Brookings: Topics - Brazil

Crime–War Battlefields

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Thu, 06 Jun 2013 11:00:00 -0400

In her new article, “Crime-War Battlefields,” published in the June-July issue of Survival, Vanda Felbab-Brown discusses the evolution of war since the end of the Cold War and the eventual rise of policy and analytical focus on the intersection of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and anti-organized crime efforts. She explains how over the past two decades, international peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and other military forces have been neither properly trained nor eager to become involved in dealing with illicit economies and organized crime actors, but have nonetheless become increasingly unable to escape these aspects of their missions. Indeed, some of the missions recently taken on by international military forces have been pure anti-crime missions, such as the anti-piracy operations off Somalia. After surveying the nexus of crime and war from Latin America through Africa and Asia, the article ends with a set of policy recommendations for how modern militaries should deal with the nexus of conflict and crime.

INTRODUCTION

Military conflicts around the world increasingly conjoin political violence, organized crime and illicit economies. In many regions, domestic law enforcement responses to organized crime resemble warfare. Government suppression of urban crime and rural instability in Latin America and South Asia, for example, progressively merges police and military operations. In Mexico, Brazil and Central America, clashes between criminals and the authorities often have the intensity of intra-state urban conflict.

Modern militaries were not designed or trained to deal with illicit economies and organized crime. Nonetheless, the frequency and intensity of international military action at the nexus of violent conflict and crime has increased since the 1990s. Training police forces and devising responses to rising crime have been a key feature, and deficiency, of the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. NATO works alongside the Chinese and Saudi militaries in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia, in what would normally be regarded as law-enforcement operations.

Although criminals and militants often interact with illicit economies in the same way, it is rare for such groups to merge into a homogenous, monolithic entity. Rather, when a crime–terror or crime–insurgency nexus emerges, their interactions will be unstable. Accordingly, countering domestic crime that threatens national security, or resolving military conflicts that involve criminals and illicit economies, requires a complex, nuanced and carefully calibrated response.

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Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Publication: Survival

Image Source: © STRINGER Mexico / Reuters

Vice President Biden’s Visit to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 24 May 2013 09:40:00 -0400

The Vice President and Dr. Jill Biden head to Brazil, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago the week of May 26th “to see a much deeper engagement within the Western Hemisphere.” After President Obama’s visit to Mexico and Central America in late April, why is the Vice President heading back to this hemisphere? Have not the issues of trade and immigration been addressed sufficiently? No, is the answer. Biden believes that:

[T]his is a moment to look forward to build – build the friendships and partnerships that are going to allow us to deal with the share challenges and shape – jointly shape a global system 10, 20, 50 years from now. It all begins now, it seems to me.
(Speech to the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, Washington, D.C., May 9, 2013)

What is the nature of these partnerships and why are they new? The United States has not cultivated partnerships in South America since Vice President Nixon visited Venezuela on May 13, 1958. That trip ended with anti-American demonstrators rocking the Vice President’s limousine and unnerving both the VP and Mrs. Nixon. They never went back to South America.

Both the Alliance for Progress and the Cold War are over. Communism is no longer considered a threat. Instead, the growing middle class in the Western Hemisphere is seen as a rising market of 225 million consumers in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Biden is wrong to anticipate that this emerging group of citizens is wealthy enough and “could qualify for a gold card.” According to categories established by the Mexican Association of Market Research & Public Opinion Agencies (AMAI) the middle class is found in the socioeconomic C and D+ categories. They are urban, possess a car, take one vacation a year away from home and own cell phones, but they are not yet middle class in U.S. terms. Nevertheless, Biden is right in recognizing that this group of citizens accounts for approximately 40 percent of citizens in Latin America. They seek quality education and will over time become the professional class that holds that gold credit card.

This changing societal landscape will continue to place great demands on energy, transport and electronic goods. Thus the opportunity for U.S. businesses to invest in infrastructure, participate in the design of urban transportation, establish enterprises to produce the sophisticated electrical goods that consumers need. The Western Hemisphere will continue to provide the opportunity for increased trade and investment. Already, U.S. exports to the hemisphere have risen from $490 billion in 2007 to $650 billion in 2011. In 2013, U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico represents a trillion-dollar trading partnership. This translates into more U.S. jobs; quality jobs that design products, engineer projects, market goods and research means to reduce the carbon footprint. These benefits result, in large part, from trade in goods and services.

U.S. exports to both Brazil and Colombia have grown at a rapid pace, but there is room for further growth. According to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in 2012, Brazil was the 8th largest market for U.S. goods and services. In that year, the U.S. exported goods valued at $43.7 billion and in the three months ending March 31 2013, U.S. export of goods totaled $10.4 billion. This accounted for a U.S. trade surplus with Brazil of $11.6 billion, up 3.57 percent from 2011. In relative terms, the value of U.S. exports in private sector goods – not including U.S. military sales and defense expenditures – has increased by 183 percent from 2000 to 2012. More significant than total trade numbers is the nature of our exports. Over this period, the top value of U.S. exports to Brazil was in electrical machinery, plastics, aircraft and aircraft parts. Agricultural exports continued, but the growth is in sophisticated manufactured products. That explains Washington’s determination to build upon the Action Plan on Science and Technology Cooperation, the MOU on Aviation Partnership and Partnership for the Development of Aviation Biofuels with Brazil. Similar trading patterns and partnerships occur with Colombia.

Since the entry into force of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement in May 2012, exports of U.S. aircraft and aircraft parts have increased by 179 percent. Exports of U.S. railway locomotives and track fixtures have increased by 79 percent, and iron and steel articles have increased by 50 percent. Although agricultural exports have increased by 68 percent with soybean meal, rice and pork leading the way, the growth path will be found in electrical machinery and equipment. Colombia seeks U.S. government help in gaining membership to the OECD. Recent initiatives, such as negotiations with the FARC, early start on implementing a hemispheric-wide electrical grid, and significant reforms to Colombia’s education system justify its membership of this 34-member club. Biden should support Colombia’s entry into an association that shares a commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all its citizens.

In his speech to the Council of the Americas, Biden identified the Western Hemisphere as democratic. He is right in identifying the rejection of military dictators who ruled most South American nations from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Electoral democracy is firmly established. In its Freedom of the World 2013 report, Freedom House categorizes Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago has “free.” Colombia is classified as “partly free” as it awaits a full investigation and prosecution of suspects in the murder of a local community activist and the director of a Colombian radio station. There is also concern regarding the independence of the judiciary in a case involving a newspaper editor charged with criminal libel. Apart from these three Colombian cases which occurred in 2012, Freedom House recognizes that the great majority of nations in the Western Hemisphere respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and the right of assembly.

However, Biden has also noted that Venezuela is not free and that its citizens, while given electoral democracy, do not currently enjoy “freedoms of expression and assembly” and protection from violence. A second reason for visiting the hemisphere at this time is to recognize that liberal democracy can better ensure the security of citizens, opportunity for economic growth and political stability through non-violent discourse. Three nations in South America are in danger of rejecting these values, preferring controlled economies and centralized power to benefit populist leaders. Biden is expected to address this divide and call for increased dialogue among neighboring countries.

