidential elections and the Iraq war, the situation in Darfur requires careful and sustained attention by the international community and by the United States.

On February 5, the Brookings Institution hosted Gonzalo Vargas-Llosa, a senior policy adviser from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for a discussion on the current realities in Darfur. Mr. Vargas-Llosa is presently working on protection efforts for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in West Darfur, and has traveled to more than forty IDP sites in the region. Colin Thomas-Jensen, a policy adviser with the ENOUGH Project, offered comments on the status of the international peacekeeping mission and progress toward a political solution to the conflict. Paul Miller, Africa adviser with Catholic Relief Services, discussed the challenges of humanitarian work in West Darfur in relation to both IDPs and host communities. Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow and co-director, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, moderated the discussion.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20080205_darfur

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Gonzalo Vargas-Llosa

Senior Policy Adviser, UNHCR

Colin Thomas-Jensen

Policy Adviser, ENOUGH Project

Paul Miller

Africa Adviser, Catholic Relief Services

Darfur Debated

Roberta Cohen — Sat, 01 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Bruising debates within the human rights and humanitarian communities have centered on the numbers who have died in Darfur, the use of the term genocide, the efficacy of military versus political solutions and the extent to which human rights advocacy can undermine humanitarian programmes on the ground.

Essential to effective planning in an emergency is knowing the scope of the disaster, the number of civilians who died, and from what cause. Yet in the Darfur emergency it has proved particularly difficult to affirm with any certainty the number of people who have perished and in what way. The principal obstacle has been the government of Sudan. Itself directly involved in ethnic cleansing, it has prevented compilation of credible mortality statistics. While the loss of life from the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict of 2006 was precisely determined, thus allowing families and communities to mourn, there has been a systematic effort by the regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir to cover up the death toll in Darfur. The government of Sudan has claimed that only 9,000 have died. The UN, however, says that more than 200,000 have perished whereas Amnesty International estimates 300,000 (95,000 killed and more than 200,000 dead from conflict-related hunger or disease) and the Save Darfur Coalition, an umbrella group of NGOs, places the total at 400,000.

This wide range of estimates has generated intense disputes about how the statistics have been developed, time frames used and whether all causes of death (killings as well as starvation and disease) have been included. Deliberately underestimating the numbers can contribute to international inaction but, on the other hand, exaggerating death tolls in order to raise the alarm can undermine credibility and put into doubt all statistics. It can also make constructive dialogue more difficult and lead the Sudanese regime to put further obstacles in the way of aid deliveries since it makes no distinction between advocacy groups and relief suppliers.

The debate over numbers points up the absence both of standardised data collection and of an authoritative international body with the mandate and authority to collect and disseminate mortality and morbidity data in emergencies. Without such a body, different actors, whether governments, UN agencies, NGOs or experts will continue to make their own ad hoc estimates of mortality in emergencies, with the result that nobody really knows the scope of the crisis.

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Authors

Roberta Cohen

Publication: Forced Migration Review

Statement to the 62nd Session of the General Assembly

Walter Kälin — Mon, 29 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400

Chairperson, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a honor to address the Third Committee of the General Assembly on my activities of the past year. I have continued to carry out my mandate to promote the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) through dialogue with governments and other relevant actors, engagement with regional organizations, as well as mainstreaming IDP issues throughout the United Nations. In addition to reporting on some specific country situations, I will focus my remarks on two important issues: the question of when displacement ends and the need to address internal displacement in peace processes.

Durable Solutions

Protection of internally displaced persons ultimately entails ensuring durable solutions to their displacement including, but not limited to voluntary return to places of origin.

In my missions of the past year, I have found that some governments have made remarkable efforts toward durable solutions for displaced populations. In Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire and Nepal, prospects of peace have triggered returns of some IDPs to their places of origin, while others are not yet ready or do not have the means to do so. I welcome steps taken by the governments concerned to help returnees, but at the same time, feel that more needs to be done to assist returns and ensure sustainability. In Turkey the considerable efforts to find durable solutions for the displaced - notably through the development of provincial action plans and support to the compensation mechanism established some time ago - must continue.

