Brookings: Topics - Bahrain

Sectarianism Spreads to Egypt

Geneive Abdo — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

Considering Egypt's wide-ranging political and economic crises, a recent national dispute might seem minor in the scheme of things, but it says volumes about the Middle East in the era of the Arab uprisings.

On April 1, more than 50 tourists from Iran visited Egypt— perhaps the first to do so since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when ties between the two countries were severed after Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. The decision to welcome Iranians into the country was backed by President Mohamad Morsi and the Minister of Tourism, but fiercely opposed by Salafist groups and others. As leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party explained, when I was in Cairo two weeks ago, it was a pragmatic decision: Egypt needs tourists to aid its failing economy, and the Iranian market is not only virgin territory, but Iranians are not afraid to visit, no matter the chaos.

But for Salafists group, allowing Muslims who are Shi’a into the country risks they will try to convert Egypt’s majority Sunni population to their Islamic sect. At least this is what many Salafists told me. The issue has created so much controversy over claims of a “Shi’a invasion,” that on April 9, Egypt’s presidential spokesman said tourist flights from Tehran to Cairo would be suspended until June. He made the statement after a series of protests organized by Salafist groups, who clashed with police.

As someone who has been researching the escalating Shi’a-Sunni divide for more than a year (you can read my new paper here), I think this is a significant development. It is understandable that countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarianism has had a long and sordid history, would be immersed in the conflicts we are seeing today. But why Egypt, where there is virtually no history of such sectarian sentiments, at least not among Muslims?

There are a few reasons sectarianism has now sparked emotion, fear, and political dilemmas in Egypt: Some Salafists consider Shi’a Muslims to be heretics, since the split in Islam occurred and Shiism became a separate doctrine in the ninth century. As a result, there is a perception among Salafist groups, not only in Egypt but in Lebanon and other countries, that Iran intends to invade Sunni lands, now that Syria could fall from Alawite control to Sunni domination. In other words, in anticipating the loss of Syria, the Salafists believe Iran is now looking to make other conquests.

Iranian officials have tried to assure the Egyptians this is not their objective. Iran's charge d'affaires, Mojtaba Amani, said in comments carried by the Egyptian state news agency MENA after a Salafist protest at his home in Cairo, that allegations Shiism was being spread in Egypt were a "major lie."

But the Salafists think otherwise. “We have evidence the Shi’a plan to marry Sunni women and promise them a better life and then they will have to convert,” one Salafist leader told me.

And it is not only the Salafists who are nervous about President Morsi’s warm overtures toward Iran. Some religious scholars at Al Azhar, the mosque and university complex that is the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims, also told me they feared Iran was trying to spread Shiism in the Sunni world.

The feelings expressed by the Egyptians reflect alarm across the region— which perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and Iran itself. One only needs to read the statements in the Iranian-state run media each day laying claim to all Muslims and praising what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls the "Islamic awakening" when referring to the Arab uprisings. But what Khamenei fails to acknowledge is that many Sunni Muslims have no intention of embracing Iranian overtures and, in fact, as the war in Syria rages on, animosity toward Iran, President Bashar al Assad’s main patron escalates, and the sectarian divide deepens.

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Arab Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

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Is the Shi’a-Sunni Rift the New Focus for Middle East Stability?

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Geneive Abdo

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and The Prospect of A Nuclear Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

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Suzanne Maloney

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Old Friends, New Neighborhood: The United States, the GCC, and their Responses to the Arab Spring

Shadi Hamid — Sun, 30 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Shadi Hamid's article says the widening policy gap between America and its GCC allies in response to Arab Spring uprisings is the result of differing threat perceptions. Hamid says that “stability” from a U.S. perspective does not mean what it used to, or what Saudi Arabia still thinks it means. For stability to be maintained, U.S. officials believe, governments must respond to the substantive demands of their people and provide them with a real stake in the political process. So while U.S. and Saudi interests do align on a number of issues, they do not align on the broader, philosophical question of how to manage political change.

However, Hamid says there are no ready replacements for the United States in its critical role as the Gulf’s security guarantor. On this basis, Hamid argues the United States and the GCC, despite apparent public tensions, will continue to find ways to work with each other. Neither, for now at least, is in a position to do otherwise.

Hamid concludes that the current nature of American-GCC relations will ultimately dampen any bold U.S. initiative to support greater democratization in the region, particularly in the conservative monarchies of Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan.

Read the article, which is part of the German Marshall Fund's paper series on "The GCC in the Mediterranean in Light of the Arab Spring" »

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Shadi Hamid

Publication: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Image Source: © Fahad Shadeed / Reuters

The Political Situation in Bahrain One Year After the Independent Commission of Inquiry

Wed, 28 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 28, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On November 28, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) held a policy discussion assessing the political situation in Bahrain one year after the release of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. Speakers discussed the implementation of recommendations set out in the BICI report and addressed the challenges in overcoming the current political deadlock. The event also looked at prospects for genuine dialogue between the government and opposition, and explored consequences of a continued political stalemate. The panel featured Stephen McInerney, Executive Director of the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), speaking from Washington D.C., Justin Gengler, Research Associate at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute at Qatar University, and Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager and Editor in Chief of Al-Arab News Channel. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business, and media communities.

Stephen McInerney opened the discussion by commending the government’s initial pledges to implementing the reform proposals outlined by the BICI report. He pointed out, however, that the overall political situation in Bahrain, one year later, is extremely discouraging and disappointing, arguing that the government’s reform efforts have been cosmetic and fail to comply with the spirit of the recommendations set forth by the commission.

McInerney summarized the findings of POMED’s recently released report, entitled “One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI Report.” According to the assessment, out of the 26 recommendations presented by the BICI, only three had been fully implemented, six had not been implemented in any significant way, two were impossible to evaluate due to lack of information, and the remaining 15 had been only partially implemented.

McInerney said that the Bahraini government had successfully implemented the following three recommendations: 1) revoking the National Security Agency’s law enforcement and arrest powers, after its crucial role in the 2011 crackdown; 2) ensuring public order training for public security forces, the National Security Agency and the Bahrain Defense Force, on a par with international standards; 3) training the judiciary and prosecutors on eradicating torture and ill-treatment. Despite these training programs, McInerney argued that there was no significant improvement in police conduct or decrease in allegations of torture and abuse.

McInerney proceeded to highlight the main areas of concern surrounding Bahrain’s reform program. According to the POMED report, the government had failed to hold accountable those responsible of acts of torture and abuse of detainees and protesters during the February 2011 uprising. He noted that no real effort had been made to integrate the Bahraini Shia in the Sunni-dominated police forces and that—due to their deliberate exclusion of opposition figures— newly established government bodies and mechanisms lacked impartiality and independence. Finally, McInerney pointed out that no real progress had been achieved in terms of freedom of expression and assembly, after the government banned protests and charged individuals for openly voicing their opinions online or in public.

McInerney concluded by criticizing the “lack of sincerity and self assessment” of the Bahraini government when claiming that 18 out of the 26 BICI recommendations had been fully implemented. McInerney also referred to the failure of the international community, and in particular the United States, to hold the Bahraini government to its reform commitments. He voiced his hopes that Washington would shift towards a policy of engagement and mediation in order to bring about tangible progress in Bahrain.

Justin Gengler turned the discussion toward the underlying social and political dynamics in Bahrain, as a way of understanding the present conflict and the government’s failure to undertake political reform. Instead of treating the government and the opposition as two homogenous groups fighting each other, Gengler outlined three “other” mutually reinforcing political conflicts in Bahrain, which, he argued, are blocking the resolution of Bahrain’s political crisis.

According to Gengler, the first and most important conflict lies between the reform-minded and the security-minded members of Bahrain’s ruling family. Gengler argued that the 2011 February uprising dealt a fundamental blow to the post-1999 reform agenda, set forth by King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman. This failure has not only vindicated those members of the royal family opposed to the reform program, such as the Prime Minister, the Royal Court Minister, and the Defense Minister, but has also reinforced their belief that a pro-active security solution, and the incitement of ordinary citizens against the Shia opposition, is the only path towards political and social stability. This, in turn, has put pressure on the King and the Crown Prince to abandon reform efforts. As a result, Gengler explained, Bahrain is now resolving its “Shia problem” through a security approach, rather than a political framework.

The second conflict lies within the fractured political opposition, between moderate opposition members—in favor of reaching a political settlement with the government—such as al-Wefaq party, and those that reject political compromise in favor of radical and violent means of protest. The rise in violence in Bahrain, Gengler explained, is symptomatic of a protest movement that is “out of the hands” of the moderate opposition, thus undermining its credibility as a reliable partner for political dialogue in the eyes of the government. This, he argued, is giving support to the security-minded royals and citizens who advocate harsher security measures to suppress the uprising.

The third conflict, analyzed by Gengler, lies within the Sunni “counter-opposition.” In the aftermath of the uprising, the government had to contend with two separate groups of discontented Sunnis: those who disagreed with what was seen as a lax security response to the uprising and those who harbored substantial political misgivings, in line with the rest of the opposition. While finding itself unable to placate both Sunni groups simultaneously, the government favored the security-minded faction at the expense of the other. This, he said, explains the recent high profile arrests and crackdown against al-Wefaq, which has led to further “radicalization, desperation, and violence on the part of an opposition which sees little hope for a promising future in Bahrain.” Gengler concluded by warning that Bahrain was heading towards further political and social polarization.

Jamal Khashoggi focused his discussion on the regional and geopolitical dynamics driving the political situation in Bahrain. He argued that the absence of outside intervention and mediation is one of the principal reasons why the Bahraini government is unable to reach an understanding with the opposition. He singled out the unique role of Saudi Arabia as a potential broker, due to its regional standing and historic ties with the Sunni and Shia communities of Bahrain.

Khashoggi invited the Bahraini opposition to lower its expectations and to understand that Bahrain “will never be a part of the Arab Spring,” drawing attention to the fundamental differences between Bahrain and other Arab countries undergoing democratic transitions. He explained how powerful neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates intend to preserve the status quo and prevent Bahrain from becoming a constitutional monarchy. He described the GCC countries as “one big family” supporting each other, arguing that the idea of Gulf unity— “al-Ittihad al-Khaliji”—is very much a real project.

Khashoggi predicted that 2013 would be a decisive year for Bahrain. Saudi Arabia will be in a better position to engage with the government of Bahrain, thanks to the potential defeat of Iran in Syria. If Iran loses its grip over Syria, the regional balance of power will change in favor of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and this, he claimed, will allow the Bahraini government more freedom to negotiate with the Shia opposition.

