Brookings: Series - Middle East Memo

The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

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The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

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Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters

Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and The Prospect of A Nuclear Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

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Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters

A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation

Kenneth M. Pollack — Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The potential for confrontation between the United States and Iran, stemming from ongoing tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and western covert actions intended to delay or degrade it, remains a pressing concern for U.S. policymakers. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy hosted a one-day crisis simulation in September that explored different scenarios should a confrontation occur.

The Saban Center's new Middle East Memo, A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation, authored by senior fellow Kenneth M. Pollack, presents lessons and observations from the exercise.

Key findings include:

• Growing tensions are significantly reducing the “margin of error” between the two sides, increasing the potential for miscalculations to escalate to a conflict between the two countries.

• Should Iran make significant progress in enriching fissile material, both sides would have a powerful incentive to think short-term rather than long-term, in turn reinforcing the propensity for rapid escalation.

• U.S. policymakers must recognize the possibility that Iranian rhetoric about how the Islamic Republic would react in various situations may prove consistent with actual Iranian actions.

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Kenneth M. Pollack

Image Source: © Fars News / Reuters

Unraveling the Syria Mess

Kenneth M. Pollack, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and Marisa C. Sullivan — Wed, 08 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy joined with the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War in June 2012 to host a one-day crisis simulation that explored the implications of spillover from the ongoing violence in Syria. The simulation examined how the United States and its allies might address worsening instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East as a result of the internecine conflict in Syria.

The Saban Center’s Middle East Memo, “Unraveling the Syria Mess: A Crisis Simulation of Spillover from the Syrian Civil War,” authored by simulation conveners Kenneth M. Pollack, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Marisa C. Sullivan, presents key lessons and observations from the exercise.

Among the key findings:

A humanitarian crisis alone is unlikely to spur the international community to take action in Syria.
Turkey is a linchpin in any effort to end the fighting in Syria, but Washington and Ankara may not see eye-to-eye on what the end game should be.
U.S. history in Iraq and Lebanon make intervention there unlikely, even if spillover causes a renewal of large-scale violence.

The simulation suggested a tension between U.S. political antipathy toward greater involvement in Syria and the potential strategic desirability of early action.

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Unraveling the Syria Mess

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack
Frederick W. Kagan
Kimberly Kagan
Marisa C. Sullivan

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-first Century

Kenneth M. Pollack — Wed, 13 Jun 2012 16:33:00 -0400

In the wake of the U.S. military departure from Iraq and in the midst of Iran’s continued defiance of the international community over its nuclear program, is a new security arrangement for the Gulf in order? If so, is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capable of such a task, or should other institutions be considered?

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack examines the possibility of developing a new security architecture for the region.

Pollack analyzes security arrangements in other parts of the world and focuses on two options: expanding the GCC and turning it into a formal military alliance and creating an arrangement modeled on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In weighing each option, Pollack finds that the latter can better furnish a path toward peace and security.

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Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century

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Kenneth M. Pollack

Image Source: © Fars News / Reuters

The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt

William McCants — Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Last winter, Salafi parties in Egypt proved themselves a formidable political force, winning a quarter of the vote in the country’s first elections in the post-Mubarak era. For many in Washington, the unexpected strength of Egypt’s conservative religious groups raised unsettling questions about the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations and America’s security interests in the region.

Will the political success of Salafis turn Egypt into an anti-American power and strengthen jihadist groups like al-Qa’ida that are bent on using violence against the United States and its allies?

In the Saban Center Middle East Memo, William McCants, a Middle East specialist at CNA and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University, examines the implications of the Salafis’ turn to, and success in, electoral politics. McCants argues that while political participation may not moderate Salafis’ positions on social issues, it will likely erode the strength of their most extreme and violent affiliates. For this reason, America’s interests may be best served when Salafis play a role in post-revolution politics.

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The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt

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William McCants

Image Source: Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

A U.S.-Egyptian Relationship for a Democratic Era

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 16:01:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

A year after President Hosni Mubarak’s fall, U.S.-Egypt relations are at an all-time low. Not, as many expected, because of the rise of Islamist parties, but because America’s longtime allies in the Egyptian military have whipped up anti-American sentiment at a feverish pace. It may have started as a political ploy, a way to build support on the street and highlight the army’s nationalist credentials, but the generals soon lost control. In January, the Egyptian government announced that sixteen Americans—including the son of a top U.S. official— would be put on trial, facing up to five years in prison. Their apparent crime was working for American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom House—that offered support, funding, and election monitoring for Egypt’s uneven transition.

On March 1, the Egyptian government lifted the travel ban on seven Americans who were still in Egypt, allowing them to leave the country. A major diplomatic breach was avoided, giving the impression that the crisis had been resolved. This appears to be the interpretation of the Obama administration, which waived congressional conditions on military aid, citing the importance of maintaining a “strategic partnership” with Egypt.2 However, the charges against the Americans remain, and there is no sign that the American NGOs in question will be able to reopen anytime soon. More importantly, the vast majority of affected NGOs—which are Egyptian rather than American—still find themselves on trial and under attack.

The NGO episode, however worrying it is on its own, reflects something larger and more troubling: the slow descent from the national unity of the revolution to a fog of paranoia, distrust, and conspiracy theorizing. Who is with the revolution, and who isn’t? The roots of the problem lie in the uncertainly inherent in Egypt’s muddled transition. Unlike in Tunisia, where the Higher Committee for the Achievement of Revolutionary Objectives (HCARO)—accepted as legitimate by all of the country’s main political forces—was responsible for managing the transition, Egypt has featured various competing actors claiming their own distinct sources of power. The struggle for legitimacy between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament, and the protest movement has created a fragmented political scene. Everyone wants to lead the transition, but no one wants to take full responsibility for the results.

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Shadi Hamid

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change

Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth M. Pollack and Salman Shaikh — Thu, 15 Mar 2012 10:19:00 -0400

Syria is trapped on a crumbling precipice, and however it might fall will entail significant risks for the United States and for the Syrian people.

The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad is employing its loyal military forces and sectarian thugs to crush the opposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar fails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly likely alternative to the current regime is a bloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon, Bosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors of such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion of Asad’s control, and would cause spillover into Syria’s neighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel—that could be disastrous for them and for American interests in the Middle East.

But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second year, also offers some important opportunities, ones that would come from the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, whose family has ruled the country with an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran’s oldest and most important ally in the Arab world, and the Iranian regime has doubled down on Asad, providing him with financial aid and military support to shore up his regime. Asad’s departure would deal a significant blow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time when it has few friends in the region or the world. In addition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward Israel, and Asad’s regime is also a longtime supporter of terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has at times aided al-Qa’ida terrorists and former regime elements in Iraq. The regime’s collapse, therefore, could have significant benefits for the United States and its allies in the region.

Actually ousting Asad, however, will not be easy. Although the Obama administration has for months called for Asad to go, every policy option to remove him is flawed, and some could even make the situation worse—seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing nothing, however, means standing by while Asad murders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil war and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence is staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000 Syrians have died and thousands more have been arrested and tortured in trying to topple the regime. At the same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition remains divided, and the Free Syrian Army is more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. Al- Qa’ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and sectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should the violence continue to intensify, Syria’s neighbors may increase their meddling, and instability could spread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors like Iraq and Lebanon.

So to protect U.S. interests, Asad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be just as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope, trying to remove Asad, but doing so in a way that keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its borders and ensuring order at home. At the end of the day, however, removing Asad may not be doable at a price the United States is willing to pay. If so, the U.S. government may be forced to choose between living with a brutal but weakened Asad or getting rid of Asad regardless of the consequences.

This memo lays out six options for the United States to consider to achieve Asad’s overthrow, should it choose to do so:

Removing the regime via diplomacy;
Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation;
Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime;
Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory;
Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and
Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.

The options are complex, and policymakers will probably try to combine several in an attempt to accentuate the positives and minimize the negatives, which will inevitably be difficult and bring out new complications. But by focusing on discrete approaches, this memo helps expose their relative strengths and weaknesses. For each course of action, this memo describes the strategy inherent to the option and what it would entail in practice. It also assesses the option’s advantages and disadvantages.

This memo does not endorse any particular policy option. Rather, it seeks to explain the risks and benefits of possible courses of action at this moment in time. As conditions change, some options may become more practical or desirable and others less so. The authors mostly agree on the advantages and disadvantages of each approach but weigh the relative rewards and costs differently.

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Recalibrating the Egypt-Israel Relationship

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction:

There is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worry about demons will tend to run into them. Like much folk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; the likelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears to be exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever since Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt on February 11, 2011, the demon named “Now What?” has been keeping the Israeli government up at night. On August 18, it finally leapt up at them.

That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses, as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat, near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackers from a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed to notice, or ignored, that they were shooting over the Egyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyptians— an officer and two enlisted men—were killed and another three later died of their wounds. Israeli minister of defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestinian groups for the assault, made comments to the effect that the attacks were largely Egypt’s fault as there had been a major security collapse in Egypt since the former regime had been ousted six months earlier.

The way matters unfolded over the next few days pointedly illustrated the answer to a question that had been asked repeatedly both by international media and the Israeli government since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster: What did Egypt’s January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? The simplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual. The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changed and both countries will have to navigate new waters carefully and wisely.

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Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: ï¿½ Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

The Elusive Myth of Democratic Egyptian Elections

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 08 Nov 2010 13:04:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Later this month, Egyptians will go to the polls, or attempt to, in order to vote in the country’s parliamentary elections. The elections will unlikely be a democratic affair in the Western sense. In fact, opposition candidates, voters, citizen groups—essentially everyone other than government representatives—are fully expecting the elections to be a violent and rigged episode. For easy reference, one can look to the June elections for the Shura Council, or upper house of Parliament, in which the governing National Democratic Party (NDP) managed to land 80 out of a possible 84 seats. Those elections were marked by violence and allegations of rampant violations.

Elections in Egypt are not generally democratic, they do not necessarily reflect the will of the people, and they will invariably usher in a house in which the NDP has an unshakeable majority. More so, the elected body has very little control over the government and none over the president, who, thanks to some creative constitutional amendments in 2007, can dissolve the Parliament at will. Election results are apparently so preordained that many have questioned the wisdom of participating at all. Opposition groups, among them the National Alliance for Change (NAC), led by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and current political reformer Mohamed ElBaradei, have been calling for a boycott. ElBaradei told reporters at a Ramadan Iftar meeting on September 7 that voting “would go against the national will.” Many political analysts and some members of the opposition have echoed the belief that participation in the elections only gives credence to a fundamentally flawed system and perpetuates the state myth of a democratic nation.

The above argument certainly has its merits, but it misses the point. Elections in Egypt are not about who wins seats—that is usually a foregone conclusion. They are about the “how and the what,” in the sense that they are oases of political activity, demand, and dissension in an otherwise arid climate. In that way, every election fought represents losses and gains for the respective participants in ways that invariably influence the following elections. Also, the ballot boxes can yield surprising results—as in the case of the 2005 elections when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained a jawdropping 88 of 454 seats in the elections for the lower house. This outcome certainly would not have come about if the Brotherhood had not participated. To be sure, there are also significant, detrimental changes that happen as a direct consequence of the elections, among them constitutional amendments designed to hobble the opposition’s ability to field candidates and campaign. Still, for opposition parties and movements, boycotting the elections is the equivalent of throwing away the only political participation they have. It would mean relinquishing any visibility or influence and it would mean admitting to their supporters that they are essentially mere window dressings in the democratic façade. Arguably, this is a reason why these elections have only ever been boycotted once, in 1990. The Egyptian political arena is one where contestants scrabble for the smallest patch of ground. The high moral ground simply does not figure into it.