In other countries, particularly in the South Caucasus, where the lack of peace agreements means that return is not yet a real option for many IDPs, governments have taken important initiatives to improve the living situation of marginalized communities who were displaced more than a decade ago. In fact, allowing IDPs to lead normal lives during displacement and safeguarding their right to return are not mutually exclusive goals. I commend the Government of Georgia for its National Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons that was adopted early this year. I encourage it to finalize and implement a comprehensive Action Plan that enhances the rights of IDPs in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and addresses their specific vulnerabilities, for example by providing adequate housing assistance to particularly vulnerable persons, including disabled and elderly IDPs. This Plan should also ensure humanitarian access in all areas and promote dialogue among all parties to the conflict in order to create the political conditions for large-scale return. I thank the Government for having invited me to contribute to both the National Strategy and the Action Plan.

Azerbaijan has invested significant resources to improving the living situation of some 700,000 IDPs pending their return to places of origin. Newly constructed settlements allowed for camps to be closed, and I welcome the plan of the government to close the remaining camps by the end of the year. I encourage the Government of Azerbaijan to prioritize the creation of livelihoods for newly resettled IDPs, to address the living conditions of urban IDPs, and to take action to end practices that might be perceived as discriminatory for example in the area of education.

Armenia has a real opportunity to remove itself from the list of countries experiencing displacement, provided it undertakes a final, concerted effort to allow the relatively small group of IDPs remaining to return to their place of origin or to integrate in the places to which they were displaced.

There has been considerable concern in recent years with the question of when internally displaced persons attain a durable solution. Unlike refugees, there is no cessation clause for internally displaced persons. They are not conferred a special legal status that could be lifted by a decision by relevant authorities, but remain citizens of their own country, entitled to enjoy the same rights as all other citizens at all times. Over the past few years I developed, together with humanitarian agencies and NGOs, a Framework for Durable Solutions with benchmarks to determine when the needs, vulnerabilities and rights violations that may characterize internal displacement may be considered to have come to an end.

Three durable solutions can be distinguished: return to the place of origin, local integration in the areas in which internally displaced persons initially took refuge, and settlement in another part of the country. Displacement ends when one of these durable solutions occurs and IDPs no longer have needs specifically related to their displacement. The end of displacement, however, does not occur abruptly. It is a process through which the need for specialized assistance and protection diminishes progressively.

In order to determine whether a durable solution has been achieved both the process through which the durable solution has been achieved and the conditions of the returnees or the persons who have integrated locally or resettled in another part of the country have to be taken into account.

With regard to the process, it is important that internally displaced persons are able to make an informed decision as to which of these options they prefer; that no coercion has been used to induce or to prevent return, local integration or settlement elsewhere; and that they can participate fully in the planning and the management of these solutions. National authorities must take appropriate measures to establish conditions, as well as provide the means for such durable solutions, and they must grant or facilitate safe, unimpeded and timely access of humanitarian organizations and other actors assisting IDPs in this regard.

Through such a process, a durable solution is finally achieved when former IDPs can fully enjoy their human rights including through conditions of non-discrimination and equal access to legal and physical protection, livelihoods and means of survival, income generation, public services, including education, health services and pensions, political rights, the right to documentation, freedom of movement, and redress for abuses including property restitution or just compensation.

The Framework for Durable Solutions was welcomed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group in March 2007 as a means to analyze and address these issues. It is intended to assist governments and international and national actors to devise national legislation, policies and programs that promote the durable solutions to internal displacement, and I urge all relevant actors to make use of this Framework.

Internal Displacement in Peace Processes

Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen,

If I may draw a general conclusion from my missions in the last three years, I would state the following: resolving internal displacement and achieving durable solutions is inextricably linked with achieving lasting peace. And finding durable solutions for IDPs is extremely difficult where peace agreements disregard displacement-specific issues, because internally displaced persons have particular vulnerabilities not encountered by other civilians affected by conflict or by refugees.

It is exactly this relationship between peace and durable solutions, which not only justifies, but in fact requires a focus on IDPs' rights and needs in peace agreements.