Khashoggi concluded his discussion by advising that the Bahraini crisis be resolved internally, ideally amongst the Bahraini people themselves or with the help of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries, citing the possibility of American intervention as possible but “not the preferred solution.”

Following presentations from each of the panelists the floor was opened for questions. When asked what a political solution in Bahrain would look like, Gengler denied the likelihood of outside mediation, especially from the United States. A solution, he said, will require enforcement of an agreement between the moderate opposition, al-Wefaq, and moderates within the government. He added that the emergence of a larger pattern of political discontent, for example in Kuwait, could alter the way the situation in Bahrain was framed at a regional level.

A member of the audience questioned Saudi Arabia’s suitability as a mediator, especially from the perspective of the Shia opposition in Bahrain, asking whether an Arab League commission would present a better alternative. While excluding the possibility of an Arab League role, Khashoggi insisted that Bahrain’s political crisis be resolved as a “GCC internal matter,” strictly “behind closed doors.”

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The Political Situation in Bahrain One Year After the Independent Commission of Inquiry

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Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On

F. Gregory Gause, III and Sean L. Yom — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

No monarchy fell to revolution in the Arab Spring. What accounts for this monarchical exceptionalism? Analysts have argued that royal autocracies are inherently more resilient than authoritarian republics due to their cultural foundations and institutional structure. By contrast, this paper leverages comparative analysis to offer a different explanation emphasizing deliberate regime strategies made in circumstances of geographic fortuity. The mobilization of cross-cutting coalitions, hydrocarbon wealth, and foreign patronage accounts for the resilience of monarchical dictatorships in the Middle East. Without these factors, kingships are just as vulnerable to overthrow as any other autocracy—something that history indicates, given the long list of deposed monarchies in the region over the past half-century.

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F. Gregory Gause, III
Sean L. Yom

Publication: Journal of Democracy

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening

Tue, 25 Sep 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 25, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Following the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the death of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, the United States is weighing its position and policies in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. More than a year after the initial Arab uprisings, the United States is questioning the state of its relations with the nascent Arab democracies and the emerging Islamist regimes. As the second anniversary of the Arab revolutions approaches, political and economic instability persists alongside growing anti-American sentiment, forcing the United States to adapt its policies to the evolving landscape in the Middle East. With the U.S. election just over six weeks away, many American voters are questioning the presidential candidates’ foreign policy strategies toward the region and wondering how the volatility in the Middle East and North Africa will affect the United States in the months and years ahead.

On September 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on the Arab Awakening, the tenth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. POLITICO Pro defense reporter Stephanie Gaskell moderated a panel discussion where Brookings experts Tamara Cofman Wittes, Shadi Hamid and Raj Desai presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BIArabAwakening.

Download papers from the event:

Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East, by Shadi Hamid
Three Key Challenges in Confronting the Arab Awakening, by Tamara Cofman Wittes
The Challenge of a Reform Endowment, by Raj M. Desai

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening

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Event Materials

A Conversation with F. Gregory Gause III: Security in the Gulf

F. Gregory Gause, , III — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In a conversation with Marc Lynch, F. Gregory Gause III discusses the relative stability of oil regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, noting the importance of countries' willingness to spend oil money and maintain patronage networks.

Gause also says he believes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to be stable, but that the country's foreign policy extends beyond what it is comfortable with. Describing the KSA as "bullish" on stability, Gause says if the country was going to face significant unrest, it would have done so in 2011. Yet the KSA's recent interventionist tendencies, and its unprecedented generational shift in leadership, implicate change is forthcoming, although it is unlikely to be destabilizing.

In his conclusion, Gause notes there is an immediate academic, theoretical, and policy need to chart and follow what has happened in the region over the last few years. He maintains there is still very little work being completed on Middle East international relations.

Watch the full interview at POMEPS.org »

Authors

F. Gregory Gause, III

Publication: Project on Middle East Political Science

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Follow @BICampaign2012
Editor's Note: The following is a Campaign 2012 policy brief by Shadi Hamid proposing ideas for the next president on U.S. policy in the Middle East. Tamara Wittes prepared a response arguing that the next president must remain flexible in response to the political instability throughout the region. Raj Desai also prepared a response arguing that the next administration should focus on economic development in the region in order to drive democracy and rebuild America’s influence.

It seems unlikely that U.S. policy toward the Middle East will get much attention during the 2012 presidential campaign, especially when it comes to the epochal transformations under way in the Arab world, colloquially referred to as the “Arab Spring.” It received painfully little airtime as the various Republican contenders jostled for their party nomination. There may be some discussion of how best to confront Iran. If Iraq slides back into civil war, as seems ever more possible, there may be some painful debates over who “lost” it. And Republicans have routinely attacked Barack Obama for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, and will continue to do so. But there is seemingly little desire to address what are likely to prove the most influential events of all those currently transpiring across the region. This is in stark contrast to the 2008 contest, where Middle East policy figured prominently in the campaigns of most major candidates.

It was in 2008 that Barack Obama positioned himself as the anti-Bush, drawing sharp contrasts with Republicans on democracy promotion, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, and, of course, Iraq. For many Americans—and many Arabs—the promise to reorient U.S. foreign policy was key to Obama’s appeal. Yet after a brief honeymoon period, opposition to American policies in the region soared under the Obama administration. In fact, according to several polls, U.S. favorability ratings have been lower under President Obama than they were during the final days of the Bush administration.

What was once a major strength and source of appeal for Obama has become a potential liability. Indeed, on the Middle East, President Obama’s first term will be defined by the Arab Spring and his response to it. In part because it initially deprioritized democracy promotion in the region, the Obama administration was caught unprepared. As late as January 25, 2011—the day Egypt’s revolution began—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously stated, “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable.” Eventually, senior U.S. officials responded to Cairo’s massive demonstrations by calling for an immediate transition and by using their influence to urge Egypt’s military—which receives over 20 percent of its budget from the United States—to refrain from using force against protesters. Since then, the administration has tried to get on the right side of history, with President Obama repeatedly proclaiming his support for Arab democratic aspirations. Yet the rhetoric has not been translated into clear policy initiatives, let alone significant material assistance. A major critique of neoconservatives and Arab revolutionaries alike is that the Obama administration has—in nearly every country facing mass protest—been slow to support protesters on the ground.

For its part, the Obama administration has avoided articulating a broader vision or grand strategy and instead emphasized the need for a “boutique strategy” that focuses on the specifics of each particular case. Considering the vastly different contexts of each country, this is unavoidable. Yet, a case-by-case approach, to be successful, needs to be guided by a coherent vision. Despite the historical import of the Arab Spring, there is nothing approaching the unified purpose of Truman’s Marshall Plan or even the rhetorical sharpness of Bush’s short-lived “freedom agenda.” The scale and scope of Obama’s declared policies can at times seem tepid. The amount of U.S. economic assistance promised to transitional countries is minimal, dwarfed by the commitments made by the Gulf countries.

In the United States, there is growing sentiment, particularly on the Left, that America’s declining influence and negligible credibility in the region compel it to adopt a “hands-off” approach and reduce its footprint in the Arab world. Yet it is precisely because of its still considerable power and influence in the region that the United States can and should provide critical support to Arab countries transitioning to democracy. After supporting autocratic regimes for more than five decades, the United States has a second chance to get it right and, in the process, build considerable goodwill among Arab populations and the governments they elect. That new governments are likely to be Islamist in orientation only strengthens the argument for sustained U.S. engagement. By establishing a working relationship with Islamist parties, the United States can encourage them to consider and respect key U.S. security interests, such as isolating Iran, pursuing peace with Israel, maintaining a stable oil market, and continuing vital counterterrorism cooperation.

Whether Obama is reelected or replaced by a Republican, the United States must:

Articulate a comprehensive strategy toward the Middle East that advances American long-term interests by prioritizing the support of democracy and democrats in the region.
Institutionalize the promotion of Arab democracy by coordinating the funding of a multilateral “reform endowment” that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement necessary reforms.
Pursue a strategic dialogue with rising Islamist parties in key countries of interest.
Recognize that the window for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is closing, commit to rebuilding frayed ties with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and outline clear U.S. parameters on borders, right of return, and the status of Jerusalem.

The Obama Record

Obama’s record on the Middle East, and the Arab Spring in particular, is challenging to assess because of the unrealistic expectations set early on. When he first took office—in part because of how he ran his presidential campaign and in part because he seemed the opposite of George W. Bush in every way—Arabs of all stripes (and often of radically different viewpoints) were well disposed toward the president. His June 4, 2009, Cairo address was applauded across the Middle East and seemed to be the first sign that Obama would be the sort of leader that so many in the region had hoped for. But the disappointment quickly set in. Beyond some limited programming on entrepreneurship and some science and technology cooperation, there was surprisingly little follow-up after the speech.

Initially, the administration put the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace at the core of its Middle East policy—as signified by the appointment of special envoy George Mitchell. Administration heavyweights let it be known that they believed that once the conflict was satisfactorily resolved, a truly refashioned relationship with the Middle East would become possible. But the administration’s almost single-minded focus on halting settlement construction backfired, arousing the ire of the Israeli government while distracting from the key Palestinian concerns of borders and the right of return. Faced with this initial rebuke, the administration seemed to lose interest in the Israeli--Palestinian issue, and thereafter few new ideas or initiatives were forthcoming. When Senator Mitchell resigned in May 2011, the administration made no move to replace him with someone of similar stature.

Compared with its predecessor, the Obama administration put little emphasis on promoting democracy abroad. As early as March 2009, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, Sameh Shukri, approvingly noted that bilateral ties were improving because Washington was dropping its demands “for human rights, democracy, and religious and general freedoms.” In her first trip to Cairo, that same month, Hillary Clinton assured the Egyptian government that “conditionality is not our policy.” Meanwhile, U.S. democracy assistance to Egypt was slashed by 60 percent (from $54 million to $20 million) and funding for civil society and good governance programs in Jordan fell by 44 and 36 percent, respectively.

The administration’s priority, instead, was strengthening government-to-government relations, something that Obama administration officials felt had suffered unnecessarily under the Bush administration. The relationship with Egypt had gotten so icy that President Hosni Mubarak suspended his annual visits to Washington for five years. Journalist Spencer Ackerman, who interviewed Obama’s foreign policy advisers extensively during the 2008 campaign, wrote that the Obama Doctrine was “dignity promotion” rather than democracy promotion. Indeed, the common thread throughout the statements and speeches of Obama and his senior advisers is the emphasis on institutional reform, economic development, and poverty alleviation first, and free and fair elections later. Such gradualism may have made sense for status quo powers like the United States that sought to avoid the untidiness of rapid democratization, but it made little sense for Arabs, who had already waited decades and only seen their societies grow more closed and repressive.

