Brookings: Series - Analysis Papers

The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide

Geneive Abdo — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

In today’s Arab world, all politics is local.

This paper examines the rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world, specifically looking at Bahrain, Lebanon and Iran, and offers key policy recommendations for the United States. In the midst of the Arab Awakening, there is a new Sunni-Shi’a divide which has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geopolitical challenges facing the United States by demanding that serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation. Religion, gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent role in determining social and political interaction than in the past.

While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are quick to observe that the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict is a battle within Islam, the broader geo-political implications from the rise in sectarianism should be of great concern to the United States as it seeks to preserve its interests in the Middle East. (In Bahrain, for example, the lack of reconciliation between the Shi‘a-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.)

In the long-term, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will undercut their security objectives if they do not take measures to assist the opposition or penalize the Al Khalifa government for its repressive policies that have led to well-documented human rights violations.

This paper addresses important U.S. foreign policy concerns relying on approximately 200 substantive interviews with key players, analysts, and policymakers in the Middle East, and another two dozen interviews in the United States and Europe, conducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well as current literature and media reports in Persian, Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with some analysis and recommendations for U.S. policymakers struggling with the challenges posed by the reemergence of sectarian discourse in the politics of the Muslim Middle East.

Highlights include:

How popular perceptions of outside intervention and interference have created a virtual proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey on the other.
Why the Shi‘a-dominated uprising in Bahrain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis, but for the standing of the collective Shi‘a in the Middle East.
Among other policy recommendations, a case for why the United States needs create a contingency program for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, currently in Bahrain, and whose presence in the Gulf ensures the flow of oil and other energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean.
An exploration of the idea that the Shi‘a rise in Lebanon is at risk for the first time in many decades because the Syrian war has placed the Shi‘a leadership in an untenable position by supporting the Asad regime and provided the motivation for more radical Sunni religious movements to challenge the Shi‘a’s hard-earned place within Lebanon’s historiographical landscape. As a result in the decline of power for the Shi'a, Salafist movements and parties are in ascendance and are likely to play increasingly important roles in Arab politics.

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Geneive Abdo

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Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis

Itamar Rabinovich — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

For decades, Israel viewed Syria as its most bitter Arab enemy. Syria’s Arab nationalist ideology was fiercely anti-Israel, and border disputes left the two nations perpetually on the brink of conflict. After the June 1967 war, Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights became the most important issue separating the two countries, and when Syria joined the peace process launched in Madrid in October 1991, the future of the Golan Heights became the main bone of contention between the adversaries. The Israeli-Syrian negotiations came close to fruition but ultimately failed. During the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s reign, relations with the United States became tense and Israeli-Syrian contacts were severed. The Ehud Olmert years in Israel saw renewed peace talks with Syria via the Turkish channel, again raising hopes of an end to hostilities but again ending in failure.

In early 2011, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis that has since descended into civil war sparked a rethink of Israel’s policy toward its neighbor. While Israel may have once preferred the Assad regime to remain in power rather than take its chances with an unknown successor, this “the devil we know” approach is no longer valid. After Israel had found itself frustrated by developments beneficial to Iran and its “Resistance Axis” throughout the Arab Spring—most notably the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak—the increasing pressure on the Syrian regime has represented a blow to Iran and its allies. Thus, while recognizing that Israel has little to no influence on the course of events in Syria, Israel’s leaders have largely reached a consensus that Assad’s departure from power is preferable.

As it rages on, Syria’s civil war complicates a variety of Israel’s foreign policy priorities. Clearly, the uncertainty in Syria has put the question of the Golan Heights on hold indefinitely. It may be a long time until Israel can readdress the prospect of giving the Golan back to Damascus, as many hawkish (and in fact some dovish) Israelis have seen Bashar al-Assad’s actions in his domestic crisis as proof that past efforts at a Golan-for-peace deal were misguided. Israel’s efforts to challenge Iran over its nuclear program are also affected by the instability facing Tehran’s ally in Damascus. If Israel or the U.S. were to launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, a desperate and beleaguered Assad could conceivably seek to transform his domestic war into another Arab-Israeli war by taking the opportunity to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. However, the Syrian conflict has the potential to bring the damaged Israeli- Turkish relationship closer to normalcy; if the two nations can resolve their dispute over the Mavi Marmara incident, they can find common ground in seeking to foster a stable post-Assad government in Syria.

Overall, Israel would prefer regime change in Syria, but has concerns about what type of government would succeed Bashar al-Assad. It hopes for a secular regime to emerge, but due to limited influence —and the likelihood that support for any faction would backfire due to Israel’s toxic reputation in the Arab world—it is maintaining a passive stance. Without changing this greatly, however, Israel should build discreet channels to the emerging actors in Syria to prepare for future outcomes. And with several neighbors—such as Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf states—sharing some common goals for the outcome of the Syrian crisis, Israel must seek to cooperate with them to advance its interests, which requires building trust with those actors. Thus, to avoid being a bystander in the Syrian crisis, it would serve Israel well to re-engage with Turkey and earn good will in the Arab world by seriously restarting the Palestinian peace process.

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Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations

Daniel L. Byman — Fri, 27 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Breaking the Bonds between al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate Organizations examines the dynamics of al-Qa’ida-affiliate relationships and the interests each party brings to these partnerships.

Highlights from the paper include:

• Factors that determine why local groups decide to join or not to join with al-Qa’ida.

• Benefits al-Qa’ida and local groups gain from affiliation.

• Dynamics that lead to frayed al-Qa’ida-affiliate relationships.

Byman argues that by exploiting the areas where al-Qa’ida and its affiliates do not agree, the United States and its allies can limit al-Qa’ida’s influence and expansion around the world.

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Daniel L. Byman

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Echoes of Empire: Turkey's Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy

Michael A. Reynolds — Mon, 25 Jun 2012 14:56:00 -0400

With Turkey a critical partner to any solution to the crisis in Syria and the standoff with Iran, and to U.S. interests in the Middle East in general, understanding Ankara’s motivations and interests has become increasingly important for U.S. policymakers. Many observers of Turkey, however, are concerned about the country’s move from a staunchly secular, reliable U.S. partner to a more assertive actor with an Eastern-oriented outlook.

In this Saban Center–Center on the United States and Europe Analysis Paper, Echoes of Empire: Turkey’s Crisis of Kemalism and the Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy, Princeton University’s Michael A. Reynolds offers a detailed examination of the evolution of Ankara’s foreign policy and regional outlook. By analyzing the factors that challenged the country’s secular Kemalist tradition, particularly Turkey’s inability to resolve its “Kurdish question,” and detailing the influential views of its foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Reynolds offers much-needed insight into Turkey’s new position.

Rather than the result of short-term tactical thinking or a passing trend, Reynolds argues, Turkey’s shift is the product of a deeply felt, religiously informed worldview that identifies secularism as threatening to Turkey’s wellbeing. Only by understanding the prism through which Turkey’s leaders see their country and surrounding region, can U.S. policymakers best forge a relationship that advances critical U.S. interests in the Middle East.

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Michael A. Reynolds

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Is the Quartet Dead? The Israel-Palestine Peace Process Revisited

Khaled Elgindy — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 14:03:00 -0500

In late January, after five rounds of exploratory discussions, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators failed to meet the Middle East Quartet's deadline for resuming direct negotiations.

With this latest blow to peace, is it time to rethink the place of the Quartet—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—in the peace process?

Have the group's actions over the past decade been beneficial or detrimental to the quest for peace? And, if the Quartet should not be the one to shepherd the process along, then who should be? Khaled Elgindy addresses these questions in this Saban Center Analysis paper.

