Brookings: Topics - Afghanistan

Battle for Afghanistan: Lessons from the First Anglo-Afghan War

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 15:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
3:30 PM - 4:45 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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A discussion with William Dalrymple on current day Afghanistan and lessons learned from the British experience there, as detailed in his new book, "Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan."

On April 24, the Brookings Institution hosted noted historian and journalist William Dalrymple for a discussion on current day Afghanistan and lessons learned from the British experience in Afghanistan, as detailed in his new book, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan (Bloomsbury, 2013). Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel participated as a discussant and Brookings President Strobe Talbott moderated the conversation.

When Westerners talk about the Taliban, they object to the treatment of women and football stadium executions. When you talk to Afghans about the Taliban, they object to the fact there was no electricity, there was no mobile phone network, the economy was a complete mess and it was a medieval darkness economically. No one wants that back again. - William Dalrymple

We have, in my view, studied Afghanistan as pitifully little as the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th century. One concrete examination of that is the Taliban, our enemy. - Bruce Riedel

We are extremely unlikely to see the Taliban roll through Afghanistan as they did in the late-90s. I think the Northern Alliance is too well-armed. I think the Taliban is too unpopular. - William Dalrymple

In the spring of 1839, nearly 20,000 British and East India Company troops poured into Afghanistan, in a massive invasion for its time. From first-hand accounts, the Afghan people initially offered little organized resistance, but in 1842 rose in violent rebellion across the country. The first Anglo-Afghan War ended in retreat, ambush and rout; an utter military humiliation for the then-most powerful nation in the world at the hands of poorly equipped Afghan tribesmen. Fast forward to the 20th and 21st centuries—new global powers enter Afghanistan with new motivations and goals. Each finds Afghanistan to be a military challenge of unexpected proportions. Each nation leaves the country questioning its mission and arguably facing national humiliation, forced out by tribal fighters. Britain's greatest military disaster serves as a powerful and important parable for our times, underscoring the terrible outcomes when cultures and national agendas collide.

The Stakes for America in the Race to Replace Karzai

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Michèle Flournoy — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 13:08:00 -0400

Afghanistan has held two presidential elections since 2001. Hamid Karzai won both, but the most recent (in 2009) was marred by irregularities such as stuffed ballot boxes and acrimony between Mr. Karzai and the international community. The Afghan constitution demands that Mr. Karzai step down next year, and by most accounts that is his intention. Who will succeed him?

On a recent trip to Afghanistan, almost everyone we spoke to highlighted next April's presidential election as a make-or-break event for the country—including its ability to fend off the Taliban and avoid backsliding into civil war.

What should be the international community's role over the next 12 months? Although the United States and other key outside nations shouldn't and won't try to pick a winner, they should do what they can to ensure that the next elections are freer and fairer than the last. Since the U.S. has promised at least $5 billion a year in future aid (for half a decade or more) and is considering spending $10 billion a year or more on a post-2014 military presence, Americans in particular have a stake in the electoral process and outcome.

Put more bluntly: If Afghans either hold a fraudulent election or elect a corrupt future leader, the odds of the U.S. Congress providing the expected aid are slim to none. This is also the case for other countries. The U.S. should, therefore, voice its views now rather than simply cut off aid later if the election goes badly.

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Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Michèle Flournoy

Publication: Wall Street Journal

Counterinsurgency, Counternarcotics, and Illicit Economies in Afghanistan: Lessons for State-Building

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 15:30:00 -0400

Editor's note: The following excerpt introduces a book chapter produced by Vanda Felbab-Brown for the Center for Complex Operations volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, published in April 2013. In this chapter, Felbab-Brown analyzes U.S. counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan since 2001, how the Obama administration broke with the dominant counternarcotics framework, and the potentially problematic side effects of counternarcotics success.

Since 2001, Afghanistan has become synonymous with the narco-state and the spread of crime and illegality. In 2007 and 2008, the Afghan drug economy reached levels unprecedented since at least World War II. Although the drug economy has declined since, the decrease has largely been driven by the saturation of the global drug market and by poppy crop disease rather than the policies of the international community and the Afghan government. Although several other illicit economies thrive in Afghanistan including the smuggling of legal goods, narcotics receive by far the most attention because they generate the largest profits and the greatest international opprobrium.

Narcotics production and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for drug control there and worldwide, but also for security, reconstruction, and rule-of-law efforts in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many of the counternarcotics policies adopted after 9/11 not only failed to reduce the size and scope of the illicit economy in Afghanistan but also had serious counterproductive effects on peace, state-building, and economic reconstruction.

In 2009, the Obama administration wisely decided to scale back eradication efforts in Afghanistan, courageously breaking with 30 years of counternarcotics policies that focused on ineffective forced eradication of illicit crops as a way to reduce the supply of drugs and to bankrupt belligerents. But the effectiveness of its counternarcotics policies there—interdiction focused on Taliban-linked traffickers and alternative livelihoods efforts—has been challenged by implementation difficulties and is ultimately dependent on major progress in improving the security situation and governance in Afghanistan. As of fall 2011, governance in Afghanistan had been steadily deteriorating, with corruption and ethnic tensions rising and political patronage networks becoming more exclusionary, while any security improvements following the 2010 U.S. military surge remain extremely fragile. A civil war post-2014 remains a very likely outcome, with the corollary thriving of the drug trade.

This chapter first details the evolution of U.S. counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan since 2001, situating the changes in the policy within two conceptual frameworks. Next, it describes how the Obama administration broke with the dominant counternarcotics framework in an attempt to synchronize counternarcotics policies with its counterinsurgency efforts. That section also analyzes the implementation challenges President Barack Obama’s counternarcotics strategy encountered—from the side effects of its interdiction focus, to poor governance and the inability to decide whether and how to combat broader corruption in Afghanistan, to defining alternative livelihoods efforts as narrow buying support programs rather than long-term sustainable development. Next, the chapter considers the likely security and political conditions in Afghanistan after a reduction in U.S. combat forces there in 2014. Subsequently, it explores two oft-ignored but potentially problematic side effects of any future counternarcotics success in Afghanistan: what illegal economy may replace the opium poppy economy if it is reduced, and where the opium poppy economy is likely to shift. In conclusion, the chapter offers broader lessons for dealing with illicit economies in the context of counterinsurgency and state-building.

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Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Publication: Center for Complex Operations

America's Care in the Use of Force (and Use of Drones)

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

American University professor Akbar Ahmed’s new book, The Thistle and the Drone, is elegant and erudite in many ways. He demonstrates a rich historical and anthropological understanding not only of his native Pakistan but of other tribal societies around the world relevant in the broader “war against terrorism.” He cautions wisely about the geostrategic dangers that can result if Washington is seen as using force disproportionately or carelessly in ways that hurt innocent people in these areas. Ahmed is right to question whether the United States needs to reassess its approaches in these matters.

However, as someone who has followed these same issues myself, albeit from a somewhat different vantage point as a national security scholar with close ties to the U.S. military and intelligence community, I have a different perspective on several of the issues Ahmed raises. In some of his specific arguments, Professor Ahmed is not fully fair, accurate, or up to date.

He makes insufficient effort to understand trends in drone warfare including the huge progress that the United States has made in minimizing civilian casualties. While mistakes are sometimes still made, I believe after following the use of drones closely for years that the United States Armed Forces take a great deal of care in their use of force. It is dangerous for Ahmed to suggest otherwise, since in doing so he can fuel the very fires of hatred and distrust that he decries.

For example, in Afghanistan, ISAF forces have made extraordinary efforts to reduce their use of firepower, and accidental or inadvertent strikes now account for less than 10 percent of all civilian fatalities there according to UN figures. This is still far too many—a few hundred a year—but it is incredibly precise by the standards of warfare. Indeed, under General McChrystal three years ago, some NATO troops felt they were even being asked to accept greater personal risk to themselves and their fellow troopers when engaged in firefights so as to ensure maximum safety for Afghans. NATO troops do not fire on Afghan homes or other buildings unless in dire peril, and their care has produced a huge improvement in our track record.

