Brookings: Topics - Arab-Israeli Relations

Israel's Unlikely Peacemaker

Martin S. Indyk — Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Menachem Begin, Israel’s sixth prime minister, who died in 1992, was among the legendary Zionist giants who shaped Israel’s destiny and the modern history of the Jewish people. Shimon Peres is the last of that founding generation of Israeli leaders. He will turn 90 later this year. To read a biography of Begin, therefore, is to go back in time and revisit those dramatic events that led to the creation of the Jewish state, its early struggle for survival, its moments of triumph and its growing pains. But it is to see them through the lens of an outsider—a revisionist Zionist ideologue who fought British rule with the tools of terror and Labor Zionist rule with defiance and rhetorical resistance. The outsider who eventually became the insider, Begin presided over Israel’s fate for five tumultuous years, from 1977 to 1983, during which he made peace with Egypt, withdrew from Sinai, won the Nobel Peace Prize, bombed the Osiraq nuclear reactor, and got the Israeli Army stuck in Lebanon on an ill-fated exercise in derring-do that lasted a decade and resulted in the rise of Hezbollah.

Avi Shilon, an Israeli journalist, has done an admirable job tracing the wellsprings of Begin’s complex personality from his early days as a youthful Beitar Commissioner in Poland, touched by Jabotinsky’s ideological zeal but determined to outflank him through advocating for greater militancy, to his rise to the leadership of the Irgun and its revolt against the British Mandate in Palestine, to his many years in the political wilderness as the leader of the right-wing political party Herut, and finally to his ascent to power as head of Likud. As Shilon admits in his conclusion, Begin’s passing from power 20 years ago marked the end of an era of ideological leadership that is unlikely to return to Israel and would be ill-suited to current times if it did. So why bother with a voluminous biography of a former Zionist icon who ended his political life in self-imposed seclusion?

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Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: Moment

Image Source: © NIR ELIAS / Reuters

Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 19:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
7:30 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

On April 24, during an event honoring His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, Martin Indyk asked about Qatar's views on the Syrian crisis, the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the still unfolding Arab Awakening. The event marked Qatar's ten years of support for the Brookings Doha Center and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

Video

The End Of 'Fayyadism' In Palestine

Khaled Elgindy — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Nearly a week after the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Washington is still coming to terms with what happened and what a post-Fayyad era might mean. To many, Fayyad’s departure has dealt a major blow to the seven-year project he oversaw to build the institutions of a future Palestinian state, and hence to the prospect of peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. According to one Washington analyst, Fayyad’s departure represents an “early defeat for Secretary [of State John] Kerry” as well as his boss. “For the last four years,” opined the analyst, “the administration has elected to work with Abbas at the expense of Fayyad.” This view, while common in Washington policy circles, stems from a basic misreading of both Fayyad’s role and the reasons behind its termination.

The end of the Fayyad era was not only inevitable, but was always bound to elicit far more anxiety in Washington, London and Brussels than in Ramallah, Nablus, or Hebron—not because Palestinians don’t want or need institutions but because Fayyad’s institution-building project, affectionately known as “Fayyadism,” had run its course and, more importantly, was fundamentally out of step with Palestinian realities and politics.

To be sure, Fayyad’s was always an impossible job. And in the end both he and his economic recovery and institution-building plans were doomed by a perfect storm of internal and external forces—an inept and corrupt Palestinian leadership, an all-consuming and repressive Israeli occupation and a deeply flawed and dysfunctional “peace process.”

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is itself a “government” unlike any other; it has neither an army nor sovereignty over its territory. Meanwhile, its very institutions, which remain almost entirely dependent on foreign largesse, are themselves of questionable legitimacy. President Mahmoud Abbas’s term is technically expired, while the Palestinian parliament has not convened in five years. All this in the context of a debilitating division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, which—thanks to U.S. and Israeli opposition to internal Palestinian reconciliation—has become part and parcel of the U.S.-led “peace process.”

Fayyad’s government was further constrained by a severe fiscal crisis triggered by growing domestic debt and the drying up of international donor funds. Last, but certainly not least, were the myriad restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation itself, including the hundreds of impediments to movement and access necessitated by Israel’s vast and ever-expanding settlement enterprise in the West Bank.

Even against such overwhelming odds, Fayyad’s efforts proved to be stunningly successful. As early as April 2011, the World Bank had effectively “certified” the PA as being “well positioned to establish a state at any time in the near future.” Since then, the World Bank has continued to reaffirm that conclusion, while warning that “Israeli restrictions and controls… have a detrimental impact not only on economic growth but also constrain the PA’s ability to develop its institutions as well as limit politically its room for maneuver on tougher reforms.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have long since lost faith in the Oslo process, of which “Fayyadism” was merely the latest incarnation. Last September’s “cost of living” protests were an early warning signal, particularly the ease with which popular anger against Salam Fayyad’s austerity measures morphed into generalized demands for the cancellation of the Oslo Accords themselves. Having reached the upper limits of what could be achieved, and in the absence of a genuine political progress, it was only natural that the process would turn in on itself.

Among other things, the September protests raised questions about the value of building governing institutions while overlooking—if not actively reinforcing—the broader dysfunctional context in which they operated. Why should 36 percent of the PA’s budget go to security while only 2 percent is spent on agriculture? Likewise, what value was there in building institutions that cannot reach 40 percent of its population in Gaza? Or that hasn’t had a functioning parliament in nearly six years? How far can an economic recovery plan go when Palestinians are prohibited from accessing or developing 60 percent of the West Bank in the resource-rich Jordan Valley? In short, what value was there in building the institutions of a state that never comes into being?

Fayyad’s “institution-building” was never intended to be a stand-alone project. Its international sponsors, including the United States, understood that its success would depend on progress made along parallel diplomatic and political tracks. With both a credible negotiations process and developments in Palestinian politics in a state of “peace process”-imposed paralysis, however, Fayyadism became a substitute for both meaningful diplomatic efforts to end the Palestinians’ predicament and the domestic political means to achieve it.

All of which raises an even more fundamental contradiction. Fayyad is rightly credited with several major accomplishments, including restoring basic law and order, scaling back corruption, and reestablishing a measure of public confidence in Palestinian institutions. However, if these accomplishments cannot withstand Fayyad’s absence—as many now fear they won’t—then they were never institutions to begin with. Any policy that is so bound up in a single solitary mortal being is by definition untenable—underscoring both the absence of strategic foresight in the U.S.-led “peace process” and a stunning lack of regard for domestic Palestinian politics.

America’s casual disdain for domestic Palestinian politics was summed up rather succinctly by DOS spokeswoman Victoria Nuland in February 2012. Responding to a question about internal reconciliation efforts, Nuland put it thus: “What matters to us and what matters… to the process that we are trying to keep on track here is that Abbas remains the president, that Fayyad remains the prime minister.” The same infantilizing attitude was displayed when word first broke of Fayyad’s possible resignation, in which a State Department prematurely (and incorrectly) declared, “As far as I know he's sticking around.” American interference in the domestic politics of other countries is certainly not unheard of, including in Israel. But whereas in Israel and elsewhere such interventions are the exception, in Palestine they are the rule.

Despite his numerous accomplishments, Fayyad was simply no longer viable from the standpoint of Palestinian domestic politics. While Fatah and Hamas have seldom agreed on anything, the two warring factions were united in their staunch opposition to Fayyad’s rule, as was a growing segment of the Palestinian populace. For all his popularity in diplomatic circles, Fayyad never had any significant domestic base of support. His “Third Way” party won only two seats in the last parliamentary elections and continues to poll at under one percentage point, while his approval ratings have steadily declined. Fayyad was by no means despised by the masses, but nor was he seen as the messiah-like figure held up by the West.