In the lead-up to elections in Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain in late 2010, the Obama administration did little to exert pressure on leaders in these countries, all three of them close allies. The polls produced the most unrepresentative parliaments in Egyptian and Jordanian history—in Egypt because of widespread fraud and in Jordan because of an opposition boycott. Throughout the region, there was a pervasive sense of steady political deterioration, after the short-lived democratic openings of the “first Arab Spring” of 2004 and 2005, triggered in part by the Bush administration’s democracy promotion measures.

After the Arab uprisings began in early 2011, the Obama administration stated that it supported the peaceful struggles for freedom and congratulated the Tunisian and Egyptian people on their revolutions. The administration’s rhetorical support for democracy—particularly the pressure on Mubarak to leave office—was seen as an ominous sign by Arab regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, and created significant tension between the two countries. At the same time, the United States tried to reassure Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other allies that it stood behind them. President Obama reportedly called King Abdullah of Jordan personally to assure him of American support. He also sent the State Department’s then number three official, William J. Burns, and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on a tour of Arab capitals to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to their bilateral ties. Rather than assuaging the fears created by the Arab uprisings, the administration’s diplomatic efforts backfired. They alienated a wide range of potentially pro-American groups, simultaneously convincing Arab protesters and revolutionaries that Obama was siding with the dictators and panicking Arab autocrats into suspecting he was backing revolutions across the board.

The administration’s efforts at a nuanced policy toward the Arab Spring—what its critics damned as half-hearted and half-baked—produced additional confusion with its decisions on Libya. There, the Obama administration initially disparaged the appropriateness of a military option. Washington, to its credit, later reversed course and took decisive action after Muammar Qaddafi’s forces threatened to commit massacres in Benghazi, the seat of the democratic rebellion. Even then, however, France and Britain, Libyan rebels, and some Republicans like Senator John McCain attacked Obama for waiting too long. Moreover, after the first few weeks of the NATO operation, Washington publicly distanced itself from the ongoing fight and withdrew considerable American military hardware, once again leaving Arabs to wonder just what parts of the Arab Spring the United States was trying to support—and why. Ultimately, Libya was a qualified success for President Obama. Without American diplomatic and military support, the NATO intervention would not have happened and Qaddafi would almost certainly still be in power today. Yet it did little to ease the confusion over how the administration intended to pursue American interests in the region.

Washington’s handling of Syria has only muddied the waters further. If the administration’s handling of Libya was a qualified success, then Syria can only be seen as the opposite. Early on, the intensifying regime violence and the militarization of some opposition elements provoked only the most grudging and tardy of condemnations from the United States, coupled with half-hearted diplomatic efforts. Moreover, the violence in Syria provided a rebuke to the Obama administration’s early attempts to peel Syria off from Iran and bring it into the Western orbit, making those efforts seem naïve or even cynical in retrospect. After holding out hope that Bashar al-Asad might be persuaded to reform, the United States finally called on him to step down in August 2011 and began implementing asset freezes, travel bans, and sanctions on the regime and its most senior officials. As the Syrian uprising reached its one-year anniversary, the Syrian regime’s assault against civilian population intensified, dragging the country into all-out civil war. With the international community failing to stop the killing, the criticisms that the United States was either leading from behind—or not leading at all—persisted.

In formulating responses to the many and varied Arab uprisings, the Obama administration has opted for slow deliberation and caution, avoiding the strong, sometimes impulsive, gestures of the Bush administration. But the line between caution and irresolution can easily be blurred. Whatever the genesis of the term “leading from behind,” it does seem to capture key aspects of the administration’s approach to the Middle East and the president’s temperament on foreign policy more generally. The declining influence of the United States in comparison with the influence of rising powers like China, Brazil, India, and Turkey has led many American policymakers and analysts to conclude that the United States cannot act like it once did and that it must allow, even encourage, others to lead. Senior American officials routinely emphasize the inability of the United States to shape events in the Arab world and alter the behavior of reluctant allies. However, America’s actual influence often stems from how others, friends and enemies alike, perceive it rather than from a strict assessment of its objective ability or (more often) willingness to take action. By repeatedly discounting U.S. leverage in the region, the Obama administration has undermined the impact of its own declarations and policy measures when it does choose to act.

The result, in the Arab world, has been a noticeable power vacuum, with growing confusion over the thrust of American policy. What role does the United States see for itself in a rapidly changing region? “I’ve never seen Americans so confused and worried as I have ever since January [2011],” said Egypt’s Hisham Kassem, a prominent liberal publisher. While this may be overstating the case, the narrative of a United States that is feckless, incoherent, and increasingly irrelevant is one that has taken hold in Arab public discourse. And in the Middle East, perception is often reality.

The Republican Critique

Republican responses to Obama’s policies toward the Middle East in general and the Arab Spring specifically run the gamut. Republican hawks who remain close to the neoconservatives, such as John McCain and to a lesser extent Mitt Romney, believe Obama’s “less is more” approach has endangered efforts to promote democracy in the region. Other Tea Party–influenced Republicans, animated by a sense of American overcommitment abroad, have criticized Obama’s adventurism in Libya and suggested that he too quickly withdrew support from embattled allies, including President Mubarak.

As varied as they are, two common threads run through Republican critiques. First, they portray President Obama as an indecisive leader whose ad hoc, incoherent policies have undermined American credibility abroad. Second, they argue that Obama is not comfortable with American supremacy and is abdicating leadership to others in acknowledgement of a “post-American century.” With few exceptions, the Republican candidates failed to offer anything resembling a coherent alternative to Obama’s policies. To the extent that they have, the candidates, save Ron Paul, focused primarily on three issues—Israel, Iran, and the threat of Islamism—which gives some sense of where priorities will lie under a Republican administration. Republican policy toward emerging democracies—or existing autocracies—would primarily be a function of a given government’s positions on Israel and Iran as well as whether or not it had an Islamist orientation.

Republican candidates have reserved their harshest rhetoric for Obama’s approach to Israel. Romney, for example, has regularly attacked the administration for throwing “Israel under the bus” and blames Obama’s policies of “appeasement” for encouraging the Palestinians to pursue statehood at the United Nations. Meanwhile, several candidates cast doubt on the very notion of an independent Palestinian state—the product of decades of bipartisan consensus. Most famously, former Speaker Newt Gingrich called the Palestinians an “invented people.” In addition, he declared shariah law a “mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the world as we know it.”

Indeed, Republicans have routinely brought up the specter of an Islamist threat and have tended to lump nonviolent Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, with violent ones, such as al Qaeda. The Obama administration, in contrast, has begun engaging, if reluctantly, with the Muslim Brotherhood and has repeatedly affirmed the need to respect democratic outcomes, regardless of who wins. President Obama’s willingness to engage with Islamists has invited a flurry of attacks from conservatives that he is soft on extremism and indulges anti-American forces. There is some degree of fantasy in these criticisms. Notwithstanding the aggressive anti-Islamist rhetoric coming from most candidates, a Republican administration would have little choice but to adapt to new realities and work with Islamically influenced governments too.

Middle East Policy in the Next Presidential Term

None of the extant problems of the Middle East are likely to abate over the next four years. There may be some bright spots—Tunisia in particular shows considerable promise—but the overall regional trend is unlikely to improve significantly for some time, and it could well get worse before it gets better. Thus the central question for the next American president is the extent to which he wants to try to alleviate the problems of the region and help steer it away from the worst paths and toward better ones. The inward turn of American public opinion, political deadlock in Washington, and the country’s continuing economic problems will all limit just how much any president might do for the Middle East. None of these obstacles, however, is so great that determined leadership might not be able to overcome or at least mitigate them.

The direction of U.S. policy toward the region is far from settled and is likely to vary considerably depending on who wins the November election. During the primary campaign, different presidential candidates staked out very different positions, from neo-isolationism, to restrained involvement, to a much more muscular role in the region. On the Middle East, the divide between the Democratic administration and mainstream Republicans has continued to grow, certainly in rhetoric but also, increasingly, on policy—a result of real philosophical differences over the importance of American leadership during a time of significant financial constraints and greater global competition. If President Obama is not elected, there is still a considerable range of views within the Republican Party itself.

With the lack of bipartisan consensus or even a consensus within either party, there is an opportunity for a frank and wide-ranging debate about the past and future of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The relative decline in America’s influence and standing in the region—whether real or perceived—can, and should, be reversed, and the Arab Spring presents a particularly opportune moment to do so. Many of the American establishment’s long-held assumptions about the Middle East have proved false. A Democratic or Republican administration must be prepared to think creatively about how to reengage with the region on the basis of a new set of principles. The aspirations of ordinary Arabs can no longer be cast aside as irrelevant to U.S. interests. Americans are no longer engaging solely with unelected and unaccountable regimes but with populations that are demanding a voice not just in their own affairs but in foreign policy as well.

Active and consistent support for democratic change in the Arab world—even if it means occasionally angering long-standing allies—is important for a number of reasons. First, it aligns American policy with regional trends that are irreversible. Instead of being caught unaware once again, the United States should anticipate the changes to come—and recognize that the region is growing more, not less, democratic. It means little to support the demands of protesters after they have already won. It will send a much stronger signal to the region’s future leaders if Washington encourages and defends them when it is not easy and when their victory is far from a foregone conclusion.

Second, before the Arab Spring, anti-American sentiment could be—and often was—ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. After all, it mattered what governments did, and most Arab governments were firmly in the pro-U.S. orbit. In the coming years, however, what Arabs think and what their governments do will be much more closely linked. And, as long as tens of millions of Arabs dislike the United States, viewing it as a destructive force in the region, Arab democracies will feel compelled to act against American interests to gain popular support. Of course, Arab public opinion, fueled by deeply held resentments, will not change overnight, but, over the long run, the United States can work to build new relationships—based on shared values and common interests—with the region’s rising democracies.

As for countries that are not democracies, and may not be anytime soon, a forward-looking strategy is required. Many, including Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, will follow a middle path, somewhere between outright revolution and total repression. Here, the United States and like-minded nations should work to persuade them that they must start or continue down the path of reform because substantive change, however difficult, is ultimately the only viable option. Rather than being satisfied with partial, cosmetic reforms, the United States should clarify that the ultimate goal is a revamped political system in which the king or dictator relinquishes significant power to elected bodies. The United States should judge reform efforts by that standard. In these cases, it is critical that American policy be seen as supportive and beneficial to those who are willing to tread this arduous path. Reform is costly and often painful, and material assistance of all kinds from the United States and its allies should figure at least as prominently as the threat of sanctions—diplomatic, economic, and otherwise—in Washington’s efforts to help foster stabilizing change in the Middle East.

