Brookings: Topics - Central Asia

Democracy and Poverty: A Lesson from Mongolia

Nyamosor Tuya — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Later this month, Mongolia will host the 7^th ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies (CD), an intergovernmental forum of democracies formed in 2000 at the initiative of Bronislaw Geremek of Poland and Madeleine Albright of the United States. Several civil society events will accompany it.

The CD was launched at a conference in Warsaw in 2000, and its goals were announced in the Warsaw Declaration: strengthening democratic values and institutions, protecting human rights, and promoting civil society. The effort was to be undertaken both at the national level, by supporting one another in these endeavors, and at the global level through collaboration on democracy-related issues in international and regional institutions. The Warsaw Declaration also emphasized the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy.

After 2000, however, despite a sustained schedule of meetings and statements, the CD never really took off. Democracy’s progress worldwide had slowed in subsequent years, as noted in a number of surveys, including one by Freedom House. Celebrating its 10^th anniversary in Krakow in 2010, the CD acknowledged this state of affairs and through its Act of Recommitment to the Warsaw Declaration pledged to intensify its efforts to transform itself “into a unique forum for the world's democracies to promote and strengthen democracy on a global basis.” To meet this objective, the CD began to retool itself by creating a permanent secretariat, launching a partnership initiative that focuses on assistance to specific countries and, on top of civil society, bringing young people, businesses, and parliamentarians into its dialogue on democracy.

The April 2013 conference in Ulaanbaatar will be an occasion for the CD to further reinvigorate its agenda. Mongolia, which currently holds the CD presidency, offers a number of lessons to offer that could contribute to the organization’s recommitment to its objectives, especially emphasis on the interdependence between poverty, development and democracy. This emphasis is important both as an immediate goal for the host country and as a larger goal for the CD as a whole.

The case of Mongolia on poverty and democracy is instructive. The country started transitioning to democracy over twenty years ago and, for almost as long, the rate of poverty has stood at 30 percent and above. In the 1990s, much of it could be attributed to the disruptions caused by changes in its political and economic system. Harsh weather has been an intermittent factor, too. But no significant progress has been registered in later years, when the economy has grown at an annual average of 9 percent in the past decade. The latest available figure (2011) shows that poverty still stands at 29.8 percent, despite the double-digit economic growth in the past two years. The gap between poor and rich has continued to grow, and infrastructure has languished in a chronically decrepit state. Corruption, on the other hand, has continued to increase. Between 1999 and 2011, while the economy was growing, the country’s corruption ranking has managed to drop from a place where it was comfortably ahead of some of its fellow post-communist countries in Europe to a dismal 120th place out of some 180 countries surveyed by Transparency International. The implications for democracy were grave: most reforms stalled, vote buying became a serious concern, and public trust in the institutions of democracy was shaken. In a survey conducted in June 2012, over 80 percent of respondents believed that government policies were “always” or “often” failing to solve their concerns, chief among them unemployment and poverty.

The lesson to be drawn from this experience is that, early on in the transition process, new democracies should put economic liberty and transparency on a par with other democratic values such as regular elections, rule of law, human rights, freedom of association and freedom of speech. Otherwise, a callous and corrupt government, sometimes voted in through dubiously “free and fair” elections, can use the trappings and rhetoric of democracy as a façade while behind the scenes they engage in rent-seeking practices that can lead to a systemic entrenchment of corruption. In such a system political power is used for economic gain and economic gain is used for buying political influence. Few or no dividends go to the general populace. This results in persistent poverty among a large percentage of the population coupled with poor social services. Public enthusiasm or support for democracy wanes, democracy is eroded, therefore human rights are violated, and eventually democracy breaks down. Such scenarios are an early and real threat to democracy because the impoverished populace does not have the necessary tools―such as education or access to information―to fight back and, in most cases, is simply unfamiliar with the concept of demanding government accountability and responsiveness.

Early on, the CD emphasized this problem by stating in Warsaw that eradication of poverty is an “essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development” (2000). This emphasis should now be renewed. To do so, recommitment to the concept of interdependence between democracy and poverty found in the Santiago Commitment (2005) is essential. The Commitment stressed that democracy cannot be sustained without persistent efforts to eliminate extreme poverty and, vice versa, that the strengthening of democratic governance was “an essential component” of the efforts to alleviate poverty. Rooting out corruption that “corrodes democracy,” as stated in Warsaw, is a central element of these efforts, and this stance was reaffirmed in the Krakow Plan for Democracy (2010). Poverty is as much a threat to a democracy as poor institutions in that it deprives people of their political voice preventing them from holding their governments accountable and responsive, and eroding public trust in the emerging institutions of democracy. The CD’s Bamako Consensus (2007) addressed the issue of public trust: “persistent inequality and poverty can lead to low public trust in political institutions and vulnerability to undemocratic practices both of which are threats to democracy.” Poverty is also an assault on human dignity which is why the Bamako Consensus also emphasized that democracy, development and human rights were mutually reinforcing.

This body of reasoning serves as a good foundation for the CD to contribute to the ongoing global debate on the post-2015 development agenda. This debate presents the CD with an opportunity to pursue its position that eradication of poverty and the consolidation of democracy are interdependent. The thematic session on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that is planned for the CD’s meetings in Ulaanbaatar could therefore be seized as an occasion to launch substantive discussions on collaboration, in the coming years, with international organizations and civil society on ways to incorporate democratic governance in the post-2015 development agenda, or mainstream anti-corruption efforts into it, and ensure that this agenda adopts a human rights-based approach, addresses inequality and promotes social inclusion. Discussions could revolve around the issues raised in papers and notes by UN bodies and agencies and other actors, especially civil society, that call for encompassing human rights, democracy and good governance in an inclusive development agenda focused on poverty eradication. The ideas expressed at the global consultation on governance and the post-2015 framework could also be taken up.

The experience of Mongolia could also be looked at. Mongolia is one of two countries that have voluntarily added a ninth goal to its MDGs: Strengthen Human Rights and Foster Democratic Governance. While a welcome initiative, Mongolia’s MDG 9 has not been a successful undertaking either in terms of its design and implementation; one of its targets, “zero tolerance for corruption,” has been, for too long, an embarrassing slogan given the deteriorating realities on the ground. The initiative did not target such central principles of democratic governance as government accountability, transparency and participation. Neither has the mutually reinforcing nature of the goals to reduce poverty, promote gender equality and improve governance been duly highlighted in the national MDGs framework. Mongolia’s case strongly suggests that the design of governance goals and the methodology of assessing and monitoring their progress should be given careful consideration. The country’s experience also suggests that it is important for national leaders in new democracies to fully embrace and own the goals and targets of poverty reduction and democratic governance -- and to lead. And they should be held accountable for the failures in the implementation.

The impending Community of Democracy discussions in Ulaanbaatar will provide Mongolian leaders both in government and in civil society with an opportunity to reflect on the current status of the country’s MDGs on poverty reduction and democratic governance and commit to their acceleration. It should be noted that the latest poverty figure shows a decrease―29 percent in 2011 versus 39 percent in 2010―but it is yet to be determined if this is attributable to government’s untargeted cash handouts of the past three years, or whether it points to a trend. Whichever the case, sustaining economic growth and expanding the opportunities offered by it, especially by reducing youth unemployment, will be essential if the country is to meet its goal of reducing poverty to 18 percent by 2015. The discussion will also help the thinking on the best ways to incorporate the “unfinished business,” or any unmet MDGs, into the country’s post-MDGs goals in a way that is mindful of the importance of the wider governance context for any success in the key areas of poverty, gender equality and environment.

After years of stalled reform that threatened to jeopardize the country’s democratic gains, it appears that the Mongolian government is now more willing to tackle its outstanding governance issues. It has laid out its plans to reform the civil service, judiciary and police, the institutions most frequently cited in past surveys as the most corrupt; wider policy deliberation and citizen feedback and participation are encouraged, including through the use of new technologies; democracy education is being debated; efforts to address corruption have been stepped up and a more robust national strategy to combat it is in the works. A recent survey showed a slight increase in the level of confidence that people place in the ability of the country’s anti-corruption agency to tackle the issue. In a promising sign, in a single year, the country moved up 26 places in its ranking of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (the effect of changes in methodology and lesser number of countries surveyed is unclear). The government has also expressed its intent to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multilateral transparency initiative involving governments and civil society. Its OGP Action Plan is scheduled to be presented later this month.

The government’s commitment to accountability and transparency will be put to the test by its handling of the case of a former finance minister, whose failure to disclose his offshore company and a secret Swiss bank account, holding $1 million at one time, was brought to light last week by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).

If sustained, reform should improve government effectiveness and create an enabling governance environment for focusing on poverty eradication which should remain the government’s first priority. In the years ahead, the country’s significant extractive wealth will also have to be managed in an exemplary way so that its benefits go to the entire population in an equitable way. The CD’s position that eradication of poverty is essential for a healthy democracy should serve as a guiding principle for the Mongolian government for it to regain public trust and produce outcomes that ensure prosperity, justice and security for the people.

Since the next CD ministerial will take place in 2015, only a couple of months removed from the global gathering on development, the Ulaanbaatar CD ministerial is an opportunity for democracies to start working together to include the democratic principles of accountability, transparency and participation into the post-2015 poverty eradication agenda. A reaffirmation of the CD’s belief in the mutually reinforcing nature of democracy and development can also help re-shape the debate in Mongolia in a way that integrates eradication of poverty, equity and social justice into the broader project of democracy.

Authors

Nyamosor Tuya

Image Source: © Stringer China / Reuters

Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?

Johannes F. Linn — Wed, 31 Oct 2012 10:56:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: The following piece is a chapter from the 2012 edition of Eurasian Development Bank’s Eurasian Integration Yearbook.

INTRODUCTION

For centuries Central Asia was in the backwater of global political and economic attention, tales of “Great Games” and “Silk Roads” notwithstanding. However, interest in Central Asia from outside the region has been on the rise in recent years: Central Asia’s energy resources are of great importance to its neighbours in Europe and Asia. In addition, China wants a peaceful backyard, while Russia considers Central Asia part of its historical economic and regional interests and draws heavily on Central Asia migrants. Turkey is attracted by the common Turkic heritage of the region. Iran shares language and cultural ties with the Tajik people. The Central Asia’s Islamic tradition connects it with the Middle East and other Islamic countries. And now NATO countries rely on Central Asia for transit of their nonlethal military supplies in their engagement in Afghanistan.

There is wide agreement that economic prosperity and political stability in Central Asia is critical not only for the 60-plus million inhabitants of the region, but also for Central Asia’s neighbours, since Central Asia serves as a strategically important land bridge between Europe and Asia. Since the five Central Asian countries are landlocked small economies, a critical prerequisite for long-term economic growth and political stability is successful economic integration underpinned by effective regional cooperation.

This paper therefore addresses the central question of what are the prospects for regional economic integration and regional cooperation in Central Asia. It starts by briefly reviewing the role of Central Asia in the context of the overall process of Eurasian continental economic integration. It then considers what are the benefits and obstacles of regional integration and cooperation in Central Asia against the backdrop of lessons of international experience with regional integration and cooperation, and looks at four of the most important recent regional cooperation initiatives. In closing, the paper provides an answer to the question whether regional integration and cooperation in Central Asia are for real or only a mirage.

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Authors

Johannes F. Linn

Publication: Eurasian Development Bank

Image Source: © Staff Photographer / Reuters

Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Recognition vs. Institutionalization

Nyamosor Tuya — Fri, 31 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In September 1992, in an address to the United Nations, the president of Mongolia declared his country’s territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The declaration was about politics, geopolitics and policy. The political context at the time was quite dramatic: the announcement came on the heels of the completion of the Soviet/Russian troop withdrawal from Mongolia, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism in both Russia and Mongolia. The decades of Mongolian dependence on the Soviet Union and hostility toward China were about to become history, as the country set out to normalize its relations with China and revamp those with its new old northern neighbor.

In geopolitical terms, it spoke to the country’s unique location. Few countries in the world―in fact, no other country in the world―share Mongolia’s unique geographical and geopolitical location: the country is located on the peripheries of Russia and China, its only neighbors, who also happen to be two of the world’s five acknowledged nuclear powers.

The declaration at the UN was one of the first independent moves made by Mongolia in formulating its own foreign policy goals. The concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, whereby states in a designated territorial area choose, as a group, to promote their security by prohibiting the stationing, manufacturing, testing, and ownership of nuclear weapons on their territories (rather than seeking security by joining alliances or enjoying extended deterrence), had a great deal of appeal to Mongolia. Six such zones, with varying specifics, are currently in existence, all created via treaty arrangements among state parties: in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa. The Antarctic could also qualify. Protocols to those treaties designed for the signing and ratification by nuclear-weapon states include provisions committing them not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Mongolia’s ambition was to become a similar internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zone enjoying the same security assurances from the nuclear-weapon states.