Whether or not domestic opposition to Fayyad is wise or warranted in the eyes of the U.S. or other western governments is wholly beside the point. Just because Palestinians do not have a state does not mean they do not have politics or that their leaders are immune from public opinion and other domestic pressures.

Indeed, for many in the U.S. and Israel, “Fayyadism” is seen not just as a pathway to Palestinian statehood but as a means of “reinventing” Palestinian politics along the way—which may also explain much of the anxiety surrounding his departure. Without Fayyad and his institution-building project, the U.S., Israel and the rest of the international community come face-to-face with the core of the conflict—the occupation, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees—in the form of a genuine diplomatic process aimed at ending the conflict, and hence with Palestinian politics as well.

The fact that Palestinians do not have a state is not because they do not have enough, or the right kind of, institutions. Those institutions exist, whether in the form of the PA or the ostensibly more representative and authoritative umbrella of the PLO—the Palestine Liberation Organization. But for those institutions to function properly, they must have domestic political support and legitimacy. For that to happen, they must be seen as working for and not against Palestinian basic aspirations—namely ending the occupation and achieving self-determination.

In short, it is the absence of a credible peace process as well as an inability to come to terms with Palestinian politics that has led to the erosion of existing Palestinian institutions, and not the other way around.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: The Daily Beast

Homegrown Terrorism in the Boston Bombings, President Obama's Middle East Visit, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Martin S. Indyk — Sat, 20 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with Dana Weiss on Israel’s Meet the Press (Channel 2), Martin Indyk discusses homegrown terrorism in the Boston Marathon bombings, as well as President Obama’s recent trip to the Middle East, the role of Secretary of State John Kerry, and prospects for peace between Israel and Palestine. Read an excerpt below, and watch the full interview at mako.co.il (interview starts at 10:05).

Dana Weiss: You’re here for the INSS conference, but of course the focus is naturally on the events back in the U.S., and as we see the unfolding events in Boston, it’s quite clear that terror has struck again at the heart of America.

Martin Indyk: It’s the great irony, I’m here in Israel, which is normally ground zero for terrorism, and it’s happening in our backyard, in Boston. And it’s a big shock, I think, to Americans who thought that so many years after 9/11, so much effort taken to fight al-Qaeda, the taking out of Osama bin Laden himself, the sense that we had them on the ropes – and here, an act of homegrown terrorism that appears to be Islamist-related, jihadist-related – and how do you deal with homegrown terrorists?

It’s a kind of shock for the system, because look at what happened on 7/7 in London – those kinds of attacks from, again, homegrown terrorists there – it’s a very scary thing to imagine that they’re in our midst – and how do you find them under those circumstances?

Dana Weiss: And you know, the President asked not to jump to conclusions and to wait for the facts, but I think it’s quite clear that as you said, it’s not enough to get rid of bin Laden. There is actually no way to eliminate this terror, especially when it’s back to the extreme Muslim terror against the West.

Martin Indyk: Well, if that’s what we’re facing – and we have to be careful jumping to conclusions – but if that’s what we’re facing, then yes, it’s a long struggle that is, at its heart, ideological. And that’s, essentially, people turn to extremist actions – terrorist actions – for a range of motives, but certainly it seems that for Muslim believers, there’s a potential to move to an extreme point because of the teachings and extremist ideology that’s being perpetrated out there every day out there on the internet; places like Inspire magazine, and they can learn, get their instructions and learn how to build their bombs, and it becomes a metastasized problem.

Dana Weiss: And do you think it will affect in any way the American policy in the Middle East, pulling out of Afghanistan, even dealing with the situation here in our region?

Martin Indyk: No, I don’t think so. I think that the American people are tired of wars in this part of the world. Obama is holding up, it’s an achievement, of ending America’s involvement in wars in the greater Middle East, and that is very popular in the United States; with the United States Armed Forces as well. And so I think that people now draw a distinction between having to fight terrorism, wherever it rises as a threat, and avoiding the kind of ground wars in the Middle East. And of course Obama’s use of drones has, I think, led the American public to believe that we have a kind of easy way of dealing with this…

Dana Weiss: …yeah, from a far distance…

Martin Indyk: …from a distance, but not when it’s in your backyard.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: Israel's Meet the Press (Channel 2)

Image Source: © Alexander Demianchuk / Reuters

A New Push for Mideast Peace

Martin S. Indyk — Thu, 04 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Bernard Gwertzman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Martin Indyk looks at how President Obama's trip to Israel was a success. Read an excerpt below.

Bernard Gwertzman: It's been a couple of weeks since President Obama made his first trip to Israel as president, in which he gave a very well-received speech to an audience of students and touched upon the need for peace between Palestinians and the Israelis. Now Secretary of State John Kerry is apparently going to have to carry the peace-talks ball. Where do you think the United States stands after this trip?

Martin Indyk: In preparation for the trip, the White House wanted to remove any expectations that there would be any significant results, and the timing of the trip seemed to be structured in a way that would have the effect of lowering expectations because the president would be going only three days after the new government in Israel had been formed. But, in fact, the president was able to deliver what I consider to be two big things: the first was that he did win over that part of the Israeli public that is winnable. His popularity jumped in the first few days after his speech. He'd started from a low base of ten; now he's around forty, and that's very significant. And the fact that he took Israel by storm and won the hearts and minds of many Israelis had a direct impact on the second deliverable, which was the apology that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leading to the opening of renormalizing relations between Turkey and Israel.

The two are directly related. The fact that the president had turned himself almost overnight from being an unpopular figure in the minds of most Israelis into somebody who they now understood did care about them meant that he managed to convince them to trust him more. The importance of that was that Netanyahu knew that the Israeli public would punish an Israeli prime minister who mishandles the relationship between Israel and a popular American president. Netanyahu had been able to exploit the fact that President Obama was very unpopular in Israel. When he famously upbraided the president in the Oval Office, Netanyahu actually went up ten points in Israeli public opinion. Obama in effect reversed that when he asked Netanyahu during the trip to call Erdogan and apologize to him. Instead of saying he couldn't do that, which is basically the position that Netanyahu had adopted for three years, he turned around and said okay, essentially understanding that the Israeli public would support him in doing so and would criticize him for not responding to a president who had gone out of his way to manifest his friendship to Israel.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: Council on Foreign Relations

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Palestinian Politics Do Matter

Khaled Elgindy — Sun, 24 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With President Obama's visit to Israel and the occupied territories now behind us, attention is likely to turn to how we might restart the peace process. But if the past is any indication, one crucial element will be largely ignored in the discussion: Palestinian politics.

In contrast to the almost limitless deference shown to the pressures of Israeli domestic politics (as when Obama abandoned calls for a settlement freeze in 2010 because of the composition of Israel's governing coalition), American officials remain remarkably tone deaf to Palestinian political needs. But there are some realities they need to understand about the deeply divided Palestinian body politic.

It has now been seven years since Hamas defeated Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah faction in a parliamentary election for control of the authority. That 2006 electoral victory emboldened Hamas' forces to seize control of the Gaza Strip, ending nearly half a century of Fatah domination of Palestinian politics. Although Abbas has managed to cling to his position as president of the Palestinian Authority, he and his leadership have little to show for their rule other than a series of failed negotiations, a cash-strapped government on the verge of collapse and an unprecedented schism in the Palestinian national movement.

Meanwhile, Abbas' term has long since expired, and the Palestinian parliament has not convened in nearly six years — both testaments to the paralysis of Palestinian politics as well as the waning legitimacy of Palestinian leaders.

