According to former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” Indeed, as Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku discussed in his Foresight Africa 2020 piece “Good and inclusive governance is imperative for Africa’s future,” without good and inclusive governance, Africa will not achieve its social and economic targets.

Though Africa has made progress toward democracy and good governance (Figure 1), many challenges persist, and reforms are still needed in many countries, argues Mbaku.

Figure 1. Spread of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has stagnated since the mid-2000s

Source: Ordu, A., & Golubski, C. (Eds). (2020). Foresight Africa: Top priorities for the continent in 2020-2030. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Importantly, as Mbaku explores, a lack of democratic reforms and good governance damage a state’s ability to ensure peace and security as well as the economic growth needed to tackle poverty. In other words, he writes, the absence of good governance too often hinders African countries from creating and sustaining peaceful coexistence thus hindering economic growth given that wealth creation and growth are intimately intertwined with peace and security.

He ends with recommendations to successfully bolster good and inclusive governance. More specifically, he states that countries should strive for a governance structure that addresses peaceful coexistence and economic development, inequality, climate change, pandemics, and regional cooperation. To do so, he offers five recommendations:

1. Countries in or recovering from crisis must engage in process-driven constitution-making and produce constitutional principles to inform and guide the drafters while safeguarding against abuses of power.
2. Countries that have a progressive and inclusive constitution undergirded by the separation of powers should engage in national dialogue to help citizens understand and appreciated the importance of the constitution to governance and human rights.
3. With the aid of civil society, all countries should develop and implement education programs that help citizens understand and appreciate the constitution and recognize the law as a tool to resolve conflicts.
4. All administrations should engage in regular dialogue to revisit important governance issues and ensure that governance is inclusive of women and youth.
5. Citizens should be involved in shaping the institutional and legal environments for the transformation of Africa’s governance architecture over the next decade.

      

Global government debt surged to nearly 100 percent of GDP during the global recession of 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a collapse in output and governments provided unprecedented fiscal support. As the global economy recovers and fiscal support is withdrawn, a key question is whether government debt (relative to GDP) will stabilize and start to decrease. In a new study, we answer this question by analyzing the evolution of government debt after previous recessions.

Government debt: often increases after global recessions

Historically, global government debt has increased after every global recession over the past six decades. Between 1960 and 2019, there were four global recessions: 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009. Global government debt rose by a cumulative 4-15 percentage points of GDP over the five years following these global recessions—by 4 percentage points of GDP over 1975-80, 15 percentage points over 1982-87, 9 percentage points over 1991-96, and 4 percentage points over 2009-14 (Figure 1).

Government debt also tended to be higher after recessions in a majority of countries. On average, in the five years after a global recession, two-thirds of countries had the same or higher debt levels. A slightly larger share of advanced economies saw higher levels of debt after recessions than emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), while around three-quarters of low-income countries (LICs) had higher debt after recessions.

Advanced economy debt has seen a consistent jump in the five years after every global recession, with an increase of 3-14 percentage points after the global recessions prior to 2020 (Figure 2). The last three recessions all saw an increase in advanced economy debt of more than 10 percent of GDP.

In contrast, the evolution of government debt in EMDEs has been more erratic (Figure 3). Government debt in EMDEs excluding China saw small declines in the five years after the 1991 and 2009 recessions. For the 1991 recession, debt rose in the immediate aftermath of the recession but then decreased rapidly as growth recovered. While in the 2009 recession government debt saw a modest increase during the recession but stabilized thereafter, as EMDEs were less affected and recovered more rapidly from the global financial crisis than advanced economies.

Regional dimensions: a mixed picture but not for everyone

Regionally, the evolution of government debt after global recessions was more varied. Almost all regions saw an increase in debt following the first two recessions, with particularly large increases in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). EAP and LAC saw an unwinding of this debt in the period after the 1991 recession as debt was reduced, including due to the provision of debt relief (via the issuance of Brady bonds), while debt in SSA rose further as many countries did not receive debt relief until the late 1990s.

Debt was broadly stable in most regions following the 2009 recession, which mainly affected advanced economies. Overall, all regions other than SSA saw at least one global recession episode in which government debt declined. In SSA, however, government debt has increased following each previous recession, and debt only declined during the late 1990s and 2000s as a result of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. SSA has the largest number of LICs, and more than half of LICs are in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.

Hopes and realities: no time for complacency

In the medium term, some expect that global government debt stocks will stabilize at current levels as a result of the post-pandemic rebound in growth and withdrawal of fiscal support measures. The expected stabilization in debt-to-GDP ratios may alleviate some concerns about elevated debt levels at present.

If such a stabilization materialized, however, it would be a significant departure from debt developments in the aftermath of previous recessions, particularly in the case of advanced economies and countries in SSA. Furthermore, forecasts of government debt tend to suffer from optimism bias: actual government debt to GDP ratios have been shown to be about 10 percentage points of GDP higher after five years than initially forecast, on average.

In light of this historical record, and given large financing gaps and significant investment needs, including facilitating the energy transition, a stabilization in debt levels looks optimistic. Even if debt does stabilize, it remains at exceptionally elevated levels by historical standards and may rise if current low interest rates do not persist.

What are the implications of these observations for policymakers? It is critical to avoid complacency among policymakers who may have optimistic views about debt prospects in the near term. Some policymakers in EMDEs may be tempted to rely on growth alone to lower debt while some others hope that low interest rates would help keep debt service manageable. Policymakers should hope for the best but prepare for the worst as a new monetary policy tightening cycle gets underway in advanced economies.

      

Starting in 2010, a new wave of debt accumulation—the “fourth wave” of debt—had been underway in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs, Figure 1). With the sharp increase in debt during the COVID-19 pandemic, the fourth wave of debt has turned into a tsunami and become even more dangerous. The tsunami of debt has amplified the difficulty of resolving debt not just because of record debt levels but also because of significant changes in the structure of debt markets.

Sharp and broad-based increase in debt

In 2020, total global debt rose by 30 percentage points of GDP, to 263 percent of GDP—the largest single-year increase since at least 1970 (Figure 2). This increase was broad-based, evident across government and private debt, domestic and external debt, and the majority of countries. In EMDEs, total debt went over 200 percent of GDP, and in advanced economies, total debt exceeded 300 percent of GDP in 2020.

As output plummeted in the worst global recession since World War II and governments enacted unprecedented fiscal support measures, global government debt registered its fastest single-year jump to roughly 100 percent of GDP, its highest level in half a century. The increase was near-universal. Government debt rose in almost nine-tenths of countries and at its fastest pace in half a century in around one-quarter of countries.