As a policy, the Mongolian initiative reflected the country’s resolve to never let its territory be used as a stationing ground for nuclear weapons: during the Sino-Soviet split the Soviets had reportedly kept nuclear-capable missiles in Mongolia. Ensuring its security by avoiding taking sides in a major power rivalry, let alone a confrontation involving nuclear weapons, was a powerful lesson that the country had drawn from its Cold War experience. Therefore, Mongolia welcomed the normalization of relations between Russia and China in the late 1980s and endeavored to pursue greater balance and good-neighborliness in its own relations with these two countries.

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Nyamosor Tuya

Image Source: Reuters

Natural Disasters in Central Asia: Thousands Yearly but Little Response Capacity

Elizabeth Ferris — Thu, 31 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: This is a shortened version of Elizabeth Ferris’ report on her trip to Kyrgyzstan. Read the full report here.

I’d never been to Central Asia before and so when we planned a workshop in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, I looked forward to learning about disasters occurring in this part of the world. Organized in collaboration with the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the workshop focused on protection in natural disasters for representatives of governments, UN agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies and civil society organizations from seven countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Disasters are common in this region and governmental capacity to respond to – and especially to prepare for – disasters varies a lot within the region but is in most cases limited. Tajikistan, for example has around 9,000 earthquakes a year – most of which are small but the possibility of a major earthquake in the future is a frightening one. A report by my colleague, Johannes Linn outlined both the risks of earthquakes in this region and the inadequate government capacity to prepare for it. As he wrote two years ago, “the bottom line is that there has been little progress in this critical area [preparedness and response capacity] since the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, and the risk of a major disaster possibly on the scale of Haiti, is a real threat…If anything, the ability of Central Asian countries to respond to a major disaster today is less than in Soviet days.” Earthquakes can occur, of course, in both rural and urban areas but there is particular fear of a major earthquake striking an urban area, where populations are concentrated and where it’s not clear how many structures are designed to be earthquake-resistant. I was glad to see the active role being played by UN agencies in carrying out contingency planning throughout the region.

In addition to the dangers from earthquakes, the region regularly experiences river flooding and landslides and there is growing concern that climate change will lead to increased flooding from glacier mountain lakes. There are thousands of lakes in Central Asia and as glaciers recede, more lakes are likely to be formed, dramatically increasing the risk of what are called glacier lake outburst floods. Disasters have transborder dimensions. For example, landslides from Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana Valley could affect Uzbekistan as well – a source of particular concern given that there are a significant number of uranium tailings in the Fergana Valley, a legacy from the Soviet times. Many of these sites are undoubtedly degraded. I’d never thought about the possibility of ‘radioactive landslides’ before wish I knew more about the science of it.
Although the workshop focused on natural disasters, everyone was conscious of the June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in which mobs had burned largely Uzbek homes, killing some 400 people (according to official figures) and destroying more than 2,000 homes. Some 400,000 people were displaced, including over 100,000 who crossed the border as refugees into Uzbekistan. On one level, the crisis was over quickly. Within weeks, the refugees and most of the IDPs had returned and over the past two years, many of the destroyed houses have been rebuilt. In comparison with many other situations where displacement drags on for years, this was positive indeed.

But although the situation is presently calm, people admitted that there is still tension and the possibility of another violent outbreak couldn’t be ruled out. This is reinforced by disturbing reports of discrimination and harassment of the region’s ethnic minority, the Uzbeks. As happens in most major emergencies, there was an influx of international organizations following the violence, but most have since left. And yet the continued presence of international organizations, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, in Osh may serve as an effective prevention measure for further violence.

Usually when I think of natural disasters and displacement, the cases that come immediately to mind are the Haitian earthquake, the Japanese earthquake/tsunami, and the massive flooding in Pakistan and Colombia. But this workshop in Bishkek reminded me that many countries which rarely feature in Washington DC headlines are also vulnerable to disasters. Perhaps because they aren’t regularly on the international radar screen is precisely the reason that practitioners and academics alike need to pay more attention to them.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Central Asia: Disasters, Displacement and Human Rights

Elizabeth Ferris — Tue, 29 May 2012 14:16:00 -0400

I’d never been to Central Asia before and so when we planned a workshop in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, I looked forward to learning about displacement and disasters in this part of the world. Together with UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance), the workshop focused on protection in natural disasters for representatives of governments, UN agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies and civil society organizations from seven countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Disasters are common in this region and governmental capacity to respond to – and especially to prepare for – disasters varies a lot within the region but is in most cases limited. Tajikistan, for example, has around 9000 earthquakes a year – most of which are small but the possibility of a major earthquake in the future is a frightening one. A report by my colleague, Johannes Linn outlined both the risks of earthquakes in this region and the inadequate government capacity to prepare for it. As he wrote two years ago, “the bottom line is that there has been little progress in this critical area [preparedness and response capacity] since the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, and the risk of a major disaster possibly on the scale of Haiti, is a real threat…If anything, the ability of Central Asian countries to respond to a major disaster today is less than in Soviet days.” A report by UNDP last year made essentially the same point – that both national and regional preparedness had declined since the Soviet days. Earthquakes can occur, of course, in both rural and urban areas but there is particular fear of a major earthquake striking an urban area, where populations are concentrated and where it’s not clear how many structures are designed to be earthquake-resistant. I was glad to see the active role being played by UN agencies in carrying out contingency planning throughout the region.

In addition to the dangers from earthquakes, the region regularly experiences river flooding and landslides and there is growing concern that climate change will lead to increased flooding from glacier mountain lakes.

And there are other trans-border dimensions. A governmental representative from Uzbekistan noted that landslides from Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana Valley could affect Uzbekistan as well – a source of particular concern given that there are a significant number of uranium tailings in the Fergana Valley, a legacy from the Soviet times. Many of these sites are undoubtedly degraded. I had never thought about the possibility of ‘radioactive landslides’ before and wondered why this possibility hadn’t received more attention.
You would think that with countries facing similar and interrelated threats from natural hazards, there would be strong incentives to cooperate on preventing and preparing for disasters. After all, working together on natural disasters is generally less politically controversial than trying to resolve political conflicts. I was thus encouraged before I set off for Kyrgyzstan by Johannes Linn’s upbeat report last year about regional cooperation. But although there were open and cordial exchanges between participants from different countries in the workshop, there were few signs of concrete steps to promote regional cooperation. For example, in spite of an optimistic launch of a new Central Asian Center for Disaster Response and Risk Reduction – with financial support from the European Union regional support for the initiative seems to be faltering. Three governments have to agree to join for it to come into force, but so far only two governments have signed up; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and so, at least for now, the Center is on hold. Water and energy management issues are controversial in the region, as evidenced by the opposition to the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan. Construction of this dam (which, when completed, will be the highest in the world) has been in the works for decades. But there are questions about the impact of the dam on neighboring Uzbekistan and controversies about the planned resettlement of 30,000 people from areas likely to be flooded by the dam.

Although the workshop focused on natural disasters, everyone was conscious of the June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, in which over four days mobs had burned largely Uzbek homes, killing some 400 people (according to official figures) and destroying more than 2,000 homes. Some 400,000 people were displaced, including over 100,000 who crossed the border as refugees into Uzbekistan. On one level, the crisis was over quickly. Within weeks, the refugees and most of the IDPs had returned and over the past two years, many of the destroyed houses have been rebuilt. The UNHCR representative told me that today there are only 3,200 IDPs left although far larger numbers – around 172,000 are still considered to be affected by the June events. This is down from the July 2010 figure of 75,000 IDPs and 400,000 affected. In comparison with many other situations where displacement drags on for years, this was positive indeed.

But although the situation is presently calm, people admitted that there is still tension and the possibility of another violent outbreak couldn’t be ruled out. This is reinforced by disturbing reports of discrimination and harassment of the region’s ethnic minority, the Uzbeks. All of these countries have complex ethnic relationships. Kyrgyzstan, for example has some 80 distinct ethnic groups; while the Kyrgyz make up about 40%, and the Uzbeks slightly under half in the southern region of Osh, the local governments are dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz.

As happens in most major emergencies, there was an influx of international organizations following the violence, but most have since left. And yet the continued presence of international organizations, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, in Osh may serve as an effective prevention measure for further violence.

There is considerable migration within and beyond the region. Uzbeks who can’t find jobs in Kyrgyzstan have gone to Russia as economic migrants, leaving wives and children behind, often sending money home. In fact, the International Organization for Migration reports that in 2009, remittances from overseas workers totaled USD 882 million.

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Workshop on Protecting Rights of Civilians in Natural Disasters in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Tue, 15 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 15-16, 2012

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus are susceptible to both sudden (such as earthquakes, floods, landslides) and slow-onset disasters (such as drought and land degradation). In addition, climate change scenarios predict more extreme temperatures and precipitation as well as changes in the intensity and frequency of weather-related natural hazards. Experience from many disaster areas has shown that the disaster response is most successful when both governments and humanitarian actors use a rights-based approach when preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters. Unfortunately, in many cases, human rights concerns are rarely taken into consideration in disaster management.

Given this reality, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and UN OCHA jointly convened a workshop with key players in the field, including government representatives (responsible for disaster relief and disaster risk reduction), Red Cross/Red Crescent representatives, major national NGOs and civil society representatives and key UN actors with the aim to increase the capacity of involved actors to incorporate human rights and protection issues in preparing for, responding to, and/or recovering from natural disasters. From the Brookings Institution, Elizabeth Ferris (co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement) and Daniel Petz (senior research assistant on natural disasters) planned and engaged with partners for this workshop.

Specific overall objectives of the workshop included:

Increasing awareness of the protection challenges that exist in natural disasters and activities that promote the rights of disaster-affected people;
Clarifying the role of governments and humanitarian actors in protection in natural disasters;
Increase awareness of the IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions and how they can be applied in the Central Asia and the Caucasus;
Discussing good practices in terms of regional, national and local monitoring mechanisms of humanitarian response in natural disasters;
Generating specific recommendations to strengthen policy and action for rights protection at the local, national and regional levels.

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Event Materials

Central Asia and Caucasus Workshop Report 2012

Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities: The Limits of Hospitality?

Thu, 22 Mar 2012 12:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 22, 2012
12:00 PM - 1:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Most of the world’s 27 million people who have been internally displaced by conflict do not live in camps; rather they live with family members or friends or are dispersed within communities. One frequently overlooked aspect of displacement is the impact of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the communities which host them—communities which are often poor and marginalized themselves.

On March 22, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) hosted a discussion of two recent reports on IDP and host community relations: "Can You Be an IDP for Twenty Years? A Comparative Field Study on the Protection Needs and Attitudes Toward Displacement Among IDPs and Host Communities in Azerbaijan” and “The Effects of Internal Displacement on Host Communities: A Case Study of Suba and Ciudad Bolívar Localities in Bogotá, Colombia.” Panelists included Chaloka Beyani, United Nations special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, and Roberto Vidal, professor of law at Pontifica Universidad Javierana in Bogota, Colombia. Mary Werntz, head of delegation at the ICRC, provided introductory remarks. Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, moderated the discussion.

After the program, the panelists took audience questions.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Mary Werntz

Head of Regional Delegation
International Committee for the Red Cross

Chaloka Beyani

UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs
Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

Roberto Vidal

Professor of Law
Pontifica Universidad Javierana

Scaling Up Development Interventions: A Review of UNDP's Country Program in Tajikistan

Johannes F. Linn — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 12:12:00 -0500

A key objective of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is to assist its member countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). UNDP pursues this objective in various ways, including through analysis and advice to governments on the progress towards the MDGs (such as support for the preparation and monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies, or PRSs, in poor countries), assistance for capacity building, and financial and technical support for the preparation and implementation of development programs.

The challenge of achieving the MDGs remains daunting in many countries, including Tajikistan. To do so will require that all development partners, i.e., the government, civil society, private business and donors, make every effort to scale up successful development interventions. Scaling up refers to “expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs and projects on different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.” Interventions that are successful as pilots but are not scaled up will create localized benefits for a small number of beneficiaries, but they will fail to contribute significantly to close the MDG gap.

This paper aims to assess whether and how well UNDP is supporting scaling up in its development programs in Tajikistan. While the principal purpose of this assessment was to assist the UNDP country program director and his team in Tajikistan in their scaling up efforts, it also contributes to the overall growing body of evidence on the scaling up of development interventions worldwide.