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Khaled Elgindy

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The Next War: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing For It

Nicholas Blanford and Bilal Y. Saab — Mon, 15 Aug 2011 14:55:00 -0400

Executive Summary

Lebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm in the five years since the August 14, 2006 ceasefire that brought an end to that summer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict. Despite fighting the IDF to a standstill in southern Lebanon, Hizballah experienced substantial—but sustainable—losses and its “divine victory” came at a cost. Hizballah lost its autonomy over the southern border district, its battle tactics were prematurely exposed, and it had to abandon the military infrastructure of bunkers and firing positions that it had installed over the previous six years.

Israel suffered the humiliation of underestimating its foe, and achieved none of its overly ambitious war goals. The IDF’s poor performance on multiple levels—leadership, coordination, logistics, and fighting capabilities—undermined Israel’s muchprized deterrent factor, and led to the perception of defeat.

The prevailing peace along the Lebanon-Israel border in the intervening five years is a result of both sides absorbing the costs of the 2006 war and the risks inherent in another round of fighting. Yet, although this is the longest period of tranquility along the traditionally volatile frontier since the late 1960s, the calm remains precarious and could be shattered at any time. Neither Hizballah nor Israel believes that the 2006 conflict will be the last battle waged between them, and both sides have been feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the last one ended.

Hizballah’s Posture

Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has undergone the largest recruitment and training drive in its thirty-year history, swelling its ranks with dedicated cadres and reviving its former multi-sectarian reservist units. In terms of weapons procurement, Hizballah has focused on acquiring long-range rockets fitted with guidance systems to target a list of specific military and infrastructure sites in Israel. Hizballah also is believed to have received training on more advanced air defense systems that could pose an increased threat to low-flying Israeli air assets, such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.

With the support of Iran, Hizballah has made further advances in its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications capabilities. Hizballah is expected to use these upgraded weapons and SIGINT capabilities to play an offensive role in a future conflict with Israel, attempting to seize the initiative, rather than adopting the reactive and defensive posture of 2006. Among the new battle plans being prepared by Hizballah are land and seaborne insertions into Israel to carry out commando-style raids. Given the range of the missiles in Hizballah’s possession, the battlespace in the next war will likely be larger than the traditional theater of southern Lebanon and northern Israel, encompassing large portions of both countries.

The war preparations notwithstanding, Hizballah does not seek nor want another conflict with Israel at this time. Its strategy is based on deterrence, striking a “balance of terror” with Israel through a concept of reciprocity. In a series of speeches in the past three years, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah’s leader, has warned Israel that it has the ability to inflict devastating blows against Israel on land and at sea in response to an Israeli attack on Lebanon.

Despite Hizballah’s jihadist instincts and ideological opposition to the Jewish state, it is beholden to two sometimes conflicting interests that have compelled it to honor the 2006 cessation of hostilities. First, Hizballah serves as a deterrent factor on behalf of Iran. Iran has invested millions of dollars in Hizballah since 2000 to boost its retaliatory capabilities, and as a result, planners of an attack on Iran and its nuclear facilities have to take into account the reaction of Hizballah. Second, Hizballah’s continued existence as a powerful force in Lebanon is dependent upon the support of its Shi’i constituency. No amount of Iranian funds would save Hizballah if it were to lose the backing of Lebanon’s Shi’i population. Therefore, Hizballah has to tread a fine line between following the edicts of Iran and respecting the interests of the Lebanese Shi’i community, the crushing majority of which does not want war with Israel.

Israel’s Position

Israel also has been busy implementing the lessons it learned from 2006 in preparation for the possibility of another conflict with Hizballah. The IDF has instituted greater logistical autonomy and sustainability in its combat units, and has strengthened the ability of its ground forces, navy, and air force to carry out joint operations. It also has trained extensively in large-scale ground operations, employing rapid maneuver techniques and using more robust and flexible equipment to reduce tactical vulnerability. The IDF created several urban warfare centers shortly after the 2006 war, the largest of which, the Urban Warfare Training Center (UWTC), simulates a variety of Lebanese villages, towns, and refugee camps.

The IDF has also introduced a number of new technologies that it is expected to use in any new conflict with Hizballah. These include a multi-tiered missile defense shield to intercept and destroy both Hizballah’s short-range and long-range weapons and Iran’s ballistic missiles. Also, all new tanks are now fitted with the Trophy defense system to protect against anti-armor projectiles. How these new systems cope in a war situation, and with Hizballah’s rocket barrages and anti-armor tactics remains to be seen.

Despite the IDF’s extensive military preparations, Israel still faces formidable challenges in another confrontation with Hizballah, and its options are less than perfect. A concerted attempt to smash Hizballah’s military capabilities once and for all would cause a large number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in both Lebanon and Israel, draw international opprobrium, and offer no guarantees of success.

The “Dahiyah doctrine” that Israel revealed in 2008, which calls for an intense bombing campaign against civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, serves as a factor of deterrence. But, its successful application is dependent on Hizballah quickly backing down and suing for a ceasefire, a most unlikely outcome. Instead, Hizballah is more likely to continue fighting in the hope of forcing Israel into a prolonged ground campaign, exactly the outcome the Dahiyah doctrine is supposed to prevent.

A Fragile Calm

Although mutual deterrence has prevented a repetition of the low-intensity conflict that existed along the Lebanon-Israel border from 2000 to 2006, the underlying factors that led to war five years ago still have not been addressed. The prevailing balance of terror is inherently unstable and even though both sides are aware of the risks of miscalculation, the chances of one side misreading the actions of the other remain dangerously high. In that regard, the uncertainties of the popular uprising in Syria could play into the Israel-Hizballah dynamic. Specifically, if the regime of Bashar al-Asad, the Syrian president, feels it faces imminent collapse, it could ignite a limited conflict with Israel in the Golan Heights, which could quickly escalate and drag in Hizballah, even against the latter’s will. If the Asad regime falls and the new leadership in Damascus decides to abandon its alliance with Iran and Hizballah, Israel may decide it is an opportune moment to attack Hizballah in the hope of permanently degrading its military capabilities and neutralizing the group as a future threat.

Ultimately, the likelihood of renewed war between Hizballah and Israel remains high in the mid- to long-term. It is critically important that as the Middle East convulses with the shockwaves engendered by the “Arab Spring,” the international community continue to play close attention to the nascent conflict under preparation in Lebanon and Israel.

Given that an accidental trigger is the most likely cause of the next war between Hizballah and Israel, diplomatic efforts should focus on ways to prevent misunderstandings from developing into conflict. In this context, the monthly tripartite meetings hosted by the UNIFIL commander which groups Israeli and Lebanese military representatives in Naqoura has proved to be an effective means of resolving issues linked to the United Nations-delineated Blue Line and a forum for advancing and addressing concerns voiced by either side. There also exists an emergency communications facility between the Lebanese Army and the IDF with the UNIFIL commander as go-between to resolve any pressing problems that cannot wait for the next tripartite session.

Yet, as long as the underlying political issues between Lebanon, Syria, and Israel are not negotiated, Iran continues to enrich uranium and build an extensive military infrastructure in Lebanon, and Hizballah and Israel aggressively prepare for another war, the chances of another, more deadly and destructive, conflict breaking out remains worryingly high.