Let me give you some examples from my missions:

In the aftermath of a conflict, if militias in areas of origin are not disarmed, or if landmines have not been removed, IDPs will be reluctant to return, or they may be displaced again after return as a result of insecurity. If IDPs are unable to recover their land or property, or if property-related disputes are not adequately addressed, large scale return is unlikely or could inadvertently provoke new tensions. If reconstruction and economic rehabilitation remain insufficient to enable the displaced to resume
livelihoods, settlement or return will not be sustainable. And if impunity for those responsible for displacement prevails, and rule of law, including accountability for past crimes, is not established, the prospects for reconciliation between the displaced and those responsible for their displacement diminishes.

The successful return and reintegration of displaced persons is often considered a key indicator of the success of a peace process. Internally displaced persons want to be heard in peace negotiations that are crucial for their future. I am convinced that consultations with IDPs must be strengthened, and I am working on an analysis of good practices and guidelines for the establishment of consultative mechanisms with IDPs. An expert meeting on this topic will be held in Geneva next month.

IDPs are rarely consulted or represented in a peace process for different reasons. They often belong to minority groups and may lack the necessary resources, education and political skills to participate in a peace process. They are often dispersed and lack organization or official representation. And there may be times when their participation could be harmful to peace talks, as when they are manipulated by one or more parties in peace negotiations.

It is therefore important to develop complementary strategies to ensure that their rights and needs are taken into account in peace negotiations and agreements. One strategy is for international mediators to prompt political leaders to incorporate displacement issues in peace negotiations. Another strategy is to focus on the human rights of IDPs through international, regional and national mechanisms, including my mandate.

A report prepared by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement to be launched in conference room 5 over lunch today analyzes the role of IDPs and internal displacement in peace processes. With analysis of more than ten peace agreements, this report identifies displacement-related issues for incorporation in peace agreements, as well as good practices for doing so. It also underlines the necessity to mainstream these issues into peacebuilding activities and emphasizes the unique institutional opportunity offered by the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Specifically, four areas related to displacement require attention within the text of peace agreements:

· Clear definitions that distinguish between refugees and IDPs, refer to standard international definitions, clarify local terminology, are inclusive in coverage and recognize regional displacement specificities,
· Guarantees of parties' cooperation in the resettlement process, including a commitment to safety and security both during and after return, specific language on how security will be provided, and sanctions against those who would violate the rights of displaced,
· An enumeration of the rights of the displaced persons, including the right to choose among durable solutions and their rights as citizens, including the right to documentation and to participation in post-conflict election and referenda, and
· The definition of an implementation process, including the establishment of a responsible authority, the establishment of a funding mechanism, and procedures for cooperation with the international community in finding durable solutions.

Within the framework of my mainstreaming mandate, I am committed to promoting the incorporation of the human rights of IDPs in peace agreements and the systematic consideration of issues related to IDPs in peacebuilding activities based on the recommendations of the study.

I addressed the Peacebuilding Commission on these issues in May, and I intend to develop a handbook for mediators addressing these areas of concern for IDPs and suggesting wording for peace agreements with clear legal underpinnings. We will draw upon good examples from existing peace agreements.

I am concerned that serious gaps exist in our funding mechanisms for protection, transitory assistance and early recovery activities following the conclusion of peace agreements. These gaps are particularly acute when one can no longer speak of a humanitarian crisis, but the situation remains too volatile for pure development activities. In Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, UNHCR and other organizations may have to close their offices at year-end for lack of donor support. Yet this is a time when such activities are of utmost importance to ensure that on-going returns consolidate the peace instead of plant seeds for relapse. Similarly, as an expert workshop organized by UNHCR and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement earlier this year established, we lack appropriate funding mechanisms for situations of protracted displacement, and continue with humanitarian assistance for prolonged periods of times. This may be counterproductive, creating dependency instead of investing in strategies that would enable the majority of IDPs to become self-reliant pending their return, local integration or resettlement.

Country situations

Turning to country situations not yet addressed, I am pleased to report that several situations have improved over the past 12 months, such as in Nepal, Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda, although the latter situation remains critical.

Yet there are still too many countries with troubling IDP situations. About 25% of the population in the north of the Central African Republic is displaced. Numerous villages were burnt, primarily by state security forces, and the IDPs live in precarious conditions often beyond the reach of humanitarian actors. During my official mission last February, I appealed to the government as well as rebel groups to adhere to the fundamental tenets of international human rights and international humanitarian law and to address the prevailing impunity. I welcome the deployment of a multi-dimensional international presence in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) to provide physical protection to the thousands of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians in this fragile zone.