Energy is an important theme for Biden in all of the host nations. Trinidad and Tobago is the leading Caribbean producer of oil and gas and its economy is heavily dependent upon these resources. Forty percent of GDP and 80 percent of exports come from oil and gas, but that industry only provides employment for 5 percent of its citizens, according to the World Bank. Consequently, there is more focus on the production of liquid natural gas (LNG) and renewable energy sources. Trinidad and Tobago claims to be the most advanced and dynamic economy in the English-speaking Caribbean, demonstrated by its high mobile phone penetration of over 120 percent. The potential use of mobile phones for banking, health and education services, as well as its energy potential should encourage Biden to consolidate a strong relationship with this leading CARICOM nation.

Finally, education is a critical theme, which is strengthened by Dr. Jill Biden’s presence on the trip. She is a professional teacher at community colleges where thousands of young Americans acquire the technical skills necessary to move into engineering and scientific jobs. She is also a strong advocate for industry partnerships between community colleges and employers. As President Obama seeks to develop the “100,000 Strong in the Americas,” a State Department program to increase international study in Latin America and the Caribbean through greater international exchange of students, he finds a strong partner in Jill Biden. She knows the advantages of public-private partnerships in education. Her visits to university campuses throughout this visit will focus attention on the importance of education in achieving social inclusion, healthier citizens and environmental sustainability.

The trip should consolidate U.S. partnerships not just with these three nations, but send a message that a new form of engagement with the United States is now possible. The days of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere are over, and a president and vice president no longer travel with a packet of aid. Indeed it was notable that President Obama offered no financial assistance during his visit to Mexico and Central America despite the recognition of “shared responsibility” for the drug-related violence. Instead, constructive partnerships are sought with offers to develop technology, share scientific practices and encourage our students to seek quality education both at home and in the United States. Biden can rightly conclude that this trip represents “…the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, longtime.”

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Authors

Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

BRICS Investing in Africa: Geopolitical and Economic Ramifications

Thu, 28 Mar 2013 09:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 28, 2013
9:30 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

B-354
Rayburn House Office Building
45 Independence Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20515

On Thursday, March 28, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings (AGI) and the Congressional African Staff Association (CASA) hosted a briefing for congressional staffers on the growing relationship between the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—and African countries, and implication for U.S. foreign policy and economic relations with Africa. Panelists included: Yun Sun, Brookings visiting fellow, and Haroon Bhorat, professor of economics and director of the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Vera Songwe moderated the discussion, and Gregory H. Simpkins, professional staff member of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, provided opening remarks.

This event is part of the Africa Policy Dialogue on the Hill, a monthly congressional briefing hosted by AGI and CASA on topical issues relevant to Africa’s growth and security.

TRANSCRIPT

MR. SIMPKINS: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Africa Dialogue on the Hill. I’m Greg Simpkins, Professional Staff Member for the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. Our forums offer an African perspective on Africa issues as well as those of outside experts. This is a monthly co-presentation by the Congressional Africa Staff Association, or CASA, and the Africa Growth Initiative of the Brookings Institution.

For those who don’t know CASA, we’re a bipartisan, bicameral association of staff members who seek to educate our colleagues on today’s substantive Africa issues on the continent and within greater Africa diaspora through panel discussions, briefings, and other events with decision makers and officials involved in Africa policy.

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Event Materials

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BRICS Leadership Will Be Tested by Syria

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is probably the most serious crisis facing the world today. And yet, the international community is struggling to find a way forward. With more than four million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and three million internally displaced – a conservative UN estimate based on surveys of 6 out of 14 governorates in Syria – the humanitarian response to the plight of civilians so far has been entirely inadequate. A recent UNICEF report highlighted the two million children maimed, orphaned, and suffering from malnutrition as a result of the conflict – an entire generation “scarred for life”. Meanwhile, over one million refugees are seeking asylum in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This number will likely hit the three million mark by the end of 2013 – a ticking bomb for countries based on delicate social, ethnic, and sectarian balance.

Humanitarian access in opposition-held areas, where assistance is most urgently needed, is extremely limited. The humanitarian policy dilemma has shown what a mess we are currently in. Under General Assembly resolution 46/182, the United Nations cannot operate inside rebel-held territory without the explicit consent of the Syrian government. As that government’s authority is waning, however, many wonder whether we should be bound by the sovereignty of a tyrannical regime that continues to aggravate the crisis. Others, meanwhile, are advocating for direct humanitarian cross-border action in coordination with the internationally recognized Syrian National Coalition. With the election of Ghassan Hitto as the interim prime minister of a transitional government in “liberated” areas, this call will no doubt grow louder.

It is time for the international community to overcome this obstacle and allow for a more effective humanitarian response in Syria – whenever and wherever it may be required. One way forward would be for key countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India to support a more aggressive effort to ramp up the UN’s cross-border aid operations inside the country. Such an opportunity presents itself at the forthcoming 2013 BRICS summit in Durban next week. These countries should use their influence to secure a Security Council endorsement of this approach, principally by applying pressure on Russia and China.

Furthermore, they should use their direct channels with Assad to insist that the regime allow for cross-border operations and give full humanitarian access to all areas of the country.

Why the BRICS? Given their rising prominence on the world stage, it’s become clear that these nations play a key role in steering the international response to this crisis. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Assad, travelled to South Africa last week to deliver a message to President Zuma, urging BRICS nations to intervene to stop the violence in Syria and encourage the opening of a dialogue. Three weeks ago, she was in India, doing the same. It goes without saying that such cynical diplomacy on the part of the regime should be met by more purposeful calls to spare the lives of civilians. This is a strategic opportunity for the BRICS to use their influence and play a more decisive, helpful role.

There is no time to lose. To date, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to protect the Syrian population. Even with regard to the funding of UN humanitarian operations, only 20% of the $ 1.5 billion pledged by international donors in Kuwait in January has been honored. International inaction in Syria will leave a lasting legacy of insecurity and suffering, while the spillover effects of this humanitarian crisis will only contribute to the growing instability in Syria’s neighborhood and across the greater region. The BRICS nations, along with the international community, have a responsibility to act now.

Given the state of emergency on the ground, however, humanitarian cross-border access alone may not be sufficient. In order to protect civilians, guarantee the safe passage of relief organizations as well as refugees attempting to leave the country, there is a growing imperative for the establishment of humanitarian corridors and civilian safe areas along the sensitive borders of Syria. Make no mistake, such safe areas will have to be secured and protected by all means possible. Here, there will be much to learn from the UN’s experience in Bosnia in the 1990s – involving an assessment of what went right as well as wrong.

The BRICS and their international partners should be ready to endorse such measures. The situation demands it. Yet at a minimum, they must now demand that Assad allows the UN to cross Syria’s borders to reach civilians in need. The UN has the required institutional knowledge to deliver aid to fragmented areas making it the organization that is best placed to do so in Syria. Enabling the UN to undertake a country-wide response would help prevent the politicization of assistance as well as ensure a coordinated response in crucial sectors such as water, sanitation, infrastructure reconstruction, food assistance and education. The end goal would be to ensure that the UN is able to meet the basic needs of all civilians and upholding fundamental humanitarian principles in this bloody conflict.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Asharq Al-Awsat

Metro Brazil: An Overview of the Nation's Largest Metropolitan Economies

Jill Wilson and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

To coincide with the Global Cities Initiative’s international forum in São Paulo, Brazil, the Metropolitan Policy Program is providing economic snapshots of the Brazilian metro areas that rank among the world’s 300 largest metropolitan economies. Using data from the latest Global MetroMonitor, these profiles illustrate how metropolitan areas contribute to national economic growth.