Palestinians today are deeply frustrated with this divided and ineffective leadership, Israel's ongoing repression and ever-expanding settlement enterprise, and a so-called peace process that has done little more than enable all of these.

Despite all of this, the United States continues to operate as though Abbas' West Bank leadership has no political opposition or public opinion to answer to. For too long, American policymakers have treated Palestinian politics as something that can be avoided, suppressed or, if need be, reshaped. Indeed, if an accommodation is to be made, it is usually Palestinian politics that must bend to the perceived needs of the peace process rather than the other way around.

Even today, the United States continues to pressure Palestinian leaders to return to talks, despite their slim chance of success and the enormous costs incurred by repeated failures. And, despite the strong desire of Palestinians to see an end to the seven-year rift between Fatah and Hamas, the Obama administration continues to oppose internal Palestinian reconciliation efforts.

As convenient as it might seem, the idea that Palestinian politics don't matter, or that they can somehow be reengineered by outside actors, is both wrongheaded and dangerous. Hamas may be a problematic actor, but it cannot simply be wished away or boycotted out of existence. Despite its record of violence, including horrific attacks against Israeli civilians, Hamas remains a major force in Palestinian politics; it has also shown a willingness to play pragmatic politics, both in terms of Israeli security and a two-state solution.

Attempting to exclude Hamas or any other political group is a recipe for perpetual internal conflict; it is also self-defeating. As the recent Gaza conflict has demonstrated, the policy of isolating Hamas while building up the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has been a spectacular failure. Hamas has more international legitimacy today than before, while the authority is on the brink of collapse.

Even thorny issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugees, another important political constituency long neglected by both the peace process and their own leaders, cannot be ignored indefinitely.

Palestinians may not have a state yet, but that doesn't exempt their political leaders from very real domestic constituencies and political pressures that they must answer to, whether inside the occupied Palestinian territory or in the diaspora. Just as we intuitively understand the constraints imposed on the administration by Congress and by powerful domestic lobbies, or remain preoccupied with the ever-present concerns of Israel's coalition politics, so too should the U.S. begin to acknowledge and accommodate Palestinian politics.

Although it is true that Palestinians do not enjoy anything like the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel, simple logic ought to dictate that a weak and divided Palestinian leadership with questionable domestic legitimacy is in no position to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with Israel. More important, for such an agreement to hold, it must have buy-in from key Palestinian political constituencies, including both supporters and opponents of the current leadership. The same is true of Israel, or any other nation — a point President Obama alluded to in his speech to Israeli students in Jerusalem when he stressed that "peace must be made among peoples, not just governments."

"As more governments respond to popular will," the president said, "the days when Israel could seek peace with a handful of autocratic leaders are over." Although the president was referring to Arab states in the throes of revolutionary change, the point applies equally to the Palestinians.

The United States does not have to like Palestinian politics or endorse its themes or outcomes — any more than it needs to embrace the appointment of pro-settlement and anti-peace figures to Israel's Cabinet — but it does need to acknowledge them. No political leadership should have to choose between international acceptance and domestic legitimacy. Indeed, any credible peace process must allow the Palestinians to have both.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Los Angeles Times

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Obama Helps Restart Talks Between Israel & Turkey

Dan Arbell — Fri, 22 Mar 2013 16:50:00 -0400

Israel apologized to Turkey today for the May 2010 incident on board the Mavi Marmara naval vessel, part of a flotilla to Gaza, in which nine Turks were killed from Israel Defense Forces fire. The apology came during a 30-minute telephone conversation between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, orchestrated by President Barack Obama, who was ending his 3 day visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Erdogan accepted the Israeli apology, and the leaders agreed to begin a normalization process between Israel and Turkey, following the past three years, when relations were practically at a standstill. (Last December, I wrote about the beginnings of a Turkey-Israeli rapprochement, and discussed more of the policy implications here.)

This development allows the two countries to begin a new phase in their relationship, which has known crisis and tension, but also cooperation and a strong strategic partnership.

The U.S. administration played a key role behind the scenes in creating the conditions that paved the way for an Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance. Undoubtedly, a close relationship between Turkey and Israel-- two of America’s greatest allies in the region-- serves United States’ strategic interests globally and regionally. At a time when the Middle East political landscape is changing rapidly, it was imperative to end the long impasse between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Over the past year, Turkey and Israel have also come to realize that repairing their relationship and re-establishing a dialogue is at their best interest, as they face great challenges in their immediate vicinity (first and foremost, the Syrian civil war).

United States officials emphasized that this is the first step in a long process. Nevertheless, the parties will have to make a great effort to overcome years of distrust and suspicion if they want the relationship to work. No one is under the allusion that relations will go back to what they were in the “honeymoon” period of the 1990s but modest improvement can be made. It will not be an easy task, and for that to happen it is essential that the parties not only talk to each other, but also listen to one another and begin to respect each other’s sensitivities. In order for this rapprochement to be successful, United States will have to continue to oversee discussions between Turkey and Israel, and remain heavily engaged in this process.

Authors

Dan Arbell

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Obama's Jerusalem Speech

Martin S. Indyk and Itamar Rabinovich — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Charlie Rose, Martin Indyk and Itamar Rabinovich discuss President Obama's recent speech in Jerusalem and prospects for the Middle East peace process. Read an excerpt below.

Charlie Rose: Characterize this speech by the President [Martin Indyk].

Martin Indyk: This speech was typical Obama at his best working his oratorical magic on a crowd that lapped it up. He spoke very convincingly about his commitment to Israel’s security and his understand of their security dilemmas, and particularly underlined he was going to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But then he went into a riff about peace, and the necessity of peace, and the possibility of peace, and why peace has to be just, even saying; “Put yourself,” you Israelis, “in the shoes of the Palestinians,” and he talked over the heads of the leadership of Israel to say to them “you need to push your leaders, to take risks for peace”

Rose: Basically [Obama] saying; “you [Israel] have to make sacrifices on settlements and other issues in order to get some kind of agreement for Palestinians because that is in fact in the long term interest of your national security.”

Indyk: Exactly. “I care about your security but here is the best way to secure your future…”

Rose: An agreement with the Palestinians…

Indyk: An agreement with the Palestinians.

Rose: that gives them some sense…

Indyk: Two states for two people, he talked specifically about a Jewish state.

Rose: What did you think [Itamar Rabinovich]?

Itamar Rabinovich: I agree. It was a very well crafted, very convincing speech. It was in the heart of the mission to speak to the Israeli public. In a way, President Obama has been doing what President Sadat had done in the late 70’s. He came to Jerusalem before the actual negotiations with Mr.Begin in order to build support for the peace with Egypt at the time, and to enable Mr.Begin to make concessions and win public support. So he was investing public diplomacy in the same way trying to build support in the, or among, the Israeli public for the painful concessions that will have to be made.

Rose: And so how do you think the Prime Minister and his party will take this?

Rabinovich: They would have done, they could have done, without this part of the visit but they had their part of the visit in the first day.

Rose: Which was Iran?

Rabinovich: Well we don’t know what went on behind closed doors. But publically, you know Netanyahu came out weakened, hurt, from the elections and one of the criticisms leveled at him was that he mismanaged the relationship with the United States and here was the President all smiles and friendship and patting each other on the back. That was very good for Mr. Netanyahu, he relished it and he took advantage of it, but this was the first course. The second course is somewhat less tasty for the Prime minister.

Authors

Publication: Charlie Rose

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Resurrecting Obama's Reputation in the Middle East

Martin S. Indyk — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Witnessing Air Force One touch down at Ben Gurion Airport is a big deal for Israelis. The imperial majesty of that giant powder blue 747, and all the pomp and circumstance associated with it, sends a clear message that Israel's most important backer is about to step on to the Holy Land and from there to ascend to Jerusalem. And that inevitably generates high expectations that something dramatic is about to happen: a breakthrough negotiated, a peace agreement signed, a beloved leader buried. Indeed, many Israelis and Palestinians are impressed that the president made visiting them his first foreign trip of his second term.