Following a recent visit to Afghanistan, I continue to follow the situation with care. I am concerned that displacement is increasing and, moreover, has the potential to increase dramatically, for several reasons. Firstly, hostilities are escalating with a continuing disregard for the principles of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities. Secondly, I am concerned that the return of refugees from Pakistan and Iran, if not pursued henceforth in a manner that is measured, sustained and voluntary and that allows for true social, economic and political integration, could lead to returning refugees merely becoming IDPs. The fact that humanitarian access is seriously curtailed or even impossible in large parts of the country is also particularly worrying. At the same time, I am heartened by the apparent commitment of the national government, and the international community, to better define the scope and problems of internal displacement in Afghanistan, and I encourage them to develop a coordinated and targeted strategy to address the needs and vulnerabilities of the internally displaced. I will gladly lend my support to these efforts and hope to return to Afghanistan on mission once these efforts are underway.

I remain extremely concerned about the situation in Iraq with its estimated 2.2 million IDPs, a figure that persistently and steadily increases. Attempts by some authorities at the regional and local level to stop the entry of persons seeking refuge, and the lack of access to those most vulnerable, are deeply troubling. I fear that a humanitarian crisis is in the making in Iraq that will haunt us for a long time.

I hear alarming signals from Somalia, where more than 300'000 persons have been displaced in recent months adding to existing displaced population of 400'000 persons. And I am worried about the situation in East Timor, where more than 10% of the population remains displaced, largely unnoticed by the world and with far too little assistance from the international community.

I look forward to engagement with both national and international actors to address immediate concerns and work toward conditions for durable solutions for IDPs in Sri Lanka. I am concerned not only by the large numbers of displaced due to an intensification of the conflict in the past 15 months, but also by the continuing needs of those displaced for many years. I am grateful to the government of Sri Lanka for its invitation to visit in December, and I am eager to establish a constructive relationship focused on mutual commitment to the prevention and resolution of displacement in Sri Lanka.

While certain returns have become possible over the course of last year in the Democratic Republic of Congo, new displacements continue in the Eastern part of the country, notably in Northern Kivu. These are caused in particular by recent fighting and violence, including systematic rape. The capacities of the government and the international community to assist and protect the displaced remain weak and insufficient. I am grateful for the invitation extended to me by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo some time ago and hope to conduct a mission there in January 2008.

Finally, I welcome the invitation by the government of Sudan to visit Darfur in spring 2008, a mission I hope to undertake together with my African counterpart, the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons in Africa. The situation of roughly 2 million IDPs in Darfur remains one of the most serious in the world. I call on all parties to the conflict and all stakeholders to take full advantage of the upcoming peace talks, as well as the deployment of a hybrid AU-UN force, to create conditions to end violence against the displaced, to allow unimpeded humanitarian access, and to facilitate sustainable return.

Thank you very much.

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: United Nations, General Assembly, Third Committee

The Genocide in Darfur: America Must Do More to Fulfill the Responsibility to Protect

Susan E. Rice — Wed, 24 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400

The genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan has lasted for more than four years. As many as 450,000 people have died from the raging conflict in that African nation. More than two and one-half million others have been displaced or have become refugees and the situation is worsening. Yet U.S. policy has coupled generous humanitarian assistance with unfulfilled threats and feckless diplomacy. The situation in Darfur is evolving rapidly. Clearly, the next President will be faced with a different, yet still difficult, situation in Darfur.

Recommendations
The U.S. government should immediately take the following five steps:

i) Impose tougher sanctions on Khartoum:

freeze dollar-denominated oil transactions;
pursue comparable sanctions in the UN Security Council or, failing that, with the European Union;
keep sanctions in place until Sudan allows the full and unfettered deployment and operation of the UN-AU force.

ii) Support efforts to unify the rebel groups and negotiate a durable ceasefire and political agreement to end the conflict.

iii) Speed deployment of the UN-AU force by training, equipping, airlifting, and otherwise supporting the rapid deployment of UN battalions:

contribute specialized capabilities and equipment—such as helicopters, night vision capability, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities—to support the UN mission in Darfur;
obtain NATO agreement to deploy its NATO Response Force (NRF) to provide short-term augmentation and a bridging component to beef up the AU force until the full UN-AU hybrid can deploy.

iv) Implement and robustly enforce, with NATO, a no-fly zone. The United States should also signal its readiness to strike Sudanese military and intelligence assets, including aircraft and airfields, if necessary.

v) Finally, Congress should authorize the use of force in order to end the genocide.

