Brookings: Topics - Arms Control

Options for Reducing Nuclear Arms

Wed, 22 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Recent visits to Moscow by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Secretary of State John Kerry appear to have injected a more positive tone to U.S.-Russian relations, as Washington and Moscow prepare for meetings between Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin in June and September. Further nuclear arms reductions beyond those mandated by the New START Treaty, now in its third year of implementation, appear to figure high on the U.S. agenda. What sort of additional nuclear reductions, if any, should the United States now pursue?

On May 22, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore the possibilities for further nuclear reductions, looking at the spectrum of possibilities. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon moderated a discussion with Global Zero Co-Founder Bruce Blair, National Institute for Public Policy President Keith Payne and Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, co-author with O’Hanlon of the recent Brookings Focus Book, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Press, 2012).

NATO and the Costs of Star Wars

Clara M. O'Donnell — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Over the last decade, the US has spent tens of billions of dollars constructing a shield to stop nuclear missiles from North Korea or Iran reaching its soil. So far, the shield does not work. Fortunately for the Americans, neither Pyongyang nor Tehran has nuclear missiles that could hit the US. Unfortunately, however, America's missile defence programme has upset China and Russia, two countries that do have nuclear arsenals that could reach its homeland. America's European partners in NATO should try to convince Washington to scale back its missile defence ambitions for the next few years. Not only would this allow the US government to spend its shrinking defence budget on more pressing military needs. It would also improve European security by reducing tensions between NATO and Russia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been increasingly worried about nuclear attacks by 'rogue' states. In 1998, a study group chaired by Donald Rumsfeld predicted that North Korea and Iran could field intercontinental ballistic missiles within five years. Today, however, Iran has neither intercontinental missiles nor a nuclear bomb. In March of this year, a report from the Pentagon's intelligence agency (erroneously declassified) assessed "with moderate confidence" that Pyongyang could build a nuclear device that fits on a missile. But there is still no evidence that North Korean missiles are sophisticated enough to reach the US.

Although the American mainland is not currently under threat, every president since George H.W. Bush has sought to deploy nation-wide defences against a limited attack by ballistic missiles. Reviving some of President Ronald Reagan's 'star wars' ambitions, the US has had missile interceptors deployed in Alaska and California since 2004. Both the George W Bush and Obama administrations have also had various plans to deploy interceptors against intercontinental missiles at bases in Europe. (The Obama administration, working with NATO, has also been deploying interceptors in Europe to protect Europeans and US troops in the region against shorter-range missiles from Iran – a threat which does exist.) In March, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel announced that because of technical problems and budgetary constraints, the US is suspending its efforts to build Europe-based strategic interceptors. He also said that in response to the bellicose attitude of North Korea's new leader, the US will add 14 missile interceptors in on its West Coast, and perhaps deploy a few more on the East Coast, too.

The Obama administration has been wise to cancel the European leg of its strategic missile defence plans. Several recent studies had highlighted significant shortcomings in the programme. For example, a 2012 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the interceptors planned for Europe would have been too slow to stop an incoming missile. But the US would be ill advised to increase the number of interceptors on the West – and possibly East – Coast. Studies have shown that the interceptors in Alaska and California do not work well either. According to Congress' Government Accountability Office, ten out of the 30 interceptors rely on technology which has never intercepted a missile during tests. The GAO estimates that it will take several years to repair this technology, costing the US taxpayer an additional $700 million. Hagel has promised to fix these glitches before the new interceptors are deployed. But the Pentagon does not yet have a solution to another big problem. None of its interceptors can distinguish between an incoming warhead and debris or decoys. (Ballistic missiles can easily carry decoys in addition to warheads.)

America's strategic missile defence efforts have made the US taxpayer fund a weapon that does not work to tackle a threat that does not exist. They have also antagonised China and Russia. Both countries worry that US technological breakthroughs could undermine their strategic deterrents. Moscow has been most displeased. The Kremlin has been asking for legal guarantees that the US would not direct its missile defences against Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. To reassure Russia, the Obama administration has encouraged Moscow to co-operate with NATO's defence programme against Iranian short and long-range missiles. (Moscow is less worried about NATO's defences against Iranian short-range missiles because the interceptors used would be too slow to stop a Russian strategic missile.) Washington has also been willing to provide Moscow political guarantees that its nuclear deterrent is not under threat.

But so far, the Obama administration has refused to give Russia legal guarantees. The US has made such commitments in the past. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty established limits on what Moscow and Washington could do in this area from the 1970s until 2002. President George W Bush then withdrew from the agreement in order to pursue America’s missile defence ambitions unhindered. The Obama administration fears that Republican senators – who are keen on missile defence – would not ratify a treaty that would constrain the US. As a result, missile defence has become one of the most contentious issues in a troubled US-Russia relationship. Moscow has refused to negotiate further cuts in its nuclear arsenal until the issue is resolved. Last year, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces threatened to attack the European NATO countries hosting US missile defences. And according to press reports, Russian bombers have been simulating strikes against American missile defence installations.

Now that Hagel has cancelled the European leg of US strategic missile defences, there is a chance that NATO and Russia could end their dispute. Senior American and Russian officials have resumed talks about Russia co-operating with NATO's missile defence efforts. US policy-makers have also been encouraging Moscow to negotiate new bilateral nuclear reductions – a top priority for President Barack Obama. According to some Russian officials, President Vladimir Putin may be open to an agreement when he meets President Obama at the G8 in June or at their bilateral summit in September. But the Russians still want legal guarantees on strategic missile defences.

Europeans welcome the possibility of improved NATO-Russia ties. Most of them have never been convinced of the need for, or feasibility of, strategic missile defences and many disliked Washington's decision to leave the ABM treaty. Germany and others have been keen for Russia to co-operate with NATO's missile defence programme as a way to alleviate tensions. To maximise the chances of a deal between Washington and Moscow, Europeans should now encourage their American allies to include legal guarantees on missile defence in a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Steven Pifer and Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution point out in their book 'The opportunity' that treaty limits could still allow the US to deploy all its planned defences against North Korea and Iran: the US and Russia could for example agree to each having a maximum of 125 interceptors capable of engaging intercontinental missiles. (The ABM treaty initially allowed for 200.) The treaty could also be limited to ten years, so that both sides could reconsider its ceilings in light of how the threats from North Korea and Iran evolve.

The White House, and Europeans, would struggle to convince some Republican senators to ratify such a treaty. But without it, Russia is unlikely to reduce its numerous tactical nuclear weapons – an arsenal that worries both Democrats and Republicans. Europeans should also discourage their US counterparts from deploying additional interceptors against strategic missiles until tests have shown them to be effective. The risk of wasting large sums of money at a time of savage defence cuts should help senators to reassess their views on missile defence.