What is noticeable about Barack Obama's first trip to Israel as president is that the White House has been working overtime to lower those expectations. Even the president himself felt it necessary to explain to American Jewish leaders last week that the trip "is not dedicated to resolving a specific policy issue but is rather an opportunity to consult with the Israeli government about a broad range of issues." Indeed, how could it be anything other than a broad consultation, since the new government in Israel will barely have been sworn in by the time the president meets with the prime minister and his cabinet.

So why, after four years of not coming to Israel, has the president chosen this moment to visit? Having waited so long, why not wait a little longer and give John Kerry, his new secretary of state, a chance to set things up, perhaps laying the groundwork for a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that Obama could then bless?

Unfortunately, the president himself has such low expectations of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders he will be meeting, after they repeatedly disappointed him in his first term, that he no longer believes much can be achieved on the peace front. So why wait? Better to get the visit over and done with, demonstrate he is a lover of Zion, deprive his Republican adversaries of an effective talking point, and move on to greener Asian pastures.

That cynical view of the purposes of the Obama White House overlooks one critical objective that the president can achieve on this visit. He can reintroduce himself to the Israeli public as the American leader who does care deeply about their security and well-being, will be – as he has already been – in the trenches with them when the chips are down, means what he says when he vows that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, AND will be their reliable partner in the effort to resolve their existential conflict with the Palestinians.

The speech Obama delivers at Binyanei Ha'Uma in Jerusalem next Thursday evening to an audience of young Israelis will be the long-awaited analog to the speech he made to the Arab world in Cairo in June 2009. It will provide him with an opportunity to reintroduce himself to the Israeli people, identify with their hopes and fears, and build a quotient of trust that has been missing in their relationship.

If Obama can achieve that purpose, the trip will have been worth it. For if the Israeli public comes to view Obama as the trusted friend that he in fact is, Prime Minister Netanyahu will have to think long and hard before he decides again to upbraid the president in the Oval Office. It will not be so easy for him to refuse Obama's requests to restrain settlement activity, take confidence-building steps toward the Palestinians, and pipe down about Iran's nuclear program. Historically, the Israeli public has punished prime ministers who mishandle Israel's all-important relationship with a popular U.S. president. It's precisely because Obama has been so unpopular with the Israeli public that Netanyahu has been able to thwart his purposes. If the resident can change the balance of Israeli public opinion in his favor, he will benefit from a more positive relationship with a more pliant Israeli prime minister.

That in turn will help him with the Palestinians and Arabs. Obama thought he could please them by distancing the United States from Israel. What he didn't understand is that they gave up believing that will ever happen a long time ago. What they care about is not splitting the United States from Israel but having the president use his influence with Israel. His inability to do that in his first term cost him Arab support as well (today Obama's standing in Arab public opinion is lower than George W. Bush's).

Resurrecting Obama's reputation in the Middle East will be good for everything the United States needs to achieve there at a time of great challenge to American interests. Words alone will be insufficient to the task, but that speech in Jerusalem can be an important first step for his second term.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: Haaretz

Image Source: © NIR ELIAS / Reuters

Assessing the Stakes for President Obama's Israel Trip

Martin S. Indyk — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Tavis Smiley, Martin Indyk assesses the stakes for President Obama's first trip to Israel. Read an excerpt below.

PBS: I guess the start is whether or not I have just overstated the case. There are some who believe, as I intimated a moment ago, that the president’s very presence in Israel – that is to say, our president, Barack Obama – this very trip signals to some that there might be some renewed vigor, some renewed possibility for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Yet there are many more others, perhaps, I would say as I read, who think that that is really a false hope; that the expectations on this need to be tamped down. Where does Ambassador Indyk stand?

Martin Indyk: Well, certainly the White House has been trying to tamp down those expectations, including the president himself. He’s going early in his second term, just a couple of days after the Israeli government has been sworn in after their elections.

So it’s very hard to see what exactly could be done on this trip to actually achieve some kind of resumption of the negotiations. If he were going to try to do that, he would have gone later, he would have had the secretary of State go out, try to set things up in that way, and then come in and try to convene the negotiations.

He’s chosen not to do that, and I think the reason for that is that he doesn’t have himself high expectations that even resumption of negotiations is achievable at the moment. So I think his purpose is something else which could help further on down the road, and that purpose is to reintroduce himself to the Israeli public in particular.

They have gotten the impression that he doesn’t like them, that he wants to distance the United States from Israel. His standing in Israeli public opinion is at 10 points, believe it or not – a poll that was taken last Friday.

I think that that’s a bum rap that he has. He doesn’t deserve that. He’s been very supportive in so many ways of their security. But what they seem to care about is whether he loves them or not. They were showered with 16 years of affection by Bill Clinton and then George W. Bush, and they got used to that.

He now has an opportunity to go there, to explain to them that he’s got their back, that he’s been with them in times of difficulties, whether it’s at the U.N. or rockets from Gaza or the Iranian nuclear program, and that he’s going to be with them in the future.

I think he’ll use his oratorical magic, and I think he’ll have a powerful impact. That will be very helpful for an effort to restart the peace process after he leaves.

Authors

Martin S. Indyk

Publication: The Tavis Smiley Show (PBS)

Image Source: © Ammar Awad / Reuters

Why Is Obama Going to Israel—Now?

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 16:30:00 -0400

President Obama’s visit to Israel this week is a big deal. Not because it is expected to lead to a breakthrough in the stalled Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, nor to a unified U.S.-Israeli position on the Iranian nuclear challenge. It is a big deal, simply because it is happening.

A presidential visit to Israel is not routine. Quite the contrary. Since its birth in 1948, only four American presidents have visited Israel—Nixon, Carter, Clinton and Bush II. Obama will be the fifth. Truman, first to recognize Israel, never visited the state; nor did Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Reagan or Bush I.

Israel is hailed as America’s closest ally in the Middle East, but obviously such rhetorical affection, even esteem, has not translated into an Obama visit. Not till now. For example, several months into his first term as president, Obama traveled to Egypt, where he delivered a major speech about American-Arab relations, but then, foolishly, chose not to stop in near-by Israel. That slight, or so it was interpreted in Israel, proved to be a major diplomatic blunder.

So, why go to Israel now? Considering the president’s huge economic and political problems at home, it would surely make more sense for Obama to stay in or near the White House than to whisk off to the Middle East and spend the better part of a week in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. But off he goes. The president now realizes that if he is to achieve progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, if he is to persuade Iran, through diplomacy, not to build nuclear weapons, if he is to come up with a realistic policy toward crumbling Syria, he must first develop a good, solid, working relationship with Israel, meaning with Israel’s recently-re-elected prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Everyone knows that Obama’s relationship with Netanyahu has been frayed and unusually testy, and it needs dramatic improvement—and needs it now. Trust, so clearly in short supply between these two leaders, must be developed. Commonality of views and policies must be nurtured. Time is of the essence--so fragile is the balance between war and peace in the Middle East. The dangers and differences are obvious.

On Iran: Netanyahu believes that Iran will be able to produce the ingredients for a nuclear bomb late this spring or summer. Obama thinks Iran needs at least another year. The Iran danger requires a coordinated policy, and at the moment that does not exist.

