Brookings: Topics - Civil Society

Why Global Education Financing Must Be Part of Europe's Financial Transaction Tax Revenues for Development

Sarah O’Hagan and Rebecca Winthrop — Wed, 01 May 2013 14:17:00 -0400

As the financial transaction tax (FTT) becomes part of the European political landscape and moves its way through EU member-state legislatures, the use of a percentage of tax revenues for development – and specifically for basic global education needs— remains highly uncertain.

The 11 eurozone countries that got the green light from EU finance ministers in January to move forward with a coordinated tax on financial transactions could deliver as much as €35 billion for their national budgets. But the clear consensus shared by these 11 nations— which collectively represent two-thirds of the EU’s economy— on the timeliness and necessity of implementing such a tax now is not equally matched by a consensus on allocating part of the revenues to international development, let alone education. This is an unfortunate state of things given that the idea of using part of the revenues to support global development was a big reason for the huge social movement in support of the tax.

The backdrop to this uncertainty is the austerity agenda being pursued by many governments, in which foreign aid budgets are under pressure. As a consequence, foreign aid to global education risks falling faster than overall aid levels.

To date, only one of the vanguard countries in the FTT movement, France, passed its own FTT in mid 2012 and committed to allocate part of the revenues to development and climate finance. At the time, many called for 50 percent of FTT revenues to be dedicated to overseas development assistance and climate finance, but that figure soon dwindled to 10 percent, and ultimately 4 percent, for health and environmental projects. The ray of hope is that France has expressed its willingness for the EU FTT to also be partly allocated to development and climate finance, and is currently gathering support.

Civil society groups in France and in Europe generally are more effectively mobilized within the health and environment sectors, and are comparatively weaker on the education front. Yet given that global education is a sine qua non for successful economic development, it’s vitally important that global education activists in France and elsewhere not only mobilize within their countries to earmark revenues for development-- including basic education— but also collaborate across the larger European landscape to set a precedent for the use of financial transactions taxes around the world. An EU financial transaction tax for development could indeed put more kids in school and improve their learning outcomes in developing countries.

The European Union, via its member states and the European Commission, is among the largest donors to global education in the world. But the recent OECD Development Assistance Committee data release revealed a decrease in official development assistance for the second year in the row with significant cuts in countries like Spain and the Netherlands. And an agreement among EU heads of state at the February 8 European Council for the 2014-2020 EU budget is not going to fill this gap. In fact, the budget froze the portion earmarked for development at 2007-2013 levels, leaving the EU far from its commitments to reach 0.7 percent ODA/GNI by 2015.

Another worrying fact is that global education may not be a priority sector for the EU in many countries moving forward according to early word from several developing countries partners.

For low-income countries that simply cannot grow and improve their basic education systems without external financing, a decrease in aid flows without a compensating or greater infusion from innovative financing such as the financial transactions taxes, spells disaster. That is why, in addition to pushing donors to respect their commitment in developing countries to aid, the education community should do all it can to ensure that newly enacted financial transaction taxes allocate part of their revenues to global education.

If these examples are indicative of the way financing for global education has worked to date, they amply underscore the patchwork approach that even pieced together will still leave students in developing countries falling behind.

Authors

Sarah O’Hagan
Rebecca Winthrop

Image Source: © Darrin Zammit Lupi / Reuters

The Common Good: Theoretical Content, Practical Utility

William A. Galston — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 10:34:00 -0400

Despite skepticism about the common good, the idea has both theoretical content and practical utility. It rests on important features of human life, such as inherently social goods, social linkages, and joint occupation of various commons. It reflects the outcome for bargaining for mutual advantage, subject to a fairness test. And it is particularized through a community’s adherence to certain goods as objects of joint endeavor. In the context of the United States, these goods are set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution—in general language, subject to political contestation, for a people who have agreed to live together in a united political community. While the Preamble states the ends of the union, the body of the Constitution establishes the institutional means for achieving them. So these institutions are part of the common good as well. These are the enduring commonalities—the elements of a shared good—that ceaseless democratic conflict often obscures but that reemerge in times of crisis and civic ritual.

Read the full essay at amacad.org » (PDF)

Editor's Note: The above is from the Spring 2013 issue of Daedalus (a journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences) co-edited by William A. Galston (Brookings) and Norman J. Ornstein (American Enterprise Institute), which contains essays on the topic of “American Democracy and the Common Good” by Galston, Brookings’ Thomas Mann, and a number of other noted scholars. The essays range from theoretical and historical inquiries to examinations of specific institutions in the public and private sectors and in civil society.

Authors

William A. Galston

Publication: Daedalus

Image Source: © Shannon Stapleton / Reuters

Pakistan Will Rise Again

Madiha Afzal — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 10:48:00 -0400

Pakistan will rise again. It certainly seems improbable right now. But our people are too strong and too full of heart to let this country crumble. I believe in Pakistan and in Pakistanis.

Still, with each act of violence on this soil which destroys the futures of innocent children, women and men, my hope wanes a little and my optimism recedes.

I imagine a young boy sitting in his family’s apartment in Abbas Town on the evening of March 3. His father has gone to the mosque to pray and he is putting the finishing touches on his homework while his mother prepares dinner.

Imagine his face, the surprise when that blast came out of nowhere and took his future away. Imagine his mother’s shock. Imagine the father who found everything he lived for literally blown up. One imagined face and life, and the heart shrinks.

Thinking of all those who died in Abbas Town, as well as the hundreds of Hazaras in Quetta this January and February, is almost unbearable.

Pakistan’s homegrown militants get more brazen by the day, striking marketplaces in Quetta during the evening rush hour and homes in the heart of the country’s most populous city. They attack where citizens are supposed to feel safest. But where are Pakistan’s leaders? Do they grieve each child, each man and each woman lost to this senseless violence?

They do not visit the affected areas until days after the attacks, if then. Do they look at each victim’s picture, not the one with blood and missing body parts, but at the picture of the happy eight-year-old, the face full of life? Do they bother to learn his or her name and what made the child special?

Does the thought that it could have been one of their own cross their minds? They must know it probably couldn’t, given the amount of security they receive. So, they remove themselves from the situation and hide behind aggregate casualty numbers and impassive condemnations of the attacks.

It is impossible that any well-meaning state can be this inept at protecting its own. As long as innocent citizens continue to be killed under its watch, the government’s condemnations mean nothing. A state’s foremost responsibility is protecting the lives of its citizens. How can cars get loaded with explosives and travel through the country’s largest city, through narrow streets, to arrive successfully at their target?

The ranks of the army and police far outnumber the terrorists responsible for these attacks. So, how can the militants be more adept than the state, time and again? How can the state refuse to take the name of the terrorist organisation, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which took responsibility for the Quetta attacks? Why has its leader been arrested in Punjab on charges of hate speech, instead of suspected terrorism?

Where, you ask, is there room for hope in the midst of all this? The government has certainly failed us. My hope in Pakistan lies in its people. It lies in the Shia and Sunni survivors in Abbas Town helping each other out, in those donating blood to the injured, in the lawyers who declared March 4 a day of mourning for the attack, and in those collecting donations of money, food and supplies for the survivors.

In the Pakistan where I grew up, I never knew which of my friends were Shia and Sunni. I never knew whether one was Ahmadi, the other Kashmiri. We were all the same. In almost every way, we have regressed since then, but I can bet that the majority of children today still do not know which sect their friends belong to. Let’s not let that be overwritten by the hatred of a few.

I am not alone in thinking this way. Policy analysts, who know Pakistan well, continually cite the strength and intelligence of Pakistan’s people and its growing ‘civil society’ as the reason why Pakistan is unlikely to fail anytime soon. Pakistanis rally together after disaster strikes.

Following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan’s north, they helped in recovery and relief efforts by generously donating time, food, supplies, money and medical expertise in the affected areas. They did so again following the debilitating 2010 floods.

So, when Pakistan emerges from this wave of senseless sectarian violence, battered but still intact, I will know who saved it. It will not be the army, nor the politicians, nor the judiciary. It will be the man on the street, who remains compassionate despite the most damning circumstances.