Private debt also rose at a record pace and to an unprecedented high in 2020 as output collapsed, lockdowns closed businesses, and fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy measures supported credit extension. Globally, it jumped by 15 percentage points of GDP to 165 percent of GDP in 2020, its highest level since records started in 1970. Similar to government debt, the jump in private debt was broad-based, affecting more than four-fifths of countries.

The bulk of the increase in total debt in 2020 was accounted for by rising domestic debt. In advanced economies, rising domestic debt accounted for about one-half of the increase in total debt in 2020; in EMDEs, for nine-tenths; and globally for three-fifths. In advanced economies, less than one-half of total debt (and less than one-third of private debt) is domestic whereas, in EMDEs, total debt remains predominantly domestic (85 percent of total debt), especially for private debt, which is nine-tenths domestic. Global external debt also rose by 12 percentage points of GDP in 2020, to 114 percent of GDP in 2020, and, as a result, the stock of external debt at the global level now exceeds its 2010 level, after a decade of decline.

Larger risks

Thanks to exceptional monetary policy support, borrowing costs have fallen to record low levels. Low global interest rates can make additional debt-financed government support seem attractive, especially when growth rates are expected to be above interest rates. However, rapid debt accumulation, triggered by fiscal support measures, still entails significant risks. There is no guarantee that any future economic shock will lower interest rates.

In addition, EMDEs face a risk of sudden stops of capital flows, especially if they have other vulnerabilities like sizeable foreign currency debt, overvalued exchange rates, and financial system fragilities. This is also recognized in sovereign risk ratings: The fraction of EMDEs that experienced sovereign credit downgrades in 2020 was larger than that over the 2010-19 period, whereas in advanced economies it was smaller (Figure 3).

Risks associated with rapid debt accumulation have been magnified because of the likely adverse impact of some policy interventions on policy frameworks. Many governments have heavily encouraged credit extension and eased regulatory policies since the beginning of the pandemic. These necessary measures prevented a credit crunch. However, private sector liabilities could eventually migrate onto government balance sheets, either in a financial crisis or, indirectly, in a protracted period of low growth.

Similarly, unprecedented monetary policy support measures were necessary due to the magnitude of the pandemic shocks. However, these policies may also sow the seeds of solvency problems that may become apparent once global interest rates begin to rise from historically low levels. The sharp increase in debt in a short period and looser fiscal controls also heighten the risk that not all of the debt was used for productive purposes.

New policy challenges

For countries that get into debt distress, achieving a successful resolution may be more difficult than it was in the past. Specifically, future debt restructurings will likely be more complicated because of a more fragmented creditor base than in the past and a lack of transparency in debt reporting. The importance of bilateral non-Paris Club lenders has increased significantly over the past decade (Figure 4). The increasing number of private creditors and range of financial instruments further complicates debt resolution. The growing diversity of creditors and complexity of debt instruments has been associated with greater uncertainty about the level and composition of debt, as not all creditors are bound by a single set of reporting standards and loan terms are often confidential.

In several dimensions, the playing field is currently tilted in favor of creditors and discourages prompt and comprehensive debt resolution. While 91 percent of sovereign bond issuance since 2014 has included collective action clauses that facilitate restructuring, a large legacy stock without such clauses remains: about 50 percent of outstanding international debt does not include collective action clauses. In the past, delays in resolving high debt were associated with weaker output and investment growth, raising the prospect that even slower debt resolution could lead to a lost decade of growth in some countries already facing significant debt problems. In addition to sovereign debt, the rise of private debt, especially during the pandemic, highlights the importance of effective resolution frameworks to mitigate the risk of private debt overhang.

Urgent action needed

The challenges of resolving record-high debt point to the urgency to act on the parts of both national policymakers and the global community. National policymakers will need to improve policy frameworks to make debt sustainable, as well as to consider the best approaches to resolving debt if it becomes unsustainable. The global community needs to act rapidly and forcefully to ensure that this debt tsunami does not end with a string of debt crises in EMDEs, as earlier waves did.

      

By all measures, the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) signed into law last month is a massive, once-in-a-generation outlay. But as history shows, the consequences of such massive federal outlays have been the inequitable distribution of benefits by race as well as the burdens of their resulting projects. Interstate highway construction in the early 1960s, for example, cleaved through predominately Black neighborhoods in Houston, New Orleans, and Nashville, Tenn.

Today, policymakers are acknowledging that racial inequities were built into our public infrastructure, with talk about “reconnecting communities” divided by highways, upgrading harmful and antiquated water and energy services for homes in underserved places, and providing new critical infrastructure systems for all communities’ access. Some federal programs are already integrating equity, such as the Flood Mitigation Assistance program’s vulnerability scores. And on his first day in office, President Joe Biden signed an executive order on racial equity and underserved communities, followed by the “Justice40” executive order, which seeks to deliver 40% of overall benefits from relevant investments to disadvantaged communities.

Ultimately, however, these are administrative rules, not law. So, the question remains: Unlike the massive federal expenditures of the past, does the new infrastructure law cement racial equity into our built environment?

Unfortunately, the IIJA does not radically move the equity conversation down the road. On the whole, it funds business as usual, with continued funding for traditional infrastructure (like highways) that have caused problems before and no explicit references to Justice40. In this piece, we’ll examine seven ways in which equity is not prioritized in the IIJA, and how these potholes could be avoided as program rules and project selections roll out over the next five years.

The importance of ‘naming names’ when it comes to targeted investment

The IIJA primarily adds funds to existing federal programs, most of which rely on past requirements such as environmental reviews and perfunctory community input when it comes to equitable investment in historically disinvested places. In a few cases, the IIJA sets aside specific funding streams for geographic jurisdictions that directly invest in marginalized communities—specifically, tribal lands. New investments are also going to specific places (such as rural communities) that indirectly support certain racial groups simply because of local demographic patterns. And a few place-based funds in the IIJA indirectly address equity; for example, increasing the Superfund and Brownfields remediation programs invariably help those sites’ neighbors, who are typically low-income households or households of color.

Finally, other programs’ funds that are distributed to states already consider disadvantage at the household level, such as the existing home weatherization assistance program and the broadband connectivity assistance. The IIJA’s new “digital equity” funds don’t name racial equity as a goal, but require states to assess broadband gaps that likely reflect race-based disparities. While these set-asides are helpful, they obviously don’t cover all communities in need and don’t address the health, financial, and social burdens that the toxic sites and concentrated disinvestments originally caused.