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Mirette F. Mabrouk

Assessing the Obstacles and Opportunities in a Future Israeli-Syrian-American Peace Negotiation

Itamar Rabinovich — Tue, 25 May 2010 12:45:00 -0400

Introduction:

In the ebb and flow of Middle East diplomacy, the two interrelated issues of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement and Washington’s bilateral relationship with Damascus have gone up and down on Washington’s scale of importance. The election of Barack Obama raised expectations that the United States would give the two issues the priority they had not received during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. Candidate Obama promised to assign a high priority to the resuscitation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and separately to “engage” with Iran and Syria (as recommended by the Iraq Study Group in 2006).

In May 2009, shortly after assuming office, President Obama sent the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the senior director for the Middle East in the National Security Council, Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus to open a dialogue with Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Several members of Congress also travelled to Syria early in Obama’s first year, including the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Kerry, and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman. In addition, when the president appointed George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East, Mitchell named as his deputy Fred Hof, a respected expert on Syria and the Israeli-Syrian dispute. Last summer, both Mitchell and Hof visited Damascus and began their give and take with Syria.

And yet, after this apparent auspicious beginning, neither the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria, nor the effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian negotiation has gained much traction. Damascus must be chagrined by the fact that when the Arab-Israeli peace process is discussed now, it is practically equated with the Israeli-Palestinian track. This paper analyzes the difficulties confronting Washington’s and Jerusalem’s respective Syria policies and offers an approach for dealing with Syria. Many of the recommendations stem from lessons resulting from the past rounds of negotiations, so it is important to understand what occurred.

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Itamar Rabinovich

How Palestinians are Applying Past Lessons to the Current Peace Process

Khaled Elgindy — Mon, 10 May 2010 16:38:00 -0400

Introduction: Despite the launch of indirect, “proximity” talks between Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas continues to resist a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel absent a full settlement freeze. As chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Abbas also insists that any new negotiations pick up where previous talks left off in December 2008 and that the parties spell out ahead of time a clear “endgame,” including a timetable for concluding negotiations. While these may seem like unreasonable preconditions, Palestinian reluctance to dive headfirst into yet another round of negotiations is rooted in some genuine, hard-learned lessons drawn from nearly two decades of repeated failures both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

Not only have negotiations failed to bring Palestinians closer to their national aspirations but the peace process itself has presided over (and in some ways facilitated) a deepening of Israel’s occupation and an unprecedented schism within the Palestinian polity. Such failures have cost the Palestinian leadership dearly in terms of both its domestic legitimacy and its international credibility. While it remains committed to a negotiated settlement with Israel based on a two-state solution, the PLO/PA leadership has been forced to rethink previous approaches to the peace process and to negotiations, as much for its own survival as out of a desire for peace.

Haunted by past failures, Palestinian negotiators are now guided, to varying degrees, by six overlapping and sometimes conflicting lessons:

1. Realities on the ground must move in parallel with negotiations at the table.

2. Don’t engage in negotiations for their own sake.

3. Agreements are meaningless without implementation.

4. Incrementalism does not work.

5. Avoid being blamed at all costs.

6. Don’t go it alone.

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Khaled Elgindy

The Economics of Influencing Iran

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 13:15:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Influencing the Islamic Republic of Iran has proven to be a perennial conundrum for American presidents. The complexity of Iranian politics and the intractability of the problems posed by Tehran’s revolutionary theocracy may explain why, over the course of three decades, each U.S. administration has been forced to revise its initial approach to Iran in hopes of achieving better outcomes. The overall result has been an American tendency to oscillate between engagement and pressure, with frustratingly limited results.

And so it goes for the Obama administration. After an initial, high-profile effort to draw Tehran into a serious dialogue both to resolve the nuclear issue as well as transcend it, Washington now finds itself pivoting away from diplomatic engagement to a more coercive policy centered around economic pressure. The shift comes amidst a dramatic new context within the Islamic Republic, characterized by historic turmoil on the streets and bitter divisions among the elites, and at a moment when the international urgency surrounding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has never been greater. This context raises the stakes and heightens the sensitivities of getting U.S. policy on Iran right after so many years of failure.

The turn toward sanctions is a predictable one. Sanctions have proven to be an instrument of American policy toward Tehran for the past thirty years. American use of economic pressure as a means of dissuading Iranian malfeasance began with the freezing of Iranian assets after Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and culminated in the nearly comprehensive ban on trade and investment in Iran that has been in place since the Clinton administration. But, despite the appeal of sanctions, their protracted duration underlines their limitations—particularly when they are unilateral—as a mechanism for categorically revising Iranian policy. Still, many find sanctions attractive because the overall track record of Iranian decision-making demonstrates that Tehran often considers the costs and benefits of its policy options in determining its course. As Iran’s internal strife exacerbates the regime’s vulnerabilities, the prospects for international consensus around new economic restrictions appear more realistic than ever before.

To examine the options and implications for using sanctions to address the multi-faceted challenges of Iran, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution held a half-day symposium in late October 2009. The workshop featured off-the-record panel discussions led by experts on Iranian internal politics and the key actors shaping the diplomatic landscape. The conclusions from that session are presented below.

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Suzanne Maloney

Osiraq Redux: A Crisis Simulation of an Israeli Strike on the Iranian Nuclear Program

Kenneth M. Pollack — Tue, 16 Feb 2010 17:23:00 -0500

In December 2009, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the critical decisions each side made during the wargame.

The simulation was conducted as a three-move game with three separate country teams. One team represented a hypothetical American National Security Council, a second team represented a hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The U.S. team consisted of approximately ten members, all of whom had served in senior positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israel team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli decision-makers, and who, in some cases, had spent considerable time in Israel. Some members of the Israel team had also served in the U.S. government. The Iran team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran, some of whom had lived and/or traveled extensively in Iran, are of Iranian extraction, and/or had served in the U.S. government with responsibility for Iran.

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Kenneth M. Pollack

Lebanon on the Brink of Elections: Key Public Opinion Findings

Shibley Telhami — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 12:00:00 -0400

OVERVIEW

As the Lebanese approach a crucial election on June 7th that could alter not only internal Lebanese politics but also Lebanon’s relations with the world, much of the focus has been on predicting the outcome or the likely coalitions that could emerge. Equally important, however, are the expressed opinions of the Lebanese public, many of whom will be going to the ballot box. In many ways, the attitudes of the public on core foreign and domestic issues will be critical to the type of government that could emerge. During the campaign, some important issues of concern to the United States were discussed in the course of the political debate. For example, the current Hizballah-led opposition sought to assure the public that Lebanon would not become an Iran-like theocracy. The United States, for its part, made its intentions clear, through visits by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice-President Joe Biden, both of whom registered their support for the current ruling coalition.

Whether or not these steps will make a difference remains to be seen, but some things are clear: On many issues, majorities of the Lebanese public remain very much at odds with American foreign policy, even as they express somewhat positive views of President Obama. What’s also clear is that on many issues, all the major communities in Lebanon (Shi’ah, Sunni, Christian, and Druze) are united. A critical reason for this is that, quite strikingly, large majorities of each group see themselves as Lebanese above all else. In this way, expressed Lebanese views are more “statist” than the other countries polled in the Arab world (Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates). One issue on which the Lebanese public largely agrees is that of Iran’s nuclear program; a majority opposes international pressure on Tehran to stop its nuclear project.

At the same time, however, the Lebanese public disagrees on several important issues. Some differences are predictable: Few Shi’ah identify Iran as one of the two biggest threats they face, whereas 45 percent of Druze, 29 percent of Sunnis, and 23 percent of Christians do. Other differences are somewhat surprising: While 11 percent of the Shi’ah polled express support for al- Qa’ida’s methods, 20 percent of Christian Lebanese express similar approval.

Not surprisingly, the Arab-Israeli issue is seen as the central issue through which most Lebanese evaluate American foreign policy. But what is striking is that the second most important issue is economic aid, which is significantly different from what publics in other Arab countries state. Whether or not an assessment of the likely economic consequences of the elections will be a factor on voters’ minds remains to be seen, but it is clearly an important issue to them (one that Vice President Biden may have tried to play on when he spoke in Beirut about the unlikelihood of continuing aid if the Hizballah-led coalition wins a majority).

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Shibley Telhami

Democracy Promotion Under Obama: Lessons from the Middle East Partnership Initiative

Andrew Masloski and Tamara Cofman. Wittes — Thu, 14 May 2009 12:00:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Obama administration lays out ambitious foreign policy goals in the Middle East, some wonder where human rights and democracy will fall on the new agenda. While President Bush’s Freedom Agenda was problematic, debates over political reform in the Arab world are not likely to fade, and will inevitably produce policy dilemmas for the United States.

As Obama’s team builds its own approach to democracy promotion, it should examine the record of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), created in 2002. MEPI has overcome early deficits to create a small-scale, successful model of “democracy diplomacy” that integrates foreign assistance with foreign policy. MEPI has reached out to civil society actors in the Middle East, supported local efforts at political reform, and created new incentives for U.S. officials to incorporate democracy and human rights advocacy into their work.

The program still suffers from a lack of top-down policy support, as well as from some programming weaknesses. Overall, though, its record shows how a flexible aid program, embedded in a regional bureau, can help the U.S. government seize opportunities to protect its interests and advance democracy abroad. As such, the program suggests the value of tying foreign aid more closely to foreign policy, and moving at least some aid authority in-country and closer to the ground.

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Authors

Andrew Masloski
Tamara Cofman Wittes

Shaping Lebanon's Future

Bilal Y. Saab — Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

Lebanon is mired in a long running and seemingly intractable political crisis. The country has been without a president since November 2007, a reflection of deep-rooted problems in Lebanese politics. Three years after the withdrawal of Syrian troops, Lebanon has become less, not more stable. The United States therefore needs to craft a Lebanon policy that can help ease the country out of its constitutional gridlock. Such a policy would seek to rebuild state capacity and shield Lebanon from negative foreign interventions, respect its internal balance of power, push for the convening of the international tribunal on the murder of Rafiq Hariri and other Lebanese politicians, and continue sponsoring moves towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Lebanon ’s Unending Crisis

Lebanon has been struggling from what appears to be a non-stop crisis since former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated in Beirut on February 14, 2005. There has been a string of political murders, the heavy cost of conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006, a battle with al-Qa‘ida-inspired terrorists, and relentless internal feuding. The result has been institutional paralysis, economic stagnation, and a political log jam. There have been intermittent episodes of domestic strife akin to the civil war (1975-90).

The crisis has led to an unprecedented political and institutional stalemate. For over a year, the Lebanese government has been under siege from a powerful opposition led by the Shi’i group Hizballah, which is allied with Syria and Iran. The governing coalition, which is anti-Syrian, is endangered by a dwindling parliamentary majority because of the targeted killings of its deputies. The government has vowed not to let Lebanon fall into what it calls the Iranian-Syrian axis. The opposition has pledged to prevent Lebanon from joining what it sees as the U.S. orbit.