Authors

Madiha Afzal

Publication: The Express Tribune

Image Source: © Naseer Ahmed / Reuters

Assessing the Work of Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management

Elizabeth Ferris, Daniel Petz and Chareen Stark — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

This chapter looks at one group of important but little-studied actors in disaster risk management (DRM): regional organizations. Although regional mechanisms are playing increasingly important roles in disasters, there has been remarkably little research on their role in disaster risk management. In fact, there are few published studies about the relative strengths and weaknesses of regional bodies, much less comparisons of their range of activities or effectiveness in DRM. A recent study carried out by the

Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement sought to address this gap by providing some basic information about the work of more than 30 regional organizations involved in disaster risk management and by drawing some comparisons and generalizations about the work of thirteen of these organizations through the use of 17 indicators of effectiveness. This chapter provides a summary of some of that research.

It is difficult to compare the work of regional organizations in DRM given the great variety of regional organizations in terms of history, purpose, size, capacity and other characteristics.

In order to facilitate comparisons between diverse organizations, a set of seventeen indicators was developed to serve as a baseline for comparison.

These indicators are:

Does the regional organization have:

1. Regular intergovernmental meetings on DRM

2. A regional DRR framework/convention

3. A regional DM framework/convention

4. A specific organization for DRM

5. A regional/sub-regional disaster management center

6. A regional disaster relief fund

7. A regional disaster insurance scheme

8. A way of providing regional funding for DRR projects

9. A means to provide humanitarian assistance

10. A regional rapid response mechanism

11. Regional technical cooperation (warning systems)

12. Joint disaster management exercises/simulations

13. Regional capacity building for NDMA staff/technical training on DRM issues

14. Research on DRM issues

15. Regional military protocols for disaster assistance

16. A regional web portal on DRM

17. A regional IDRL treaty/guidelines

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« Chapter 1: The Year of Recurring Disasters

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Chapter 2: Assessing the Work of Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Daniel Petz
Chareen Stark

Image Source: © Ana Martinez / Reuters

Disaster Risk Management: A Gender-Sensitive Approach is a Smart Approach

Elizabeth Ferris, Daniel Petz and Chareen Stark — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Women and girls, who account for over half of the 200 million people affected annually by natural disasters, are typically at greater risk from natural hazards than men – particularly in low-income countries and among the poor. Natural disasters and climate change often exacerbate existing inequalities and discrimination, including those that are gender-based, and can lead to new forms of discrimination.

The term “gender” refers to the socially-constructed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes that a society considers appropriate for a person based on his or her assigned sex at birth. Understanding the gender implications and facets of natural disasters and climate change is critical to effective disaster risk management practices that enable communities and countries to be disaster resilient.All women, men, girls and boys do not face the same needs and vulnerabilities in the face of natural disasters and climate change; there are differences within each group and between individuals regarding specific protection concerns and capacities – for example, people with mental or physical disabilities, minorities and indigenous populations, the elderly, chronically ill, unaccompanied children, childheaded household, female-headed households, widows, etc. – and over time throughout the disaster and post-disaster phases. Various factors, including social, economic, ethnic, cultural and physiological factors, affect not only the ways that disasters impact women, men, girls and boys, but also their coping strategies and their participation in prevention, relief, recovery and reconstruction processes.

Women play significant roles in all stages of disaster and climate risk management; they are often at the frontline as responders and bring valuable resources to disaster and climate risk reduction and recovery. However, the important roles or potential roles women take on are often not recognized, and women themselves “are largely marginalized in the development of DRR policy and decision-making processes and their voices go unheard.”

Yet, in most crisis situations, women and children account for the majority of those affected (e.g., more than 75 percent of those displaced by natural disasters, and typically 70 to 80 percent of those needing assistance in emergency situations). Moreover, global pressures of urbanization have particular implications for men and women in both urban and rural communities. As the frequency and severity of hydro-meteorological hazards due to climate change are predicted to increase, it is important to understand the relationship between gender and disasters.

This chapter examines some of the gender-related vulnerabilities and capacities in natural disasters, why it is important to adopt a gender-based strategy for planning and response, what a gender-based approach to disaster management looks like, and recommendations to relevant actors.

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Chapter 4 - Disaster Risk Management: A Gender-Sensitive Approach is a Smart Approach

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Daniel Petz
Chareen Stark

Image Source: © NIR ELIAS / Reuters

China in Revolution and War

Cheng Li — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Several serious problems in China could trigger a major crisis, potentially igniting either a domestic revolution or foreign war. Cheng Li wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What challenges does the Chinese Communist Party face?
What does the Chinese Politburo need to do about these challenges?
How can the United States prevent any Asian states from engaging in the use of force?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Cheng Li

China poses a major policy challenge to the United States largely because of the unpredictable trajectory of both its domestic transformation and foreign relations. While there has been much attention paid to China’s rapid economic rise and growing international clout, two other scenarios have been overlooked: domestic revolution and foreign war. There are many serious problems in China that could trigger a major crisis, including slowing economic growth, widespread social unrest, rampant official corruption, vicious elite infighting, and heightened Chinese nationalism in the wake of escalated tensions over territorial disputes with Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. This suggests that your administration should not easily dismiss the possibility that revolution or war might occur. Either event would be very disruptive, severely impairing global economic development and regional security in the Asia-Pacific; a combination of the two would constitute one of the most complicated foreign policy problems of your second term.

Recommendation:

The best way to prepare in advance for either likelihood is for this White House to cultivate a deeper relationship with Xi Jinping and his new leadership team, maximizing cooperation in various areas. In establishing a constructive relationship with the new Chinese leadership, the United States should be fully aware not only of the daunting challenges that Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) confront on both domestic and international fronts, but also the uncertain nature of Xi’s policy trajectory and of Chinese public opinion about the new Party boss.

There are two particularly undesirable outcomes. One is a situation in which the vast majority of the Chinese public becomes both anti-CCP leadership and anti-American. The other is a situation in which Xi derives his popularity from a strong endorsement of Chinese militarism.

To avert the first you should, while engaging with the Chinese leadership, more explicitly articulate to the Chinese people both the longstanding goodwill that the United States has towards China and America’s firm commitment to democracy, human rights, media freedom, and the rule of law, which the United States believes are fundamental to the long-term stability of any country.

To decrease the likelihood of the second — a conflict in the region that could involve the United States directly — you should more consistently exert American influence on U.S. allies or partners (including China) in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent the use of force by any party. Simultaneously, promoting military-to-military ties with the new PLA leadership should be a top priority.

Background:

China in Revolution: Anti-CCP, Anti-America

The scenario of abrupt bottom-up revolution occurring in China has recently generated much debate within that country. One of the most popular books in elite circles today is the Chinese translation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1856 classic The Old Regime and the Revolution. Senior leaders of the CCP (most noticeably Premier-designate Li Keqiang and new member of the Politburo Standing Committee Wang Qishan) were reported to have strongly recommended that officials read the book. In speeches given after becoming Party General Secretary, Xi warned that the Party could collapse if the leadership failed to seize the opportunity to reform and improve governance.

The fear and anxiety on the part of the CCP leadership seem well grounded given the daunting challenges the Party confronts:

• China’s GDP growth target of 7.5 percent for 2012 was the lowest since 1990 (in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident). This downturn is not only the result of flagging exports in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, but also the country’s own political bottlenecks. This slowdown will, in turn, further reveal flaws in the Chinese authoritarian system and thus could become a trigger for political crises.

• Economic inequality is increasing substantially. The Gini coefficient rose to 0.47 in 2009 and then to 0.61 in 2010, far exceeding the 0.44 threshold generally thought to indicate potential for social destabilization.

• China’s official data reveal that there are roughly 180,000 mass protests annually, or about 500 incidents per day. According to the Chinese official media, these protests have become increasingly violent in recent years, especially in ethnic minority regions.

• Corruption is out of control. The latest report by Washington-based Global Financial Integrity (GFI) shows that cumulative illicit financial flows from China (primarily by corrupt officials) totaled a massive $3.8 trillion from 2000 to 2011.