On Syria: Netanyahu wants the U.S. to bomb Syrian rockets on their way to Hezbollah in Lebanon, even if that escalates the already dreadful conflict in Syria. The U.S. appears ready to use its military force in Syria only when President Assad decides to commit his chemical and biological weapons to his war against the insurgents—only, in other words, as truly a last resort. Syria looks like a hot firecracker about to explode and envelop the region, and the U.S. so far remains on the sideline.

On the chronic Palestinian conundrum: Obama’s White House has already made it clear the president will not be carrying any plan for a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, and that’s fine with Netanyahu, who does not seem eager to move on this front anyway.

Obama’s aim on this trip will be to persuade as many Israelis as possible that he is their friend and supporter in any possible conflict with Iran or Arab opponents, and that if the Israelis reach an agreement with the Palestinians, the U.S. will back it fully. This is his hope, his way of extending a hand of friendship and cooperation and reducing the distrust and disappointment many Israelis have felt towards Obama ever since he stiffed them in 2009 after his Cairo speech.

It is often said of Obama that Israel has been, for him, an acquired taste. He did not, and probably still does not, feel an instinctive sympathy for Israel. But he knows now, if he did not earlier, that it is very hard, if not impossible, for an American president to reach across the chasm of Israeli-Arab hostility and arrange an agreement between the two belligerents without first establishing a beachhead of sympathy and understanding with Israel. There is no guarantee that Obama will be able in his second term to midwife a Palestinian-Israeli agreement; but if he is to do so, he knows he must first improve his relations with Israel. Basically, that’s what this journey is all about.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © Ronen Zvulun / Reuters

Back to the Beginning in the Middle East

Marvin Kalb — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 10:09:00 -0500

Let us, for a moment, imagine what it might have been like in mid-February, 2009, if Barack Obama, then a new president, perhaps a transformational president (he was, after all, the first African-American elected to the job), decided that, in foreign policy, he would focus on the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and, miracle of miracles, produce a breakthrough. Miracles have been known to happen in that part of the world.

Instead of opening his Mid-East diplomacy with a cutting critique of Israel’s cantankerous settlements policy, often considered the third rail of Israeli politics, instead of traveling first to Egypt, where he delivered a warm speech, opening his arms to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but ignoring Israel, which proved to be a stunning blunder, instead of allowing, even encouraging, a discomfiting coolness in Israeli-American relations, instead of monopolizing America’s foreign policy rather than leaving some of the legwork to his secretary of state—instead of all this, if Obama did then what he appears to be doing now, four wasted years later, the Israelis and the Palestinians might be engaging in serious, face-to-face negotiations on a peace treaty by this time. Who knows?

Now, Obama appears to be allowing his new Secretary of State, John Kerry, to play a major role in the sensitive Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, a subject in which the former Senator has a passionate interest. He never allowed his first Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, once his principal opponent in the Democratic race to the White House, to lead an American initiative in this area, to engage in the sort of “shuttle diplomacy” that brought not only results but fame to another Secretary of State, named Henry Kissinger. On his first weekend as the nation’s top diplomat, Kerry made news by telephoning Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, informing both that he intended to visit the Middle East very soon, his way of signaling a new American activism in the region, particularly in the dormant negotiation between these two old antagonists.

Soon thereafter, apparently not by coincidence, the White House announced that the president himself will visit the Middle East on March 20—in other words, to do now what he should have done in 2009, namely, visit Israel, the Palestinian West Bank and, then as a gesture to a tottering ally, Jordan. On this trip, he will not visit Egypt, perhaps because an unstable Egypt may be too dangerous a destination.

According to American experts, Obama wants to focus on two main subjects in his talks with Netanyahu--Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s convulsing civil war. But Netanyahu, having already talked to Kerry, expects the president to raise another hot topic—namely, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. Netanyahu told his Cabinet last Sunday that this subject is very much on the president’s mind. “There is no doubt,” Netanyahu is quoted as saying, “this matter will be part of the work of the next government.” The prime minister is in the process of forming a new, broad-based government in Israel, one result of a political shake-up after the recent election that weakened his own base of political support and strengthened new and moderate forces more eager than he to resume negotiations with the Palestinians.

If Obama is, in fact, intent on launching a new American initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, he knows, or should know, that this effort requires a great deal of advance preparation, and little has been done. Realistically, Obama can do little more on this visit to the Middle East than set the stage for the negotiation and then leave it to his secretary of state to do the daunting, detailed legwork, starting with reopening the stalled dialogue between Netanyahu and Abbas. Then the serious work begins. Fortunately, for Kerry, he would have to shuttle only a short distance between Jerusalem and Ramallah, the interim Palestinian capital.

2013 may be the year, theoretically, for the US to pivot to Asia and the Pacific, but it is likely that this strategic pivot may have to be delayed, in part because the Middle East has a way of nipping at America’s heels. The crises in Iran and Syria may demand Obama’s attention this year. No one really knows, or so it seems, but Iran may be on the edge finally of developing a nuclear bomb. Is she six months away, or a year? And what does Obama do? He is on the record as saying the US will stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even using its military power to do so. Syria is absorbed in a civil war of increasing intensity and danger. The US may be changing its policy about providing lethal weapons to the anti-Assad opposition, but everyone asks, who is the opposition? Can it be trusted? Or is it a new incarnation of al-Qaeda?

And then there is the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, for which guarantees of success can only be described as being in short supply. If even modest success were possible, it would clearly make it easier for the US and Israel to coordinate their strategies on the Iranian nuclear threat and on the unpredictable but deadly civil war in Syria.

Every president seems to harbor a secret dream to bring peace to the holy land. This is now Obama’s turn. In 2009, he started out with such high hopes and expectations and then quickly stumbled. Maybe now, four years later, he will do better. Maybe this is his time. Let’s wish him well.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Israelis Love to Argue: And Four Other Tips for Obama's First Presidential Visit to Israel

Natan B. Sachs — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Barack Obama's announced trip to Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank in March appears at once premature and long overdue. Premature because the tangible goals of this trip seem, as yet, unclear. Overdue because -- as many critics have suggested -- his failure to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority in his first term contributed to a sense, among Israelis in particular, of a presidential cold shoulder.

Of the two big items on the president's Israel plate -- dealing with Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- the former appears paused, awaiting a diplomatic move by the international community, while the latter is in deep freeze and beset by pessimism on all sides. Unsurprisingly, Obama does not plan to announce a major new peace initiative on this trip, and he is unlikely to bring about a breakthrough on Iran now. Rather than seeking to extract specific policy concessions from any of the parties, the president should approach this with the broader aim of restarting his engagement with Israelis and Palestinians, while setting the stage for dealings with Iran and the peace process over the next four years. But even an unambitious trip to the Middle East is full of political minefields. Here, then, are five suggestions for Obama's first presidential journey to the Holy Land.

Don't promise the moon.

Many things are lost in translation between the political cultures of the Middle East and United States, but few contrasts are as sharp as the gap in cynicism. Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbors are cynical to a degree that often astounds Americans, and with the endless unmet promises of peace and of "process," the attitude is not completely unwarranted. As Obama knows all too well, to have tried and failed in Middle East peace is sometimes worse than not to have tried at all. Today, after so many failures, the fanfare of the 1990s peace process is best replaced by sober -- though vigorous -- negotiations more reminiscent of the mid-1970s, when Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy set the stage for the subsequent grand gestures of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

But in the halls of Washington these days, there is speculation that Secretary of State John Kerry could back a new full-scale push for comprehensive peace. The motivation is understandable, even laudable, and the goal of achieving a two-state solution is vitally important. But the peace process of old is over; the trust between the parties that was to be wrought through interim steps is long gone, to the degree that it ever existed.