Making matters worse, the considerable mistrust among the rival political blocs has prevented the election of a new president. Consequently, Lebanon has been without a head of state since President Emile Lahoud left office on November 23, 2007. Lahoud’s term had already been extended by Syrian fiat in 2004. More than a dozen parliamentary sessions to elect the Lebanese president in parliament have been called off by the speaker of the chamber, Nabih Berri. There is no prospect of a new president anytime soon.

The Domestic Roots of the Crisis

The roots of the crisis in Lebanon are the non-cooperative behavior of Lebanon’s domestic elites and the nature of the country’s power sharing arrangements. These behavioral and structural features of Lebanese politics thwarted any hope of change in the aftermath of Syria’s forced departure from Lebanon in 2005.

Hariri’s killing was followed by the largest demonstration in Lebanese history on March 14, 2005. The massive protest against the Syrian presence was evidence of a groundswell of opinion for national unity and freedom. The March 14, 2005 demonstration was successful and Syrian troops left shortly thereafter.

For a brief period, the momentum for change appeared to be unstoppable. Free parliamentary elections were held in June 2005. In the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal the winning political bloc, the “March 14” coalition, won handily. For the first time in Lebanese history the result was a government with a clear majority in the council of deputies (72 out of 128 deputies).

These election results were unusual as the Lebanese system makes gaining a majority extremely difficult due to inbuilt checks and balances. Moreover, Lebanese electoral tickets are often formed on a constituency-by-constituency basis following negotiation among local sect leaders. These loose coalitions at the local level have rarely formed cohesive blocs at the national level in parliament. One factor that facilitated the “March 14” bloc’s victory was the gerrymandered electoral law bequeathed by Syria. Lebanese politicians from across the spectrum, and whatever their views of Syria, were happy to operate within the electoral law.

“March 14”: out of steam

The euphoria of the “March 14” bloc’s victory and its hold on the legislative and executive branches did not last. Despite support from the United States and the international community, the “March 14” coalition faced considerable challenges in governing. A key obstacle was the obduracy of the opposition, led by the Shi’i group Hizballah, which quickly rallied. One of the peculiarities of the Lebanese system is that it is consultative to a remarkable extent. As a result, the opposition sits as a separate group in parliament while at the same time has ministers in cabinet. Hizballah took advantage of this by asking the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, to shut parliament’s doors, refusing to attend cabinet sessions and then by putting its supporters on the street.

Still the governing coalition was also the author of some of its own misfortunes. Led by Saad Hariri, the son of the murdered former Prime Minister, the “March 14” bloc also thwarted the aspirations of all Lebanese calling for a free, democratic and sovereign Lebanon through internal feuding and its inability to come to an accommodation with the opposition. Arguably Lebanese politicians would have had a better shot at averting the present political crisis had their concept of change been more calmly and effectively negotiated. In particular, instead of politics as usual, they could have sought change under the framework of “no victor no vanquished,” thereby giving every political force a stake in the new system, and “no compromises whatsoever on the issue of Lebanese sovereignty and independence,” which would have considerably helped distance all factions from external backers.

Instead, the promise of change became a political bludgeon that the governing coalition and the opposition used against each other. For the governing coalition, change meant first and foremost ridding Lebanon of any remaining traces of Syrian influence, jumpstarting economic reforms in line with the prescriptions of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), promoting a UN tribunal to bring Hariri’s killers to justice and closer relations with Washington and its Arab allies.

To advance this ambitious agenda, however, the “March 14” coalition needed to retain an upper hand over executive decision making. Unsurprisingly, the governing coalition refused to grant the opposition any veto power in the cabinet. Such an approach, in the eyes of the opposition, went against the historical Lebanese practice of consensus politics, the cornerstone of Lebanon’s often fragile political stability.

The opposition: united at home, divided abroad

The opposition was able to turn the governing coalition’s attitude against it, making Saad Hariri and his allies appear to be opponents of reform (which is not true). According to the opposition, the “March 14” approach of a strong executive under Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was a violation of the spirit of the Ta’if agreement of 1989 that ended the civil war. Indeed, the Hizballah-dominated opposition was able to coalesce around its desire to overturn the political status quo which it views as corrupt, illegitimate, and discriminatory.

Unlike its domestic stance, the opposition does not have a unified foreign policy agenda. Hizballah is keen to maintain its strategic relationships with Syria and Iran, its weapons and its “resistance” option, even if it tarnishes its Lebanese nationalist credentials. Hizballah’s stance puts its Christian ally, Michel Aoun, and his Free Patriotic Party, in a difficult position. Aoun had fought a bloody war against Syria in 1989-90 that ended in his defeat and exile. He now says that he is against all foreign intervention in Lebanon: U.S., Syrian, or Iranian. After returning from exile, Aoun signed a document of understanding with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah in February 2006. Aoun now finds himself trying to reconcile his vision for an independent Lebanon with his alliance to Hizballah, a party whose ties to Syria compromise any hope of Lebanese independence.

Squaring the internal circle

One of the better approaches for dealing with the domestic aspects of the current crisis is to promote pluralism in the Shi’i community. This involves a potentially feasible short-term approach of pushing apart Lebanon’s Shi’i political groups; and a more ambitious, difficult, and long-term strategy of politically distancing the Shi’i community from Hizballah. In the short-term, the governing coalition could promote a political divorce between Amal, the lesser but more secular of Lebanon’s Shi’i parties, and Hizballah, the dominant but fundamentalist party among the Shi’ah and the driving force of the Lebanese opposition. This will be difficult to achieve because the crisis has encouraged Lebanese to instinctively side with their co-religionists and because Amal’s association with Hizballah has in fact increased its political standing.

The longer-term approach will be difficult and time consuming to implement. Hizballah is deeply rooted in Lebanon’s Shi’i community. Moreover, the onus is on the governing coalition. Lebanon’s Shi’i are extremely sensitive to how they are treated by the Lebanese state, a legacy of decades of neglect. Most Shi’ah have unconditionally supported Hizballah because the group offers them social services and a political voice not available from the state or the governing coalition.

Providing the Shi’ah with an alternative to Hizballah will require implementing some of the reforms called for in the 1989 Ta’if agreement. These reforms will impose political costs on some parts of the governing coalition. Changes would include: the decentralization of administration and municipalities, the creation of a bicameral legislature with the lower house holding the legislative initiative and an upper house to represent communal interests, a new electoral law (to more fairly represent the popular vote and end the gerrymandered constituency system), and a stronger, independent judiciary. The abolition of political sectarianism, while essential to the future of liberal democratic politics in Lebanon, is not a realistic goal in the near term (a gradual process is a more stable and desirable path).

The Syrian obstacle

The continued negative interference of Syria in Lebanese domestic politics makes resolving the domestic crisis even more daunting. Syria has not left Lebanon quietly. Instead, Syria has obstructed the introduction of any serious reforms in Lebanon and has for years systematically eliminated its political enemies in Lebanon and cruelly silenced Lebanese voices calling for change and freedom from Syrian rule. Lebanon’s democracy and its foreign policy orientation directly affect Syrian national security. Damascus has been very clear that it will resort to any measure to regain its lost influence over Lebanon. The Syrian regime will also seek to impede any attempt by the UN tribunal to find the killers of Rafiq Hariri, whose murder the Syrian regime is strongly suspected of committing.

Regional and International Ramifications

As Syria’s continued involvement demonstrates, Lebanon’s domestic political crisis has an important regional and international dimension. While Arab League and European diplomatic initiatives have foundered, foreign actors, with the exception of Syria, have actually helped prevent rather than provoke a serious escalation in internal Lebanese tensions.

Wedged between Israel and Syria, Lebanon’s crisis is part of the broader struggle for influence between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Iran, Syria and their proxies on the other. Regional tensions between Saudi Arabia (the strongest Arab sponsor of the governing coalition) on the one hand, and Syria (Hizballah’s strategic ally) on the other also play a role.

Although the governing coalition and the opposition routinely accused the other of arming and training for a possible confrontation, regional forces are working against a new Lebanese civil war. The most important factor here is the tacit agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent a Sunni-Shi’i clash in Lebanon. Both countries fear that this could be transformed into a regional war along the lines of what has occurred in Iraq.

A civil war would cost Hizballah its status

This fear of the broader ramifications has fed down to these two countries’ Lebanese allies. The most militarized party in Lebanon, Hizballah, appears to be taking a more determined stance against conflict as its influence increases. This might appear counterintuitive, as renewed conflict could work in Hizballah’s favor on a local level. What is restraining Hizballah is that it would lose its symbolic status in the region as an Arab and Islamic resistance movement against Israel once it turns its guns on fellow Lebanese and starts a civil war.

The Lebanese and the region know a civil war is a loser for all sides

On a psychological level, all sides know that the logic of war is unconvincing. In April 1975 the Lebanese warring parties firmly believed that a war would produce a victor and a vanquished (they were wrong). In 2008, by contrast, the leaders of Lebanon’s rival political blocs appear to understand that a war would be lose-lose scenario. Regional actors, with the exception of Syria, have a similar perspective.

The Lebanese Army has also proved to be a buffer separating a politically tense Lebanon from the devastation of a new civil war. For the most part the army has acted to deter major and potentially uncontrollable outbreaks of violence.

While the regional and security factors have contained conflict, they are no cause for complacency. There are limits on the extent to which the governing coalition and the opposition can control their followers. As the opposition’s popular demonstrations in recent months have demonstrated, street politics are volatile and can acquire a life of their own. In Lebanon’s stateless society, the smallest external provocation or internal miscalculation can easily cause violence to spiral out of control.

Needed: A Different U.S. Policy

The United States needs to have a Lebanon policy that contributes to Lebanese state building rather than simply deny the country to U.S. adversaries. A collapse of the Lebanese state and a renewed civil war would have a deleterious affect on U.S. regional allies, in particular Israel, but also Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In a similar vein, were Lebanon to fall into the hands of Iran and Syria, this could tilt the regional balance of power against the United States and its allies.

Lebanon’s positives

On the positive side, Lebanon is a highly successful example of U.S. soft power projection in the Middle East. The cumulative impact of such U.S.-sponsored institutions and programs, such as the prestigious American University of Beirut, are too often underestimated. These bodies, and the connections that they have created, have served as important gateways for American ideas and values to reach the wider Arab and Muslim world. In addition, the Lebanese tradition of free market enterprise, democratic politics and religious-cultural diversity offer an alternative to the prevailing authoritarianism of most Arab League states. Nurturing the Arab world’s most open and free society should be a U.S. interest.

Lebanon need not be a costly theater for the United States

The problem for the United States is that its experiences in Lebanon have more often than not been unrewarding due to U.S. blunders and miscalculations. The U.S. intervention of 1958, when U.S. Marines landed at the request of Lebanese President Kamil Chamoun proved to be a misleading exception. The 1958 deployment was brief and without substantial cost.

The U.S. intervention of 1982 was influenced by its precedent in 1958. The United States soon discovered that the context was entirely different. In 1958 Lebanon had been threatened by internal dissent and the ambitions of Syria and Egypt. In 1982 it was a cockpit of warfare, with an Israeli invasion force besieging Palestinian fighters in Beirut, a bruised but powerful Syrian force in the Beka’a valley and dozens of separate armed Lebanese factions already embroiled in lethal contests. The cost to the United States is well known: 283 U.S. Marines were killed and dozens of U.S. nationals were kidnapped and murdered.

Lebanon as a bargaining chip

After the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984, Washington’s attitude was that Lebanon was tradable in the broader sweep of U.S. diplomacy. To secure Syrian participation in the international coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the United States acquiesced in Syria’s policy towards Lebanon. Benefiting from Washington’s decision to turn a blind eye, Syria launched a large and successful military offensive against Aoun’s anti-Syrian government in East Beirut, forcing his capitulation.

Using Lebanon to punish Syria

The value of Lebanon started to change in 2000-2001. This change in attitude evolved as a consequence of the death of Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the installation of an ideological administration in Washington bent on pursuing an aggressive strategy of democracy promotion and social engineering in the Middle East, and Syria’s role in destabilizing Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. Finally, there was the assassination of Hariri in February 2005 in which Syria was implicated.

Lebanon is at the heart of the Bush administration’s Middle East democracy promotion strategy. But for the United States, Lebanon is also the perfect battlefield for settling scores with its adversaries, namely Iran and Syria. As such, Lebanon is where U.S. idealism and realpolitik meet and often conflict. The result is a shattered country torn between two divergent trends of U.S. foreign policy.

Washington treated Damascus’ suspected role in killing Hariri, a U.S. ally and very close friend of Saudi Arabia, as a threat to its interests in the region. The U.S. administration therefore set out to punish Syria. The United States pushed to isolate Syria regionally and internationally, most notably by sponsoring three United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1559, 1701, and 1757) calling on Syria to stop meddling in Lebanese internal affairs. Washington also took bilateral action with presidential executive orders against Syrian government officials.

From denial to support

While U.S. diplomatic initiative, especially at the United Nations, has played an important role in supporting the Lebanese government, U.S. policy has now reached its limits. U.S. policy is having little effect.

Like most of the regional and international players, the United States supports the “March 14” coalition against Syria through diplomatic and economic means while seeking to prevent any military confrontation with Syria. In many ways, the current U.S. stance is a policy of denial, denying Lebanon to Syria but with little hope of promoting a resolution to Lebanon’s internal crisis. The danger of such a policy is that it hands the political initiative to Syria and its allies in Lebanon who can win by waging a gradual war of attrition.

Instead, Washington should craft its policy to support the Lebanese state, not to promote partisanship and political parties. Washington should continue to provide technical and military assistance to Lebanon in its pursuit of democracy consolidation and military modernization, such as by building up the Lebanese Armed Forces. Always stressing transparency and local ownership, U.S. efforts should focus more on inclusive programs such as strengthening the capacity of the Lebanese state as a whole in developing and supporting institutions that are responsive and accountable to all Lebanese citizens.

Similarly, U.S. officials should engage with those in official positions. While it is understandable that politicians belonging to the “March 14” coalition, who are physically threatened by Syria, should seek close personal partnerships and “bonding” with U.S. officials, this provides little benefit to the United States. (Of course, leaders of the opposition do not hide their partnership with Syrian and Iranian officials either). Instead, Washington should avoid becoming embroiled in Lebanon’s labyrinthine politics and its delicate communal balance of power, as the result is more likely to be the destabilization than the consolidation of Lebanon. This is not to suggest a hands-off policy—as this would naturally invite unchecked Syrian and Iranian intervention in Lebanon—but rather to recommend an approach that limits or denies as much as possible whatever rationale or pretext Syria and Iran may have for intervening in Lebanese politics.

By engaging with the government and by building state capacity, the United States can avoid being seen as playing sectarian favorites in Lebanon. After all, a key structural handicap for the U.S. government is its strained relationship with one of Lebanon’s largest communities (and now with its allies): the Shi’ah. Most Shi’ah support Hizballah, which the United States labels a terrorist organization. A policy of supporting the Lebanese state, rather than blindly supporting sect leaders and politicians belonging to the “March 14” coalition, can mitigate that handicap.

Protecting Lebanon from the Middle East

At the same time, the United States needs to shield Lebanon from the volatility of the broader regional struggle. U.S. diplomacy at the United Nations is just one aspect of such an approach. Not using Lebanon as a means of punishing Syria is another aspect. This does not mean, as some have suggested, abandoning or compromising on the UN tribunal to try the murderers of Hariri and other Lebanese politicians. Instead, the United States should push for the tribunal’s rapid installation. Once the tribunal is created and is a functioning, independent, and international legal institution, it is less easily treated as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy.

Finally, Washington has to continue sponsoring a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. The peace process, which is not in the best of shape at present, will take many years. Any process that promises a fair solution to the Palestinian refugee issue (Lebanon has a large Palestinian refugee problem), that promotes an end to the Israeli occupation of the Sheba’a Farms and that releases Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails will bolster the Lebanese state.

Lebanon’s crisis is unfortunately not about to end soon. Promoting regional diplomacy that insulates Lebanon from the region’s conflicts and protects it from Syria is a good start.

Authors

Bilal Y. Saab

Elections in the Arab World: Progress or Peril?

Andrew Masloski and Tamara Cofman. Wittes — Mon, 12 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500

The symposium convened a group of experts in two panels to assess how Arab regimes, Islamist oppositions, pro-democracy activists and outside actors mobilize around elections and seek to influence the process of political change. The symposium sought to identify lessons and opportunities for the United States and other outside actors to develop better policy responses to Arab elections to advance democratization.

Women, Elections, and Democratic Growth: The Kuwaiti Experience

The symposium began with a keynote address by Dr. Rola Dashti, a pro-democracy activist and former parliamentary candidate from Kuwait. Dashti is the chairperson of the Kuwait Economic Society. In her presentation, Dashti argued that the Kuwaiti parliamentary elections of June 2006 marked the first time in the country that women were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates for office. She laid out the ways in which elections can serve as a positive force for democratic change by speaking about her own experiences as a female candidate and voter in the Kuwaiti elections of the summer of 2006. She argued that the democratic process has the ability to transform societies and governments. While elections can function to help authoritarian regimes consolidate their hold on power, she noted that they are also an opportunity for opposition parties to gain significant ground and for ordinary citizens to change the dynamics of politics in their countries.

According to Dashti, nearly as many women voted in Kuwait as men. Dashti cited voter turnout figures showing that 58% of women who were registered to vote, all of whom were newly enfranchised, cast their ballots. By comparison, of registered men, just 73% voted. A law passed before the elections ensured that 100% of all eligible Kuwaiti women were registered to vote, while only 80% of men eligible to vote actually registered, despite the several decades during which voting had been open to men. Given this disparity in registration and turnout, Dashti noted, the total number of Kuwaiti women that voted was nearly equal to the total number of males turning out to vote, indicating a strong democratic impulse among Kuwaiti women and undermining the position of those who argued that women had little interest in politics.

Dashti asserted that the presence of women, both as candidates and as constituents, compelled all the candidates for parliament to consider seriously issues of particular concern to women. She related one example of a voting district where a woman married to a non-citizen ran for office with a single-issue campaign: enabling women to pass their citizenship on to their children. The level of popular support for her policy initiative forced all of her competitors in that electoral district to agree with her stance on this issue. Dashti noted that although this woman failed to win elected office, she was able to change the policy agenda of the successful candidates merely by running.

Women's activism and participation throughout the elections had a ripple effect in other areas of Kuwaiti political life. For example, it has opened up the diwaniyya, a traditional element of politics in Kuwait, which had previously been an exclusively male domain. A diwaniyya is an evening gathering, at which people discuss issues of political, economic, and social importance. Before the 2006 elections, Dashti noted, some Kuwaitis had questioned how women could effectively participate in politics without attending any diwaniyya. In the run-up to the elections, therefore, Dashti and other women candidates and activists began to attend diwaniyyas, and even held some of their own. By the end of 2006, Dashti related, the women were even welcomed at the Emir of Kuwait's high-profile diwaniyya that was held at the beginning of Ramadan.

Addressing the question of how to further democratic transformation in Kuwait, Dashti said that it was important to build on the fact that there was a high voter turnout during the last elections. Bringing people to the polls is not the most significant problem, she asserted; how to influence for whom they vote and what issues motivate them should be an important focus for Kuwaiti pro-democracy activists. She acknowledged that in other countries of the region, however, generating public participation remained a challenge.

Dashti argued that grassroots mobilization is crucial to the success of a democratic movement. People in the region must call strenuously and consistently for democratic development and reform in their own countries. Barring this, she said, there is little that outside forces can do to assist in bringing about such change. Dashti stated clearly that, despite the chaos in Iraq and Lebanon, there is no "ideological crisis" when it comes to democratic development in the region. Rather, she believes, the Arab world faces a "grassroots crisis"—a failure to mobilize enough people within the region to demand political reform.

Dashti emphasized the need for the pro-democracy movement in Kuwait and elsewhere to undertake an honest internal assessment so that it can build on the gains of the past few years and ensure its long-term impact. Lasting changes, she said, will begin to take shape only when elite figures within the pro-democracy movements stop regarding democracy as an issue-franchise reserved for them and their narrow circle of supporters. Dashti suggested that this "grassroots crisis" was due in part to the need for generational change in the leadership of these pro-democracy movements. The younger generation, Dashti said, is ready to deepen and broaden the democratic credentials of the liberal movements in the Arab world. However, older leaders must give up their hegemony over these movements and make room for these younger activists and the grassroots members they bring with them.

Lastly, Dashti argued, it is important for pro-democracy movements to capitalize on the use of new technologies. Blogging and other internet-based phenomena, she said, have proven instrumental in facilitating dialogue and activism in many of Arab countries. Also, the use of mobile telephone text messages has proven particularly useful for political communication and organizing rallies and other forms of political mobilizations in the Gulf region.

What Do Elections Accomplish for Governments and Oppositions?

Ellen Lust-Okar discussed why authoritarian regimes hold elections, noting that elections can help regimes to consolidate their control. She observed that elected parliaments can help autocratic rulers by acting as a channel for distributing state resources to citizens. Parliamentarians thus become dependent on the regime for the resources their constituents need, and citizens seek out personal relationships with their members of parliament to gain access to goods and services, diverting discontent and demands away from the state apparatus. As long as a regime possesses sufficient resources to distribute, its citizens will vote for the candidates or parties with sufficiently close relations with the regime to allow them to deliver. Indeed, citizens are likely to will prefer such well-connected candidates and parties to those candidate or parties with whom they may actually agree in terms of the issues and their political beliefs. Members of parliament who cause trouble for the government, such as by discussing government excesses, pressing demands for reform, and so on, are unlikely to be re-elected, as they will be unable to provide their constituents with access to state wealth. Elections can therefore assist the regimes by serving as low-cost means of managing patronage and containing dissent.

As a result of the role that autocrats create for parliaments, Lust-Okar argued, they cannot serve as useful political platforms for opposition parties. Instead, she noted, elections can actually harm political opposition groups because the regime uses their failure to win votes to paint them as weak, ineffective, and unrepresentative of popular views. Compounding this problem, elections that take place under authoritarian regimes provide a veneer of democracy, while undermining both local and external demands for political reform and greater political freedoms.

Jarrett Blanc examined the challenges for democracy-building of holding elections either under conditions of conflict, or in societies emerging from conflict. Using the examples of Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, he said that pre-eminence of the conflict as a political issue means that the elections' success can only be measured by how far they facilitate a termination of the conflict. Under the best circumstances, elections can force warring parties to reassess the effectiveness of military force as a tool for political domination. If connected to a peace accord, elections can also accelerate the shift to non-violent conflict resolution.

Blanc emphasized that U.S. policymakers often have little discretion regarding the timing of elections in conflict-ridden areas, making debates over sequencing moot. Much more important, he argued, is determining whether or not free and fair elections can be held. For example, although Hamas participated in, and ultimately won, the most recent Palestinian Legislative Council elections, there was little evidence to suggest that it used its weaponry to affect the electoral outcome. In such a case, a fair political contest was possible despite the environment of conflict and the participation of armed groups in the political process.

Nathan Brown spoke about the role Islamist movements in many Arab states play in the electoral process. Many Islamist groups participate in elections because the process provides a relatively open area within which they can publicize their platforms. Also, those Islamists that win election to the legislature find themselves in a relatively protected political space, where they can raise and debate issues that might otherwise be too dangerous for them to discuss publicly without the cover of parliamentary membership.

At the same time, Brown noted, elections can be dangerous for Islamist movements because those constituents who elect Islamist candidates expect them to deliver on their promises to extract benefits and concessions from governments over which they in practice have very little influence. Islamists who serve in parliament thus tend to focus on pragmatic, achievable goals. At the same time, Islamist leaders outside of formal politics continue to focus on broader issues and can take a more oppositional stance. These different incentives can cause Islamist movements to fracture, thereby weakening the anti-regime opposition. A final danger for Islamists is that participating in elections and entering parliament risks legitimating the regime and its form of governance. In conclusion, Brown argued, these mixed incentives for Islamist movements mean that different Islamists groups can make end up making different choices over time, which belies the notion that their ideology dictates a consistent pattern of behavior.

Pro-Democracy Advocates and Elections: What Is To Be Done?

Sherif Mansour focused on the ways in which opposition elements in Egypt attempted, but failed, to use the elections to expand on their demands for democracy. The Mubarak regime never intended for the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005 to empower opposition parties, Mansour noted. Instead, the electoral changes were a superficial concession to the Egyptian people in the face of growing demands for reform. Mubarak attempted to use the elections to preserve the political status quo.

Once the pro-democracy movement demonstrated its ability to attract popular support, Mansour argued, the regime fought back to close the Pandora's box that it had opened. Not only did the regime actively interfere with the parliamentary elections, but it launched a containment plan to reverse what few gains were achieved by opposition parties. The Egyptian regime's backlash against democratic demands was enabled by a more permissive international environment. Chastened by Islamist successes in the Palestinian territories and Iraq, the Western nations that had formerly been so aggressive in their calls for liberalization began again to embrace the stability of Mubarak's Egypt. Mansour concluded that the outspoken support of Western states for Egyptian democracy is crucial to the resuscitation of the internal reformers' cause.

Les Campbell spoke of the dangers inherent in Arab elections, but warned against abandoning support for elections in an effort to prevent radical change. Elections, he argued, empower moderate political opposition groups and serve to moderate Islamist parties by drawing them into the electoral process. Seen in this light, every election held in the Arab world during the last ten years has been positive for the long-term growth of democracy. Even when elections have brought Islamists to power, he argued, this step served to bring Islamist movements closer to the norms of competitive politics.

Still, Campbell argued, too much emphasis on elections can be as problematic as rejecting their importance. There must also be an emphasis on the "framework issues," those rules that govern the political context within which elections occur. Campbell concluded by encouraging Western aid groups not to abandon liberal parties or to let up the pressure on Arab regimes to reform.

Almut Wieland-Karimi argued that, while elections are an important step on the road to democracy, they receive too much emphasis in the media and from policymakers. There are many Arab countries in which elections have been held to appease external pressure, despite the fact that internal conditions hardly favored an open, or even moderately open, political contest. In countries that do not enjoy the rule of law, and that do not have laws that regulate the political parties of the establishment let alone the opposition, she said, it is bad policy to ask people to go to the polls.

Wieland-Karimi argued that western audiences and policymakers tend to focus too much on the "free and fair," procedural aspect of Arab elections: whether or not people are allowed to cast their ballots free from interference and intimidation. An equally important component is the degree of political pluralism in the electoral process, whether real opposition parties exist and are allowed a genuine chance to compete. She argued in conclusion that a commitment to cultivating greater pluralism in Arab politics is a useful focus for Western democracy assistance.

Conclusion

Although regimes have proven adept at manipulating elections to their advantage, opposition movements and pro-democracy activists can still gain from participating in the electoral process. Local pro-democracy activists must struggle to encourage wider public engagement with electoral politics and with democratic movements. The United States and other Western states can help by continuing to pressure regimes in the region to allow greater participation by the citizenry in elections as voters, candidates, and as grassroots activists. No single election will shift a state from autocracy to democracy, but elections are now a regular part of the Middle Eastern political fabric. They should not be discounted or ignored. Instead, they should be treated as opportunities for incremental change. Cooperation between internal and external democracy advocates can make each new election more meaningful than the last.

Tamara Cofman Wittes: Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution.
Rola Dashti: Chairperson, Kuwait Economic Society; former parliamentary candidate for the National Assembly, Kuwait.
Ellen Lust-Okar: Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.
Jarrett Blanc: International Affairs Fellow, the Council on Foreign Relations.
Nathan Brown: Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.
Sherif Mansour: Fellow, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy.
Les Campbell: Senior Associate and Regional Director of the Middle East and North Africa team, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
Almut Wieland-Karimi: Executive Director, Washington, DC office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Authors

Andrew Masloski
Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Should The United States Engage Syria? A Saban Center Policy Forum Debate

Andrew Masloski — Fri, 17 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500

Should the United States engage with Syria? The renewed interest in this question derives from concerns about Syria's alliance with Iran and Hizballah following the recent war between Israel and Hizballah, and a widespread view that the Arab-Israeli peace process needs to be revived. Hints from Syrian President Bashar al-Asad that he might be open to talks with the United States and Israel, and reports of Syrian assistance in foiling an attack on the U.S. embassy in Damascus, have encouraged consideration of the engagement option.

In recent weeks, retired officials, such as former Secretary of State James Baker III and former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami have urged engagement and dialogue with Syria. At the same time, senior officials in the Bush administration, notably outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, have expressed firm opposition.

The debate at the Saban Center's Policy Forum considered the following questions: What gains might the United States reasonably expect from engagement with Syria? Can the United States engage with the Syrian regime without compromising its goals in the war against terrorism? Is President Bashar al-Asad of Syria a viable partner for engagement and, if so, what lessons from previous attempts at dialogue might the United States employ in talking with him?

Joshua Landis: The Case For Engaging Syria

Syria's obstructionist behavior derives largely from the fact that the United States has historically allied itself with Syria's enemies. Rapprochement with Syria would change this context. Moreover, Syria's undefined international borders, as opposed to the Ba'thist state's ideology, is what fuels radicalism in Syria. An intrinsic component of a United States-Syrian rapprochement, then, would be a concerted US effort to press Israel to conclude a peace agreement with Syria and end the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights.

Syria's support for Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories will remain unwavering until it regains the Golan Heights and there is a lasting Israeli-Syrian peace. Syria's continued support for groups such as Hizballah and Hamas has been a necessity for Syria, a weak power attempting to bolster its influence. However, Syria would no longer be able to justify its interference in Lebanese affairs or its support for Hamas and Hizballah following the return of the Golan Heights. Moreover, there is no reason why Israel cannot have a stable peace with Syria, in the same way as it has stable peace with Egypt and Jordan. Israeli-Syrian peace, brokered by the United States, would ultimately goad Syria to exercise positive influence over Hizballah and to act as a mediator for talks between Israel and the Palestinians. That would also deprive Hizballah of its main justification for maintaining a military wing and refusing complete incorporation into the Lebanese government. Syria could then be instrumental in pressuring Hizballah to integrate better into the Lebanese state.

Second, the United States should engage with the Ba'thist government in Syria because any hope of uprooting it is futile. Those who argue that President Bashar al-Asad is weak or foolish in his political calculations, need to explain Asad's insistence on maintaining close ties with and support for Hizballah and Hamas which look like quite shrewd calculations. This consistent support has given Damascus influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Asad rightly predicted the Iraqi reaction to the 2003 U.S. invasion. Given positive Syrian economic indicators, the United States would not succeed in pressuring Syria into changing its policies through economic means. Asad can comfortably wait out the final two years of President George W. Bush's term in office and wait to see what the attitude of the next U.S. president will be. Consequently, continued U.S. isolation of Syria, will not produce another Libya-style reversal, but only a continued, painful stalemate for the Levant.

The greatest contribution the United States could make to the future of the Middle East would be to facilitate the establishment of recognized international borders by pressing for a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace. Resolving this conflict would contribute to Syria's democratization more effectively than anything the Bush Administration had yet attempted. With the Arab-Israeli dispute over, the basic ideology of the Ba'th Party will be redundant and "a real debate" between Syrians regarding the future of the country could then begin. The return of the Golan Heights would translate into more pressure on President Bashar al-Asad to end the system of one-party rule in particular and to renounce Ba'thism generally. Also, the return of the Golan Heights would help Syrian reformers and democrats because it will allow them to win back some of the credibility they have lost from their close alliance—real or perceived—with the United States. Ultimately, the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to Syria is the key to de-radicalizing the Middle East and depriving the current Syrian regime of an issue it has thus far successfully exploited to fend off calls for reform and democratization.

Ammar Abdulhamid: Dangers of U.S.-Syrian Engagement

Syria finds itself in conflict with the United States and with the international community primarily because of the policies taken by the al-Asad "clique," a corrupt group whose core motivation is simply to retain power. The issue of the Golan Heights has been useful for the al-Asad "clique" in drumming up anti-Israel and anti-American sentiments whenever it finds itself under challenge internally.

Political engagement is preferable to military conflict, and therefore U.S. political engagement with the Syrian regime should not be ruled out from the start. At the same time, the United States should only engage a corrupt and dictatorial ruling élite according to clear guidelines. These must ensure first and foremost that the United States obtains more than it concedes in such a dialogue. If this cannot be assured, engagement would only empower the current ruling group in Syria and thereby create a larger problem than the one engagement intended to resolve.

The purpose of U.S. intervention in the Middle East is to win the war against terrorism. As such, any engagement with Syria must be considered in the light of its contribution to victory against terrorism. Syria has supported terrorism for decades, both because it makes Syria relevant in the region and because it gives Syria a means of negating its military inferiority to Israel. U.S. engagement with Syria, would be inconsistent with U.S. counterterrorism policy. The Middle East peace process is just one U.S. interest in the Middle East, and it should not trump the core imperative of winning the war against terrorism.

U.S. engagement will not only shore up the Ba'thists internally, but it will also have the effect of ending the UN investigation into the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Such a step would undermine the current Lebanese government. Moreover, this engagement with Syria would cede its influence over Lebanon. In addition, the United States would be compelled to allow Syria to play a greater role in Iraqi and Palestinian affairs.

The assertion that returning the Golan Heights to Syria would force the Syrian state to reform internally is dubious. It is just as likely that the state would again avoid any discussion of internal reform by claiming that it needed to focus on Iraq.

Ultimately, engagement with Syria is dangerous for the United States because it risks further empowering the current Syrian government beyond its borders with unacceptable consequences for the United States. In order to engage with Syria, the United States will be required to abandon its promotion of democracy and respect for human rights not just in Syria, but also in the Middle East.

The notion that the alliance between Syria and Iran is likely to be broken by the offer of American incentives is debatable. In fact, the Syrian-Iranian alliance is close, of long duration, and rooted in common interests and mutual benefits. Engagement with Syria would also strengthen rather than weaken Iran, and this would compound an earlier miscalculation in U.S. policy towards Iran that eliminated the Iranians' two main enemies, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Syria's continued relationship with Iran might even enable Damascus to act as an intermediary between Iran and the West, which would divide the United States off from its allies rather than splitting the Syria-Iran axis.

The United States cannot realistically expect engagement to alter Syrian policies with regard to key U.S. concerns. For example, the present Syrian government cannot act effectively against Islamist radicalism because the Alawite sectarianism of the al-Asad "clique" has caused conflict with Syria's Sunni Islamists. The government has dealt with this by exporting radical Islamism to other countries in the region. This demonstrates that the Ba'thists are unwilling to risk a direct confrontation with Syria's Islamists and will therefore continue to turn a blind eye to the activities of Islamists.

Furthermore, the Syrian government requires an atmosphere of constant crisis to maintain its internal legitimacy. As such, Syria cannot fully satisfy U.S. needs by abandoning its current troublesome policies toward Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian rejectionists, or Iran. Instead, any U.S. engagement with Syria will result in the United States completely satisfying Syria's wishes without achieving Syrian reciprocity, violating the principle of "get more than you give" when negotiating with dictatorial regimes.

Engagement with Syria should be considered after the completion of the UN investigation into Hariri's death, and should be undertaken with the clear understanding that engagement with Syria is de facto engagement with Iran. Given that, engagement with Syria should take place within a regional framework for democracy promotion and respect for human rights, and that honors countries' obligations to UN principles and resolutions.

Unless the United States adheres to these principles, it risks turning its back on the pro-democratic forces in the region, who constitute the last group of people in the Middle East who still look kindly on the United States. The United States should heed the lessons from its last attempts at engagement with Syria, which took place in the 1990s and failed for reasons which are at least in part directly attributable to Syria.

Debating the Key Issues

The discussion that followed focused on two key issues: the strength of the Syrian-Iranian alliance; and the potential costs of U.S. engagement with Syria.

Regarding the Syrian-Iranian alliance, Abdulhamid said that Iran has for some time cultivated deep and complex relationships with different members of the al-Asad family and that Iran serves as Syria's only committed ally in the region, making it difficult to separate Damascus from Tehran. In addition, Abdulhamid claimed that, without cooperation from Iran, Syria's influence over Hizballah could be significantly reduced. Landis countered that Iran's and Syria's interests are not synonymous, and diverge particularly when it comes to the issue of Iraq. He argued that the Shi'ah Arabs in the south of Iraq identify more strongly with Iran, whereas most of the Sunni Arabs in Iraq's al-Anbar province identify with Syria and have begun sending their family members there for education and healthcare. This example, he suggested, indicated a genuine possibility for driving a wedge between Syria and Iran on an issue key to U.S. interests.

In discussing the costs and consequences of U.S. engagement with Syria, Abdulhamid warned that legitimizing Syrian authoritarianism through dialogue would result in more sectarianism and instability. Citing Syria's poor record on human rights and democracy, Abdulhamid warned that American engagement with Syria would be tantamount to stabbing Syrian democrats and reformers in the back. Landis countered that the positive consequences of engagement would outweigh the costs, and that the pro-democracy movement in Syria is so small and weak that U.S. actions would have little effect on it. While noting that engagement with the Ba'thist state would indeed add to its legitimacy, Landis asserted that it is already legitimate in the Middle East and Syria. He further argued that U.S. engagement could be a positive force for much-needed stability in the region, adding that Syria needs U.S. assistance to manage effectively the changes occurring in the Middle East. Landis also maintained that, regardless of the United States' opinion, Syria will soon be "in the driver's seat" as an important player in the region, a country that others will have to consult with on regional issues. Consequently, Landis argued refusing dialogue with Syria will isolate Washington more than it will Damascus.

During the discussion, some argued that the United States had already made generous offers to Syria, such as during the Clinton years, but that Damascus had rebuffed these approaches. In addition, an argument was made for separating the issue of engagement with Syria from the issue of dealing with Iran, with the recommendation that the United States should attempt dialogue with both countries at the same time. In response to this suggestion, Abdulhamid felt that such an approach would be more consistent and honest than engaging Syria alone, and would be more likely to yield strategic benefits for the United States. The question remained open, however, as to whether the current Syrian government is a viable and effective a partner for dialogue.

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy hosted a debate on October 23, 2006 between Joshua Landis, assistant professor at the University of Oklahoma, and Ammar Abdulhamid, a Saban Center Nonresident Fellow, on whether the United States should engage with Syria. Martin S. Indyk, Director of the Saban Center, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and twice U.S. Ambassador to Israel, and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Saban Center Research Fellow and Director of the Arab Democracy and Development Program, chaired the event

Authors

Andrew Masloski

Publication: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Dual Dilemmas: U.S. Policy Options for the Israeli-Palestinian Predicament

Martin S. Indyk and Tamara Cofman. Wittes — Fri, 19 May 2006 00:00:00 -0400

The recent Palestinian and Israeli elections have produced a uniquely complicated environment for U.S. policy-makers as they contemplate what to do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Bush Administration's final years. Perplexingly, Israelis have elected a center-left coalition government committed to withdrawal from the West Bank at the same time that Palestinian voters have given an unreconstructed, rejectionist Hamas the reins of power in the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Given Hamas' disinterest in negotiations with Israel, Ehud Olmert, Israel's new Prime Minister, will instead be in Washington on May 23, 2006 to begin negotiating his "consolidation" plan for West Bank withdrawal (also known as the "convergence" plan) with President George W. Bush. Meanwhile, civil strife and a humanitarian crisis are growing in Gaza, the PA faces imminent collapse because of Hamas' inability to pay civil servants' salaries, and Palestinian violence against Israel and against each other is likely to escalate. Despite these tumultuous developments, strong majorities of Israelis and Palestinians continue to support President Bush's vision of a two-state solution as the means for resolving their dispute, and significant proportions of Israelis and Palestinians still support negotiations.¹

At such moments of apparent diplomatic stalemate, when violence looms, American and other third-party efforts play a crucial role in preserving the gains made in earlier periods of progress, in safeguarding the possibility of future negotiations, and in preventing the destructive impact of violence. A policy of containment or conflict management, however, is insufficient to resolve the dual dilemmas that the recent elections have generated for Washington. On the Palestinian side, the Bush Administration's well-justified policy of blocking the Hamas government's access to international assistance appears likely to make that movement more popular, while Washington receives the blame for the looming Palestinian humanitarian crisis. On the Israeli side, a U.S. embrace of Olmert's "consolidation" plan could encourage a deep Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, which could imperil the prospects for a negotiated solution, and benefit a Hamas only too glad to take territory from Israel without paying a price.

Superficially, the answers to these two dilemmas appear obvious: in principle, the United States cannot recognize, condone, or in any manner support the Hamas government unless it meets the minimum standards set by the international community—standards that the Palestinians embraced when they elected Mahmoud Abbas as president in 2005. Likewise, given the impossibility of Israel negotiating with a Hamas-led PA that rejects its very existence, the United States should, in principle, support an independent Israeli plan to remove its citizens from West Bank territory. Yet how the United States applies these two principles could have profound implications for President Bush's vision of "two states, living side by side in peace and security."² Indeed, given the current direction of events, the final years of the Bush Administration could witness the emergence of an Israel existing uneasily behind a high barrier side by side with an emerging Palestinian failed terror-state. That nightmare vision cannot be what President Bush has in mind.

These two principles cannot, therefore, serve as sufficient bases for U.S. policy. They must be wedded to a third principle: continued adherence to the objective of a negotiated, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only such a mutually agreed settlement can produce lasting security for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Although far from achievable at present, this should remain the core U.S. objective. To protect this goal, the United States needs to walk a careful line. While the Bush Administration should support Israel's plan to withdraw from occupied territories, it should seek to shape that withdrawal to maximize the possibilities for a later, negotiated peace. Similarly, while the United States should shun Hamas unless it changes its stripes, U.S. policy should be to encourage viable Palestinian alternatives that can become credible and authoritative negotiating partners for Israel. U.S. disengagement from its longstanding investment in facilitating a negotiated solution will be self-defeating and could contribute to a strategic realignment of Palestinian society with the rejectionism of Hizbollah, Iran and Syria. That realignment, on the fault-line of relations between the West and the Muslim World, would bode ill, not just for President Bush's vision of a two-state solution, but also for his efforts to change the rogue behavior of Iran and Syria and the broader war against terrorism.

This Middle East Memo presents recommendations generated by the seventh Daniel Abraham Israeli-Palestinian Workshop, held April 24-26, 2006 at the Saban Center at Brookings. In this Workshop, a group of senior Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, European Union, and American experts and officials held an off-the-record discussion of the current stalemate, the stakes for all sides, and the choices facing the major actors in the coming months. The list of participants appears at the end of this document. However, this memo does not necessarily reflect the views of the participants, and is written in our names alone. We are very grateful to Daniel Abraham, whose determination to find a way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict inspires us and makes these workshops possible.

THE DANGERS OF THE STATUS QUO

The removal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 left a vacuum that was quickly filled by contending Palestinian warlords, security forces, and political organizations. The crumbling PA, whether run by Fatah or Hamas, has proven unable to control the situation. The consequent anarchy and internecine strife, along with continued rocket and terrorist attacks on Israel, have impeded the flow of goods into Gaza, rendering the hard-won, U.S.-sponsored agreement on the Gaza-Egypt and Gaza-Israel passages almost inoperative. These dire circumstances and the cut-off of international aid and Israeli tax remittances following Hamas' assumption of power are creating an economic and humanitarian crisis. As food and medical supplies run short in Gaza, a new United Nations study suggests that on current trends the Palestinian population could face a severe humanitarian crisis by the end of this summer.³

The isolation, hardship and divisions within Palestinian society may presage the collapse of PA institutions. The Palestinian political system has long been fragmented and dysfunctional. Now, however, the PA is splintered among parallel and competing institutions because the president and prime minister, both enjoying electoral mandates, present sharply divergent political programs. Hamas controls parliament and the cabinet along with some militant forces, but the various squabbling factions of Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah Party control the security services, the top levels of the PA bureaucracy, the judiciary, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), some armed militias, and the PA presidency.

If the PA is to govern effectively, some minimal consensus among these competing forces is required—which current tensions suggest is unlikely. Disputes over control of PLO and PA offices and resources are severely damaging any authoritative mechanisms for resolving the dramatic divisions among Palestinians on domestic and foreign policy. Violence between armed Palestinian factions has already broken out: wider civil strife is likely to follow.

The deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territories could also generate increased violence and terrorist attacks against Israel. A Hamas leadership that is failing to govern will possess little incentive or capacity to restrain militants. Another intifada with popular support could result if Hamas successfully blames the developing calamity on Israel and the Western powers. Hamas may already feel competitive pressure to use terrorism from Palestinian Islamic Jihad's (PIJ) successful suicide attacks (including the April 17, 2006 bombing that killed eleven people in Tel Aviv). Israel may respond to increased terrorist attacks by expanding military activity in populated Palestinian areas, and in extreme circumstances by reoccupying parts of the Gaza Strip. These dynamics could precipitate the collapse of the PA, turning Gaza and the West Bank into failed statelets, and necessitating international intervention in a hostile environment.

In such circumstances, Prime Minister Olmert's withdrawal plan could prove impossible to implement. Indeed, his coalition government could fracture, with Olmert losing his governing majority (a fate that befell two previous Israeli governments when attempting to cede territory). Olmert's coalition does not have the necessary majority of 61 votes in the 120 seat Knesset for unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. He is already relying on parties outside his coalition to enable him to proceed with the withdrawal. An Israeli political crisis would delay unilateral withdrawal and might stymie less ambitious, but still vital U.S. efforts at Israeli-Palestinian crisis management.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT HAMAS?

The Bush Administration's decision to cut off all aid to the PA once Hamas took power was inevitable and necessary. U.S. law, Congressional opinion, and basic American interests made funding a government that rejects the fundamental principles of America's approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues impossible. Similar considerations drove the European Union to quickly impose its ban on funding the Hamas-led PA. Nevertheless, that decision prompts the question, what is the ban's purpose? Is the leverage of U.S. and international assistance best wielded to generate regime change (the collapse of the PA) or behavioral change (the moderation of Hamas' policies)?

In practice, the distinction will be blurred because the aid cut-off might result in the Hamas government's collapse, even if its true purpose is to moderate Hamas' behavior. U.S. policy must therefore seek to communicate to Palestinians that Hamas' decision to reject the basic principles of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence is the cause of their government's inability to meet their basic needs. If Palestinians understand Hamas' failure in this light, then they will eventually seek alternative leaders and political programs. If, however, Hamas is able to blame its shortcomings on international pressure, then international isolation of Hamas will backfire and increase the popularity of Hamas and its rejectionism. Thus far, Hamas has turned the tables on U.S. policy by arguing that the funding suspension is a deliberate, cold-hearted external veto upon the Palestinians' free exercise of their democratic rights, revealing the insincerity of U.S. democracy promotion. Moreover, Hamas is counting on the looming humanitarian crisis to split the Quartet (the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States), because the European Union and Russia will want to find ways to assist the PA while the United States will firmly oppose it—thereby isolating the United States, not Hamas.

In other words, U.S. policy is already proving counter-productive and therefore needs adjustments to eliminate its contradictions:

First, the Bush Administration should clarify that its objective is for the elected, Hamas-led PA to meet the requirements of international legitimacy (i.e. forswear violence, accept Israel, and honor existing agreements), not to engineer that government's overthrow. The United States should repeatedly emphasize that these "rules of the game" were established by the Palestinians when their official representative, the PLO, signed the Oslo Accords, recognized Israel and renounced violence. By rejecting these three conditions, Hamas should be portrayed as undercutting hard-won Palestinian legitimacy, setting back the Palestinian cause by decades;
Second, the Bush Administration should specify steps that Hamas could take were it inclined to observe the "rules of the game", and should make clear that if Hamas met these conditions, then the United States would treat it as a legitimate government. The most important step would relate to violence and terrorism. As the elected government, Hamas would have to demonstrate responsibility for the territory under its control. This would mean stopping all "resistance" activities not just by Hamas cadres but also by PIJ, the Popular Resistance Committees, and Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. If Hamas did so consistently, then it would have acted more effectively against terrorism than the Fatah PA. Moreover, Hamas would have to explain its arrest and disarming of terrorists to Palestinians, in contrast to its previous espousal of "resistance" activities. Such measures would do more to demonstrate Hamas' true intentions than verbal gymnastics designed to approximate the Quartet's conditions without actually meeting them;⁴
Third, given that Hamas will likely remain intransigent even if provided with such a "road map" to recognition, the United States should encourage alternative Palestinian leadership. Such a course is difficult. It could take years for Fatah to rehabilitate itself as a credible alternative to Hamas. Independent parties are also unlikely to generate significant popular support in the short-term. This leaves bolstering Mahmoud Abbas as the only viable, short-term alternative. As the elected president of the PA, Abbas has a popular mandate to forswear violence and negotiate peace with Israel. As the Chairman of the PLO, he is already the legitimate interlocutor for such negotiations.

The problem is that Abbas has lost credibility in U.S. and Israeli eyes because of his inability to prevent violence or establish order. There is a genuine question about his ability to deliver on any commitments made in negotiations, including securing Hamas' acquiescence to an agreement with Israel.⁵ Nevertheless, he is for the moment the sole alternative Palestinian leader, and the United States should treat him accordingly by seeking to bolster his capabilities and effectiveness. Because past experience suggests that his leadership style makes fulfilling this role problematic, the United States should also maintain support for the development of other Palestinian political forces. And in strengthening Abbas, the U.S. should bear in mind that it could at the same time undermine Palestinian progress toward accountable government, progress resulting from ten years of U.S. investment in Palestinian democracy;
Fourth, the United States should find effective means to communicate to Palestinians that their welfare and their future are matters of concern to Americans. Congress has already appropriated some $450 million in aid for the Palestinians, which has now been blocked because of Hamas' accession to power. The Bush Administration should use some of these funds to provide emergency humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations and UN agencies, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the United Nations Development Program, which can aid Palestinians independently of the Hamas government. The remaining funds should be held in a U.S. trust fund for the Palestinians, available for distribution when their government plays within the rules of international legitimacy;
Fifth, now that the Quartet has decided to explore establishing a "temporary international mechanism" to provide direct assistance to Palestinians, the Bush Administration should engage actively in its design to ensure that the Quartet does not head down a slippery slope of funding and engaging with Hamas-led PA ministries. To avoid such an outcome, the mechanism would need the following structure:
Hamas can be expected to object to what would be a purposeful diminution of its control over these institutions. It could use violence, for example by targeting international aid workers, occupying hospitals and schools, or by intimidating civil servants from "collaborating" with the president's office and the ITF. But as Palestinians' circumstances worsen by the day, they would face a clear choice between supporting Hamas and forgoing international aid, or supporting their elected president's partnership with the international community and acquiring the necessary health, education and welfare assistance. With the PA unable to pay salaries or fund welfare facilities, Hamas' ability to block the mechanism's operations could become untenable in the face of Palestinian desperation. Even if Hamas managed to prevent ITF operations in the short-term, the mechanism should remain available for use in the likely event of the PA's collapse, when international intervention would become a necessity;⁶

WHAT TO DO ABOUT ISRAEL'S "CONSOLIDATION" PLAN?

Ehud Olmert will make his first official visit to the White House as prime minister on May 23, 2006. While Iran may top the agenda of mutual U.S.-Israeli concerns, Olmert's campaign promise of rapid disengagement from the West Bank Palestinians also demands American attention.

During the recent election campaign, Olmert signaled his intentions and his strategy to Israelis more clearly than any Israeli leader in recent history. He noted that while he prefers negotiated withdrawal to unilateralism, he will not wait indefinitely for the Hamas government to remake itself to enable negotiations. In some comments, he has suggested that his withdrawal timetable will begin at the end of the year.⁸ His government has also suggested that withdrawal could include Arab suburbs of East Jerusalem.⁹ Moreover, he has repeatedly stated that the withdrawal will set Israel's final borders, which have remained undecided since the state's founding in 1948.

No American president could seriously contemplate rejecting an offer of Israeli withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements from any of the territories occupied in 1967. The question is not whether the United States should welcome Olmert's "consolidation" plan, but how. Put otherwise, what requirements should be attached to America's support, and what diplomatic, political and security context can the United States foster for the withdrawal to ensure that it contributes to the U.S. goal of a negotiated two-state solution. These questions are pertinent because Prime Minister Olmert may make President Bush an offer that he will find difficult to refuse: that the extent of Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank be commensurate with the degree of U.S. willingness to legitimize Israel's new borders.

Presenting the Israeli withdrawal this way puts President Bush in a bind. He will want to maximize the Israeli withdrawal to promote the viability of a future Palestinian state and rightfully claim credit for laying its foundations. However, longstanding U.S. policy and previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements specify that those borders be determined through Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. If Israel unilaterally decides the extent of its withdrawal, with U.S. blessing for its new borders, then the United States will have acceded to Israel's unilateral drawing of the future Palestinian state's borders. Since "consolidation" would involve annexing settlement blocs occupying some eight percent of the West Bank, this Israeli imposed border will be rejected as illegitimate by the Palestinians and the Arab states. America's Quartet partners are also likely to strongly oppose the move.

Nonetheless, President Bush might be sorely tempted to respond positively to his Israeli ally's request to abandon the imperative of negotiating a final settlement. Bush tends towards radical and unconventional approaches to foreign policy, discarding, for example, thirty years of non-proliferation policy to secure a historic and controversial nuclear deal with India. Heading into his final years in office, his "legacy phase", Bush might ask himself whether a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from over 90 percent of the West Bank, including Arab suburbs of east Jerusalem, would enable history to judge him favorably as the father of a viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian state. With such a prospect before him, maintaining the U.S. commitment to an eventual negotiated solution might appear foolish given its meager prospects with Hamas in power. He might well see it as a theoretical ideal obstructing an attainable good.

If this prospect proves too powerful to resist, the Bush Administration should still shape Israeli "consolidation" to minimize negative consequences and maximize the chances for an eventual negotiated agreement. Any legitimization of Israel's withdrawal as fulfillment of its territorial obligations under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 (1967) would therefore need to be combined with the following:
Olmert's efforts to finalize Israel's borders may be impossible to implement if Palestinian violence and terrorist attacks escalate. In such circumstances, Israel is unlikely to contemplate removing its forces from the West Bank or allowing Palestinians free access to the Jordan border and Arab east Jerusalem, as this would increase rather than decrease the vulnerability of Israeli civilians.

The Bush Administration would therefore be wise not to commit to any particular formulation regarding the Israeli withdrawal until it is actually carried out. The worst possible outcome for U.S. interests would be to make forward-leaning statements regarding the significance and implications of Israel's withdrawal, only to have the withdrawal curtailed or cancelled because of changing conditions in the Palestinian territories or an Israeli political crisis.

A "STATE WITH PROVISIONAL BORDERS"?

Taking all these requirements into account, President Bush might decide that legitimizing Israel's unilateral borders is too costly. He could then contemplate another option: use Olmert's evident willingness to withdraw from the West Bank to promote negotiations with Abbas over an interim agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian "state with provisional borders."

Transforming Israeli unilateralism into negotiations over Palestinian statehood contains several advantages. It would maintain the consistency of America's approach to a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian solution and enable President Bush to achieve his goal of a Palestinian state during his time in office. A negotiated agreement on statehood would undercut Hamas by preventing an Israeli withdrawal being viewed as a victory for violence (unlike Gaza disengagement), and would provide Palestinians with a credible political alternative to isolation and misery. Furthermore, a negotiated agreement on a Palestinian state would require the dismantling of the PA and its replacement with a newly elected, sovereign government. This time, however, election rules excluding parties that do not forswear violence or accept negotiated agreements could be devised and strictly enforced.

On the security level, negotiating a Palestinian state with provisional borders would be an improvement over unilateral withdrawal. Israel could retain in the interim certain security assets in the West Bank, obviating the extensive security arrangements required by a final withdrawal. The current multiple, competing PA security forces could be dismantled in favor of a functional structure. A Palestinian state would perforce have a monopoly on the use of violence within its territory, giving President Abbas the necessary grounds to act against militant groups and collect privately-held weapons.