As Greg Thielmann, a former senior US state department intelligence official, remarks, Europeans have "tamed ill-considered American instincts" in the past: in the 1980s, Europeans encouraged a reluctant Reagan administration to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For the benefit of NATO-Russia relations and global arms control, the Europeans should encourage their ally to reassess its stance again.

Authors

Clara M. O'Donnell

Publication: Centre for European Reform

Image Source: © Yves Herman / Reuters

Big Hurdles Ahead for Arms Control

Steven Pifer — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National Interest.

Four years ago in Prague, President Obama announced his desire to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and set an ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear arms. He returned to the Czech capital one year later to sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The president has said he wants to do more: cut nuclear weapons further and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Those are worthwhile goals, but achieving them will require overcoming significant challenges.

The New START Treaty limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. That is a good step, but do those weapons levels make sense twenty years after the end of the Cold War? New START, moreover, covers only a part of the total nuclear arsenals of the superpowers; non-deployed (reserve) strategic warheads and non-strategic (tactical) weapons remain free of any constraint.

The superpowers each have total stockpiles numbering 4,500–5,000 nuclear weapons, more than fifteen times larger than the next nuclear weapons state. Washington and Moscow could easily reduce their arsenals by half and retain robust deterrents—and they would clearly remain top dogs in the nuclear-arms world.

In his January state of the union message, Mr. Obama stated his intention to “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” Press reports in early February suggested the administration was nearing a decision on reductions to no more than 1,000–1,100 deployed strategic warheads and a total of 2,500–3,500 total nuclear weapons. The administration could pursue this in different ways.

One option would seek to negotiate a U.S.-Russian treaty covering all nuclear weapons. It might limit each side to 2,500 total weapons, with a sublimit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. That would reduce the New START level by 35 percent and, more significantly, for the first time cap reserve strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

Negotiating such an agreement would get into new territory; for example, the sides would need to develop agreed definitions, counting rules and verification measures to apply to the classes of warheads not previously limited. None of that would be easy and would take considerably longer than the eleven months it took to finish New START.

The Obama administration might conclude that it lacks time to finish such a treaty before the end of his second term. It thus might consider a fast deal to reduce New START’s limits. That could be as simple as just negotiating new numbers, for example, a limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads in place of 1,550. New START’s definitions, counting rules and verification measures would apply equally well to the new numerical limits. As for reserve strategic and tactical weapons, Washington could seek to engage Moscow in a process beginning with transparency and confidence-building measures and ultimately leading to a negotiation of legally binding limits. However, getting to that negotiation, and then concluding it, would take far longer than agreeing to change the New START limits.

Pursuing either approach would encounter challenges. The first and most critical: is Moscow prepared to engage? President Putin and the Russians have shown little enthusiasm recently for further nuclear arms cuts. They may choose not to play.

Perhaps not, but it is too early to close that door. The Russian government could have incentives to negotiate. For example, while the U.S. military can easily maintain its forces at New START levels, the Russian military must build new missiles to keep to the levels. Lowering New START’s limits could provide an attractive cost-saving measure for Moscow.

National Security Advisor Donilon travels to Moscow next week, and presidents Obama and Putin plan to meet in June and September. Those encounters provide opportunities to sound out the Russians’ readiness to deal.

Verification will pose a special challenge for limits on reserve and tactical nuclear arms. The U.S. intelligence community has high confidence in its ability to monitor New START’s limits. But monitoring constraints on reserve strategic and tactical weapons—which are not deployed on large strategic ballistic missiles but sit in storage bunkers—will prove a tougher task.

In the end, the intelligence community likely will not have the same degree of confidence in its ability to monitor those limits as it does with New START. That will raise questions, particularly in the Senate, though the risk posed by less certainty in monitoring limits on reserve strategic and tactical weapons should be set against the current situation, in which there are no constraints of any kind on those weapons.

A third challenge waits on Capitol Hill. Senate turnover has meant the loss of considerable muscle memory on nuclear arms-control questions. Senate Republicans, moreover, tend to be skeptical about the value of arms control. And they feel that the Obama administration has not moved as fast on nuclear modernization as it promised during the New START ratification debate. So, any new nuclear-reductions treaty would face a stiff test in a ratification vote.

That has led the administration to weigh options other than a legally binding treaty. One could be to seek a political commitment by the U.S. and Russian presidents to cut deployed strategic warheads to one thousand on no more than five hundred deployed strategic delivery vehicles. The sides could use New START’s verification measures to monitor these politically binding limits as well as the legally binding limits of 1,550 and 700.

The administration also would like to secure ratification of the 1996 CTBT. The Senate did not consent to ratification in 1999, primarily due to concerns about the reliability of the U.S. stockpile absent testing and the ability to detect cheating. Developments over the past ten years in the stockpile-stewardship program and advances in monitoring, such as improved seismic techniques, have largely allayed those two worries.

Bear in mind also how hard Nevada fought against storage of nuclear waste at the nuclear test site. With the population of nearby Las Vegas having tripled since 1992, the year of the last U.S. nuclear test, does anyone believe a resumption of testing would be feasible politically? Moreover, the United States carried out more nuclear tests than the rest of the world combined and learned more from individual tests. Why not freeze this American advantage?

Persuading Senate Republicans of the validity of these points nevertheless cannot be taken for granted. The administration will want to do a careful head count before making a CTBT ratification push, as a second negative vote in the Senate would be devastating for the treaty.

The president has said he wants to do more on cutting nuclear-arms levels and moving the CTBT closer to reality. Those are worthy goals that could cement his nuclear legacy and make America more secure. But major challenges stand before his agenda. President Obama has to engage personally, both with the Russians and the Senate, if he wants to overcome them.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Policy and Arms Control: Issues for the United States, NATO and Russia

Steven Pifer — Sun, 31 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In a recently-released National Resources Defense Council report, From Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Stability: Exploring a New Comprehensive Framework for U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions, Senior Fellow Steven Pifer contributed a chapter on dealing with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The chapter describes U.S., NATO and Russian policies regarding such weapons, discusses the issues they raise for arms control, outlines various arms control approaches, and concludes with recommendations for U.S. and Russian action.

Introduction

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons—also referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons—have long been elements of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian arsenals. Thousands of these weapons on both sides were eliminated as a result of the “presidential nuclear initiatives” in 1991 and 1992, and the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty banned the sides’ groundbased ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. Aside from the INF Treaty’s ban, however, nonstrategic nuclear weapons are not constrained by current U.S.-Russian arms control agreements.