In Pakistan, U.S. forces have had essentially a zero-casualty policy for at least three years. Attacks are not made if there is any realistic risk to civilians—with only a partial exception if al Qaeda’s top two or three leaders might be in the crosshairs. Yes, mistakes have been made. But these have been extremely rare. Peter Bergen tallies the number of accidental deaths of innocents as well under 10 percent of the total in recent times. To be sure, critiques are warranted, and we can afford to scale back our use of force now that bin Laden is dead, top al Qaeda leadership in general is decimated, and some key Haqqani leaders are out of the picture (we have already reduced the pace of attacks substantially, as Bergen’s data repeated at www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex show). But the insinuations that we have not been extremely careful and have not tried to learn further lessons along are simply incorrect.

Ahmed goes further. On p. 39 of his book, he even says that "There appears to be a deliberate attempt by official agencies in the war on terror to obfuscate and distort." This is a big charge that he makes without substantiation or specificity.

There are a few other specific matters where dissent is warranted, as well. On p. 305 he suggests that many if not most American scholars blame Islam and its basic nature for terrorism. This is not accurate. Far more American scholars go out of their way to argue just the opposite in the last 12 years.

On p. 309 he actually suggests that a mainstream strand of American national security thinking wants to "eradicate Islam." This is, frankly, a preposterous and irresponsible allegation.

On p. 311 he suggests that it was a serious idea to carpet bomb Muslim villages with videos of Baywatch, and that Americans would take such nonsense seriously. Perhaps here Ahmed is being tongue in cheek, but in light of his other arguments, I couldn’t tell. I hope so!

On p. 313, he says that al Qaeda is now blamed for every outburst of violence around the world, and that Americans live on pins and needles because of fear of another attack. In fact, most Americans have moved on. They worry far more about the economy. In national security terms, recent policy has focused as much on the so-called rebalancing towards Asia, and the problems with North Korea. More than anything else, though, what typifies the current American public policy debate is less paranoia over al Qaeda than Americans' growing isolationism. Ahmed would have been more fair to criticize the country for its indifference towards the Syrian civil war than for hypervigilance towards militants.

Finally, on p. 319, Ahmed suggests that anthropologists were brought into U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking to help determine how to properly torture Muslim prisoners. This too is wrong.

Ahmed is a remarkable scholar who has made big contributions, but on the above matters, I simply disagree.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Hamid Karzai, Confused by the U.S.

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Stephen Biddle — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

For most Americans, Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s words and actions are difficult to understand and hard to accept. He often seems ungrateful for the efforts of U.S. troops, cavalier in his ideas of how to change the Afghan-NATO military campaign and irresolute in his commitment to the war effort. He has suggested that our troops stay out of Afghan villages even before Afghan forces are ready to handle security there. He has chastised NATO soldiers for occasional, and clearly unintentional, mistakes that led to civilian casualties. He has withheld a promise to give our troops legal immunity if they stay in his country beyond 2014. He has even equated the U.S. role in prolonging the war with that of the Taliban.

We are among those who wish Karzai would stop this behavior. He struck a more positive tone this week during a news conference with Secretary of State John Kerry, but it would be a mistake to assume that the problems have been fixed. U.S. relations with the Afghan president will sustain further ups and downs, and the only way to reduce the severity and frequency of the low points is by understanding what provokes them.

Karzai is not, as some have claimed, crazy or a fool. He is confused. In his view, the world’s only superpower is surely able to defeat a ragtag force of Taliban guerrillas — if it really wanted to. In his view, the United States could surely force Pakistan to stop harboring Afghan Taliban insurgents — if it really wanted to. Yet Washington does neither. On the contrary, Karzai watches Americans look the other way while their logistical contracts are siphoned off to support the Taliban (albeit less so lately), and he sees Americans give billions of dollars in aid each year to their ostensible Pakistani tormentors. Karzai concludes that there must be some hidden reason for the apparent contradictions.

Karzai, of course, heard President Obama reinforce the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan by 30,000 troops in March 2009 and by another 30,000 that December. Yet Karzai then heard that Vice President Biden suggested,in the same month as Obama’s speech, that the United States did not have a “counterinsurgency” strategy to preserve the Afghan government or a long-term commitment to the countryand that America’s only real interest in the region was to hunt al-Qaeda terrorists, not to defeat the Taliban. More recently, U.S. officials have suggested that the Taliban is not America’s enduring enemy and that, while militants who attack U.S. territory are terrorists, those who strike on Afghan soil are not.

These challenges did not originate in the Obama administration. In 2001 President George W. Bush pledged U.S. support to Karzai, a leader he called a hero. But in 2003 the Bush administration shifted its attention to Iraq and handed off the defense of this hero to a polyglot multinational coalition. Karzai naturally wondered whether Americans believed what they said about the importance of his government’s survival.

Many of these apparent contradictions are unintended byproducts of U.S. efforts to craft a nuanced policy. The United States has security interests in Afghanistan, but they are limited ones. The chief threat to U.S. security in the region is al-Qaeda, but it would be hard to defeat al-Qaeda if its Taliban allies overthrew the Afghan government and took over important parts of the country. Too narrow and intense a focus on the Taliban misses the big picture of America’s underlying interests; by contrast, too little emphasis on defeating the Taliban overlooks a critical means of securing the ultimate end.

To resolve these conflicting incentives, the Obama administration has sought a policy of balance and moderation. These, however, can easily become self-contradiction, confusion and muddle unless the components are carefully crafted and presented. Obama is capable of presenting subtle, nuanced positions on complex issues — his 2008 campaign speech on race relations is a defining example — but he has devoted remarkably little time to discussing his Afghanistan policy in sustained, direct public communication. The result has been mixed and confusing messaging, especially since some White House officials have, occasionally, publicly dissented from that policy.

This is not to absolve Karzai. He often lets emotional impulse preempt analysis, and his outbursts frequently elevate his domestic political interests above the needs of his alliance with the United States or of the war effort.

Yet America shares some of the blame for the public divisions between Washington and Kabul. Our inconsistencies and reversals have interacted with Karzai’s various shortcomings to create an ever more difficult relationship.

That does not change the fact that Karzai and the rest of the Afghan people know they need us and will ultimately try to work with us. We need to keep perspective, and a thick skin, when engaging in this relationship, as Kerry has done. Equally important, we need to get our own message and policy straight. If we do not, we may discover that Karzai’s successor will find us just as confusing as Karzai has.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Stephen Biddle

Publication: The Washington Post

Still Knee-Deep In Poppy: The Evolution of Counter-Narcotics Policies in Afghanistan

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 10:20:00 -0400

Editor’s note: The following excerpt introduces a book chapter produced by Vanda Felbab-Brown for the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) volume, Partners for Stability, published in March 2013. In this chapter, Dr. Felbab-Brown explains how international and domestic counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan cannot be successful without first achieving substantial security improvements and good governance within the country.

Perhaps nowhere in the world have a country and the international community faced such a strong illicit drug economy as in Afghanistan. In 2007 and 2008, the economy reached levels unprecedented in the world at least since World War II. But neither opium poppy cultivation nor heroin production is a new, post-2001 phenomenon: each robustly existed during the Taliban era and before. Although opium production has declined in Afghanistan since 2008, the decrease has largely been driven by the saturation of the global drug market and by poppy crop disease, rather than being the outcome of the policies of the international community and the Afghan government.

Narcotics production and counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for drug control, but also for the security, reconstruction, and rule-of-law efforts in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many of the counter-narcotics policies adopted during most of the 2000s not only failed to reduce the size and scope of the illicit economy in Afghanistan, but also had serious counterproductive effects on the other objectives of peace, state-building, and economic reconstruction. In a courageous break with a previous counterproductive policy, the Obama administration wisely decided in 2009 to scale back poppy eradication in Afghanistan, but it has struggled to implement its new strategy effectively. Although it backed away from centrally-led eradication, Afghan governor-led eradication persists. The interdiction policy adopted by ISAF at times approximates eradication in its negative effects on farmers’ well-being and their receptivity to Taliban mobilization, and rural development policies have failed to address structural drivers of poppy cultivation. Moreover, despite the surge in U. S. military forces adopted in December 2009 and important improvements in security in Afghanistan’s south, the 129,469 U. S. and ISAF forces deployed as of May 2012 have not stabilized other parts of Afghanistan, such as the east. The Taliban and related insurgencies have not been robustly defeated even in the south, and they maintain an important foothold in Afghanistan’s north as well. As U. S. and ISAF troops are preparing to depart Afghanistan by 2014, they are handing over an on-going war to Afghan security forces. Although both Russia and the United States have supported counter-narcotics policies in Central Asia, such as interdiction training, these efforts have achieved little systematic effect on either reducing illicit flows, the strength of organized crime, and corruption in the region or encouraging regional cooperation.

Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Publication: German Council on Foreign Relations

Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

A Discussion on Afghanistan with General John Allen

Mon, 25 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 25, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN.org »

On March 25, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted General John Allen, former commander of the International Security Assistance Force, for a discussion of the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan.

General Allen led forces in Afghanistan for 19 months, from mid-2011 through February 2013. Prior to that, Allen was deputy commander of the U.S. Central Command from June 2008 through mid-2011. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon, just back from his most recent research trip to Afghanistan, joined General Allen in a discussion on the mission as it progressed during his time in command through the current period.

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A Discussion on Afghanistan with General John Allen

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Kandahar and Hope

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Michèle Flournoy — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 10:25:00 -0400

Kandahar. Ancient crossroads of Central Asia. Home province of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and the site from which Osama bin Laden began to prepare the Sept. 11 attacks. Epicenter of the fight pitting Afghan and NATO forces against the Taliban over the past dozen years. Region where patronage networks led by the likes of the late Ahmed Wali Karzai, together with centuries-old tribal rivalries, have greatly complicated our counterinsurgency campaign and efforts to help Afghans establish good, or at least better, governance.

Now, Kandahar gives hope to the war effort. The struggle is far from won. But it is much closer to a success than a failure at present, as we saw on a recent trip sponsored by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force.

This is not meant to be happy talk. Kandahar was the sixth day of our trip and the first five days included plenty of discouraging news in Kabul. The tensions between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the United States have intensified to one of their worst levels ever, the corruption problems in the Afghan government remain serious, Pakistan is still playing a largely unhelpful role in the conflict, and uncertainty about America’s and NATO’s future presence in Afghanistan after the end of the current mission in 2014 looms large in every conversation.

But for all that, it is still remarkable, and genuinely encouraging, to see what has happened down south. This area of the country has long been viewed as the heart of the war effort. Prevent Afghanistan from returning to a safe haven for Al Qaeda by denying the Taliban any real hope of restoring an Islamic caliphate, keep Kabul and other population centers relatively safe and secure, protect the road networks, and nurse the young Afghan democracy toward greater functionality — this remains the prescription for at least a partial success in Afghanistan. And developments in Kandahar in recent years, which have further accelerated in recent months, suggest that these objectives may still be achievable.

Violence in Kandahar province is down by two-thirds over the past two years. Kandahar city is thriving, with markets and schools full of life. Surveys of the population report some 60 percent of locals generally satisfied with their personal security and their economic circumstances even as they remain less positive on the quality of local government. The Arghandab Valley just to the city’s north and west, the site of bloody military campaigns in recent years, is now largely calm. In Zhary and Panjway, longtime Taliban strongholds, a number of villages have recently risen up against the Taliban and asked the Afghan government to establish Afghan Local Police units to protect them. The patronage network dominated by Ahmed Wali Karzai until his death two years ago has splintered — meaning that, while corruption is still a major problem (exacerbated alas by much of the money NATO has poured into the area), spoils are spread more equally among different political leaders and tribes. That development may reduce the ability of the Taliban to recruit disaffected followers from disenfranchised communities.

A skeptical reader might say, fine, things are better, but only because of an incredible effort by NATO in general and the United States in particular since we surged forces into the area some three years ago. With NATO forces already down by one-third locally this year from their earlier peak, and slated to decline another third by fall, one might reasonably ask how this will all hold up as we draw down our forces — even as the enemy remains resilient.

It is a fair question — and a good reason why we should not leave with all our forces. A clear message from our trip is the importance of a U.S.-Afghan accord that allows American and other NATO forces to remain in Afghanistan to continue advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Force, albeit in much smaller numbers, after 2014.

But in fact, there is an even better reason to stay hopeful — the enormous and ongoing improvement of the Afghan security forces. Consider:

Afghan forces in the five provinces of the southeast including Kandahar now exceed 50,000, in contrast to NATO’s current total of under 20,000. Afghan forces are taking some 75 percent of all coalition casualties, and are leading more than 85 percent of all operations. The preponderance of ISAF forces are now in an advise-and-assist role, supporting the ANSF.
Afghan forces are finding the predominant share of roadside bombs in the area now, and often do so through human intelligence and vigilance rather than high technology, boding well for their ability to keep doing so on their own.
In the words of more than one U.S. officer we spoke with, these Afghan forces “fight a lot better than Iraqis.” The special forces are widely seen as very good.
Regular army forces have further to go but are getting much better. For example, when a battalion in the Zhary/Panjway/Maiwand region in the western part of Kandahar province was under attack recently, the local Afghan corps commander quickly sent reinforcements from another battalion, in a sign of growing operational responsiveness, flexibility and savvy. And when a group of Afghan Local Police — sort of an armed neighborhood watch program now thriving in the area — came under attack by a large group of Taliban a few weeks ago, the Afghan army came quickly to their aid without phoning ISAF for help.
In an effort to foster self-reliance, ISAF no longer supplies Afghan forces logistically, even though it could do so. Afghan logistical systems have a long ways to go to operate efficiently, but they are making headway.
Insider attacks, by Afghan security force personnel or imposters against ISAF troops or Afghan soldiers and police, have declined by half or so in recent months as Afghans have accepted much more responsibility for vetting and monitoring their own ranks.
A new unit rotation policy instituted by Afghan army leadership has reduced AWOL rates in Kandahar to the lowest in the nation, despite the heavy fighting that troops here must still do.
According to Maj. Gen. Abe Abrams, the NATO regional commander, Afghan forces are getting much better at clearing operations of late — finding hidden weapons caches “better than we can,” for example. And according to several staff sergeants with whom we spoke, while the Afghans do not always train or fight hard when ISAF forces take charge, they actually do better when in the lead themselves, responding well to the challenge.

We are far from out of the woods in Afghanistan, of course. Even leaving aside all the problems in Kabul of late, the progress in the south (and the east) is still fragile. Afghans will have to protect roads and clear bombs without all of our high-tech assets that presently help them do so. They will have to master their logistics systems to keep fielded forces provisioned and supported. They will have to keep their political and tribal rivalries in check even as NATO forces end their current mission in 2014 — the very same year that Afghan presidential elections will create considerable additional uncertainty about the country’s future. Local government will have to deliver services to areas that are becoming more peaceful. And Afghans will have to continue to cope with malevolent elements in Pakistan just across the border.

But make no mistake about it, Kandahar right now is much improved, and continuing to head in the right direction. And so are the Afghan national security forces. This good news has not been reported much, but it should be factored into our assessments of where Afghanistan is headed and our approach to the country through 2014 and beyond.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Michèle Flournoy

Publication: POLITICO

China Buys into Afghanistan

Erica S. Downs — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This paper first appeared in the SAIS Review, Volume XXXII, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2012), pages 65-84.

This article examines three elements of the popular narrative of China’s involvement in the development of Afghanistan’s vast natural resource wealth. It argues that Chinese companies invested in Afghanistan’s minerals and energy in the pursuit of their own corporate interests rather than at the direction of a Chinese government concerned about resource security. To be sure, the Chinese firms did have a leg up on their Western competitors by virtue of their state ownership. However, the infrastructure packages they offered as part of their bids are consistent with a shift in the global mining industry away from enclave private sector developments and towards leveraging mineral development to benefit the broader economy, which is being driven largely by Chinese companies. Finally, while it is fair to say that China is free-riding on the U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan because Chinese companies are benefitting from a public good to which China has not contributed, the mining and energy investments made by Chinese companies could well end up advancing U.S. goals.