Another advantage to this approach is long-range, but important: when Israelis and Palestinians finally negotiate an end to their conflict, they would do so as equals, state-to-state. This would eliminate the difference in status that has plagued past negotiations, and make Palestinian commitments more explicitly binding and enforceable under international law.

Prime Minister Olmert intends to spend this year testing whether a Palestinian negotiating partner is available. Using this time to promote a negotiation on "interim statehood" would not force Israel into an undesirable agreement, and would preserve the unilateral withdrawal option. The attempt would assuage discontent among Olmert's partners about "consolidation." Influential voices in Olmert's government, including his coalition partners in the Labor Party and ministers from his Kadima Party, prefer to negotiate Israel's withdrawal with Abbas than deliver territory gratis to the Hamas-led PA. By pursuing Palestinian statehood, Olmert could demonstrate to Labor his preference for negotiations, while reassuring right-wing critics that he does not intend to yield territory in exchange for nothing. Indeed, for Israel, withdrawal in the framework of an agreement on Palestinian statehood would enable it to secure Palestinian commitments to the demilitarization of that state and other critical security arrangements which might not be implementable in current circumstances but will be important in the future and would be unattainable if the unilateral withdrawal option is pursued.

The option of a Palestinian state with provisional borders is provided for in Phase Two of the Quartet's Road Map. Drafted in the middle of the second intifada and never implemented, the Road Map remains the only post-Oslo framework agreed by all the relevant actors. Under the terms of the Road Map, the parties cannot enter Phase Two until Phase One is completed—a phase that requires Israel to freeze settlement building and the PA to dismantle the infrastructure of the terrorist organizations. Pursuing a state with provisional borders involves jumping over Phase One requirements and moving directly to Phase Two.

While this shift would free the Palestinians of their Road Map obligation to fight terrorism, the fact is that Israel's withdrawal from West Bank territory unilaterally, without any Palestinian reciprocity, would render the PA's Phase One obligations irrelevant anyway. Moreover, if the Bush Administration laid out a new "road map" (see above) by which Hamas could comply with international obligations, it would be conditioning diplomatic and financial relations with the PA on fighting terrorism and dismantling the terrorist infrastructure. This is a more effective way, in the current circumstances, of achieving the same Phase One objectives. Palestinian security obligations should also be incorporated into any statehood agreement. A Palestinian counterterrorism commitment, however doubtful its implementation, is worth more than the absence of any obligation to responsible behavior that will prevail following Israel's unilateral withdrawal.

Should President Bush wish to pursue a state with provisional borders, he will first have to convince President Abbas, who has repeatedly rejected this option. Abbas is currently proposing immediate final status negotiations (Road Map Phase Three). Abbas objects to interim statehood because of fears that the international community will forget the Palestinians once the interim state is recognized, leaving the Palestinian state's provisional borders to become its de facto final borders. Alleviating this concern requires providing U.S. and international guarantees about what a Palestinian state's final borders will look like, and when they will be achieved. These guarantees could be provided in a letter of assurance enunciating the "Bush Principles" for a final agreement. The principles of "territorial compensation," refugees and Jerusalem that were discussed in the context of U.S. legitimization of Israel's borders could be similarly employed to facilitate negotiating a state with provisional borders.

THE DEFAULT OPTION: MINIMAL WITHDRAWAL

As he contemplates these options, President Bush may find his appetite for renewed activism on the Israeli-Palestinian front limited by the policy challenges he faces elsewhere in the Middle East. The outcome of the Iraq and Iran predicaments will likely determine Bush's legacy more than any move on Palestinian statehood. Even setting these issues aside, Bush has generally avoided major investments in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, restricting his personal role to statements from the bully pulpit, while U.S. efforts have focused on short-term crisis management.

In current circumstances, he might wish to shun any Israeli-Palestinian policy option that demands significant new U.S. engagement. If Bush is not prepared to enable a major Israeli withdrawal or to jumpstart interim negotiations, then Israel will likely revert to a "default" option: a more modest, unilateral withdrawal from outlying West Bank settlements after completing the security barrier around key settlement blocs. The problem with this "default option," however, is that it will reinforce trends toward growing anarchy, and greater Hamas influence, in areas left to Palestinian rule. It will also complicate Bush's efforts on other Middle Eastern fronts, as Iran and Syria exploit the deterioration in the Palestinian arena to help them escape the isolation and containment that the U.S. seeks to impose upon them. The results will be increased Palestinian hardship, more terrorism against Israelis, and extinguished hopes for an outcome that would best serve the interests of Americans, Israelis and Palestinians: a negotiated, two-state solution.

American influence will strongly determine whether Israel's West Bank disengagement is conducted in a manner that facilitates a later negotiated settlement, is simply consistent with that possibility, or at worst undermines it. Similarly, while rejecting Hamas as an appropriate interlocutor, America's attitude toward the PA and its interactions with other segments of Palestinian society will strongly influence the possibilities of promoting alternative Palestinian leadership that will enjoy the ability and legitimacy to negotiate effectively with Israel and to implement agreements.

The Bush Administration's choices regarding whether to use its remaining influence to improve the current negative environment and increase the likelihood of future peace negotiations will be read as signs of U.S. diplomatic commitment and creativity, and more fundamentally of our commitment to an Arab-Israeli peace process begun and sustained through the efforts of seven consecutive American administrations. An American misstep, just as surely as precipitous actions by Israelis and Palestinians, could help to render this conflict insoluble. That outcome must be avoided at all costs.

The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Ariel Kastner in the preparation of this paper, as well as the other staff of the Saban Center who made the Workshop possible.

IP WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

Palestinians
Ziad Abu Amr, Member, Palestinian Legislative Council, Gaza
Ziad Asali, Founder, American Task Force on Palestine
Amjad Atallah, Founder and President, Strategic Assessments Initiative
Salam Fayyad, Member, Palestinian Legislative Council; Former Minister of Finance
Nisreen Haj Ahmad, Former Member of Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestinian National Authority
Lamia Matta, Legal Advisor, Palestinian Negotiations Support Unit
Khalil Shikaki, Director, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Israelis
Nahum Barnea, Saban Center Kreiz Visiting Fellow and Columnist for Yediot Ahronot
Giora Eiland, Chairman, National Security Council
Avi Gil, Former Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation
Eival Gilady, CEO, The Portland Trust; Former Head of Coordination and Strategy for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
Gidi Grinstein, Founder and President of Re'ut Institute
Pini Meidan, Former Policy Advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
Amnon Lipkin Shahak, Chairman of the Board, Tahal Group; Former Deputy Prime Minister
Baruch Spiegel, Israel Defense Forces Head of Civilian and Humanitarian Issues vis-à-vis Security Fence; Brig.-Gen. (Res.) Israel Defense Forces

Americans
Edward Abington, Bannerman and Associates; Former U.S. Consul General, Jerusalem
Daniel Abraham, Chairman, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation
Robert Danin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Martin Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Daniel Kurtzer, S. Daniel Abraham Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Egypt
Scott Lasensky, Senior Research Associate, United States Institute of Peace
David Makovsky, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Program Director, International Crisis Group
Kenneth Pollack, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Kim Savit, Senior Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
Puneet Talwar, Senior Professional Staff Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland
Toni Verstandig, Senior Policy Advisor, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

International
Hassan Barari, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan
Markus Bouillon, Associate, Middle East and Special Programs, International Peace Academy
Ezzedine Choukri-Fishere, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt
Marc Otte, Special Representative to the Middle East, European Union
An International Trust Fund (ITF), fully transparent and accountable, available to all donors, including Arab states, devoted to direct assistance to the Palestinians;
A "partnership" arrangement with the Office of the PA President through which funds for healthcare, education and welfare would be channeled. ITF appointed representatives working inside the Office of the PA President in partnership with PA Presidential advisors would administer these sectors (including hospitals and schools). ITF representatives would be jointly accountable to President Abbas and to the ITF Trustees;
If the ITF succeeds in delivering assistance to the Palestinians without involving the Hamas-led government, Israel should be encouraged to place Palestinian tax revenues into the ITF. Similarly, Congress could be encouraged to shift previously-appropriated funds into this mechanism;
The line of withdrawal needs to allow for maximum contiguity of Palestinian territory, a connection between the West Bank and Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, a border with Jordan, and an eventual West Bank-Gaza connection. The Israeli army would need to withdraw from the Jordan Valley, and be replaced by an international force. To provide the West Bank-east Jerusalem corridor, Bush would have to insist that Olmert rescind his planned annexation of "E1", territory adjacent to Ma'ale Adumim;
Evacuating some 60,000 settlers and some sixty settlements will be expensive, and Israel will almost certainly seek U.S. financial assistance. President Bush is not obliged to agree. The United States has consistently opposed the building of the settlements from their inception after the 1967 war. However, if Olmert is prepared to withdraw from at least 92 percent of the West Bank, Bush should provide loan guarantees (which require Congressional approval and budgetary set-asides);
Any U.S. statement acquiescing to "consolidation" must articulate the principle that any final agreement provide "territorial compensation" or "land swaps" for the limited West Bank territory that Israel would annex. This American statement would maintain faith with President Bush's commitment that an Israeli withdrawal and a Palestinian state would end the occupation that began in June 1967;¹⁰
Additional American principles regarding a final status agreement should be enunciated alongside any blessing for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. Reference could be made to the principle of compensating Palestinian refugees and funding their absorption into the Palestinian state or resettlement elsewhere, including in Israel under family reunion arrangements. Reference could also be made to the principle of a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem, and preserving universal access to the holy sites. In this way, Bush could embrace the contemporary necessity of Israeli unilateralism, while underscoring the enduring U.S. commitment to a negotiated final settlement;
Finally, consistent with the approach of strengthening President Abbas as an alternative to Hamas, Bush should press Israel to coordinate the withdrawal with the PA president, so that he, not Hamas, wins the credit for liberating the West Bank. Abbas will not want to be seen as legitimizing Israel's annexation of West Bank territory, but he might be willing to coordinate the withdrawal in exchange for U.S. assurances about territorial compensation, refugees and Jerusalem.
Sixth, in the security arena, the Bush Administration should keep focusing on Hamas' obligation to prevent violence while helping to build the security capabilities of the forces remaining under PA Presidency control—the Presidential Guard and Force 17. These forces will probably remain too small to supplant Palestinian Police or Preventive Security Forces' functions, but they could usefully ensure the efficient functioning of the Gaza-Egypt and Gaza-Israel passages, which are critical to preventing a humanitarian crisis. Recently, President Abbas deployed the Presidential Guard at the Rafah crossing point, thereby considerably improving its security arrangements. This also improved Abbas' credibility with the United States and Israel⁷
Finally, the Bush Administration should not oppose Palestinian efforts at a national dialogue that could eventually bring Hamas to accept the international community's requirements. These efforts by President Abbas and by Marwan Barghouti, the imprisoned Fatah leader, will ultimately be meaningless unless they result in a clear termination of violence against Israelis. In the meantime, however, they indicate that some Palestinian leaders are prepared to assume responsibility for moderating Hamas' rejectionism. Such a dialogue could open divisions within the Hamas leadership, separating more pragmatic internal leaders from those remaining under the influence of the rejectionists in Tehran and Damascus.