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Authors

Johannes F. Linn

Mongolia’s Quest to Balance Human Development in its Booming Mineral-Based Economy

Alicia Campi — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 10:10:00 -0500

Mongolia—long ignored by Asia specialists as a sleepy nomadic ex-Soviet satellite—finally burst onto the world economic scene in 2011 when exploitation of its vast mineral deposits led it to a 6.7 percent economic growth rate that was 2^nd highest in the world. During the fourth quarter of last year the economy was booming at a growth rate of close to 20 percent. Both the Asian Development Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit are predicting a 2012 growth rate of 15 percent, and other forecasters contend that if Mongolia’s informal economy is taken into account the growth rate could approach 40 percent. Mining experts estimate that the country possesses as much as $1 trillion worth of untapped precious metals and minerals in at least 6000 sites. That works out to potentially over $333,333 per every man, woman and child in the country.[1] While this is undeniably a positive situation for Mongolia, the challenge facing the nation is to ensure that its mineral wealth benefits the whole nation rather than just certain sectors of society, as has been the case in some other resource-rich countries.

After wrenching economic difficulties in the 1990s caused by the collapse of its Soviet-inspired command socialist system, the Mongolian economy has grown by an average 7 percent a year since 2003. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has soared with the long-delayed but now operational large-scale western mining joint venture, the $4 billion Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper and gold operation, now under development by Ivanhoe of Canada and multinational giant Rio Tinto. OT may hold as much as 32 million tons of copper and 1,200 tons of gold, according to government estimates. Annual output when the mines are developed is predicted to exceed 450,000 tons of copper and 330,000 ounces of gold. Per capita GDP in Mongolia has more than tripled to $2,200 in 2010 from $638 in 2004. Haruhiko Kuroda, president of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has proclaimed that Mongolia is at “the threshold of prosperity,” while advising that further efforts must be made to make economic growth more inclusive to ensure that the benefits from high economic growth are distributed more broadly, and that people have equal access to opportunities and basic social services.[2]

In 2008 Mongolia’s Parliament [Great Khural] passed a National Development Strategy and created a Human Development Fund (HD Fund) with the ambitious goal of bringing Mongolia’s human development status to the same level as that of the developed countries by 2020. (The country has been ranked with a value of only 100th out of 169 countries by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Global Human Development Report.[3]) This Fund made it legally possible for every citizen of Mongolia, for the first time in its history, to be equally eligible to own a share of the nation’s mineral wealth. In preparation for the establishment of the Fund, Mongolian economists looked at the $40 billion Alaska Permanent Fund, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund worth $410 billion, and Chile’s use of its copper resources to help drive growth. They also considered Canada and Australia as models for distribution of mineral revenues to alleviate poverty and avoid the so-called Dutch Disease, a curse afflicting some resource-rich societies.[4]

To avoid this destabilizing effect, in July 2009 the Mongolian Parliament passed a law, based on a similar Chilean act, that creates a mechanism for saving surplus revenue from mineral royalties when prices are high in order to stabilize the annual state budget when prices (and therefore mineral revenues) fall—as happened in 2008.[5] The state budget each year sets a certain amount of money to be drawn from the HD Fund in anticipation of revenues to be earned; this draw is stated as an actual amount of Mongolian National Tugriks (MNT, the Mongolian currency), not as a percentage of the Fund’ value. The state budget must pay out the specified number of tugriks, regardless of whether the Fund has earned the money anticipated. The 2009 legislation is a way to keep the Government in compliance with the Parliament-approved annual budget while at the same allowing the flexibility to react to actual Fund earnings.

Initial capital for the HD Fund was drawn from the OT mine project, which is estimated will account for 30 percent of Mongolia’s GDP when completed and will generate $30 billion in tax revenue over 50 years.[6] Additional revenues for the HD Fund will be coming from development of Mongolia’s $2 billion Tavan Tolgoi (TT) coal deposit, the largest in the world. The country also has very rich uranium and rare earth mineral resources waiting to be exploited. The HD Fund’s other sources include income from sale of shares and dividends of state property connected with state-owned mineral deposits (because they were designated by law as large deposits of national strategic significance); fees for exploration and processing activities in these mining sites; advance payments and loans related to the exploitation of the strategic mining sites; and income from bonds, loan certificates, and savings interest from international and domestic financial markets for the Fund.

The HD Fund is expected to provide pension, health, housing, and educational benefits as well as cash payouts to all citizens, and thus be a mechanism to distribute the wealth obtained from Mongolia’s minerals equitably among the populace. The Parliament in 2011 stipulated that MNT805 billion (roughly US$567 million) from the Fund should be distributed to all citizens for health insurance and to students for tuition fees,[7] with MNT21,000 (about US$15) per citizen for cash payouts. Although the per capita amount is small, the amount distributed in 2010 was 16 percent of the state budget―and in 2011 almost 40 percent. Both the IMF and World Bank have criticized the 2011allocation as too expansionary, and a cause of the high 14 percent inflation rate.[8] Most of these payout monies were in cash,[9] which is opposed by 87 percent of the people who preferred the benefits be in cashless form.[10]

Originally, the HD Fund’s resources were to be applied for investment and capital repairs, to reduce the budget deficit, and for social welfare systems.[11] However, its use has become embroiled in Mongolia’s volatile election politics. In the 2009 presidential election, the two main parties, the Democratic Party and the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (now renamed the Mongolian People’s Party), pledged to distribute as much as $6 billion, or up to 1.5 million tugriks (US$1,060) for every citizen, from the country’s mining wealth. However, because of a sizable shortfall in actual revenues as opposed to anticipated revenues, the Parliament at the end of 2009 authorized only the distribution of MNT120,000 (approximately US$92) as a cash grant for each citizen of Mongolia. In the just-approved state budget for 2012, HD funds are to be distributed in July 2012, which is around the time of Mongolia’s parliamentary elections, so many observers believe the distribution plans are once again most likely exaggerated campaign promises designed to attract votes.

Mongolia’s Prime Minister, Sukhbaataryn Batbold, wrote in 2011 that “human development is at the center of government policy and we are taking all efforts to achieve this goal. Yet, Mongolia faces many challenges…such as unemployment, poverty and inequality are coupled with environmental problems such as climate change, pasture degradation, natural disasters, droughts, dzuds, water and forest resource depletion, air and soil pollution.”[12] He and other Mongolian leaders emphasized that although economic growth is considered essential for the wellbeing of the people, the human costs of the growth are of serious concern for the nomadic pastoral society and contribute to a sense of vulnerability. Therefore, the government is committed to promoting human development as a central strategy for achieving economic sustainability.

Mongol herders, although accustomed to an extreme climate, periodically suffer under dzud (harsh winter drought) which can decimate the nation’s 40 million head of livestock herds and make the nation vulnerable to food insecurity. National leaders increasingly are concerned by climate changes which affect the delicate ecosystems of the countryside’s inhabitants (over 40 percent of the total population of 2.8 million) who depend upon a traditional pastoralism based upon herding sheep, goats, cattle/yak, horses and camels; degrade the grasslands;[13] and pollute the country’s very limited water resources. Such factors negatively influence the local population’s view of mining and agricultural development.

As of 2008, an estimated 35 percent of the population was still living below the official poverty line. Inequality remains high both within cities and between those living in urban areas and those in the countryside. Although poverty assessment studies may be exaggerating rural poor versus urban poor, there is no doubt that the poor lack access to clean energy and heating sources, clean water and sanitation, and educational and healthcare facilities. The government, in consultation with international organizations and the United Nations, aims to utilize budget resources from FDI-generated taxes pouring into the HD Fund to reduce the nation’s carbon and ecological footprints by 20 percent within five years and significantly reduce the high air pollution that engulfs the nearly one-half of the national population that lives in the Ulaanbaatar capital area.

In light of these challenges, discussion of how to distribute the HD Funds has been a hot topic in Mongolia for years. All stakeholders, including the countryside and urban poor, have actively expressed their opinions via workshops, community groups, environmental protests, and in the vibrant Mongolian press. While it is clear that in the 20 years of the democratic era Mongolia has made much economic progress, income inequality, unemployment, and a failure to measurably reduce the poverty rate have incited much public criticism and compelled the UNDP to call for greater promotion of human development at the national policy level, protection of human rights, and greater transparency and accountability in use of HD Fund monies. Another major aspect to the whole discussion is centered around how poverty in Mongolia’s traditional pastoral society should be measured and compared to the previous socialist era. However, there is a national consensus that the government should utilize mining revenues to focus on improving access to basic services and housing conditions, reducing inequality in life expectancy and material standards of living, and maintaining environmentally sustainable income flows to transform mineral wealth into renewable assets for sustainable and broad-based growth to meet Mongolia's most significant development challenges.

The World Bank has warned that although so far Mongolia has managed well the global economic downturn, it must devise management skills to reduce the impact of cyclical mineral prices on Mongolia’s increasingly mineral-based economy, use fiscal rules to manage monetary policy and the exchange rate, develop and maintain a competitive and stable regime for the mining and private sectors, and encourage economic diversification in its herding and tourism sectors to sustain balanced growth.[14] But it appears that Mongolia’s present policies are being well received by some of the international community: on December 19, 2011 Standard & Poor upgraded its outlook on Mongolia to positive, citing that Mongolia had introduced a fiscal responsibility law to limit budget deficits to 2 percent of GDP from 2012. In the upcoming 2012 parliamentary election season in Mongolia, it is certain that widespread debate will continue on the HD Fund and its use in Mongolia to ensure that the wealth flowing in from rapid development of national mineral resources benefits all Mongolian citizens. If the electorate is not generally satisfied with the government’s overall mineral development policy and plans for utilization of the HD Fund, it is highly likely that this coming spring will see a renewal of the nearly annual street protest demonstrations in the capital which were particularly violent in 2008.

Mongolia is blessed with this wonderful revenue stream, and at least some of its leaders have long-term ideas for how to use it (a reserve fund for re-investment in the mineral industry; improving the quality of life of the people; mitigating climate change and pollution). Two challenges will be constant. One is to insulate this revenue stream from corruption on the part of the various actors who have some degree of authority over it. The other is to protect it from the temptation of politicians to ignore some priorities (reinvestment and mitigation) in favor of more immediate but comparatively minor problems in an effort to win votes.

[1] “Mongolia: Mineral Wealth Set to Transform country into “Minegolia”,” November 8, 2011, Eurasianet.org and Economic Intelligence Unit’s World in 2012 report.

[2] “ADB President Kuroda: Mongolia's Development Should Benefit Everyone,” October 10, 2011 beta.adb.org.

[3] Since its introduction in 1990, the Global Human Development Report publishes a human development index (HDI) as an alternative way to compare development performance of countries. Its modeling formula was reformulated in 2010 based on geometric mean and using gross national income (GNI) per capita, life expectancy index, and a new education index to take into account the expected years of schooling a child entering school age today can attain.

[4] Where a sudden surge in wealth invites a commodity boom and attracts so much foreign exchange that it raises the local currency’s value and makes domestic manufacturing less competitive and ultimately hampers expansion.

[5] Michael Forsythe, “Mongolian Harvard Elites Aim for Wealth Without ‘Dutch Disease,” February 15, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aONmVLraqtO8.

[6] Yuriy Humber, "Mongolia Seeks Balanced Growth to Avoid `Dutch Disease' From Mining Boom,” March 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/mongolia-says-shifting-focus-to-balanced-growth-from-mining.html and “Mongolia Fund to Manage $30 Billion Mining Jackpot,” Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/.

[7] Montsame News Agency, August 31, 2011 report of a Mongolian Cabinet meeting which decided each student regardless of age would receive MNT500,000 for tuition fees.

[8] International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Concludes the Second Post-Program Monitoring with Mongolia,” Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/146, November 28, 2011 and quotes in the financial press in 2011 from Steven Bennett, IMF’s head of Mongolia coverage.

[9] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of Mongolia 2011, From Vulnerability to Sustainability: Environment and Human Development: Environment and Human Development, “Box 1.3: The Human Development Fund,” 2011, 23.

[10] Badrakh, “Human Development Fund survey results revealed,” July 1, 2010, Business-Mongolia.com.

[11] B. Bat and Ts. Batsukh, “Some lessons of natural resource revenue management: The searching NRRM for Mongolia,” Ulaanbaatar, 2010, http://ic.ses.edu.mn/files/pdf/0202BatEn.pdf.

[12] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of Mongolia 2011, xi.

[13] Ibid., 2. It is claimed that within Asia, Mongolia has the highest proportion of people living on degraded lands.

[14] See the World Bank’s Mongolia country overview for 2011 at http://www.worldbank.org/.

Authors

Alicia Campi

Image Source: Â© Carlos Barria / Reuters

Central Asia and the Caucasus – At the Crossroads of Eurasia in the 21st Century

Wed, 22 Jun 2011 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 22, 2011
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Twenty years after independence from the Soviet Union, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus region are at a turning point in their economic history. With greater collaboration, these countries have an opportunity to accelerate their economic and social development. Reminiscent of this region’s centuries-old role on the Silk Road, Central Asia and the Caucasus can become an important economic link between the economic giants in Asia and Europe.