Many discussions of China’s involvement in Afghanistan begin with the investments made by Chinese firms to extract Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth, which is valued at about $1 trillion by the United States Geological Survey and $3 trillion by Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines.1 In 2007, Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL) agreed to make the single largest foreign investment in Afghanistan to date—$4.4 billion—when they won a tender to develop what geologists believe is the world’s second largest undeveloped copper deposit at Aynak in Logar Province, 35 kilometers southeast of Kabul.2 In 2011, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its Afghan partner, Watan Oil & Gas, secured the rights to three oil blocks in the provinces of Sari-i-Pul and Faryab in northwestern Afghanistan, which CNPC expects to
invest $400 million initially to develop.

These investments gave rise to the contention that China is free-riding on the U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan to lock down natural resources needed to fuel China’s continued economic development. Specifically, critics argue that China is benefiting from a public good provided by the United States and its partners in Afghanistan—security—to which it has not contributed. China has not offered any troops, equipment, or funds to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Yet, ISAF has made Afghanistan safe for Chinese investment. China’s state-owned energy and mining companies won Afghanistan’s first major mineral and energy tenders. Moreover, they did so by offering generous terms, including infrastructure development packages, which their Western competitors were unable to match. To add insult to injury, as the narrative goes, U.S. troops are indirectly providing security for the Chinese companies by patrolling the areas in which they operate.

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Authors

Erica S. Downs

Publication: SAIS Review

The Strategy For Afghanistan

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As he prepares to give his fourth State of the Union address, President Barack Obama is expected to focus on numerous matters of domestic policy. Whatever brief mention he may make of foreign affairs will probably focus largely on celebrating a gradual end to the nation’s wars. Taking this narrative further, many now speculate that the president may use his speech to announce an accelerated troop drawdown from Afghanistan and a plan for a minimalist presence after the current NATO mission there ends next year.

This storyline is partly right but also partly wrong. It forgets how presidents tend to view foreign policy, especially in their second terms as they start to look to the history books. It also forgets just how much the Afghanistan campaign is now Obama’s. Robert Gates, Adm. Mike Mullen, David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, Gen. John Allen, Hillary Clinton, Ryan Crocker, Richard Holbrooke — all these figures have come and gone, with Leon Panetta likely to do so soon too. Yes, Osama bin Laden is now dead, and the remaining global terrorist threat has migrated somewhat back toward the Middle East and North Africa as well. But Afghanistan remains Al Qaeda’s original preferred sanctuary, and South Asia more generally remains one of the most terrorist-prone and nuclear-armed parts of the planet. The president has been intent on avoiding a quagmire in Afghanistan. But those who would go to the other extreme and argue that it no longer really matters almost surely do not have the president’s ear.

Beginning with the State of the Union address, and then continuing through a major policy review with his new secretaries of state and defense and new field commander, as well as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and international partners, Obama needs to lay out a clear strategy for Afghanistan for the months and years ahead. The current debate is far too fixated on the narrow military question of figuring out what America’s long-term presence should be in Afghanistan after 2014. The president needs to broaden his administration’s prism on the problem. Four particular ideas should influence him in the process.

1. This year’s force levels should stay near current levels of about 65,000 Americans through the 2013 fighting season. It is already getting late to plan a big drawdown for this winter — and it is pointless to do the drawdown in spring or summer during the peak of the fighting season. Having pulled more than 30,000 U.S. forces out of the country starting in late 2011, the president should now be patient with what happens over the next eight months. By fall, substantial U.S. troop reductions will be feasible, as Afghan forces will have assumed primary security responsibility throughout the country. But in the meantime, we should go slow, and give the new Afghanistan field commander, Gen. Joe Dunford, time to deepen and consolidate progress in the country’s crucial eastern regions in particular.

2. After 2014, when the International Security Assistance Force mission ends in Afghanistan, we should plan on a bridging mission to the U.S. forces. Reportedly, former ISAF commander Gen. John Allen favored keeping up to 20,000 Americans in the country after 2014 while the White House pushed for fewer than 10,000. The right answer is a compromise — starting closer to Allen’s 20,000 in 2015 but moving toward 10,000 over the next two to three years, as Afghans acquire the logistics, air power, helicopters, artillery fires and other key secondary capabilities that will take a few more years to develop.

3. Obama should ask Congress to become more of a full partner in the Afghanistan mission. The key point here is that Afghanistan needs stronger checks and balances, stronger political parties and less dominance by the president of the country. When members of Congress visit Afghanistan, they should therefore ask for more meetings with Afghan parliamentarians and governors. Congress should also channel more funds to Afghan political parties and encourage Afghanistan’s parliament to create research organizations modeled after the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service that can provide it greater heft in developing legislation.

4. Working with Afghans and Pakistanis, we need to develop a clearer sense of what reconciliation with elements of the Taliban could involve. For too long, we have oscillated between signaling that a peace deal is our only way out of the war with honor — essentially telling our enemy that we are desperate for his help — and getting bogged down over the technicalities of small prisoner exchanges designed to kick-start a negotiation process that has remained dead in the water.

One way to give a new boost to reconciliation is to seek out insurgent commanders who are willing to stop fighting in exchange for positions in district-level or provincial-level government. Associated insurgent militias could be allowed to keep their light weapons if they stopped fighting and swore allegiance to the government. Such arrangements would be fine on a small scale, as long as the individual militias were small, and as long as they had to give up any heavier weaponry like mortars they might possess. That way, they could always be disciplined by Kabul (with its increasingly capable 350,000-strong security forces) in an extreme case. Funds for local economic activities could be used as leverage as well. This pocketbook approach to enforcing respect for central authority is of course a time-honored Afghan method. Such militias would have to be registered with the state, and biometric indicators used to register individual members, so that their behavior could be tracked. Over time, these militias should be increasingly integrated within normal state security forces.

Not all of these ideas need to be in the State of the Union, of course. But the Afghanistan War is too important--to this country's security, to the president's legacy, to the memories and honor of those fellow Americans who have sacrificed so much there--for us to just limp out of the place over the next two years. We can and must do better.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Politico

Image Source: © Andrew Burton / Reuters

A Record Of Progress: How Afghanistan Improved Under Gen. John Allen

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Sun, 10 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Gen. John R. Allen steps down as commander of NATO forces in Kabul this weekend, several accomplishments merit mention. A man who was unfairly tainted by the Jill Kelley e-mail scandal deserves praise for a remarkable 19-month tenure that brought stability and steady progress to the mission in Afghanistan. Even more important, a fair reckoning of Allen’s tenure should give hope to those depressed about the war effort, as well as giving pause to those who would reduce our current forces too quickly out of frustration or fatalism. Consider:

Afghan security forces are reaching their intended size. The path to achieving the targets was established under previous commanders, Gens. Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, as well as the three-star heads of the NATO training command in Kabul, William Caldwell and Daniel Bolger, but Allen has seen it through. That said, Afghan forces still lack some crucial enablers in air power and air transport, artillery and logistics that may require the United States to have a larger “bridging” force in 2015 and 2016 than some would now advocate. And it will be important not to prematurely cut that 350,000-strong Afghan force by 100,000 or more troops, as some in Washington have favored.
Afghan forces lead most operations. When Allen arrived in the summer of 2011, these forces led perhaps a third of all missions — generally the easier ones, in the safer places. Today, they lead 85 percent of all operations and have primary responsibility for security in about three-fourths of the country. Their casualty figures prove their willingness to sacrifice, with about 2,000 losing their lives annually. Those casualty numbers also indicate, unfortunately, that the enemy remains resilient. But the enemy is not winning.
In southern Afghanistan, NATO forces were downsized substantially on Allen’s watch, and total U.S. forces in Afghanistan declined from 100,000 to 68,000 over the past 15 months. Security conditions have not deteriorated. Of course, the larger test comes under Allen’s successor, Gen. Joseph Dunford, a fellow Marine who must oversee a much larger drawdown by the time the international mission is replaced in late 2014 by a much more modest effort. But the reduction in enemy attacks and civilian casualty rates — some 20 percent to 40 percent in Kandahar and Helmand provinces — achieved since around 2010 is holding even as the number of U.S. troops has declined by tens of thousands.
Insider attacks, while still a huge worry, appear to be lessening. This plague preoccupied Allen during much of his tenure, with dozens of U.S. and NATO forces (and comparable numbers of loyal Afghan forces) lost to Taliban recruits, mentally unstable individuals or simple criminals. Through improved vetting procedures, worked out with Afghan authorities, the rates of “green-on-blue” killings have fallen by perhaps half in recent months.
Although largely an accomplishment of Afghans themselves, encouraged by the international diplomatic corps, Allen helped Afghanistan stay on track to presidential elections in April 2014. His successor will, again, have the larger chore, but Allen deserves credit for keeping things on course when some were calling for President Hamid Karzai to seek a third term or expected him to anoint one of his brothers for the job. A legitimate, democratic leadership change is crucial for Afghanistan’s future.
Because of all this, and Afghanistan’s generally stable, if not peaceful, security environment, fears of an incipient civil war have not greatly intensified in the past two years. That could, of course, still change. But the military progress has helped open up space for political progress. Afghans who began conversations with worries of civil conflict a year or two ago often raise other issues now; that counts as a step forward in the land of the Hindu Kush. In recent days Afghan and Pakistani leaders have even talked about cooperating in peace talks with the Taliban — also a promising sign, as the two governments have often been at extreme odds over the past few years.
While Afghanistan is still plagued by corruption, NATO has gotten much better, under Allen’s leadership, at reducing its contribution to this problem. NATO outsourcing of security and logistics contracts to Afghan companies has improved, and dozens of contracts have been redirected after they were found to have involved corrupt or violent Afghan groups.
None of this, of course, allows a definitive prediction of success. But Afghanistan, the United States and our allies are in a much better place than many appreciate because of Allen’s leadership during America’s longest war; the remarkable warriors who served under him; and all the diplomats, development experts and other dedicated public servants who have continued the war effort while most of the rest of us have preferred to move on to other things.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Mohammad Ismail / Reuters

Hagel Defense Nomination Will Pass

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 30 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Chuck Hagel's confirmation hearings as secretary of Defense starting today promise to be the most riveting of any of President Obama's second-term nominations. The former GOP senator from Nebraska and Vietnam War veteran will surely come under fire from some committee members over his provocative views on a variety of areas.

Whether a contrarian-type thinker like Hagel can be highly effective at the Pentagon is partly a matter of timing. For a new administration, needing a steady and cautious hand on the tiller, it might not be best.

But now that President Obama is in his second term, he knows his own mind on many matters, and John Kerry, as secretary of State, represents a careful and pragmatic voice on foreign policy, too. So Hagel's willingness to challenge others' assumptions might not be so undesirable. Indeed, on some issues, it could be productive.

Much of the controversy over Hagel has concerned his views on key countries such as Israel, Iran and Iraq. Here's what he has said and why it should not derail his confirmation:

On Israel, Hagel has criticized aspects of Israeli policy, including its reticence in engaging with Palestinians. In 2006, he said, "Our relationship with Israel is a special and historic one. But it need not and cannot be at the expense of our Arab and Muslim relationships." Many others in the foreign policy community have expressed similar concerns. It is highly doubtful that Hagel will express any hesitancy about helping Israel defend itself.

On Iraq, Hagel called the 2007 U.S. troop surge "the most dangerous foreign policy blunder ... since Vietnam." But even some of us who came to defend that policy strongly had initial doubt. In any event, U.S. troops are now home from Iraq.

On Iran, the nominee has expressed doubts over possible U.S. airstrikes even as Tehran continues its march toward a nuclear weapons capability. But the president has declared repeatedly his firm view that Iran must not be allowed a nuclear weapon.

In this regard, Hagel's skepticism about a hard line could be a welcome antidote to a strong consensus leaning toward the use of force in coming months, a decision that would be fraught with danger.

On Afghanistan, it is important that Hagel show an openmindedness about our policy. He has been a skeptic, but that is OK as long as Hagel understands where we are in the campaign plan, and recommends any major changes with utmost care.

Much progress has been made, and Afghans have been counting on a gradual and careful U.S. transition out of the combat mission. Without delicate handling, the Afghan army and police could collapse, and next year's Afghan presidential elections could deteriorate into a sectarian and tribal competition. That would risk future stability and increase the likelihood of an al-Qaeda return.

The U.S. defense budget is the biggest issue of all for Hagel. If confirmed, he will step into a situation where, failing new congressional action, the Pentagon will have to eliminate almost 10% in its current year budget under the automatic spending cuts due March 1.

Hagel has said that the Defense Department "in many ways has been bloated. ... I think the Pentagon needs to be pared down." Yet one round of defense cuts has already been agreed upon. The cuts are somewhere between $350 billion and $487 billion over the next 10 years, as part of the deal worked out between Obama and Congress back in 2011.

But on March 1, if no further action happens, another $500 billion will be taken out of its 10-year plan. These cuts are in addition to the more dramatic reductions in war costs underway. Some have noted that annual defense spending would still slightly exceed the Cold War average even after such reductions. But the automatic cuts are not wise, and I hope Hagel will say so.

To be sure, additional Pentagon budget cuts of $100 billion to $200 billion over the next decade are feasible as part of a broader deficit deal. But I see no way to make $500 billion more in cuts without undermining our defense strategy.

Hagel can bring some fresh thinking to the budget process, and if he shows flexibility with some of his past views during the hearings, there's no reason he won't win confirmation.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: USA Today

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Big Bets and Black Swans: Foreign Policy Challenges for President Obama’s Second Term

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

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Chaos in Kabul

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A security meltdown in Afghanistan would severely compromise America’s ability to pursue its interests in the region, leaving the United States with few policy options. Vanda Felbab-Brown drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What actions will the U.S. have to take to ensure stability in a post-2014 Afghanistan?
What can the U.S. do to end corruption and strengthen accountability and rule of law in Afghanistan?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Vanda Felbab-Brown

As the 2014 transition to a radically diminished U.S. presence and mission in Afghanistan approaches, it is likely to leave in its wake a perilous security situation, a political system few Afghans see as legitimate, and a likely severe economic downturn. Although a serious security deterioration, including the possibility of a civil war that many Afghans fear, is far from inevitable, it is a real possibility. Such a security meltdown would severely compromise American ability to prosecute U.S. interests in the region, leaving the United States with few policy options.

Recommendations:

Even though U.S. leverage in Afghanistan diminishes daily, U.S. decisions still critically affect Afghanistan’s future. The United States can still take important steps to minimize the chances of a critical security meltdown in Afghanistan after 2014:

• Withdrawing in an orderly fashion at a judicious pace that does not step ahead of Afghanistan’s security capacities;

• Continuing to provide security assistance, such as training, combat support, and specialty enablers after 2014, and restraining the splintering of the Afghan National Army;

• Defining negotiations with the Taliban as a broader societal reconciliation process that entangles equally the Taliban and the Afghan government in rule-of-law constraints and pluralistic processes, rather than as close-to-the-vest powerbroker bargaining and a fig leaf for U.S. departure;

• Elevating the emphasis on good governance on par with security, supporting political reformers, and not consistently compromising good governance for the sake of short-term military exigencies — without greater legitimacy for the Afghan government, there is little chance for stability in Afghanistan;

• Avoiding a premature embrace of abusive Afghan powerbrokers, many of whom are currently favored by the United States — the United States may have to rely on them eventually to help protect U.S. interests including counterterrorism operations, but that does not mean that it should embrace them today.

Background:

In the military surge areas of Helmand and Kandahar, there have been palpable security gains. How robust they are remains to be seen. In the east, where the Haqqanis operate close to Pakistani safe-havens, the war is stalemated. Parts of the north, such as Balkh, are very stable, but bitter ethnic tensions are brewing in Kunduz and Baghlan and elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have improved, but cannot yet function without international enablers. Patronage networks pervade the ANSF, and a crucial question is whether the forces will splinter along ethnic and patronage lines post-2014.

Since 2009, U.S. aid has flooded into Helmand and Kandahar but instead of bringing sustainable development, it distorted local economies and triggered contestation over the spoils. Turning off this spigot is no loss. But U.S. departure will produce a massive economic constriction in Afghanistan.