These problems have generated even more public resentment due to the unprecedented predominance of “princelings” in power — leaders who come from families of high-ranking officials. Four of the seven Politburo Standing Committee members, including Xi Jinping, are princelings. Large numbers of prominent Party leaders and their families have used their political power to convert state assets into private wealth; this includes transfers to family relatives who live, work, or study in the United States and other Western countries. The dominance of princelings in the new leadership is not only undermining elite cohesion and the factional balance of power, but is also generating cynicism among the Chinese public regarding any promises on the part of the leadership to tackle corruption. Furthermore, it may add ammunition to the sensational accusation that the United States provides a haven for corrupt CCP officials.

China in War: The Rise of Chinese Militarism under Xi

From the Chinese perspective, the first scenario of domestic revolution could result from a failure of the Xi Jinping leadership to adopt effective political reforms to prevent crisis; the second scenario —that of China in war — may be considered one possible “successful” attempt by Xi to consolidate power. This does not necessarily mean that the Chinese leadership intends to distract domestic tensions with an international conflict; contemporary Chinese history shows that the practice of trying to distract the public from domestic problems by playing up foreign conflicts has often ended in regime change. Yet Xi may be cornered into taking a confrontational approach to foreign policy in order to deflect criticism of his own strong foreign connections.

You need to be alert for warning signs that might point in this direction, especially the increasing anti-American rhetoric in both the Chinese official media and in diplomatic channels. Xi can be quite assertive in his approach to the United States. This was evident during his visit to Mexico in 2009 when he criticized what he termed the “bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than point fingers at China.”

Even more importantly, your administration needs to pay attention to the emergence of militarism among some military officers, especially the princelings within the PLA. Chinese analysts have observed that these military princelings are interested in bolstering the military’s power in the upcoming Xi era. Such a move would have the potential to increase the risk of both military interference in domestic politics and military conflicts in foreign relations.

Conclusion:

It is not in U.S. interest to see China’s transition to a constitutional democracy proceed in a manner overwhelmingly destructive to China’s social stability or its peaceful relations with any of its neighboring countries, which would risk leading the United States into war. Clarifying to the Chinese public that the United States neither aims to contain China nor is oblivious to their national and historical sentiment would help reduce anxiety and possible hostility across the Pacific. Second, enhanced contact between U.S. and Chinese civilian and military policymakers can help us better understand the decision-making processes and domestic dynamics within China. It can also aid us in heading off a regional conflict. Finally, when done within a broader strategy with all U.S. allies and neighbors in the region, it could reassure China that the United States is not only firmly committed to its regional security framework in the Asia-Pacific, but also genuinely interested in finding a broadly acceptable solution to the various disputes.

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Authors

Cheng Li

Image Source: © China Daily China Daily Information Corp - CDIC / Reuters

In Response to Sanctions, Russia Aims to Bar U.S. Adoptions of Russian Children

Fiona Hill — Thu, 27 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In the wake of the U.S. Senate’s passage of the Magnitsky Act, the Russian government has banned Americans from adopting Russian orphans. In an interview with Ray Suarez of PBS’s NewsHour along with Lauren Koch, Fiona Hill explains the internal politics that have led Russia to take this step. Read an excerpt below.

Ray Suarez: Fiona Hill, is this even about adopted children at all, or is this about a more confrontational stance towards the United States?

Fiona Hill: Well, sadly, it is now about adopted children, which, of course, the story makes very clear.

But it's come out of really campaign politics on both sides of the United States and in Russia. Mr. Putin faced, actually, a rather surprisingly bruising campaign to become president again, in spite of the fact that everybody saw him as a shoo-in.

And as part of that campaign, he really did ratchet up anti-American sentiment. He blamed protests that took place around the elections for the Russian parliament and around the presidential elections that brought many thousands of people out in the streets in Moscow and elsewhere, he blamed all those on U.S. support.

He's taken a lot of punitive action against U.S. NGOs. He's declared many non-governmental organizations in Russia that receive foreign funding, especially funding from the United States, to be foreign agents. People now under a new legislation have to register themselves as foreign agents. And, unfortunately, this is also part of that.

Suarez: So, by ratcheting up anti-American sentiment, does this kind of thing play well where with the Russian public, keeping the orphans inside the country, rather than letting them go to the United States to live?

Hill: Well, certain amounts of punitive action against the United States does play particularly well.

Part of the story is also the Magnitsky bill, the legislation that's just gone through the Congress that the president signed last week. And this is seen in many respects as sort of a tit for tat.

The U.S. always, in the Russian view, applies a double standard. It is always taking punitive action and applying sanctions against Russia. So this does play well.

However, as I think as we saw from the clips at the very beginning, there's been some soul-searching on the part of many Russians about this particular bill, because this is a disproportionate action. This is something that actually hurts Russian children, as well as ordinary families. So this is really sort of taking things in a very different angle.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: PBS NewsHour

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Integration or Emancipation? (Muslime in Deutschland brauchen Emanzipation)

Jonathan Laurence — Sun, 18 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In his article in Der Tagesspiegel, Jonathan Laurence takes a look at the degree to which Muslims in Europe – many of them immigrants – have become truly emancipated. Emancipation of a minority, he argues, is different from their integration or assimilation. As political situations come and go and change daily attitudes towards Germany’s religious minorities, Germany must be careful to preserve the small steps already taken toward minority emancipation. Read the article in English or German below.

German President Joachim Gauck’s visit to the Sehitlik mosque in Berlin before Eid al Adha earlier this month heartened critics who regretted his earlier hesitation to claim Islam as an integral part of federal republic. The about-face revealed a paradox within the man – just as within the country and perhaps the continent – that is tearing at the fabric of 21st century European Islamic life. Despite enormous progress, European Muslims still do not enjoy what has historically been called “emancipation.”

No mainstream politician denies the permanence of Islam’s presence. But as Islam is more visibly accommodated in the public sphere, it elicits fiercer resistance from nativists, who want proof of loyalty and a higher tribute in exchange for admission to the nation. Islam-critical populism no longer lingers on Germany’s political extremes alone. This reopens a wound that 1999’s historic citizenship reform was intended to heal, leading to “hyphenated” Germans’ frustration with limits on religious liberties and apparent double standards in the fight against political and religious extremism.

Rooting Islamic organizations and religious observance in domestic institutions in Germany and elsewhere in Europe is undeniably underway: the Deutsche Islam Konferenz and other consultations have led to hundreds of new prayer spaces in construction, the availability of religious education, and scores of imams, teachers and theologians who are being locally trained.

The legal and political status of Islam, nonetheless, escapes easy categorization. Two trends are impeding the anchoring of Islam. Within Europe, Islamkritik has slipped from aiming to preserve the “neutrality” of the public sphere or to defend “western human rights,” and towards a basic dubiousness about Islamic religious practices in general. This in turn reinforces the protective instinct within the countries of origin, where new ministries are to maintain religious, political and economic ties with diasporas abroad.

Emancipation in the sense of the way Prussian reformers Stein and Hardenberg used the term, offers a robust and realistic way out: The mass entry of a previously excluded group into the democratic order, based on the rule of law and equal rights and obligations as citizens -- including collective rights, if they choose to join a religious community or certain other types of secondary association. Of course, it has also always implied new duties, including taxation and the possibility of military conscription. Emancipation is a generational process that takes time; France’s Jews received full rights in 1791, whereas it took the 1871 Imperial Constitution (Reichsverfassung) to grant the same across a united Germany. The process has always been characterized by a “dual movement.” With one hand, the state liberates, equalizes and enfranchises, and acknowledges collective identity. While with the other, it forces adaptation and the reform of community structures.

Over the long and winding course of democratization in 19th and early 20th century Europe, Groups who were once absent from the body politic – including Jews, minority Catholics, and the working classes – gradually acquired full citizenship. And they were soon thereafter granted “group” status –in the form of central councils, concordats or trade unions — to administer institutional privileges and to anchor their organizations domestically within a constitutional framework.

But why use this outmoded expression? The word evokes the failures of German democracy, but it might as well point a way to reclaiming some of the brighter spots in the country’s democratization. Twelve years of Third Reich should not be atoned by reneging on earlier progress.