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Nicholas Blanford
Bilal Y. Saab

Image Source: © Damir Sagolj / Reuters

The Challenge of Gaza: Policy Options and Broader Implications

Daniel L. Byman and Gad Goldstein — Fri, 01 Jul 2011 17:27:00 -0400

Executive Summary:

Although both the United States and Israel devote tremendous attention to the Middle East peace process, the Gaza Strip and its Hamas government have continued to vex American and Israeli policymakers. With the most recent incarnation of peace talks between the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority at a standstill, and turmoil and political change spreading throughout the Middle East and North Africa, it has become even more important for policymakers in Jerusalem and Washington to understand the factors shaping developments in Gaza. This understanding is critical for policymakers to assess options, determine the benefits and drawbacks of the alternative policies, and make strong, informed decisions.

Factors Shaping Israeli Policy

The most obvious, and the most immediate, factor shaping Israeli policy toward Gaza is the threat of mortars and rockets fired from Gaza into Israel. Hamas has not only launched these rockets, but has conducted cross-border shootings and kidnappings, and has placed improvised explosive devices near the security barrier along the border. Beyond furthering Hamas’s goal of causing pain to Israel, these attacks help Hamas preserve its credentials as the leading Palestinian resistance organization and enable it to retain the loyalty of militant members of its own organization. Rockets are also meant to deter Israel from killing Hamas leaders and pressure Israel into changing its policies to ones Hamas prefers, such as having the border crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip opened.Hamas draws on many resources to stay in power. Most notably, Hamas has long exploited its infrastructure of mosques, social services, and community organizations to raise money and attract recruits. Hamas has also constructed a large tunnel network to circumvent the Israeli blockade. In addition to smuggling commercial goods into Gaza, tunnel operators bring in ammunition, rockets, and people, including militants returning from training in Lebanon and Iran. While most of the tunnels run between Gaza and Egypt, Hamas has tried to maintain tunnels into Israel, as the 2006 kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit demonstrates.

But Hamas’s strength is a result of more than its control of smuggling operations and raising of funds. Hamas officials, in contrast to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah, have an image of honesty among many Palestinians. Moreover, many Palestinians admire the resistance model Hamas champions, believing that the peace process with Israel has not stopped settlements or ended the occupation.

Despite Hamas’s strength, Israeli and international economic pressure threaten Hamas’s position, as it must provide services and maintain its image in the face of the harsh pressure in order to stave off political foes. Politically, Hamas is beset from all sides. Fatah has been waiting in the wings, and rivals like Palestine Islamic Jihad challenge Hamas by advocating for more attacks against Israel. The emergence in Gaza of jihadists who look to al-Qa’ida for guidance (though they are not directly tied to al-Qa’ida itself) has also increased pressure on Hamas.

In addition to Hamas’s poor fiscal and political positions, it is organizationally weak in the West Bank, and does not possess the level of military strength it desires. Indeed, Israel’s 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead humiliated Hamas on the battlefield. Because of the outcome of that war, and because of Gazans’ lack of appetite for confrontation with Israel, Hamas has largely stopped rocket attacks in the months following the operation. In other words, for now, Israel’s deterrence has proven stronger that Hamas’s firepower.

However, Hamas may become stronger in the years to come. The size of Hamas’s rocket and mortar arsenal, and the range of its rockets are likely to grow. Hamas is also likely to increase its roster of trained fighters, courtesy of Hizballah and Iran.

In addition to these developments, factors outside of Gaza affect Hamas and the way in which Israel and the United States should deal with the group. The political change sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, particularly the fall of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, has tremendous reverberations in both Gaza and for President Mahmoud Abbas and other Palestinian moderates who seek peace. Though often uneven, Mubarak’s moves to keep Hamas’s strength in check were a critical part of President Abbas’s efforts at challenging the group’s rule of Gaza. Because President Abbas and other moderates remain weak, some observers believe that the PA would not be able to squelch a Hamas takeover should Israeli forces depart the West Bank (though successful efforts to improve law and order in the West Bank have begun to bolster moderates there).

The status of the peace process has been and continues to be a fundamental factor in affecting policy toward Gaza. If the peace process is robust, Israel would likely draw down its presence in the West Bank, and the stature of President Abbas and moderate voices would rise. If there is no prospect of a peace deal, many Palestinians would question the legitimacy of those who champion talks.

The relationship that has developed between Tehran and Hamas has had a considerable influence on developments in Gaza. Hamas has turned to Iran in part due to the isolation and financial crisis it faces, and Iran has looked to Hamas as an ally it can cultivate against Israel and use as a bridge to the broader Arab and Sunni world. The danger for Israel is that Iran’s growing influence is a force against Hamas’s moderation. At the same time, the attitudes of U.S. allies shape events in Gaza; Hamas has made progress in terms of public opinion in Europe, and has improved ties with Russia and Turkey.

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Daniel L. Byman
Gad Goldstein

Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward

Wed, 01 Dec 2010 12:49:00 -0500

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Iraq still hangs in the balance. The dramatic improvements in Iraqi security between 2007 and 2009 have produced important, but incomplete changes in Iraq’s politics. These changes make it possible to imagine Iraq slowly muddling upward, building gradually toward a better future.

However, Americans must be constantly on guard against the considerable potential for Iraq to slip into all-out civil war. There are dozens of scenarios— from military coups, to official misconduct, to the assassination of one or two key leaders—that could spark such violence. The conflict might look somewhat different than before, perhaps featuring Arab-Kurd conflict, greater intra-Shi’i fighting, or various parts of the Iraqi security forces warring for control of the state.

-Iraq’s own internal dynamics and the history of intercommunal civil wars indicate that if Iraq does not find a way to muddle slowly upward toward greater stability, it is far more likely that it will slide quickly backward into the chaos of all-out civil war than that it would simply muddle downward toward an unpleasant, weak, but minimally stable state that need not concern the United States.

Washington has signaled its intention to withdraw U.S. military forces from the country, sooner rather than later. What is not clear, however, is what the United States hopes to accomplish before its troops depart and its other resources attenuate, or how it plans to reach its goals.

-Washington has announced a strategy to exit, but it has not yet formulated an exit strategy that will secure and sustain its interests in Iraq and the region.

Although U.S. influence in Iraq remains substantial, it is less than what it has been in the past. It is diminishing as American troops leave Iraq, as American resources are diverted elsewhere, and as the Iraqis themselves regain the ability to secure their country and govern themselves. This makes it all the more imperative that the United States have a clear strategic concept that establishes clear goals and well-defined objectives that can be achieved with this reduced panoply of tools.

-An American strategy for exiting Iraq must include a ruthless prioritization of U.S. goals and objectives to ensure that the United States directs its residual influence toward securing first what is absolutely vital, and only then whatever else is possible.

The United States will have several different goals as it exits Iraq, but these goals, and the objectives they imply, are not all of equal importance, and Washington must recognize the priorities among them. The following should be the priority for U.S. interests in Iraq:

1. Iraq cannot be allowed to descend back into civil war. Because of Iraq’s own resources and its position in the economically vital and geo-strategically sensitive Persian Gulf region, it would be disastrous for American vital national interests if Iraq were to slip into an all-out civil war, which still remains very possible.

2. Iraq cannot reemerge as an aggressive state. There is little danger of this in the near term, but as the United States works to build a strong, cohesive Iraq that would not relapse into internal conflict, it also must avoid building one that is so powerful and selfconfident that it will threaten its neighbors.

3. Iraq should ideally be a strong, prosperous U.S. ally. Because it will be difficult enough to ensure that Iraq averts civil war and does not emerge as a new “Frankenstein’s monster” of the Gulf, this last objective should be seen as an aspirational goal rather than an irreducible necessity.

Since Iraq is now a fully sovereign nation enjoying a resurgence of nationalism, it is essential that Iraqis see themselves as benefiting from continued American involvement in Iraq. The more the Iraqis believe that the relationship with the United States is of value to them, the more desirous they will be of preserving ties to the United States, and the more willing they will be to overlook American interference or see it as positive, and the more afraid they will be of losing those ties. In this respect, Iraqis generally desire continued American aid, investment, and technical assistance, as well as U.S. help regaining Iraq’s full international standing by resolving major diplomatic issues that arose from Saddam Husayn’s misdeeds.