Moving in this direction requires measures that institutionalize the promotion of Arab democracy. The next president should coordinate the funding of a “reform endowment” that would provide clear incentives to Arab countries to implement necessary reforms. The endowment would include a minimum of $5 billion and would be available to all interested countries. Receiving aid would be conditioned on meeting a series of explicit, measurable benchmarks on democratization. These benchmarks would be the product of extensive negotiations with interested countries. Unused funds would be reinvested, while new democracies would be asked to contribute annual dues to help grow the endowment over time. For skeptical Arab audiences, the message from the United States and other donor countries would be clear—democracy cannot be imposed, but it can be actively and vigorously supported.

For transitional states like Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, benchmarks could include military noninterference in civilian affairs, the establishment of judicial independence, and the protection of a vibrant, independent press. For liberalizing monarchies, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait, benchmarks should focus on expanded political space for opposition groups and the gradual devolution of power to elected institutions that are accountable to the people. This reform endowment should be funded with contributions from the United States, European nations, Turkey, Brazil, Qatar, and other like-minded powers. An international board would apportion loans and grants to states seeking to bring about real reform.

Democracy skeptics will counter that such efforts are in vain and that democratization has its dark side in light of the rise of Islamist parties. In a sense, they are right; in the Middle East, the future is Islamist. Instead of denying or fighting what is now an unmistakable reality, the United States and Europe should adapt by pursuing a strategic dialogue with Islamist actors across the region. Such parties are either already playing major roles in parliament and government or are likely to do so in the near future. Therefore, U.S. interests in the region will, whether Americans like it or not, be inextricably tied to theirs. With this in mind, there is an urgent need to foster a degree of mutual understanding and trust with these groups. Many of them, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, have made clear their desire to engage with the United States, realizing that American support will be critical to boosting trade and attracting foreign investment. Again, timing matters. Such relationships should be developed before these parties come to power, rather than afterward, when American leverage is likely to be less effective. With such channels, the United States can exert influence—and, if necessary, pressure—when Islamist parties overreach and take action that threatens vital U.S. interests in the region.

It is, by now, a cliché, but the importance of getting on the “right side of history” should not be underestimated. Yet all the support of Arab democracy will still fail to usher in a refashioned U.S. relationship with the region if, as currently seems likely, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to fester. There is reason to fear that the window of opportunity for a two-state solution is closing, and the next president will have the weighty task of trying to resuscitate a defunct peace process. A Republican administration is unlikely to make this a priority, while a second-term Obama administration will continue to be constrained by its tense and sometimes acrimonious relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (or a similarly minded right-wing government). A top priority for the next president must therefore be rebuilding trust with Israeli leaders and reaching out to the Israeli public. A presidential visit and public address in Israel, focusing on the concerns and fears of Israelis, would be a good place to start.

The Arab Spring will see the emergence of governments that are less amenable to Israel’s security interests. The more democratic the Middle East becomes, the more anti-Israel new elected governments will be. Israel’s isolation is only likely to grow. With this in mind, the United States should make clear that it stands firmly by Israel during a difficult time, while also impressing upon it the need to act sooner rather than later to make the difficult but ultimately necessary compromises for a durable peace.

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Prioritizing Democracy

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Iraq in the Middle: Iraq’s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council

F. Gregory Gause, , III — Wed, 23 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with Robert Tollast, F. Gregory Gause III discusses the foreign policy future of Iraq.

Can Iraq become an outward looking nation on the international stage or will it remain doomed to play out its neighbours proxy wars?

Many of us would like to forget about the Iraq conflict. The fact remains however, that the country sits atop an estimated 43 billion barrels of crude oil and straddles a sectarian fault line that looks likely to simmer on the brink of serious violence for some time to come. Therefore, how Maliki’s government can act diplomatically with its neighbours is of importance when trying to understand the increasingly sectarianized politics of the region. This interview asks F. Gregory Gause III about the direction Iraqi foreign policy is heading, and asks if we are doing enough to avert future crisis.

Rapprochement

Robert Tollast (RT): In February, there was some excitement at the prospect of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq when Saudi Arabia reopened their Iraqi Embassy, even though it will be based in Amman. It was enough for Iraq’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Labeed Abbawi to hail “a new phase of bilateral co-operation and an exchange of visits." Looking at the current controversy surrounding Bahrain and Saudi concerns over Iranian plans in the region, one could surmise that this rapprochement is not based on good will, but realpolitik. Iraq is looking to reopen an oil pipeline with the capacity to export nearly 1.5 million barrels per day to the Saudi port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, thereby reducing dependence on the Straits of Hormuz. There is also the issue of Saddam era debt cancellation and the fact that in February the Iraqis were desperate for Arab delegations to attend the Baghdad Summit, so were rapidly trying to mend fences. Do you think the Iraqis are reaching out to Saudi Arabia for their own ends, or do you think this might reflect something more genuine, ie good will? If it is good will, then maybe the Arar border crossing could see as much commerce as it does Hajj pilgrims...

Gregory Gause (GG): I think that the talk about improved relations was a blip, basically generated by Iraq’s desire to get a good turnout at the summit and Saudi technical issues in terms of summit prep. Of course, the Saudi presence at the summit was very low-level, which was a pretty clear signal to the Iraqi government that Riyadh was not in much of a mood to make nice. On the Iraqi side, I think that the outreach was more genuine. I do not think that Maliki wants to be a client of Iran. No politician really wants to be anybody’s client. I think that he wants to have better relations with Saudi Arabia to give him some options vis a vis Iran. But the Saudis are stonewalling until they see him take some very significant steps to demonstrate his independence from Iran.

A common enemy?

RT: Going back to the dark days of 2007 in Iraq, around 40% of foreign fighters infiltrating into the country were Saudi Arabian. The situation is so different in Iraq now partly because al-Qaeda’s uncompromising approach in western Iraq was ultimately rejected by Iraqi Sunnis. Much credit has to go to the Saudis, following the entreaties of Ryan Crocker and Dell L. Dailey to curb extremism and secure their borders.

However, despite Saudi progress in combating extremism and their much vaunted extremist rehabilitation programmes, the damage to Saudi Arabia’s image in Iraq has been extensive. Fanar Haddad has documented in his book Sectarianism in Iraq, how the Sadrists have frequently referred to terrorists in Iraq not as Salafi or Irhabeen (terrorists) but Wahabis, which not only implies Saudi origin but also evokes the historical memory of the sacking of Karbala in 1801. Likewise, it was only a few years ago that King Abdullah called Maliki “an Iranian agent.” As AQ’s leader once again urges the toppling of the House of Saud, do you think Iraq and Saudi Arabia can build bridges to fight the common enemy? For example, Maliki’s media advisor Ali al-Musawi recently stated that “Both countries are facing threats from al-Qaeda. And it is necessary to cooperate and to exchange information.”

GG: This would be an excellent basis for improved relations, if the Saudis saw their domestic al-Qaeda tendency as their biggest threat. But right now they see Iran as their biggest geopolitical and, potentially, domestic threat. And they see the Maliki government as being very closely aligned with Iran. Bahrain is both a domestic and a regional issue for the Saudis, and I think it is at the top of the Saudi priority list right now. They see Iraq as basically supporting Iranian positions on Bahrain and Gulf issues more generally.

Human Rights Watch

RT: The last Human Rights Watch report on Iraq report details how security forces detained as many as 1500 Iraqis under suspicion of being Ba’athists or “terrorists” in recent months. The bulk of the latest detaining campaign happened in western suburbs of Baghdad, so we can assume that most of the terror/ Ba’ath suspects were of Sunni origin (as with many similar campaigns in the past.) Perhaps the only time hundreds of Shia were rounded up by the ISF was during Operation Charge of the Knights in 2008, which won Maliki some short lived respect from the Saudis.

But the recent ISF campaign will appear sectarian to many (some of those on ISF arrest lists had been dead for several years) while many Shia in Iraq continue to be outraged at discrimination towards Saudi Arabia's Shia minority, something highlighted as still persistent in the latest Human Rights Watch report on Saudi Arabia and clearly apparent in the form of hunger striking Shia activist Mohammed Saleh al-Bajady.

The US has made some quite limited attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia and Iraq to improve their human rights, or at least curtail abuses, but colossal arms sales go ahead, even as the latest State Department country report on Saudi Arabia shows the US government is not in denial over their human rights record. Could our failure to reprimand these two nations on the issue of the rights of minorities be emboldening those with a sectarian agenda, increasing mistrust and ultimately paving the way for conflict?

GG: I do not think that the American position here has much causal weight on either side. Even if the US were more forthright about human rights issues with both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and was willing to hold up other aspects of the relationship unless there were improvement on the treatment of sectarian minorities, I do not think it would make that much difference. Both governments have defined their internal and regional threats in sectarian ways, it seems, and once a government has defined its biggest threat, it takes quite a bit of pressure to move it off that position. So, for all the obvious reasons, the US is not going to make sectarian minority human rights issues a big part of the bilateral relationship with either Riyadh or Baghdad (maybe a bit more with Baghdad, but more in political stability than human rights terms). Even if it did, I do not think it could move the two governments off their current policies in this regard. In the end, I think that the only thing that could move Saudi Arabia on the sectarian issue would be improved relations with Iran. That would also loosen things up regarding Saudi-Iraqi relations. But it does not look like that is in the cards anytime soon.

A united GCC policy toward Iraq?

RT: The approach toward Maliki’s Iraq has differed somewhat between the GCC countries. Kuwait, for example has shown some genuine warmth to the nation that once sent its troops to pillage Kuwait City, despite the dispute over the Mubarak and al-Faw ports. Likewise, the UAE has been happy to do business with the new Iraq and Qatars national oil company,Woqod has won various service contracts. But other tensions, such as the situation in Bahrain and the Tariq al Hashemi saga seem like a major stumbling block. Do you think the GCC countries are too different to follow a joint foreign policy toward Iraq? It seems like the GCC countries most open to reform are happiest to build bridges with Iraq.

GG: I would disagree on the reform point. Neither Qatar nor the UAE is all that keen on real political reform. But neither is as obsessed about sectarian politics as is Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait has taken some interesting steps here, including having the Amir attend the summit. But the core issues in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship (the “debt”, reparations, Chapter 7, border, etc.) are tied up with Kuwaiti parliamentary politics, and it will be harder to get issues seen as “pro-Iraqi” through the parliament. The government could take more steps toward Iraq, but parliament will put a stop to moves on these key issues, I think. At least any Kuwaiti minister contemplating moves in this direction has to think about the parliamentary reaction. This is the only GCC state where this is true.