A push for peace now should not assume that the process has merely stalled; its old form is likely dead. The repeated failures to achieve final status agreements from the second Camp David summit in 2000 onward and the new realities of the Middle East -- with turmoil in Egypt, Syria, and potentially among other neighbors of Israel -- have redefined the nature of the process at its core. Right now, quiet talks over practical steps, with peace as the ultimate goal, are far better than grand promises that few believe will be fulfilled.

But don't give up on reaching for the moon.

The myriad difficulties of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not lessen the vital need to halt backsliding on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the need to advance toward an eventual resolution. The untenable nature of the status quo is no less true because of the difficulties of achieving the goal.

In this respect, there's a silver lining for Obama in the grim cloud of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though seemingly dead in the water, the peace process did leave both parties and the international community with a relatively clear view of what resolution would eventually look like. Obama can therefore focus on articulating U.S. interests -- as he has done in the past -- rather than dealing with the intricate details of negotiation (something his predecessor, Bill Clinton, may have done too often).

The irony is that the very same polls that show Israeli and Palestinian skepticism of the prospects for peace also show their fundamental agreement with the terms required to achieve it (even among right-wing Israelis, there is willingness for real compromise). Stopping the backsliding on the ground -- the erosion of the Palestinian Authority and the moderates, on one side; the construction of Israeli settlement outposts, on the other -- while building Palestinian independence and ensuring long-term Israeli security remains in everyone's interest. On these points, the president should not shy away from articulating the long-term U.S. vision, whether his hosts agree with every detail or not.

Talk to ordinary Israelis.

Israelis may seem tough and argumentative, but at times it seems that they just want to be understood. While Israelis don't "deserve" Obama's undying love, the trust of ordinary Israelis can be a useful tool for a president facing several dramatic crises in the Middle East -- not least of which involving Iran's nuclear program -- and a prime minister with whom he's not on particularly good terms. In this regard, he could stand to learn a thing or two from Bill Clinton on how to capture the hearts of Israelis: mention Israel's right to exist, acknowledge the horrors of the Holocaust, and reaffirm the ancient Jewish attachment to the Holy Land. Quote from the Old Testament (not the New). Psalms worked well for Clinton.

Here's something to avoid: don't repeat that part of the 2009 Cairo speech which seemed (to Israeli ears) to suggest that Israel was born of the Holocaust. In fact, the state was founded mostly by the Jews who already lived there, and modern Zionism predates World War II by many decades. This matters to Israelis.

But, of course, there's more than sympathy and understanding. Ordinary Israelis want to hear (yet again) the president's resolve to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon -- a commitment that is underappreciated both in Israel and among Obama's opponents in Washington. The clearer the public alignment of goals is on Iran (despite important differences in nuance), the less likely it is that Israel will launch a unilateral strike. Both ordinary Israeli citizens and the nation's elite are already deeply divided over the wisdom of an Israeli strike, and the best antidote to rash decisions is Obama's firm, stated leadership.

Don't read too much into the Israeli election results.

The news of Obama's visit has already stirred speculation in Israel that the White House is trying to meddle in domestic politics and intervene in the ongoing coalition-formation process. Clearly, the precise makeup of Benjamin Netanyahu's next coalition (which could easily change again in the future) is not what motivates the first presidential visit since George W. Bush, but there is a longstanding temptation to overplay the U.S. hand in Israeli politics.

Obama faces a dilemma here: the United States is an influential actor in Israeli political life, and swaying the population can have an effect. But Washington is not adept at meddling in the details of Israeli party politics (as it tried to do, unsuccessfully, in 1996) and it shouldn't bother, for both practical and principled reasons.

Nor should Obama read too much into the purportedly moderate results of the Israeli elections. Netanyahu won, as widely expected (albeit more narrowly than most predicted) -- and while the makeup of his new coalition will have important ramifications for his foreign policy, it will not be altogether more centrist than, for example, Netanyahu's short-lived grand coalition in the summer of 2012. In truth, on the Palestinian question, Israeli politics has moved much less than is often claimed, whether to the right or to the center. Yes, there is a real rise of radical politicians on the right, but the strength of the overall blocs -- right, religious, center, left, and Arab-Israeli -- is remarkably stable.

Don't underestimate how much Israelis like to argue.

With 120 members in the Knesset, there are, at the very least, 120 opinions on anything. Argument is not merely tolerated among Israelis; it's the national pastime. And Israelis respect someone who does it well. Gaining their trust does not mean obscuring U.S. priorities or papering over disagreements. Appreciating Israel's difficult neighborhood and the complexity of its position does not mean Obama has to agree with Benjamin Netanyahu. Many Israelis disagree with their leader -- and those who don't often pretend to.

In other words, so long as Israelis are sure that the United States is still on their team, disagreement is just a fact of life. Moreover, Obama will realize that Israelis might actually listen to him -- not something they usually do -- and at times even hear him.

Obama's upcoming visit carries particular weight because it is so long-awaited. Clinton, though brilliant in capturing the hearts and minds of Israelis, also spoiled them. He visited the country four times and made both Israelis and Palestinians expect that he would be intimately involved in detailed negotiations. But that's not the president's role.

Obama faces a complex task, to say the least. But while his goals should be broad, his aim should be narrow. He needs to restate clearly his vision of peace and re-energize the efforts to prevent backsliding without appearing naïve or, conversely, creating unrealistic expectations. He needs to impress upon Israelis his proven commitment to the U.S.-Israeli alliance while remaining true to U.S. interests. And he needs to capture the hearts of cynical publics -- Israeli and Palestinian -- without losing sight of the grim and volatile realities of the contemporary Middle East. Despite the potential pitfalls and the formidable challenges, the president should be commended for re-engaging the region. True, it's never easy to win friends and influence enemies in the Middle East, but at least it's warm and the food is fantastic. Good luck, Mr. President.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Darren Whiteside / Reuters

Hagel’s Misreading of How to Treat an Ally

Michael Doran — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Chuck Hagel likes Ike. That much has been apparent for some time. But thanks to David Ignatius’s Jan. 27 op-ed column, “Reviving Eisenhower’s doctrine,” we now know what he likes best: Eisenhower’s management of the Suez crisis. For Hagel, it is more than a shining example of past American leadership. It is a guide for future presidential behavior.

Dwight D. Eisenhower is certainly worthy of emulation, but Hagel has unfortunately learned precisely the wrong lessons. In 1956, Britain, France and Israel launched coordinated invasions of Egypt. To say that Eisenhower disapproved would be an understatement. He directed at his allies a level of hostility typically reserved for worst enemies. After demanding that the attacking forces evacuate Egypt immediately, he imposed crippling economic sanctions on France and Britain. Against Israel, he threatened sanctions while engaging in bare-knuckle diplomacy.

All three powers buckled under the pressure, which was particularly damaging to Britain. Although Prime Minister Anthony Eden was America’s closest ally, Eisenhower brought his economy to the verge of collapse. The pressure destroyed Eden’s career and drove the final nail in the coffin of the British empire.

Realists in the Hagel mold find this episode exhilarating. Eisenhower, they say, pursued the national interest without concern for “sentimental” attachments, to say nothing of domestic lobbies. When applied to the present, the analogy calls for dealing sharply with Israel. The United States, the implication goes, must not allow its client to drag it into conflict with Iran. Instead, Obama must treat Benjamin Netanyahu with the same grit that Ike flashed at Eden.

But this analogy omits a key fact: Ike came to regret those policies. “Years later,” Richard Nixon wrote in the 1980s, “I talked to Eisenhower about Suez; he told me it was his major foreign policy mistake.” By 1958, Ike himself had realized his error and reversed course.

Two primary considerations prompted Eisenhower’s reevaluation. First, the Suez policy simply did not work. By distancing the United States from Israel and the Europeans, Eisenhower believed he was stabilizing the region and laying the foundation for a strategic accommodation between the Arabs, as a bloc, and the United States.

But the anticipated benefit never materialized. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged from the conflict much stronger and more adversarial to U.S. interests. The Soviet penetration of the Middle East deepened considerably. These trends had catastrophic consequences, chief among them the 1958 revolution in Iraq, which replaced the most pro-Western Arab government with a junta that migrated into the Soviet orbit.

The United States, Ike realized, was paying a heavy price for having broken the only immutable rule of a realist foreign policy: Support your friends and punish your enemies. It would continue to pay for years, and not just in the Middle East. When the United States became mired in Vietnam, Britain and France refused to help. Why should they? Eisenhower had taught them that membership in the NATO alliance imposed no binding obligations outside Europe.

As he contemplated these unintended consequences, Ike concluded that he had based his strategy on a false premise. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed it with admirable clarity in the midst of the crisis. U.S. failure to compel Israel to withdraw its forces from Egypt, he remarked to an agreeing Eisenhower, would lead to a catastrophic defeat in the Cold War. It would, Dulles said, “make it almost certain that virtually all of the Middle East countries would feel that United States policy toward the area was . . . controlled by the Jewish influence in the United States and that accordingly the only hope of the Arab countries was in association with the Soviet Union.”

Eisenhower assumed that the Arabs behaved as a unified bloc, especially with respect to Israel. The fallout from Suez, however, taught him otherwise. The upheavals that accompanied Nasser’s rise shared one factor: They had no connection whatsoever to Israel. From this, Eisenhower learned that the alignment of the Arab states in the Cold War was a function of their own internecine conflicts.

This realization led to a paradigm shift. During Suez, Eisenhower had envisioned the United States as an honest broker, shuttling between the Arab world and the alliance of Britain, France and Israel. By 1958, he defined the American role in an entirely new way. The job of the United States, he now realized, was to balance the status-quo Arab powers against a set of revisionists, who were aligned with the Soviet Union. In that context, Israel was more an asset than a liability. Historians typically ascribe this intellectual innovation to Nixon and Henry Kissinger. They were the first to publicly articulate the perspective, but Nixon had absorbed it while serving at Eisenhower’s side.

Today, another revolutionary wave is sweeping the Arab world, driven once again by internal factors. Meanwhile, Hagel remains fixated on a U.S.-Arab-Israeli dynamic. This magical triangle has never had the all-pervasive influence ascribed to it. As long as Hagel remains in its thrall, Eisenhower’s true realism will elude him.

Authors

Michael Doran

Publication: The Washington Post

Bibi Netanyahu at Bay in Israel

Itamar Rabinovich — Mon, 28 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Few foresaw the surprising setback suffered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his Likud Party, and the right in general in Israel’s recent general election. It is an outcome that will have important ramifications for Israel’s domestic politics and foreign policy alike, particularly its Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Although the final vote tally awaits (soldiers’ votes have not yet been fully counted), the basic result is known.

Given the current stalemate between the right and left, a shift of one or two seats (out of 120) in the Knesset could make a difference in the composition of the next government, which in Israel is always a coalition of some type.

Netanyahu was the sole contender for the position of prime minister, and his reelection, together with the right-wing parties’ overall victory, seemed a foregone conclusion.

He and his allies were challenged by four parties or electoral lists — Labour, Yesh Atid, Hatnuah and Meretz — though their leaders (three of them women) were not perceived to be running for prime minister.

Three of these groups — Labour, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah — were viewed as potential coalition partners in a Netanyahu government; the small, left-wing Meretz was expected to remain in opposition.

At this point, it seems certain that Netanyahu will form a new government, but he will be a much weaker prime minister than he was during the past four years.

The main winner was Yair Lapid, whose Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) emerged suddenly to pick up 19 seats and become the second largest party in the Knesset. Moreover, like the opposition, the right-wing bloc that comprised Netanyahu’s last government has undergone some important shifts.

Several developments converged to produce this unexpected outcome. For starters, the Israeli middle class and younger voters took the social protests of the summer of 2011 into the ballot box.

If Netanyahu thought that he had managed to take the steam out of the protests over high housing prices and falling living standards, he was proved wrong.

Read the full article »

Authors

Itamar Rabinovich

Publication: The Jordan Times

The Limits of U.S. Influence in Israel

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A victory in Tuesday’s Israeli elections by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud Yisrael Beiteinu alliance and the ascent of even more extreme parties are indications of Israelis’ continued move to the right.

It is also an indication of the limits and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in its relationship with Israel. Despite Netanyahu’s obvious preference for President Barack Obama’s Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, in the U.S. presidential elections — and a sense that he was intervening through proxies — Obama’s ability to influence the outcome of the Israeli elections has been negligible.

The Obama administration’s situation underscores the need for a quick decision about its policy toward whatever type of governing coalition emerges in Israel after the election. If Netanyahu forges a government with parties to his right, the White House should drop the pretense of possible peace negotiations and formulate policy accordingly: It can either produce a detailed peace plan or fall back on highlighting international law and human rights and the obligations of the parties that they entail.

Israelis were certainly aware of the tension between their prime minister and the U.S. president. Had they not been, the much-publicized report by journalist Jeffrey Goldberg about White House warnings of Israeli isolation drove the point home. Yet there is no indication that a dispute will have a significant impact on Israeli elections, since the right-wing parties that support the settlements are expected to do well. The question is: Why have the stated American opposition to Israeli settlements and subtle attempts at influencing Israeli opinion been ineffective?

This puzzle is made more acute by the consensus that Israelis — both the public and virtually all politicians—view the relationship with Washington as their most crucial strategic priority.

In the past, Israelis reacted to threats of worsening relations with the United States by punishing those politicians viewed as responsible — as happened in the defeat of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir after his confrontation with President George H. W. Bush in 1992. But it now seems that Israelis have grown to take the U.S. relationship for granted. There is clear evidence of this from the polls.

In a poll I conducted in Israel with the Program for International Policy Attitudes after the U.S. presidential elections, fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute, most Israelis said they believed the tension between Netanyahu and Obama would not affect the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Read the full article »

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: Reuters

Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

Experts from Foreign Policy at Brookings — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:36:00 -0500

President Obama begins his second term in office facing a world in turmoil and a number of critical challenges to global security and stability.

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Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

In response to these and a host of other international crises, the president can choose to place some “Big Bets” that could define his foreign policy over the next four years. However, a number of “Black Swans” –low probability, but high-impact events –may derail President Obama’s second term foreign policy agenda. Brookings’s Foreign Policy experts have released a set of 20 memos to the president—Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book—offering innovative policy recommendations that the administration might pursue.

Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy; Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; and Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy discuss some of these Big Bets and Black Swans, including turning Tehran away from nuclear weapons and a potential collapse of the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel.

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Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

Authors

Experts from Foreign Policy at Brookings

Big Bets and Black Swans: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Downloads

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Camp David Peace Treaty Collapse

Tamara Cofman Wittes and Shadi Hamid — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has been resolutely focused on maintaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. While Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi has signaled he is willing to set aside the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological opposition and most Egyptians’ hostility to Israel, several factors could destabilize the situation. Shadi Hamid and Tamara Cofman Wittes drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How should the U.S. engage with President Morsi to preserve peace between Egypt and Israel?
What can the U.S. do to improve communications between Egypt and Israel?
How should the U.S. prepare for a scenario in which the treaty breaks down and there is a direct confrontation?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Tamara Cofman Wittes and Shadi Hamid

Since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, the United States has been resolutely focused on maintaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a cornerstone of regional stability and as an essential platform for broader efforts at Arab-Israeli coexistence. The loss of this 33-year-old treaty would represent a profound strategic defeat for the United States in the Middle East.