-The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), a partnership document between Iraq and the United States that was initiated by the Iraqi government, provides a foundation for this type of assistance. If the United States wants to maintain leverage in Iraq, the SFA must ultimately deliver outcomes that Iraqis value.

-For these same reasons, the United States must work in tandem with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, other international organizations, and its allies (in the region, in Europe, and elsewhere) more than ever before. The more that the United States can move in synch with the UN and American allies, the more palatable American initiatives will be to Iraqis.

The most important source of American influence moving forward is conditionality. Virtually all American assistance needs to be conditioned on Iraqis doing the things that the United States needs them to do, which in every case is likely to be something that is in the long-term interests of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi nation, albeit not necessarily in the short-term interests of various Iraqi politicians. Conditioning assistance means linking specific aspects of American activities to specific, related aspects of Iraqi behavior. It also means tying wider aspects of American cooperation with Iraq to the general course of the Iraqi political system.

-Ultimately, the United States must condition the continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship on the willingness of the Iraqi political leadership to guide their country in the direction of greater stability, inclusivity, and effective governance.

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Authors

Raad Alkadiri
J. Scott Carpenter
Frederick W. Kagan
Sean Kane
Kenneth M. Pollack

Image Source: © Staff Photographer / Reuters

A More Viable U.S. Strategy for Lebanon

Bilal Saab — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 14:57:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States should adopt a new approach toward Lebanon if it wishes to secure its interests in that country and in the broader Middle East. The 1983 attack against the U.S. Marines in Lebanon was the beginning of the end of the United States’ involvement in Lebanon. Since then, with the exception of a brief period during the George W. Bush administration, there has been a strong sentiment in Washington that the price of U.S. engagement is too high, and that problems in Lebanon are not threatening to American strategic interests in the Middle East. Even when Lebanon’s problems boiled over on several occasions and threatened to engulf other parts of the region in conflict, the United States still assumed it could treat these problems on the cheap. When the United States did engage during the George W. Bush administration, it did so inconsistently, without a sense of purpose, and without a long-term plan in mind, thus undermining not only Lebanon’s stability, but also U.S. interests in the region.

The core of a new, effective U.S. strategy toward Lebanon should entail a clear understanding by Washington of what is at stake and what it will take to achieve success. The United States has gotten it wrong in Lebanon over the years because it misdiagnosed its own interests there and misunderstood the implications of Lebanon’s problems for U.S. policies.

There are three main reasons why Washington should pay closer attention to Lebanon and help it address its problems while nurturing its assets: One, Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty uphold U.S. geopolitical interests in the Middle East by denying U.S. adversaries—Iran and Syria—the ability to exploit Lebanon to improve their strategic positions in the region at the expense of the United States and its allies. Two, an internally secure and strong Lebanon that is capable of fixing or defusing its own problems boosts U.S. security interests in the Middle East and those of its ally, Israel. Three, the United States has a strategic interest in supporting democratic countries and in strengthening democratic institutions around the world. The fact that Lebanon is a democracy (even if imperfect) with liberal impulses that plays an important cultural-intellectual role in the region, but is surrounded by neighbors who are outright hostile to it should be an American concern.

The United States’ past experiences and setbacks in Lebanon furnish a number of useful lessons that should guide the formulation of a new U.S. strategy toward Lebanon:

• The United States should strike the right balance between immediate needs and longterm interests.

• Washington should take concrete diplomatic action to prevent Israel from using excessive force against Lebanon during times of military confrontation with Hizballah, as largescale punitive operations by Israel against Lebanon are counterproductive and undermine American interests in Lebanon.

• The United States should not intervene militarily to support one Lebanese camp over another. Doing so would deepen Lebanese political polarization, exacerbate existing communal cleavages, and jeopardize the entire U.S. approach.

• The United States should not use Lebanon as a battlefield against regional adversaries or as a bargaining chip in regional diplomacy. Doing so would further destabilize the country.

• Washington should implement a policy that contains Hizballah. No U.S. policy in Lebanon can succeed without an effective containment strategy for Hizballah, the single most powerful political and military actor in the country.

Because Lebanon has internal problems, such as a weak central authority, as well as external problems, such as excessive intervention in its domestic affairs by outside forces, any new U.S. policy toward Lebanon should contain a local component and a regional component. The local part of a new U.S. strategy should entail assisting Lebanon in bolstering its internal strength and stability. While USAID has already made strong contributions to strengthening Lebanese state capacity, Washington should focus on investing in the building of a strong, modern Lebanese national military and security apparatus. Indeed, no area in Lebanon’s state apparatus deserves more urgent attention by Washington than the Lebanese Armed Forces. The current Lebanese military is incapable of assuming the responsibility of defending the country from major internal and external threats, given the small size of its budget and poorly trained and badly equipped combat force. Therefore, because security in Lebanon is in short supply, all attempts at reform and state building will suffer and remain incomplete unless security is achieved.

The regional part of a new American strategy toward Lebanon should address the problem of external intervention. While Hizballah is a product of Lebanon’s internal weakness (the Lebanese state has been historically unable to address the political, security, and socio-economic needs of Lebanese Shi’ah), it is also the product of Iran’s and Syria’s interventions in Lebanese domestic politics. Indeed, Lebanon would have been able to more effectively limit external intervention in its affairs if it were not for Hizballah’s links to Damascus, and especially, Tehran. Washington’s goal, therefore, should be to take diplomatic measures that help turn Hizballah into a purely local actor and end its active involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The “Syrian solution” to the Hizballah challenge (asking Syria to reign in Hizballah) should be a non-starter because its record is bleak and its price tag is high. Indeed, not only did Damascus fail to contain Hizballah when Syria was militarily present in Lebanon (1990-2005), it also harmed Lebanese democracy by maintaining a tight grip over Lebanese politics. A Syrian solution should be even more unappealing to Washington today because President Bashar al-Asad has repeatedly stated that it is in his country’s interest to pursue policies that seek to bolster, as opposed to weaken, Hizballah.

The United States should also forgo military approaches to declaw Hizballah. Israel’s 2006 war shows (as do its previous military actions in Lebanon) that any strategy aimed at militarily destroying Hizballah—short of waging a total war against Lebanon as a whole, which would ignite a regional conflict—would likely fail and backfire. Equally important, any U.S. or Israeli military approach to the Hizballah challenge would significantly undermine other U.S. and Israeli interests in Lebanon by weakening the country and possibly causing further political breakdown and disintegration.

Only Iran, which has long invested in and nurtured Hizballah, is in a position to exert control over the group. Therefore, the United States has a good chance of localizing and taming Hizballah by engaging in direct talks with Iran. However, Washington should realize that Iran will never accept demands to disarm Hizballah (in any event, only the Lebanese people can disarm Hizballah). The most it would do is instruct it to discontinue its regional role and adopt a more compromising posture toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

While it is true that a U.S.-Iranian understanding that includes an agreement on Hizballah would not eliminate Syria’s influence in Lebanon (perhaps nothing would), it can significantly limit it. The main reason why Hizballah has defended Syrian interests in Lebanon over the years is because Syria sends arms to the group and facilitates weapons shipments that come from Iran, making it possible for Hizballah to be a regional, rather than a local, actor. However, if Iran were to instruct Hizballah to discontinue its regional role and armed struggle against Israel, the group would no longer need to receive weapons from Syria and would no longer feel obliged to defend Syrian interests in Lebanon. Instead, it would focus on its local interests, Islamist agenda, and role in Lebanese politics.