I think that you are right about the GCC states being too different to have one comprehensive policy toward Iraq. This was true in the last years of Saddam’s rule, and it remains true now. The UAE and Qatar will do business with Iraq happily (Oman, too, but not as much money there). Bahrain will follow Saudi Arabia, for which the sectarian issue and relations with Iran will continue to determine the nature of Saudi-Iraqi relations. Kuwait will be cautious but not confrontational.

The end of Assad

RT: America and Europe have essentially warned that sending arms to Syria is a bad idea while supporting the odd grey area of “non lethal aid,” in the form of equipment such as secure radios so that the FSA can talk to each other safely while planning their next lethal attack. This seems like an oddly indecisive policy. Meanwhile, the US entreaty to Saudi Arabia and Qatar not to send arms to the fight looks increasingly feeble, and so far we have managed to persuade Iraq (who have virtually no control over their airspace) to politely ask Iran to stop sending arms flights to Syria. Alas, the Iraqi Minister of Transport Hadi al-Amiri is head of the Badr Organisation, and claimed the flights were “US lies.” Can we do more with our use of leverage to stop what you termed the "sectarianization" of regional balance of power conflicts in the Middle East?

GG: I am not sure that the US can do more on this score. As you said in the question, our opposition to arms shipments to the Syrian rebels is pretty half-hearted, maybe even one-quarter-hearted. I do not think that the Saudis and the Qataris feel any real push-back from the US on this. Our influence with Iran on this is, of course, negligible. As long as Iran wants to do it, I doubt that the Iraqi government would be able to summon the political will and internal unity to say “no.”

The only steps the US could take on this score would be big steps toward ending its confrontation with Iran, not only on the nuclear file but on a range of regional issues. That would change the regional environment quite a bit, and other pieces could fall into new places, including Iraqi-Iranian and Saudi-Iranian relations. (At least initially, the Saudis would not be so pleased with the US if a US-Iranian rapprochement were reached, either.) Perhaps that is a possibility, but right now I remain skeptical that it can happen. A breakthrough on the nuclear issue can lead to something different, but we need to see that breakthrough happen. Even if Iran were willing to compromise on the nuclear file, it does not seem willing to abandon Assad, and that remains the key geopolitical struggle for regional influence right now.

Authors

F. Gregory Gause, III

Publication: Small Wars Journal

The Arab Revolutions, Political Islam, and Democratic Transitions

Wed, 29 Feb 2012 18:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 29, 2012
6:00 PM - 7:30 PM EST

The Brookings Doha Center

Doha, Qatar

On February 29, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion with Gilles Kepel, professor at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP) and research director for France’s National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). Professor Kepel’s address focused on the large-scale dynamics of the Arab Awakenings, with particular focus on the impact of changes in the region on the role of Islam in the political arena. The event, which was followed by a question and answer session, was moderated by Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, and attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic, and media communities.

Kepel began his remarks by explaining that the recent uprisings in the Arab world have had varying trajectories in different parts of the Middle East. He noted that all successful revolutions have been in North Africa, while attempts at revolution in the Arabian Peninsula were stalled, and it remains to be seen what effects the uprisings will have on the Levant. Kepel then divided the Middle East into three subregions, which he dubbed Zone A (North Africa), Zone B (Arabian Peninsula), and Zone C (the Levant).

Zone A, Kepel said, is unique because it is the area where the first successful revolutions took place. That region is distinct, he said, because domestic issues there are more important than international ones. For example, even when change came to Egypt, a key player in the Arab-Israeli system, the revolution was perceived by the outside world as a development that could be absorbed by the international system. Kepel went on to distinguish countries in Zone A as having a fair degree of national cohesion – especially in comparison with the states of the Levant. In Libya, he said, in spite of the country’s tribal divisions, the revolutionary process itself had engineered a significant degree of national cohesion. Kepel went on to say that revolutions could take place in Zone A largely because that change they were not perceived as a threat to the global order. In fact, some outside actors even welcomed these revolutions both for ideological reasons, as they supported democracy, as well as from a strategic point of view.

Kepel began his description of Zone B by stressing that changes in the Gulf have a global impact given the region’s critical importance to the global petrol supply. Therefore, regime change in Zone B is considered far more dangerous than elsewhere. For instance, the uprising in Bahrain provoked fears of upheaval in global markets and the political order. Indeed, despite the fact that they did not use Shi’i language and stressed their cause as Bahraini, the revolutionaries were widely seen as “stooges of the Iranian Republic.” When the uprising was then quashed by the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, international reaction was muted, as many feared the global effects of genuine revolution in the Gulf. Yemen, the other country in the Gulf experiencing a widespread uprising, was on the verge of disintegration. Ultimately, however, the GCC stepped in with a political solution to the crisis, as neighboring countries and other powers have a critical stake in keeping unrest in Yemen within Yemeni borders.

Zone C, Kepel explained, could be distinguished by the deep sectarian and ethnic divisions in the societies in the Levant. This subregion, Kepel noted, was deeply scarred by Lebanon’s civil war. Today, then, the possibility of the fall of Bashar al-Asad in Syria is measured against the fact that this might unleash a bloody civil war. Indeed, one main challenge to the Syrian opposition is whether the group would be able to deliver social peace in the event of Asad’s ouster. Asad himself is playing on this fear both internationally and domestically. In fact, it is this fear, Kepel contended, that has prevented the elites of Aleppo and Damascus from withdrawing support from the regime. Because Iran and Israel are located in this Zone, the explosion of neighboring Syria will change the balance of power. Syria, Kepel said, is “to some extent the linchpin of the Middle East system politically – as much as the Arabian Peninsula is its lynchpin financially and economically.” At the moment, he explained, Arabs are split on the issue of Syria. Some consider Western support for the opposition evidence that the uprising is a plot of American imperialism and Zionism. Others, however, see the need to oust Asad as a means of diminishing Iranian power in the region.

Kepel next described the recent revolutions as having three phases. The first, he said, included events that proved to be starting points, such as the self immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi and uprising of Sidi Bouzid, the arrest of lawyers in Benghazi, the assassination of Khalid Said, and repression in Deraa. During this phase, certain actions crystallized latent tensions. These events played off popular discontent, since social conditions had significantly worsened in the region in recent years. Originally, these first phases of revolt had very little to do politically with Islamists of any kind, he noted.

Kepel described the second phase as that of elections, in which Islamists, primarily of the Muslim Brotherhood have been successful. Phase three, he explained, is the post-election period. During that time, those who have succeeded at the ballots must now deliver socially and economically. Al-Nahda in Tunisia in particular is already facing this pressure, as unemployment has increased and prices have risen. Meanwhile, Kepel described a “tripod of power in Egypt: the army, parliament, and the square.” Tahrir Square, Kepel said, had originally been the source of revolutionary legitimacy though this was hijacked, he claimed, to some extent by the Muslim Brotherhood, who have the popular legitimacy of the ballots. Kepel stressed that the Brotherhood will be forced to deliver when control is ceded by the military – in particular as Egypt faces the threat of bankruptcy in a matter of weeks.

Kepel ended his remarks by stating that two issues are of great concern for the immediate future. The first is that of the GCC-Iranian tension and its link to Syria. If the Syrian system breaks down, Iran will clearly have less leverage in the Levant and Arab world more broadly. This, Kepel asserted, may therefore be seen by Israel as an opportunity to strike Iran, which would have massive global consequences. The second is the social issue. Tunisia and Egypt are already feeling enormous economic pressures, and the new regimes’ ability to deal with such issues will be a litmus test for the very near future and harbinger for future tensions.

Following Kepel’s remarks, the question and answer session covered a range of issues, including the role of Al Qaeda in the revolutionary Middle East, the emergence of extra-regional powers on the Middle Eastern stage, and Israel’s stance on the Arab Awakenings. Moderator Salman Shaikh began by asking whether the success of Islamists at the ballot box could be explained by the fact that they were the best organized parties or whether their success connoted increased religiosity in the post-revolutionary era. Kepel answered that astute autocrats like Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar al-Qadhafi remained in power largely by exploiting the threat of radical Islam, while moderate Islamists garnered support on the ground. Once the autocrats were ousted, Islamist parties remained the only other political force, and “a re-Islamization of society at a basic level made their political language palatable.” People feel deeply religious, Kepel stated, and Islamists were using language they understood.

Another question concerned what parties would come to power if mainstream Islamists fail to meet social and economic needs of the post-revolutionary countries. Kepel answered that the rise of the Salafis is a significant trend in post-revolutionary North Africa. This is surprising, he noted, as Salafis originally did not support the revolution, at least in Egypt. The Salafi vote in Egypt is now economic vote, with most of their support coming from among the poorest communities. He stated that the extent of the Salafis’ electoral success was an embarrassment for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It remains to be seen, however, to what degree Salafi movements will attempt to apply whatever religious or social agendas they have, or whether they will act more as opposition parties.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

0229_arab_revolutions

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Gilles Kepel

Professor at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP)
Research director for France’s National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Where Does the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Stand on the Arab Uprisings?

Mon, 12 Dec 2011 18:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 12, 2011
6:00 PM - 8:00 PM EST

Salwa 3
The Sheraton Hotel, Doha

Doha

On December 12, 2011, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a special policy discussion at the Sheraton Hotel in Doha with H.E. Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as part of the Center’s Distinguished Lecture Series. Professor Ihsanoğlu’s address focused on the impact of ongoing Arab revolts on the region and on the wider Muslim world, as well as on the OIC’s position toward them. The event, which was followed by a lively question and answer session, was moderated by Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, and attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic, and media communities.

Professor Ihsanoğlu opened the discussion by noting that almost one year had passed since Muhammad Bouazizi’s death set the Tunisian revolution into motion. Since that time, he said, three police states have fallen. In his 2010 book The Islamic World in the New Century, Ihsanoğlu had predicted that long-standing demands for justice and good governance would soon come to a head.

Ihsanoğlu went on to assert that although few Muslim countries have recent experience in democracy, good governance has been promoted throughout Islamic history. Modern history demonstrates that democracy and Islam are compatible. Without respect for human rights, good governance, and transparency, however, political actors have no hope of influencing their system of government. They therefore tend to turn to the religious sphere. For Muslim societies to progress, Ihsanoğlu argued, the relationship between the religious and political spheres must be clearly defined. This relationship should be based on mutual respect, pluralism, and democratic values, and should involve a clear demarcation between each sphere.