Emancipation also offers a way out of the false dichotomy of integration or assimilation. Integration cannot be the appropriate word for the millions who were born, raised and educated here, and who don’t consider themselves to be foreigners or immigrants. And to them, assimilation sounds like a euphemism for dissolution. In other words: if you uncover your hair, give up your minarets, stop your brutal halal slaughter and cruel circumcision rituals – then we have a deal: Welcome! Emancipation, in contrast, has historically meant becoming subject to the rule of law – and thus winning protection from administrative arbitrariness – and armchair theologians.

Why even bring religion into this discussion? Isn’t the focus on religion divisive and problematic and a contribution to needless communitarianism? There is no reason to pretend or to wish that Islamic identity or piety be the defining trait of the generations born here of immigrant background. Just as with “free markets”, which do not exist suspended in a theoretical space, but are regulated in myriad ways, so too is “universal citizenship” structured with many formal and informal institutions. Citizenship guarantees individual religious rights. But it is group status – usually in the form of public law – that gives meaning to those rights in city halls, government ministries, armed forces, prisons, schools, hospitals and sometimes even in public streets.

While not all European states have immigrant or foreign culture-oriented policies, all have religion offices and maintain some privileges, and often, a formal relationship with faith communities. State-Islam relations have begun to lay the groundwork for German Islam. Muslim students in NRW now have the option of Islam religion classes. Hamburg just concluded a historic state contract with several major Islamic federations. At eight universities, there are now centers of Islamic studies or chairs training future teachers, imams and theologians. This is still at a small scale: the cumulative enrollment is in the low dozens, while there’s an existing need for more than 2,000 imams and religious leaders in Germany.

This new institutional presence has already helped reduce tensions related to the “defense of Islam” in the public sphere and helped manage cyclical religious scandals. The YouTube user who uploaded an anti-Islamic video that went viral in September was a geistiger Brandstifter (intellectual arsonist). But the Muslim communities of Europe proved they are not a tinderbox, waiting to catch fire at the slightest provocation. Images of attacks abroad on schools, consulates, and embassies were dispiriting, yet all of the tragic violence occurred elsewhere. In Europe, the angry responses took the form of lawsuits and small demonstrations.

It’s tempting to think that nothing has changed in the quarter century, since Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. But the reaction to violent extremists should be proportionate to their numbers. The legal complaints filed against authors and magazines illustrate the power of formal institutional access that comes with full emancipation. By registering their offense, by protesting discrimination where they see it, European Muslims have begun to employ their democratic rights.

Another example of this came during last spring’s NRW elections. In the aftermath of a violent Salafist protest against the Prophet cartoons in Bonn, something much more meaningful took place. Federations representing hundreds of thousands of German Muslims condemned the violent protesters and implored constituents to express their dissent by fulfilling the civic duty of voting. As the proportion of Muslims of foreign nationality living here decreases, democratic political institutions are increasingly kicking in.

Nonetheless, the mixed experience of the current Federal Interior Minister reminds Germans of the need for non-partisan (überparteilich) consensus on Islam policy. The NSU murders and revelations of rightwing infiltration of the security apparatus, moreover, in addition to differences in counter-radicalization strategies, has broadened and deepened the sense of mistrust vis-à-vis German institutions.

Perceptions matter, and many German Muslims perceive that their community’s status shifts dramatically from one President to another, and from one coalition government to the next. The communication channels between Islamic organizations and the authorities during these crises never completely broke down, but relations have suffered. This is not unique to Germany, of course – France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK all have experienced some form of it. In the absence of that consensus, it pushes the discussion in minority communities back towards the option of dual citizenship, just in case. The loss of confidence in German or European institutions would mean a return to internationalization.

But this is also a genuine opportunity for Germany to push back. The dual citizenship battle shouldn’t be about confiscating foreign passports. It is rather about endowing the German identity card with binding commitments. Without a basic minimum set of guaranteed rights there will always be a market for protection – whether from ancestral homeland governments or transnational political movements.

This is a complex and multi-level interaction between state and religious actors within and across borders. Nonetheless, it is the nation-state that is ultimately responsible for guaranteeing the free exercise of its citizens’ religious rights. Only individual European governments can emancipate Europe’s Muslims, and the longer there is no final status agreement – in whatever form that take, whether it be Religionsgemeinschaft, Körperschaftstatus or something new – then the more fragile and reversible that progress will be. Until then, a real danger exists that the modest early accomplishments of emancipation will be undone before Muslims’ incorporation has even taken place.

Muslime in Deutschland brauchen Emanzipation

Anlässlich des muslimischen Opferfestes hat Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck im Oktober die Berliner Sehitlik-Moschee besucht. Seine Kritiker ließ diese Tatsache Hoffnung schöpfen – jene Kritiker nämlich, die seine frühere Weigerung bedauert hatten, den Islam als integralen Bestandteil Deutschlands anzuerkennen. Diese Kehrtwende legt Gaucks paradoxe Haltung offen, die in Deutschland und vielleicht auf dem ganzen Kontinent vorherrscht und die das muslimische Leben im Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts bestimmt.

Trotz enormer Fortschritte genießen die europäischen Muslime immer noch nicht das, was im historischen Kontext „Emanzipation“ genannt wird.

Kein demokratisch gesinnter Politiker in Deutschland leugnet, dass die Präsenz des Islam in Europa von Dauer sein wird. Aber während der Islam in der Öffentlichkeit demonstrativ willkommen geheißen wird, löst er zunehmend heftigen Widerstand bei den Nativisten aus, die von Muslimen einen Loyalitätsbeweis und mehr Integrationsbemühungen als Gegenleistungen für ihre Zugehörigkeit zur Gesellschaft einfordern. Islamkritischer Populismus ist längst nicht mehr nur an den Rändern des politischen Spektrums zu Hause. Dieser Populismus reißt eine Wunde wieder auf, die 1999 durch die Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts geschlossen werden sollte. Die neuen „Bindestrich-Deutschen“ sind frustriert angesichts der Grenzen, die ihrer Religionsfreiheit gesetzt werden und angesichts der Bigotterie im Kampf gegen den politischen und religiösen Extremismus.

Die Einbindung islamischer Organisationen und auch ihre Einbettung in bestehende gesellschaftliche Strukturen in Deutschland und Europa funktionieren zunehmend besser: Die Deutsche Islamkonferenz und ähnliche Gipfeltreffen von Politikern und Verbänden haben zu Hunderten neuer Gebetsräume und Gotteshäuser geführt, auch wenn viele davon noch im Bau sind. Ebenso positiv anzumerken sind die verbesserten Angebote religiöser Erziehung in Schulen und die immer größere Zahl von Imamen, Lehrern und Theologen, die im Land ausgebildet werden.

Der rechtliche und politische Status des Islam in Europa hingegen entzieht sich trotz aller Bemühungen einer Einordnung. Zwei Entwicklungen behindern seine Verankerung: Die Islamkritik in Europa verschiebt sich von der Betonung der Neutralität des öffentlichen Raumes und der Verteidigung westlicher Menschenrechtsvorstellungen hin zu einem generellen Unbehagen gegenüber allen muslimischen Glaubenspraktiken. Das wiederum ruft in den Herkunftsländern Beschützerinstinkte hervor, Ministerien werden geschaffen, um die religiösen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bande mit der Diaspora zu erhalten.

Das ist der Ausweg aus der falschen Dichotomie von Integration und Assimilation

Die Emanzipation in dem aufklärerischen Sinn dieses Wortes, den die preußischen Reformer Stein und Hardenberg meinten, bietet einen sicheren und realistischen Ausweg aus dem Dilemma: Den Eintritt einer zuvor ausgeschlossenen Gruppe in eine demokratische Gesellschaft, basierend auf bestehenden Gesetzen, mit den gleichen Rechten und Pflichten für alle Bürger. Emanzipation umfasst auch Kollektivrechte, falls diese Bürger sich entschließen, einer religiösen oder einer anderen Art von Gemeinschaft beizutreten. Natürlich waren damit immer auch Auflagen verbunden, wie solche zur Steuer- oder zur Wehrpflicht. Emanzipation ist ein ungleichmäßiger Prozess, der sich über mehrere Generationen hinzieht. Die Juden Frankreichs erhielten bereits im Jahr 1791 gleiche Rechte, wohingegen jene in Deutschland bis zur Reichsverfassung 1871 warten mussten. Ihm eigen war dabei schon immer eine Art doppelter Handschlag zwischen Staat und Religionsgemeinschaft: Mit der einen Hand sorgt der Staat für Gleichheit und erteilt Rechte. Mit der anderen erzwingt er Anpassung und eine Reform der Gemeindestrukturen.