Yet, a strategy that reduces Syrian influence in Lebanon would not address the Palestinian issue in Lebanon. Only an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement that successfully tackles the future of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (and elsewhere) would solve Lebanon’s refugee problem.

In order for the United States to protect its interests in Lebanon, it will have to break from its past policies and look at Lebanon in a truly different light.

Implementing a new U.S. strategy for Lebanon would be a difficult task, given the country’s many internal and external complexities, but it is a challenge worth pursuing. The opportunity for a more principled and consistent American approach in Lebanon, one that benefits Lebanon and advances both American interests and ideals still exists, but the recent drums of war in the region serve as a stark reminder that the opportunity may not be around for much longer.

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Bilal Saab

Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran

Tue, 30 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Introduction

What should the United States do about Iran? The question is easily asked, but for nearly 30 years, Washington has had difficulty coming up with a good answer. The Islamic Republic presents a particularly confounding series of challenges for the United States. Many Iranian leaders regard the United States as their greatest enemy for ideological, nationalistic, and/or security reasons, while a great many average Iranians evince the most pro-American feelings of any in the Muslim world. Unlike other states that may also fear or loathe the United States, Iran’s leaders have consistently acted on these beliefs, working assiduously to undermine American interests and influence throughout the Middle East, albeit with greater or lesser degrees of success at different times. Moreover, Iranian foreign policy is frequently driven by internal political considerations that are both difficult to discern by the outside world and even harder to influence. More than once, Iran has followed a course that to outsiders appeared self-defeating but galvanized the Iranian people to make far-reaching sacrifices in the name of seemingly quixotic goals.

Despite these frustrating realities, the United States is not in a position to simply ignore Iran, either. Iran is an important country in a critical part of the world. Although Tehran’s role in creating problems in the Middle East is often exaggerated, it has unquestionably taken advantage of the growing instability there (itself partly a result of American missteps) to make important gains, often at Washington’s expense. Meanwhile, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, properly understood, warned that Tehran was likely to acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons at some point in the next decade.¹

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The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue

Itamar Rabinovich — Mon, 02 Mar 2009 12:00:00 -0500

Executive Summary

The priority the United States placed on the Israeli- Syrian relationship declined dramatically under the administration of George W. Bush, compared to its cardinal position during the period of the Clinton Administration. In addition, during the Bush years, the relative importance of the Israeli component of Washington’s relationship with Damascus declined whereas other components, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, came to the fore. The Bush Administration’s overall policy toward Syria—neither to engage with Syria nor attack it, but to seek soft ways of penalizing it—failed to work.

On the Israel side, the Israeli government’s policy transformed from Ariel Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s initial rejection of “the Syrian option” to Olmert’s quest for a settlement with Syria. It will be up to the Obama Administration and Israel’s new government to decide whether to pick up where Olmert left off. Of critical importance is the fact that the emphasis of Syrian- Israeli negotiations has shifted from the relatively simple formula of “territories for peace” to a more comprehensive formula that includes Syria’s relationship with Iran, Hizballah, and the radical Palestinian organizations.

The Obama Administration and Israel’s new government will most certainly take a fresh look at Middle Eastern diplomacy. The Israeli government will have to decide whether it wants to proceed with the Syrian negotiations, in what fashion, and to what end. It will have to integrate such decisions into a larger strategy that will address the other core issues of Israel’s national security policies: its relationship with the new U.S. administration, how to address the Palestinian issue, and what to do about Iran’s quest for regional hegemony and a nuclear arsenal.

For the Obama Administration, Syria would be a small, yet a significant piece in a larger national security puzzle. Its policy towards Syria and the issue of an Israeli- Syrian peace process is likely to unfold along one of the following four scenarios:

A Derivative of a Potential American-Iranian Dialogue. One of the top priorities of the Obama Administration will be to develop an Iran strategy. It may continue (or push further) the Bush Administration’s policy of isolation or, more likely, it may explore whether a “grand bargain” with Iran is feasible. Such a choice would be natural for a president who had advocated an open dialogue approach with Iran during his election campaign.

If a dialogue materializes and unfolds successfully, a new context would be created for Washington’s relationship with Damascus. An American-Iranian understanding should cover Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. If such an understanding is indeed reached, Syria would no longer be seen as the junior partner of an evil state and therefore U.S.-Syrian accommodation and a new American stewardship of an Israeli-Syrian peace process would be facilitated.

A By-Product of Lingering Hostility with Iran. Should the previous option not be pursued or should it fail, the prospect of wooing Syria away from Iran would loom as a joint policy goal for both the United States and Israel. This idea is not new. In fact, the aim of breaking Syria away from Iran was used by the Olmert government in justifying its decision to enter into and publicize indirect negotiations with Syria. A similar rationale was articulated by France when Nicolas Sarkozy decided to engage with Asad. However, Syria has refused to discuss a change in its relationship with Iran as a precondition to progress in negotiations with Israel. Yet, in the past, various Syrian spokesmen have alluded to the position that Syria’s alliance with Iran is not fixed and that it is mostly a result of Washington’s rejection of Syria. Such claims can of course be tested, but testing them would not be an easy diplomatic exercise. The Ba’th regime has a long tradition of straddling the line and Syria’s leadership is likely, if a dialogue with the United States is renewed, to try to proceed in that dialogue without actually severing its intimate relationship with Tehran.

Henry Kissinger’s success in shifting Egypt in the early and mid-1970s from the Soviet orbit to a pro-American orientation has been cited as a model for pulling Syria away from Iran. It should be noted that a peace process and Egypt’s regaining of the Sinai were important dimensions of that successful strategic realignment. It should also be noted that while the Egypt case is an inspiring example, Anwar Sadat was a bold, visionary leader who was willing to jump from the Soviet orbit even before a safe position with the United States had been secured. Hafiz al-Asad showed no such inclination, and thus far, neither has Bashar.

A Policy of Using Force. As noted above, the Bush Administration decided to avoid both ends of the spectrum by refraining from either dialogue with or using force against Syria. If both varieties of dialogue mentioned above do not materialize, the Obama Administration could reconsider the option of using force against Syria. However, this is a highly unlikely prospect.

A Policy of Maintenance. Should the Obama Administration relegate the Syria issue to a relatively low place on its foreign policy agenda or should it decide to allocate priority to the Palestinian issue, it will have to find a way of keeping it and the question of the U.S. relationship with Syria on hold. If put on the back burner, the Syrian issue may deteriorate into direct or indirect conflict, similar to what occurred in earlier decades. Therefore, a strategy of conflict management will be necessary.

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Itamar Rabinovich

Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach

Richard Youngs and Tamara Cofman. Wittes — Fri, 23 Jan 2009 12:00:00 -0500

Tensions between the United States and the European Union since the 2003 war in Iraq affected many arenas of Middle East policy, but perhaps none has come to encapsulate those tensions as much as the quest to advance democracy in the region. This paper looks beyond the highly charged, Iraq-related deterioration in the transatlantic relationship in order to assess the real similarities and differences in the two actors’ democracy promotion strategies in the Middle East.

The United States and European Union disagreed on some notable issues regarding Middle Eastern reform, and serious mistrust developed between them as they developed their post-9/11 diplomacy on this issue. Yet, the substantive divergence in policy is not as great as is now routinely presumed. Both actors made strong commitments to supporting Arab democracy in the wake of 9/11 and articulated an understanding that democratic development in the Arab world was important to the security of Western states. In light of mounting regional security challenges and certain electoral outcomes, such as the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, both actors shifted some way back toward realist alliance-building with autocratic Arab regimes. Additionally, both parties have been reluctant to engage with Islamist opposition groups, but have done so in various instances.