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Susan E. Rice

Publication: Opportunity 08

A Faithful Case for Intervention: Our Common Responsibility to Protect Humanity and Prevent Atrocities

Elizabeth Ferris — Sun, 30 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400

People of faith struggle every day with the question of how to translate their spiritiual values into concrete and appropriate responses to people whose lives are unprotected or endagered by their own government. This responsibility—to protect fellow citizens of the world who face death and mistreatment by tyrants who hide behind national sovereignty, and to prevent such situations from occurring—has been under intense debate since the formation of the modern nation-state.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, a more sweeping understanding has developed of how people of faith should act for the global common good in the face of civil conflicts and tyranny rooted in nation-states. One striking example of this is the interfaith advocacy being carried out through the Save Darfur Coalition.

Yet responding collectively in the face of clear crimes against humanity by nation-state leaders does not come easily to the world's major faiths. The reasons: theological differences in approaches to war and pragmatic uncertainties about the nature of the appropriate response. The relationship between the global common good and the responsibility of the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries in order to protect people whose lives are at risk is known as the "responsibility to protect." This concept has been the subject of intense debate in international circles over the past two decades.

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Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Pursuing the Common Good: Principle and Practice in U.S. Foreign Policy (Center for American Progress, 2007)

Will Security Council Resolution 1769 Make a Difference in Darfur?

Roberta Cohen — Thu, 09 Aug 2007 00:00:00 -0400

Arabic Translation

The Security Council's July 31 resolution on Darfur is the strongest so far. To begin with, it was unanimously adopted, which sharply contrasts with earlier resolutions, whose authority was undercut by the abstentions of China, Russia or members of the Arab League. Second, it promises nearly to quadruple the number of troops and police on the ground from the current 7,000 African Union (AU) forces, which proved insufficient to Darfur's size, to 26,000 AU/United Nations forces. Third, it gives the troops a stronger mandate, authorizing them under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to take the "necessary action" to prevent armed attacks, ensure the security of humanitarian workers and protect civilians, both of whom have been under ongoing attack. At the same time, the resolution emphasizes the importance of a political process, endorsing Sudanese government-rebel talks under UN/AU auspices and rightly affirming that "there can be no military solution" to the Darfur conflict. Fifth, the resolution expresses "strong concern" about the ongoing attacks on humanitarian workers and calls for their full, safe and unhindered access to populations in need, in particular internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. And it looks forward to the reconstruction and development of Darfur, including the return of IDPs, compensation programs, and security in return areas. Finally, the resolution is noteworthy in not explicitly inviting Sudan's consent as did last summer's Resolution 1706, which enabled Sudan then to refuse the deployment of a Chapter 7 UN force.

This said, Resolution 1769 also has its shortcomings. The major one is its time frame. It is not until October that the new hybrid AU/UN force - UNAMID - is to set up initial command and control structures, not until the end of the year that UNAMID will take over from the AU force, and not until some unspecified time "thereafter" that full operational capability and force strength will be achieved. Indeed, it could take more than a year for 26,000 troops and police to be on the ground, in the meantime leaving beleaguered civilians unprotected. The security situation has so deteriorated in Darfur that UN officials have expressed fear that the world's largest humanitarian operation could collapse. From January to May 2007, more than 60 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, 56 staff abducted (and released), 31 aid convoys ambushed and looted, and 13 relief organizations forced to relocate due to attacks. Over the past six months, civilians have come under renewed assaults by Sudan's air force, by Janjaweed militias, by rebel forces fighting amongst themselves as well as by bandits and inter-Arab tribal fighting. In fact, most of the gains made in 2005-06 in reaching civilians with humanitarian aid and providing a modicum of protection have been sharply reversed by the overwhelming violence, which has also spread into neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic.

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