Auf dem langen und schwierigen Weg der Demokratisierung im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts wurde von der politischen Teilhabe ausgeschlossenen Menschen – Juden, Katholiken, die Arbeiterklasse – nach und nach das volle Bürgerrecht gewährt. Ihnen wurde auch der Status „gesellschaftliche Gruppe“ zugestanden, sie konnten sich in Verbänden, Interessengruppen und Gewerkschaften organisieren, um institutionelle Privilegien wahrzunehmen und ihre Interessen innerhalb eines gesetzlich verankerten Rahmens zu vertreten.

Aber warum sollten wir heute noch den überkommenen Begriff „Emanzipation“ verwenden? Das Wort beschwört die Misserfolge der deutschen Demokratie herauf, dabei könnte es auch die lichten Momente des deutschen Demokratisierungsprozesses beleuchten. Zwölf Jahre „Drittes Reich“ sollten nicht die schon zuvor errungenen Fortschritte negieren.

Authors

Jonathan Laurence

Publication: Der Tagesspiegel

Image Source: © Thomas Peter / Reuters

Rocky Times Ahead for Obama and Putin

Fiona Hill — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Managing the relationship with Russia will be more difficult for President Obama in his second term -- because he now has to deal directly with Vladimir Putin. Russians were generally indifferent to the U.S. election and the Kremlin remained above the campaign fray. If asked to make a choice, they deemed an Obama second term somewhat more palatable given Mitt Romney's designation of Russia as the "number one geopolitical foe." But, President Obama will have to start from scratch with the Russian president.

Over the four years of his premiership and tandem power-sharing relationship with Dmitry Medvedev, Putin deliberately avoided meetings with Obama (and many other leaders). As one Kremlin aide quipped, it was titular President Medvedev's job to have "tea with dignitaries." Obama and Putin only met twice. Once in Moscow in July 2009, and then during the G20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in June 2012. By limiting access, Putin kept everyone guessing. He created an obsession, even at the highest levels, with finding reliable ways to pass on important messages.

The best illustration was Obama's "hot mic" incident in Seoul in March 2012. President Obama was caught explaining to still-President Medvedev that he could not make much progress on critical issues during the U.S. election season. He hoped to have more flexibility in a second term. Medvedev reassured Obama that he would "transmit this information to Vladimir." President Obama will now have to transmit information for himself.

He will find Vladimir on the defensive and suspicious of U.S. intentions. Putin's primary concerns are domestic politics and ensuring regime survival -- not establishing cordial relations with the U.S. president. When Putin announced in September 2011 that he would return to the Russian presidency, he did not anticipate the negative reaction from Russia's urban elite. He was stunned by the rise of new organized opposition movements.

Putin now faces a serious dilemma. His strategic long-term plan is to rebuild and re-industrialize Russia. He needs human capital capable of creativity, innovation, and problem-solving to carry this out. But Russia's professional classes took to the streets to protest and voted against him in large numbers -- including more than fifty percent of Moscow's urban population. Putin's base of support is rooted in Russia's past, among the industrial workers, public sector employees, pensioners, and rural residents, who depend heavily on Kremlin subsidies rather than create new wealth. This is Russia's "silent majority."

The more vocal minority of urban professionals is the constituency that the United States has funded through various civil society initiatives since the 1990s. It is also the group the Obama Administration reached out to with its first term 'reset' policy. In supporting this middle class, the United States has effectively put itself in conflict with the Kremlin. Putin has directly accused the 2011-2012 protestors of being foreign (i.e., U.S.) agents. Over the last several months, the Kremlin has moved aggressively to intimidate the opposition, impose hefty fines and jail sentences, and cut off their sources of funding, including closing USAID. We can expect these actions to continue, which will undermine the basic premise of President Obama's "reset."

The biggest barrier to changing the dynamic is Putin's excessive focus on security, and a pervasive mistrust at all levels of the Russian political system. Putin does not want to devolve authority and lose control inside the country. The Kremlin does not want Russia to appear vulnerable in any way to outside powers. Putin distrusts the new urban middle class. Putin and the Kremlin distrust the United States and see Washington as seeking to infiltrate and overturn the Russian political system. President Obama can do little to lessen this mistrust given his own domestic political constraints and realities.

In the meantime, there are few incentives for Putin to "loosen up." The Russian opposition movements are not motivated by economics. Obama's second presidential term was almost upended by the U.S. economic crisis. Putin is a victim of his own economic success. Prosperity and stability in the past decade helped create the new urban middle class, which now wants political change to match its economic achievements. If Putin does not find a way to open up the political system, Russia cannot make the transition to a modern and economically competitive society without large disruptions.

The dangers, however, seem too great. The more progress Putin makes in modernizing Russia, the larger the strata of people who reject the system. Domestic dissent and Putin's efforts to counter it will be a permanent feature of the next several years, increasing the tensions and political tussles with the United States. Against this backdrop, President Obama will have to work very hard to create and manage a relationship with a beleaguered and belligerent Vladimir Putin.

Authors

Fiona Hill

Publication: The Huffington Post

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Religion and Political Civility

Peter Mandaville — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Summary:

As communities revise their basic political rules and shape new political institutions, some of the most complex and vexing questions regard religion and what role it should play. On the one hand, there is much to be found in the world’s great religious traditions that strengthens and undergirds citizenship and political civility. Notions of tolerance, compassion, and respect for the rule of law and governing institutions are central to all great faiths.

But difficult issues frequently arise around the question of religion’s role in politics, particularly in the diverse societies that are increasingly the norm in a globalized world. For example, if faith informs public morality, what space is there for those whose religious beliefs are outside the majority—or for non-believers? And while many would agree that religious values can and should infuse political life, the question of whether religious authority has any superior claim to determine or affirm legislation raises a thorny set of issues. What is the appropriate relationship between the state and religious institutions and other faith-based actors? How can the full rights of all citizens—particularly those in the minority—be ensured, and who has the authority to determine the boundaries of citizenship? Given the importance to many of religion and religious values as the fundamental basis for determining right from wrong, what are the respective roles of the state and religious institutions in shaping, implementing, and enforcing both religious norms and secular affairs? Who is authorized to define and speak on behalf of religion? And when, as is inevitable, conflicts do arise over different conceptions of morality, authority, and national priorities, where can we turn to find resources and examples for resolving these disputes judiciously and equitably?

This paper reflects the rich and active discussions that took place on these questions, among others, during the course of the “Long Conversation” on religion, civility, and state-building at the 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum.

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Authors

Peter Mandaville

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Compassion: An Urgent Global Imperative

Karen Armstrong — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 16:33:00 -0500

Summary:

At the 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, the Religious Leaders Working Group brought together religious leaders and activists from all over the world to discuss compassion and how to restore it to its rightful place as the test of true spirituality and the heart of religious and moral life. The working group’s participants discussed the Charter for Compassion, written in 2008 by leading activists and thinkers representing six of the major world faiths, and how the group could build a global network of compassionate religious communities. The group decided that it would initially develop a succinct guide to explain what a compassionate synagogue, church, temple, or mosque would look like in the 21st century, making it clear that compassion has nothing to do with pity or sentiment but consists of a principled determination to transcend selfishness and reach out imaginatively and practically to all others—not simply those we find congenial. In September, Karen Armstrong will give the keynote speech at the Islamic Society of North America, and will announce that ISNA has endorsed the Charter and that Imam Mohamed Magid has declared the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center a Compassionate Mosque and will invite all ISNA mosques to do the same.