Fundamentally, European and American officials struggle with the same two challenges: whether and how to offer Arab governments significant incentives for democratic reform, and how to mesh the longterm objective of supporting democracy with shorterterm strategic objectives. In short, both actors share the same challenge of transcending the fundamental ambivalence about the “democracy project” that hampers their policy effectiveness. Advancing sustainable and meaningful political reform in the Middle East will require the efforts of governments on both sides of the Atlantic. American and European policymakers should build upon their shared strategic framework to forge a new partnership on behalf of Arab reform. In this vein, the paper suggests several concrete steps that European and American governments should take:

Avoid concretizing divergent rhetoric in disparate European and American mechanisms or institutions. Brussels and Washington should consider setting up a higher-level transatlantic forum for coordinating policies in the Middle East, along the lines of the U.S.-E.U. strategic dialogue on Asia established in 2005.
Continue issuing joint diplomatic statements on the need for and desired shape of Middle Eastern reform. The Atlantic community should leave Arab leaders in no doubt of the West’s continued interest in and attention to democratic growth and human rights improvements in the Middle East.
Coordinate rewards on offer for democratic reform. The Atlantic allies should seek common criteria for determining such rewards and coordinate on the use of positive conditionality to induce greater reform and ease the costs of change.
Uphold the principle that local civil society can seek and accept foreign assistance. The European Union and the United States should articulate clearly and forcefully that their links to and support of Arab civil society are non-negotiable.
Coordinate positions on engagement with Islamists. Western defense of peaceful political activism should not be selective, and transatlantic pressure should be wielded when regimes crack down on nonviolent Islamist organizations or prevent them from meeting with Western donors.
Improve coordination in the provision of non-governmental aid. American and European government funders should engage in more sustained and regular dialogue on funding strategies for democratic development in specific states, and how to use their funds most efficiently to achieve common goals.
Stress jointly that democratic development in the Middle East is a common interest of Europe, the United States, and the peoples of the region, not a means to other ends. Democracy should be supported as a system that meets the aspirations of Middle Eastern citizens for greater say in their government, and not simply because it is judged as instrumental for Western interests.

Challenges to greater transatlantic policy coordination and effectiveness derive not only—or even primarily— from the invasion of Iraq. They also result from the more prosaic fact that the European Union and United States approach the issue of Middle Eastern political reform from different angles. The United States is still struggling to build a framework for its engagement of Middle Eastern society that would invest its views on democracy with greater legitimacy and credibility in the region. The European Union, for its part, needs to demonstrate that its already-existing forms of multifaceted engagement can translate into a more tangible contribution to democratization. If European and American policymakers wish to move beyond the ructions of recent years, they can and should focus on their points of relative similarity as a foundation from which transatlantic cooperation in the Middle East can, cautiously, be rebuilt.

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Richard Youngs
Tamara Cofman Wittes

Does the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Still Matter?

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 12:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

In the past five years, news in the Arab world has been dominated by mostly painful stories from Iraq. In the Gulf region, many Arabs are caught between a crumbling Iraq and the rising influence of Iran and have focused on Shiite-Sunni sectarianism—while at the same time enjoying economic vibrancy driven by high oil prices and domestic investments. The Lebanese have suffered from the 2006 war with Israel and the ensuing domestic crisis. Egyptians and other Arabs are hurting from rising food prices, and the tragedy in Darfur continues to grab attention. Has all this eclipsed concern about the Palestinians? To what extent do Arabs still care about the Arab-Israeli conflict?

In this paper, I will analyze some of the emerging trends in public attitudes and whether there has been a change over time in the degree to which Arabs assign importance to this issue. The aim is not only to analyze how the ranking of the Palestinian issue has changed in Arab public opinion but also to study the ramifications for Arab perceptions of the divide between Hamas and Fatah, between the government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and the Hamas-appointed government in Gaza. In addition, I will analyze Arab public attitudes toward Israel, Israeli power, and the prospect of Middle East peace. The analysis in this paper is primarily based on six public opinion surveys I completed (with Zogby International). They were conducted face to face in six countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia (KSA), Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Six annual surveys were conducted in 2002-2008, ranging in size from 3300 to 4046 participants, representing a sample of urban, educated populations in each country.¹ Additional surveys are planned for the next two years.

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Shibley Telhami

The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 29 May 2008 12:00:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. approach toward state sponsorship of terrorism rests on a flawed understanding of the problem and an even more flawed policy response. The U.S. Department of State’s current formal list of state sponsors includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. But Cuba and North Korea have done almost nothing in this area in recent years, and Sudan has changed its ways enough that elsewhere the Bush administration credits Sudan as a “strong partner in the War on Terror.” Of those on the list, only Syria and Iran remain problems, and in both cases their involvement in traditional international terrorism is down considerably from their peaks in the 1980s.

What seems like a brilliant policy success, however, is really an artifact of bad list management, because much of the problem of state sponsorship today involves countries that are not on the list at all. Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. Hugo Chavez’s government in Venezuela is a major supporter of the FARC. And several other governments, such as those in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories, create problems by deliberately looking the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups.

These new state sponsors are actually more dangerous to the United States and its interests than the remaining traditional state sponsors, because some of them are tied to Sunni jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida— currently the greatest terrorist threat facing the United States. The nightmare of a terrorist group acquiring nuclear weapons is far more likely to involve Pakistan than it is Iran or North Korea.

The new state sponsors can also be harder to deal with than the old ones, not least because they often have a more complicated relationship with terrorists. In many cases, the government in question does not actively train or arm the terrorist group, but rather lets it act with relative impunity— an approach that, in practice, allows the government to claim ignorance or incapacity. Thus it can be hard to distinguish between Yemen’s willful inaction and cases like Jordan, where terrorist cells also operate but do so despite a fierce regime counterterrorism campaign. Many of the new sponsors are also U.S. allies. And some cooperate, albeit fitfully, with the U.S. war on terrorism even as they surreptitiously allow terrorists to operate from their soil.

Because of this complexity, the answer to the problem does not lie only in updating the State Department’s state sponsorship list to reflect current relationships— swapping out Cuba for Venezuela, say, or replacing North Korea with Pakistan. The very concept of a binary list, with countries either on it or off, is flawed and often does more harm to U.S. interests than good. Once a country is listed it is hard to remove even if it does not support terrorism (as Sudan has found out),and the list provides little incentive for partial or incomplete counterterrorism cooperation (which is all several countries are realistically likely to give).

So what Washington should really do is adopt a new approach that recognizes the complex nature of state sponsorship today. The first step should be to forge an international consensus on a broad definition of what constitutes state sponsorship—a definition that encompasses not only errors of commission, such as arming and training groups, but also errors of omission, such as unwillingness to stop terrorist fundraising and recruitment. A good precedent to follow here is the effort to stop money laundering: by forging an agreement among key states on financial accounting standards, the United States and its allies have been able to make considerable progress on improving compliance and reducing the number of countries with lax enforcement.

At a bilateral level, moreover, simple embarrassment has proven surprisingly effective as a tool against some countries. The spotlight held on Saudi Arabia after September 11 humiliated the kingdom’s royal family,making it scramble to at least appear cooperative. The United States should consider creating a list of passive sponsors and their activities in an attempt to “name and shame” them into better behavior, using as a model the “transparency index” that measures the level of corruption in countries around the world.