Regarding the stance of the OIC, which has undergone substantial reform since 2005, Ihsanoğlu cited two documents that have cemented the organization’s commitment to democracy. The first, the Mecca Declaration and the Ten Years Program of Action, formulated in 2005, promotes core values of human rights, transparency, and fighting corruption. The second document, the New OIC Charter, unanimously approved in 2008, stipulates the same notions as core objectives of the OIC. Given the emphasis of these documents, Ihsanoğlu said, it has been critical for the organization to respond proactively to the needs of the Arab people during recent uprisings.

In Libya, for example, the OIC was the first international organization to express as early as 22^nd of February a "strong condemnation of the excessive use of force against civilians." In March, the OIC issued additional statements condemning the Qadhafi regime’s brutal actions and sent assistance through Egypt and Tunisia. In addition, the organization participated in international contact group meetings and advocated the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya.

On the Arab uprisings more generally, Ihsanoğlu voiced his objection of the temporally limited term “Arab Spring,” arguing that transformation taking place in the Arab world will take years. “If we want a catchy metaphoric expression,” he suggested, “we can say it is the autumn of Arab dictators." The revolutions in the Middle East have inspired others to take to the streets in such disparate places as New York City and Moscow. What distinguished these revolutions, however, is that they are not led by a single philosophy or ideologue, and they are grassroots movement. The significance of this year’s revolutions, Ihsanoğlu asserted, is that they have allowed the Arab people “to join the context of history.” Since World War I, he stated, Arab nations have been forced to live outside the context of history, with the borders of the region determined by external powers, and rulers managed to stay in office for decades due to their abuse of the international balance of power. Tension accumulated over time, and erupted now under the weight of severe socioeconomic problems, including high unemployment rates, and decades of political stagnation under authoritarian governments.

Following Ihsanoğlu’s presentation, the question and answer session covered a range of issues, including the ongoing transition in Egypt, and the prospects for future OIC action in transitioning Arab states as well as OIC’s stance on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Ihsanoğlu said that the OIC supports the right of nations to acquire and utilize nuclear knowledge for peaceful purposes in line with (IAEA)’s ability to inspect. This is, of course, something that Iran is encouraged to do in order to assure its neighbours of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Salman Shaikh began by asking Professor Ihsanoğlu how he views the rise of Islamist actors in the emerging democracies of the Middle East. Ihsanoğlu said that the rise of such parties has been a natural development. Because people in authoritarian Arab states were not allowed to form political parties, they turned to mosques as the hub for social and political activities. Islam – given its ubiquity and the piety of the people of the region – was a natural means of uniting them, and so the politicization of the religion held great appeal. Ihsanoğlu cautioned, however, that the relationship between the religious and political spheres must be based on mutual respect, consensus that pluralism should be allowed, and agreement that democratic processes must be observed. He said the formation of Islamist parties, then, is not something that should be feared, and stressed that the will of the people should be respected. "We need not fear or repeat what happened in Algeria in the 1990s."

An audience member asked about the OIC’s stance on what steps the international community should take in Syria. Ihsanoğlu responded that since early April, the OIC has been trying to engage with the Syrian government to convince it to embark on political reform and end the use of violence against civilians. The Asad regime, he said, has responded with a series of empty promises. The next step, according to Professor Ihsanoğlu, is to place more international pressure on the regime, so that President Asad eventually resigns. He suggested the Yemeni experience provides cause for hope, as President Saleh was persuaded to step down after international pressure built up. Ihsanoğlu clearly stated, however, that outside powers should not become militarily involved: “we should not repeat what happened in Iraq or Libya.” Such action, he asserted, would endanger the safety of the Syrian people and would likely ignite a regional conflict. As for humanitarian support in Syria, however, Ihsanoğlu reported that the OIC affirmed in its recent ministerial meeting the importance of allowing Islamic aid groups into the country. If they do not gain access, and the Arab League Initiative not been respected, then the United Nations should become involved to avoid an escalation of human rights violations.

Another question concerned Ihsanoğlu’s view of how recent uprisings have affected the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Ihsanoğlu stressed that “there is no other solution than two states.” He added that democratization in the Middle East will likely help the both the Palestinians and Israelis. While dictators tend to act violently, democracies are unlikely wage war on one another. Still, the new democracies in the Arab world will likely adopt agendas more closely aligned with the aspirations of their people and, by extension, with Palestinian demands for self-determination. This will therefore help Palestinians further their cause through peaceful means. Palestinians, he said, need to seize the opportunity at hand and move forward with their plight, and the bid for membership at the UN is one means of doing so.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

1213 Event Transcript

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu

Secretary General, Organization of Islamic Cooperation

After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the Chill of an Arab Winter

Daniel L. Byman — Sun, 04 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

One year after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire in an act of defiance that would ignite protests and unseat long-standing dictatorships, a harsh chill is settling over the Arab world. The peaceful demonstrations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen that were supposed to bring democracy have instead given way to bloodshed and chaos, with the forces of tyranny trying to turn back the clock.

It is too soon to say that the Arab Spring is gone, never to resurface. But the Arab Winter has clearly arrived.

Tunisia, where it all began, recently carried out free elections. But that country — small, ethnically and religiously homogenous, and prosperous — was always a more likely candidate for a successful transition to democracy. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Saudi troops helped orchestrate a crackdown on demonstrators in Bahrain, regime forces gun down protesters in Syria, and Yemen crumbles into civil war, with al-Qaeda running rampant in the countryside. In Libya, we see warlords, Islamists, tribal leaders and would-be democrats vying for power in the post-Gaddafi world. And in Egypt, where the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February gave us the defining images of the Arab Spring, the military is trying to keep its hands on power.

So what went wrong — and what will an Arab Winter mean for the Middle East, the United States and the rest of the world?

The reason the Middle East has long seemed like infertile soil for democracy is not because Arab peoples do not want to vote or otherwise be free — poll after poll confirms the opposite — but rather because entrenched dictators had long imprisoned or killed dissenters, bought off opponents, undermined civil society, and divided or intimidated their people. And when dictators fall, their means of preserving power do not always fall with them.

In Egypt, the military ushered Mubarak out of office, but stayed in as a supposed caretaker and is reluctant to relinquish power. Now the security forces have again shot people in Tahrir Square. In Yemen and Libya, tribes and other power centers often opposed the old order, but they saw one another as rivals, too. Throughout the region, the police and the judiciary are broken after years of dictatorship, but there is nothing to take their place.

Moreover, the demonstrations that led to the ouster of rulers such as Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali hardly offered a clear governing alternative. Although they embodied a genuine outpouring of popular rage, the protests were largely leaderless and loosely organized, often via social media; there was no African National Congress or Corazon Aquino to take the reins. You cannot govern by flash mob.

And the opposition voices that were organized were not necessarily the most democratic. With the Arab Spring, Islamist forces rose to prominence. In Tunisia, a moderate Islamist party won victory in the October elections, gaining 89 of 217 seats in parliament, dwarfing the 29 seats of its nearest — secular — competitor. In Morocco, where the king has opened the political system somewhat, the Islamist party likewise won a plurality of the vote in the November elections.

Disciplined by years underground, Islamist groups have popular support because of the social services they provide and the repression they suffered. They were allowed to have a role in society but with limited political participation. Now that groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood are poised to do well in free parliamentary elections, they are unlikely to accept those old bargains with the military junta in Egypt or other old-regime forces elsewhere.

Brotherhood leaders have learned to mouth a commitment to pluralism and tolerance, but it is unclear that they would act on it when in power. More hard-line Islamists are openly skeptical of democracy, seeing it as a means of gaining power and not as a model for governing. Egyptian salafists, who espouse a more puritanical version of Islam, have also entered the political system and are performing unexpectedly well in the elections; their demands for Islamicizing society are extreme and may push the Brotherhood to pursue a more radical agenda when in power.

These domestic forces often deter democracy in subtle ways, but some other reactionary forces are more brazen. In March, Saudi troops drove across the causeway to neighboring Bahrain, backing a brutal crackdown against Shiite protesters. At home and abroad, the Saudis have spent tens of billions to buy off dissent. Riyadh has pushed fellow monarchs in the Arabian Peninsula and in Jordan to stop any revolutionary movements, and the Saudis are offering a haven for dictators down on their luck, such as Tunisia’s Ben Ali.

The Saudi royals not only worry about their own power diminishing, but fear that change elsewhere would be an opening for their arch-rival Iran and for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Middle East expert Bruce Riedel puts it, the Saudis have proclaimed a 21st-century version of the Soviet-era Brezhnev doctrine: “No revolution will be tolerated in a bordering kingdom.”

A faltering Arab Spring doesn’t mean we will return to a world of dictators and secret police. Not only are Mubarak, Ben Ali and Moammar Gaddafi gone, but so are the cults of personality they nurtured. Bashar al-Assad may cling to power in Syria, but he will be isolated abroad and hollow at home. Even regimes that have experienced limited unrest — Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria — are entering a new era.

Where old regimes survive, they will be weak; where new ones come in, they will be weaker, because old institutions can be destroyed more quickly than new ones can be built. Both new and old leaders must play to public opinion, and this may lead to rash, incoherent foreign policies, as politicians make campaign promises that are not in their countries’ interests to fulfill.

Israel, of course, is the easiest card to play. A Pew Research Center poll taken after Mubarak’s fall found that Egyptians favored annulling the 32-year-old peace treaty with Israel by 54 percent to 36 percent, and — no surprise — many mainstream leaders have criticized it. Indeed, Israel can serve as a perfect diversion to struggling governments. In May, as unrest swept across Syria, the regime encouraged Palestinians to march across the Syrian border into the Golan Heights, leading to four deaths when an Israeli border patrol shot Palestinians as they broke through a frontier fence.

Even if violence involving Israel does not escalate, a renewed push for peace seems unlikely. “The ugly facts,” wrote former Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens, “are that the two peace treaties that Israel concluded so far — the one with Egypt and the other with Jordan — were both signed with dictators: Anwar Sadat and King Hussein.” It is hard to imagine new leaders, who need to play to anti-Israel public opinion, sitting down with their Israeli counterparts to advance peace.

Anti-Americanism is also likely to rise in the Arab Winter — and it matters much more now that governments will seek to be in tune with public sentiment. After Mubarak’s fall, for example, only one in five Egyptians had a favorable view of the United States (just slightly higher than under Mubarak), and even in Mideast nations that are allied with Washington, majorities identify the United States and Israel among the top two threats to their security.