The United States and Russia have different views of the roles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW—the term in this paper is used to apply to warheads, not delivery systems, and covers all nuclear warheads except for those for strategic delivery vehicles). The U.S. government and NATO regard U.S. NSNW deployed forward in Europe as having only marginal military utility; their value is seen primarily in political terms, symbolizing the link between the United States and NATO Europe. NATO is currently reviewing its nuclear posture as part of its deterrence and defense posture review.

The precise role of NSNW in Russian military strategy is less clear. The Russian General Staff appears to assign them more of a military role in terms of offsetting what the Russian military regards as conventional force imbalances in comparison with NATO and, though it is rarely mentioned, China. The rationale for the large number is unclear.

Washington has stated that it wishes to include NSNW, along with non-deployed strategic warheads, in the next round of nuclear arms reduction negotiations with Russia. Moscow has said that other issues—such as missile defense, long-range conventional strike and the fate of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty—must be addressed before it would consider further nuclear reductions. Russians officials have also stated that the withdrawal of U.S. NSNW to national territory should be a precondition for any negotiations covering NSNW.

Should the sides agree to put NSNW into an arms control context, there are a range of options that they could pursue. These include confidence-building measures, unilateral steps and negotiated outcomes. They might choose some combination of these options as well.

Read the full report »

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Natural Resources Defense Council

Image Source: © Murad Sezer / Reuters

Will Russia Take "Yes" for an Answer on Missile Defense?

Steven Pifer — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 11:47:00 -0400

When Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced this month that the Pentagon would increase the number of missile interceptors in Alaska, he noted that the U.S. missile defense program in Europe would be restructured. This means cancellation of Phase 4 of the plan, which called for the deployment of upgraded interceptors in Eastern Europe.

The decision could open the way for resolving U.S.-Russian differences over missile defense, one of the thorniest problems on the bilateral agenda, and remove an obstacle to further nuclear arms reductions — if Moscow can say something other than “nyet.”

The initial Russian reaction gave little ground for optimism. But Russian officials often react slowly to new ideas, so we may not yet have the final word.

The Obama administration unveiled its “European Phased Adaptive Approach” in 2009 with the goal of deploying increasingly capable SM-3 missile interceptors in anticipation that Iran would develop missiles with increasingly longer ranges. Moscow initially appeared to welcome the approach.

In November 2010, NATO and Russia agreed to explore a cooperative missile defense for Europe. Talks between U.S. and Russian officials in early 2011 yielded significant convergence on questions such as transparency, joint exercises and jointly manned NATO-Russia centers to share early warning data and plan how NATO and Russia missile defense systems would work together.

The dialogue stalled, however, as Russian officials began to complain more vociferously about Phase 4 of the plan, originally scheduled for 2020, when the SM-3 IIB interceptor would achieve the capability to engage intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Moscow asserted that Iran stood many years, if not decades, from developing an ICBM, and claimed that the United States instead planned to target SM-3 IIBs against Russian ICBMs. U.S. officials countered that SM-3 IIBs in Europe would be ill-placed to engage Russian strategic missiles.

Hagel’s announcement renders that argument moot.

Now if the Russians do not want to move forward on resolving their differences with Washington over missile defense, they have to find other reasons to object. And they may.

A Russian official has expressed opposition to the fact that Phases 2 and 3 of the missile defense plan will go forward in Romania and Poland. SM-3 interceptors in those phases, however, will only be able to engage intermediate-range missiles. That presumably poses no problem for Moscow, as a 1987 treaty bans Russia (and the United States) from having intermediate-range missiles.

Russian recalcitrance may reflect simmering resentment about NATO enlargement, and the prospective deployment of SM-3 missile interceptors in Eastern Europe could add to the unhappiness. But how will small U.S. military detachments with interceptors to defend against missiles that Russia does not have pose a threat to Russia?

Moscow has sought a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic missiles, even though they know full well that Senate Republicans would block such a treaty. Russian officials assert that the absence of legally binding limits creates uncertainty about the offense-defense relationship.

Moscow is correct that increasing missile defense capabilities could undermine the balance in strategic offensive forces, but that problem will not arise for 15 or 20 years, if then. The United States plans to deploy only 44 interceptors capable of engaging ICBMs in 2017.

Russia could cut its strategic missile force by 50 percent or even 75 percent and still easily overwhelm those interceptors. Until the gap between strategic offense and defense narrows considerably, a U.S. political commitment not to target Russian missiles, coupled with transparency on missile defense plans, should suffice.

Domestic motives may lie behind the Russian position. President Vladimir Putin may see political value in scratchy relations with the United States. Similarly, the Russian Ministry of Defense may hope that keeping alive tensions over missile defense will produce greater resources for military modernization.

If the Russians want to continue the argument over missile defense, they can offer various pretexts. But that should not obscure the main point: their assertion that missile defenses, specifically SM-3 IIB interceptors, will threaten Russian ICBMs and thereby undermine the strategic balance now has no substantive basis.

So is Moscow prepared to engage in a serious way with Washington and NATO to settle the missile defense question and pursue a cooperative approach?

Russian officials have begun to offer a more nuanced reaction to Hagel’s announcement and, on Monday, he and the Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, agreed to resume consultations on missile defense. This is good news.

The question now is whether Moscow can find a way to say yes. Or will it instead seek an excuse to keep the fight going? President Putin, over to you.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The New York Times

U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Prospects and Challenges

Steven Pifer — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 14:32:00 -0400

Editor's note: Senior Fellow Steven Pifer gave a March 25 seminar at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on "U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Prospects and Challenges." He outlined the possibilities for future U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions and resolution of differences over missile defense, as well as the challenges that must be overcome in order to take advantage of those possibilities. Listen to the audio, view the slide presentation, and read an excerpt below.

Well Marty, first of all thanks for having this. Let me talk a little bit, I’ll draw some ideas on the opportunity, but talk a little bit about where I think Washington is on some questions such as next steps in nuclear reductions, what to do about missile defense, and a couple of other arms control issues, and then I’ll talk a little bit about some of the challenges that I think this administration faces in achieving what it would like to do.

First, just to start off with where things are now, the New START treaty was signed about three years ago. It’s now in its third year of implementation, having entered in force in February of 2011, and these are the three main limits in the treaty; 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and I think those are the two more meaningful limits. I should note that 1,550 is arms control math, in that 1,550 actually probably equals about 1,800 on the American side, and that’s because that 1,550 limit counts the actual number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but since neither the American nor the Russian militaries keep weapons on bombers, the negotiators decided to attribute each bomber with one weapon. And the Federation of American Scientists estimate is that there are about 300 cruise missiles and bombs for U.S. strategic nuclear bombers, so in this case 1,550 on the American side is probably more like about 1,800. Now this is certainly, I think, a significant step forward on the START 1 Treaty, which allowed each side 6,000 weapons using slightly different counting rules, but I think there is still a question to be asked whether 20 years after the end of the Cold War, and 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whether these sorts of numbers are still necessary.