If diplomatic pressure has little impact, political and economic penalties should then be introduced. Initially, such penalties should be mostly symbolic at first, embarrassing a regime in front of elites and signaling to foreign investors and others that more harsh penalties are on their way. (Travel bans for regime leaders fall into this category.) If those don’t work, more serious economic and other penalties should come into play over time, tailored to the circumstances of each particular case and with care taken to ensure that both sides understand what, exactly, the sanctions are linked to and what will be required to have them lifted.

Together, such a package of measures would do much more to combat the real problems of state sponsorship of terror that currently exist than does the outdated approach Washington employs today.¹

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Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Saban Center Analysis Paper

The “Shi’i Crescent”: Myth and Reality

Moshe Ma‘oz — Fri, 30 Nov 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Executive Summary

This paper argues that far from there being a threatening “Shi‘i crescent,” or a Middle East about to be torn apart along Muslim sectarian lines, the pattern has been for mixed Sunni-Shi’i states to remain intact. The reason is that important differences remain among Shi’i communities. In many cases, the Shi’ah are more concerned with changing their lot within their existing countries than in binding themselves to Iran, the largest Shi’i community in the region, or in creating any other form of pan-Shi’i alliance.

As for Iran’s regional ambitions, and its alleged leadership of a “Shi‘i crescent,” these are not expressed or implemented in a sectarian Shi’i fashion. Iranian foreign policy aims to advance Iranian national interests as much as to promote any sectarian Shi’i agenda. Furthermore, the growing importance of the Shi’i Arabs of Iraq poses a threat as much as it presents an opportunity to Iran. It is as likely that the Shi’i Arabs of Iraq will rival Iran for the leadership of Shi’i communities in the Persian Gulf as it is that the Iraqi Shi’i Arabs will join with Iran as part of a pan-Shi’i alliance.

The “Shi’i crescent” is therefore largely a myth that masks important, but malleable state interests. By rejecting this myth, the United States can see the Shi’ah in the Middle East for what they are: varied communities with as much dividing them as uniting them, potential partners in some places and aspiring adversaries in others.

The eventual nature of relations between Iran and Shi’i Arab Iraq is a core issue for the Middle East. The nature of these relations will have a tremendous impact upon the smaller Shi’i communities in the Arab Middle East. Tehran prefers an undivided but weak Shi’i-dominated Iraq rather than an Iraq divided into three states: Shi’i, Sunni and Kurdish. A disintegrated Iraq poses a mixture of opportunity and threat that Iran would probably prefer to avoid. Iran is likely to exert strong influence over any Shi’i mini-state in southern Iraq and may even annex it. At the same time, Iran might encounter a significant domestic challenge were there to be an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq because this might encourage separatist feelings in Iran’s Kurdish population.

Even if the Iraqi Shi’ah Arabs emerge dominant and victorious in the current conflict with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, they might not prove to be the close allies of Iran that many imagine. Iran, after all, has pursued policies in contradiction with those of its apparent Iraqi Shi’i allies. For the moment, Iran, like Syria, has no stake in a stable Iraq. Fostering instability in Iraq is a means of indirectly inflicting damage on the United States, but it has also imposed a steep cost on the Iraqi Shi’ah. Quite how relations between Iran and Iraq will develop over the long-term is unclear, but the end result might not be to Iran’s liking.

Moshe Ma‘oz is Professor Emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies and former Director of the Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was recently a visiting scholar at Harvard University working on contemporary Muslim-Jewish relations. He has published widely on issues concerning the political and social history of the modern Middle East, notably Syria, the Palestinian territories, Arab-Israeli relations, and has studied religious and ethnic communities. He has been a visiting fellow at numerous leading institutions including the Brookings Institution, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

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Moshe Ma‘oz

Publication: Saban Center Analysis Paper

Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence Reforms

Yosef Kuperwasser — Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

The events of September 11, 2001 led to large-scale examination of the American intelligence system, with many questioning whether the failure to prevent the terrorist attacks lay on the doorstep of decision makers or intelligence personnel. The questions and concerns stemming from 9/11 led to a commission of inquiry and, ultimately, passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which was signed by President Bush in December 2004. Many of the provisions of the Act advanced specific structural and cultural changes, and were coupled with measures to improve the intelligence “product.” Around the time that the debate surrounding 9/11 was taking place, however, another intelligence failure unfolded. The contention that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, a key rationale behind the George W. Bush Administration’s drive to war in Iraq, could not be substantiated. Again, the debate resurfaced about who—the intelligence community or the policymakers—was responsible. The underlying premise in this discussion over the American intelligence system was that structural, professional, and cultural changes had to be implemented in order to improve the way intelligence agencies perform their missions, and that within the United States, intelligence and policymaking are in fact two separate spheres.

In Israel, there was no major intelligence failure in recent years akin to those mentioned above, and policymaking and intelligence are more intertwined than in the United States. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, Israel’s intelligence leadership felt it necessary to reform the concepts, perceptions, and practices of intelligence since existing methodologies could no longer fully address the growing complexity of the security environment and the emerging threats. While ideas for improving intelligence date back over thirty years in Israel, to the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the reforms in the late 1990s grew from the identification of a number of geo-strategic changes and some new understandings.

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Yosef Kuperwasser

Publication: Saban Center Analysis Paper

Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World

Steven Heydemann — Mon, 15 Oct 2007 12:00:00 -0400

Authoritarianism in the Arab world is not what it used to be. Indeed, it might well be stronger, more flexible, and more resilient than ever, despite the best efforts of the United States, its European Union partners, and Arab democrats to bring about sustained and systematic political reform over the past two decades. While U.S. conceptions of Arab authoritarianism and U.S. strategies for promoting democratic reform have remained largely unchanged during this period, Arab regimes have not stood still. They have adapted by re-organizing strategies of governance to adjust to new global, regional, and domestic circumstances. Autocrats have not simply fallen back on coercion to fend off pressures for change—though repression remains a visible and potent element in the arsenal of Arab governments. Regimes have turned instead to a process that can best be described as “authoritarian upgrading.”

These emerging strategies of governance have undermined gains achieved by democracy promotion programs, and will continue to blunt their impact in the future. Has democracy promotion in its current form run its course? Has it outlived its usefulness? The possibility should be on the table. If democracy promotion has, even if unintentionally, provided Arab regimes with new tools for securing authoritarian forms of governance, should it be continued? If so, in what form?

At a minimum, authoritarian upgrading underscores the need to rethink how the U.S. pursues democracy promotion and to recognize, in particular, that Arab regimes are converging around policies that are explicitly designed to stabilize and preserve authoritarian rule in the context of ongoing demands for political change. At the same time, authoritarian upgrading holds out clues to the kinds of democratic changes it is reasonable to expect in the Arab world, and how these are likely to differ from the Latin American and Eastern European experiences that have been a principal inspiration for U.S. democracy promotion policies worldwide. To be effective in this context, democracy promotion efforts must also adapt.

After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion—if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Strategies that take advantage of the openings offered by authoritarian upgrading are more likely to advance democratic change in the Middle East than the continuation of policies that do not take into account how governance in the Arab world is being transformed. Two openings hold out particular promise:

• First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces;

• Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends.

Both will require substantial adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies.

-----------------
Steven Heydemann is Associate Vice President at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He was formerly a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. From 2003 to 2007 he directed the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University, where he remains an adjunct professor in the Department of Government. He is the author or editor of several books, including Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970; War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East; and Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Reconsidered.

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Steven Heydemann

The Case for Soft Partition in Iraq

Edward P. Joseph and Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 01 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400

The time may be approaching when the only hope for a more stable Iraq is a soft partition of the country. Soft partition would involve the Iraqis, with the assistance of the international community, dividing their country into three main regions.