After we have piloted this scheme, we hope to create an international council of clergy from all faiths, who would bring a truly compassionate and authoritative perspective to world crises and challenges, countering the strident voices of extremism and making the compassionate voice of religion a dynamic, practical, and positive force in our dangerously polarized world. Only then can the faith traditions fulfill one of the chief tasks of our time: to build a global community where people of all ethnicities and ideologies can live together in mutual respect. It is time for religion to become pro-active. As a first step, the group would like to make a two-minute video, filmed and edited by Unity Productions, to make the compassionate ideal more comprehensible and accessible to a still wider audience.

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Authors

Karen Armstrong

Image Source: © Zohra Bensemra / Reuters

Developing New Mechanisms to Promote the Charitable Sector

Dean Dilley and Elizabeth Ryan — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Summary:

An important national security priority for every country is preventing the diversion of charitable assets for illegal purposes. At the same time, many Muslim charities and charities operating in Muslim-majority countries now confront significant handicaps in fundraising and in operating overseas. Donors who wish to support such charitable activities face a dilemma when assessing the qualifications of a particular charitable organization in what has been described as “a climate of fear.” Similarly, and in reaction to their own changing regulatory obligations, financial institutions are increasingly risk averse in dealing with Muslim charities.

The working group convened key stakeholders to consider these challenges to philanthropic giving and to develop practical solutions. Among the options considered in this review was the viability of an independent rating or evaluative organization that would produce public reports on individual charitable organizations, assembling purely objective information relevant to prospective donors. This includes, for example, information regarding governance, internal controls, accounting practices, primary donors and grantees, and participation, if any, in any public sector sponsored activities. While this paper attempts to reflect faithfully the discussions of the working group, specific recommendations represent the views of the authors.

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Authors

Dean Dilley
Elizabeth Ryan

Image Source: © Harrison McClary / Reuters

The Middle Classes and Foreign Policy in Latin America

Ted Piccone — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

As the middle classes have expanded in Latin America’s prospering democracies over the past 30 years, so too has their demand for better public policies from their governments. As their awareness of the effects of globalization on their own lives increases, civil society, including the media, business groups, academics and NGOs, are slowly becoming more vocal and organized.

This increasing competition for a voice in international affairs is the start of a long-awaited trend toward the democratization of foreign policy, offering both opportunities for greater transparency, accountability and pro-human rights policies, as well as risks of politicization and capture by special interests.

Read the article on America's Quarterly »

Authors

Ted Piccone

Publication: America’s Quarterly

Music and Art in a Changing Pakistan

Thu, 11 Oct 2012 14:30:00 -0400

Event Information

October 11, 2012
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

On October 11, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted a discussion with the award winning musical duo of Zebunnisa Bangash and Haniya Aslam and Arif Rafiq, adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. The panel was moderated by Cynthia Schneider, distinguished professor in the practice of diplomacy, Georgetown University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Durriya Badani, deputy director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, delivered welcoming and introductory remarks.

Cynthia Schneider, Zebunnisa Bangash and Haniya Aslam

The popular duo, “Zeb and Haniya” have recently been in the United States as cultural exchange Ambassadors on behalf of the U.S. Department of State, sharing their insights about the significant role that music and musicians are playing amidst the increasingly conservative climate in Pakistan. As young Pashtun women, the duo shared their perspective on the initial difficulties of attaining recognition. However, to their surprise and delight the influence and impact of their music has now reached well beyond the boundaries of Pakistan, and into Uzbekistan, India, Iran and Afghanistan.

Arif Rafiq stressed the fact that the average American fails to familiarize him/herself about other cultures and societies beyond what is portrayed in the media. Rafiq reminded audiences that, “the cultural fluidity expressed in Zeb’s and Haniya’s music contradicts the conventional image of Pakistan.” In a country where 70 percent of the population is comprised of youth, it is important to recognize and support emerging positive agents of change in a country embroiled in violence, conflict and political instability.

Zebunnisa Bangash, Haniya Aslam and Arif Rafiq

Participants listen to the panelists discuss the impact of art on change in Pakistan

Participants

Panelists

Cynthia P. Schneider

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World

Poverty in the Midst of Abundance: Governance Matters for Overcoming the Resource Curse

Daniel Kaufmann — Thu, 13 Sep 2012 13:30:00 -0400

In 1990, almost 600 million people lived on less than $5 a day in resource-rich countries. Today, it is estimated that poverty has increased to about 700 million people. Among this population, close to 300 million live in dire poverty, surviving on $2 a day or less. The majority of the poor in resource-rich countries live in Africa, where 80 percent of citizens in extractive-intensive countries live on under $5 a day, and over 50 percent live on under $2 a day.

In many countries the failure to harness natural resource wealth towards national well-being is in large measure linked to a failure of national governance. Of the hundreds of millions of citizens living on under $2 a day in resource-rich nations, 85 percent live in very poorly governed countries – countries which, according to the updated Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), rate very poorly in corruption control and other governance dimensions.

The WGI organize and synthesize data reflecting the views and reports of tens of thousands of stakeholders worldwide, including respondents to household and firm surveys and experts from nongovernmental organizations, public sector agencies and providers of commercial business information. The newest WGI dataset being released is based on dozens of different data sources from over 30 organizations around the world, and aggregates the data from hundreds of disaggregated questions. The indicators cover over 200 countries between the mid-1990s and the present, thus also allowing observers to monitor country trends.

Governance has political, economic and institutional dimensions. The WGI project defines governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes how governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the government’s capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and provide public services; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. This definition drives the six core indicators of governance measured by the WGI:

1. Voice and Accountability: captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.

2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

3. Government Effectiveness: captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

4. Regulatory Quality: captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

5. Rule of Law: captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

6. Control of Corruption: captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

With this updated WGI dataset, we can assess trends over time and ask whether governance has improved in extractive-intensive countries. Reviewing the past 10 years of WGI data, we see in Figure 1 that governance, in various dimensions, on average has not improved in these countries. To the contrary, we observe a somewhat declining trend in Control of Corruption among extractive-rich countries, contrasting the (mildly) improving trend for the rest of the world (non-extractive countries). Similarly contrasting patterns are suggested by the data on other governance dimensions in the WGI, such as in Voice & Accountability and Rule of Law.

Thus, not only has the level of poverty in extractive countries risen, but governance has also deteriorated. Yet this trend – the average of the full sample of 54 extractive-rich countries – masks differences across countries. While there are many nations facing enormous governance challenges, there are countries that show that natural resources can be a blessing. For instance, in Figure 1 we see for a group of extractive-rich states, governance performance is not only satisfactory, but has been improving over the past decade.

In fact, the WGI data suggests that governance has improved in extractive-rich countries that have not yet attained stellar standards of governance. Examples of countries that have achieved significant improvements in one or more dimensions of governance since 2000 include Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Namibia and Colombia, among others. These countries contrast sharply with other resource-rich countries that have experienced significant deteriorations in at least some key dimensions of governance over the same past dozen years, including (among others) Syria, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Mauritania and, over a longer time span, Zimbabwe.

And we know that governance matters. Past research has pointed to a very high payoff for governance reforms, which we have characterized as the ‘300 percent development dividend of good governance’. Improvements in governance (by one standard deviation) have been causally associated with about a three-fold increase in a country’s income per capita on average.

From the simple depiction in Figure 2 we see that high levels of corruption control are linked with higher income levels. It is noteworthy that this link applies both to resource-rich countries and others. In other words, an overall higher standard of governance matters for countries rich in natural resources at least as much as it matters to the rest of the world. High standards of governance and natural resources are not contradictory notions.

Yet particular attention to governance challenges is needed in extractive-rich countries, not only because of the particular governance and management problems associated with the industry, but also because most of these countries still struggle with national-level governance challenges. As we see in Figure 2, 55.6 percent of resource-rich countries rate poorly on corruption control (bottom third in corruption), while 33.3 percent rate in the average range (middle third).

For years, a central question for resource-rich countries has been whether they are destined to be cursed in terms of governance standards and thus development prospects, or whether it is possible to turn natural resource abundance into a blessing. In other words, is it the case that natural resources themselves result in worse institutions, or, is it that subpar governance and institutions result in worse natural resource management outcomes?