Corruption, serious crime, land theft and other usurpation of resources, nepotism, a lack of rule of law, and exclusionary patronage networks permeate Afghanistan’s current political dispensation. Afghans crave accountability and justice and resent the current mafia-like rule. Improved human security plus leadership accountability are their unfulfilled aspirations. Whether the 2014 elections will usher in better governance or trigger violent conflict is another huge question mark.

U.S. Interests after 2014:

The United States will continue to have important interests in Afghanistan’s stability, including countering terrorism. The Taliban may have soured on al Qaeda, but a full break with al Qaeda generates costs — with respect to maintaining internal unity and provoking attacks by the now-betrayed salafi brethren. Whether the Haqqanis would obey the Taliban or pick al Qaeda is also a question mark. Should the Taliban, through fighting or a negotiated deal, come to control parts of Afghanistan, at best the Taliban will attempt to appease both the salafists and the United States.

Prosecuting U.S. counterterrorism interests from the air depends on local bases and human intelligence. Many powerbrokers and informants cultivated by the United States will have an incentive to hedge and minimize intelligence flows to those serving their, not necessarily U.S., interests.

Should a Pakistani nuclear weapon or some fissile material be acquired by a terrorist group, a usable Afghan military base would be highly advantageous for the U.S. ability to recover them.

An unstable Afghanistan will be like an ulcer bleeding into Pakistan. It will further distract Pakistan’s leaders from tackling the country’s internal security, economic, energy, and social crises, and the radicalization of Pakistani society. These trends adversely affect U.S. interests.

An unstable Afghanistan will also worsen overall security in the broader region, destabilizing Central Asia as well. Iran, Russia, India, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries, and perhaps even China will be at least indirectly drawn into the Afghanistan conflict and cultivate proxies.

Scenarios of a Security Meltdown and U.S. Policy Options:

A major security collapse in Afghanistan will in the initial phases likely resemble the early 1990s pattern of localized and fragmented ethnic and local-powerbroker infighting with pockets of stability, rather than the late 1990s when a Taliban-advancing line of control moved steadily north. The extent of violence and fragmentation will depend on whether the ANSF, particularly the Afghan Army, splinters. Even then, a rump ANSF and the Afghan government may have enough strength to hold Kabul, major cities, and other parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban will control parts of the south and east. Elsewhere infighting may be among members of a resurrected Northern Alliance or among Durrani Pashtun powerbrokers. But ethnic fighting may eventually explode even on the streets of Kabul where Pashtuns harbor resentments about the post-2001 influx of Tajiks that changed land distribution in the capital.

Options available to protect U.S. interests will depend on whether a U.S.- Afghan Status-of-Forces agreement (SOFA) has been signed and the United States has military forces and bases in Afghanistan. In the absence of a SOFA and bases, the United States will be dependent on indirectly supporting selected warlords.

If the United States retains bases and forces in Afghanistan, you will face the following choices:

• Should the United States fly sorties and for what purposes? Against al-Qaeda only or more broadly against the Taliban? Should the United States extend assistance to the Afghan government? Any attacks on U.S. bases will generate pressures for either U.S. ground operations or a full troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

• Should the United States support certain battlefield objectives — for example, avoiding the fall of Kabul or supporting a de-facto partition of Afghanistan north of Kabul? Through what military means — the use of air power only or special operations forces assistance, or other ground-combat support as well?

• Assuming the most important U.S. interest in the region is that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are not acquired by a salafi group, and that having a land reach into Pakistan is important, could Afghan authorities ever consent to the United States having access to Afghan bases only for strikes into Pakistan? Pakistan would of course do all it could to subvert any such arrangement.

Regardless of whether the United States retains bases and directly engages in Afghanistan’s conflict or not, it will also face the following policy questions:

• How should the United States react to any effort by Northern Alliance members to provide safe havens to Baluchi insurgents to retaliate for Pakistan’s support for the Taliban? Pakistan will be determined to ensure that the northerners cannot complicate Pakistan’s security interests and Taliban control in southern Afghanistan. If Pakistan intensifies its support for the Taliban and the United States seeks to limit the Taliban’s control, U.S.-Pakistan military encounters could increase.

• Should the United States acquiesce in or encourage greater Indian security involvement in Afghanistan to minimize Taliban and salafi presence? Pakistan will see such Indian presence as extremely threatening, a development complicating U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Conclusion:

A direct U.S. military engagement, even if limited to air strikes or special forces operations, will entangle the United States in prolonged conflict that, at best, may disrupt al Qaeda presence or Taliban control. Maintaining domestic support for such a U.S. role will be difficult. None of the direct limited or indirect engagement policy alternatives will easily result in stable territorial boundaries and an end to the conflict. U.S. ability to secure its interests would be decidedly poor. Doing all your administration can before 2014 to strengthen Afghanistan’s security and the legitimacy of the Afghan government to avert a major meltdown is by far the best policy.

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Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Karzai and Obama Meet in Washington: What Does the Future Hold?

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Thu, 10 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai begins the last leg of his presidency and President Barack Obama embarks on his second term, the two leaders will meet in Washington this week, for talks about the future of Afghanistan and the NATO mission there. With the U.S. troop drawdown and a presidential election both slated for next year, key decisions regarding Afghanistan can’t be rushed and both presidents should bear that in mind notes Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon.

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Karzai and Obama Meet in Washington: What Does the Future Hold?

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Don't Rush Out of Afghanistan

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 09 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

With Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his top advisers visiting Washington this week, huge questions about the future of the NATO mission there consume Afghan and American minds. How fast can we draw down our current total of 68,000 U.S. troops (and another 30,000 or so from other outside countries) before the mission formally concludes at the end of next year? And how many forces do we have to keep in Afghanistan afterward? These questions come on top of other decisions we have been making lately, about the long-term size of the Afghan army and police and about foreign aid levels the international community will provide to Afghanistan for many years.

We should slow this process down. It is important that Afghans — and other interested parties in places like Pakistan — see evidence of a long-term partnership between the outside world and our Afghan friends. That much is true. So some clarity about long-term plans is useful. But we cannot and should not try to answer all questions now.

Making specific, long-term plans is unrealistic for two main reasons. First, we cannot foresee battlefield conditions in Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond. Second, we cannot foresee who will win the Afghan presidential elections next year and what kind of partner the new president will become for the international community.

This rush to decide everything prematurely has already had some unfortunate consequences. In our efforts to be sure that future Afghan security forces get enough outside aid after 2014 to function effectively, we have already begun to assume that they must downsize by one-third — after we just spent half a decade building them up. Moreover, NATO will have pulled out most of its own remaining forces by that point, making it even harder for Afghans to also scale back drastically. It is in fact doubtful that such downsizing of the Afghan army and police should occur so soon.

Read the full article »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Baltimore Sun

Karzai Visit a Time for Tough Talk on Security, Corruption

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is meeting this week with President Obama in Washington amid increasing ambivalence in the United States about what to do about the war in Afghanistan.

Americans are tired of the war. Too much blood and treasure has been spent. The White House is grappling with troop numbers for 2013 and with the nature and scope of any U.S. mission after 2014. With the persisting corruption and poor governance of the Afghan government and Karzai's fear that the United States is preparing to abandon him, the relationship between Kabul and Washington has steadily deteriorated.

As the United States radically reduces its mission in Afghanistan, it will leave behind a stalled and perilous security situation and a likely severe economic downturn. Many Afghans expect a collapse into civil war, and few see their political system as legitimate.

Karzai and Obama face thorny issues such as the stalled negotiations with the Taliban. Recently, Kabul has persuaded Pakistan to release some Taliban prisoners to jump-start the negotiations, relegating the United States to the back seat. Much to the displeasure of the International Security Assistance Force, the Afghan government also plans to release several hundred Taliban-linked prisoners, although any real momentum in the negotiations is yet to take place.

Washington needs to be careful that negotiations are structured in a way that enhances Afghanistan's stability and is not merely a fig leaf for U.S. and NATO troop departure. Countering terrorism will be an important U.S. interest after 2014. The Taliban may have soured on al Qaeda, but fully breaking with the terror group is not in the Taliban's best interest. If negotiations give the insurgents de facto control of parts of the country, the Taliban will at best play it both ways: with the jihadists and with the United States.

Negotiations of a status-of-forces agreement after 2014 will also be on the table between Karzai and Obama. Immunity of U.S. soldiers from Afghan prosecution and control over detainees previously have been major sticking points, and any Afghan release of Taliban-linked prisoners will complicate that discussion.

Karzai has seemed determined to secure commitments from Washington to deliver military enablers until Afghan support forces have built up. The Afghan National Security Forces have improved but cannot function without international enablers -- in areas such as air support, medevac, intelligence and logistical assets and maintenance -- for several years to come. But Washington has signaled that it is contemplating very small troop levels after 2014, as low as 3,000. Their mission would most likely be limited to counterterrorism efforts.

Everyone is hedging their bets in light of the transition uncertainties and the real possibility of a major security meltdown after 2014. Afghan army commanders are leaking intelligence and weapons to insurgents; Afghan families are sending one son to join the army, one to the Taliban and one to the local warlord's militia.

Patronage networks pervade the Afghan forces, and a crucial question is whether they can avoid splintering along ethnic and patronage lines after 2014. If security forces do fall apart, the chances of Taliban control of large portions of the country and a civil war are much greater. Obama can use the summit to announce concrete measures -- such as providing enablers -- to demonstrate U.S. commitment to heading off a security meltdown. The United States and international security forces also need to strongly focus on countering the rifts within the Afghan army.

Assisting the Afghan army after 2014 is important. But even with better security, it is doubtful that Afghanistan can be stable without improvements in its government.

Afghanistan's political system is preoccupied with the 2014 elections. Corruption, serious crime, land theft and other usurpation of resources, nepotism, a lack of rule of law and exclusionary patronage networks afflict governance. Afghans crave accountability and justice and resent the current mafia-like rule. Whether the 2014 elections will usher in better leaders or trigger violent conflict is another huge question mark.

Emphasizing good governance, not sacrificing it to short-term military expediencies by embracing thuggish government officials, is as important as leaving Afghanistan in a measured and unrushed way -- one that doesn't jeopardize the fledgling institutional and security capacity that the country has managed to build up.

Karzai has been deaf and blind to the reality that reducing corruption, improving governance and allowing for a more pluralistic political system are essential for Afghanistan's stability. His visit provides an opportunity to deliver the message again -- and strongly.

Authors

Vanda Felbab-Brown

Publication: CNN

Battle for the Soul of Pakistan

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 16:28:00 -0500

2013 will be a pivotal year in Pakistani history. National elections, turnover at the top military position and the denouement in the war in Afghanistan; all promise to make it a critical year for a country that is both, under siege by terrorism and the center of the global jihadist movement. The changes in Pakistan are unlikely to come peacefully and will have major implications for India and America. The stakes are huge in the most dangerous country in the world.

Pakistan is a country in the midst of a long and painful crisis. According to the government, since 2001 45,000 Pakistanis have died in terrorism related violence, including 7,000 security personnel. Suicide bombings were unheard of before 9/11; there have been 300 since then. The country's biggest city, Karachi, is a battlefield.

One measure of Pakistan's instability is that the country now has between 300 and 500 private security firms, employing 3,00,000 armed guards, most run by ex-generals. The American intelligence community's new global estimate rates Pakistan among the most likely states in the world to fail by 2030.

Pakistan also remains a state sponsor of terror. Three of the five most-wanted on America's counter-terrorism list live in Pakistan. The mastermind of the Mumbai massacre and head of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafeez Saeed, makes no effort to hide. He is feted by the army and the political elite, appears on television and calls for the destruction of India frequently and jihad against America and Israel.

The head of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar, shuttles between ISI safe houses in Quetta and Karachi. The Amir of Al Qaeda, Ayman Zawahiri, is probably hiding in a villa not much different than the one his predecessor was living in, with his wives and children, in Abbottabad until May 2011.

Pakistan also has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world, bigger than Great Britain's. The nukes are in the hands of the generals, the civilian government only has nominal control. President Asif Ali Zardari has only nominal influence over the ISI as well; indeed it has conspired for five years to get rid of him.

Against the odds, Zardari has survived.

By next fall, he will have served five years, becoming the first elected civilian leader to complete a full term in office and pass power to another elected government. It will be a major milestone for Pakistani democracy. He has served years in prison and lost his wife to the terrorists who besiege the nation. He has often been called a criminal by many, including his own family, and the national symbol of corruption.

Yet, as president, he presided over a major transfer of power from the Presidency to the Prime Minister's Office, even the titular national command authority over the nukes, to ensure the country is more democratic and stable.

The parliamentary election in the spring will be a replay of every Pakistani election since 1988, pitting Nawaz Sharif's PML against the late Benazir Bhutto's PPP. Needless to say, many Pakistanis are sick of the same stale choices. But the odds favour the old parties. Both Sharif and Zardari are committed to cautiously improving relations with India, keeping open ties with America and trying to reform the Pakistani economy. Both will have troubled relations with the Army.

The Economist has tagged Sharif as likely to do best. If he returns to the Prime Minister's job for a third time, it will be a remarkable turn in his own odyssey.

Sharif was removed from the office in 1999 in an illegal coup and barely escaped alive, to go into exile in Saudi Arabia. His decision to withdraw Pakistan's troops behind the LOC, during the Kargil war, prompted his fall from power; it also may have saved the world from nuclear destruction. It was a brave move. I remember talking to him and his family in the White House the day after he made the decision to pull back, you could see in his eyes that he knew Musharraf would defame him; but he knew he was in the right.

But many Pakistanis want a new face to lead their country. Out of desperation some are turning to Imran Khan to save Pakistan. The ISI is probably helping his campaign behind the scenes to stir up trouble for the others. He is a long shot at best. He is much more anti-American, anti-drone and ready to make deals with the Taliban, to stop the terror at home. Yet, he understands well that Pakistan is a country urgently in need of new thinking.

Whoever wins will inherit an economy and government that is in deep trouble. Two-thirds of 185 million Pakistanis are under 30, and 40 million of the 70 million 5 to 19 years old are not in school. The youth bulge has yet to spike. Less than one million Pakistanis paid taxes last year. Most politicians don't pay any taxes. Power blackouts are endemic. Clean water is increasingly scarce even as catastrophic floods are more common. Growth is 3%, too little to keep up with population demand.

So, it is no wonder that the generals prefer to have the civilians responsible for managing the unmanageable, while they guard their prerogatives and decide national security issues. As important as the coming elections will be, the far more important issue is who will be the next Chief of Army Staff.

The incumbent General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was given an unprecedented three-year extension in 2010. He is the epitome of the Pakistani officer corps and the so-called 'deep state'. Pervez Musharraf made him Director General of the ISI in 2004. It was on his watch that the Afghan Taliban recovered and regrouped in Quetta, Osama bin Laden built his hideout 800 yards outside Kayani's alma mater the Kakul Military Academy in Abbottabad in 2005, and planning began for the Lashkar-e-Taiba attack on Mumbai. He was DG/ISI when David Headley, the American serving life for his role in the 2008 attack, began his reconnaissance trips to Mumbai to prepare the way for 26/11. Kayani probably authorized the funds for Headley's cover and travel. He is the first DG/ISI to become COAS. His term expires in September, 2013.

The history of civilians choosing Chiefs of Army Staff in Pakistan is not encouraging.

Ayub Khan used the post to become Pakistan's first military dictator in 1958. Zulfikar Bhutto chose Zia ul Haq, who he called his 'monkey general' because he thought he was apolitical. Zia staged his own coup and then hung Zulfi. Nawaz Sharif picked Musharraf, quarrelled over Kargil and fired Pervez, who then staged his coup. No wonder Zardari just rolled over Kayani for another three years in 2010. It was the easy way out.

The next COAS will come from the shadowy group of a dozen corps commanders who run the army. They do not advertise their political views as a rule. By next summer, a consensus will probably emerge in the inner circle on who should replace Kayani and the whole world will try to decipher the implications of the choice.

The White House, CIA and Pentagon will be especially alert.

