Brookings: Topics - Balkans

How The Hague Courts and Tribunals Protect Human Rights

Thu, 04 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 4, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the last twenty years, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has given a voice to victims as it prosecuted those accused of grave human rights abuses in the Yugoslav conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established just over ten years ago, also plays a vital role in holding violators responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. These anniversaries provide a valuable opportunity to reflect on the past and look to the future of international courts and tribunals and how they promote and protect human rights globally.

On April 4, the Managing Global Order Project at Brookings and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hosted a discussion to take stock of the ability of the ICTY, the ICC, and other international and regional justice mechanisms to hold leaders accountable for grave human rights abuses. Panelists included: Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court; Theodor Meron, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its successor the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; and Ambassador Stephen Rapp, ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks. Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, moderated the discussion.

Women Responding to War

Roberta Cohen — Tue, 22 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Whatever would Aristophanes, the Greek playwright of antiquity, think of the new PBS documentary, Women, War and Peace? In his play Lysistrata performed in the fifth century B.C., Aristophanes depicted women tired of war and angry over its devastation of their and their families’ lives, uniting marching, occupying the Acropolis and withholding themselves to force men to the negotiating table. They triumph: the warring parties sign a peace agreement and the women propose some of its terms. For Aristophanes and his Greek audiences, women in war did not have to be victims but rather potentially powerful agents of change.

Fast forward twenty-five centuries to the PBS documentary whose five riveting segments also show that when women join hands, they can rise above enormous odds in wartime. Here is some of what they achieved:

An end to the war in Liberia—women come together to stage sit-ins and demonstrations and play a substantial role in forcing opposing warlords to conclude a peace agreement in 2003;
The halting of evictions in Colombia—a peasant woman organizes impoverished communities and with the help of advocates in Washington prevents the forced removal of Afro-Colombians from their land.
The sentencing of rapists from the former Yugoslavia—women provide evidence and serve as prosecutors and judges on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and bring to justice key perpetrators.
Gaining access to education in Afghanistan—women and girls find ways to go to school despite Taliban violence and intimidation.

But PBS unlike Aristophanes shows the world as it truly is: a world in which women cannot generally stop the drumbeat of war nor halt the flow of arms nor prevent the mass uprooting of their families or the use of rape as a weapon of war. In 2008 and 2009 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more than 30,000 women were raped in a deliberate effort to destroy families and communities, humiliate the victims and uproot people. Most perpetrators have gone unpunished. And in Afghanistan, despite the appeals of Hillary Clinton, the hopes of women and girls for education, employment and political participation will more likely than not be sacrificed in any peace agreement between the government and the Taliban.

Nonetheless, international exposure of the impact that war has on women can help in a number of ways.

First, greater international attention to the forced displacement of women and children in wartime has resulted in national, regional and international efforts to protect and assist them. There are today 27.5 million persons internally displaced by conflict, 70 percent of whom are women and children. While prevention is the weakest link, far greater awareness now exists that arbitrary displacement from one’s home, community and livelihood is a life-altering event that ought to be addressed on humanitarian and security grounds. To hold governments and armed groups accountable, a legal framework has been developed—the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2009 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (soon to be in force). More than 20 countries also have adopted national laws on forced displacement, some with special clauses to protect women, if implemented. This includes a new law in Colombia which will restore land forcibly taken from IDPs and compensate the victims of civil conflict. International organizations have become directly involved as well with programs for the protection of women, while most peacekeepers’ mandates today include IDP and civilian protection in their mandates. Reinforcing this, 192 governments in 2005 endorsed the collective responsibility to protect (R2P) when governments fail to defend their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In Kenya in 2008, R2P did succeed in halting the ethnic violence and displacement that erupted following electoral conflict. In sum, standards and tools now exist for addressing displacement but need further strengthening at the national, regional and international levels.

Second, there is movement toward including women in peace processes. Women’s organizations worldwide are demanding a greater role in negotiating peace agreements and challenging the notion that peace can be decided only by the warring parties. They point out that the sidelining of women can undermine recovery and reconciliation. In 2000 for the first time, a United Nations Security Council resolution (1325) called for women to be included in all phases of peace negotiations and in post-conflict rebuilding. While implementation has a ways to go, women’s concerns—in particular their access to land, inheritance, property and security—are making their way into peace agreements.

Third, impunity from gender based violence in wartime is beginning to be challenged.
The Nuremberg tribunal in 1945 failed to prosecute rape as a war crime or crime against humanity, but the international courts today—set up after the Balkans Wars and the Rwanda genocide—sentence sexual violators. And the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court specifies that rape can be prosecuted as a war crime and crime against humanity. This is a far cry from what a senior UN official said to me at the height of the Balkans Wars—“What’s so terrible about rape, you don’t die from it.” No longer is rape considered a regrettable but unavoidable part of conflict. In fact, there are conflicts where mass rape is not a factor at all. And there are IDP camps where watch teams and patrols curb sexual violence. International assistance with forensic evidence and documentation of rape is beginning to boost national capacities. UN peacekeepers charged with protecting women are now being taught that sexual violence and exploitation of women are unacceptable under the UN’s “zero tolerance” policy. Female police and military are being added to international forces to protect and prevent rapes while those committing crimes are now more likely to be sent home for prosecution, and the UN has begun to arrange for compensation to the victims.

At a deeper level, attitudes toward women must change for them to be treated more humanely in wartime. How many centuries it will take, I cannot say. Some women advocates go so far as to claim that countries will be less likely to go to war when there is gender equality. What I do see is a movement to better guarantee women’s protection as women worldwide become more vocal. If Aristophanes were to pay a visit today, he would no doubt be surprised to find that it has taken us all so long to learn the lesson he offered—and have done it so imperfectly.

On November 8^th, 2011, PBS aired “War Redefined,” the capstone episode of the series Women, War & Peace. In the program Roberta Cohen provided analysis on internal displacement during conflict, the long-term consequences of displacement and the importance of including women in peace agreements. View the full program »

Authors

Roberta Cohen

Image Source: Â© Ali Jasim / Reuters

The Frontiers of Europe : A Transatlantic Problem?

Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, eds. — Mon, 15 Aug 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2011 240pp.

As the European Union tries to increase both its visibility and its impact on the world stage, it cannot overlook the fact that until now enlargement has formed its most successful foreign policy. But is the EU's enlargement strategy still relevant today? Have the economic crisis and the speculative attack on the euro made the enlargement policy more uncertain?

In The Frontiers of Europe, an international cast of leading experts and policymakers examine the EU's prospective borders from new perspectives. Indeed, the frontiers of Europe are as much a matter of values and the EU's international credibility as they are a matter of geographic definition. The contributors highlight the considerable yet different interests of the United States and Russia in the EU's enlargement strategy, paying special attention to the likely effects on the future of U.S.-EU relations.

This comprehensive volume focuses not only on the European Union's outward expansion, but also on the internal dynamics within EU states and those states' abilities to deal with pressing issues such as terrorism, immigration, internal crime, and energy security. The EU must prioritize stability in both its enlargement strategy and its relations with the broader international neighborhood. The book raises a note of caution, however: as governance challenges increase, the EU's attention increasingly draws inward, thus diminishing its soft power.

The Frontiers of Europe is important reading for anyone trying to understand the current geopolitical landscape of Europe and what it means for the rest of the world.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Federiga Bindi

Federiga Bindi holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Integration at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she is the founding director of the European Center of Excellence. She is also a professor at the Italian National School of Public Administration and a senior fellow at the Center of Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins SAIS.

Irina Angelescu

Irina Angelescu is a researcher with the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe.

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Incorporating Protection into Humanitarian Action: Approaches and Limits

Elizabeth Ferris and Chareen Stark — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In a presentation to a conference in Beirut, Lebanon hosted by the American University of Beirut and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Elizabeth Ferris and Chareen Stark examine the evolution of the concept of civilian protection, the challenges of operationalizing protection, and what international organizations in other crises can learn from UNRWA.

Protection has become very much in vogue in the humanitarian community. Policies, manuals, guidelines, and training courses on protection abound for working with conflict- and disaster-affected populations. Conferences are organized; articles, books, and studies are devoted to protection.

But civilians are still deliberately targeted as a strategy of warfare and civilians continue to suffer from serious human rights violations. Even as humanitarian actors develop more sophisticated policies on protection, the question remains about the extent to which humanitarian actors can protect people from bombs, attacks, and blockades, especially when confronted with overwhelming force, as in Darfur, Tibet, Burma/Myanmar and the occupied Palestinian territory. Protection is defined in different ways by different actors and the number of actors working on protection has mushroomed. Defining protection in practice remains elusive.

Protection issues in the areas of operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) have usually been considered as unique to that context, and most academics writing about international protection usually focus on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with perhaps a few generalizations about other humanitarian actors. This paper attempts to bridge this divide by looking at UNRWA’s contributions to operationalizing protection as well as to what other humanitarian actors can learn from UNRWA’s protection efforts.

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Authors

Elizabeth Ferris
Chareen Stark

The Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons

Walter Kälin — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Chairperson, Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come to New York from Kampala where I attended last week’s African Union Special Summit of Heads of State and Government on refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons in Africa. There, I witnessed the historic moment of the adoption of the AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The importance of this Convention cannot be underestimated. Building on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement it is the first legally binding IDP-specific treaty covering an entire continent. The Convention is a tremendous achievement and a beacon of hope for the almost 12 million people in Africa internally displaced by conflict and the many more internally displaced by natural disasters, and hopefully serves as a model for other regions, too.