If the former is the case, namely that resources foster misgovernance, then extractive intensive countries are deterministically cursed. Fortunately, much of the literature and evidence point more strongly to the latter – that there is nothing predetermined about the resource curse. Instead, it seems that resources become a curse where governance and institutions are already weak.

Yet at the same time there is little room for complacency since the evidence also suggests that excessive dependency on natural resources can exacerbate governance challenges when they already exist. Concentrated natural resources can be a magnet for rent-capture, which in turn can contribute to: i) the elite capturing those rents and fighting to maintain control over them; ii) disincentives for regular political transitions; iii) instability more generally, as competing groups fight for control over resources; iv) ability by the elite to buy supporters and placate opponents by distributing resource rents, thus silencing opposition; v) unaccountability to citizens due to overreliance on extractive revenues rather than taxes, and, vi) macro-economic instability due to the ‘Dutch Disease’ (an overvalued exchange rate resulting from overreliance on extractive exports), and the instability of oil and mining revenues.

This is a daunting list of challenges, faced by many countries to varied extents, but the outcome is not predetermined. Countries that are led with integrity and that invest in good governance not only can mitigate the resource curse, but can turn it into a blessing. Highly industrialized countries like Norway are not the only the only illustrations of how resource abundance can be compatible with high governance standards; well-governed emerging countries, like Chile and Botswana, are also illustrative (as are those countries experiencing improved governance, highlighted above).

It is difficult to see the future. But we can suggest that whether the hundreds of millions mired in poverty in resource-rich countries will see their prospects deteriorate further, or instead improve, will depend on the quality of governance, and within it, the extent to which transparency, accountability and corruption control reforms take hold at the national level, as well as within the extractive industry in each country. Ultimately in these resource-rich countries, it is governance what will determine development success or failure.

Overcoming the resource curse is not only a major task for governments, but also for civil society and the private sector, both at the national and international levels. But multinational oil, gas and mining companies also bear an important responsibility in helping improve governance standards worldwide, as illustrated by the major debates surrounding the Dodd-Frank (Section 1504) natural resource disclosure rules (just passed by the SEC), as well as the pending EU disclosure rules. In short, collective action by key stakeholders will be essential.

Note: The updated Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), a joint research project between Brookings Institution and the World Bank, are now available on the new Brookings Development, Aid and Governance Indicators and at the World Bank. The WGI is prepared by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, who are responsible for views and errors. The poverty data utilized in this analysis was drawn from the paper by Kharas and Rogerson, and this article benefitted from the assistance from Natasha Ledlie and Veronika Penciakova.

Authors

Daniel Kaufmann

Egypt's Uncomfortable Challenge: Balancing Security and Civil Liberties

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 20 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

On August 11, one day before Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi launched a civilian "counter-coup" and forced top military leaders into retirement, the privately owned al-Dustour newspaper published a now infamous editorial that took up the entire front page. Government authorities confiscated copies of the issue. Soon after, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were attacked for clamping down on freedom of speech. The U.S. State Department zeroed in on the Dustour controversy, saying, "We are very concerned by reports that the Egyptian Government is moving to restrict media freedom and criticism in Egypt, including preventing the distribution of al-Dustour."

The Brotherhood had made plenty of alarming moves -- such as censoring critical articles in state-owned newspapers -- and both Egyptian liberals and the international community were right to push back. Still, the Dustour controversy is more complicated. It brings into sharp focus questions of legitimacy, the limits of free speech, and the uneasy balance between civil liberties and national security in Egypt. There is also, of course, a more immediate question: do citizens have a constitutional right to agitate for the overthrow of their own government?

The Dustour editorial warned that if the Brotherhood had its way, Egypt would see "the destruction of the citizen's dignity in front of his family and his children and the rape of his private property rights." It warned that the result would be "killing and bloodshed." Alarmist and offensive, to be sure, but not quite at the level of incitement. The most controversial part came in the final paragraph, which seemed to suggest the military might be encouraged to move against the government:

Saving Egypt from the coming destruction will not occur without the union of the army and the people and the formation of a national salvation front composed of political leaders and the army [which would announce] an explicitly civil state protected by the army, very much like the Turkish system. If this does not happen in the coming days, then Egypt will fall and be destroyed. ... Taking to the streets in peaceful protest is imperative and a national duty until the army responds and announces its support for the people.

Is this protected speech? According to Article 174 of Egypt's penal code, which dates back to the 1930s, citizens can be imprisoned for a period not exceeding five years for "incitement to overthrow the government." According to this and other provisions, the government appears to have had legal grounds to confiscate copies of al-Dustour. But just because something is "legal" does not necessarily make it right. After all, a liberal reading of the penal code could render nearly any anti-government activity illegal.

Should Egyptians (or anyone else) be able to call, however peacefully, for the army to depose an elected president? According to the U.S. criminal code, to take an example, such calls are not generally protected under the first amendment.

Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

Established democracies tend to have similar provisions, with European countries often being more restrictive than the U.S. on hate speech and incitement. There are also recognized practices, best exemplified by the "Johannesburg Principles," which state that restrictions on free speech cannot be justified unless they are meant to protect "a country's existence or territorial integrity against the use or threat of force or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force" including from an "internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government."

But successful democracies depend not just on legal provisions but also on accepted norms. In the United States, far-right groups and individuals do, on occasion, speak of bearing arms and overthrowing the government. Americans, myself included, don't tend to get too worried about this, because the vast majority of their fellow citizens accept the legitimacy of the elected government, no matter how much one might hate its policies. Moreover, civilian control of the military is a principle that virtually no one in America today objects to, so socialized has it been into the prevailing political culture.

Egypt, obviously, finds itself in a very different place, coming out of decades of effective military rule. There is a significant faction of Egyptians who, for a variety of reasons, do not recognize the legitimacy of their current government, which was elected in June. (The very fact that a leading newspaper would call for a coup is itself evidence of this.) Such questions over legitimacy are, in part, the result of a woefully mismanaged transition as well as the inherent conflict between revolutionary legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. Because Egyptians launched what was essentially an extra-legal overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in February 25, 2011, there is a similar sense in certain quarters that the current president, Mohamed Morsi, can and should be removed from office outside the confines of normal politics. Of course, the major difference is that Mubarak was a dictator, and Mohamed Morsi, whatever his faults, certainly appears to have been freely elected by the Egyptian people.

The al-Dustour, no isolated incident, came in the context of worsening political polarization and growing rumors of an impending move to depose Morsi, possibly through a military coup. The most extreme example came when Tawfik Okasha, the sensationalist television commentator, called for violence against the Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi, saying, "I make your blood permissible as well." Meanwhile, a million-man "second revolution" against the Brotherhood was announced to take place on August 24. Interestingly, the protest does not seem to have a specific political aim but instead calls for the dissolution of the Brotherhood and its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party. As Hesham Sallam wrote in Jadaliyya, "These trends, coupled with the developments that followed, signal that some military leaders may have been prodding their allies among opinion shapers and friendly media outlets to promote the image of popular support for a coup d'etat against the Brotherhood."

Fearing that the military might act against Morsi, the Brotherhood, in apparent coordination with a number of younger military officers, seem to have decided to take pre-emptive action and fire the presumed leader of any such coup: Hussein Tantawi, the head of the armed forces and Mubarak's longtime defense minister. The Dustour editorial, on August 11, had warned that Morsi was preparing to "overthrow" the "current leaders" of the armed forces. Tantawi was fired the next day. Maybe it was just a coincidence, but in this atmosphere of suspected coups, pre-emptive coups, and counter-coups, national security concerns might take greater precedence than might otherwise be appropriate.

This lack of security, along with persistent questions over legitimacy, could perhaps blur the line between protected and punishable speech. There are possible policy responses to this -- overhauling the obviously outdated penal code, for example -- but, more importantly, it may require Egyptians to establish the limits of public dissent. Maybe the Dustour editorial falls outside of those limits, or maybe not, but the point is setting norms. Some Egyptian clerics, for example, have sometimes come perilously close to takfir (the practice of making a Muslim's blood licit). Others have already crossed that line. Hashem Islam, a cleric from Daqahlia, declared that those who join the anti-Brotherhood protests on August 24 are guilty of committing "high treason" and suggested that their blood was licit.