In the past, the federal government has named names when it comes to disinvested communities, directly providing investment incentives in specific places as recently as the Opportunity Zone program. Naming the people and places in need is a first step in stopping further harms and repairing past ones.

The lack of such targeted and transparent earmarks is the most fundamental oversight in the IIJA. Consequently, committed state governments must now look for every opportunity to identify disinvested communities relevant to each provision’s implementation, starting with programs that are directly controlled by the federal government, such as the Army Corps of Engineers.

States aren’t obligated to use formula funds in disinvested communities

The majority of IIJA funds go to current and new funds that are provided to states through established criteria or formulas. There are about $3 in formula grants to every $1 in discretionary and competitive grants. Ninety percent of the highway fund—the biggest single pot in the IIJA—is given out in formula grants. The formula for the clean water and drinking water revolving funds that received a $23 billion infusion is based on periodic water quality assessment, and the new $15 billion for lead service pipe replacements is similarly apportioned.

States such as California and New York have created definitions for “environmental justice communities” to identify specific geographies (or at least formulas and criteria for geographies) to move pots of their own state monies directly. Yet, even there, there is no clear commitment to funnel IIJA resources as well. There are few or only minimal statutory requirements for prioritizing or considering equity in the projects states select for their apportionment. For example, the new lead service pipe funds specify only that priority be given to assisting disadvantaged communities that are defined by affordability criteria that each state gets to establish itself. Other newly apportioned grants, such as those for broadband infrastructure and electric vehicle charging networks, have similarly ambiguous targets for prioritizing investments and equitably allocating them to communities in need.

Without the sticks of rigorous and explicit statutory requirements on how states can use the funds, states may not even consider equity when selecting their projects—as what happened recently with large block grants in the American Rescue Plan. Consequently, federal agencies will need to monitor states’ project selection and encourage them to prioritize equity-promoting projects and processes.

Competitive grants must be refined with extensive equity requirements

Competitive grants have always proven more flexible for project ideas that respond to specific needs, such as focusing on historically disinvested communities. A handful of the IIJA’s new competitive grant programs are designed with equity in mind; the Reconnecting Communities program, for example, is designed to rectify past harms from highway construction. Programs for “healthy streets,” EV charging grants, and passenger rail corridors note the importance of prioritizing low-income communities. For new funding streams, the program rules are already evolving.

However, most of the bill’s competitive grant programs have surprisingly lukewarm equity statutes, some of which are weaker than what federal agencies are currently proposing. In most cases, the act leaves it to the administering agencies’ “consideration” to determine how much priority to give to equity-driven proposals.

Fortunately, there are many ways to leverage this type of grant to encourage competition in prioritizing disinvested communities. Available grant values or federal shares could increase for proposals with direct community benefits. Proposal review and scoring rubrics should be weighted to prioritize disinvested communities. Requiring authentic community engagement—and evidence of it—in proposal narratives and subsequent awards should be standard. Finally, grant administrators can simply ask proposals to make the case for how disinvested communities will benefit or be directly served.

Safeguards should also be placed against using disinvested communities to leverage other, less needy beneficiaries. The quality of the carrots matter as much as their size.

Build local capacity in disinvested places, including their public and private players

Since the IIJA gives proportionally fewer dollars to competitive grants than entitlements, there is less of an incentive for underperforming jurisdictions to try for competitive grants—especially with additional proposal requirements. In the past, states have passed on these opportunities often in disservice to their own communities.

Low-capacity communities have less wherewithal to develop and propose projects that could be considered for entitlement funding or developed into a proposal for competitive grants. Many county and city governments simply do not have the government administrators that can perform the necessary range of activities, from community engagement through project development and, later, to project administration and reporting. There is also likely to be a dearth of professional talent as many rush to high-capacity jurisdictions with cutting-edge projects. All these factors make it less likely for disinvested communities to be prioritized or for inequitable conditions to be innovatively addressed.

Using program management funds in both formula and competitive programs, federal agencies could provide extensive technical assistance programs targeted at low-capacity communities to help them advance community-driven, technically feasible projects and prepare competitive applications. Most agencies have either existing assistance and guidance staff or operational funds to work with communities on engagement strategies and programming, and can potentially bring in experienced peers from other jurisdictions to support public servants in disinvested communities.

Federal agencies should also get creative about addressing the local professional gaps in these places. Bringing in global experts to help disinvested places—similar to what the Department of Housing and Urban Development did in the Rebuild by Design competition for Hurricane Sandy-damaged communities—could harness expertise with civil sector resources. Finally, administrators could think about using discretionary funding streams to support new and retired engineers to serve as project leads and advocates for communities, ideally from similar backgrounds to those communities.

Economic development should be better integrated with equitable workforce opportunities

Businesses in disadvantaged communities are not neglected in the IIJA, which solidifies the Minority Business Development Agency and establishes several new business center programs, advisory councils, and grants to nonprofits that serve minority businesses. Ensuring that these efforts translate to state and local bidding opportunities will be a critical task, and one that needs almost immediate action as IIJA bids roll out from states.

On the worker development side, however, the IIJA sows fewer seeds of equitable change, aside from commissioning a few studies and advisory boards for identifying ways to include underrepresented groups in transit, transportation, and energy workforces. Federal grantees can create local hiring preferences but are not required to go beyond current statutes and rules, and the tweaks and modest funds to worker training programs generally do not reference opportunities for underserved communities. Finally, most jobs the IIJA creates are subject to prevailing wage requirements and other labor organizing supports, though the relevant unions’ relationships with communities of color have been mixed.

Despite the focus on jobs in the act’s title, there is no guarantee of racial equity in the resulting jobs. Federal agencies should encourage local community benefits agreements for individual projects—particularly competitive grants—as well as showcase examples in which diverse worker programs and procurements combine to produce infrastructure that positively benefits disinvested communities. Existing worker training and apprenticeship funds should also better channel underrepresented people into the jobs that are opening soon.

Equity studies are needed, but we shouldn’t wait to act

The IIJA commissions several studies on the disparate effects of past and newly funded infrastructure projects on neighborhoods of color and low-income communities. Some of these studies are absolutely needed to provide evidence for future policymaking, such as the analysis of small and disadvantaged communities’ clean water.

In many cases, though, there are independent academic inquiries and existing federal data resources that have already given preliminary evidence of disparities. These could be harnessed immediately for action and grant monitoring. Further, federally funded research should also prioritize scholars at historically Black colleges and universities and other researchers of color.

The value of investments must meet the challenge

The biggest equity pothole by far is not within the IIJA itself. It is whether the amount of money meets the need, including the full social and economic costs of past disinvestment as much as the engineering capacity gaps of future infrastructure. Budgets for many of the equity programs in the IIJA were significantly downsized during negotiations.

Ultimately, $1.2 trillion is nothing to sneeze at, and new public investment is welcome after years of disinvestment and neglect. But if we want to ensure prosperity for all in the future, the IIJA is only a down payment on the debt that is owed to communities who have been denied resources. Policymakers at all levels of government will need to work to ensure that equity is cemented into both the projects that are implemented and the process by which that implementation takes place. Equity requires constant building—in this case, literally.

      

In 2021, The Hamilton Project conducted original research and commissioned policy proposals from leading economic thinkers as part of its core mission of promoting opportunity, prosperity, and inclusive economic growth. Given the urgency around responding to the COVID-19 recession and the need to understand in real-time how conditions are changing, The Hamilton Project focused on providing evidence and proposals to support the economic recovery. In this review, we highlight some of the key figures The Hamilton Project produced over the past year. These figures and the linked related work tell the story of an irregular, uneven economic recovery and policy proposals aimed at a strong, equitable recovery.

      

The pandemic has challenged public education in a variety of ways. School leaders, teachers, families, and students are contending with controversies over vaccines, mask-wearing, quarantine procedures, and the ever-present threat of new variants, to say nothing of students’ academic and social-emotional setbacks. During widely publicized school-board meetings, frustrated parents have been angrily pushing back against mask mandates and the teaching of America’s current and historical race relations.

Parent anger over extended school closures and curriculum were part of the prevailing media narratives about Terry McAuliffe’s loss to Glenn Youngkin in Virginia’s governor race last month. The narrative was subsequently posited as key to Republican advantages in the 2022 midterm elections. But is the narrative grounded in public opinion, or based on a vocal minority? Results from the nationally representative Understanding American Study (UAS) parent survey shed some light.

We have been asking parents about their K-12 students’ experiences since the beginning of the pandemic. During the 2020-21 school year, parents—particularly those of partially or fully remote learners—were clearly, and understandably, concerned, and measures of satisfaction with schools were low. This school year, almost all students are back in school buildings, and billions of federal dollars have flowed into the education system. Using our UAS survey, we had the opportunity to ask parents how it’s going. Across the board, we found much less concern this time around.

Parents’ concerns about their children’s well-being have steadily decreased since fall 2020

We have surveyed parents four times during the pandemic about their concerns for their children: October 2020, when 29% had fully in-person school; April/May 2021, when 50% were in-person; June 2021, when 79% were on summer break; and October 2021, when 93% were in-person.

Across domains—overall and for all respondent subgroups—concerns in October 2021 were significantly lower than earlier time periods. For example, Figure 1 shows parents’ concerns about “amount learned,” disaggregated by race/ethnicity. Trends look similar for other domains of concern we asked about.

Notably, we did not observe meaningful differences in parent concerns between Democrats and Republicans. For example, 13% of Democrats and 15% of Republicans were concerned in fall 2021 about the amount their child was learning compared to during a typical year.

When we saw parents’ concerns drop in summer 2021, we speculated that summer break might have been the reason (i.e., there was less concern about school during the summer). We anticipated a rise in concern once school started. That rise did not happen. Instead, concerns continued to fall and are lower now than since early in the pandemic. This evidence suggests that the relative normalcy of in-person learning this year may be driving reduced parental concerns.

Black parents remain more concerned than others as of October 2021

Despite similar patterns of diminishing concerns over time, there were some differences when we looked within subgroups, particularly comparing responses of Black and white parents. Greater proportions of Black parents were concerned about their children’s progress in science (25%) and English/language arts (26%) relative to white parents (13% and 15%, respectively). More Black parents were also concerned about their children’s psychological (27%) and social (25%) well-being relative to white parents (16% and 15%, respectively), and more Black parents were concerned about their children missing out on extracurricular activities (23% versus 11%).

We observed this trend even though the proportion of Black parents reporting their child was attending fully in-person in fall 2021 (89%) was far higher than in spring 2021 (36%). If concerns were purely driven by whether a child was attending in person, concerns among Black parents should have converged with those of parents of other races/ethnicities. This lack of convergence indicates Black parents remain more concerned about their children’s well-being.

Satisfaction with school efforts to address pandemic effects was high, both overall and for subgroups

In fall 2021, we asked parents about their level of satisfaction with school efforts to meet their children’s needs in numerous ways, including academically, socially, and in terms of mental health. Across the eight dimensions we asked about, 82% to 91% of parents were satisfied in each area (see Figure 2). The percent of “very satisfied” was generally between 35% and 45%.

This level of positivity was consistent across subgroups, including by race/ethnicity, household income, parental education level, region of the country, urbanicity, partisanship, and grade levels. In fact, the percent of satisfied parents was not lower than 75% for any subgroup. Interestingly, on whether partisan rancor during school-board meetings is representative of all parents or a vocal minority, 79% of Democrats and 80% of Republicans were satisfied or very satisfied with school efforts to adjust instruction to help children catch up from any learning losses.

Parent “grades” of school quality also demonstrate improved satisfaction

Over time, we have also asked parents to grade their children’s schools on an A-F scale. We converted letter grades to numeric averages using grade point average transformations (i.e., A=4, B=3, etc.)

We compared parents’ assigned letter grades this fall to what they assigned last fall. Last fall, we found that average ratings were meaningfully different depending on whether the student was attending in person or not. Table 1’s first two columns show fall 2020 averages separately for families whose children were learning remotely and in-person at the time. Notably, assigned letter grades in fall 2020 among in-person students was similar to those assigned in fall 2021 overall, sometimes even exceeding the average given in 2021. These results suggest the sweeping improvements in parents’ ratings of school quality and satisfaction may be driven by the return to in-person schooling (even if other factors also explain part of this pattern).

Table 1: Parents’ grades of their children’s schools, by child attendance mode in fall 2020 and all responses in fall 2021

Again, parents’ responses were virtually indistinguishable between Democrats and Republicans, averaging 3.3 and 3.4 on the fall 2021 quality of education, respectively.

What’s next

The big picture? With the return to in-person learning, parents’ satisfaction with their children’s schools has rebounded, and the proportion of parents who remain concerned about their kids is dwindling. These results align with the fall 2021 538/Ipsos survey of children aged 5-18 showing that children feel largely positive about their lives at home and school.

We did not observe any significant differences between Democratic and Republican parents on any measure of concern, satisfaction, or school quality grades. These results question the veracity of the notion that parents’ lingering dissatisfaction with their children’s schools is a trend that has and will continue to hurt Democrats in upcoming elections, though continued school closures could of course reverse these trends.

That said, our results do suggest some racial differences in concerns and satisfaction, with Black parents more concerned about their students’ academic progress than any other group. Given recent evidence about the disproportionate academic effects of the pandemic across student groups, these concerns are well founded and merit strong prioritization.

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation Grants No.2037179 and 2120194, the Hewlett Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations. We are also grateful to Marshall Garland, Michael Fienberg, and the UAS administration team for their contributions to this work.

      

The past two election cycles have demonstrated the power of the Native American vote in federal elections. Native American voters were recognized as a consequential electoral sub-group in many key races in both 2018 and 2020. This includes the 2020 Democratic victory in Arizona, their first since 1996 in the state, and President Biden’s victory in Wisconsin.   Moving beyond Native American heritage month and looking ahead to the 2020 Congressional elections, this post summarizes what we have learned about the voting behavior of this important sub-group of the larger electorate who are sadly often invisible in national discussions about electoral politics.

What Have We Learned About Native American Voting Behavior From The Last Two Election Cycles?

 I draw largely from earlier work that pulled from the 2018 and 2020 American Election Eve Surveys to explore factors that help explain Native American voting behavior. Though they rely on an opt-in/self-identification approach to capture Native American respondents, both surveys have large national samples of Native American voters that allows for a comparison between Native Americans and other racial and ethnic groups, as well as internal variation within this diverse community.

As reflected in the figure below, 61% of Native American voters reported voting for a Democratic candidate for Congress in 2018, which is significantly higher than white voters, but lower than Black, Latino, and Asian American/Pacific Islander voters Democratic vote share.

There are some important sources of variation in voting behavior among Native Americans that are worth noting.[i] First, there was a significant gender gap among Native American voters in 2018, with 67% of women reporting they voted Democratically compared to 54% of Native American men. A sense of gender consciousness ignited by the context of sexual harassment and the Me Too Movement not only influenced Native American voting behavior in 2018, but turnout as well. In fact, 72% of Native American women voters encouraged friends or family to register or vote, a rate 13 percentage points higher than for Native American men.

Native American Independents broke toward the Democrats, with 46% of independent/other party identifiers reported voting for a Democratic candidate, compared to 38% for a Republican candidate and 13% for another party’s candidate. This will be key in 2022, as Native Americans have been found to be less attached to either of the dominant political parties.

Young Native American voters were critical in 2018, and across many indicators of civic engagement in the survey, those between the ages of 18 to 29 were the most politically active of all Native American age groups. More specifically, 59% of young Native American voters encouraged friends or family to register or vote, 35% attended a protest or demonstration, and 27% volunteered for a candidate or a voter outreach drive.

As we documented in a brief drawing from the 2020 Election Eve Survey, the trends from 2018 across the Native American electorate generally continued in 2020, where 60% of Native American voters supported President Biden, a rate again higher than non-Hispanic white voters, but lower than all other racial and ethnic minorities. There was an identical percentage who reported that they voted for a Democratic candidate for the U.S. House in their district. Gender, age, and partisanship continued to be key drivers of variation in voting behavior, with similar patterns to what was observed in 2018. The 2020 data also suggested that Native American voters in urban areas were more likely to support the Biden/Harris ticket (+5%) than those living in rural areas of the country.

The severe inequalities facing Native Americans in pandemic outcomes led to COVID-19 relief being the most important issue for Native voters (45%). This was followed by jobs and the economy (37%) and the cost of health care (27%) according to the 2020 survey. However, other issue areas, such as climate change and police brutality were also identified as key issues among a sizable segment of Native American voters, particularly those under the age of 30.

The 2020 election also provided direct evidence for the long-standing suggestion among experts of Native American politics that Native Americans do not vote based on party, but on which candidates will do the most to advance the interests of Native American communities. When asked what was the primary motivation for their voting decision, 26% of Native American respondents said it was to “support and represent the Native American/American Indian community” which was higher than other racial and ethnic groups. Conversely, Native Americans were less likely than other groups to vote in 2020 to support Democratic candidates.

Native American Candidates Help Drive Mobilization and Turnout 

A major driver for the high turnout rates of Native American voters in 2018 and 2020 was the high rates of mobilization activities directed toward these communities. The 2020 Election Eve Survey identified that 57% of Native American voters were contacted by a campaign, political party, or community organization to ask them to register to vote or vote. This was higher than all other racial and ethnic groups in the survey other than African Americans at 67%.

The data suggests that outreach from community organizations was particularly high, as 28% of Native Americans who were contacted indicated that this came from people from community organizations, again a higher percentage than all groups but African Americans.  There is also a much more even balance in the mobilization of Native Americans by party than for other racial and ethnic minorities. As reflected in the figure below, 36% of respondents reported that the people who contacted them were from the Republican party, only 2% lower than the percentage of respondents who were contacted by Democrats. This may help explain the lower Democratic vote share among Native Americans when compared to Latinos and African Americans.

Approximately 93 Native American and Alaska Native candidates ran for political office in 2018. Ten Native American candidates ran for the House of Representatives, seventy-two Native American candidates ran for state legislature seats, and 11 Native American and Alaska Native candidates ran for state offices. The record breaking number of Native American candidates running for office in 2018 helped fuel the higher than expected turnout that year, as the political science literature has found that minority electorates tend to vote at higher rates when they have co-ethnic candidates to support.

Representation of Native American in the US House continued in 2020, where overall, a record 6 Native Americans were elected to Congress. The ability for candidates to mobilize voters from their own racial and ethnic communities suggests that for turnout in 2022 to mirror what we observed in 2018, Native American participation in the election as candidates must also be reflective of 2018. It is too early to tell whether this will happen, but with many Native Americans facing re-election, there is potential for mobilization to remain high in 2022. The even split between Democratic and Republican members elected in 2020 (3 Dem/ 3 GOP) is consistent with the nearly even partisanship split in reported contact with Native American communities.    

Evidence to Suggest Native American Engagement in 2022 Will Remain High 

If turnout among Native Americans in 2022 is on par with 2018 and 2020, this sub-group of the electorate could have an impact on election outcomes across the country. The population density of Native Americans in several specific states increases the potential for them to be influential voters. For example, at 11% of the overall population in New Mexico, Native American voters will have an impact on all three congressional races in the state, particularly in the state’s southern district which has been one of the most watched races in the country over the past two cycles and is the home district to Native American incumbent Yvette Harrell. Also in the West, Arizona has one of the most competitive senate races for 2022 and Native American voters have been critical to outcomes in the state in the past two cycles.

Oklahoma is another key state to focus on for Native American politics. In 2018 the state saw Tom Cole (Chickasaw) and Markwayne Mullin (Cherokee) win re-election to Congress, and Kevin Stitt (Cherokee) was elected governor of Oklahoma.

We have historically observed substantial drops in turnout during off-year elections when there is not a Presidential race to drive mobilization, particularly among racial and ethnic minorities. However, there are a few reasons for optimism that Native Americans may continue to outperform expectations in 2022.  

First, although Native Americans tend to vote at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups, published analysis has suggested that American Indian and Alaska Natives (AI/ANs) tend to vote in midterm congressional years at relatively high rates. We therefore may not see a major drop in voting rates for Native Americans relative to 2020 than for other groups.

Second, Native American voters may be energized to build momentum generated by some positive outcomes for their collective interests during the Biden administration’s first term. This includes having the first Native American Cabinet Secretary in a prominent position. Secretary Haaland has used her position in creative ways to represent Native Americans, most recently announcing that her office will work on removing racially insensitive names used (such as squaw) to define places across the nation.

Third, the Build Back Better plan has many components aimed at advancing racial equity that are projected to advance the interests of racial and ethnic minorities, including Native Americans.  This includes advancing climate change initiatives and environmental justice, an issue area this brief identifies as important to Native American voters. The framework will also greatly expand access to broadband critical to Native American communities who face the greatest inequalities in access to high speed internet of any racial and ethnic group in the nation. Mid-term congressional elections are always a referendum on the President and the President’s party, so how this signature domestic policy is received by the Native American electorate is particularly salient.

The success of the mobilization efforts in 2018 and 2020 should translate to the investment of resources needed to allow the groups on the ground, who have trust from tribal communities, to continue outreach efforts in 2022 that can keep turnout high among Native Americans. This will be particularly important for the prospect of continuing the trends over the last two election cycles regarding high participation of young voters. In my view, what we ultimately see happen in 2022 for the Native American electorate will depend greatly on whether the funding for get out the vote efforts makes it way to groups who demonstrated that they are well worth that investment over the past two election cycles.

Footnotes

[i] This section of the report draws largely from the following report: https://latinodecisions.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Native_Am_2018_Brief.pdf

      

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Decreases in reimbursement rates save money, don’t reduce amount of health care  

The U.S. spends more than any other country on health care, which has led to calls to lower reimbursement rates to health providers. The risk is that providers would respond to lower payments by restricting supply, impeding access to health care and worsening patient health outcomes. Marcus Dillender from the University of Illinois at Chicago, Anthony T. Lo Sasso from DePaul University, and Lu G. Jinks from Analysis Group examine provider responses to a 30% cut in reimbursement rates in the Illinois workers’ compensation system—one of the highest-reimbursing workers’ compensation insurance systems in the nation. Using data on more than 1.5 million claims from 2009 to 2013, they find that lowering maximum reimbursement rates reduced annual costs by over $400 million with no detectable effect on the amount of care injured workers received. The authors conclude that reducing reimbursement rates for high-reimbursing payers could reduce health care costs without major changes in care.  

US-China trade war boosted global trade   

The U.S. and China imposed tariffs on imports from each other in 2018 and 2019. Using bilateral trade data from the top 50 exporting countries over the 2014-2019 period, Pablo Fajgelbaum of Princeton and co-authors find that the trade war boosted global trade by 3%. While the U.S.-China trade war lowered trade between the two countries, it caused other exporting countries to trade more with each other in products that had higher U.S.-China tariffs. Other countries also reallocated exports toward the U.S. and away from China, the authors find. The export response — which varied across countries — was driven by the sensitivity of each country’s exports to price changes rather than its specialization in the tariff-targeted items. Factors such as pre-trade war reallocation capacity and scale economies may have enabled the boost in exports, the authors suggest, ensuring that “the trade war created new trade opportunities in aggregate and did not simply reshuffle trade flows.”  

Job training program gains were erased during the pandemic   

Using data from a randomized control trial in Cali, Colombia, Felipe Barrera-Osorio of Vanderbilt, Adriana D. Kugler of Georgetown, and Mikko I. Silliman of Harvard find that workers who received job training fared no better during the pandemic than those without job training. Participants randomly assigned to receive job training (primarily in service fields) initially saw higher monthly earnings and employment rates, they find. However, the differences were erased when the pandemic hit, with both groups having similar employment outcomes starting in March 2020. The authors note that the pandemic uniquely affected service workers, which may have played a role in these results. Moreover, the training program included only 160 classroom hours and was completed only a year and a half before the start of the pandemic; longer training programs and workers with longer tenures at their jobs may have fared better, they say.  

Chart of the week: US 2-year Treasury yield rises sharply as Fed signals interest rate increases in 2022 

Source: Tullett Prebon, The Wall Street Journal  

Quote of the week:  

“[I] think we are well-positioned to deal with what’s coming, with the range of plausible outcomes that can come. I think if you look at how we got here, I do think we’ve been adapting to the incoming data, really all the way along, and noticing and calling out that both the effects and the persistence of inflation, of bottlenecks, and labor shortages, and things like that. We’ve been calling out the fact that those were becoming longer and more persistent and larger. And now we’re in a position where we’re ending the taper by March…and we’ll be in a position to raise interest rates as and when we think it’s appropriate. And we will, to the extent that’s appropriate,” says Jerome Powell, Chair of the Federal Reserve. 

“I think that the data that we got toward the end of the fall was a really strong signal that inflation is more persistent and higher and that the risk of it remaining higher for longer has grown. And I think we’re reacting to that now, and we’ll continue to adapt our policy. So, I wouldn’t look at it that we are behind the curve. I would look at it that we’re in position now to take the steps that we need to take in a thoughtful manner to address all of the issues including that of too high inflation.” 

The Brookings Institution is financed through the support of a diverse array of foundations, corporations, governments, individuals, as well as an endowment. A list of donors can be found in our annual reports published online here. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this report are solely those of its author(s) and are not influenced by any donation. 

      

Myanmar is on the edge of a state collapse nearly 11 months after a military coup. Violence and insecurity have followed the coup, while the country is also suffering greatly from COVID-19 and a resulting economic crisis. Former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who lived under house arrest for nearly 15 years in the 1990s and the early 2000s, might be spending many more years in detention after the junta sentenced her to two years in prison, while still facing additional charges. But the Southeast Asian country of 54 million people is slipping away from headlines, as other important global issues are occupying the world’s attention. Meanwhile, Myanmar seems to have fully returned to autocracy, showing little hope for the freedom of its citizens.

What can the international community do to resolve the political crisis in Myanmar? Western countries have already imposed targeted sanctions on junta members, including freezing their assets in foreign bank accounts and restricting their access to visas. But they are struggling to change the junta’s course as its State Administration Council (SAC) was smart enough to court China and Russia, both of which have continued to undermine the West’s efforts to pressure the military regime. While China is unhappy with the political instability created by the coup, it has not openly sided with the rival National Unity Government (NUG). Meanwhile, the Myanmar army’s relationship with Moscow has reached an all-time high. The international community thus does not have much leverage to address the political crisis in Myanmar, but they can still do at least three things to help the country.

Bring all parties to the negotiation table

The junta’s SAC is resolute to gain complete and total power by any means necessary – even if that means killing civilians. The NUG believes that only an armed revolution could stop the junta, so it launched the “People’s Defensive War” against the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar’s armed forces. Both parties are determined to defeat the opposite side in a civil war. But violence is not — and should not — be the answer to settle this dispute, especially when the conflict has reached a stalemate. The outside world must help foster a return to a democratic path in Myanmar through a peaceful resolution because it has invested so much in the country in the past 10 years supporting the democratic transition. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reached a five-point consensus with the coup leaders in April, which included immediately ceasing the violence and beginning a constructive dialogue among all parties. So far, the SAC is not keen to implement the ASEAN consensus. To be fair, the NUG is not interested in engaging in a dialogue process either. The opposition movement wants to remove the Tatmadaw from power once and for all.

Both sides are trying to get the control of the country, but before this fierce competition ends, Myanmar could fall to pieces. A large part of the country has already been a battleground for numerous fights between the military and resistance groups, and the human and economic costs of a civil war would be astronomical. The outside world must pressure and persuade both the SAC and the NUG to come to the negotiation table. The junta is paranoid with anti-Western sentiments, and it does not have much respect for ASEAN either. But the generals are comfortable with some global figures, such as Bill Richardson of the United States and Yōhei Sasakawa of Japan. Both visited Myanmar in November, and they should continue talking to the top brass. Quiet diplomacy by global statesmen whom the junta seems to trust could perhaps persuade the generals to negotiate. Similarly, the West needs to convince the NUG that political dialogue is a way forward. China holds much leverage on both sides, so it is essential to have Beijing on board in this negotiation process as well.

Provide humanitarian assistance

Myanmar is experiencing one of the worst crises since its independence. Fighting with several ethnic armed organizations resumed after the coup. The NUG and its military wing, the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), along with various armed resistance groups, are carrying out guerrilla warfare against the Tatmadaw. The junta seems determined to destroy the PDFs. As in conflict areas in the past, the Myanmar military is now committing human rights violations against combatants and civilians. Violence has forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. On top of that, a new wave of COVID-19 in July and August killed thousands more and paralyzed the country’s health care system. Compared to other countries in the region, Myanmar has low levels of vaccination coverage, which leaves it vulnerable to future COVID-19 waves. Furthermore, the twin crisis of the coup and the pandemic are severely impacting an economy that is expected to contract around 18% this year, according to the World Bank. The United Nations emergency relief coordinator said that three million people across Myanmar need life-saving humanitarian assistance because of rising conflict and insecurity, the pandemic, and a failing economy.

The international community must work with the U.N. and NGOs to provide humanitarian aid to Myanmar. As Richardson told The New York Times, 54 million people should not suffer because of the political crisis of the military takeover. The world can help by providing COVID-19 vaccines, offering assistance to internally displaced persons, and contributing economic support to small businesses and the poor. There is a risk that delivering aid to Myanmar allows the Tatmadaw to claim credit and bolster its domestic support. To avoid this risk and not legitimize the junta and entrench military rule, the donor community needs to consult with local civil society organizations (CSOs) and international development organizations inside Myanmar to develop an effective aid strategy.

Engage with the Tatmadaw

During Myanmar’s democratic transition, the Western governments and NGOs poured millions of dollars into the country to build the capacity of local CSOs and nurture political and social activists. They are now at the forefront of the resistance movement against the coup. Western nations, however, failed to engage with the Tatmadaw. When Myanmar enjoyed greater freedom and prosperity, soldiers did not have many opportunities to interact with the world outside of their own institution, and military propaganda was reinforced to them through training and other means of indoctrination. Social media, particularly Facebook, fueled political polarization in Myanmar, creating intense fights between Tatmadaw supporters and Aung San Suu Kyi fans on the internet. Even though the military has sent thousands of officers to Russia for graduate studies, they are still cementing authoritarian mindsets due to a lack of exposure to democratic education.

To change Myanmar, the Tatmadaw must be changed. The international community should start thinking about engaging with Myanmar’s military after the current political turmoil ends. Whatever the outcome of the present crisis, it is likely that the Tatmadaw, as the country’s strongest institution, will still be there. Engaging with the Tatmadaw is thus required, but it does not mean lifting existing arms embargos or transferring military technology to Myanmar. Western countries should provide norm transmission and diffusion through international exposure and education related to democratic values. Offering the Tatmadaw training on democracy, human rights, and leadership should be considered. Even teaching English to Burmese military officers would be a good start. The United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries tried these initiatives briefly, though they all ended after the Rohingya crisis broke out in 2016-2017. This time, the West should put more effort into helping to integrate the Tatmadaw into the international arena to end their isolation. Reforming an authoritarian army entrenched in power for decades — with a record of human rights violations — will take time, of course. But with patience and the right strategy, it is worth trying.

The path to peace

The ongoing political crisis in Myanmar has no end in sight. The hard-won democratic achievements of the last 10 years have disappeared. No one knows what the future will look like. But an armed revolution might not be a wise idea, given the brutal counterinsurgency history of the Tatmadaw. The international community should bring all parties to the negotiable table to start constructive dialogues to achieve a peaceful resolution. Global statesmen should continue quiet diplomacy to persuade the generals to stop violence and perhaps finally agree to talk with the democratic movement. The NUG could come to the negotiation table when they realize that armed revolution cannot topple the military regime. Humanitarian aid must be delivered to the poor and most vulnerable groups inside the country and along the border. As a long-term solution, the West should engage with the Tatmadaw to reform it as a professional army by discouraging their isolation and giving them access to a liberal education.