All profiles are available in English and in Brazilian Portuguese. All files are PDFs.

Baixada Santista English » Portuguese »	Belo Horizonte English » Portuguese »	Brasília English » Portuguese »
Campinas English » Portuguese »	Curitiba English » Portuguese »	Fortaleza English » Portuguese »
Grande Vitória English » Portuguese »	Manaus English » Portuguese »	Porto Alegre English » Portuguese »
Recife English » Portuguese »	Rio de Janeiro English » Portuguese »	Salvador English » Portuguese »
São Paulo English » Portuguese »

Downloads

Authors

Jill Wilson
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka

The Metropolitan Future of Brazil and the United States

Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 09:33:00 -0500

Editor’s Note: During the Global Cities Initiative’s international forum in São Paulo, Bruce Katz delivered remarks on metropolitan areas and their potential to power national economies worldwide. The remarks were written by Katz and Julie Wagner.

The Metropolitan Future of Brazil and the United States
(This presentation is also available in Portuguese)

Good morning everyone. It is a pleasure to be back in Sao Paulo with JP Morgan Chase, our partner in the Global Cities Initiative. I am grateful for their support and leadership.

I first want to thank Governor Alckmin and Mayor-elect Haddad for their participation today and we fully welcome the opportunity to work with both of them and the city and state in the coming months and years.

This has been an extraordinary week for our delegation of mayors and business, civic, and university leaders from 10 major American cities and metropolitan areas.

We have seen firsthand the proud history and infectious energy and vibrancy of this great city and macro-metropolis. We are grateful to Luiz Felipe D’Avila and the Centre for Public Leadership for co-sponsoring this forum today. We also owe a debt to others who have hosted and guided us this week—the State of Sao Paulo, particularly the State Secretariat for Metropolitan Development, Insper, the Commercial Association of Santos and the Port of Santos and the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, and the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador Shannon.

As Aod said at the outset, São Paulo is the first stop outside the United States in our five year Global Cities Initiative. That is a deliberate choice. The relationship between the United States and Brazil is a critical one. Despite barriers, the economic and social ties between our two countries are strong and growing stronger. Trade is booming. Investment is up. Tourism and business travel have never been higher. And the recent state visits by presidents Obama and Rousseff send a clear signal that this is a partnership of the highest order.

Yet there is hard work to do in both our countries. The U.S. and Brazil are undergoing major economic transitions. By global standards, both of us under-perform on exports, far trailing other countries. The U.S. is shifting slowly back towards a more productive, sustainable economy after our worst downturn in 80 years; Brazil is moving forward towards a more open, outward looking economy.

Against this complex backdrop, our delegation comes bearing a simple proposition. The answers to national challenges lie, in great part, below the national level.

We live in a century where cities and metropolitan areas are driving national economies and the global economy. The U.S. and Brazil have 84 and 85 percent of our respective populations living in our cities and metropolitan areas … and these communities generate 91 percent of the GDP in the U.S. and 88 percent of the GDP in Brazil. There is, in essence, no American or Brazilian—or German or Chinese—economy; rather our national economies represent networks of powerful city and metropolitan economies.

Today, I will make three main points.

As the world urbanizes, cities and metropolitan areas have emerged as the engines of national economies.

As our economies globalize, cities and metropolitan areas act as the centers of international trade and investment.

To prosper today, cities and metropolitan areas need to drive their economic destiny. In our federal republic, where power is shared across national, state and local governments, that requires new thinking about who does what.

But, first things first; we cannot put forward a metropolitan playbook without first understanding what a metropolis is. And the best way to do that is from the ground up.

On the right side of the screen you see the São Paulo metropolis, 20 million strong, 10^th most populous in the world.

On the left side of the screen you see Chicago, Mayor Daley’s hometown, with a population of 9.5 million, 26^th largest in the world.

Both of these metro areas cluster around core cities but cover large land masses and encompass multiple jurisdictions.

The São Paulo metro is more than 8,000 square kilometers in size, with more than half of your population living in the city proper and the remainder residing in 38 other municipalities.

Chicago is close to 19,000 square kilometers in size with one third of the population living in the central city and the remainder spread across, incredibly, three states, 14 counties encompassing hundreds of separate municipalities and townships.

The assets São Paulo and Chicago need to compete nationally and globally are spread across their regions:

Clusters of workers;

Key colleges and universities;

Major hospitals and health care facilities;

A network of urban green space; and

The infrastructure—roads, rail and transit and airports—needed to move people, and freight

In other words, metro areas are the natural, organic geographies of the economy, clustered around central cities for sure, but also benefitting from the assets offered by satellite cities and suburban, exurban and rural areas.

With that background, let me start with an irrefutable observation: cities and metropolitan areas are the 21^st century engines of national economies.

Since 1950, the world’s urban population has more than quadrupled in size. Now sized at 3.6 billion people, it is expected to surpass 5 billion by 2030.

In 1950, 29 percent of the world’s population lived in cities and their metropolitan areas. By 2009, the share surpassed 50 percent. By 2030, urban settlements will harbor more than 60 percent of the world’s population.

In many respects, the world is becoming more like us. The United States and Brazil are two of the most highly urbanized countries with city and metro concentrations surpassing those of both mature economies in Germany, Britain, and Spain and emerging economies like China, India, and South Africa.

Cities and metros do not just house people; they power economies. Today Brookings released our annual Global Metro Monitor that tracks the economic performance of the world’s top 300 largest metropolitan economies.

Incredibly, we find that these metropolitan areas house a little under one fifth of global population but generate nearly half its total output. Put simply: Metros around the world punch way above their weight.

Why are they so powerful?

Because they cluster and connect firms, large and small, with ports and airports, transport and energy infrastructure, and a broad range of supportive institutions that supply skilled labor, advanced research and customized capital. And when that happens, productivity improves, entrepreneurship rises, employment and wages increase.

The dominance of metros holds true for both our countries, which house 13 and 76 of the top 300 global metros, respectively.

Your thirteen top metropolitan areas are home to one third of Brazil’s population, concentrate half of Brazil’s manufacturing output and your population with college education and account for 56 percent of national GDP and 63 percent of financial services output.

These metros range from Sao Paulo, 11^th largest economy in the world, to Baixada Santista, 295^th largest.

Eleven of your metro areas are state or national capitals; this state is home to three of the 13 large metro areas.

Metro São Paulo takes its place among the world’s most populous and economically powerful metros.

You are home to one tenth of Brazil’s population, account for one-fifth of Brazil’s GDP and generate 57 percent of the GDP of this state.

For America’s part, our top 76 metros form the real heart of the U.S. economy.

Housing 61 percent of our population, they concentrate a majority of our manufacturing output, gather our most educated people, and generate more than 68 percent of our national GDP.

They also make an outsized contribution on financial services and the production of patents.

In the U.S., the top 76 metros range from New York, L.A., and Chicago to less well known communities like Allentown, Little Rock, and Harrisburg.

This leads to my second point: as economies globalize, cities and metropolitan areas act as the centers of international trade and investment.

Metros and trade are inextricably linked, and have been for millennia. The Silk Road that connected Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. The Hanseatic League that grew from Hamburg and Lubeck to include 170 cities that monopolized trade in Northern Europe between the 13^th and 15^th centuries. The great Italian city-states of Venice, Pisa, Genoa, and Amalfi.

These historic networks offer essential lessons:

As a recent Brookings report concluded:

“Trade is essential to metros—it is how they grow their economies. And metros are essential to trade—they provide the specialization and market access that facilitates exchange among producers and consumers.”

The top Brazilian and U.S. metros are our nations’ logistical hubs, concentrating the movement of goods and people by sea and by air. In Brazil, 61 percent of foreign waterborne trade, measured by tonnage, passes through the seaports of the top metros; in the United States the equivalent share is over 66 percent. Passenger travel is even more concentrated; in both countries, close to 82 percent of international air travel passes through the airports of the top metropolitan areas.

Significantly, the top cities and metros in both our countries are magnets for foreign direct investment, particularly “greenfield FDI” where foreign entities invest in new facilities or expansions of existing facilities rather than just purchase domestic companies.

From 2003 through September 2012, Brazil’s 13 accounted for 77 percent of greenfield FDI projects in Brazil and 59 percent of the jobs created through this key growth vehicle. The top 76 U.S. metros also accounted for 77 percent of Greenfield FDI projects and 70 percent of the jobs created.

Brazil’s 13 are responsible for a third of all national goods exports; the share is substantially higher for the top U.S. metros. Brookings research on U.S. exports shows that our top U.S. metros dominate the trade in manufacturing and services … and, given their edge in sectors like chemicals, consulting and computers, are on the front lines of commerce with China, Brazil, and India.

In sum, our research has shown the collective centrality of our top cities and metros to the trading position of our nations.

Yet metro economies do not exist in the aggregate; they have distinctive starting points and vary considerably in their trading prowess and intensity. What makes São Paulo special on the global stage—your distinctive offer, your special investment potential—is different from what defines and drives Rio or Curitiba or Salvador.

São Paulo is Brazil’s premier global metropolis and the numbers reflect that. Your metro houses 10 percent of Brazil’s population but:

Your airports handle 26 percent of all passenger traffic in Brazil and 33 percent of all air cargo.
Your macro metro neighbor, Santos, which we visited yesterday, is the busiest container port in South America and 43rd in the world.
You are Brazil’s largest metropolitan exporter, producing 27 percent of all metropolitan exports of goods

And from 2003-2011 you received 19 percent of all greenfield FDI in Brazil … in fact, more FDI than New York, LA, Chicago, Houston and San Francisco combined.

You trade with the world’s most prosperous cities, in the United States and elsewhere, but in particular ways given your distinctive industry clusters and sectors.

Given your substantial concentration in financial services (with 19 of the 25 top international banks present and the world’s third largest financial exchange), you interact naturally with New York and Miami in the U.S., London, Madrid, and Frankfurt in Europe and Shanghai, Tokyo and Hong Kong in Asia.

Despite the outward movement of industry, you still serve as Brazil’s main global platform for advanced manufacturing sectors like automotive, linking you closely with Detroit in the U.S., Milan and Stuttgart in Europe, and Nagoya in Japan.

The shape and structure of your economy puts São Paulo in an exclusive club of “global cities,” a definition drawn in the 1990s when the process of trade, investment, and globalization was seen as empowering a few command and control finance metros of the world.

But today, our notions of “globalizing cities” are more expansive, recognizing that all cities are fueled, to different degrees, by global investment and connected, in distinctive ways, via global commerce and exchange, global product and labor supply chains.

The energy cluster in Rio finds common interest with the energy cluster in Houston through investments by Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Petrobras … and then further with energy firms in Amsterdam, Dar es Salaam, and Bogota.

Campinas’ hi-tech sector naturally links with the hi-tech cluster in San Jose’s Silicon Valley via elite universities, advanced R&D institutions, and global tech giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Dell … and then further with tech clusters in Tokyo, Bangalore and Dublin.

As headquarters of Embraer, São Jose dos Campos links via supply chains to Palm Bay, Florida, Harbin, China and Lisbon, Portugal.

In short, a new global map is being drawn in the world, not of nation to nation trade but of metro to metro exchange.

That leads to my final point: To prosper in the global economy today, metros need to drive their global economic destiny.

We have a three part playbook:

The playbook starts at home, with cities innovating locally to exploit their distinctive competitive advantages in the global economy.

In the U.S., cities and metropolitan areas are acting with intentionality in the aftermath of the Great Recession to devise and implement what we call “metropolitan business plans.” The purpose: build on their distinctive competitive advantages in the traded sectors of the economy, given the crippling effect on housing and consumption.

The elements of business planning are fairly simple and straightforward

Each metropolis does a market assessment of their unique economic profile and potential … what goods and services they trade, which nations they trade with, where trade trends are likely to head given market dynamics here and abroad.

Armed with this information, metros then set goals and objectives that build on their distinct advantages, devise strategies to meet those goals and establish metrics to gauge progress.

All these efforts are undertaken by a consortium of corporate, government, university and civic institutions that cut across jurisdictions, sectors, and disciplines and “collaborate to compete” globally.

Let me give you an example of how these business plans are helping cities and their metros grow jobs and restructure their economies.

Los Angeles, represented here by Mayor Antonio Villaragoisa, has devised an ambitious plan to grow exports by identifying and proactively supporting export ready firms in leading trade sectors like aerospace, computers, professional services, and film and television. The L.A. system of trade is moving from a story of fragmentation, where no clear institution defines or drives decision-making, to a reality of coordination and collaboration, responsiveness and flexibility under one Los Angeles Regional Export Council. The result: More firms will export more goods and services to more places producing more and better jobs.

We believe business planning holds great potential for São Paulo and other Brazilian metros. Obviously, fixing the basics is a critical first step for economic growth: safe streets, quality schools, efficient transport and sound governance. But a business plan might focus on increasing foreign direct investment in infrastructure necessary to reduce congestion, improve mobility, and enhance accessibility to jobs.

The key is not what you focus on … but to decide your focus based on evidence and in a collaborative manner and then to hold yourself accountable through continuous assessment and measurement.

Having innovated locally, cities must network globally—creating and stewarding close relationships with trading partners in both mature economies and rising nations.

The new global reality is leading to intricate networks of trading cities which grow together by linking together and learning together.

These networks obviously start with firms and ports that do business with each other.

But, over time, networks extend to supporting institutions—governments, universities, business associations—that provide support for companies at the leading edge of metropolitan economies.

The city of Houston and the city of São Paulo, for example, executed a formal agreement earlier this year that commits each city to increase commercial relations, intensify scientific and technological connections, and facilitate information to tackle shared challenges.

Enterprise Florida, the principal export and investment organization in that state, opened an office in São Paulo in 2011 to help Florida companies expand trade. APEX-Brasil, Enterprise Florida’s Brazilian counterpart, has its only U.S. location in Miami’s free trade zone. There it executes projects like providing clean and renewable fuels to IndyCar, the American based auto racing body.

The Ohio State University and the University of São Paulo have partnered to support the exchange of students and collaborative research. Areas of recent focus: natural and mathematical sciences, medicine, and teacher training. In 2014 Ohio State anticipates opening its third “Global Gateways” office in the world in São Paulo to further capitalize on these linkages.

Here is the simple message: We can see a network of trading cities emerging right here in São Paulo and it is a future characterized by multi-layered relationships across multiple dimensions and disciplines, interests and institutions.

Finally, having innovated at home and networked globally, cities and metros must advocate nationally for federal and state policies and practices that will support metro growth.

Metros are engines, but they do NOT act alone.

Only national governments can set the rules of the road: enhancing access to foreign markets, enforcing trade agreements, opening up borders to immigrants and protecting intellectual property. They can also help match domestic firms with potential global customers, provide export promotion support, and commit resources to modernizing logistics hubs.

As the world evolves as a network of trading cities, it is only natural that cities become more articulate and aggressive about the support they need from higher levels of government.

In the United States, cities have found a receptive partner in the Obama Administration. Key federal agencies—the International Trade Administration, the Ex-Im Bank, the Small Business Administration—have been central partners in guiding business plans with a particular focus on boosting exports.

Similar alliances could be built here. As part of the Global Cities Initiative, the ESADE Business School mapped the trading system in São Paulo. Their research clearly shows the central role of your federal and state governments in advancing the internationalization of your economy. True success will come when these higher level entities align closely with your distinct assets and advantages.

Going forward, the advocacy of cities must extend beyond accessing the export promotion and finance programs of federal and state governments. They must get to the heart of the matter.

The United States has had a North American Free Trade Agreement in place for 20 years with our partners, Mexico and Canada.

We have recently concluded important Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and Korea.

President Obama was in Southeast Asia this month discussing the possibilities of a Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The 2011 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation signed by President Obama and President Rousseff provides a platform to build on.

As they have expressed, we need a new vision for our Hemisphere … and for our two countries.

We are both growing with healthy demographics.

We both have an enormous pool of natural assets.

We both have a shared imperative to reorient our economies.

Empowered with the right policies, enabled with the right frameworks, we have the potential to grow together this century, powered by our major population and economic centers.

So that’s our playbook:

Innovate locally. Network globally. Advocate nationally.

Let me end where I began.

From the beginning of time, cities have been centers of commerce, formed along the roads and routes of trade.

And so it is today.

The cities of our nations are powering our nations.

They are giving physical shape to the globalizing economy, seamlessly integrating the exchange of people, goods, services, energy, capital, ideas, and culture.

The promise of the Global Cities Initiative broadly is to capture and channel this energy into lasting, sustained networks and partnerships.

Our pledge as we leave here today is to work with you, partner with you, and ensure that the United States and Brazil bind together not just as two nations but as living, vibrant, powerful networks of trading cities and metropolitan areas.

Authors

Publication: Global Cities Initiative, São Paulo, Brazil

Image Source: Â© Nacho Doce / Reuters

How Global Cities Adapt to Global Change

Alan Berube — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:00:00 -0500

Moving around (or trying to move around, at least) the city of São Paulo this week, spending time with the State Secretariat of Metropolitan Development, and visiting the port of Santos, it doesn't take too much insight to see that better transportation infrastructure is critical for the future global competitiveness of the entire São Paulo metropolitan region.

But I was struck at today's Global Cities Initiative (GCI) forum how many speakers and panelists, when confronted with the question of what one factor will matter most for the future of São Paulo , U.S. cities, and both countries, said the same thing: education.

The issue comes into stark relief in São Paulo thanks to the rapid de-industrialization the region has endured over the last couple of decades. By most estimates, services constitute 80 to 85 percent of greater São Paulo’s economy, up substantially from a couple decades ago when, as state governor Geraldo Alckmin explained, it was Latin America's industrial powerhouse. It still retains some of the nation's most advanced manufacturing sectors, but most of its low- and mid-skilled production jobs have fled to other regions of the country, or abroad to Asia.

One by-product of this industrial shift is an increasing demand for skilled workers to power existing firms, and to attract new investment. As in many U.S. cities, job quality is a chief concern in São Paulo as well, so that employment growth brings rising living standards.

Against that backdrop, it is amazing that only in the last decade or so has Brazil begun to provide universal primary and secondary education to its young people. It retains a world-class set of public universities, but even in the nation's most important regional economy, just 17 percent of adults hold a college degree. That's only about half the share as in the Chicago metropolis, for example. Given the ever-increasing pace of change in the global economy, especially in the traded sectors that shape the growth of cities, public leaders here recognize the need to dramatically accelerate educational achievement and attainment to maintain the city's global edge.

Government is responding. The average educational expenditure per student in Brazil rose 121 percent from 2000 to 2008, the largest increase among 30 countries. The government's Bolsa Familia program has helped as well, with payments conditional on school attendance. And as Eduardo Wurzmann of H&R Block Brazil observed, where 10 years ago education was not a major part of the public policy dialogue, one can pick up newspapers every day here and find significant coverage of the issue.

But as cities in the United States and around the world have learned, promoting adaptability and growth in city economies requires more than boosting education spending. Former Chicago mayor and Global Cities Initiative chairman Richard M. Daley, and mayors Antonio Villaraigosa of Los Angeles and Michael Coleman of Columbus, explained how their cities had stepped into the void of federal and state leadership to tackle tough issues related to education, job creation, and the environment. In an evolving federal system, Brazilian cities are still seeking the powers to act authoritatively like their American counterparts. Former Brazilian president Henrique Cardoso started this process of devolution in earnest in the late 1990s, handing over education and health responsibilities to cities, but explained how fiscal strictures continue to limit city flexibility.

Building city resilience is also not a one-electoral term project. Sustaining strategic investment over successive administrations, as discussed in Wednesday's GCI workshops, takes shared commitment across the public, private, and civic sectors. Mayors Daley and Coleman stressed how important partnership with business was to the success of their long-range plans. In that respect, it was heartening to hear Jorge Gerdau, president of Gerdau Group S.A. and the leading private sector spokesperson for Brazil's national competitiveness plan, list education as the number one factor critical to the future growth of the country, and especially cities like São Paulo.

And that made for a fitting coda to the first global GCI forum and our week in São Paulo. Cities exist, in the end, for the benefit of their people. So "going global" can only be a good thing for cities if it's a good thing for their residents. And those residents can only benefit from the opportunities that global trade and investment provide if they have the capacities--what Cardoso called the "human resources"--that ultimately promote economic adaptation and growth, and enhance local quality of life. That's a message that our two urban nations, and the metro areas that constitute them, can both embrace.

Authors

Alan Berube

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters

Moving São Paulo Locally and Globally

Alan Berube — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Sitting again in São Paulo's deadly rush hour traffic this morning, one has to wonder: Where are all these people going?

Of course, they're off to work. The São Paulo metro area has an unemployment rate of 5.9 percent, two full percentage points below the U.S. average. Many of its residents work in the schools, hospitals, retailers, and restaurants that serve the city's 11 million people, the 20 million in the São Paulo metropolitan region, and the more than 30 million in the São Paulo "macro metropolis."

Many others, however, form the lifeblood of São Paulo's traded economy, and the key to its economic growth. The São Paulo macro-metro has several assets that buoy its undeniably global reach--a top five international stock exchange, the largest cargo airport in South America, and key offices of hundreds of global firms. But one must travel 60 miles southeast of the heart of São Paulo, to its neighboring metro area Baixada Santista, to find arguably its most important international connection point: the Port of Santos.

One of Brazil’s original settlements--and home to international soccer star Pele--Santos has grown to become the largest port in South America. It handles 25 percent of Brazil’s foreign trade and accounts for 95 percent of exports from the state of São Paulo. Yet despite being the Southern Cone’s largest port, it is also one of the most congested. Demand has exceeded capacity to the point where it costs two and half times as much to move a shipping container through Santos as it does Rotterdam. When these costs are passed onto firms, the São Paulo region runs the risk of losing investment to locations with better freight and logistics infrastructure.

In this way, the trading capability and economic potential of Brazil’s most significant region hinges on how quickly and cost effectively the Port of Santos can move the region’s goods to market.

Understanding that imperative, representatives from the Port of Santos, CODESP (federal agency that operates the port), the city of Santos, and the Commercial Association of Santos shared with U.S. metro leaders their efforts to both expand and improve terminals at the port itself, as well as improving the surrounding road and rail infrastructure to facilitate more efficient goods movement from ship to destination. These multi-billion dollar projects require collaboration across local, state, and federal levels and between the public and private sectors. In turn, the officials from Santos heard from PortMiami Director Bill Johnson, who has stewarded parallel large-scale collaborative investments to prepare his metro for the super-sized post-Panamax container ships.

These port-related initiatives aim to address one important element of the broader "Brazil cost" (Custo Brasil) that still inhibits the country's fuller integration into the global economy. Taxes, regulations, and transparency all constitute barriers to further inward investment and trade nationwide. As Bruce Katz discussed at today's Global Cities Initiative forum, local leaders like the Port of Santos can innovate locally to become more competitive, and network globally with other leaders like PortMiami to establish new partnerships that can increase trade. But ultimately, they must also advocate nationally to push needed policy changes at the federal and state levels that matter immensely for local growth.

In the end, those changes and the growth they spur provide the fiscal latitude to support the massive infrastructure, skills, and other investments needed to sustain growth and increase local living standards. And make São Paulo rush hour a little more bearable.

Authors

Alan Berube

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

São Paulo and U.S. Metros Link and Learn Together

Alan Berube — Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:26:00 -0500

Yesterday's discussions in São Paulo dug further into the challenges facing the São Paulo metropolis, the responses that governments are mounting, and obstacles to implementation and long-term prosperity. Among the issues tackled were infrastructure, land use, housing, social inequity, education, governance, and public sector capacity and continuity.

Turns out that changing hemispheres doesn't change some things all that much.

In that spirit, leaders from an array of U.S. cities and regions imparted their experiences in metropolitan development and economic growth strategies that might hold lessons for the city and state of São Paulo. Although the economic and social starting points for São Paulo and, say, Cleveland are radically different, a set of common themes, as well as key challenges for both American and Brazilian city leaders, came into view. Several of those themes were reflected in remarks that JPMorgan Chase Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon delivered to the delegation at the start of the day regarding his firm's interest and investment in global cities:

1) Focus on the long term. Dimon sounded a bullish note on the global economy long term, noting the remarkable progress that has been made in recent decades, and the power of technology and urbanization to transform economies and societies for the better. Understanding quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year balance sheet fluctuations and economic performance is important for market transparency, he remarked, but responsible investment decisions must be made over much longer time horizons.

The same imperative should animate, but often bedevils, metropolitan development. Moving a regional economy in a new and more strategic direction can take decades, across several changes in political leadership, shifting priorities, and budget fluctuations. The city of São Paulo's SP2040 plan for instance, aims to develop three sub-sectors of the city to serve complementary functions for advanced services firms by better aligning industrial development, transportation, housing, and the environment. Similarly, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) developed the GO TO 2040 plan to meet the long-run infrastructure needs of that region's advanced services and manufacturing economy. Participants agreed that ensuring the success of both efforts over the next two to three decades requires building capacity and ownership outside the public sector to hold successive administrations to account for implementation.

2) Public/private relationships are a two-way street. Dimon related that when he became chairman and CEO at Bank One, former Chicago Mayor Richard Daley (chair of the Global Cities Initiative) discussed with him how the city could support the bank's continued presence and contribution to the local economy. Dimon stressed how important a supportive local business environment was for corporate investment decisions. At the same time, he emphasized that businesses must "get in the game" at the local level to support smart and strategic public spending on things like infrastructure and education, where public investment can yield clear private benefit.

The ambition of metropolitan business planning in the United States, as Brad Whitehead from the Fund for our Economic Future in Northeast Ohio explained, is to engage private, public, and other civic actors in charting and executing a strategic vision for a metropolitan economy. Adopting the rigor and language of a private-sector tool--business planning--has proven useful for developing business participation in realizing that region's plan. Leaders from São Paulo clearly recognize the critical role that business can and must play to deliver economic growth, and are engaging them around public/private partnership investment opportunities to alleviate the massive infrastructure deficits the region faces. But as Brazilian participants discussed, trust issues complicate the relationship between government and business here, even more so than in the United States. A common vernacular, and a focus on addressing issues of equity and social cohesion first and foremost through economic growth, may help advance those relationships.

3) Local is global and global is local. In a multinational firm like JPMorgan Chase, Dimon explained, the global and the local meet. A significant share of the firm's 20,000 employees in the Columbus, Ohio area, for instance, work not on local finance but in international markets. For that reason, local leadership in the public and private sectors must truly understand global markets and the opportunities and challenges they present for local job growth.

That merging of the local and the global is in many ways the animating idea of the Global Cities Initiative. Metro leaders from São Paulo and the United States not only traded ideas and lessons learned, but walked away with a better understanding of some of the dynamics affecting some of the world's most important economic centers. Representatives from World Business Chicago and Brazil Investments and Business discussed their respective visions and strategies for making Chicago and São Paulo globally competitive cities, including how their cities could adapt to long-run shifts in the global location of manufacturing and services activities. American metro leaders were meanwhile challenged and inspired by the "macro-metro" planning that is linking four metro areas in São Paulo state (Baixada Santista, Campinas, Paraiba Valley, and São Paulo) and helping to position a diverse, integrated, 30 million-person region on the global stage.

Like the scale of the city itself, the challenges facing São Paulo are massive. But they are not intractable. These discussions between São Paulo and U.S. metro leaders revealed fertile ground for continued dialogue, joint problem solving, and opportunities to understand not just one another's—but also our own—cities better.

Authors

Alan Berube

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

Global Swing States and the Human Rights and Democracy Order

Ted Piccone — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This paper was originally published on the German Marshall Fund of the United States website. You can also download the related report titled "Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Future of International Order."

SUMMARY

The convergence of values and divergence of methods between the “global swing states” — Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey — and the world’s established democracies are on particular display in the arena of democracy and human rights. To varying degrees, all four nations are prepared to play a role in supporting international mechanisms to strengthen human rights and democracy, but this is to be done on their own terms: through quiet diplomacy and mediation, using coercive methods only as a last resort. The challenge before Western democracies is to evaluate when to seek convergence with global swing states on international interventions to uphold human rights and when to yield to parallel efforts that may entail less control but greater acceptance and therefore greater effectiveness on the ground.

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Global Swing States and the Human Rights and Democracy Order

Authors

Ted Piccone

Publication: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

São Paulo Striving to Keep Global Economic Edge

Alan Berube — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

What makes São Paulo a global city? Some might say its size. It is the largest city in South America. The São Paulo metro area, as our forthcoming Global MetroMonitor will reveal, is the 10th largest in the world by population and 13th largest by GDP. Others might point to its role as the finance capital of Latin America. Still others might point to its large international population, which includes the largest number of ethnic Japanese residents outside Japan.

Our contention in our recent Metro Trade report, and in our Global Cities Initiative [forum this week], is that trade and international exchange define a city's global character. There is no "yes/no" global city status, so much as a continuum of global engagement along which all cities sit by virtue of their firms' participation in the global marketplace.

In that respect, the São Paulo city-region is indeed highly globalized. As we heard in a presentation today by Aod Cunha of JP Morgan Chase, the São Paulo economy is much more knowledge-intensive and services-focused than are other parts of Brazil. The headquarters of dozens of national and multinational firms in Latin America--including 19 of the world's 25 largest banks—can be found here. At the same time, it is a manufacturing powerhouse, leading in aircraft exports via Embraer. And it retains an important role in Brazil's commodity economy, sending oil, sugars, and fruits to foreign markets, especially China.

Yet as São Paulo and other cities have begun to understand, the upsides of participation in global trade--gaining access to new sources of demand, boosting productivity, hedging against domestic declines--are balanced by the demands of real global engagement: brutal competition, frequent dislocation, and constant pressure to innovate.

So São Paulo faces some critical challenges to maintaining its competitive edge and re-asserting its leadership in the fast-changing Brazilian and Latin American economy. Chief among these, as Cunha described, is urban mobility and industrial development. One ride into the center of São Paulo city at rush hour, or from one neighborhood to another in the middle of the day—often a multi-hour project--tells you much of what you need to know about the urgency of the problem.

This partly reflects that, relative to demand, São Paulo's public transportation is underdeveloped and in need of upgrading and expansion. But it also reflects a planning and economic development challenge. One is struck immediately upon entering São Paulo from the airport 25 miles to the northeast how many high-rise residential buildings ring the outskirts of the city. Connecting those densely populated neighborhoods to the places in the region with jobs to keep firms competitive is a huge priority for the city and region and the subject of the ambitious SP2040 plan and its associated public and private investments.

These are not the only factors that will determine São Paulo's global success; tax and education reform are key issues that remain to be tackled at the national level for Brazil. But they provide a reminder of the key role that metropolitan leaders play through local investment decisions in supporting a city's global engagement. As Cunha concluded, there are too many variables to know whether Brazil will grow at 3, 4, or 5 percent in the long term ... but if it even hopes to grow at 1 percent, it can no longer afford to ignore the huge infrastructure challenges that face its most important metro economy and most globalized city.

Note: This post has been updated to reflect that São Paulo is home to 19 of the world's 25 largest banks, not 15 of the largest 20 as previously stated.

Read Metro Trade: Cities Return to Their Roots in the Global Economy »

Authors

Alan Berube

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

Live from São Paulo, It’s Global Trade!

Alan Berube — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

This week, the Global Cities Initiative convenes its first overseas forum in São Paulo, Brazil. As participants from Brazilian city, state, and federal levels gather with counterparts from eight U.S. metropolitan areas, we are grappling with a critical question for our respective countries: How can our cities work together to advance national prosperity?

Our new paper suggests one key answer—trade. From the dawn of civilization in Mesopotamia, to the emergence of the Silk Road in Asia, to the Hanseatic League that linked port cities in Northern Europe, cities sprouted up to facilitate trade, even before there were nation-states. And trade makes cities, regions, and ultimately nations more productive and wealthier; Paul Krugman and his colleagues call a city's exports to the rest of the nation and the world its "economic rasion d'etre."

In the United States, however, city economic growth strategies—especially in the go-go real estate market of the 1990s and 2000s—have relied too heavily on housing, retail, and other consumption-oriented activities. Meanwhile, trade debates at the national level too often ignore the critical role of cities and regions in spurring innovation, productivity, and ultimately exports and foreign direct investment.

In response, a growing number of U.S. cities and metro areas are undertaking purposeful strategies to enhance their global reach and profile—for exports, investment, migration, and the like.

What does this have to do with São Paulo? As the largest metropolis in the Southern Hemisphere, São Paulo is now at a crossroads. It grew in the 18th and 19th centuries through the coffee trade, in conjunction with the nearby port of Santos. And it became Brazil's industrial powerhouse in the 20th century, eventually emerging into Latin America's capital of finance and one of the economic drivers of the "Brazilian miracle" growth of the 1990s and 2000s.

But of late, its growth has faltered. Other parts of the country are growing much faster; and as Brazil's economy cooled off in 2012, São Paulo's economy slowed even more. But Brazil needs São Paulo, which holds 10 percent of its population but generates 20 percent of its GDP. To grow Brazil's economy, São Paulo must build upon its competitive advantages to enhance its position in global trade and exchange, generating new sources of wealth for the city and the nation. Cities and metro areas in Brazil have not typically had a strong voice in these issues, but that may be changing with the election of new mayors and a new agency in São Paulo State focused on metro areas.

Each day this week, we'll look at the challenges and choices facing the 20-million person São Paulo metropolis as it strives to achieve growth and prosperity through trade and global linkages, including with U.S. cities and metro areas. How should it invest in the assets that drive trade, like innovation, skills, and infrastructure? How can it organize itself for trade, working with other players in the region and at the state and federal levels? And how could it network globally to forge strategic economic relationships with partner cities around the globe, including the eight U.S. metro areas represented here at the Global Cities Initiative forum?

The road to global economic prosperity runs through cities, our hubs of trade and commerce. São Paulo is an auspicious place to examine the potential for building a new network of trading cities across the globe.

Read Metro Trade: Cities Return to Their Roots in the Global Economy »

Authors

Alan Berube

Publication: The Avenue, The New Republic

The Energy-Poor BRIC

Charles K. Ebinger and Govinda Avasarala — Fri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: The following op-ed, which was originally published in The Indian Express, is an adaptation of the chapter “India and the other BRICs: Energy and the implications for economic growth,” in the Economist Intelligence Unit report Empowering Growth: Perspectives on India’s Energy Future.

Economic aspirations in Brasilia, Moscow, New Delhi and Beijing are inextricably linked to the strength of their national energy sectors. As the economies of the BRIC nations continue to grow, their energy demand will rise sharply. According to data from the US government’s Energy Information Administration, by 2025 the BRICs, led by China, will account for nearly 38 per cent of global primary energy demand, up from 27 per cent in 2005. Some of its members will manage surging energy demand better than the others. Owing to their advantageous resource endowments and the nature of their energy consumption, Brazil and Russia are relatively energy-secure nations. In 2011, Russia and Brazil were the second and ninth largest producers of oil respectively. Last year, Russia was the world’s fifth-largest producer of coal and the world’s largest producer and exporter of natural gas. For its part, Brazil is almost entirely dependent on hydropower for electricity generation, and recent offshore oil discoveries may soon catapult it into the ranks of major oil exporters. China and India are less self-sufficient, but superior infrastructure and a centralised government position China better to meet its rising energy demand. India has the most unstable energy condition in the BRIC club, and possibly the most uncertain energy future of all.

The scale of the energy dilemma is not new, nor are the problems and the solutions. Indian policymakers were aware of the country’s crippling energy shortages decades before the mass blackouts that occurred this July. Policymakers know that power plants are starved of coal and natural gas, that subsidies promote waste and inefficient consumption and that electricity theft is rampant. Pricing reform and better enforcement of electricity theft are still two critical solutions.

To its credit, recent reforms announced by the government suggest that policymakers are refocused on modernising India’s energy policy. However, these same politicos have in the past implemented marginal reforms, while neglecting to implement transformative reforms that truly attract investment. Today, policymakers would be well served not to repeat such an error. The emerging global energy landscape and the new wave of consumers promise a sustained period of expensive energy.

The new global energy gluttons, a group that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, are still considered lynchpins of global supply, but are concurrently grappling with surging domestic demand. As a result, export volumes from these nations are in decline. For example, take Saudi Arabia, which accounted for one-fifth of India’s oil imports in 2011-12. Between 1991 and 2010, global demand for oil increased by 31 per cent, and Saudi Arabia’s production increased by more than one million barrels per day. During this same period (albeit with some fluctuations), however, exports from the kingdom remained flat at 6.6 million barrels per day. The natural gas market provides a similar picture: in the mid-1990s Indonesia and Malaysia accounted for roughly half of global LNG exports. Today, both countries are planning import facilities to meet growing demand. Kuwait and the UAE, both considered energy-rich nations, import LNG from as far away as Trinidad & Tobago to satisfy demand.

If nothing else, this trend should crystallise for Indian policymakers the urgency of major pricing reforms. In the short term, the oil price will reflect the prevailing macroeconomic and geopolitical winds at any given time. In the long term, however, most analysts forecast a consistent increase in the price of oil. Similarly, the long-term trend suggests that natural gas prices will remain high. Although GAIL is contracted to receive shipments of LNG from the United States at cheaper US prices, such a contract structure will be the exception, not the norm. Unlike Cheniere, GAIL’s American LNG supplier, most LNG producers are major oil and gas companies that need financing arrangements that justify investments in the exploration and production of natural gas, as well as the construction of multi-billion dollar gas liquefaction facilities. These financing realities suggest that oil-indexed contracts are likely to remain an integral component in global LNG trade. Although macroeconomic headwinds in China have depressed coal prices this year, pricing reform in Indonesia and surging demand in southeast Asia suggest that coal prices will also remain competitive in the future.

In this context, insufficient reforms will be costly. First, the surging cost of imported gas and coal, coupled with stagnant domestic production, have not only left power plants idle and bankrupted State Electricity Boards (SEBs), but they have also burdened the banking sector with a portfolio of non-performing loans. Government efforts to bailout SEBs without dramatic changes to electricity pricing will hinder any lingering incentives to invest in new generation, transmission and distribution projects and may raise the borrowing costs for any new investments. The new oil pricing reality is of greater concern. Reform will not dramatically change India’s import dependence on oil; even increased production will not make India self-sufficient. But now, amid ballooning fiscal deficits and jittery financial markets, market-determined prices are necessary to rid the government and the oil companies of unsustainable subsidies on their deficit-laden balance sheets.

Will such initiatives be too little, too late for India? Will its slowing growth and meandering energy and economic policies result in India becoming the first “fallen angel” among the BRIC nations, as Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, warned in a June 2012 report? Perhaps not. Recent pro-reform messages from Delhi are promising. But unlike China, where the government can make unpalatable energy decisions relatively quickly, or Russia and Brazil, where they don’t need to because of the abundance of energy resources, India has a government that historically has been incapable of fully executing painful energy reforms. If India is to continue as a vibrant emerging market, it will have to tackle its energy-security weaknesses immediately. If it cannot, BRIC may lose an “I”.

Authors

Charles K. Ebinger
Govinda Avasarala

Publication: The Indian Express

Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting"

Thomas Wright — Wed, 29 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Last week I attended a workshop in Rio de Janeiro on the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), a Brazilian concept introduced in late 2011 to curb what it perceives as the excesses of the Responsibility to Protect. Over the course of the workshop, I had the opportunity to hear and interact with senior foreign policy officials and experts from Brazil, South Africa, India, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Here are some observations on the RWP concept (a subsequent post will discuss Brazilian foreign policy more generally).

The IBSA countries—India, Brazil, and South Africa—feel betrayed by the Western interpretation of the mandate it received under UNSC resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya. They realized it meant an initial series of strikes against Libyan air defenses but wanted the West to consider a settlement with Gaddafi after the initial strikes. They claimed to be shocked by the extension of the campaign into one of regime change. The West views Libya as a success of sorts, but IBSA sees it as a dramatic failure and warning.

IBSA officials complained, in particular, that their diplomats were treated dismissively throughout the operation and were left uninformed. This sense of personal humiliation at the hands of the P3 (the US, France, and the UK) appears to be the most significant proximate cause of RWP (although the official reason is the path of the intervention in Libya). The IBSA countries made it clear that they would be extremely reluctant to support any new R2P action in light of the Libyan experience.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

What Hurdles Face Brazil Ahead of the Olympics & World Cup?

Andrés Rozental — Fri, 17 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

After what has been universally characterized as a tremendous success by London in organizing the Olympics, Rio de Janero and Brazil will have a tough act to follow. While London is generally a disciplined and orderly city, Rio, like many other large urban concentrations in developing countries, is somewhat chaotic and disorganized. The biggest challenge the Brazilians face is to somehow make logistics work during both the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. A large hotel deficit in Rio, combined with poor public transportation networks and phenomenal traffic congestion—especially in São Paulo—will present huge challenges to the authorities as they prepare for the influx of tens of thousands of athletes and spectators.

While there is still time to build the necessary new infrastructure, Brazil needs to accelerate
preparations and ensure that the airports, roads, transportation facilities and stadiums are ready. Neither FIFA nor the International Olympic Committee seem to be worried that things are not on schedule, but the risk remains that some of the major projects might not be in place by 2014. Security is also a concern, but more from the perspective of localized crime and violence, than from any terrorist threat. The mayor of Rio de Janeiro was in London twice during these past Olympics and was able to take advantage of watching the recently concluded Games to better understand the size and complexity of the events and how to adequately prepare for every contingency.

Having attended several of the events in London myself, I can't underestimate the task ahead and Brazil's challenges in preparing for their time in the sun.

Read the full Q&A, including responses from other non-Brookings experts » (PDF)

Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Dancing on the Sand: How the Rio+20 Summit Fell Short

Bruce Jones — Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

At 4:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning, 1,000 or so advanced delegates at Rio+20 (formally, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development) laid down their pens and shut off their laptops. At noon, Brazil's worldly foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, gaveled through the Outcome Document from the chair. And by mid-afternoon, Rio was full of a sound to which that joyous city is unaccustomed: the collective moan of 40,000 environmentalists disappointed about the results. (Yes, you read that right: 40,000. Alongside 10,000 official government participants.) But if the environment movement expected Earth-saving outcomes from Rio, they were clearly enjoying too much of Brazil's famed cachaça.

That the Rio outcome fell short of the highest expectations was not only predictable, it was predicted -- by everybody. A senior European Union negotiator told me last month that the EU's major focus had already turned to lowering expectations. That was wise: No credible analysis of environmental agreements past tells us that a global summit of this kind, with a broad, encompassing agenda, can actually deliver genuine changes in the way the world does its economic or energy business. Throw in a gloomy global economic situation, and major leaps forward were a non-starter.

There were some avoidable mistakes. Brazil got into an early fight with Mexico, which was simultaneously preparing the Los Cabos Summit of the G-20, about which country would "lead" on green growth issues. (As if the problem is that we have too much leadership on green growth, rather than a dearth of it.) The result was that rather than the G-20 negotiations bolstering Rio, the two processes proceeded in parallel. For the Rio process itself, the U.N. produced a reasonable backdrop analysis but never managed to escape the utterly opaque language of "sustainable development," and did far less than was necessary to shape the political space for action.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Bruce Jones

Publication: Foreign Policy