One of the ironies of U.S. support for democratic change is that the autocrats have traditionally been more pro-American than the democrats. Now, forces of the old regimes feel that Washington abandoned them at their most vulnerable time, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia are livid that the United States abruptly dumped Mubarak and question the U.S. commitment to their security.

The United States may end up with the worst of both worlds: scorned by the forces of democracy because of its ties to dictators, but disdained by dictators — whose cooperation is vital to U.S. economic and security interests — for reaching out to democrats.

The most dangerous outcome of the Arab Winter, however, is the spread of chaos and violence. In Syria, where thousands have already died, the body count may grow exponentially as sectarian killings spread and peaceful protesters take up arms. In Yemen, the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh has not ended the turmoil throughout the country. And Libya, lacking strong institutions and divided by tribal and political factions, may never get its new government off the ground.

If unrest spreads, families will leave their homes, burdening neighboring states and incubating fighters for future conflicts. Perhaps 1 million Libyans sought refuge in nearby countries while civil war raged there this year. Tens of thousands of Syrians have fled, and more will leave if the violence there escalates — as it shows every sign of doing. In Turkey, Syrian refugees could become a source of recruits for a future opposition army that would fight the regime in Damascus.

These conflicts could widen if neighbors intervene, whether because they fear more instability or because they want to consolidate their influence across borders. Saudi Arabia has long meddled in Yemen, for example, and the collapse of that regime may lead the Saudis to move directly against al-Qaeda forces and other perceived threats there. Meanwhile, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Israel all have strong interests in Syria and may arm factions or otherwise get involved simply to offset their rivals. Neighboring Lebanon’s history of civil war and foreign intervention offers a depressing precedent for how a local conflict can drag in neighbors.

Distrusted and broke, the United States can do little to make the Arab Winter better, but it can do a lot to make it worse. The value and possibility of economic aid, for instance, are questionable. Regimes such as Mubarak’s used American aid to prop themselves up and resist democracy. While supporting new democratic parties is a better use of dollars, it is hard to imagine a budget-conscious Congress approving serious aid for new governments that will inevitably include anti-American Islamist groups with a questionable commitment to democracy. Nor would the region’s true democrats necessarily welcome U.S. support, with its stench of foreign interference.

Washington has the most influence with the region’s militaries, but supporting them presents a dilemma. Militaries were supposed to be the “orderly” part of an orderly transition to democracy in the Middle East, but as Egypt’s experience makes clear, most officers want to keep their perks and power, and U.S. support can help them do that. Outside Egypt, militaries are politicized by tribe (Yemen), sect (Syria) and loyalty to the old order (everywhere), making them part of the problem, not the solution.

The Arab Spring began without U.S. help, and the people of the region will be the ones to determine its future. Washington should recognize that change is coming and support it, especially in key power centers such as Egypt. But inevitably it will play catch-up, managing crises where it can or must to keep instability from spreading. This could involve helping refugees, using diplomacy to try to prevent neighbors from intervening and escalating a conflict, and continuing to aggressively pursue al-Qaeda affiliates so they do not threaten Arab nations or the United States.

Just a few months ago, President Obama optimistically declared that, across the Arab world, “those rights that we take for granted are being claimed with joy by those who are prying loose the grip of an iron fist.”

We can hope that Tunisia will lead the region not only in loosening that grip, but in creating real democracy through free elections. However, we must also recognize that the Arab Spring may not bring freedom to much, or even most, of the Arab world. Even as the United States prepares to work with the region’s new democracies, it also must prepare for the chaos, stagnation and misrule that will mark the Arab Winter.

It is too soon to say that the Arab Spring is gone, never to resurface. But the Arab Winter has clearly arrived.

Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: The Washington Post

The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East

Fri, 18 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2011 381pp.

Video

"The events began in Tunisia in January 2011 . . . shook the political, social, and intellectual foundations of the Middle East. The tremors can still be felt, and no one is quite certain when the aftershocks will end, or when another shock wave of popular unrest might occur. Nevertheless, enough time has passed to try to make sense of what has happened so far and, perhaps, gain an inkling of where the region is headed."—from the Introduction by Kenneth M. Pollack

About the Book | Contents | Author Commentary | Events | About the Authors

About the Book

The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. Coauthored by 18 of the leading experts on the Middle East, it is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences.

Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.

The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the "Arab Street"; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The authors also look at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. They offer insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, as well as individual nation studies.

Part I: The Dynamics of the Arab Spring
Part II: Countries in Transition
Part III: The Imperative of Reform
Part IV: States in Crisis
Part V: Other Regional Actors
Part VI: The External Powers

Author Commentary

" Israel Looks at the Arab Awakening with Skepticism" by Daniel Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, February 9, 2012
"International Order in the Arab World " by Bruce Jones, Brookings Up Front blog, February 1, 2012
"Yemen's Transition of Power" by Ibrahim Sharqieh, Brookings Up Front blog, January 9, 2012
"The United States and Iran: The Arab Awakening Changes Everything" by Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Up Front blog, January 4, 2012
"The Palestinians and the Arab Awakening" by Khaled Elgindy, Brookings Up Front blog, December 29, 2011
"United States Policy in Syria: Masterful Inaction" by Michael S. Doran, Brookings Up Front blog, December 13, 2011
"The Long Spring Ahead" by Stephen R. Grand, Brookings Up Front blog, December 8, 2011
"Arab Public Opinion: A Question of What They Want and Say" by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Up Front blog, December 6, 2011
"Can Al Qaeda Capitalize on Unrest in Egypt and Syria? " by Daniel L. Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, December 1, 2011
"The Egyptian Military Faces Its Defining Hour " by Kenneth M. Pollack, Brookings Up Front blog, November 28, 2011
"Saudi Arabia: Its Rulers and its Future in Light of the Arab Awakening " by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Up Front blog, November 23, 2011
"Egypt: The Military, Elections, and the Hope for Reform " by Shadi Hamid, Brookings Up Front blog, November 21, 2011

Events

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Akram Al-Turk

Akram Al-Turk is the publications manager and senior research assistant in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Pavel K. Baev

Daniel L. Byman

Michael Doran

Khaled Elgindy

Stephen R. Grand

Shadi Hamid

Bruce Jones

Suzanne Maloney

Jonathan D. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he is
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Previously, he was director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House).

Bruce Riedel

Ruth H. Santini

Salman Shaikh

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Ömer Taşpınar

Shibley Telhami

Sarah Yerkes

Sarah Yerkes is a former Research Analyst of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A History of Meddling

Shadi Hamid — Fri, 27 May 2011 00:00:00 -0400

In a video debate on bloggingheads.tv, Shadi Hamid discusses President Obama's Middle East speech, the current situations in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and broader implications for U.S. policy.

Shadi Hamid: I thought [Obama's speech] was a rather pedestrian speech and disappointing in a number of ways, and the last thing I would call it is "ambitious." [...] There was nothing, I mean America always says that it’s on the side of democracy and reform, so all the rhetoric was there, that was nothing new, but what I found surprising was that there were no surprises in this speech. The White House spokesman Jay Carney had been talking about a sweeping, comprehensive speech that really brings all the different strands of U.S. policy together and I didn’t really see that. Where were the bold new initiatives? Where was the vision? Saying that you support democracy in the Middle East is not a vision. There was some criticism of Bahrain; that’s nice. That was welcomed, and I think the Bahraini opposition appreciated that. But what are we going to do about Bahrain? So we have to figure out how we translate that rhetoric, where we say we support democracy, into actual policy changes on the ground. I was waiting to hear a road map, I was waiting to hear how that kind of comes together, and it wasn’t there.

[...]

Shadi Hamid: I agree that the goals are ambitious, but America’s role, as presented by the Obama administration, was less so. I didn’t really see, and this is where we get to the discussion about Obama’s general foreign policy orientation and that big New Yorker article; there was this description of Obama leading from behind and I think that’s really an appropriate way of describing how the U.S. now sees itself in the broader community. That we’re going to be humble, we’re going to move back, we’re going to let others lead, it’s up to Arabs to make their own decisions (and of course it is, no one’s disagreeing with that), but what I found to be a little bit disingenuous in a lot of this kind of talk is we aren’t a neutral party. We aren’t innocent bystanders here that are going to just kind of jump in altruistically and what I had actually wanted to see Obama do is acknowledge America’s really, quite frankly, tragic role in the region over the last five decades and say ‘listen (and address this to Arab audiences), we made serious mistakes. We supported autocratic regimes for five decades. We did not support your democratic aspirations and you know what? We were wrong.’ And I had actually written an article for Slate the day before this speech where I called on Obama to actually issue an apology. And I knew of course that wasn’t going to be realistic, but at the very least acknowledgement of that kind of role because if we don’t understand where we’ve been, it’s very hard to correct our past policies and come up with a new, bold, ambitious foreign policy if that is, in fact, what we want to do. And I’ve been an advocate of the U.S. fundamentally re-aligning and re-orienting its policy in the Middle East to be in line with Arab democratic aspirations. But I don’t think we can do that until we really face our past and try to understand why is it that we supported these autocratic regimes in the first place and why is it going to be different this time around.

Watch the full debate »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: bloggingheads.tv

Mr. Assad: Tear Down Your Police State

Stephen R. Grand — Fri, 20 May 2011 16:29:00 -0400

For those hoping President Obama would lay out a grand strategy for the Middle East, his recent speech at the State Department must have been disappointing. There was little attempt to connect the dots and explain why the United States had endorsed regime change in Tunisia and Egypt but not Bahrain, why we chose to intervene in Libya but not Yemen or Syria. The president did not put forward, as some had urged, a new framework for Middle East peace. Instead, the president delivered what was on its surface a much more modest address. But while late in coming, the speech could ultimately prove transformational.

For want of a better term, it could be described as a “directional” speech. In Reagan-esque style, President Obama provided the world with his own interpretation of the recent dramatic events that have swept across the Middle East and North Africa, and the direction in which he saw the winds of history now blowing. The president described how, driven by a hunger for dignity and self-determination, “the people of the Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands.” He observed that, “Two leaders have stepped aside. More may follow.” He suggested that “it will be years before this story reaches its end.” But he made it clear how he thought it would end: “that repression will fail, and that tyrants will fall.”

Speaking fittingly from the State Department, he declared a new direction for U.S. policy: that America would align itself squarely behind these new winds of change. “It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.” He offered significant financial assistance to the fledgling democracies of Tunisia and Egypt, while also indicating that U.S. assistance would “extend to nations where transitions have yet to take place.”