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Download slide presentation

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Image Source: © Sergei Karpukhin / Reuters

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

Steven Pifer — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with WKAR on the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Steven Pifer, co-author of The Opportunity, discusses prospects for future international arms negotiations as well as the stability of the U.S. and Russian bombs, submarines and planes. Read an excerpt below.

WKAR: Before we get into the details, can you give us a sense of the scale we’re talking about here? I’m sure the exact number is a guarded secret but about how many nuclear warheads does the U.S. maintain?

Steve Pifer: Well actually it’s not a secret. In 2010 the United States released a number and said that as of September 2009 the total American stockpile was 5,113 weapons.

WKAR: Okay

Pifer: Which is a huge decrease from the Cold War, at the height of the Cold War there were 25,000- 30,000 weapons. But you still have to ask the question; does that number make sense twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union?

WKAR: What about the dollar cost of maintaining that arsenal?

Pifer: The dollar cost in terms of maintaining them, on a day to day status, is estimated at say thirty to forty billion dollars a year. So it’s a part of the defense budget…

WKAR: Wow

Pifer: But where the costs get really big is if you look, say five or seven years down the road, where the Navy’s going to have to start building a new ballistic missile submarine to replace the Ohio class submarines which have to be retired in about 15 years and then you’re talking about an estimate of $6 to $7 billion dollars, per boat, not counting the missiles or torpedoes.

Listen to the audio »

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: WKAR

Image Source: © Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters

SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty

Steven Pifer — Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:49:00 -0400

Yesterday’s blog—“Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate”—described how presidents over the past 40 years have sought to limit or reduce nuclear weapons by means other than a treaty requiring two-thirds majority approval in the Senate. Why would the Obama administration consider something other than a treaty? Because it fears that Republicans in the Senate would not consider a treaty on its merits. A comparison of the ratification experiences of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed by President George W. Bush in 2002 and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signed by Mr. Obama in 2010 provides Exhibit A for those fears.

SORT limited the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,700-2,200 “strategic nuclear warheads,” the level of nuclear weapons that the Bush administration’s 2001 nuclear posture review concluded was necessary for the United States—regardless of what levels of nuclear arms other countries had. Mr. Bush originally proposed that he and President Vladimir Putin merely make statements of national policy setting out their intended strategic force levels, but he later agreed to do a treaty at Mr. Putin’s insistence.

SORT was not much of a treaty. While START I and New START each made a good-sized book, SORT barely filled two pages. Curiously, it did not define a “strategic nuclear warhead” … or any other term for that matter. Lacking any monitoring provisions, SORT was unverifiable.

It appears, moreover, that Washington and Moscow did not even count the same weapons. The Bush administration defined “strategic nuclear warheads” as the same as “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads”—that is, nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) plus nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles stored at air bases for B-2 and B-52 bombers (as a normal practice, neither side’s air force keeps weapons on bombers). The Russians, however, apparently tallied only warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. They did not count bombs or air-launched cruise missiles at air bases for their bombers; those weapons were not on the aircraft and thus not “deployed.”

On March 6, 2003, 48 Republican senators voted to consent to ratify SORT, which won approval by a tally of 95-0.

Given how SORT sailed through the Senate, the Obama administration in 2010 expected the New START Treaty to receive easy approval as well. After all, the treaties imposed similar limits on deployed strategic warheads. New START specified a limit of 1,550, but it treated each bomber as only one deployed warhead (bombers can carry more). The United States and Russia each likely have 200-300 additional weapons to put on their bombers, so New START’s 1,550 limit amounts to about 1,800 or so total weapons, equivalent to SORT’s 1,700-2,200. In contrast to SORT, the sides use agreed counting rules under New START, so they count the same things. Moreover, New START has substantial monitoring provisions and is verifiable.

What happened to New START in the Senate? It faced a tortuous ratification debate: myriad claims of alleged flaws and weaknesses, 1,000 questions for the record, and several efforts to delay a vote. On December 22, 2010, the Senate finally approved New START by a count of 71-26. Seventy-one votes meant four more than needed, but it was a far cry from the 95 votes that approved SORT.

The 26 senators who voted against New START in 2010 were all Republicans. Sixteen of them held seats in the Senate in 2003; 15 voted to approve SORT while one abstained. Moreover, three other Republican senators who voted to approve SORT chose to abstain on New START.

So 18 Republican senators who voted “yea” on SORT in 2003 just seven years later found New START—a verifiable treaty with agreed counting rules and a warhead limit comparable to SORT—an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. One can be forgiven for thinking that factors other than New START’s merits and the national interest figured in their votes. Indeed, one senator attributed his “nay” vote against New START to unhappiness with the Obama administration’s decision to do away with the military’s “don’t ask/don’t tell” policy.

It thus should come as little surprise that the Obama administration thinks about arrangements other than a treaty. And the administration need only look back to its predecessor for a ready model: the Bush administration’s original proposal in 2001 that Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin simply make parallel statements of the number of strategic warheads that each country would deploy.

Say that Mr. Obama and Mr. Putin now agree that they could reduce the number of each country’s deployed strategic warheads from New START’s limit of 1,550 to 1,000 (still well more than enough to devastate the other). The two presidents could announce, perhaps in a joint statement, that each had decided as a matter of national policy to limit his country’s strategic forces to no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.

The 1,000 limit would be politically binding, while the 1,550 limit would remain a legally binding constraint. U.S. and Russian officials could use the detailed monitoring provisions of New START to verify compliance with both limits.

This would be a relatively fast and simple way to achieve further nuclear reductions—not requiring a new treaty, not requiring a treaty amendment, and not requiring a vote in the Senate.

To be clear, the preferable way for such an arms control agreement would be a legally binding treaty, ideally one that limited all U.S. and Russia nuclear weapons, not just deployed strategic warheads. But a treaty is not the only option the Obama administration has. Nor, given attitudes of some in the Republican Senate ranks, is it the only option the administration should consider.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate

Steven Pifer — Thu, 14 Mar 2013 12:32:00 -0400

President Barack Obama desires to further reduce nuclear arsenals below the levels set in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Republicans on Capitol Hill and former officials of the George W. Bush administration assert that he can reduce U.S. nuclear forces only as the result of another treaty, requiring approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate. In fact, over the past 40 years, there is plenty of precedent—set by Republican presidents—to the contrary.