On June 22, Global Economy and Development at Brookings and the Emerging Market Forum hosted the launch of Central Asia and the Caucasus – At the Crossroads of Eurasia in the 21st Century (SAGE Publications, 2011). In it, Werner Hermann and Johannes F. Linn highlight papers that cover a broad range of issues affecting the Eurasian supercontinent including energy, the regional business environment, the impact of the global economic crisis, and old and new political rivalries. Panelists included Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Johannes Linn, senior resident scholar with the Emerging Markets Forum; Pradeep Mitra, former chief economist for Europe and Central Asia, the World Bank; and Martha Brill Olcott, senior associate, Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Senior Fellow Fiona Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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Central Asia and the Caucasus – At the Crossroads of Eurasia in the 21st Century

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Pradeep Mitra

Former Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia
The World Bank

Martha Brill Olcott

Senior Associate, Russian and Eurasian Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Qualitative Energy Diplomacy in Central Asia

Simon SHEN — Tue, 03 May 2011 15:31:00 -0400

At the turn of the 21st century, Central Asia – especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which are rich in oil and gas – has emerged as a new center of energy reserves. To compete for access to these resources in a pragmatic manner, the major powers also found it increasingly necessary to rationalize their ambitions qualitatively, if not necessarily ideologically. So the United States designed the platform of liberal democracy and “human rights above sovereignty,” Russia proffered its own idea of “sovereign democracy” to the Central Asians, and China posed as a non-interventionist “responsible state.”

From Energy Diplomacy to “Qualitative Energy Diplomacy”

As various scholars have proposed, a qualitative, value-driven or ideology-based foreign policy, in combination with traditional realist interpretations, constitutes a new distinctive “constructivist” school of thought in the study of international relations.[1] However, the rules of this new game are not yet fully spelled out. This paper begins by seeking to strengthen the theoretical groundwork of the constructivist school of international relations, on which this analysis is based, by proposing the following core rules, which can be used to study how the three powers maneuver within Central Asia:

1. Most studies on energy politics share two common assumptions: that the stakeholders are rationality-based, and they are realist-orientated. It would be naïve to assume that states today are not seeking to maximize their energy and security interests. Yet, this alone is no longer sufficient for the 21st century either.

2. Since the end of the Cold War, realist tenets have been challenged by the rise of norms and ideas that call for qualitative justifications of interest-maximizing behaviors. Encroaching on overseas energy resources might be seen as a violation of some of the new norms, such as peace and conservation. Without offering values or ideologies to rationalize their behavior from the moral high ground, the powers could face considerable challenges domestically and internationally.[2]

3. As a result, states have to offer a state-sponsored qualitative dimension to rationalize their hunt for resources in seemingly non-interest-driven terms. To be effective, such qualities, values, or ideologies need to serve as a compelling alternative to offset conflicting norms that question the energy campaigns; be easily shared by domestic nationalists; and be potentially accepted by some audiences in the home countries that host the resources.

4. From the perspective of states, interests always trump qualitative values because blindly following the rules could result in deviation from national interests. If the two are in conflict, values in the political sense are often less important than interests in the economic sense; in particular, excessively fanatical ideological pursuit would be discouraged; reporting of the regimes’ sacrificing of mere pursuit of values would be toned down. In other words, QED is different from mere ideological diplomacy in a sense that QED includes both carrot and stick: non-cooperative nations in terms of energy are more likely to be also denounced in moralistic terms by the powers.

5. The efforts spent by different powers on QED are, of course, different. Generally speaking, the more pluralistic a country is domestically, the more likely their values will be taken seriously on the diplomatic front. In this sense, it is expected from the paper that values play a relatively larger role in the United States’ Central Asia policy and a lesser role in its Russian and Chinese counterparts.

Note that this article primarily studies the role of the governments in advancing QED, whereas the private agendas of other domestic actors like oil companies (other than state-owned enterprises / SOEs) or pressure groups are not the direct focus here, even though their roles are by no means insignificant. The following section of the article shows how the above tenets of QED have been adopted by the United States, Russia and China in Central Asia. For each of these major powers, three aspects are reviewed: (1) the official-sponsored qualitative values chosen; (2) how these qualities facilitate traditional energy diplomacy in the region; and (3) how interests trump values as proven by the insincerity of these nations in preaching mere ideologies when they go against interests.

[1] See Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Christer Pursiainen, Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2000); Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua, New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).

[2] John Kurt Jacobsen, “Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy,” World Politics, 47(2) (Jan 1995), pp. 283-310; Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization, 50(1) (December 1996). pp. 69-108.

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Simon SHEN

Image Source: © Stringer Shanghai / Reuters

An International Response to Central Asia’s Severe Disaster Risks

Johannes F. Linn — Tue, 26 Apr 2011 14:24:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: In his opinion piece from June 12, 2008, “The Impending Water Crisis in Central Asia”), Johannes Linn reported on signs of a possible water and energy crisis in Central Asia and called for a concerted response by the international community. Since then representatives of international and bilateral agencies have met three times in Almaty, Kazakhstan for the Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment (CARRA), to review the evolving risk situation and chart an appropriate response. Linn summarized the results of the first meeting in August 2008 (The Compound Water-Energy-Food Crisis Risks in Central Asia: Update on an International Response ). In this commentary, Linn reports on the third CARRA meeting, which took place in Almaty on April 14-15, 2011. Johannes Linn serves as an adviser to the United Nations Development Program, which organized this meeting as well as the previous CARRA events.

On April 15 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, some 120 representatives of over 40 international, regional and bilateral agencies gathered for a two-day conference to review the cumulative risks which Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) face. The risks these countries face arise from the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, as well as water, energy and food insecurity. The purpose of this third Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment (CARRA) meeting was to take stock of the evolving challenges, to review progress on actions taken nationally, regionally and internationally to prepare for major disasters, to share information about agencies’ planned future activities, and to explore how the international community can best assist the stakeholders in the region in preparing for and responding to disasters when they strike. Memories of recent disasters – Haiti’s, Chile’s and Japan’s earthquakes, Pakistan’s and Australia’s floods, and Central Asia’s own history of major calamities – provided a dramatic backdrop reminding participants of the painful impacts that disasters can have on people.

All major cities and population centers in the region— including the densely populated Fergana Valley, which is home to 7 million people— lie in seismic zones of highest or high risk and have experienced major earthquakes in the past century (see Protection Against Severe Earthquake Risks in Central Asia). In addition, millions of people live in flood-prone zones. Major parts of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are arid lowlands, which rely on scarce water for irrigation and drinking supplied by the two major rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, whose water flows depend on volatile rain and snowfalls, and on the management of water levels in the many upstream reservoirs. The populations of countries in the uplands of the Central Asia mountain ranges, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, depend on these same waters and reservoirs for winter energy supplies (see Water-Energy Links in Central Asia). In recent years, millions of people in these two countries have been cut off from electricity in the region's harsh winters. They depend on electricity for heating and lighting of homes, schools, health facilities and for the running of irrigation pumps and industrial equipment. A recent resurgence of poliomyelitis in Tajikistan is attributed in part to the failure to keep vaccines refrigerated during electricity outages. And due to pervasive poverty, about six million people are estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to have suffered from undernourishment in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They are at risk of high food insecurity in the best of times and exposed to external shocks, such as the recent food price rises, interruptions of imports from neighboring countries (Russia and Kazakhstan) and intermittent severe droughts.

The third CARRA conference agenda was organized around four thematic areas: natural disaster risk reduction, water and energy security, food security and social protection. Participants reached the following conclusions:

Natural disaster risks (NDRs) are multiple, severe and rising. The highest risk is that of earthquakes, but there are others, such as floods, mudslides, droughts, etc. Climate change is reinforcing non-seismic natural disaster risks.
Water and energy security risks represent a “the perfect storm”: chronic water and energy insecurity is especially severe in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Recurrent crises are caused by bad weather and poor water and energy management, with severe impacts on agriculture, industry, food security and poverty. One million inhabitants of Tajikistan face frigid winters without access to electricity, due to power shortages, and rapid increases in electricity and water tariffs fall especially on the poor. Climate change again reinforces the risks in this area.
High chronic and transitory food insecurity prevails in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is reinforced by high and rising global food prices, high dependency on volatile imports, national agricultural policy constraints, and limited fiscal capacity and poor governance.
Social protection mechanisms can serve as safety nets for chronic and transitory risks to the poor, but in Central Asia these mechanisms are fragmented, poorly targeted, not flexible or poorly developed, and have weak fiscal and institutional capacity. So far social protection mechanisms have not been used effectively or at all to cushion the impact of compound crises on the poor.

In this context, four challenges continue to confront the international community as it tries to assist Central Asian countries address the risks they face:

The national risk monitoring capacity has declined since Soviet days; it is limited at the national level and fragmented at a regional level. The same holds true for risk preparedness and response capacity.
There has been a limited focus on the national risk management issues by the national leaderships in Central Asian countries and regional organizations have not focused on disaster risks and water, energy and food security.
The international response has been fragmented. Crisis response has often been slow, uncoordinated, and with limited impact. Chronic risks are addressed through many uncoordinated initiatives and information on agency activity remains scattered.
Humanitarian crisis response has been delinked from the long-term development response.

Despite these continuing challenges, conference participants noted that there has been progress over the last three years in the way Central Asia’s risks are being addressed.

There is now much more awareness and interest in this issue among national, regional and international bodies, which was reflected in the high numbers of participants at the third CARRA event compared to the earlier two.
Much improved information on the prevalence and severity of different risks in different locations of Central Asia is now available, due in good part to the concerted analytical efforts supported by international agencies.
A regional disaster risk center is in an advanced state of preparation with three countries participating (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan) and is supported by the European Union and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) has formed a partnership with the World Bank and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and has organized the Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Initiative (CACDRMI). With the support of many other international agencies, this initiative aims to improve the information base on regional disaster risks, to develop disaster financing and risk insurance mechanisms and to invest in hydrometeorological service improvements.
A comprehensive energy-water development program is under development by the World Bank. It aims to address a wide range of energy and water management, capacity, investment and policy issues, and is designed to improve the long-term utilization of these key regional natural resources and hence the water and energy security of Central Asians.
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan has developed an interagency and disaster preparedness and response system with international assistance, which can serve as a model of others in the region.
As reported at the conference, UNDP has recently completed research, which quantifies the economic and social impact of water and energy tariff increases on the poor and of their limited access to these essential services in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.

Nevertheless, the conference concluded that much remains to be done since the risks remain very significant for all five countries in Central Asia and for many segments of their populations. Local and national-level action is the basic building block of risk management, but regional action matters since the key risks are regional phenomena – seismic risks, meteorological conditions, climate change, global food and energy prices, and economic shocks. They all have cross-border impacts – earthquakes, floods, water and energy management, environmental events, and refugees. Therefore, regional crisis preparedness and response are essential and regional, cross-border preparedness and response will be needed in the event of a major disaster. And of course, shared learning, training and capacity building are best pursued on a regional basis. Finally, a regional approach to disaster preparedness can help to build trust among neighbors in a region where generally the readiness to cooperate across borders is limited due to intense rivalries over limited natural resources and over regional preeminence.

Going forward, the third CARRA conference identified four major cross-cutting areas for action by the international community:

Monitor seismic risk and vulnerabilities, hydro-meteorological and hydrological conditions, household water, energy and food indicators (prices, access, etc.), and high vulnerability populations
Prepare for and respond to sudden onset crisis (earthquakes, floods, conflict), to slow onset crisis (drought, food insecurity, economic crisis) and to climate change.
Build links between humanitarian crisis response and development interventions by incorporating development considerations into crisis response; by focusing on transition from crisis response to development assistance; and by incorporating risk management into national/regional development planning.
Build awareness within and outside the region of Central Asia’s risks and vulnerabilities, create the commitment to preparedness and response, and foster readiness to cooperate regionally and the capacity for regional preparedness and response.

In all these areas initiatives under CARRA will involve: the sharing of information about which international and regional agency does what; the identification of gaps in information and capacity; cooperation in research on high vulnerability groups; and exchange of lessons learned and best practice across the region and worldwide.

As a next step, UNDP, FAO and UNICEF staff will finalize the background papers and the action plans for follow-up in each of the four thematic areas covered by the conference (disaster risk reduction, water and energy security, food security and social protection). Concerned agencies have offered to provide inputs and cooperate in the implementation of the action plans. An informal, “light” interagency consultation process will be pursued, with quarterly meetings in Almaty of staff from the agencies represented in Kazakhstan. These meetings are designed to facilitate this consultation effort, supplemented by the annual CARRA conferences. UNDP will also explore putting the CARRA initiative under the umbrella of one of the existing regional institutions. This would facilitate outreach to and engagement by the national governments of the region. They clearly must have a voice in the discussions of risks and challenges affecting their countries and they are indispensable partners together with other national stakeholders in implementing agreed measures on a national or region-wide basis.