America's relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically during President Obama's first term. Despite Obama and Zardari's efforts to find common ground, the relationship has foundered over Pakistan's proxy support to the Afghan Taliban, its collusion with LeT and other terrorists and the drone war against Al Qaeda in the tribal bad lands. Obama has ordered over 300 lethal drone attacks on Pakistani soil in his first four years in office. There is no reason to believe the drone war will end, even as the NATO mission in Afghanistan transitions to Afghan leadership in 2014.

Of course, Obama also sent the SEALs into Abbottabad in May 2011 without telling any Pakistani that we even suspected that the high-value target number one was hiding in the front yard of the army's top academy. Officially, the United States says there is no evidence, no smoking gun, that Kayani or any other senior official knew bin Laden was in a villa the locals called 'the Waziristan House.' But despite providing over $25 billion in military and economic aid to Pakistan to fight Al Qaeda between September 2001 and May 2011, the President wisely decided he could not trust the Pakistanis.

It is safe to say the trust deficit has not gone away. Senior American officials, like Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director Leon Panetta, shun dealing with Pakistan. Still US aid to Pakistan goes on. The military has received 18 F16 jet fighters, 20 Cobra attack helicopters, 6 C 130 transport aircraft and a Perry class frigate and much more in the last decade alone. Washington tries to encourage partnership, while trying to contain the worst excesses of the ISI and the army.

It is in Afghanistan that the relationship will be tested the most in 2013.

In September 2012, the Taliban attacked a UK base, called Camp Bastion, destroying eight US Marine jet aircraft and killing two Marines. They claimed they wanted to kill Prince Harry who was serving there with the British army. The interrogation of the surviving Taliban fighter indicated the attack was planned at an ISI safe haven in Pakistan, with Pakistani army expertise. Then in December 2012, the head of

Afghan intelligence Asadullah Khalid was almost assassinated by a terrorist, who President Karzai says, came from Pakistan and was sent by an intelligence service, implying it was the ISI. Neither attack shocked the Americans who follow the war.

If Pakistan clearly and unequivocally put its weight behind pushing the Taliban to negotiate, renounce Al Qaeda and enter into a political process with Kabul, the chances are the war might end. After 35 years the guns could fall silent in the Hindukush. Again, the civilians seem to be open to this and Foreign Minister

Hina Khar says all the right things. But it is far from clear that the ISI is on-board for any outcome in Afghanistan, short of a Taliban victory.

Another shock to the relationship could come at any time in the next year and is more likely than not.

The CIA could find Zawahiri's hideout and Obama could send in another SEAL team. A skirmish along the Durand line could get out of hand and create a crisis. Much could and probably will go wrong, and there is little prospect of a positive breakthrough.

Pakistan and America are locked in a deadly embrace for the foreseeable future.

Today, India's economy is eight times larger than Pakistan and by 2030 it will be 16 times larger. But an increasingly prosperous Indian middle class needs a healthy neighbour. A failing state, or worse a jihadist state, makes for a very dangerous neighbourhood. So, New Delhi will also be keenly following the political machinations in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in 2013.

The worst case would be that the dark forces - the jihadist camp and its military allies - launch another mass-casualty attack like Mumbai. They have tried in the last four years. A plot to disrupt the Commonwealth Games in 2010 in New Delhi was disrupted and this year, a senior LeT operative was deported from Saudi Arabia where he was reportedly planning a major terror outrage. The charged atmosphere, of a political year with leadership changes at the top, could encourage extremists to act.

So, Washington and New Delhi need to be vigilant. But they should also be supportive. Pakistan is trying to become a normal state where power is passed, without violence, from one elected leader to another. For decades Pakistan has been plagued by coups and assassinations. The people of Pakistan have been the victims, now more than ever.

2013 could be a transformative year for the country, indeed it will be the battle for the soul of Pakistan.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: India Today

With Karzai, Taking the Good with the Bad in Afghanistan

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Thu, 03 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As he prepares to visit Washington in the coming days, Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai is completing 10 years in office. His relationship with America began with mutual affection and infatuation, and deteriorated gradually over the years, first under President George W. Bush, then even more so during the early part of the Obama administration. But as in a bad marriage that stays together for the kids, both sides have continued to cooperate for the sake of their common interest in building a stable Afghanistan.

As new information continues to surface about corrupt and inept practices in Afghanistan — such as those surrounding the Ponzi scheme of the Kabul Bank, where hundreds of millions of dollars recently disappeared without accountability — American officials will hardly be effusive in their support for the visiting Afghan delegation. But as we seek to make crucial decisions with Karzai over matters such as the pace of American troop drawdowns in the next two years, the long-term presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014, and preparations for Afghanistan’s presidential race in 2014, we would do well to remember Karzai’s strengths as well as his weaknesses. The alternative is to risk a toxic dynamic that may lead to big mistakes on one or both sides, such as an abrupt decision to downsize American forces precipitously in a way that could lead to civil war.

As Karzai completes his second and last full term allowed by the Afghan constitution, we need to encourage him to continue what he has been doing well, and also work to ensure that his nation’s next leader retains the desirable features of his presidency. They are essential to our common interest in preventing the return of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Karzai is not believed to be personally corrupt. This may sound like damning with faint praise, given the number of Karzai associates who are corrupt, and it hardly excuses the Afghan president from tolerating a weak rule of law. But it is nonetheless important; things would be far worse if he were criminal in his own behavior.
Karzai is not a killer. Again, to American ears, this may sound like a minimalist credential, but in a country that has suffered through a generation of warfare, not having blood on one’s own hands is no mean feat. Karzai is not believed to run his own death squads or to resort to extrajudicial actions to silence his enemies. Indeed, Karzai is clearly pained by the amount of violence that goes on within his country. To be sure, he often scapegoats coalition forces for contributing to the violence in a way that is not only inaccurate but insensitive and counterproductive. Yet it appears to be rooted in part in his genuine repulsion at the warfare he sees going on around him.
Karzai is the democratically elected leader. For all the valid concerns about fraud and other abuses that tainted the 2009 presidential elections, there is no doubt that Karzai won, just as he won the 2004 race. And while he was reluctant to allow the runoff in 2009 that was required by law, since no one gained an outright majority vote in the first round, he did ultimately relent — largely thanks to the diplomacy of Sen. John Kerry.
Karzai remains popular with Afghans. Despite the corruption associated with his government by many Afghans, they still feel that Karzai is the legitimate leader of the country, and his personal popularity remains consistently in the 70 percent range.
Karzai respects the constitution and intends to step down in 2014. Of course, there are contingencies that could still occur, but there is currently no reason to think he will seek to extend his time in the palace in Kabul extra-constitutionally. That should be automatic, at one level. But many presidents in young, weak states are tempted to see themselves as the indispensable leader of their nation and, out of ego or self-interest or self-preservation, suspend the rule of law to stay on. Every indication we have from Karzai is that he will not do so. That is crucially important.
Karzai has tried to unite the country ethnically. While he has undoubtedly favored his own family and cronies, he has not governed as a Pashtun chauvinist. In fact, some in Pakistan and elsewhere wrongly accuse him of being a stooge of the Northern Alliance — the largely Tajik group that opposed the Taliban throughout the 1990s and led the fight to depose it in 2001. Karzai’s appointments for Cabinet positions and governorships have been reasonably balanced across ethnic lines. His top peace negotiators with the Taliban have been Tajik, including former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, until he was assassinated, and then Rabbani’s son. In various periods, his foreign and interior ministers have had Tajik roots, his two current vice presidents are Tajik and Hazara, and his minister of mines is Uzbek. The list goes on.

None of this is meant to trivialize the problems we have with Afghanistan’s current government. Karzai’s mistakes are legion and his limits as a leader are evident. But working together, we do in fact have a chance to ensure that the next two years solidify the creation of a modern Afghanistan that survives political transition as well as the departure of most NATO troops and finally starts to move, if slowly and haltingly, toward an ability to run its own affairs. Only by building on what has worked during the Karzai regime, even as we seek to help Afghans improve upon it when Karzai steps down, can this important project achieve its minimal standards of success.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: POLITICO