Why this matters has to do with how Mr. Obama might codify a new arms reductions arrangement with Russia. If Moscow is prepared to engage, still an open question, the Obama administration appears to want options in addition to a treaty. Why? Fear that Senate Republicans would set an impossibly high bar for any new Obama treaty, a worry fueled by the unexpectedly partisan and bitter ratification fight over New START.

For more than 40 years, U.S. presidents reduced nuclear weapons and recorded limits—or sought to do so—in ways that did not require Senate consent to ratification, starting with Richard Nixon. Mr. Nixon in May 1972 signed the interim offensive arms agreement on strategic weapons. It froze the numbers of launchers of U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at levels giving the Soviets significantly larger numbers. Mr. Nixon chose to submit this as an agreement requiring a simple majority vote by both houses of Congress rather than as a treaty requiring two-thirds majority approval in the Senate.

Some 20 years later, President George H. W. Bush made deep unilateral cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In September 1991, he announced what became known as the “presidential nuclear initiatives.” These included the elimination of all U.S. nuclear artillery shells and warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, as well as the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. Navy warships, many of which would be destroyed. Mr. Bush said that he had consulted with his senior advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He made no mention of the Senate or Congress—and appears not to have consulted with them before announcing a second set of nuclear initiatives in January 1992.

As a result of the presidential nuclear initiatives, the United States unilaterally eliminated thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from its arsenal. According to Department of Defense figures, the overall U.S. nuclear stockpile fell from more than 23,000 weapons to less than 13,000 during the Bush presidency. Only some of those reductions resulted from treaties approved by the Senate.

Ten years later, in November 2001, President George W. Bush announced that, as a result of his administration’s nuclear posture review, the U.S. military would maintain 1,700-2,200 “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.” When President Vladimir Putin asked for a new arms control treaty with limits below the levels of the 1991 START I Treaty (it allowed each side 6,000 warheads), the Bush administration came up with a novel approach: Mr. Bush would state publicly that the United States would maintain no more than 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and Mr. Putin would state that Russia would maintain X. It would be up to Moscow to fill in the X at whatever level the Russians chose; the Bush White House did not care. These would be parallel statements of national policy, not a treaty subject to approval by the Senate.

This approach held little appeal for the Russians. In the end, Mr. Bush, grateful for Russian support in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, agreed to Mr. Putin’s direct plea for a treaty. They signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002, a two-page agreement that limited the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,700-2,200 “strategic nuclear warheads,” though it failed to define “strategic nuclear warhead” or anything else and had no monitoring provisions. The treaty was unverifiable.

There are good reasons to consider codifying further nuclear reductions in a treaty, particularly a treaty with agreed definitions and verification provisions. But Mr. Obama has other options, as his Republican predecessors have demonstrated. Tomorrow’s blog—“SORT vs New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty”—will address why the administration might choose an option other than a legally binding treaty.

Authors

Steven Pifer

UN Sanctions, North Korean Threats

Richard C. Bush III — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:28:00 -0500

The UN Security Council has unanimously condemned “in the strongest possible terms” North Korea’s February nuclear test (its third). It expanded financial sanctions, mandated close checks of cargo entering and exiting North Korea, and warned of future measure if Pyongyang persists in its provocative behavior.

Are these new sanctions likely to bring about an immediate and positive change in North Korean policy?

Probably not. Economic sanctions usually require a long period of time to “bite,” and they must be fully multilateral in scope. These new sanctions can further constrain the resources available to the resource-poor North Korean regime and thereby its broader policy choices. To have that effect, however, sound implementation is critical. This is particularly true of China, through which much of North Korea’s trade and financial transactions flow.

What is the underlying objective of the sanctions regime?

The goal of this and previous actions is to sharpen the choices of North Korea, to disabuse it of the idea that the international community will both accept it as a state with nuclear weapons and permit international economic activity on a normal basis. Only when it understands that it can only have one or the other will it even consider making a fundamental choice between the two. The transition to a new regime creates, in the medium term, the possibility of such a policy shift. If that does not happen, the international community will have to contain the consequences.

What should we make of North Korea’s threat to attack the United States?

Certainly, those threats cannot be dismissed out of hand. But Pyongyang has issued similar warnings before and not acted upon them. The regime has domestic reasons to make create a crisis atmosphere, and while it glories in shows of bravado and brinksmanship, it is not suicidal. Actually, the greatest danger in the near term is a conventional but limited military action against South Korea. Look for Seoul and Washington to strengthen deterrence against such attack and prepare a proportionate response should deterrence fail.

What is North Korea’s strategy that is driving these actions?

Just as the United States, South Korea and others have sought to sharpen Pyongyang’s choices, so too is North Korea trying to sharpen ours. There is a test of wills at play here. The salutary consequence of the current struggle is that it has led China to seriously question its past “even-handed” policy, which had the effect of indulging North Korea in its provocations.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Bobby Yip / Reuters

Obama Renews Arms-Control Push

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Steven Pifer — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In his State of the Union address, President Obama said that his administration will engage Moscow to seek further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, returning to the nuclear arms-reduction agenda that he first laid out in an April 2009 speech in Prague.

The president in Prague called for reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and embraced the goal of a world free of nuclear arms—though he cautioned that much had to happen in order to get to zero. One year later, in April 2010, he recorded his most important arms-control achievement, signing the New START Treaty.

That treaty began its third year of implementation last week. It requires that the United States and Russia each reduce its nuclear forces to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than seven hundred deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits kick in fully in 2018.

To be sure, New START represents progress. But its levels hardly make sense twenty years after the end of the Cold War.

The president indicated he is prepared to go further. His administration reportedly is considering seeking to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to a level of 1,000-1,100 deployed strategic warheads. That would be a welcome step. It would cut the number of Russian warheads capable of striking America by 30 percent.

At the same time, the lower level would mean that the Pentagon could build and operate fewer strategic systems in the future, which would save precious defense dollars. The U.S. military nevertheless would still maintain a robust triad of missiles on submarines, land-based missiles and bombers that would deter any adversary from attacking the United States or its allies.

The White House reportedly also would like to expand reductions to include all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—reserve strategic warheads and tactical (or non-strategic) weapons as well as deployed strategic warheads. That makes sense as the distinction between strategic and non-strategic becomes increasingly blurry.

At present, New START covers only one-third of the Russian and American arsenals. By constraining all nuclear weapons, a new approach would address the large number of Russian tactical nuclear arms that concern U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. They worry the Senate as well; ratification opponents criticized New START for failing to include tactical weapons.