Authors

Johannes F. Linn

The War Games in Central Asia That You Didn't Hear About Last Month

Julie Boland — Fri, 29 Oct 2010 12:13:00 -0400

While much of the U.S. foreign and security policy community were preoccupied last month with Secretary Gates’ visit to Asia amid the diplomatic row between Japan and China over events and disputed territory in the East China Sea, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conducted the latest in its series of joint security training exercises in Central Asia. Yawn, right? Another small exercise by a loose collection of states that have nothing in common? Maybe not. The SCO exercise deserves attention from Washington because, while it was characterized by the organization as merely counterterrorist in nature, it also reflected multilateral tensions and national aspirations that Washington should keep in mind as the United States pursues partnerships in the region.

On September 8, Secretary of State Clinton outlined the Obama administration’s approach to international relations in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. Secretary Clinton noted that the United States seeks “to build a network of alliances and partnerships, regional organizations and global institutions, that is durable and dynamic enough to help us meet today’s challenges…[it] can make it easier to identify common interests and convert them to common action.” Clinton said earlier this year, in a speech to the East-West Center, that “the failure of the United States not to participate [in regional organizations] demonstrates a lack of respect and a willingness to engage…And as we’ve also seen new organizations, including the…Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we hope that we will be able to participate actively in many of those.”

But what is notable is what played out the very day after the speech and then over the course of the next two weeks, as the SCO conducted its “Peace Mission-2010” exercises from Sept. 9-25. The planning and operational maneuvers, which took place at Kazakhstan’s Matybulak training area, reportedly included over 5,000 personnel and various equipment from SCO members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Three issues should draw U.S. decision makers’ attention about Peace Mission-2010:

1. Peace Mission-2010 demonstrated that Beijing and its partners are indeed interested in using the SCO to enhance its force capabilities, counterterrorist and otherwise.

Since the SCO was created in 2001, some commentators have assessed that China’s primary focus in the SCO is on expanding its economic opportunities in Central Asia, while Russia’s is on security-related issues. This is clearly in error. While China undoubtedly pursues economic interests in the region, any assessment that it’s not as interested in the security side of the SCO needs to be revisited. Chinese airplanes in the exercise—four bombers and two fighter jets, according to Chinese press—took off from within China and flew to the training range in Kazakhstan. These cross-border missions were the first by the Chinese air force, according to the deputy commander of the Chinese forces participating in Peace Mission-2010. Even though the destination was within the aircrafts’ range, the deputy commander told reporters that they took the opportunity to practice refueling them in the air “to ensure a complete success of their missions.” A mission “more relevant for possible use against India in the event of a military conflict,” noted a former Indian official writing in regional press about the exercise.

In addition, Chinese military spokesmen characterized the experience of transporting nearly 1,000 troops plus many tons of materials to Kazakhstan by rail as “valuable experience in large-scale movements,” noting that the difference in rail gauge between the two countries required practice in changing trains and unloading and loading equipment.

Of course, that’s not to say that the other members are not interested in using the SCO exercises to increase their security forces’ experience, too. Peace Mission-2010 also included the first integration of nighttime maneuvers into a joint SCO exercise, according to Chinese television, undoubtedly useful to each member. Tajikistan’s interest in the exercise no doubt was underscored by the violent attacks it has suffered over the last month from radical Islamists, and Kyrgyzstan, too, experienced severe domestic turmoil when its president was ousted earlier this year. Other SCO members have used the Peace Mission exercises to demonstrate capabilities difficult to characterize as counterterrorist-related. Russia used a previous such exercise in 2007 to showcase and announce the return of its heavy bomber force to regular patrols.

2. Kazakhstan hosted Peace Mission-2010—and NATO’s Steppe Eagle-2010 multilateral peacekeeping exercise just a month earlier—vividly demonstrating that its balancing act in the region continues.

Kazakhstan has come a long way since SCO’s Peace Mission-2007 exercise, when it forced Chinese troops to take a 10,000 kilometer or so trek the long way around the country to reach the Russian exercise grounds in Chelyabinsk, claiming there was no legal provision for foreign troops to be allowed to traverse through the country. For last month’s SCO exercise, 1,000 troops each from China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and 150 each from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan drove, flew, or marched over the Matybulak training facilities in Kazakhstan, according to Kazakhstan’s defense ministry.

Despite stepping up to its turn as host for the SCO’s multilateral security exercise, Kazakhstan is clearly intent on maintaining its multi-vector foreign policy. Steppe Eagle-2010 included troops from Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Kazakhstan hosted the exercise in 2006, 2007, and 2009, too. This bodes well for the United States, especially given Kazakhstan’s agreement earlier this year to give overflight rights for US troops and weapons heading to Afghanistan.

3. Uzbekistan was the lone SCO member to opt out of the exercise, suggesting Tashkent continues to be reluctant to concede security planning to other SCO members and is sensitive to how such exercises could be viewed by the West.

Uzbekistan was the last country to join the organization, transforming it from the Shanghai Five to the six-member SCO in 2001, but it has maintained a love-hate relationship with it ever since. Tashkent has been willing to demonstrate its regional leadership by playing host to the SCO’s standing counterterrorist committee (the Regional Anti-Terror Structure, or RATS) and to SCO heads of state summits, but reluctant to consistently endorse other SCO activities—like multilateral security exercises.

Tashkent did not participate in SCO security exercises until 2006, when it hosted the SCO members on its territory for the East Anti-Terror-2006 exercise. By then, its relationship with Washington had deteriorated after the United States criticized the harsh government crackdown on the May 2005 Andijon riots and Tashkent had evicted US troops based in Karshi-Khanabad. However, Uzbekistan did not remain completely in the SCO fold for long and only contributed staff officer observers to SCO’s Peace Mission-2007 and Peace Mission-2009 exercises. Last year, Uzbekistan’s parliament ratified the SCO’s 2007 agreement to cooperate on security exercises, but limited Tashkent’s participation to observer because of national legislation prohibiting sending military contingents to other countries, according to Kazakhstan Today. And now, for Peace Mission-2010, it did not participate “in any quality,” according to the Russian Ground Forces spokesman for the event.

It appears that Washington can rest assured that Tashkent’s current logistical support for Operation Enduring Freedom will not require a stamp of approval from the SCO at large—but should still be cautious of Uzbekistan’s sometimes fickle sense of loyalty.

So what are the bottom line takeaways? Peace Mission-2010 showed a growing security focused edge to the SCO, but it also reflected some of the organization’s political and military tensions, which should be considered as Washington seeks partners in the region. It demonstrated the SCO’s coherent and continuing concern about the “three evils” of separatism, extremism, and terrorism—something the United States could build on as it encourages engagement with the region. Defense Secretary Gates this month took steps to reinvigorate U.S.-China military ties and his anticipated visit to Beijing next year could be one opportunity to discuss converging concerns between the United States and the SCO. Washington’s awareness of the convergent—and divergent—concerns among SCO members would be useful to make any future partnerships with the SCO and its individual members both realistic and fruitful.

Authors

Julie Boland

An American Opportunity in Kyrgyzstan

Johannes F. Linn — Wed, 14 Apr 2010 09:32:00 -0400

Following a deadly uprising in Kyrgyzstan last week, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev fled Bishkek to his ancestral village in the south. Many viewed his administration as corrupt and authoritarian-ruled.

Although Bakiyev has not yet resigned, the victorious opposition installed an interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva, in hopes of unifying the country. Although Otunbayeva has a strong reputation as a democrat and free of corruption, there is no guarantee that last week’s revolution will lead to a democratic government—judging by the 2005 “Tulip Revolution,” led by now deposed Bakiyev. The risk of continued instability in Kyrgyzstan, and of even a civil war between the north and south, is high. Further unrest could severely damage the poor country’s economy, and it certainly will slow the recovery from the global recession.

The country’s instability will also affect Central Asia. While Kyrgyzstan is small, it shares borders with China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, it has become a major transshipment center for goods from China to other Central Asian countries. And it acts as an important transit corridor for East-West and North-South trade, including one used by NATO to ship materials to Afghanistan from the Baltics.

Further, political violence in Kyrgyzstan could upset some of the neighboring Central Asian governments—particularly in Tajikistan, which experienced a bloody civil war in the 1990s. In the short term, the Kyrgyz uprising will likely lead the autocratic governments of its neighbors to clamp down even harder on internal opposition, real or perceived. In the long term, this may create more domestic popular dissatisfaction and a more fertile ground for radical Islamic forces. Initiatives to foster regional cooperation and economic integration, which are critical for the long-term development of Central Asia, will be hampered by the instability in Kyrgyzstan and by its neighbors’ efforts to insulate themselves from the Kyrgyz strife.

The American press has focused on the potential impact of the Kyrgyz upheaval on the U.S. military base at Manas, which is of considerable importance to the U.S. for its engagement in Afghanistan. The interim government indicated that it will not reopen existing agreements for now, but it has been less reassuring about the longer-term prospects. One of the factors behind this ambivalence is that the new Kyrgyz leadership, while still in opposition, felt slighted by the U.S., who was seen to support President Bakiyev in exchange for favorable treatment in negotiation of the Manas base. In contrast, the Russian government had criticized Bakiyev and his government for its corrupt and repressive governance and had apparently offered signals of support to the opposition. There is considerable irony in the Russians supporting ostensibly democratic forces, while the Americans supported an autocratic regime. It is a demonstration of the challenging task that the U.S. administration has in balancing the pursuit of its goals in Afghanistan while also supporting democracy and human rights in Central Asia.

Western media were quick to declare the Kyrgyz opposition’s victory as a foreign policy success for Moscow and, by implication, a failure for Washington. But whatever satisfaction Moscow may be reaping is likely to be short-lived—the seeds of unrest, and of a potential democratic revival, may prove to be a future challenge for the control-minded Russian government, while representing an opportunity for the U.S.

It is in America’s best interest to pursue low-key and steady diplomacy in Central Asia, and to see Kyrgyzstan succeed in taking a serious step toward democracy and stability. The United States should therefore support the efforts of U.N. Special Envoy Ján Kubiš to broker a peaceful transition toward democratic elections in Kyrgyzstan; and work to assure Chinese and Russian support, open or tacit, for this process and for the betterment of Kyrgyzstan’s people.

Authors

Johannes F. Linn

Image Source: © Vasily Fedosenko / Reuters

Protection Against Severe Earthquake Risks in Central Asia

Johannes F. Linn — Tue, 23 Mar 2010 13:12:00 -0400

On January 2, 2010, a 5.3 magnitude earthquake hit a number of remote villages in Tajikistan. According to the Associated Press, some 20,000 people were left homeless, but fortunately there were no reported deaths. The international media barely took notice of the event although Tajikistan, along with its Central Asian neighbors, lies in one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world.

Ten days later, on January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. Over 220,000 people were reported killed and more than a million people left homeless. On February 27, 2010, an even stronger earthquake with the magnitude of 8.8 hit the coastal region of central Chile. It left some 450 people dead and affected more than 2 million people. The death toll of the Chilean earthquake was substantially lower than that in Haiti despite its greater strength, mostly due to better building construction, better preparedness and better response, all linked to greater wealth and better governance conditions in Chile compared to Haiti. Nonetheless, the initial response of the authorities was criticized widely for lack of adequate speed and effectiveness (see Natural Disasters, National Diligence: The Chilean Earthquake in Perspective by Daniel Kaufmann and José Tessada).

The Haiti and Chile earthquakes should serve as a wakeup call for Central Asia and for its neighbors and international friends. Located at the intersection of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates, all Central Asian countries[1] have significant zones of very high seismic risk – virtually all of Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan included – and all the big cities of Central Asia, with the exception of Astana, Kazakhstan’s new capital, lie in high-risk areas. Indeed the cities in Central Asia have a dreadful history of seismic disasters: Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, was leveled by an 7.5 magnitude earthquake in 1966 with over 300,000 reported homeless. Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital, was substantially destroyed in 1948 by a 7.3 quake with between 110,000 to 176,000 deaths reported. Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, was severely damaged by earthquakes repeatedly between 1887 and 1911. Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, experienced a 7.4 earthquake in 1907.