And he offered some direction regarding what should and should not be acceptable in this new world – some rules of the road in a region undergoing dramatic change. He spoke of the “moral force of nonviolence” and the right of citizens to free speech and free assembly. He made clear that “the United States opposes the use of violence and repression against the people of the region.” Rulers, he suggested, had to heed their citizens’ calls for change and move toward dialogue and democracy. Singling out Syria as an example, he indicated, “President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.”

On the one hand, it was a much more realistic speech than the one President Obama gave in Cairo shortly after taking office. There were no soaring promises this time, like his earlier pledges to close Guantanamo and halt Israeli settlements – pledges that have since haunted his efforts to engage with the Muslim world. This was a speech by a more seasoned American president, more cognizant of the limits of American power and the American presidency.

On the other hand, it may yet prove to be a revolutionary speech, akin to President Reagan’s 1987 speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. That, too, was a statement by an American president about the world as it was evolving, in attempt to shape it toward “the world as it should be.” Reagan’s call to Mr. Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” was dismissed by many at the time as lacking in seriousness because the United States lacked the leverage to make it happen. But the call carried tremendous moral force. Reading between the lines of the Obama speech, it can be understood as a similar call to those “prying loose the grip of an iron fist” to continue in their struggle. It was also a stern warning to the region’s leaders to heed the voices of their people or stand aside the forces of history. This was the president not as commander-in-chief of the world’s largest army, but as its most inspirational cheerleader, trying to breathe new life into the Arab Spring.

History will judge whether the speech and subsequent U.S. policy succeed in turning noble aspirations into a better tomorrow for the peoples of the Middle East.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Obama's Middle East Speech: An Unspoken Message to Saudi Arabia

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 20 May 2011 11:39:00 -0400

The two most important words in President Barack Obama’s much vaunted speech on the Arab Awakening were the ones he did not say: Saudi Arabia. In a speech that proclaimed a dramatic reboot of American policy toward the Middle East, the absence of any direct reference to the state that is an irreplaceable U.S. partner on regional security and energy and uniquely relevant as the birthplace of Islam was striking.

But make no mistake about it: despite his reluctance to mention Saudi Arabia by name, the president’s words were aimed squarely at Riyadh. Proclaiming that “the status quo is not sustainable,” the president boldly endorsed a new democratic future for the Middle East and placed America unequivocally – and unconditionally – on the side of change. Even more remarkably, the president declared that support for regional reform “is not a secondary interest – today I am making it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions.”

That posture will win plaudits among many around the world and along both ends of the political spectrum in Washington. If the soaring vision laid out by the president is implemented with the same force with which it was articulated, the shift would bring U.S. policy in the region into closer alignment with both American values and what appears to be the prevailing preferences of Arab populations for representative, responsible rule.

However, the speech will only exacerbate the fissures between the United States and Saudi Arabia that were triggered by the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq and have only worsened under the Obama administration, despite the president’s efforts to improve American relations with the Muslim world and promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Arab Awakening has inflamed this distrust: Saudi leaders are livid over the speed with which Washington sought to dispatch another old ally, Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, in the wake of massive public protests. Under the blatantly specious auspices of a Gulf security pact, they dispatched security forces into neighboring Bahrain to help quell peaceful demonstrations by Shi’a Bahrainis who have long been politically disenfranchised by the ruling Sunni monarchy.

Although his speech declared that “we will keep our commitments to friends and partners,” the president’s speech did little else to assuage Saudi anxieties. Mr. Obama condemned the repression in Bahrain, although without referring to the Saudi role and in far less vehement terms than he criticized the actions of more convenient nemeses such as Libya, Syria and Iran. It was a flagrant and particularly unfortunate hedge for a speech that attempted to contrast American principles with Iranian hypocrisy. Even Mr. Obama seemed uncomfortable with the artful avoidance, stumbling slightly over his lines at this point in the speech.

For their part, the Saudis are in no mood to pull punches, and have already begun to outline an approach to the region that is quite contrary to the vision laid out by President Obama. In a Washington Post op-ed piece several days ago, an influential Saudi analyst heralded Riyadh’s decision to embark on an “assertive” new foreign policy independent of Washington on the grounds that “there is simply too much at stake for the kingdom to rely on a security policy written in Washington, which has backfired more often than not and spread instability.” The oped cited the Iranian threat, an increasingly obsessive fixation for an aging and fearful Saudi leadership and a cynical appeal to American (and Israeli) security concerns.

President Obama’s speech forcefully articulated a vision of the Middle East that diverges dramatically from what the Saudis proclaim. In this respect – as a not-so-subtle shot across the bow at Saudi recalcitrance – the President’s speech worked well. However, it is worrisome that there was nothing in the speech that suggests that either he or his administration more broadly has begun to grapple with the central strategic uncertainty emanating from the Arab spring: how to advance America’s vital interests in the Middle East – interests such as advancing Arab-Israeli peace, combatting terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and ensuring the free flow of energy– without relying on autocratic allies.

The Saudis are vital partners for any American administration: we have a long history of constructive cooperation, and they share many of our regional interests. Moreover, the current leadership is profoundly preferable to any alternative that might emerge from either violent regime change or a peaceful democratic transition, and its internal politics are unlikely to be moderated by any bumbling American attempt to influence them. Still, our differences are real and they are growing, a reality underscored by the president’s compelling call for protecting women’s and minority rights, an area where the Saudi record is particularly indefensible.

Through its rhetoric as well as its actions in Bahrain and elsewhere, Riyadh is staking out an activist stance to block any further advances in the movement for meaningful political change that has emerged across the region. That puts the Kingdom in diametric opposition to the approach articulated by the president today. Washington needs to begin mapping out how this will impact our shared interests on issues such as Iran and energy security.

In some areas, such as Iran and Iraq, this may entail a robust American effort to rebuld and reorient cooperation with Riyadh; in others, the administration needs to be ready to counter Saudi efforts, particularly where the Kingdom is attempting to sabotage peaceful transitions and democratic reforms. The administration needs to guard against ploys to undercut the President’s proclaimed agenda, including the fallacious argument that the Arab spring empowers Tehran. In reality, developments in Bahrain and elsewhere only confirm that continuing regional repression offers an opening rather than an antidote to Iranian influence. Finally, the Administration must carefully think through how to square the president’s call for efforts to promote reform across the region when we have neither the capacity nor the intention to do so with respect to our most important ally, Saudi Arabia.

Today’s speech signaled a mutual recognition of the manifest distance in the longstanding strategic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In private if not in public, Mr. Obama will have to address the Saudi elephant in the room.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

The Bahrain Crisis and Its Regional Dangers

Salman Shaikh — Wed, 23 Mar 2011 15:19:00 -0400

While U.S. and international attention is focused largely elsewhere in the region, especially Libya, the violent crackdown against protestors in the tiny island kingdom of Bahrain may well pose a bigger threat to the entire region's stability. The Bahrain situation is exposing long simmering tensions and rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran and carries the danger that it will trigger the next regional war. Such a scenario would likely draw in the United States at a time when its relationships with key allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, are under strain. Urgent action is therefore needed to de-escalate the situation in Bahrain and create the trust necessary for the government and opposition to start a much delayed national dialogue that charts the future of the country.

Worryingly, a senior unidentified Saudi official has described the mission of Saudi and other GCC troops to support the Bahraini security forces as "open-ended." A three month state of emergency has led to a campaign of house raids and arrests that have included the leaders of the main opposition parties, as well as human rights activists and other dissidents. There are also mounting concerns that these combined security forces are using disproportionate force and committing serious violations of international law and humanitarian law. The space for dialogue seems to be rapidly closing.

In the days ahead, we are likely to see a deepening of the culture of resistance in Bahrain. In particular, calls for dialogue to establish a constitutional monarchy may be swept away by more radical groups and the combative youth that increasingly supports them. Further radicalization of Bahrainis seems inevitable the longer the current impasse lasts, carrying with it the real danger that the country will be mired in a full blown civil war.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Beyond Libya: Activity Across the Middle East

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 00:00:00 -0400

As much of the world remains focused on Muammar Qaddafi, Ibrahim Sharqieh offers a look at the current situation in the Middle East beyond Libya. Sharqieh shares his insights in an interview with Patt Morrison of Southern California Public Radio.

Patt Morrison: First, let’s look at Egypt, where there was the first real election with real choices in a long time.

Ibrahim Sharqieh: That is true. This is very historical by all standards. The people are so excited about it. The entire region is excited about it. It hasn’t happened in a very long time. Probably over 50 to 60 years. So the success of holding a real election for the first time in 50 years in Egypt has been historical by all standards. And this is going to set a standard for the entire region. For the first time, we are getting real results.

Morrison: What are the new amendments [to Egypt's political process] designed to do?

Sharqieh: Basically, [their purpose is] to relax the standards that were set by the National Democratic Party in the past, that allowed only certain individuals that meet a certain standard [to run for election]. Candidates had to be approved by the parliament and the ruling party itself – the National Democratic Party. So from now on, we should have more free elections and many more people will be able to run for free elections as they wish.

Listen to the full interview at scpr.org »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Southern California Public Radio

Middle East Youth May Be Key to Economic and Political Stability

Samantha Constant — Sat, 19 Feb 2011 10:47:00 -0500

Introduction

Over the past several weeks, the world watched enraptured as crowds led by young Egyptians thronged the streets of Cairo to protest President Hosni Mubarak’s rule and to force him from office. No two countries are exactly alike. But many of the same demographic and economic forces that produced the Egyptian earthquake are present throughout the region—which could mean more tremors ahead.

Like Egypt, most countries in the Middle East are experiencing an unprecedented youth bulge. In countries from Morocco to Iran, people ages 15 to 29 make up the largest share of the population. Ominously for the region’s rulers, neither Tunisia nor Egypt, the epicenters of the uprising, is particularly unique in its demographic tilt. Young people represent 29 percent of the population in both Egypt and Tunisia, compared with 28 percent in Bahrain, 30 percent in Jordan, 31 percent in Algeria, and 34 percent in Iran, all of which have faced their own protests. The comparable number in most Western countries is around 20 percent.

What’s more, the next few years may represent a point of maximum demographic pressure across the region—a period somewhat analogous to the 1960s in the United States when the first baby boomers surged onto the political and cultural scenes. In Bahrain and Jordan, the share of the population under 30 is projected to continue rising for several years. But in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran, the youth bulge is either peaking now or will peak shortly. That means the generational demand for change could also be cresting.

Read the full article at the National Journal website »

Authors

Samantha Constant

Publication: National Journal