Limiting all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons would put Washington and Moscow in a stronger position to insist that any subsequent reductions involve the other nuclear weapons states, most of whose weapons are not strategic.

The Obama administration will face two big challenges in reinvigorating the nuclear agenda. First, how will Moscow respond? The Russians have shown little enthusiasm for further cuts and bear much responsibility for the fact that arms control languished in 2011-2012.

The Russians, however, may have incentives to engage. The U.S. military can with its current force structure easily stay at the New START limits, while the Russian military must build new missiles to do so. Lowering the limits would offer Moscow a chance to save money. Also of interest to the Russians: putting all weapons on the table would mean constraining reserve strategic warheads, where the U.S. military has a significant numerical advantage.

If the Russians engage—admittedly, still an open question—Republicans in the Senate will pose the second big challenge. They are skeptical of arms control in general. The White House and others were surprised by how tough it was to secure ratification of New START. Would Senate Republicans consent to ratification of a new treaty with lower limits? Or would the administration adopt a less formal approach that would obviate the need for Senate approval?

It is not clear whether President Obama’s new arms-reduction push will be able to overcome these challenges. In any case, he should test the proposition with the Russians and put this issue at the top of the agenda when national-security advisor Tom Donilon visits Moscow later this month.

If the Russians show interest, long months of hard bargaining will lie ahead. The sides will have to deal with questions—such as verifying limits on nuclear weapons at storage sites—that they have not faced before. Then there might (or might not) be a debate in the Senate. But success would mean that the president could leave a transformational nuclear legacy when he departs office in 2017. More importantly, Americans would be safer and more secure.

Authors

Publication: The National Interest

Try Temporary North Korea Sanctions

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

What to do about North Korea after its third nuclear test on Monday - this one possibly involving a device employing highly enriched uranium rather than plutonium, and perhaps small enough to fit on a missile?

Unfortunately, the international community is at a loss. North Korea is already sanctioned extensively and without China, we cannot tighten the noose a great deal more. China for its part does not wish to increase the economic pressure on Pyongyang much further, fearing that North Korean instability could result. Moreover, North Korea has already shown that when it is sanctioned, it often ups the ante rather than back down.

There is another dilemma: North Korea may be producing highly enriched uranium at a secret site. This could give it the capacity to produce up to several bombs’ worth of U-235 per year, in theory. As Graham Allison of Harvard and others have warned, this could lead to North Korea selling nuclear materials to the highest bidder — something the United States should, as Allison advises, warn North Korea not to do in the strongest possible terms.

And there is one more complication, although this one is of a different sort. It has to do with the longer-term prospects for encouraging North Korean reform. While hope is clearly evaporating that North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-Un, might be more inclined to consider changes at home, and detente with the outside world, than did his father or grandfather, we should want to keep that option alive. After all, Vietnam and China ultimately reformed even while keeping their communist systems. There is a chance that North Korea will too — less out of any softening of the regime’s attitudes than out of economic necessity.

Clearly the new, 30-year old Kim is not showing any reformist inclinations right now. But it is possible that he feels political pressure internally to establish himself with hardliners before he can pivot to a more reasonable line. This may not be the likely future trajectory, yet it cannot be ruled out.

So here’s an idea: any additional U.N. sanctions, above and beyond the base that now exists, could be temporary. They could be constructed in such a way as to sunset automatically in say two years if there is no further nuclear testing in the interim. But they would automatically return if North Korea were to conduct another test, again for two years’ duration—or perhaps for three or four years in that event, to avoid any suggestion that this approach is somehow soft or lenient.

Such an approach might prove more negotiable with Beijing. It could also give Kim Jong Un, the new and young leader, a chance to reassess his belligerent ways — rather than lock ourselves into a permanently hostile dynamic with him.

Any lifting of other, preexisting sanctions, including trade sanctions, would require resolution of the broader nuclear problem. North Korea would have to stop enriching uranium and agree to a long-term plan for gradual de-nuclearization. Indeed, if it did these things while also gradually making other reforms, outside powers could also offer it the prospect of substantial development assistance in the future as well.

We are not at a point where that kind of road map to a grand bargain and fundamentally improved relationship can be realistically pursued. For now, therefore, the goal should be more modest: to provide a firm response to North Korea’s unacceptable behavior, but do it in a way that can engender Chinese participation while not closing off the door to a calmer relationship down the road. Making any additional sanctions temporary could achieve this balance and should be considered.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Politico

Getting it Wrong on North Korea and Nuclear Reductions

Steven Pifer and Jonathan D. Pollack — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:13:00 -0500

Arms control critics wasted no time citing North Korea’s nuclear test as a principal reason why the United States should avoid further nuclear arms reductions. On February 12, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon stated: “It is also unfortunate that on the same day the president of the United States plans to announce further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons, we see another hostile regime unimpressed by his example. U.S. security cannot … afford even more cuts to U.S. defense capabilities, such as our nuclear deterrent.”

It may make for a nice sound bite, but the argument does not stand up to serious scrutiny. The current U.S. arsenal numbers between 4,600 and 5,000 nuclear weapons, many of which sit atop intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of launching within minutes. The North Korean stockpile, by contrast, is estimated at eight to ten weapons, though it seems intent on increasing these numbers.

If the president tomorrow chose to cut the U.S. nuclear arsenal by 50 percent, it would still be 200-300 times larger than North Korea’s. The United States also possesses a wide array of conventional deep strike weapons that could inflict devastating damage on North Korea should it contemplate an attack on South Korea, Japan or U.S. regionally deployed forces. And, despite its claims, North Korea lacks a demonstrated capability to strike the United States with a nuclear warhead.

North Korea’s nuclear defiance is deeply troubling, and its latest test warrants heightened multilateral measures to inhibit Pyongyang’s efforts to increase its arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively. The leaders in the North appear to believe that their nuclear weapons can legitimate the country’s power and entitle it to enhanced international status. These claims are rooted in a deeply adversarial nationalism that has defined North Korea since the earliest years of the state. By claiming undiminished U.S. hostility, it seeks to rationalize the country’s acute isolation and economic dysfunction to its beleaguered citizens.

North Korea is well practiced at identifying the United States as its “sworn enemy.” If anything, additional reductions in the number of warheads in the U.S. inventory would weaken the case Pyongyang seeks to make to justify its nuclear pursuits. But the driving imperatives of its nuclear program reflect its domestic needs and vulnerabilities, not the aggregate numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The nuclear cuts reportedly under consideration by the administration—such as reducing the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads to 1,000-1,100—would hardly embolden North Korea or any other state to challenge the United States in a manner different than it does now. Moreover, Pyongyang is undoubtedly aware that the remaining inventory of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons was unilaterally withdrawn from the Korean peninsula more than two decades ago.

If the United States, with a nuclear arsenal 15 times larger than that of any country other than Russia, is not prepared to reduce further, can it credibly argue that other nuclear weapons states should not build up or that other countries should not acquire nuclear arms? Further reductions, on the other hand, would bolster the ability of U.S. diplomacy to persuade third countries to increase pressure and sanctions on nuclear outliers such as Iran and North Korea. In the three years since New START was signed, American diplomats have had ample success in getting other countries to increase sanctions on Iran.

A nuclear-armed North Korea undoubtedly represents a serious threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia. But that is no reason to argue that Washington should not pursue the next stage of nuclear arms reductions with Russia.

Authors

The Next Step on Nuclear Arms Reduction

Steven Pifer — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.

The United States and Russia have just begun the third year of implementing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the treaty takes full effect in February 2018, each country will be limited to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. That represents progress, but more can and should be done.

For instance, New START does nothing to constrain non-deployed (reserve) strategic warheads or any non-strategic (tactical) weapons; it covers only about thirty percent of the total U.S. nuclear arsenal. It’s time to bring these weapons to the table. Additionally, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, do the United States and Russia require such large deployed strategic forces?

Recent press reports suggest the Obama administration is ready to answer this question and also bring the “off the table” weapons into the equation. The reports said the administration has concluded that it would be able to reduce the U.S. arsenal to 1,000-1,100 deployed strategic warheads and 2,500-3,500 total nuclear weapons, “without harming national security.” This would be an important step forward. An agreement along these lines could mean a thirty percent cut in deployed strategic warheads from the New START level and could require up to a fifty percent reduction in total U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Such a treaty would be in the U.S. interest for several reasons. First, it would reduce the nuclear threat to the United States. It would also promote a more stable nuclear balance with Russia, that is, a balance in which neither side has incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis. The lower limit could lead the Russians to conclude that they do not need their proposed new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which would threaten U.S. ICBMs in their underground silos. At the same, a new heavy ICBM would itself present a lucrative target for preemptive attack in a crisis—a problem noted by a number of Russian experts critical of the planned missile.

Second, by bringing all nuclear arms into the negotiation, a new U.S.-Russia treaty would cover non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would be welcomed by U.S. allies in Europe and Asia who feel threatened by Russian tactical weapons. Moreover, by submitting all of their arsenals to limits, Washington and Moscow would be better positioned to then expand the arms control process to include other nuclear weapons states. That is because the arsenals of Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea contain many non-strategic nuclear arms.

Third, a new treaty that reduced U.S. and Russian nuclear forces could mean cost savings for a strained defense budget. The savings in operating costs in the near term might not be that large, but lower limits could mean substantial savings in the longer term, as the United States recapitalizes its strategic forces. For example, the U.S. Navy estimates that the replacement submarines for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine will cost $6-7 billion each. The Navy hopes to cut that cost, but the recent history of naval shipbuilding suggests the ultimate price tag of new vessels is often higher than initial estimates. A treaty that reduced the need for even two submarines would eliminate the cost of building and then operating them for up to forty years.

Fourth, further U.S. and Russian reductions would bolster those countries’ credentials in raising the bar against nuclear proliferation. A new treaty would not cause North Korea or Iran to change course. It could, however, empower American diplomacy to persuade third countries to up the pressure, including sanctions, on nuclear proliferators.

Finally, a new U.S.-Russian treaty could contribute to an improved broader relationship between the two countries. It could also contribute to better relations with China.

Negotiating and concluding such a treaty would by no means be easy. It is not clear that the Russians are prepared to deal. New tensions have afflicted the bilateral relationship over the past year, and President Putin seems in a cantankerous mood. But Moscow may have incentives to engage. The United States is better placed to sustain its strategic forces at New START levels, while the Russians will have to build new missiles to maintain their forces at the negotiated limits—and they may face tough budget decisions of their own.

There should be a better idea of whether the Russians want to engage after National Security Advisor Donilon’s visit to Moscow later this month, during which arms control undoubtedly will rank near the top of the agenda. The odds of getting a new agreement may not be all that high, but the pay-off in terms of a safer America and enhanced global security makes it a proposition worth testing.

Authors

Steven Pifer

Publication: The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs

Beyond the State of the Union, A Plan for Nuclear Arms Control

Steven Pifer — Wed, 13 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In his State of the Union Address, President Obama pledged to engage Russia in talks that would ultimately lead both countries to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, agrees that such a move is the right course of action for these two world powers. Pifer says the U.S. and Russia should work toward a new strategic arms reduction agreement.

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Beyond the State of the Union, A Plan for Nuclear Arms Control

Authors

Steven Pifer

Obama’s Aims to Reduce Nuclear Threat

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Steven Pifer — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In his State of the Union address on Tuesday, President Barack Obama will reportedly reiterate his interest in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, though unlikely to announce specifics. The administration is interested in seeking an agreement with Russia, building on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and cutting U.S. strategic nuclear forces by another third in the expectation that Moscow will do the same with its nuclear arsenal.

This would leave each country with roughly 1,000 deployed long-range warheads, plus several thousand more in reserve and in tactical arsenals.

It would be an appropriately modest step toward serious pursuit of Obama’s (and President Ronald Reagan’s) goal of a nuclear-free world. With 1,000 warheads, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would remain more than capable of targeting any reasonable set of military sites abroad. Washington and Moscow would also avoid tempting any medium-size nuclear powers, most notably China, with its 250 or so warheads, to pursue nuclear superpower ranks.

It is sound policy. Dramatic enough to make a major difference in Obama’s foreign policy legacy yet measured enough to sustain U.S. deterrence for Washington and its allies abroad. Still, it will work best if several additional steps are included:

Modest U.S. unilateral cuts are a reasonable way to jump-start the process if Moscow is not immediately amenable to reciprocative measures. But they should be modest and reversible ‑ until we see how Russia reacts. This is not about fear of a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange, but rather about avoiding the possibility that Moscow would become more assertive if it somehow felt empowered by a new position atop the nuclear hierarchy.

Tactical and surplus warheads should be constrained. As a first step, data exchanges and some informal monitoring provisions should be explored. U.S.-Russian arms-control treaties have not previously limited warheads in these inventories. Since they are not normally affixed to big missiles or bombers, they are harder to track. But that is why they must be limited in some way. We will need to improve monitoring methods for these warheads if other countries are to be brought into the nuclear arms-control process in future rounds, since most other nations’ arsenals are dominated by these shorter-range weapons.