Islamists, now that they're in power, obviously have a strong interest in delegitimizing and criminalizing speech that calls for deposing an elected government, one that they happen, now, to dominate. Liberals have a similar interest since, presumably, one day, a liberal candidate may win the presidency. The last thing Egypt needs is a bunch of radical Islamists (or ordinary clerics) calling for the overthrow of a democratically elected, liberal head of state.

Muslim Brotherhood critics have a strong case on the group's worrying censorship, even if the al-Dustour confiscation could conceivably fall within the bounds of acceptable government behavior. But the Brotherhood's aggressive majoritarianism and intolerance of criticism has undermined its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of Egypt's institutions in the eyes of a significant number of Egyptians. If the Brotherhood wishes to institutionalize democracy as "the only game in town," as they sometimes put it, then they need to play it fairly.

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The Atlantic

New Technologies and Human Rights Monitoring

Mon, 06 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

August 6-7, 2012

Stanford University

Stanford, CA

Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and Google.org, convened a two-day workshop to advance strategic thinking on how to leverage new technologies to strengthen U.N. human rights monitoring around the world. Bringing together a small group of United Nations Human Rights Council mandate-holders, leading civil society activists, government representatives, and technologists working at the intersection of technology and human rights, the workshop developed concrete proposals for how technology platforms can be used to amplify the voices of mandate-holders, broaden their engagement with activists and citizens globally, and increase the awareness and impact of U.N. human rights monitoring mechanisms.

On the first day of the workshop, participants identified the needs of special rapporteurs, learned how technology is currently being used to promote human rights, and discussed the possibilities presented by new technologies for strengthening U.N. human rights mechanisms. The second day was conducted in the form of a design workshop. Hosted at Stanford's Design School (“d.school”), participants engaged in a day-long exploration of the needs of particular constituencies of the U.N. Special Rapporteurs, and designed and prototyped potential solutions to meet those needs.

Key findings/prototyped solutions:
- A victim-oriented platform of reporting, tracking, and responding to complaints of human rights abuse would allow victims and UN mechanisms to engage one another more directly and effectively;
- A dashboard-style case-management system designed to collate and analyze data would help manage and broadcast the work of UN mandate-holders, facilitating timely reporting and public engagement at all steps of the process;
- A tool for crowd-sourcing support for specific tasks like language translation could help address the lack of financial resources and human capital that hinders effective human rights monitoring

Read the full summary of the event »

Event Materials

New Technologies and Human Rights Monitoring Report_FINAL_2012

The Precarious Position of Women and Minorities in Arab Spring Countries

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Fri, 01 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Anyone fearing for women’s rights these days should have been at the third plenary session of Brookings’ U.S. Islamic World Forum in Doha yesterday. On social change and the power of non-state actors, the panel pulled off a double whammy: both Tawwakul Karman and Zainah Anwar were present.

Karman is a Yemeni activist who founded Women Journalists without Chains. She is also the youngest Nobel Laureate ever and only the second female Muslim. She originally started campaigning for journalistic reform in 2007 and then continued to up the ante and was a pivotal figure in the protests that saw the fall of former President Aly Saleh. Her struggle is especially relevant in light of the fact that Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries with, according to UN metrics, the worst record on gender equality.

Anwar is Malaysian, a founder of Sisters in Islam and the Director of Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in Muslim countries.

It is one of those sad dichotomies of life that Islam is a religion which has accorded myriad rights and privileges to women but that Muslim-majority countries have a poor track record on gender equality. The Arab Spring revolts initially held great promise for women, who were at the forefront of demonstrations and fighting in every one of the countries touched by the upheavals. Since then, women feel there has been a steady movement to shove them to the back of the line.

In some cases, this is a literal comment: in Yemen’s Change Square, the epicenter of the revolt, there used to be a rope sectioning off the men from the women during the demonstrations. It’s now a wooden platform with a metal door. Women in some countries feel they have more to lose than others. Tunisia has been at the forefront of regional gender equality; its 1956 personal status code granted equality to men and women and legalized divorce and abortion- 19 years before abortion was legal in France, which Tunisia is often accused of following blindly. The post-revolutionary parliamentary elections saw women making up 28% of the national assembly (48% of the bloc gained by the Islamist party Ennahda). However, women fear that the Islamists will start to curtail their freedoms.

In Egypt, women have even more to worry about. They make up a miserable 2 percent of the People’s Assembly. Among the female deputies, Azza AL-Garf has become a national celebrity for her pronouncement on women’s duties. For women, she favors female genital mutilation and embroidery. There has been a steady stream of attempts to overturn legislation perceived to be in women’s favor. Among them is a divorce law granted in Islam which took over 1400 years to see the light of day in Egypt. It allows a woman an uncontested divorce and Islamists claim that it tears at the fabric of society and was only passed to please former first lady Suzanne Mubarak. They were stymied by both Al-Azhar’s legislation department and the Shariah legislation department of the Constitutional Court which both affirmed that the law was Islamic and constitutional. The National Council for Women, a governmental body, is constantly under attack for ‘undermining the fabric of society,’ clusters of bearded men often picketing silently outside its gates.

The assault on liberties is not limited to gender. In the midst of economic, social and political upheaval, minority rights are in serious danger. The excuse often given is, considering the long list of very real dangers, civil liberties are a luxury, not a priority. Egypt’s Coptic Christians, an estimated 10% of the population, are feeling threatened by the rising Islamist tide. Following the presidential elections, there were what can only be construed as attempts to stir up more sectarian strife, by claiming that Egypt’s Copts had voted en masse for former Mubarak aide and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, thereby selling out the revolution. The claims conveniently ignored the fact that the greatest number of Shafik votes came from the Delta region, which has a minimal Coptic electorate. The governorates with the highest Coptic presence were one by the Nasserite candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi and the Muslim Brotherhood and leading candidates, Mohamed Mursi.

Other religious minorities, like Egypt’s tiny Shiaa or Bahaai populations are likely to feel even more threatened.

The rights of women and minorities are not luxuries. They are not matters that may be safely put away until one has the time to deal with them. They are intrinsic to the fabric of any stable, democratic society and if the countries of the Arab Spring truly want, or deserve, democracy then they must concentrate on citizenship, rather than populism. Listening to Karman and Anwar speak, I was struck by the fact that those wishing to marginalize women are likely to find it much more difficult to do than it was to unseat despotic regimes. It remains to be seen whether the same will hold true for minorities.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: Paul Morse

Comment on Cartagena

Abraham F. Lowenthal — Fri, 11 May 2012 16:19:00 -0400

Quite apart from the distraction caused by the shenanigans of U.S. Secret Service agents with Cartagena prostitutes, most comments on the Cartagena Summit of the Americas missed the important points. They emphasized the inability of the participating presidents to agree on a final communiqué, highlighted vocal Latin American rejection of U.S. policies on Cuba and anti-narcotics strategy, and suggested that the Summit showed a confrontation between the United States and Latin America.

Actually, the Summit confirmed what most analysts have long understood: that no meaningful agreements can be reached to unite the diverse interests and priorities of more than 30 countries of such great variety. The difference between a meaninglessly vague final communiqué and no statement at all is unimportant.

Second, if there was anything significant about the extended discussion in Cartagena, it was that the presidents discussed their differing perspectives and on counter-narcotics efforts respectfully, not confrontationally, and that President Obama willingly participated in a dialogue. What a contrast from John Foster Dulles’s trip to Caracas to secure an OAS resolution condemning communism, in preparation for the CIA overthrow of Guatemala’s President Arbenz, when he immediately left the conference, not waiting to hear the Latin American presentations on their own agendas of concerns.

Finally, the most evident gap in Cartagena was between the ALBA nations—Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador and Bolivia, with Argentina apparently aligned—and the rest of the Latin American members. The presidents of Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador were absent for different reasons. President Morales of Bolivia was isolated, and Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner left early and in a huff when she could not garner the support for escalating tensions around the Malvinas/Falklands dispute. The ALBA nations are losing momentum; that was, for me, the big story from Cartagena.

Authors

Abraham F. Lowenthal