Recommendation:

To mitigate such a possibility you should take immediate steps to deepen U.S. engagement with the Morsi government, the Egyptian military and opposition forces; consider negotiating new Israeli-Egyptian agreements to address each side’s grievances about Sinai security; promote better communication and confidence building measures between the Egyptian and Israeli militaries; and be ready to intervene immediately should a crisis erupt.

Background:

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s decision to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in November 2012 signaled that he was willing to set aside the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological opposition and most Egyptians’ hostility to Israel in favor of a pragmatic raison d’etat. Nevertheless, there are several possible ways by which the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty might be ruptured.

Third-party terrorist attacks in Sinai or emanating from Gaza could draw in Israeli and Egyptian troops and rupture relations. In August 2011, for example, a terrorist attack led Israeli forces on a hot pursuit into Sinai, during which they killed five Egyptian soldiers. This generated heated demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo. That incident took place under the military council’s rule; a future incident would take place under a democratically-elected government that would face strong popular pressure to respond, provoking a further crisis and threatening the treaty itself. While Israel has been careful since then to avoid any provocation in Sinai, it has also watched continued terrorist activity there, and Egypt’s inability or unwillingness to tackle it, with growing alarm. At the end of the day, Israel will insist on its right to self-defense. Terrorists and others with an interest in creating a crisis could easily provoke an incident in a location that would heighten the chances for a direct Israeli-Egyptian military confrontation.

Even without a border incident, an elected, Muslim-Brotherhood-led government might resort to populist nationalism to sustain support for its rule. While the international community saw Morsi’s diplomacy in Gaza as a signal that an Islamist-led Egypt would act responsibly to reinforce regional stability, his opponents in leftist and revolutionary circles attacked him for working within the Mubarak framework of relations with Israel. Even Morsi’s own Brotherhood has taken a harder line than he, as for example in August 2012 when it claimed that a recent terrorist attack on Egyptian soldiers in Sinai was a “Zionist” plot. In the coming years, Morsi’s opponents are likely to make greater use of anti-Americanism and anti-Israel sentiment to attack the Brotherhood in the court of public opinion (just as the Brotherhood did to Mubarak).

Moreover, the touch policy measures required to stabilize the Egyptian economy will worsen the pain of average Egyptians, making populist policies, and particularly adventurism abroad, a tempting distraction for an increasingly unpopular government. A continued failure to address deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian relations could also spark further violence between Hamas and Israel or a collapse of the Palestinian Authority, exacerbating anti-Israeli sentiment in Egypt. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government security-focused approach to Sinai’s problems relies on ham-handed repression while failing to invest the necessary resources to promote local development and reduce local grievances. This increases the incentives for locals to participate in violence. Morsi and the Brotherhood cannot be expected to continue to confront increasing public pressure over these issues without any impact on cooperation with Israel. At some point, the temptation to make a symbolic move against the treaty could become too strong to ignore. Morsi might then demand amendments to the treaty or put it to a popular referendum. He might also seek to address both security threats in Sinai, and perceived slights on Egyptian sovereignty there, by moving additional forces into zones where the Treaty restricts forces without Israeli consent.

Should Morsi be tempted to use hostility toward Israel to bolster his domestic standing, this will only persuade Israeli officials that their worst fears about the Arab Spring are being realized. Any Egyptian move to undermine the Treaty would be seen as implying a sharp decrease in Israel’s deterrent capabilities, and would likely produce a sharp response.

Israel is already nervous. Since Egypt’s revolution, Israel has acquiesced in Egypt’s remilitarization of eastern Sinai, accepting a semi-permanent Egyptian presence close to its border. At the same time, Israel has doubled the number of battalions it has deployed along the border, built a border fence, and established a new “Southern Brigade” to defend Eilat. In the context of anti-Israeli populism, any Egyptian military move that Israel does not know about or approve could easily provoke suspicion and a matching Israeli military mobilization intended to send a signal about the costs of abandoning the treaty. But given the already-increased troop presence and the limited communication between the two sides, such a scenario heightens the chances for unintended escalation.

Preventing a Peace Treaty Rupture:

There are steps you should take now to reduce the chances that terrorist provocations or populist moves by Egypt’s leadership might end in the rupture of the Treaty:

• Deepen U.S. security cooperation and coordination with the Morsi government so that, even in the event of growing anti-Israel agitation inside Egypt or a terrorist provocation in the Sinai, Morsi and the Brotherhood feel they have a vital stake in not upsetting the bilateral relationship.

• Sustain and expand U.S. engagement with the Egyptian military and with political actors across the Egyptian spectrum, in the course of which administration officials should extol the benefits of peace with Israel for Egypt’s stability and economic recovery. In order to avoid the perception of a Mubarak-style authoritarian bargain, your embassy in Cairo should balance its cooperation with Morsi with broader political outreach and sustained pressure on the Brotherhoodled government to promote inclusive democracy.

• Consider developing a new Egypt-Israel modus vivendi that would enhance the sustainability of the peace treaty. Israel is not happy with the very limited bilateral communications over Sinai and Gaza, which occur through a high-level intelligence channel; Egypt is unhappy with the Treaty’s limitations on forces in Sinai. These limitations may also no longer meet the needs of the two parties when the primary security threat is non-state terrorism and illicit activity. A revised agreement that codifies the alreadyaltered realities on the ground, and that adds more robust bilateral information sharing and coordination mechanisms, could potentially relieve pressures on the Treaty within Egyptian politics, while better serving both sides’ security interests.

• Press now for increased communication between Egyptian and Israeli militaries. Those operating along their shared border must have some direct means to share information in the event of a crisis. You can also work to enhance the role of the Multinational Force Observers in Sinai (MFO). Currently, limited numbers and capabilities as well as security concerns restrict MFO movements. A larger, more mobile and capable force could improve information sharing and verify that new Egyptian deployments in Sinai are sized, equipped, and operating according to agreements. This would also lessen Morsi’s ability to “surprise” Israel with any new military deployments, reducing his incentive to do so.

Minimizing Fallout in the Event of Further Deterioration:

In extremis, if the treaty is broken, or if tensions flare to the point that cross-border fighting is conceivable, you should be ready to act quickly to:

• Deter both sides from a direct confrontation, or bring one to a swift end. Since the Egyptian military is unlikely to seek allout war with the far-superior Israeli Defense Forces, it may welcome U.S. intervention. This could involve seeking an immediate separation of forces monitored by MFO, and, if necessary, putting nearby U.S. forces on alert to deter aggressive movements by either side in advance of such a separation taking hold. The temptation in Washington might be to declare swift and clear support for Israel’s defense. But in a case where extreme nationalism is driving Egyptian actions this would not itself act as a deterrent to further escalation.

• Prevent terrorist elements in Sinai or Gaza from taking advantage of the crisis to fire rockets or breach Israel’s borders. Success in this objective will require getting both Egypt and Israel focused on the primacy of the terrorist threat: pressing Egypt to back down swiftly, urging Israeli restraint in response to provocations, and mobilizing third-party channels to Hamas in Gaza warning against such moves.

• Prevent an Egyptian-Israeli rupture from having ripple effects in the region. The United States should engage swiftly and firmly with Arab capitals, especially in the Gulf, to head off any statements of support for Egyptian actions against the treaty and to elicit public and private messages expressing a desire to maintain regional peace. Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel would become an immediate target should this effort fail, and the United States as well as our Gulf allies should seek to demonstrate their support for the maintenance of Jordan’s peace with Israel in the face of what could be a fierce nationalist onslaught.

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