Missile defenses need to be part of the process. Since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the George W. Bush administration, there have been no ceilings on any type of missile defenses. There is little point here in trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together. Not only do congressional Republicans strongly oppose any limits on U.S. missile defenses but the technologies are evolving too fast (and are still too immature) for restraints to make much sense. Especially since some missile defense capability is a reasonable desire for those worried about North Korean and Iranian threats. But greater transparency, some degree of actual collaboration between the United States and Russia and, depending on the evolution of not just the technology but also the threat, some greater flexibility regarding U.S. plans to put advanced missile defenses into Europe in the future makes sense. The flexibility should not go so far as to weaken Washi! ngton’s bonds with allies and should not prevent the United States and its allies from protecting themselves. This point needs to be made plainly to Moscow.

Third parties should be asked to promise restraint, too. The other U.N. Security Council Permanent Five nuclear powers ‑ Britain, France and China ‑ as well as Israel, India and Pakistan should promise not to exceed current arsenal sizes, or at least not by much. This need not be a deal breaker if they refuse. But it would be a useful complement that would help ensure that no new nuclear competition is triggered by U.S. and Russian cutbacks, and would help pave the way for future multilateral treaties. To help persuade the other nuclear powers to agree, all countries could be asked to promise not to develop or augment existing nuclear weapons inventories. In other words, language could be proposed that would allow non-nuclear states to make the same pledge, and that would not require countries such as Israel to acknowledge officially that they have nuclear weapons. (Since right now they might not.)

Other arms-control measures could be considered. Top of the list is ratification of the 1990s-era Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States and China, among the world’s declared nuclear powers, have not yet ratified. (The Senate voted it down in 1999.) Another ratification debate is not prudent if it leads to a formal Senate defeat. But this is an opportune moment to remind Americans that our current arsenal is holding up extremely well without testing, and to make the case for formalizing our testing restraint. The last U.S. test was in 1992; no state other than North Korea has tested in the last dozen years.

Obama has rightly seized this nuclear arms-control opportunity. It may or may not make him the president who started the real march toward a nuclear-free planet. Indeed, that may not even be a realistic or desirable goal at this stage.

But his plan should help future presidents and Congresses evaluate the wisdom of such a possible step. Meanwhile, it saves a little money and, more important, helps keeps America and her allies safe.

Authors

Publication: Reuters

The Implications of North Korea's Third Nuclear Test

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 09:37:00 -0500

We do not yet know how much North Korea has advanced its nuclear weapons program as a result of today’s test. Specialists are intensely curious about the fissile material used (plutonium or enriched uranium) and the design of device. Pyongyang claims that the latest test was of a smaller, lighter weapon, and the available seismic data indicates an appreciably greater explosive yield than either of the prior tests. The North is undoubtedly making progress, and it is not too early to assess the implications of this test – and the successful ballistic missile launch in December – for the interests of all countries immediately affected by the detonation.

Kim Jong Un very likely sees himself as the big winner from today’s test. Kim became North Korea’s top leader following the death of his father Kim Jong Il fourteen months ago. His principal goal since then has been to establish his own personal legitimacy and preserve that of the Kim Royal Family. In that regard, securing progress on the missile and nuclear programs is the coin of the realm.

For the United States and Japan, the two tests confirm past judgments about Pyongyang’s long-term intentions. That is, the DPRK is intent on acquiring the ability to strike the continental United States as well as Japan with nuclear weapons, an objective that no package of outside incentives is likely to prevent. The stakes are high. Should North Korea succeed in its quest, it will significantly destabilize the security of Northeast Asia and increase the dangers of proliferation to other regions.

Some will fault Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul for not having engaged Pyongyang to head off the tests of recent months, but there is little or no evidence that Kim Jong Un would have been any more responsive to engagement than his father. Instead, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea have sought in recent years to “sharpen North Korea’s choices,” between sustaining its nuclear and missile programs, in contrast to heightened economic and political benefits with the international community. All three states will likely respond to today’s test by seeking to tighten sanctions. There is ample room to improve the implementation of existing measures, and new financial sanctions are available (see the current Iran menu). But a question lingers, are we indeed shaping North Korea’s choices or is it shaping ours?

The third nuclear test puts China’s new leadership on the hot seat. Under its previous leader Hu Jintao Beijing had multiple objectives in its North Korea strategy: restrain DPRK provocations; limit the impact of multilateral sanctions so that they do not stabilize the North Korean regime; provide economic support to Pyongyang to enhance stability and encourage better behavior; and facilitate a diplomatic approach for managing the problem, if not solving it. By testing in defiance of China’s wishes, Pyongyang has once again demonstrated that it has a very different agenda. It is betting that Beijing’s threats of punishment (as under Hu Jintao) are all bark and no bite. In effect, it is testing China’s new paramount leader, Xi Jinping. Will he cooperate with Washington in tightening sanctions and withdraw material and political benefits to Kim Jong Un? Or will Xi accommodate to a new status quo? Those questions will occupy the Beijing leadership during the Chinese New Year holiday.

The DPRK’s action probably has the greatest impact on South Korea’s president-elect, Park Geun-hye, who will be inaugurated on February 25^th. Madame Park had campaigned on the premise that the North Korea policies of the current president, Lee Myung Bak, had been too tough and one-sided. She had proposed the creation of a “trust-building” process with Pyongyang and a focus on areas of potential mutual benefit. Much of the South Korean public supported that stance when they cast their votes. With today’s nuclear test, Kim Jong Un has signaled that any acts of accommodation must come solely from the South Korean side, thus putting Madame Park on the defensive. Her initiative is now very unlikely to get off the ground. Any claims that the test was directed against outgoing President Lee will ring hollow to the new president, compelling her to rethink her approach to future dealings with the North.

Brookings: Topics - Arms Control

Options for Reducing Nuclear Arms

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NATO and the Costs of Star Wars

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Big Hurdles Ahead for Arms Control

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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Policy and Arms Control: Issues for the United States, NATO and Russia

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Will Russia Take "Yes" for an Answer on Missile Defense?

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U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Prospects and Challenges

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The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

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SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty

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Presidents, Nuclear Reductions and the Senate

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UN Sanctions, North Korean Threats

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Obama Renews Arms-Control Push

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Try Temporary North Korea Sanctions

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Getting it Wrong on North Korea and Nuclear Reductions

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The Next Step on Nuclear Arms Reduction

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Beyond the State of the Union, A Plan for Nuclear Arms Control

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Obama’s Aims to Reduce Nuclear Threat

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The Implications of North Korea's Third Nuclear Test

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