I commend the African Union for its leadership in developing this Convention. I urge all African states to ratify it and implement its provisions, and I call on the international community to seize this momentum and to lend all support needed to its implementation.

Mr. Chairperson,

Reflecting on my mandate’s activities over the past 12 months, I would first like to highlight three topics: climate change and natural disasters, internal displacement and peace processes and the search for durable solutions for internally displaced persons.

Climate Change and Internal Displacement

Climate change increases the frequency and magnitude of climate related disasters, both sudden-onset disasters like flooding and hurricanes and slow-onset disasters such as desertification. The negative impact of these disasters can be mitigated by adopting disaster risk reduction measures. Yet, it is expected that the number of persons displaced by climate related disasters will increase. Most of these people will remain within their own country; hence they will be internally displaced persons to whom the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement apply. It is therefore crucial to enhance capacities of governments and humanitarian actors to provide protection and assistance to these persons. I strongly call on states to ensure that the adaptation and risk management regime of the new UNFCCC framework agreement covers forced displacement.

Internal Displacement and Peace Processes

Finding durable solutions for internally displaced persons is an essential element of a successful peace process. The way the issue is addressed in peace agreements often predetermines how internal displacement is dealt with in the aftermath of conflicts. Many peace agreements reflect the issue of internal displacement insufficiently or haphazardly. Therefore, over the past 18 months and in close cooperation with the Mediation Support Unit of the Department for Political Affairs of the UN and humanitarian, human rights and mediation experts, I developed a guide on internal displacement and peace processes for mediators. This guide provides advice on how to consult with internally displaced persons and engage them in the different phases of a peace process even if they do not sit at the negotiation table and on what kind of key displacement-specific issues should be addressed in the text of a peace agreement. It will be published later this year.[1]

I deepened my engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission through a country-based engagement on Central African Republic. I am pleased to see that the country specific strategic framework reflects many of the recommendations that I submitted on the basis of a working visit to this country last February. I plan to remain engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission in the course of the coming year.

I call on all actors presently involved in peace and peacebuilding processes to adequately address the specific needs of IDPs in the aftermath of armed conflicts.

Durable Solutions for IDPs

In the many missions I carried out over the past five years, I noticed that finding durable solutions for IDPs is always a tremendous challenge. It is a multi-faceted, long, complex and often expensive process, which requires the coordination and cooperation of a variety of actors from among national and local authorities, and the humanitarian and the development communities. With policy guidance such as that provided by the Framework for Durable Solutions—a document developed by my office and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement a few years ago and presently being revised in close cooperation with relevant stakeholders[2]—we know what should be done, but we must improve on the ground. Too often the coordination between humanitarian and development actors is insufficient, the funding for early recovery activities is lacking or IDPs are simply not a priority in recovery, reconstruction and development plans resulting in gaps jeopardizing the sustainability of returns or local integration of the displaced when the humanitarian actors phase out and the development partners are not yet able to show tangible progress in restoring infrastructure, services and livelihoods. Based on my observations in many countries, I have come to the conclusion that the practical problems in this area are a consequence of systemic failures in bringing humanitarian and development actors together to work hand in hand at an early stage of recovery. In addition to differences in approaches and cultures, these failures can to a large extent be attributed to a lack of flexible funding mechanisms for early recovery and reconstruction in spite of some recent steps in the right direction, including the creation of the peace-building fund.

Country Situations

Mr. Chairperson,

The second pillar of my mandate is the engagement in a constructive dialogue with governments. I am grateful that with a few exceptions the countries that I approached during this reporting period were open to engage with my mandate.

Allow me to provide you with an update on important developments since the completion of my written report to the General Assembly:

I carried out a mission to Somalia from 14 – 21 October. Lack of humanitarian access, security risks for humanitarian workers, and the sharp decline in donor contributions exacerbate this long-standing humanitarian crisis, and international attention to the plight of IDPs is largely insufficient. I was shocked by the degree of violence the civilian population and in particular internally displaced persons in South and Central Somalia suffer. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are committed in an environment of impunity. Such acts are a major cause of the displacement of 1.5 million persons, the majority of whom are women and children. They remain highly vulnerable and exposed to serious human rights violations, in particular sexual violence, during flight and in IDP settlements. Many of the displaced try to reach safety in Puntland or Somaliland, where the high number of internally displaced persons puts enormous strain on the limited existing resources and basic services available. Reception capacities for new internally displaced persons must be strengthened and basic services expanded to reduce the burden on host communities. Further robust development interventions are needed to transform humanitarian action into sustainable livelihoods and investing into education and job opportunities for the youth is a must in an environment where recruitment by radical forces is often the only opportunity offered to them. Present efforts by the authorities, humanitarian, development and human rights actors are largely insufficient to bring urgently needed change. I urgently call on the international community to strengthen these efforts and to reaffirm its commitment to Somalia.

I was twice in Sri Lanka over the past six months; in April, shortly before the end of hostilities, and again in September at a time the security situation had vastly improved, although over 250,000 internally displaced were still held in closed camps. Restoration of their freedom of movement has become a matter of urgency, and immediate and substantial progress in this regard is an imperative for Sri Lanka to comply with its commitments under international law. I discussed a three-pronged strategy for decongesting the camps with the government, which is based on returns of IDPs to their homes, release of IDPs to host families and transfer of IDPs to small open welfare centers in the region of return as a transitional solution until return is possible. I urged the Government to pursue these options in parallel with highest priority, to speed up the screening procedures, and to immediately release those not deemed to pose a security threat. Since my visit, this process has started. I acknowledge the progress made so far in demining and reconstructing returnee areas and releasing and returning a good number of displaced people to Jaffna and Mannar, Trincomalee and Batticaloa as well as to Vavuniya and Killinochi. I underline that this return needs to happen according to international standards. At the same time, I continue to reiterate that the ultimate goal is the restoration of freedom of movement and finding durable solutions for all IDPs.

During my visit to Georgia of last autumn, I reiterated that there should be no discrimination between different persons internally displaced in Georgia’s different waves of displacement. The approximately 220,000 individuals who have been displaced over the long-term in Georgia should be able to avail themselves of the same possibilities to improve their living conditions as are enjoyed by those more recently displaced. I welcome that in the meantime the government has adopted an action plan to improve the housing situation of the long-term displaced and started to implement it. I am also grateful that a solution was found allowing me to visit the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia region next week.

I remain engaged on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In March 2010, six other special procedures and I will report to the Human Rights Council on progress the DRC made in implementing a series of recommendations we previously made on how to tangibly improve the situation on the ground. Despite encouraging returns of 110,000 persons in North Kivu Province over the last two months, I remain concerned about the overall deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to the continued attacks on civilian populations carried out by LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) militias and the impact of the military operations against the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda) armed group and the FDLR’s reprisals against the civilian population triggering new displacements.

My working visits to Uganda and Serbia had a special focus on durable solutions. In Uganda, I was impressed to see that the majority of the formerly 1.8 million internally displaced persons have returned to their villages and I expressed my appreciation to the Government for its continued efforts. Sustaining returns remains a challenge that must be addressed by quick impact recovery and development activities, which requires stronger action by development agencies and support of donors. Despite the huge progress made thus far, the fate of a considerable number of particularly vulnerable individuals left behind in camps or living in transit sites as well as a general lack of synchronicity between the phasing out of humanitarian assistance and the increase of development activities in returnee areas continue to be a source of concern.

Many of the 200,000 persons internally displaced from and within Kosovo (I am using the term in accordance with the U.N. position of strict neutrality on the status question) have not yet found a durable solution. I note with appreciation that all relevant authorities in Pristina expressed their commitment to facilitate returns of displaced persons, regardless of their ethnicity. However, due to entrenched patterns of discrimination in every sector of life and also a lack of support, in particular at the municipal level, there have only been a few sustainable returns. At the same time, I wish to reemphasize that the right for a dignified life and the right to return are not mutually exclusive. In this respect, I would like to commend the increased efforts of the Government of Serbia to improve the living conditions of internally displaced persons who have not returned.

Mr. Chairperson,

This is my last report which I present personally in my capacity as Representative of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Over the past five years, I have seen encouraging trends. The UN Guiding Principles are now firmly rooted as the relevant framework for the protection of internally displaced persons, legislation and policies have been developed at national and regional level and the cluster approach has led to an improved humanitarian response. Overall, states and humanitarian and developmental actors are better prepared and equipped today to address the plight of the more than 50 million persons displaced within their countries. This is badly needed as the effects of climate change will lead to new displacement. At the same time, it is worrying to see that armed conflict are conducted with utter disregard for the civilian populations in several parts of the world, the humanitarian space is shrinking in many countries, and many displacement situations that were protracted when I assumed this mandate remain unchanged.

A new mandate-holder will be named next summer and I trust that he or she will also benefit from the particular strengths that currently characterize my mandate. As a Representative of the Secretary-General, I enjoy excellent access to Governments and other important stakeholders, I receive remarkable support of the relevant entities of the United Nations and from donors, and my participation as a standing invitee to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is key to reach out to the wider humanitarian community.

Thank you.

[1] The guide will be published by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the United States Institute for Peace.

[2] The revised Framework is expected to be published as an addendum to my next report to the Human Rights Council, tentatively scheduled for its 13^th session (March 2010).

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: United Nations General Assembly

Peace, Reconciliation, and Displacement

Elizabeth Ferris — Tue, 07 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Displacement is one of the tragic consequences of conflict. As we meet this morning, several million people have been displaced in Pakistan as a result of the counter-insurgency campaign being carried out by the government against the Taliban in the Swat valley and Waziristan. Hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans face an uncertain future as they are confined to camps following the government’s final offensive against the Tamil Tigers. In fact, over 40 million people have been displaced within and outside the borders of their countries.[1] But displacement is not only an unintended consequence of conflict. Increasingly it is used as a deliberate strategy by combatant forces. Ethnic cleansing, or its latest variant, sectarian cleansing in Iraq, requires that people be forcibly displaced from their communities in order for one side to be victorious.

While people can be displaced in a very short period of time—2 million Pakistanis in two weeks in June of this year, for example—resolving displacement always takes far longer. Until recently, political and military leaders have thought that a war is over when an enemy has been vanquished or a peace agreement has been signed. The reality is very different. Usually the hard work is just beginning and requires rebuilding societies, economies, and political systems which were destroyed by war, including finding solutions for those uprooted by conflict. This requires political will and commitment on the part of national authorities coming out of conflict and it usually requires financial resources and support from the international community.

Resolving displacement and preventing future displacement is inextricably linked with achieving lasting peace. “Stop the fighting so that we can go home” is a common refrain among displaced communities. Unfortunately, going home is usually more complicated than this.

This presentation focuses on the relationship between peace and displacement. In sum: peace is needed for displaced people to find durable solutions and durable solutions are needed for peace to be consolidated. Or to put it negatively: without peace, there are no durable solutions for displaced persons and without durable solutions for displaced persons, it is difficult for peace to be sustained. This is a theme which has been explored by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IIDPs) and the Brookings-Bern Project over the past few years.[2]

I would like to build on this work by looking at the way in which displacement is considered in some of the different approaches or paradigms to post-conflict transitions. Nation-building, state-building, peacebuilding, reconciliation, stabilization, early recovery—these are all terms presently used by different actors in dealing with the multiple challenges of post-conflict situations. But they are not just terms. They are paradigms which determine the way one looks at a particular issue, the solutions one finds, and even the agency or actor expected to take the lead. The paradigm used to approach post-conflict transitions also affects the way that solutions for the displaced are perceived. For example, military actors focusing on stabilization tend to see humanitarian assistance to displaced persons as a way of promoting security while those focusing on early recovery stress the role of returnees in economic development.

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[1] According to the most recent figures available there are 10.5 million refugees of concern to UNHCR, 4.7 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA and an estimated 26 million conflict-induced IDPs. See www.unhcr.org; www.unrwa.org; http://www.internal-displacement.org/.

[2] Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building, Washington, DC: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, September 2007. Walter Kalin, "Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension of Peacebuilding," Briefing Paper submitted to the Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned Meeting, 13 March 2008. Elizabeth Ferris, "The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding," Statement delivered to UN Peacebuilding Commission, Lessons Learned Working Group, 13 March 2008. Internal Displacement and the Construction of Peace, Summary Report, Washington, DC: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, February 2009.

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Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: UCLA Conference on Peace and Reconciliation: Embracing the Displaced

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Serbia

Walter Kälin — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Distinguished Members of this House,

It is an honour and privilege to have been invited to address this House in my capacity as Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. I am glad that Parliament has decided to dedicate today’s hearing not only to the situation of refugees, who of course deserve your utmost attention, but that you are also considering the situation of your fellow citizens who have been internally displaced.

This is the second time that I have the opportunity to come to the historic city of Belgrade in my official capacity. In 2005, I already visited then Serbia and Montenegro and subsequently presented a report with recommendations to the United Nations on how to better protect the rights of persons who were internally displaced from and in Kosovo in 1999 and the years after that. The political landscape has certainly not become easier since my last visit and I would like to assure you that I will carry out this follow-up visit in full respect of Security Council Resolution 1244 and the United Nations position of strict neutrality on the status of Kosovo.

***

Internally displaced persons have a right to return to their homes or places of habitual residence, if they so choose. Everything has to be done that those who return can participate in society without discrimination on the basis of equality and are protected from violence and harassment. Regardless of whether they want to return or not, internally displaced persons must be able to reclaim their property or receive at least adequate compensation if this is not feasible. I will also insist on respect for these principles, which are enshrined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, when travelling later this week to Pristina.

At the time, we need to have pragmatic models of cooperation between authorities so that human rights principles can become realities on the ground. I think the Foreign Minister of Serbia hit the right note a few days ago, when he told the United Nations Security Council that “we all have our constraints and they should be respected”, while adding that we should “focus on improving the lives of citizens instead of making them the victims of our disagreements.”

***

Internally displaced persons have a right to return, but as citizens they also have a right to choose to rebuild their shattered lives at the place where they find themselves. Indeed, there may be many among those displaced a decade ago, who might today be unwilling to return. Others may be simply unable to return because they are traumatized or elderly or do not feel strong enough yet to rebuild their lives in their former home. We need to respect their choice and help them rebuild independent lives now. Please bear in mind that those who regain control of their life in displacement will be better able to master a sustainable return, if in the end they choose to return.

It is positive, and a clear step forward since my last visit, that authorities like the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees have started programmes to help IDPs leave collective centres, move to their own houses and regain their livelihoods. Yet, bureaucratic obstacles, in particular cumbersome procedures relating to documents and even problems for some in obtaining birth certificates, continue to make it unnecessarily difficult for many IDPs to access public services. Yesterday, I visited a group of Roma IDPs who for ten years have lived in abject poverty in a muddy informal settlement on the outskirts of Belgrade in shacks without running water, and electricity. Their children cannot go to school, they cannot find regular employment and since a few months they no longer can access free health care - and all of this simply because they have no registered residence.

These people are your citizens and they are human beings like you and I. I saw their miserable situation with my own eyes. Yet, because they do not have a legally recognized address, even though they have lived for a decade in the same city, they are invisible to the institutions. Thousands or even tens of thousands of people, mostly Roma, live in such shocking situations. They are victimized on multiple grounds: First by having been forcibly displaced 10 years ago, second by administrative regulations that may make sense under normal circumstances but disregard the special situation of marginalized communities among the displaced, and third by belonging to a minority that has been living at the margins of society even before becoming displaced.

This Parliament has the power to help the people I met and many other internally displaced persons living in very difficult circumstances. Soon, you will have amendments to the Law on Residence before you that, if properly drafted, would make it much easier for IDPs and others to register a residence. I also understand that the Government is preparing a Bill on Recognition of Persons before the Law / Law on Personal Subjectivity that would also bring tangible progress. I would like to urge you to adopt these and other legislative changes improving the lives of IDPs.

***

Distinguished members of this house, when we refer to internally displaced persons we should never forget that we speak about citizens and human beings that have lived through a tragic experience. They deserve the full protection and assistance of the state and the compassion and support of their fellow citizens. I thank you for your attention.

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: Parliament of Serbia

Protracted Displacement in Europe

Walter Kälin — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

President of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Madame Chairperson of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population,
Distinguished Members,

It is an honor and privilege for me to be invited to this distinguished Assembly. Since assuming my mandate I have cooperated with the Council of Europe in fruitful ways and a variety of contexts. Recently, I particularly appreciated the participation and excellent contributions of many members of this Assembly to the Seminar on Protracted Displacement in Europe that took place in Geneva on 26 November of last year.

Unfortunately, over the last years, the situation of internal displacement in Europe has continued to remain stagnant. Europe continues to have more than 2.5 million internally displaced persons, mainly in the Central Caucasus, Turkey, the Balkans and Cyprus. What is perhaps even more worrying: Over 99% of them find themselves in situations of protracted displacement having fled their homes some 15 to 25 years ago as a result of conflicts arising from rejected independence claims and territorial disputes.

Beyond these staggering numbers are individual human tragedies. Memories of some of those who I met during my visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia still touch me. I still see before my eyes the Roma families living in corroded containers next to a city dump six years after they fled Kosovo and one woman showing me the hole through which the rats entered during the night. I remember the farmer somewhere in Bosnia who had returned to an area where he belongs to a minority, dreaming 12 years after the Dayton agreement about being able, one day in the future, to buy a second cow, allowing him to make just a little bit of money. The memories of marginalized children with sad faces, somewhere in Georgia, who never knew anything else than the one dirty room in an overcrowded collective shelter without electricity, or the furor of the traumatized woman in Azerbaijan desperately wanting to know the fate of her missing son and cursing her own fate still haunt me. Totally inadequate housing conditions, abject poverty, and worst of all, a life at the very margins of society without any hope and perspective are the everyday reality of internally displaced persons in Europe who have been living in such protracted displacement for many years or even decades.

***

I would like to commend the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population and in particular the Rapporteur, Mr. John Greenway, for bringing to the open what it calls very fittingly “Europe’s Forgotten People”. The excellent report on ”protecting the rights of long-term displaced persons” will help to mobilize public attention and muster political will to address their plight. The report and the recommendations touch on the key issues and concerns that I also continue to document in the course of my work on the continent. Let me highlight a few particularly pertinent points also addressed in the report.

Many of the protracted situations in Europe are the consequence of armed conflicts that had been marked by inter-ethnic violence or even ethnic cleansing. In some of these situations, internally displaced person became manipulated as political pawns. In the absence of a political settlement to the underlying conflicts, durable solutions and even temporary integration of IDPs were in some cases deliberately discouraged. In other cases, the reality of internal displacement was simply denied. Temporary housing arrangements, segregated schools or limited access to education for IDP children as well as economic and social marginalization are among the immediate consequences. Sometimes, the living conditions of these people are worse than at the time and the immediate aftermath of the conflict when humanitarian assistance was available.

Addressing this political problem requires political will on two fronts:

As the Draft Recommendation before the Assembly highlights member states need to “seek new political impetus for finding peaceful settlement of the protracted conflicts.” In this process, the voices of internally displaced persons, including those of women and members of marginalized groups, need to be heard and peace agreements should address the rights, needs and interests of internally displaced persons. My mandate has been focusing on how to tackle the problem that IDPs are often not involved in peace processes or that they become the object of political manipulation. Those of you involved in peace negotiations may be interested in a soon-to-be-published Guide for Mediators on Integrating Internal Displacement in Peace Processes and Peace Agreements that my mandate, the Brookings-Berne Project on Internal Displacement, the United States Institute for Peace and the Mediation Support Unit of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs have developed.
Even in the absence of peace agreements, much can be done to improve the situation of internally displaced persons. In particular, it is important to accept that, just because they have been displaced, they do not loose their right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence as guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights. This means that internally displaced persons have a right to return to their homes, but they also have the right to choose a different type of durable solutions for themselves, namely to integrate locally where they are or settle elsewhere in the country. Insisting on their citizens’ rights to return should not prevent governments from facilitating other durable solutions especially if it is apparent that the political realities preclude returns in the foreseeable future. Allowing IDPs to integrate locally and resume normal lives and the right to return are not mutually exclusive and a displaced person’s decision to locally integrate must never be viewed as a renunciation of the right to return. Rather, successful local integration can avoid protracted displacement and dependency syndromes and prepare IDPs for an eventual successful return. Moreover, in all situations there are particularly vulnerable people such as traumatized or elderly persons without family support who will be unable to return even where returns are politically feasible.

I have been stressing the importance of a free choice among durable solutions for a long time with several member states. It is simply shocking that in a continent as advanced as Europe ten and more years after the end of conflicts an estimated 390 000 internally displaced persons are still living in collective centres and similar types of accommodation. I am disturbed by the fact that this all too often happens as a result of deliberate policies. It is important to insist on the right of return and on undoing ethnic cleansing and similar practices but too many of those remaining in these shelters are very vulnerable persons not able to return and live on their own. It is a simple requirement of humanity to provide them with opportunities to stay in dignity where they are. It is very encouraging that after so many years a number of states confronted with protracted displacement, including Georgia and to some extent Azerbaijan have started to change their policy paradigm and pay more attention to local integration.

Protracted displacement is characterized by the fact that

the process for finding durable solutions has become stalled, but also
that the displaced are marginalized by disregard for or failure to protect their human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights.

Poor housing, lack of employment opportunities and the absence of access to quality education are typically the dominant concerns both during protracted displacement and after return. While resources often are scarce in the post-conflict transition phase, IDPs suffer disproportionately since they have to compete for these resources from a marginalized position. Particular difficulties stem from the fact that displacement often marks for IDPs the beginning of a rural to urban transition. As a result, IDPs often find themselves among the urban poor facing the additional problem of social and sometimes also legal discrimination because of their displacement.

Protection of property left behind and, ultimately its restitution or compensation, are often ignored, hindering IDPs in their efforts to resume their lives and remaining a serious source of grievance and a trigger-point for future conflict. In Europe, many people are tenants and it is therefore very appropriate and important that the Draft Recommendation before the Assembly also stresses the protection of tenancy rights. The strict application of requirements for legal documentation, coupled with failure to replace or issue new documentation, prevents IDPs in some countries from accessing and enjoying a range of rights: to health, education, property, a livelihood – and that often years after their initial displacement.

IDPs subject to multiple and intersecting layers of discrimination face a level of problems and protection concerns not experienced by other IDPs. Ethnic minority groups not linked to a party involved in the conflict – such as the Roma – are often particularly affected. Donors and Government further fail to recognize vulnerabilities of marginalized groups in the recovery phase, e.g., by cutting funding for upgrading collective housing complexes, even though it is the most vulnerable such as the elderly or people with mental disabilities that tend to stay behind. Mental health issues, often rooted in conflict atrocities and exacerbated by the protracted nature of displacement, are frequently neglected and responses underfunded.

***

What can be done to improve the situation of internally displaced persons in Europe? The Draft Resolution in front of you contains a full action program that, if fully implemented, would radically change the fate of these forgotten people even in the absence of solutions for some of the frozen conflicts affecting our continent. What is needed is to review, enact and fully implement national laws, strategies and action plans that aim at restoring the human rights of people in internal displacement, in accordance with Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2006)06, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and binding human rights law as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, the European Social Charter, and other relevant instruments. Limited financial resources are not the main problem: My analysis of several countries has shown that inadequate laws and policies and a lack of capacity at the level of authorities coupled sometimes with a lack of political will are the main cause for the continuing suffering of Europe’s 2.5 million IDPs. In this context, I would like to bring to your attention a Manual for Law and Policymakers developed by my mandate, together with the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and leading experts across the world that analyses in great detail what can and should be done to make relevant laws and policies compatible with human rights standards. You may find it useful in your national work

Let me conclude. I am looking forward to continue the fruitful cooperation between my office and the Council of Europe. In particular, I am looking forward to the efforts undertaken by the Committee of Ministers to follow-up on the important recommendation before this Assembly today, and I stand ready to support these efforts. The commitment of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to the cause of better protecting internally displaced persons is important. Your efforts can help ensure that protraction of displacement will become protection in displacement; that Europe’s internally displaced who are forgotten today are cared for tomorrow, and that, ultimately, Europe disappears from the world map of internal displacement.

Thank you

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Debate on Protracted Displacement in Europe

Mass Displacement Caused by Conflicts and One-Sided Violence

Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng — Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Massive displacement of people within countries and across borders has become a defining feature of the post-cold war world. It is also a major feature of human insecurity in which genocide, terrorism, egregious human rights violations and appalling human degradation wreak havoc on civilians. The need of internally displaced persons (IDPs), people forcibly uprooted in their own countries, for international protection from conflict and one-sided violence was one of the factors that prompted a shift in global policy and security thinking. Over the past two decades, a strictly state-centred system in which sovereignty was absolute has evolved into become a matter of international concern and scrutiny. This evolution largely grew from the efforts of the human rights movement, which had long championed the view that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that the international community must hold governments to account when they fail to meet their obligations. It also arose from the efforts of the humanitarian community to reach people in need. The deployment of large numbers of relief workers and peacekeeping operations in the field to protect civilians reflects this new reality as do preventive and peacebuilding efforts.

Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect remain far ahead of international willingness and capacity to enforce them. The failure of states to protect their citizens has too often met iwth a weak international response. It is therefore critical that the United Nations, concerned governments, regional bodies and civil society assist states in developing their own capacities to prevent mass atrocities while also pressing for the development of the tools needed to enable the international community to take assertive action when persuasive measures fail and masses of people remain under the threat of violence and humanitarian tragedy.

This chapter examines the challenges posed by mass displacement caused by violence. Section II looks at the scale and nature of displacement, presents examples of states' failure to protect their citizens and discusses the consequences of displacement. Section III focuses on the political, legal and operational steps needed to provide greater protection for displaced populations and other civilians caught up in massive violence. Section IV presents conclusions and recommendations for the way forward.

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Publication: International Security, Armaments and Disarmament in 2008, SIPRI Yearbook 2009

The Future of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Walter Kälin — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Although it is hard to take an objective view on an enterprise in which you have been closely involved, it is fair to say that over the last ten years the Guiding Principles have demonstrated their utility and impact but also their limitations.

In Burma, they have been used to raise awareness about displacement and mobilise humanitarian assistance but have offered little diplomatic or political leverage to influence the national authorities. During elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, the Principles focused attention on IDPs' political rights but across the world IDP political participation remains inconsistent. They have helped inspire the peace process in Nepal but the country still lacks an effective IDP strategy. They have informed the ongoing process of drafting the African Union Convention for the Prevention of Internal Displacement and the Protection of and Assistanct to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa but -- assuming it is approved by the African Union at a special summit[1] -- its effectiveness will depend on the degree of compliance and monitoring. The Principles were issued to Georgian civil servants designated to provide assistance to those displaced by the recent conflict but the response of the government to Georgia's latest displacement crisis has been criticised. They form the basis for Uganda's National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons but there is still a very significant implementation gap.

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This article appears in a 40-page special issue of FMR that reflects discussions at the international conference on the Ten Years of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – GP10 – held in Oslo on 16-17 October 2008. It will be available in English, Arabic, French and Spanish. The English edition is now online at http://www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples10.htm

[1] http://www.unhcrrlo.org/Conference_Special_Events/2008AUSpecial
Summit.html

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Walter Kälin

Publication: Forced Migration Review

Guiding Principle 29 and the Right to Restitution

Rhodri C. Williams — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

At the time that the Guiding Principles were drawn up, the right of IDPs to reclaim abandoned property was not beyond dispute. Human rights law guaranteed a "right to return" but it was limitd to restoring people to the frontiers of their country of origin -- a destination often far from their actual homes. Likewise, the right to legal remedies for violations such as property confiscation was defined as a procedural entitlemetn to a fair hearing, without pre-judging whether any specific substantive remedy such as restitution should result.

Accordingly, while the drafters of the Guiding Principles were aware that durable solutions for IDPs were inconceivable without the possibility of restitution and voluntary return, prevailing legal understandings necessitated a formulation focusing on state duties rather than individual rights. However, important progress on the ground came as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia and included rights for displaced persons "freely to return to their homes of origin" and to "have restored to them property of which they were deprived." The next five years saw a methodical push to restore the property rights of Bosnia's displaced, resulting in the restitution of some 200,000 homes, the return of up to a million people and the first real precedent for large-scale post-conflict property restitution as of right.

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Authors

Rhodri C. Williams

Publication: Forced Migration Review

Frontiers of Europe

Tue, 16 Dec 2008 09:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 16-17, 2008

Pushkinska Street
Premier Palace Hotel

Kyiv, Ukraine

On December 16-17, 2008, the Brookings Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), Yalta European Strategy and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation hosted a high-level conference in Kyiv, Ukraine as part of the “Frontiers of Europe” project.

Launched in 2006, “Frontiers of Europe” is a Brookings Center on the United States and Europe initiative that aims to explore the policy options for creating a Europe “whole and free,” including possible routes to membership in key institutions and options for achieving the broader benefits of enlargement in an era of enlargement fatigue. The Kyiv conference capped a series of workshops held in Belgrade, Istanbul and Tbilisi that addressed these issues with regard to the Balkans, Turkey and the states of the Caucasus.

Through a series of panels before a public audience and the press, a select group of leading officials and experts from the United States, the European Union, NATO, Russia, Ukraine and the other “frontier” areas assessed Western policies aimed at solving pending regional issues and advancing the process of stabilization and integration. Panelists explored a number of key issues, including how Europe views the “frontiers,” how Ukraine and other states on the “frontier” view Europe, Russian perspectives, the role of democracy and the rule of law in promoting European integration, and energy connections across the “frontiers” as well as weighed policy options and roles for the European Union, NATO and the United States.

Conference speakers included, among others, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Hryhoriy Nemyria; Vice President of the European Parliament Marek Siwiec; Former Rada Chairman Arseniy Yatseniuk; Brookings Vice President Carlos Pascual; Foreign Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Ohryzhko; Former President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski; Vladimir Milov of the Russian Institute of Energy Policy; and Nino Burjanadze of the Georgian Foundation for Democracy and Development.

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Protracted Displacement in Europe: Perspectives and Solutions

Walter Kälin — Wed, 26 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500

Madame Chairperson of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population,
Distinguished Members of the Committee,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a particular pleasure for me to welcome you here. Since assuming my mandate I have cooperated with the Council of Europe in fruitful ways and a variety of contexts. I fondly remember your last seminar on internal displacement here in Geneva. I appreciated the invitation by the Council’s Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons to contribute to the development of Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on internally displaced persons of 5 April 2006. This recommendation is arguably the most authoritative statement on the protection of internally displaced persons in Europe. I also appreciated Chairperson Jonker’s forceful statement recently in Oslo at the celebration of the 10^th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Last but not least, your Commissioner on Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, and I continue our long-standing cooperation and reinforce our messages on specific situations very effectively.

While Africa could be considered the continent of internal displacement because it has more than 12 of the roughly 25 million displaced by armed conflict worldwide, Europe, with its estimated 2.5 million internally displaced persons, could be called the continent of protracted displacement. While the armed conflict in Georgia in August of this year has tragically reminded us that the threat of war remains a reality in Europe even in the 21^st century, 99% of Europe’s remaining displaced fled their homes some 15 to 25 years ago as a result of conflicts arising from rejected independence claims and territorial disputes. In recent years some governments have taken important steps to improve their situation, but overall the situation of most internally displaced people remains a cause for concern.

What, then, is protracted displacement? UNHCR has defined a protracted refugee situation as ”one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo, “ i.e., a situation in which “[t]heir lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.”[1] By analogy, experts participating at a seminar organized by UNHCR and the Brooking-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in June 2007 concluded that protracted IDP situations, in addition to their prolonged nature, exhibit two key characteristics: (1) the process for finding durable solutions has become stalled, and (2) the displaced are marginalized by disregard for or failure to protect their human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights.

My missions and visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia over the last years have placed a number of critical observations into stark relief:

Many of the protracted situations in Europe are the consequence of armed conflicts that had been marked by inter-ethnic violence or even ethnic cleansing. In some of these situations, internally displaced became political pawns. In the absence of a political settlement to the underlying conflicts, they were in some cases deliberately left in limbo and durable solutions or even temporary integration at the location of displacement were discouraged. In other cases, the reality of internal displacement was simply denied. Temporary housing arrangements, segregated schools or limited access to education for IDP children as well as economic and social marginalization are among the immediate consequences.
Housing, employment and access to quality education are typically the dominant concerns both during protracted displacement and after return. While resources often are scarce in the post-conflict transition phase, IDPs suffer disproportionately since they have to compete for these resources from a marginalized position. Particular difficulties stem from the fact that displacement often marks for IDPs the beginning of a rural to urban transition.
Protection of property left behind and, ultimately its restitution, are often ignored, hindering IDPs in their efforts to resume their lives and remaining a serious source of grievance and a trigger-point for future conflict.
Strict application of requirements for legal documentation, coupled with failure to replace or issue new documentation, prevents IDPs in some countries from accessing and enjoying a range of rights: to health, education, property, a livelihood. – and that often years after their initial displacement.
Where return or integration is agreed in principle, central governments at times fail to exercise sufficient control over reintegration processes at the local level to ensure its implementation. Without clear political signals from the highest levels of government, durable solutions are not prioritized at the local level where local political pressure may support a different result. Discrimination, harassment and denial of political participation by IDPs from minority communities frequently occurs at the local authority and local community level, and they are exacerbated if mixed signals are sent from the central level.
The absence of political settlements also negatively affects safety and security in return areas, including specific issues such as mine clearance.
The lack of IDP-specific policies and laws or their belated adoption often added to the problems.
IDPs subject to multiple discrimination face a level of problems and protection concerns not experienced by other IDPs. Ethnic minority groups not linked to a party involved in the conflict -- such as the Roma -- are often particularly affected. Donors and Government further fail to recognize vulnerabilities of marginalized groups in the recovery phase, e.g., by cutting funding for collective housing complexes, even though it is the most vulnerable such as the elderly or people with mental disabilities that tend to stay behind. Mental health issues, often rooted in conflict atrocities and exacerbated by the protracted nature of displacement, are frequently neglected and responses underfunded.
IDPs either are not involved in peace processes or they become an object of political manipulation, with the result that they cannot properly the agenda in accordance with their best interests, needs and rights.

In light of these problems, we have come together today to address the following three issues:

What are the challenges and the opportunities to enable durable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in protracted situations, in line with States’ human rights obligations and as spelled out in CoE Recommendation (2006)6?
In a protracted situation where durable solutions for displaced persons might not be feasible, how may we reconcile the right of IDPs to fully participate equally, as citizens or habitual residents of their country, in social and economic activities, in access to justice and protection from violence, with protection and preservation of their right to return?
What could be the role of the Parliamentary Assembly, and in particular its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, in advancing protection of the human rights of IDPs and placing the issue of protracted displacement as priority on the Council of Europe’s agenda in 2009?

This morning’s presentations will address these issues, and I sincerely thank my colleagues from the organizations represented here for having so graciously accepted the invitation to share their views with us.

Not wanting to duplicate what we will hear, I conclude by offering the following key principles to guide our critically-needed efforts to tackle protracted displacement situations in Europe:

Efforts to solve the frozen conflicts in Europe must be renewed. Real solutions for IDPs will remain elusive if conflicts linger on.
An absence of political solutions cannot serve as an excuse for failing to address protracted displacement situations. The government retains the primary responsibility to it citizens regardless of a frozen conflict and even in the absence of territorial control.
The point of departure for discussions about protracted situations must be the recognition first, that internally displaced persons remain -- despite their being displaced -- citizens of the country they have not left and, second, that as such, they are fully entitled to enjoy the full range of human rights available under the European Human Rights Convention, the two UN human rights Covenants and other applicable human right treaties. They must, therefore, enjoy the same level of protection and realization of these rights as the rest of the population, though respect of their rights may require specific and additional effort. In other words, the displaced have specific vulnerabilities and protection and assistance needs not shared by the rest of the population, and they are entitled to measures that address these needs. Where needed, they are therefore entitled to differential and preferential treatment and such treatment shall not be deemed “discriminatory”.
Actively addressing specific needs and vulnerabilities while respecting IDPs’ rights of participation and of non-discrimination means that internally displaced persons should be integrated into mainstream society to the fullest extent possible, even if chances for return remain. This necessitates investment into the provision of adequate housing, education, creation of livelihoods, and in some contexts measures to protect against discrimination. We must recognize, and reflect in our actions, that enabling the displaced to lead a normal life and protecting their right to return are not mutually exclusive. Rather, people who are in control of their lives and who are not hampered by continuing rights violations are more likely to go back and rebuild than are individuals or communities who have been marginalized and who suffer from dependency syndrome.
In all situations, there are categories of particularly vulnerable persons such as traumatized persons, single-headed households, persons with disabilities, or elderly persons without family support who continue to be in need of humanitarian assistance and support. Targeted attention and action will be necessary to enable them to find solutions.
When protracted conflicts are resolved by peace agreement or other means, the right of internally displaced persons to choose between return to their homes, local integration at the site of displacement, or resettlement to another part of the country must be respected. That choice must be voluntary and informed, and it must be a meaningful choice. That means that authorities have a responsibility to enable conditions for all three to be viable options, and not merely to favor one approach to the exclusion of the others.
Authorities must also take the necessary measures in a number of areas to ensure that the solution chosen will be sustainable in the long term. That means first: to ensure safety and security, particularly at locations of return. It also entails restitution of property and repair or rebuilding of houses and basic infrastructure. Finally, we must not overlook sustainability of return in economic and social terms, including non-discriminatory access to basic services and economic opportunities.
In all of this, internally displaced persons must be informed and consulted on all relevant steps, and to the extent possible, receive the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting them.

[1] Executive Committee on the High Commissioner’s Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, EC/54/SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004, para. 3.

Authors

Walter Kälin

Publication: Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population

Russia's Ominous New Doctrine?

Strobe Talbott — Fri, 15 Aug 2008 09:20:30 -0400

Russia has been justifying its rampage through Georgia as a "peacekeeping" operation to end the Tbilisi government's "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" of South Ossetia. That terminology deliberately echoes U.S. and NATO language during their 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia, which resulted in the independence of Kosovo. Essentially, it's payback time for a grievance that Russia has borne against the West for nine years. The Russians are relying on the conceit that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is today's equivalent of Slobodan Milosevic, and that the South Ossetians are (or were until their rescue by the latter-day Red Army last week) being victimized by Tbilisi the way the Kosovar Albanians suffered under Belgrade.

This analogy turns reality, and history, upside down. Only after exhausting every attempt at diplomacy did NATO go to war over Kosovo. It did so because the formerly "autonomous" province of Serbia was under the heel of Belgrade and the Milosevic regime was running amok there, killing ethnic Albanians and throwing them out of their homes. By contrast, South Ossetia—even though it is on Georgian territory—has long been a Russian protectorate, beyond the reach of Saakashvili's government.

An accurate comparison between the Balkan disasters of the 1990s and the one now playing out in the Caucasus underscores what is most ominous about current Russian policy. Seventeen years ago, the Soviet Union came apart at the seams more or less peacefully. That was overwhelmingly because Boris Yeltsin insisted on converting the old inter-republic boundaries into new international ones. In doing so, he kept in check the forces of revanchism among communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament (which went by the appropriately atavistic name "the Supreme Soviet").

Meanwhile, Yugoslavia collapsed into bloody chaos because its leaders engaged in an ethnically and religiously based land-grab. Milosevic, as the best-armed of the lot, tried to carve a "Greater Serbia" out of the flanks of Bosnia and Croatia. If Yeltsin had gone that route, seeking to create a Greater Russia that incorporated Belarus and the parts of Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan and the Baltic states populated by Russian speakers, there could have been conflict across 11 time zones with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the mix.

A question that looms large in the wake of the past week is whether Russian policy has changed with regard to the permanence of borders. That seemed to be what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was hinting yesterday when he said, "You can forget about any discussion of Georgia's territorial integrity." He ridiculed "the logic of forcing South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to being part of the Georgian state."

Lavrov is a careful and experienced diplomat, not given to shooting off his mouth. That makes his comments all the more unsettling. If he has given the world a glimpse of the Russian endgame, it's dangerous in its own right and in the precedent it would set. South Ossetia and Abkhazia might be set up as supposedly independent countries ("just like Kosovo," the Russians would say)—but would in fact be satrapies of Russia. While Russia might see that outcome as proof of its comeback as a major power, the Balkanization of the Caucasus may not end there: Chechnya is just one of several regions on Russian territory that are seething with resentment against the Kremlin and that might hanker after a version of independence far less to Moscow's liking than what may be contemplated for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Among Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's important tasks in the days ahead is to get clarity on whether a Lavrov doctrine has replaced the Yeltsin one of 16 years ago. If so, big trouble looms—including for Russia. Moscow's action and rhetoric of the past week have highlighted yet another, potentially more consequential respect in which this episode could bode ill for all concerned. For the Bush administration—and those of Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush as well—the fundamental premise of American policy has been that Russia has put its Soviet past behind it and is committed, eventually, to integrating itself into Europe and the political, economic and ideological (as opposed to the geographical) "West."

Prominent Russians have said as much. In one of my first meetings with Vladimir Putin, before he became president, he spoke of his country's zapadnichestvo, its Western vocation. Yet it now appears that beyond the undisguised animosity that Putin bears toward Saakashvili, he and his government regard Georgia's pro-Western bent and its aspiration to join two Western institutions, NATO and the European Union, as, literally, a casus belli. If that is the case, the next U.S. administration—the fourth to deal with post-Soviet Russia—will have to reexamine the underlying basis for the whole idea of partnership with that country and its continuing integration into a rule-based international community.

Authors

Strobe Talbott

Publication: The Washington Post

Warning Light on Kosovo

John Bolton, Lawrence Eagleburger and Peter W. Rodman — Thu, 31 Jan 2008 12:00:00 -0500

The Bush administration has indicated its readiness to recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a province of the Republic of Serbia that since 1999 has been under United Nations administration and NATO military control.

Such a declaration may take place as early as February. American recognition would be over Serbia's objections, without a negotiated solution between Serbia and Kosovo's Albanians, and without modification by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 1244, which reaffirms Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo while providing for the province's "substantial autonomy." U.S. recognition may be joined by that of some members of the European Union, which has been under heavy diplomatic pressure from Washington, though several EU states and a number of countries outside Europe have said they would reject such action.

Attempting to impose a settlement on Serbia would be a direct challenge to the Russian Federation, which opposes any Kosovo settlement not accepted by Belgrade.

We believe an imposed settlement of the Kosovo question and seeking to partition Serbia's sovereign territory without its consent is not in the interest of the United States. The blithe assumption of American policy — that the mere passage of nine years of relative quiet would be enough to lull Serbia and Russia into reversing their positions on a conflict that goes back centuries — has proven to be naive in the extreme.

We believe U.S. policy on Kosovo must be re-examined without delay, and we urge the Bush administration to make it clear that pending the results of such re-examination it would withhold recognition of a Kosovo independence declaration and discourage Kosovo's Albanians from taking that step.

Current U.S. policy relies on the unconvincing claim that Kosovo is "unique" and would set no precedent for other troublespots. Of course every conflict has unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious minorities in other countries already are signaling their intention to follow a Kosovo example. This includes sizeable Albanian communities in adjoining areas of southern Serbia, Montenegro, and especially the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as the Serbian portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's consent would set a precedent with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences for many other regions of the world. The Kosovo model already has been cited by supporters of the Basque separatist movement in Spain and the Turkish-controlled area of northern Cyprus. Neither the Security Council nor any other international body has the power or authority to impose a change of any country's borders.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current policy is the dismissive attitude displayed toward Russia's objections. Whatever disagreements the United States may have with Moscow on other issues, and there are many, the United States should not prompt an unnecessary crisis in U.S.-Russia relations. There are urgent matters regarding which the United States must work with Russia, including Iran's nuclear intentions and North Korea's nuclear capability. Such cooperation would be undercut by American action to neutralize Moscow's legitimate concerns regarding Kosovo.

If the U.S. moves forward with recognizing Kosovo, Moscow's passivity cannot be taken for granted. It may have been one thing in 1999 for the United States and NATO to take action against Yugoslavia over the objections of a weak Russia.

Today, it would be unwise to dismiss Russia's willingness and ability to assist Serbia. On an issue of minor importance to the United States, is this a useful expenditure of significant political capital with Russia?

Our Kosovo policy is hardly less problematic for our friends and allies in Europe. While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence, a number of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington's inflexibility and insistence. No more than the United States, Europe would not benefit from an avoidable confrontation with Russia.

Even if Kosovo declared itself an independent state, it would be a dysfunctional one and a ward of the international community for the indefinite future. Corruption and organized crime are rampant. The economy, aside from international largesse and criminal activities, is nonviable. Law enforcement, integrity of the courts, protection of persons and property, and other prerequisites for statehood are practically nonexistent. While these failures are often blamed on Kosovo's uncertain status, a unilateral declaration of independence recognized by some countries and rejected by many others would hardly remedy that fact.

The result would be a new "frozen conflict," with Kosovo's status still unresolved. The risk of renewed violence would further impede Kosovo's development. Moreover, heightened tensions might require reinforcing the U.S. presence in Kosovo when we can least afford it due to other commitments.

Serbia has made great strides in democratic development and economic revitalization since the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Current policy with respect to Kosovo risks complete reversal of these gains. Faced with a choice between Western partnership and defense of their sovereign territory and constitution, there is little doubt what Serbia would decide.

The current positive trend could falter in the face of political radicalization and possible internal destabilization. Serbia's relations with countries that had recognized Kosovo would be impaired. Serbia would inevitably move closer to Russia as its only protector.

We do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the Kosovo question nor do we suggest the status quo can endure indefinitely. As with thorny questions elsewhere, viable and enduring settlements should result from negotiation and compromise. Such an outcome has been undermined by a U.S. promise to the Kosovo Albanians that their demands will be satisfied if they remain adamant and no agreement is reached with Belgrade. Such a promise cannot be justified by the claim, often heard from proponents of independence, that the Albanians' "patience" is running out, so independence must be granted without delay. This is nothing less than appeasing a threat of violence.

A reassessment of America's Kosovo policy is long overdue. We hope a policy that would set a very dangerous international precedent can still be averted if that reassessment begins now. In the meantime, it is imperative that no unwarranted or hasty action be taken that would turn what is now a relatively small problem into a large one.

Authors

John Bolton
Lawrence Eagleburger
Peter W. Rodman

Publication: The Washington Times

Addressing Internally Displaced Persons in a Peace Process: Why and How?

Khalid Koser — Fri, 14 Dec 2007 12:00:00 -0500

My presentation today draws on a report recently published by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement entitled Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building, which is available on our website. For the purposes of this afternoon’s presentation I’ll focus on just one aspect of the report, on addressing internal displacement in peace processes – or negotiations for peace.

I’d like to convey three fairly straightforward messages:

First, there are convincing reasons to address internal displacement in most peace processes from an early stage.
Second, the best way to do this is through direct participation by the displaced, but there can be obstacles to effective participation.
Where the participation of the displaced is either not possible or not desirable, alternative or complementary strategies for addressing their needs are required.

Why is it important to address internal displacement in peace processes?

Resolving displacement is often inextricably linked with achieving sustainable peace, for a number of reasons:

Most fundamentally, IDPs – like all other war-affected civilians – have rights grounded in international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and states have an obligation to protect those rights.
Numbers: In one quarter of the countries currently in conflict, over five percent of the population is internally displaced. There are over one million IDPs in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In countries such as these the sheer scale of displacement makes it simply unrealistic to plan for the peaceful future of the country without incorporating the needs of the displaced and ensuring their active participation.
Helping displaced populations to return and reintegrate can simultaneously address the root causes of a conflict and help prevent further displacement. For example, the return of displaced populations can be an important signifier of peace and the end of conflict, and can play an important part in validating the post-conflict political order. The return of displaced populations can be a pre-condition for peace if they are politically active. And the return of displaced populations can make an important contribution to the recovery of local economies.
In some countries IDPs have become parties to the conflict, and their inclusion is therefore necessary for conflict-resolution.
One reason why IDPs may require special attention in peace processes is that they often have specific needs. More often than refugees, IDPs remain close to the zone of conflict and thus more vulnerable to violence; the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs is often more difficult than for refugees; and unlike refugees IDPs are not singled out for specific protection in international law. In contrast to other war-affected civilian populations, IDPs need shelter; may be unable to replace or receive identity cards and other official documents; and often encounter serious problems regaining land and property left behind.
Including displaced populations at an early stage in peace processes can initiate momentum for them to be active participants in post-conflict peace-building.
More widely, broad-based civil society participation in political processes – including peace – is increasingly seen as good practice. A variety of UN and other international conventions and agreements recognizes the rights of children, youth and women to participate in political processes that affect their lives.

An initial observation I would make is that this list combines factors that are IDP-specific, with those that apply more widely and are IDP-relevant. That is a distinction it may be worth returning to in discussion.

Direct participation

The best way to address the concerns of IDPs in peace processes is through their direct participation. But that has often proved difficult to achieve.

There are very few examples of formal participation of refugees or IDPs in ‘track-one’ processes, and there are three main obstacles. First, ‘track-one’ processes are often exclusive and high-level, and work to short deadlines, which largely precludes civil society participation and time-consuming consultations. As a consequence, however, they often lack the specialized contribution and sense of ownership that can be gained through civil society participation.

Second, displaced populations often have specific disadvantages as regards their potential for participating in ‘track-one’ processes: They may belong to minority groups and lack resources, education, political skills and influence. They may also lack leaders who can represent them.

A third obstacle relates to circumstances of IDPs that can hinder their participation specifically. They often do not live in camps and are dispersed; they lack an international regime to support their rights; and they may be more vulnerable to reprisals from their government when they do mobilize.

It is exactly because of these sorts of obstacles that parallel ‘track-two’ initiatives have gained legitimacy. On one hand some advantages of direct participation in ‘track-one’ negotiations cannot be replaced – for example they usually set the timetable and agenda for peace processes. On the other hand ‘track-one’ processes often rely on ‘track-two’ processes, to provide insights into local contexts and a less formal forum for problem-solving.

Our review found no examples of IDP-specific ‘track-two’ processes, however there are a number of examples where IDPs and other displaced populations have participated in wider ‘track-two’ processes – in Burundi, Colombia, Georgia and Liberia. Coalitions with women’s groups appear to have been a particularly effective tactic.

An advantage of wider engagement is the added leverage of a broader coalition. One disadvantage is that IDP-specific issues can be subsumed within the wider demands of coalitions. A second disadvantage is that it can be easier for formal parties to marginalize or exclude coalitions rather than resist pressure from numerous separate lobbies.

‘Track-three’ or ‘grassroots’ initiatives can also play an important role in peace processes, and probably provide the greatest scope for direct participation by IDPs. These initiatives can have a number of advantages: they encourage ownership of the peace process at the local level; they can provide a safety net in that if formal negotiations fail progress can still be made locally; ‘track-three’ participants can have access to local knowledge denied to other levels of peace negotiations; and grassroots initiatives have often been the main outlets of women’s peace activities.

Often, however, there is no clear impact of ‘track-three’ processes on national level peace processes, and alone they cannot be relied on to ensure that IDP concerns are represented in full-scale peace processes or agreements.

The need for alternative or complementary strategies

There are clearly a number of obstacles to the effective participation of IDPs in peace processes.

As we have seen, there are often practical obstacles that hinder the participation of IDPs – lack of education, resources and political skills – and these can also apply to participation in ‘track-two’ and even ‘track-three’ processes.
Even where IDPs do participate directly, their particular needs may be diluted, and they may not impact on national level processes.
The mobilization and participation of IDPs can entail risks for the displaced. In Colombia, for example, armed actors have used threats, assassinations, and ‘disappearances’ to dissuade IDPs from mobilizing. There are reports that IDPs are also being threatened with reprisals in Darfur.
IDPs often do not have democratic structures to nominate representatives. In Georgia, certain self-appointed IDP leaders have incited violence and raised false hopes among IDPs.
The direct participation of IDPs and other displaced populations can be associated with ‘spoiling’ tactics that can hinder, delay or undermine peace processes.

Another distinction worth highlighting here is that sometimes the direct participation of IDPs is not possible, and sometimes it is not desirable. Again we might return to this distinction in discussion.

Our report makes a series of recommendations for overcoming these obstacles and thus enabling the direct participation of displaced populations – for example through establishing democratic structures to nominate legitimate representatives, and providing training and capacity-building for civil society coalitions for peace.

At the same time there is clearly a need to develop alternative or complementary strategies to direct participation. The report identifies three main options:

First, international mediators can prompt political leaders to incorporate displacement issues in peace negotiations. This was largely a successful strategy in Mozambique and Bosnia. Our Project is working on a handbook for international mediators on exactly this topic, in a series being coordinated by USIP and the Mediation Support Unit of the UN Department of Political Affairs. At the same time unless mediators directly consult with displaced populations, they may not actually understand their priorities. One of the recommendations of our report is that mediators should consult wherever possible.
A second complementary strategy is to focus on the legal rights of IDPs, especially as advocating for agreed standards should not require direct consultations. There are often international, regional and national mechanisms that can be harnessed to promote the protection of IDP rights as a contribution to the pursuit of peace. There is a clear role here for the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.
Third, there may be a role for UN agencies and other international actors, as well as NGOs, to collect and provide information on displacement issues to ‘track-one’ actors. They are likely to have good understanding of local issues, and to have either direct or indirect access to peace negotiations. They can be effective substitutes for the displaced themselves.

Conclusions

I’ll conclude by looking forward to our discussion.

First, there is clearly a wealth of experience and expertise in this room, and I would be very interested to hear from you about specific examples of the involvement of displaced populations in peace processes – including obstacles and how to overcome them.
Second, I flagged two distinctions that it might be worth retuning to. One was between IDP-specific and IDP-relevant issues in peace processes. The other was between when IDPs cannot, and when they should not, participate directly.
Finally, I would welcome discussion on alternative or complementary strategies to direct participation.

Thank you

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Authors

Khalid Koser

Publication: Addressing Internally Displaced Persons in a Peace Process, United States Institute of Peace

The Balkans: A New Crisis?

Thu, 29 Nov 2007 11:00:00 -0500

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November 29, 2007
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

On November 29, the Brookings Institution welcomed David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. Mr. Cameron discussed recent developments in the Balkans and the looming challenges to stability in the region.

David Cameron was elected Conservative Party leader by an overwhelming majority in December 2005. Previously he had held the positions of shadow deputy leader of the House of Commons (2003); deputy chairman of the Conservative Party (2003); front bench spokesman on local government finance (2004); and head of policy coordination up until May 2005. After the general election in 2005, Mr. Cameron held the position of shadow secretary of state for education and skills.

Mr. Cameron was first elected as a Member of Parliament in June 2001. Prior to his election, he worked at high-level positions in business and government, including serving as director of corporate affairs at Carlton Communication PLC, one of the UK's leading media companies, and working as a special advisor at the British Home Office and the Treasury.

Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Carlos Pascual provided introductory remarks. Daniel Benjamin, senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe, moderated the discussion.

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The Rt Hon David Cameron, MP

Leader, British Conservative Party

Willliam Hague

Shadow Foreign Secretary, Senior Member of the Shadow Cabinet

European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution

Steven Pifer — Thu, 01 Nov 2007 12:00:00 -0400

Introduction

The Orange Revolution engulfed Ukraine following the November 2004 presidential run-off election between Viktor Yushchenko, which was marred by massive voting irregularities. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv and other cities in protest. The crisis ended on December 8 with an agreement to repeat the run-off election, a revised presidential election law that made vote falsification less likely, and constitutional amendments that gave Ukraine a parliamentary-presidential model of government.

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Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 54, no. 6

A Faithful Case for Intervention: Our Common Responsibility to Protect Humanity and Prevent Atrocities

Elizabeth Ferris — Sun, 30 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400

People of faith struggle every day with the question of how to translate their spiritiual values into concrete and appropriate responses to people whose lives are unprotected or endagered by their own government. This responsibility—to protect fellow citizens of the world who face death and mistreatment by tyrants who hide behind national sovereignty, and to prevent such situations from occurring—has been under intense debate since the formation of the modern nation-state.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, a more sweeping understanding has developed of how people of faith should act for the global common good in the face of civil conflicts and tyranny rooted in nation-states. One striking example of this is the interfaith advocacy being carried out through the Save Darfur Coalition.

Yet responding collectively in the face of clear crimes against humanity by nation-state leaders does not come easily to the world's major faiths. The reasons: theological differences in approaches to war and pragmatic uncertainties about the nature of the appropriate response. The relationship between the global common good and the responsibility of the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries in order to protect people whose lives are at risk is known as the "responsibility to protect." This concept has been the subject of intense debate in international circles over the past two decades.

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Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Pursuing the Common Good: Principle and Practice in U.S. Foreign Policy (Center for American Progress, 2007)

Maintaining Humanitarian Ideals in Conflict Situations

Elizabeth Ferris — Fri, 14 Sep 2007 12:00:00 -0400

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this distinguished panel to launch this important new book Humanitarian Diplomacy. I found the book to be a fascinating collection of diverse experiences which practitioners have talked about in an anecdotal fashion for many years. The concept of humanitarian diplomacy is a useful framework for analyzing diverse actions by different actors with different short-term objectives in virtually all regions of the world. And for people working in the humanitarian community, the book is a testament to the creativity and commitment of many people working in dangerous situations to get humanitarian relief to people in need.

I would like to begin with one general comment and then focus on several issues related to NGOs and humanitarian diplomacy.

The general comment is a sense of sadness at the fragility of the humanitarian enterprise. As many have discussed and the studies in this volume illustrate, the very concept of humanitarianism is under siege. The perception that humanitarianism is a Western liberal invention rather than a universal norm erodes the protection formerly enjoyed by humanitarian actors. The study on Afghanistan even charts the moment when the change came: “The Taliban’s predecessors had accepted humanitarian actors as relatively neutral and impartial players…For the Taliban, however, the targeting of civilians and the denial of access and humanitarian assistance became integral parts of their war strategy.” (p. 156) So too, other governments and warring parties have adopted similar policies; displacement of populations and denial of assistance has been a military strategy in situations as diverse as Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The extent to which humanitarian action is possible usually depends on the belligerents – how much they know about international humanitarian law or how much they perceive that respecting it will further their own interests.

The vagaries of conflict mean that the ability to provide assistance to large numbers of internally displaced persons and other civilians at risk often depends on the whims of a soldier at a checkpoint or a bandit hoping to make a buck. While humanitarian access can depend on the skill of the negotiators – as illustrated in this book -- it is more often determined by the belligerent forces. The truth is that humanitarians don’t have much leverage when negotiating with people with the guns. In the past, such protection was the result of a perception that it was in everyone’s interest to respect humanitarian neutrality, but that perception is clearly breaking down. Given current trends with resource wars and fragmentation of rebel movements, respect for international humanitarian law is not likely to improve.

The actions of humanitarian actors themselves can also impact on security and access – particularly their relations with governments. And in this respect, perceptions can be more important than the actual relationships. The study on Iraq, for example, illustrates the difficulties when the public perceives that humanitarian work is being conducted in support of political and military objectives – even when the relief agencies tried to distance themselves from the military efforts.

There are some who argue that we need to be uncompromising in our neutrality and impartiality as the only way of recovering humanitarian principles while others advocate a more pragmatic course. I don’t know what the answer is – to go back to basics in reaffirming classic humanitarian principles or to ‘get innovative about how we do things’ as Claudia Rodriguez frames the debate in her study. But the erosion of humanitarian principles and practice is certainly occurring and I fear that we are incrementally losing something very precious – humanitarian ideals. I also wonder about the extent to which humanitarian diplomacy itself may be contributing to this erosion. In particular, the study on the Balkans raises the question of whether the negotiations which took place – which had to take place to secure access to those in need – may have contributed to the weakening of humanitarian principles. Similarly, the study on Afghanistan refers to “unsavoury deals” while the chapter on Somalia raises the question of whether negotiating with warlords has the effect of legitimizing them. Humanitarian diplomacy is often based on compromise and yet compromising on basic humanitarian principles can weaken them.

Turning now to NGOs, there has been growing awareness over the last decade of the role NGOs play in protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians. The studies in this volume illustrate that international NGOs can and do use humanitarian diplomacy to protect and assist vulnerable people. But I was struck by the lack of reference to national NGOs in this volume. With the exception of the study on Lebanon, national NGOs are hardly mentioned. I have argued recently that, in spite of the rhetoric of solidarity, international NGOs have more in common with UN agencies than with national or Southern NGOs. This volume reinforces that argument, but I wonder about the extent to which these techniques also apply to national NGOs’ involvement with humanitarian diplomacy. National NGOs face different pressures and have different assets than national staff of international NGOs.

A second issue related to NGOs is coordination – a term which often seems to be an oxymoron. Almost all of the studies highlight the difficulties for humanitarian diplomacy when humanitarian actors pursue divergent approaches. NGOs in particular often do not feel bound by UN-negotiated agreements. For example, the study on Sudan illustrates that while Operation Lifeline Sudan was carefully negotiated with the Sudanese government and rebel forces, NGOs carried out their own airlifts which sometimes complicated the UN’s efforts. The actions taken by one humanitarian actor can have consequences for others. I was also struck by the fact that even though there are different actors with different constituencies and mandates, in most situations the public perception is that humanitarian actors are all lumped in together. As the study on ICRC’s role in East Timor noted, the arrival of hundreds of new NGOs complicated the humanitarian landscape. Today there are opportunities for humanitarian actors –Red Cross/Crescent societies, NGOs and UN agencies – to work more intentionally together through the recently-established Global Humanitarian Platform. This is in everyone’s interest. To the extent that the humanitarian community can adopt similar or complementary strategies – whether in Cambodia or East Timor or Colombia – the possibilities for effective humanitarian action are increased.

Finally, although I’m a big supporter of NGOs, I thought the book was quite gentle on the issues of NGO accountability and competition between NGOs. International NGOs – even very powerful NGOs – do not have the same accountabilities as governments or multilateral actors which makes coordination difficult. NGOs can often say ‘we can’t coordinate our work with you because we are accountable to our board of directors which has set different priorities.’

Competition between NGOs is, I believe, the biggest impediment to coordination. International NGOs compete with each other and with UN agencies for donor funding; they also compete with national NGOs. This point is nuanced several times in the book, but I think it deserves more attention. Like many of you, I have seen many occasions where NGOs jockey for international press coverage because of the comparative advantage it gives them in fund-raising with the public. And sadly, I have seen cases of NGOs withholding information from one another because information is, after all, power.

I am grateful to the editors for putting together this collection of studies on humanitarian diplomacy. They raise more questions than they answer – which is, of course, the mark of a good book.

Edited by Larry Minear & Hazel Smith, United Nations University

Authors

Elizabeth Ferris

Publication: Launch of Humatarian Diplomacy

Brookings: Topics - Balkans

How The Hague Courts and Tribunals Protect Human Rights

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Women Responding to War

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The Frontiers of Europe : A Transatlantic Problem?

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Federiga Bindi

Irina Angelescu

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Incorporating Protection into Humanitarian Action: Approaches and Limits

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The Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons

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Peace, Reconciliation, and Displacement

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Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Serbia

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Protracted Displacement in Europe

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Mass Displacement Caused by Conflicts and One-Sided Violence

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The Future of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

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Guiding Principle 29 and the Right to Restitution

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Frontiers of Europe

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Protracted Displacement in Europe: Perspectives and Solutions

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Russia's Ominous New Doctrine?

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Warning Light on Kosovo

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Addressing Internally Displaced Persons in a Peace Process: Why and How?

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The Balkans: A New Crisis?

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European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution

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A Faithful Case for Intervention: Our Common Responsibility to Protect Humanity and Prevent Atrocities

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Maintaining Humanitarian Ideals in Conflict Situations

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