A recent World Bank-United Nations report systematically reviews the extraordinarily high disaster risks which Central Asian countries face and concludes that earthquakes represent the highest risk in terms of potential loss of lives and economic damage.[2] Tajikistan might lose as much as 20% of its GDP from a major seismic event. If earthquakes of past severity were to recur, damage today is estimated to be higher due to greater populations numbers and density and low building standards. If the quake that hit Dushanbe in 1907 were to recur today, some 55,000 deaths and over $1 billion in economic damage could result, according to another World Bank-United Nations report.[3] According to a 1996 estimate there is a 40% chance that a 9.0 magnitude quake will hit one of the Central Asian cities within 20 years.[4]

But not only the large cities are at risk: The densely populated Fergana Valley, home to some 11 million people and split up by jig-saw-like borders among Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, faces very high risks of severe earthquakes. And the huge Sarez lake high in the Pamir mountains of eastern Tajikistan – the itself was formed by a big earthquake and a resulting landslide in 1911 – is at risk of flooding the downstream valley of the Amu Darya River with its 16 cubic kilometers of water, if another earthquake were to lead to a rupture of the naturally formed dam. Five million people are estimated to be at risk from such a flood in Tajikistan, as well as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

The Central Asian countries are poorly prepared to deal with this high disaster risk. As a holdover from Soviet days, each country has a government department to deal with disasters, but they have only very limited administrative and financial resources and few modern planning and response tools to prepare for and respond to a major earthquake. There is no effective regional preparedness and response capacity, an essential requirement in a region where international borders divide major population centers, such as the Fergana Valley, where the large cities are close to borders, and hence where major quakes are likely to affect more than one country at a time.[5] The quality of buildings in the region is generally poor for earthquake resistance and the population is ill-prepared for earthquakes. For example, a recent study by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) on disaster risks in Almaty – a city for which experts consider the likelihood of a major quake occurring in the next 10-15 years as very high – concluded that most buildings have a low resistance to withstand earthquakes and that a great majority of the population have a low awareness and preparedness for the high earthquake risk.[6] According to World Bank-United Nations estimates, only 1 per cent of Central Asia’s population is covered by disaster insurance, and the insurance that is available, while low in cost, is also of low quality and lacks credible reinsurance. Moreover, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the Central Asian countries’ fiscal resources available for responding to a major natural disaster are wholly inadequate.

The international community has not been oblivious to the seismic risks that Central Asia faces. In 1996, a consortium of national and international agencies met in Almaty to review the earthquake risks for Central Asia and concluded with a call for action on a region-wide basis with international support.[7] The Asian Disaster Reduction Center organized a conference in 2003 in Kobe, Japan, with United Nations assistance to assess and plan for disaster risks in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The UNDP’s Central Asia Human Development Report of 2005 prominently addressed Central Asia’s vulnerability to natural disasters and called for a national, regional and international response. The World Bank, together with the United Nations and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) mounted in 2008 the Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Initiative, which aims to assess the disaster risks in the region and to help develop effective preparedness and response capacity. In addition, international and bilateral aid agencies have provided support to individual countries to assist with disaster preparedness, including the UNDP for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, JICA for Kazakhstan, the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation for Tajikistan, while Germany’s InWEnt and USAID supported regional earthquake preparedness initiatives over the last decade. UNDP is planning an urban risk management network for the major cities of Central Asia and the Caucasus and regional disaster preparedness has been identified as an area of engagement by CAREC. A multi-stakeholder group of donors, including the World Bank and the Aga Khan Development Network successfully carried out a project to install and early warning system for downstream communities in case of a dam breakage at Lake Sarez.

Well-meaning and important as these international initiatives are, they are at best partial, uncoordinated and lacking in urgency on a regional basis. In many cases, initiatives end with calls for action with no effective follow-up, such as the 1996 consortium, the 2003 Kobe meeting, and the 2005 Central Asia Human Development Report; small-scale interventions fail to be sustained or scaled up, as with initiatives to increase awareness and preparedness at a national and local basis; earthquake risks are given lower priorities than others, as in the case of the World Bank-United Nations disaster preparedness program; and initial attention flags as in the case of CAREC’s focus on natural disaster – while the World Bank presented a progress report of the initiative at the CAREC Senior Officials Meeting in June 2009, the matter was not on the agenda of the Ministers’ Conference in October 2009 and was not even mentioned in the Joint Ministerial Statement.[8]

The bottom line is that there has been little progress in this critical area since the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, and the risk of a major disaster possibly on the scale of Haiti, is a real threat. If anything, the ability of Central Asian countries to respond to a major disaster today, similar to the Armenia earthquake in 1988, which killed 25,000 people and caused losses estimated $14.2 billion, is less than in Soviet days. National capacities are very limited, borders are hard, cooperation among countries weak, and engagement from outside the region highly constrained.

What can be done? Seven steps should be the immediate focus of action, following the dramatic warning signals that the Haiti and Chile earthquakes have sent to other parts of the world subject to high seismic risk, and especially to Central Asia.

The first step that needs to be taken is to raise the awareness and engagement on this fundamental risk at the highest political level in each country. The reality is that, even as the poorer population groups are likely to be hardest hit in case of a major quake, virtually everybody, including the countries’ presidents and elite, is at risk. The now-deceased first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, was left an orphan at a young age when his mother was killed along with most of his family in the 1948 earthquake that leveled Ashgabat.

Second, the issue of natural disaster preparedness should be put at the top of the agenda of the two key regional organizations for Central Asia: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurasEC). These organizations meet annually at the heads of state level. SCO involves not only Russia, but also China. While the capacity for financing and implementation of these two organizations is limited, their summit agreements should provide political momentum and instruct the regional implementation bodies, in particular CAREC, to develop regional strategies and action plans with international partners, including the Eurasian Development Bank, World Bank, United Nations and key bilateral agencies from Germany, Switzerland and the United States.

Third, the focus should squarely be put on earthquake preparedness and response. It represents the single largest catastrophic risk and needs priority and urgent attention.

Fourth, the focus must be regional in addition to national. Given the distribution of seismic risks in the region, the nature of the region’s population concentration and the alignment of borders, major earthquakes are likely to affect more than one country at a time. With the limited resources of each country and the need for access across borders under international response actions, only a regionally planned and executed approach is likely to be anywhere near effective. Regional cooperation in Central Asia has been weak since the breakup of the Soviet Union, partly because the newly independent countries have struggled about the allocation of precious regional resources, especially water and energy. However, preparing to face the common threat of a major earthquake, which could hit any of the countries in the region at any time, should offer win-win opportunities for all.

Fifth, the engagement of the international community must for once be truly comprehensive and coordinated. One of the implications of the major recent disasters around the globe is the great difficulty of mounting effectively coordinated responses by external humanitarian agencies. Lessons from other disasters need to be learned and learned quickly. (see Homi Kharas "Build Back Better" in Haiti: Lessons from the Indonesian Tsunami). CAREC, which has six international agencies as members and which has the goal to develop a broader partnership agenda, would be the obvious umbrella under which to aim for this comprehensive international response.

Sixth, each international and bilateral organization engaged in Central Asia should give much more attention to the issue of earthquake preparedness, not only in terms of deployment of analytical, advisory and financial resources within the region, but also in terms of assuring that its internal response capacity to a major earthquake is fully developed, tested and at the ready. Agencies also need to be sure that their own staff on the ground is housed in facilities that are likely to withstand major shocks. The tragic losses of UN personnel during the Haiti earthquake are a painful reminder of this immediate risk to the agencies themselves.

Seventh, the response should include not only a focus on better preparedness by the governments and official international agencies, but must also involve civil society at the local, national and international level. What is more, the development of private insurance mechanisms, as supported by the World Bank in Turkey, needs to be fostered proactively as recommended by a recent World Bank-United Nations report.[9]

Any serious earthquake that hits a heavily populated area will have severe consequences. The recent experience of Haiti and Chile are a tragic reminder how important effective preparedness and response are, if loss of life and damage is to be kept to a minimum. With the high risk of intensive seismic action in Central Asia, national and international attention and action must be focused on developing better risk reduction, preparedness and response in the region. It would be real progress if action is taken before the next disaster hits, rather than, as is all too often the case, after the tragedy strikes.

[1] Central Asia is defined here to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The population of Central Asia is about 60 million. It should be noted that the Central Asian zone of high seismic risk is part of a larger zone, which also includes Western China, Northern Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, the South Caucasus and parts of Turkey.

[2] “More than 91 percent of loss potential in [Central Asia and the Caucasus] is from earthquakes alone.” See The World Bank, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and CAREC, “Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Initiative (CAC DRMI)”, 2009. http://www.unisdr.org/preventionweb/files/11641_CentralAsiaCaucasusDRManagementInit.pdf

[3] The World Bank, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and CAREC, “Mitigating the Adverse Financial Effects of Natural Hazards on the Economies of Central Asia”, 2009. http://www.unisdr.org/preventionweb/files/11742_MitigatingtheAdverseFinancialEffect.pdf

[4] Ibid.

[5] United Nations Development Program, Central Asia Human Development Report, New York, 2005. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/europethecis/central_asia_2005_en.pdf

[6] JICA, “The Study of Earthquake Disaster Risk Management for Almaty City in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Interim Report, September 2008.

[7] Geohazards. “Lessons for Central Asia from Armenia and Sakhalin”, 1996. www.geohaz.org/news/images/publications/Lessons_from_ca.pdf

[8] For documentation of the Ministerial Conference see the CAREC Institute Web site under http://www.carecinstitute.org/index.php?page=eighth-ministerial-conference-on-central-asia-regional-economic-cooperation

[9] The World Bank, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and CAREC, “Mitigating the Adverse Financial Effects of Natural Hazards on the Economies of Central Asia”, 2009.

Authors

Johannes F. Linn

Case Study on Aid Effectiveness in Tajikistan

Firuz Kataev, Matin Kholmatov and Rustam Aminjanov — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 12:00:00 -0400

Abstract

This case study aims at presenting Tajikistan's perspective of, experiences with, and challenges to foreign aid. The objective of the study is to raise awareness about different dimensions of aid fragmentation, volatility and associated costs to help define the way to better coordinate official development assistance and private aid flows in Tajikistan. This study is targeted for development practitioners, government officials and all development partners focusing on aid effectiveness.

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Authors

Firuz Kataev
Matin Kholmatov
Rustam Aminjanov

Aid Coordination on the Ground: Are Joint Country Assistance Strategies the Answer?

Johannes F. Linn — Wed, 22 Jul 2009 17:30:00 -0400

Introduction

Fragmentation in aid architecture and aid delivery is a well-recognized challenge. The question of what to do about fragmentation remains puzzling with no obvious answers. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness represents an effort by donor and recipient governments to harmonize their cooperation in a comprehensive manner, with guidelines and targets that aim to improve the effectiveness of aid.

One of the aspects not addressed in the Paris Declaration is how a comprehensive approach to aid coordination at the international level would be implemented on the ground at the country level. The Paris Declaration aims to improve specific modalities of cooperation (such as the use of country systems for procurement and financial management, joint donor missions, the elimination of project implementation units, and the increase in recipient government ownership of programs, etc.), but the Declaration provides little guidance on how donors and recipient governments would plan and implement improved cooperation at the country level to effectively deploy these modalities.

One way to respond systematically and comprehensively to the agreements of the Paris Declaration at the country level is for donors and recipient governments to prepare joint country assistance strategies. While this is not explicitly envisaged or mandated in the Paris Declaration, donor teams and recipient governments have come together in at least 12 countries to prepare joint strategies for a better coordinated and harmonized aid delivery and use. They have done this generally without much support from their headquarters or from OECD DAC experts and without the benefit of a systematic evaluation of the growing body of experience with the preparation and the implementation of joint country strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to report on and draw lessons from the experience with the preparation and implementation of joint country assistance strategies. The analysis draws on two sources of information: It reflects the lessons from the author’s personal involvement as a facilitator in the preparation of a joint country assistance strategy in Tajikistan. While such direct association as a “participant observer” brings with it risks of possible biases in interpretation, it has the great advantage of close, first-hand observation. Since the Tajikistan process was not yet completed at the time of writing this paper, the descriptions and conclusions from this case study can only be seen as preliminary. Second, the paper draws on a desk review of available documentation of country experiences elsewhere in the world, much of it informal and qualitative. No claim to completeness or statistical significance of conclusions can be made. Furthermore, the joint country assistance strategy process, as it is implemented on the ground, does not currently follow any standard format or approach, since there is no explicit agreement (and quite some variance) on (1) the main purpose and objectives of joint strategy process, (2) what are the necessary elements/components, or (3) even whose instrument it should be (donors or partner country government).

Therefore, this paper is only a first step in an effort to fill a substantial gap in our understanding of how the Paris Declaration commitments are being implemented on the ground and the role that joint country assistance strategies can or should play in this implementation process. One of the main conclusions of this paper is that a more systematic evaluation of completed and ongoing joint country assistance strategies is an urgent priority.

Following this introduction, the first section reviews the Paris Declaration and its links to joint country assistance strategies. The next section provides an overview of the available assessments of joint country strategy experience. This is followed by a section that assesses specific aspects of the joint country strategy process, drawing on worldwide experience as well as the Tajik experience. The concluding section presents overall conclusions and recommendations for the development partners involved in efforts to improve aid effectiveness at the country level. An Annex reports the details of the evolving process of preparing the Tajikistan joint country strategy.

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Authors

Johannes F. Linn

The Failure to Protect: Battle-Affected IDPs in Southern Afghanistan

Alex Mundt and Susanne Schmeidl — Mon, 22 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

In early May, villagers in a remote corner of Western Afghanistan recounted how they tried to secure children, women and elderly men in a series of village compounds for safety during a raid on their village. After their houses were bombed, the villagers loaded the dead bodies onto trucks and brought them to the provincial capital as graphic proof of the carelessness of the international military forces and the enormous toll of the conflict on innocent civilians.[1] A military investigation of the incident later found that significant errors were made by American military personnel and that the civilian death toll in Farah would have likely been far lower had strict rules designed to minimize civilian casualties been followed.[2]

Civilians have long borne the brunt of the conflict in Afghanistan. During a working visit to Afghanistan in August 2007, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) expressed concern that the methods both of the Taliban and of anti-insurgency operations were disproportionately impacting civilians.[3] Since then, the situation has only deteriorated, and is expected to worsen in the coming months with the increased international military presence and accompanied rise in “kinetic activities” in the South.[4]

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), civilian casualties in 2008, totalling 2,118, were 40% higher than the year prior.[5] Speaking at the Brookings Institution in the wake of the Farah bombing, Afghan President Hamid Karzai noted that the success of the new American strategy depends on “making absolutely sure that Afghans don’t suffer—that Afghan civilians are protected.” Echoing this view, the new US Force Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, stated that the new measure of effectiveness would be the “number of Afghans shielded from violence,” rather than the number of insurgents killed.

While civilian casualties are widely covered by the media and have emerged in recent years as a rallying point for disaffection with the international military presence, broader protection concerns, particularly the plight of battle-affected IDPs, remain invisible and largely unacknowledged. The renewed counterinsurgency strategy of “clear, hold and build,”[6] assumes that displacement is a short-term phenomenon, linked only to the more visible aspects of military engagement. Relief agencies, as a result of access restrictions and a subsequent lack of information, or a wariness of creating pull factors and longer-term aid dependency, have likewise tended to reinforce this simplistic view of displaced communities eager to return once the bombs have stopped falling. However, in its 2008 IDP profile, the National Task Force noted that “the assumption that we have made, that most “battle-affected” IDPs do not move too far from their homes and rapidly return home once the fighting has ended is likely to be seriously challenged.”[7]

Research conducted by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the Afghan NGO The Liaison Office (TLO) suggests that the assumptions regarding battle-affected IDPs are indeed flawed in at least three key, interrelated respects:

The estimates of battle-affected displacement are likely grossly underestimated;
The reasons for displacement are more subtle and complex than is commonly held; and
The perceived short-term nature of displacement is the result of a lack of realistic alternatives among rural poor rather than a preference to immediately return to villages of origin.

The figure of 235,000 IDPs, estimated by the national IDP task force in its December 2008 national profile, has become the standard (and static) reference point for internal displacement in Afghanistan. However, the numbers largely reflect protracted caseloads in “contained” camp-like situations known to the UN Refugee Agency and other relief organizations rather than providing a more fluid picture of a dynamic situation of active and increasing conflict. For example, since 2004 there may be as many as 200,000 new arrivals in Spin Boldak, a southern district of Kandahar province bordering Pakistan, many of whom cite increasing insecurity as the cause of flight from areas of origin.[8] When added to the increasing numbers of those squatting in the poor outskirts of Kandahar-city, this single southern province most likely hosts more than twice the original, officially recognized IDP figure for the country as a whole. The picture differs little in the neighboring provinces of Helmand and Uruzgan, where reports of new IDP arrivals have multiplied in recent months.[9]

Actual numbers aside, preliminary interviews with “battle-affected” IDPs also suggest that the group may not be as homogeneous as previously thought. The assumption that IDPs are only driven by actual battle is misguided, at least according to IDPs themselves, many of whom fled either pro-actively in fear of anticipated fighting or as a result of increasing intimidation and harassment by Taliban and/or pro-government elements. The more subtle aspects of the conflict—the breakdown of law and order, loss of livelihoods, and a lack of access to critical social services—have left rural inhabitants with few options to ensure their safety and survival.

On the one hand, they have to deal with an inept, and often highly corrupt, Afghan government unable to provide basic security and access to services. On the other, they are confronted by a growing and highly mobile insurgency well-known for its brutality. Compounding these difficulties are international military forces with often-conflicting objectives of providing security for the local population (ISAF/NATO) while at the same time pursuing an intensified counterinsurgency strategy (Coalition/Special Forces). An IDP from Khas Uruzgan explains the dilemma of being caught between the front lines: “There are now six governments—PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), Hazara Militias[10], ANA (Afghanistan National Army), ANP (Afghanistan National Police), District government, and the Taliban. We are caught in the middle of all of them. If you side with the government, then the Taliban will kill you. If you side with the Taliban, the government will take you or the bombs will fall. The fighting was getting worse, so we left. There is no choice.”[11]

Others speak of harassment from Taliban forces in terms of extorting food, beatings, or threats if individuals are considered pro-government. A former police-chief from Gizab district in Uruzgan (which is currently under full Taliban control) said most ex-government officials or pro-government elders have left: “All people working for the government fled, all tribal elders fled, and anyone with money fled. “[12] For this category of conflict-induced IDPs, displacement tends to be long-term and IDPs make strategic choices regarding safe-havens. Yet rational choices by IDPs concerning where to settle tend to obscure national and international perceptions regarding their rights as IDPs, including their fundamental right to seek assistance and safety in any part of the country.[13] For instance, the availability and cost of rental accommodations, the prospects for livelihoods, and levels of ethnic antipathy have all emerged as factors in IDP decision-making, but at the same time have reinforced a perception of IDPs as economic migrants rather than battle-affected populations.

The defining characteristic of the decision-making process appears to be the self-awareness among IDPs that they will be largely on their own, wherever they choose to settle. In reality, this has translated into a situation in which only wealthier households are able to afford the luxury of a safe haven from the increasing and unpredictable violence. The rural poor in conflict-affected areas are left to fend for themselves and make compromises with whichever side holds the upper hand in a given area. That civilians flee direct conflict or aerial bombardment and then immediately return to villages of origin as soon as the situation stabilizes feeds a convenient narrative of the Afghan government, the international military, and relief agencies, all of whom prefer to see displacement as a short-term phenomenon with limited protection and assistance needs.[14] In truth, the reality is far more complex and many civilians, particularly the most vulnerable, have few options other than to remain in situations of unpredictable armed conflict.

While the protection of Afghan civilians has assumed its rightful place on the agendas of military and humanitarian actors alike, the sole focus on preventing civilian casualties has overshadowed other key elements of human security. Unfortunately, increased civilian displacement is a natural by-product of any armed conflict, yet the protection of battle-affected IDPs seems to have fallen largely outside the security equation in Afghanistan. Military actors, conscious of their respective public’s limited tolerance for prolonged engagement in Afghanistan, are perhaps reluctant to acknowledge the true scale of forced displacement—generally a key indicator of worsening security. Humanitarian agencies, long conditioned to view Afghanistan through a post-conflict lens, want to avoid the creation of pull factors and aid dependency that often characterize emergency, rather than development contexts. And finally, with upcoming elections, a national government with rapidly diminishing reach is determined to put its best foot forward and campaign on the glowing achievements of post-conflict Afghanistan. Sadly, IDPs are paying a high price for this wilful ignorance. As one IDP puts it, “Why is there no help for the IDPs? What is the problem with us? We had big expectations that international agencies would help us. The international community has spent millions and millions, but still the government here cannot stand on its own feet.”[15]

[1] Rahim Faiez and Jason Straziuso, "Afghans Allege Dozens of Civilian Deaths from US-Led Bombings," Huffington Post, 5 May 2009.

[2] Erich Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Report Finds Errors in Airstrikes," The New York Times, 2 June 2009.

[3] United Nations Press Release, “UN Expert Concerned About Growing Problem of Internal Displacement in Afghanistan,” August 20, 2007.

[4] Interview, Representative, US Army, 14 June 2009.

[5] UNAMA, Afghanistan: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights Unit, January 2009.

[6] Mainly applied by Coalition Forces and selected PRT lead nations.

[7] National IDP Profile, p.14.

[8] Interview with Spin Boldak IDP shura leader. 8 June 2008. Subsequent visits to Spin Boldak confirmed large numbers of tents and makeshift camp-like accommodation.

[9] IDP Task Force Meeting, 12 May 2009, confirmed new battle-affected displacements of 1200 households in Lashkar Gah, and 183 families as a result of fighting in Ghor. UNHCR since has received additional unconfirmed reports of displacement from Uruzgan and Kandahar.

[10] IDPs from Khas Uruzgan also note one reason for leaving the harassment by a Hazara-dominated Afghan National Police that is working together with American Special Forces and, among others, conducts house searches. As one IDP put it bluntly: “I went to Spin Boldak to save my dignity. We don’t want to see our wives and daughters without their shawls, searched in front of us. We were humiliated.”

[11] Interview, Kandahar-city IDP from Gizab district in Uruzgan, Kandahar-city, 30 May 2009.

[12] Interview, Kandahar-city IDP from Gizab district in Uruzgan, Kandahar-city, 30 May 2009.

[13] United Nations, 1999, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (New York: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

[14] Currently, only the International Committee for the Red Cross, through its national counterpart, the Afghan Red Crescent society, provides one-time emergency food and NFI assistance to confirmed IDPs.

[15] Interview, tribal elder of a Spin Boldak IDP settlement, Kandahar-city, 29 May 2009.

Authors

Alex Mundt
Susanne Schmeidl

Publication: The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Return of Internally Displaced Persons to Northern Afghanistan

Mon, 01 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

At first glance, the return of hundreds of displaced Pashtun families from war-torn Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan to villages of origin in the comparatively peaceful north would seem an obvious and attractive option. It is a solution welcomed by a beleaguered Afghan government and supported by United Nations agencies conditioned to see return as the optimal, and perhaps only, durable solution for protracted IDP populations. But, as with many things in Afghanistan, appearances often deceive. According to the UN Refugee Agency, many IDPs themselves have recently asked for assistance to move from an IDP settlement near Kandahar to their former homes in the north. For IDPs caught in the midst of a worsening conflict in the south, one UN official likened decisions to return as perhaps the “least bad option”. However, latent tensions among various ethnic groups, limited central and local government authority, weak rule of law, and a striking lack of investment in development throughout the north undermine the sustainable return of displaced populations.

The historical experience of Pashtuns in the north is controversial and returning IDPs (and refugees) carry heavy baggage. Over a hundred years ago, Pashtuns began arriving in the north as part of a calculated state consolidation strategy by Abdur Rahman Khan, known as the “the Iron Amir,” to secure the northern areas of the country by settling fellow Pashtuns in contested, multi-ethnic regions.[1] A second wave of resettlement followed under Zahir Shah in the mid-twentieth century, as Pashtuns were again resettled as part of a continuing policy of Pashtunisation in the north, often on newly irrigated land and at the expense of the indigenous Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik communities. These “immigrants” were called naqilin, to distinguish them from the original inhabitants of the area. These population relocations, several of them not fully voluntary[2], fostered lingering resentments among the new host population that persist today, particularly in areas where resource competition over land and water is highest.

Ethnic antipathy first erupted during the short-lived rule of the mujahideen following the fall of the Communist government. Many non-Pashtun communities (or specific commanders) took advantage of their strengthened position to take over land and property of Pashtun settlers. When the Taliban came to power in 1996, the Pashtun communities, now strengthened by a Pashtun-based government, retook what had been taken from them, at times occupying lands of non-Pashtuns. Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the tide again turned, and non-Pashtun communities took revenge, reclaiming their lands and attempted to push Pashtun communities out in a widespread series of village lootings in selected areas,[3] reprisal killings and kidnappings. Some of this retaliatory violence was supported by former mujahideen commanders linked to the Northern Alliance. Aside from scattered returns to certain areas, the majority of Pashtuns displaced by post-Taliban violence in the north have remained in camps in the south[4] or have begun to self-settle into Kandahar city. By UNHCR’s count, there are currently some 270,000 IDPs in Afghanistan, nearly half who had fled the north in lat 2001.[5]

During a recent visit to the northern province of Jawzjan for a research study, Brookings and The Liaison Office (TLO) located several of the IDP families who have returned in recent years to see how they had fared. Their stories were not encouraging. In one village—Eadhan Afghanai—some 150 families had been assisted over the last few years by UNHCR and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation to return, but only 30-40 remained amidst numerous abandoned houses.[6] Hassanabad, a stone’s throw from the provincial capital of Sheberghan, remains totally abandoned, despite the fact that approximately 20 IDP families have recently returned. These families claim to prefer the safety of Sheberghan’s main bazaar to the deep-seated antagonism of neighboring Arab villages back home, whose residents have claimed the surrounding farm and pastureland as their own.[7] In another village—Bashi Kot[8]—a village elder explained that the government-owned pastureland, which had previously been shared among ethnic groups, had been overtaken by neighboring non-Pashtun communities for cultivation, leaving little land for traditional animal grazing and agricultural production by Pashtun returnees.[9] He then showed us the only water point in the area: an ancient deep well that spewed boiling hot, salty water more than two hour’s walk from his village.[10] We were told it was unsafe to venture farther, as foreign Taliban were active in the area and our safety could not be guaranteed. Without exception, the villages we visited were empty of young men, who had returned south or even to Iran in search of work (a familiar story across Afghanistan). Among the elders we met, those who did not regret their decision to return were few and far between.

This pattern—wherein IDPs are allowed to return, but local communities had used the power vacuum to redistribute land usage in their favor—recurred in all of the villages visited and was further confirmed by legal aid counselors addressing land and property issues. In the absence of central government authority and a strong rule of law, local legal aid counselors of the Norwegian Refugee Council admitted that disputes between returning IDPs and local residents tend to be settled in favor of the latter. These interventions, mostly through traditional jirgas rather than formal courts, have largely kept the peace but inhibited returning IDPs from successfully reestablishing themselves and reclaiming their land.[11] The altered political landscape in the north affects not just IDPs but refugees as well. Of the nearly 500,000 refugees originating from northern Afghanistan who are still in Pakistan, nearly seventy percent are Pashtuns, many of whom have cited landlessness and lack of shelter as reasons for their continued asylum.[12] Some return only to find themselves again displaced in IDP camps.

To some degree, these trends of political disequilibrium and subtle intimidation repeat themselves in provinces across the north: in Takhar, a group of 70 returning refugee families have remained huddled for nearly a year in a local bazaar, unable to access their traditional lands despite Central Government Decrees confirming their rights to the land.[13] In Balkh Province’s Sholgara region, over 150 returnee families remain powerless to reclaim lost lands from local inhabitants; in Faryab, a UNHCR Protection Officer was unable to find a single assisted-IDP return household, out of more than 60 assisted in 2008 by UNHCR, in villages of origin.[14] In January, the International Committee for the Red Cross assisted nearly 2,000 families displaced by fighting between ethnic Tajiks and Pashtuns in Badghis Province alone.[15]

A former UN staff member noted that many of the IDPs still in the south had never been well-integrated with local communities to begin with, having been settled on land that could not sustain them in the long-term, which only created competition with neighboring non-Pashtun communities over scarce resources. In areas of more abundant natural resources, the integration of Pashtuns in the local social landscape was smoother without resource competition arising.[16]

A series of interviews conducted with IDPs in Zhari Dasht Camp by The Liaison Office suggest that, by and large, people continue to fear for their safety if they return and that the underlying causes of flight have not yet been adequately addressed. In some cases, those who had previously supported the Taliban felt they might still be targets of reprisal violence if they went back. Others reported that their land had been seized by local residents. Several of those interviewed mentioned neighboring families who had attempted to return to their villages, but returned to the camp as a result of harassment or lack of livelihood prospects in the north.[17] As one jobless IDP returnee in Jawzjan noted, “Uzbeks only hire Uzbeks, Pashtuns only hire Pashtuns.” And, as most land currently is occupied by non-Pashtun communities, even daily labor or sharecropping is no longer an option for returning IDPs.

In parts of Faryab and Badghis provinces, where insurgent activity and subsequent population displacement is on the rise, returning IDPs could find themselves again caught in a cycle of violence, with collaboration or collusion with insurgents their only means of sustaining themselves in villages of origin. There is precedent for this in Jawzjan. In the Dashti Lali area, disaffection with the current provincial administration, which is increasingly seen to overtly favor non-Pashtun communities, is fueling a reconsideration of local political allegiances. According to one elder, “if you are caught in the middle, you have to join a side.”[18] Disgruntled or economically-vulnerable IDP communities, therefore, may well become the next recruitment market for a growing insurgency in the north and west of the country.

With “hearts and minds” taken for granted, comparatively little development assistance has been invested in the northern region. Development funds have instead been closely tied to military and political objectives and spent disproportionately in areas affected by the insurgency (or in urban areas, predominantly Kabul). Whereas violence-plagued provinces of Uruzgan and Kandahar receive approximately $150 per capita in development assistance, many of the provinces in the north receive less than $30.[19] The thousands of flood victims currently camped under plastic sheets in Balkh and along the western highway out of Mazar-i-Sharif—the same multitudes displaced last year by severe drought—are a powerful testament to the lack of planning for and investment in sustainable development across the northern region.

All of this matters for several reasons: First, the plight of IDPs is undoubtedly worsening amid increasing insecurity in the south—local residents and IDPs alike are caught in the crosshairs of the conflict between pro-government forces and insurgents. All assistance to the primary IDP camp, Zhari Dasht, was cut-off in 2006 to encourage IDPs to return, although fewer than a quarter of the nearly 40,000 original residents[20] chose to do so, citing security concerns and lack of livelihood prospects in the north. More recently, other limitations on freedom of movement impede the ability of IDPs to move back and forth between the Zhari Dasht camp and Kandahar-city to find daily labor, creating yet another push factor. While most observers expect the conflict to worsen in areas around the camp in the coming year, there is still a pronounced reluctance to return among IDPs, who understand that further friction and hardship await them in villages of origin.

Evidence suggests that those who opt to return soon find themselves again displaced, this time as economic migrants who are more easily dismissed by provincial authorities and largely ignored by relief agencies. Many with whom we spoke would have preferred local integration or resettlement if offered.[21] One elder exclaimed, “If we had had another option, we would have stayed. If we had not been promised more than we received, we would not have returned”.[22]

For humanitarian agencies tied in knots by insecurity and a subsequent lack of access and options, the opportunity to assist IDPs to finally head home seems too good to pass up. However, in the absence of meaningful reconciliation and tangible, equitably-distributed development initiatives, return is likely to be a pyrrhic victory, prompting new waves of displacement and family separation. Furthermore, by attempting to recreate conditions that have been the source of much discord and tension in the past (and reinforce past controversial population relocation policies), the humanitarian community may, however inadvertently, sow the seeds of future ethnic conflict in the north and prompt further internal displacement.

For a national government with little practical authority outside Kabul and long conditioned to see IDPs as either short-term or economically-motivated, and return as the most preferred (if not only) solution, it is time to look for other more realistic protection-oriented alternatives. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, among other things, advocate for the government to ensure that the choices of IDPs regarding their choice of durable solutions—return, local integration or resettlement in another part of the country—are respected and carried out in conditions of safety and dignity.

It’s time to restart a conversation with IDPs and provide them with realistic alternatives to return. Until then, IDPs will continue to find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place in Afghanistan.

[1] Louis Dupree (1980) Afghanistan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press)., Nancy Tapper (1983), ‘Abd al-Rahman’s North-West Frontier: The Pashtun Colonisation of Afghan Turkistan’, in Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm) pp.233-261.

[2] Albeit relocated populations were compensated for their move by receiving land. Many had previously been landless Kuchi (Afghan Nomad) populations.

[3] Note: not all Pashtun areas were equally effected by violence. In some cases, Pashtun communities were well integrated.

[4] The official one in Zhari Dasht, and several in-official ones in Spin Boldak. Some refugees also fled to closer areas, such as Mazar-i-Sharif

[5] “National IDP Profile” Afghanistan National IDP Task Force. December 2008. (updated figures provided at IDP TF meeting, 12 May 2009. The National Profiling estimates that 166,000 were displaced as a result of fighting associated with the fall of the Taliban, primarily in the north.

[6] Interview with UNHCR Senior Field Assistant, May 2008

[7] TLO/BB interview with village elder and visit to Hassanabad. 20 May 2009

[8] In the Dashti Lali region where a famous struggle between a mujahideen commander and the Taliban had occurred.

[9] About 45 percent of the total land area in Afghanistan is pastureland designated to support livestock of settled and non-settled populations. It is for this land, however, that “land tenure arrangements are least well developed … and most subject to contention and even armed conflict” (Wily, Liz Alden (2003) Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Insecurity in Afghanistan, Issues Paper Series; Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), March 2003.

[10] Early assessments by UNAMA with an international NGO had already shown that most water in this region was linked to salty hot springs; hence while there was a lot of land, water would always be a problem. Already then, in 2002, it was clear that sustainability of return could be a problem. Interview, ex-UNAMA official, Kabul, 22 May 2009

[11] interview with Norwegian Refugee Council ILAC legal aid counselors, Mazar-i-Sharif, 21 May.

[12] UNHCR Official Refugee Statistics, 2009

[13] Brookings-Bern visit to Khoja Bhaludin, Takhar, November 2008.

[14] Interviews with UNHCR Protection Officer, Mazar-i-Sharif, 23 May 2009 and UNAMA Assistant Political Affairs Officer, Mazar-i-Sharif; 21 May 2009

[15] interview with ICRC Economic Security Officer, 25 May 2008

[16] Interview with former UNAMA official, Kabul, 23 May 2009.

[17] semi-structured interviews in Zhari Dasht Camp. April 2009.

[18] Village elder, Bashi Kot village, Dashit Lali area, Jawzjan, 20 May 2009

[19] “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan.” Acbar. March 2008

[20] National Profile of IDPs in Afghanistan. IDP Task Force. December 2008

[21] The Liaison Office/Brooking-Bern Project, study on Displacement in Kandahar. Interviews conducted with IDPs in several locations in Kandahar in April 2008 and with returnees in Bashi Kot, Hassanabad, and Tarnaw villages in Jawzjan, May 2008.

[22] Village elder, Tarnaw village, Jawzjan, 20 May 209

Authors

Alex Mundt
Susanne Schmeidl, The Liaison Office & Australian National University
Shafiqullah Ziai, The Liaison Office

Publication: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

Strategic Assessment of the Caspian Sea Basin Region

Thu, 07 May 2009 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 7-8, 2009

Somers & Stein Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

On May 7 and 8, the Brookings Energy Security Initiative (ESI) and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) co-hosted a conference entitled "Strategic Assessment of the Caspian Sea Basin Region".

The conference sought to evaluate the present state of affairs in the Caspian region, as well as the region's geopolitical importance to the United States and to the European Union, especially with reference to energy security. The efforts of ESI and NCAFP were given impetus by concerns about Russian attempts to restore the region into its own sphere of influence, growing Chinese inroads, instability in neighboring Afghanistan, and uncertainty about the ability of the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus to maintain their sovereignty under multiple internal and external pressures. All this had to be measured against the backdrop of Central Asia being geographically landlocked and separated from Europe by Russia, of unresolved conflicts in Afghanistan and in the Caucasus, and the key problem of freeing the flow of the energy riches of the Caspian Sea Basin to the rest of the world, despite great power rivalries.

The conference was divided into four panel discussions: geopolitics, pipeline routes, pipeline security, and other issues: Russian and Chinese inroads, insecurity in Afghanistan, and the lack of regional cooperation between post-Soviet states, and each was chaired by a Brookings or NCAFP expert. Rivalry between great powers, competing pipeline routes, and ability of the states of the region to deal with those problems were running themes throughout the conference discussions.

The goal of the conference was not only to evaluate the existing situation, but to present recommendations to the new administration concerning best ways to approach and resolve existing problems.

In addition to U.S. experts, the conference hosted participants from numerous countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France,Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Conference participants also took part in a joint session with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy on "Russia and the Caspian in the Global Energy Balance."

20090507_caspian_sea_basin

Participants

Panelists

Dr. Michael Rywkin (Panel Chair)

NCAFP Project Director

Dr. Hafiz Pashayev

Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan and Rector, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Dr. Marat Shaikhutdinov

Chairman, Foreign Policy Analysis and Prognostics Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kazakhstan

Dr. Thomas Graham

Senior Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc. and former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia, U.S. National Security Council

Ambassador John Ordway

Former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan

Jonathan Elkind (Panel Chair)

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Energy Security Initiative

Edward Chow

Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

John Roberts

Energy Security Specialist, Platts

Taleh Ziyadov

Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy and Cambridge University, UK

Dr. Charles K. Ebinger (Panel Chair)

Director, Energy Security Initiative