The world should not give up on Myanmar.

      

When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a staff report in late October on the privacy and data collection practices of six large internet service providers (ISPs), the commission’s chair Lina Khan called the findings “striking.” Her own remarks are striking too.

After flagging structural issues in the marketplace, Khan asserted that “the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has the clearest legal authority and expertise to fully oversee [ISPs],” and called for the FCC to reassert authority over ISPs “and once again put in place the nondiscrimination rules, privacy protections, and other basic requirements needed to create a healthier market.” Khan’s position was shared by FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, who wrote: “I hope the FCC is able to return ISPs to their proper classification as telecom services under Title II and to provide appropriate protections for these essential services.”

It’s not common for a regulator to disclaim authority. Regulatory humility can be a useful trait, but it is misplaced in this instance. For several reasons, it makes sense for the FTC to regulate ISPs with regard to privacy.

First, insofar as possible, a single set of privacy rules should apply to all sectors at the federal level, rather than add more patches to the crazy quilt of federal privacy regulation that exists in America today. It is confusing for consumers to have different privacy protections from businesses depending on their respective sectors—one law for financial services, another for communications companies, still another for health care, and no specific privacy law for most others. It is even more confusing for consumers if two directly competing services—such as location-based services offered by both “over the top” providers, like Hulu and Netflix, and ISPs—are subject to separate privacy regimes from multiple regulatory agencies. And it creates uncertainty or conflicting regulation for the ISPs themselves, many of which provide not only broadband internet access and other regulated communications services but also other services that are clearly subject to FTC jurisdiction, such as entertainment, content, advertising, and alarm services and other home automation.

A unified legal regime for privacy across sectors would be desirable, but very difficult to overlay onto existing regimes. This is why the report and draft legislative language I co-wrote with other Brookings scholars recommended that federal privacy legislation establish a federal commission to review existing laws and subsequently make recommendations to Congress “about how federal laws addressing privacy and data security may be harmonized.” In the meantime, it makes sense to avoid further fragmentation of federal privacy law.

Second, while the FCC and FTC’s differing legal authorities present a variety of issues discussed below, the FTC has much deeper and wider expertise when it comes to privacy. As Professor Chris Hoofnagle documents at length in his book Federal Trade Commission Privacy Law and Policy, the FTC has more than 100 years of experience in monitoring business practices and consumer protection, and has “evolved into the most important regulator of information privacy—and thus innovation policy—in the world” since the early 1990s. Hoofnagle joined leading privacy scholars Daniel Solove and Woody Hartzog in these pages in urging that, despite a short leash from Congress, ingrained timidity, and occasional capture, “the FTC is still the right agency to lead the US privacy regulatory effort.”  As a federal court of appeals put it in the 2018 FCC v. AT&T decision, “the FTC is the leading federal consumer protection agency and, for many decades, has been the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement.”

Over the past two decades, the FTC has brought approximately 80 cases based on the handling of personal data against companies across a range of sizes and sectors: from Facebook and Google, to brick-and-mortar businesses, to small app providers and marketing companies. This caseload reflects that privacy has become a major focus of the FTC’s work in the 21st century digital economy. Just last week, the agency proposed a rulemaking process to impose stronger privacy and security protections for businesses, as well as prevent discrimination resulting from automated decision-making. While privacy has been a steady diet at the FTC, it has been only occasional fare at the FCC. The FCC has brought cases against common carriers and telephone marketers based on narrow laws that regulate telecommunications calling data, cable television subscriber records, and telephone marketing, though these recently resulted in a $200 million fine to Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint for selling customers’ location information without proper security measures or consent. The FCC undertook broad rulemaking to apply privacy laws to ISPs following the adoption of the 2015 Open Internet Order, which subjected them to public service obligations applicable to communications common carriers under Title II of the 1934 Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. But, Congress voted to override these privacy rules in March 2017, and so the FCC never carried out this broadened enforcement role.

Third, the views of Commissioners Khan and Slaughter do not reflect the significant progress toward comprehensive federal privacy legislation since 2016 and the prevailing thrust of the resulting legislative proposals to expand FTC authority. Federal bills or draft proposals—in particular, those from leadership on both sides of the aisle within the Commerce Committees in both houses of Congress that are the most likely vehicles for enactment of a federal law—predominantly place federal enforcement in the hands of the FTC. Senator Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) SAFE DATA Act would authorize $100 million for the FTC to exercise this authority. In addition, the $1.8 trillion economic reconciliation package, as passed by the House, includes a provision for $1 billion to establish and staff a new data protection bureau within the FTC.

Moreover, several privacy bills, including the SAFE DATA Act (but not Senator Maria Cantwell’s (D-WA) Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act), would override an exemption from the 1914 FTC Act to give the agency jurisdiction to enforce privacy violations by communications common carriers and non-profits. So long as that exemption is in place, there is some basis to Chair Khan’s contention that the FCC has clearer jurisdiction to monitor ISPs—if they are classified as communications common carriers, at least. However, that Title II classification remains uncertain. The congressional override of FCC broadband privacy rules, the subsequent repeal of the 2015 Open Internet Order by the Republican-majority FCC in 2017, the absence of a new net neutrality bill so far in the 117^th Congress, and delays in confirming a third Democratic commissioner to the current FCC could prevent or delay a new net neutrality initiative and FCC rulemaking.

Even if the current Congress, or a new Democratic majority at the FCC, pursues a new net neutrality order in due course, net neutrality is fundamentally about competition, not privacy; it is aimed at preventing ISPs from discriminating against competing service providers, such as online video service competitors like Netflix or YouTube. The FCC’s 2016 privacy regulations were an incidental effect of bringing ISPs under rules for common carriers, which was also aligned with the existing net neutrality provisions. The latter includes Section 222 of the Communications Act, which limits communications carriers’ use of “customer proprietary network information.” As a result, once the FCC deemed ISPs to be common carriers, the agency needed to address the application of Section 222 to ISPs, which protects the confidentiality of “customer proprietary network information” such as call records.

Congress can obviate this issue by giving the FTC jurisdiction over privacy for communications carriers—thus clarifying the FTC’s leading role on privacy. It is the path of least resistance toward enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation and a simpler, clearer way of protecting individual privacy.

Facebook, Google, T-Mobile, and Verizon are general, unrestricted donors to the Brookings Institution. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions posted in this piece are solely those of the author and not influenced by any donation.