Each would assume primary responsibility for its own security and governance, as Iraqi Kurdistan already does. Creating such a structure could prove difficult and risky. However, when measured against the alternatives—continuing to police an ethno-sectarian war, or withdrawing and allowing the conflict to escalate— the risks of soft partition appear more acceptable. Indeed, soft partition in many ways simply responds to current realities on the ground, particularly since the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, a major Shi'i shrine, dramatically escalated intersectarian violence. If the U.S. troop surge, and the related effort to broker political accommodation through the existing coalition government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki fail, soft partition may be the only means of avoiding an intensification of the civil war and growing threat of a regional conflagration. While most would regret the loss of a multi-ethnic, diverse Iraq, the country has become so violent and so divided along ethno-sectarian lines that such a goal may no longer be achievable.

Soft partition would represent a substantial departure from the current approach of the Bush Administration and that proposed by the Iraq Study Group, both of which envision a unitary Iraq ruled largely from Baghdad. It would require new negotiations, the formation of a revised legal framework for the country, the creation of new institutions at the regional level, and the organized but voluntary movement of populations.

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Edward P. Joseph
Michael E. O'Hanlon

Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack — Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500

With each passing day, Iraq sinks deeper into the abyss of civil war. President George W. Bush has staked everything on one last-chance effort to quell the fighting and jumpstart a process of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Should this last effort fail, the United States is likely to very quickly have to determine how best to handle an Iraq that will be erupting into Bosnia- or Lebanon-style all-out civil war. The history of such wars is that they are disastrous for all parties, but the United States will have little choice but to try to stave off disaster as best it can.

To begin to help provide a solution to that dilemma, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution have written Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War. This Saban Center Analysis Paper examines the history of some dozen recent civil wars to reveal the general patterns by which such conflicts can "spill over" into neighboring states, causing further civil wars or regional conflicts. Historically, six patterns of spillover have been the most harmful in other cases of all-out civil war: refugees; terrorism; radicalization of neighboring populations; secession that breeds secessionism; economic losses; and, neighborly interventions.

From this history, the authors propose a set of policy options that the United States could employ to try to contain the spillover effects of a full-scale Iraqi civil war. The "baker's dozen" of policy options for the United States are:

Don't try to pick winners;
Avoid active support for partition (for now);
Don't dump the problem on the United Nations;
Pull back from Iraqi population centers;
Provide support to Iraq's neighbors;
Bolster regional stability;
Dissuade foreign intervention;
Lay down "red lines" to Iran;
Establish a Contact Group;
Prepare for oil supply disruptions;
Manage the Kurds;
Strike at terrorist facilities;
Consider establishing safe havens or "catch basins" along Iraq's borders.

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A Policy for U.S. to Contain Civil War in Iraq

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What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration's Freedom Agenda

Sarah E. Yerkes and Tamara Cofman. Wittes — Fri, 01 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400

Three years ago, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration launched what is now known as the Freedom Agenda, an ambitious policy to improve the long-term stability of Arab states and reduce the appeal of extremist ideology by advancing democratic transformation in the region. This new strategy represented a major shift in the traditional U.S. foreign policy approach to the Middle East, and has evoked varied reactions ranging from enthusiasm to ambivalence to outright hostility. Only three years on, the Freedom Agenda is facing a backlash from critics concerned that Arab democratization might not work out in the United States' favor. Elections in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories in 2005 and 2006 brought success to groups with radical and—in some cases—anti-American views, evoking responses from the U.S. government that called America's commitment to democratization into question. Can President George W. Bush's bold democracy drive in the Middle East be sustained in the face of apparent setbacks like those in Egypt and Lebanon? Will the Freedom Agenda, described by its authors as a generational commitment, survive the end of Bush's final term in office?

This Saban Center Analysis Paper will assess what the Bush Administration's Freedom Agenda has accomplished in its first few years, and how well the policy shift it represents has become embedded in the institutions and operation of U.S. foreign policy. In implementing the Freedom Agenda, the U.S. government has deployed multiple tools of foreign policy, including the presidential bully pulpit and diplomatic pressure. This paper will focus on the policy architecture in place to promote the Freedom Agenda, laying out the funding mechanisms and programmatic structures of three major initiatives: the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative; the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative; and democracy assistance programs including those managed by the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the United States Agency for International Development.

U.S. democracy assistance to the Middle East has increased considerably in recent years, but diplomatic efforts to support democratic development have lagged behind. However, the ultimate success of the United States' democracy promotion effort will rest in large part on the degree to which the Administration is able to build effective institutions to advance democracy that will outlast President Bush's term in office. Thus far, the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative both present only limited means to achieve that goal.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative was created in December 2002 as the flagship U.S. program to advance Arab reform. While total Middle East Partnership Initiative funding has remained relatively stable, the allocation of funds has changed significantly over time, as the Administration has focused further on political reform and programs that aid in the long-term processes of social and political institution-building. Through these shifts in programming and through building its own organizational structure, the Middle East Partnership Initiative has improved its ability to work with local Arab actors and worked to influence other aspects of U.S. policy that affect the environment for Arab reform.

The major barrier to effective U.S. support for Arab civil society at present is not the Middle East Partnership Initiative's internal capacity, but the hostility of autocratic Arab governments to any greater independence or activism in the nongovernmental sector. To preserve recent gains by the non-governmental sector and ensure that alternatives to Islamist political parties have the chance to establish themselves and grow, the U.S. government should frontally address with its Arab government partners the imperative for improved freedom of association. The Middle East Partnership Initiative should work closely with U.S. embassy staffs and should receive firm diplomatic support for such efforts to be effective. A further challenge for the Middle East Partnership Initiative and other approaches to democracy assistance is to focus on programs that will affect the prospects for meaningful, long-term political change, despite constant pressure to fund projects that produce short-term, measurable results or public relations opportunities. Empowering local actors and facilitating local coalition-building often means avoiding the spotlight and minimizing the U.S. imprint on projects supported by the Middle East Partnership Initiative. It also requires that the Middle East Partnership Initiative identify concrete milestones and opportunities for interim progress on long-term issues like the advancement of political liberties. The U.S. government should follow through on its declared realization that democracy promotion in the Middle East is a long, difficult process that will not produce its fruits during this administration.

It is clear that the Bush Administration's "forward strategy of freedom," and its flagship program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, have made significant gains since first announced three years ago. Through a large increase in funding over time and improved attention at higher levels of the government, U.S. democracy assistance has managed to make some headway in the Middle East and at home, placing freedom closer to the top of the Administration's foreign policy agenda in the region. However, the U.S. democracy promotion program in the Middle East faces significant challenges over the next two years if it is to remain a relevant part of U.S. foreign policy into the next administration.

To institutionalize the Freedom Agenda for long-term success, the democracy promotion strategy should:

be tailored to country-specific circumstances;
enjoy close and consistent support from ambassadors in the field as well as at the highest levels of the State Department and White House;
resist short-term exigencies, including public diplomacy and strategic considerations, that tend to erode democracy promotion efforts over time; and,
support the social and institutional changes in Arab states that will promote the long-term expansion of freedom and political accountability.

Developing such a strategy requires the Administration to resolve difficult but unavoidable trade-offs among short-term and long-term goals, and between democracy promotion and other strategic U.S. interests. It also requires improved policy coherence across the U.S. government to ensure that no mixed messages are sent to recalcitrant regional rulers. Only if the Bush Administration can settle these questions will the Freedom Agenda outlast the next presidential election. And only when the Freedom Agenda develops staying power will it acquire the necessary credibility with leaders and reformers in the Arab world to lay the foundation for substantive progress in political freedom in years to come.

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Authors

Sarah E. Yerkes
Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution