Brookings: Series - NE Asia Commentary

Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Management: Keeping a Proper Balance

Jibum Chung — Tue, 07 May 2013 12:16:00 -0400

Counter-terrorism strategies and tactics are rightly in the consciousness of officials and civilians in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing. While preventing future attacks should be a leading priority for government at all levels, officials must take care not to focus only on the threat of terrorist attacks. Doing so could diminish the resources, preparation, and skills needed for management of other disasters, and therefore result in greater risk to the population.

Psychology of terrorism

The major characteristic of contemporary terrorism is its unexpectedness. The time and manner of attacks are unpredictable and catch targeted communities – normally innocent civilians – by surprise. In the past, targets of were often political and symbolic figures, not the general public, and the perpetrators proudly notified who they were and why they had acted. The purposes and targets of contemporary terrorism, on the other hand, are often very unclear. Terrorists attack innocent civilians indiscriminately without prior notification, making attacks more difficult to prevent.

Even though the physical damage from terror attacks is normally smaller than that from large natural disasters, the psychological damage of such terror attacks is significant. Early research performed by Paul Slovic and others in 1980s delved into this concept of psychological damage. Using psychometric methodologies, they defined several important characteristics of many different forms of risk. At that time, in the wake of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant accident in 1979, their main research target was nuclear power plants. Slovic underlined the importance of psychological effects of risk stating that “despite the fact that not a single person died (in the TMI accident), … no other accident in our history has produced such costly societal impacts.”[1] Reminiscent of today’s terror attacks, they concluded that the nuclear risk is unknown, dread, uncontrollable, involuntary, and likely to affect future generations, so it has a very critical impact on the minds of the general public. Contemporary terrorism shares many of these characteristics: it is usually unknown, frightening, uncontrollable, involuntary, and also indiscriminately fatal to even children (future generations). It surely has significant psychological effects on people’s minds.

Terrorism and media

For the news media, terrorism is a very strong “product” which easily attracts a lot of viewers. Most media aggressively sell the product, terrorism, and help sow fear as people enthusiastically consume the product. In a seminal work on the “social amplification of risk,” Roger Kasperson and colleagues[2] described how the public perception of risk interacts with social and cultural systems (such as the media) and can be amplified during the information delivery process, sometimes resulting in “institutionalized fear.” This amplification process can eventually generate certain public behaviors, some negative and some positive, and may result in disruptions in society. Obviously, some risks are more likely to be amplified than others. Terrorism, because of its special characteristics, is easily amplified. Also, today’s social network communication technologies, such as Facebook and Twitter, can accelerate and strengthen the amplification process.

Thus, the media focus and public concerns create political pressure, and national emergency management policymakers prioritize counter–terrorism, or “civil defense,” over other forms of risk management, such as “civil protection” against all hazards including natural disasters.

Civil defense again?

Culturally and historically, “civil defense” is quite different from “civil protection.” Civil defense, “born out of wartime efforts to organize air-raid precautions, sheltering arrangements and alarms for non-combatants,” has military origins and focuses on protection against foreign military attacks.[3] Civil protection, on the other hand, has disaster origins and focuses on many forms of natural and man-made disasters and other public safety issues. In the Cold War era, civil defense against nuclear attack was the main objective of national emergency management in the United States. At that time, nuclear attack was an “institutionalized fear” made by media and government authorities. Many American homes and public buildings prepared nuclear fallout shelters, illustrating this fear very clearly.

Following the end of Cold War and recognition of the increasing trend of large man-made and natural disasters, “civil protection” gradually replaced the term “civil defense” in most countries. Civil protection focuses more on generic disasters than on the armed aggression, and administratively it is more decentralized than civil defense. In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979. It was mainly a civil defense organization during the Cold War, but in the last two decades has worked to redirect some resources toward the management of various disasters (civil protection). James Witt, director of FEMA under President Clinton, clarified this change of direction. As the FEMA website explains, “the end of the Cold War also allowed Witt to redirect more of FEMA's limited resources from civil defense into disaster relief, recovery and mitigation programs.”[4] FEMA also introduced an “all hazards approach,” recognizing the many different kinds of disasters that may require mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The September 11, 2001 terror attack dramatically changed the direction of emergency management in the United States. After the attack, the United States hastily constructed the Department of Homeland Security and downgraded FEMA, whose main duty was civil protection. This attracted criticism from some public administration experts that the U.S. government concentrated too much on terrorism, perhaps because of the “social amplification” of the risk in the wake of the attack, despite the many other critical risks facing U.S. citizens. Basically, the critics charged, the United States changed the direction of its emergency management from civil protection back to Cold War-style civil defense.

Balance collapsed in emergency management

The cost of that shift in priorities was on full display when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, easily destroying the weak levee system and submerging much of New Orleans under water. Federal and local governments’ mitigation, response and recovery to the Hurricane Katrina were mostly inadequate – resulting in the most severe disaster damage in U.S. history at that time. Due to budget cuts, the Army Corps of Engineers had been unable to strengthen the levee system protecting New Orleans. After the flooding and other damage occurred, the governments’ disaster situation awareness was poor. Communication among authorities and between authorities and civilians was broken. Assistance from the federal government was delayed and insufficient, and people died while awaiting rescue or other assistance. Critics also charged that too many government officials were not familiar with the “National Response Plan” which was implemented in December 2004 after 9/11 terrorist attack. Planning and training for large natural disasters were insufficient after the implementation of the plan. In short, too great a focus on counter-terrorism undermined capacities for natural disaster mitigation, response, and recovery in the post-9/11 United States.

This not only the case in the United States, however. The United Kingdom experienced a similar transition after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, in which suicide attacks by four home-grown terrorists killed 55 civilians. In response, the U.K. government introduced several measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Critics said that some responses to the attacks were anti-liberal, militarizing, and centralizing, and were in the wrong direction from the viewpoint of an all hazards approach. The problem, as one observer wrote, was that “too great a focus on one type of threat and on institutional preparedness can divert attention away from other problematic areas and distance the public.”[5]

In South Korea, the provocations of North Korea can divert the direction of national emergency management. South Korea had been under a thorough civil defense-oriented culture since the end of the Korean War in 1953. All citizens, for example, must participate in compulsory civil defense training preparing for military attacks from North Korea, and there is a military service requirement for men.

The mood of reconciliation that developed on the Korean Peninsula during the post-Cold War Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations (1998-2008) changed the direction of Korean emergency management policies, highlighted by the 2004 establishment of the South Korean National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) by the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Large disasters such as Typhoon Rusa in 2002 and the Daegu subway accident in 2004 demanded a comprehensive emergency management system that can manage the all types of hazards, not only a military attack by North Korea. South Korea is gradually replacing its civil defense culture with one of civil protection. The Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) established the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) in 2008. MOPAS enlarged the scope of disaster management to include fostering a safety culture and anticipating future disasters induced by climate change. The Ministry has proposed civil protection strategies such as promoting public safety awareness, strengthening leadership of local governments, and promoting participation of private companies in disaster preparation and mitigation. Also, MOPAS pushed ahead several projects like the “Safe City” initiative that tries to enhance the safety level of local communities by encouraging the participation of various local stakeholders in preparation, mitigation, and response planning an activities. This means that the civil protection ideals and an all hazards approach were widely adopted as a government policy direction at that time.

However, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean forces in November 2010, which was unexpected and resulted in four deaths, changed this trend back again. After the Yeonpyeong Island bombardment, most projects for disaster and safety management were canceled and delayed because the highest priority was placed on national defense against North Korea. To some extent, this mirrors the experiences of the United States after 2001 and the United Kingdom after 2005. Although the deaths by Yeonpyeong Island bombardment were relatively few compared 209 deaths in Typhoon Rusa and 192 deaths in the Daegu subway accident, the political impact on the Korean government was huge.

Keeping a balance in emergency management

Civil protection and an all hazards approach are vital to maintaining preparation and the best possible response to major natural and man-made disaster. But they can be weakened if governments focus too heavily on national security (including civil defense against terrorism). And that can result in the other large disasters. Keeping balance in emergency management planning, and implementing an all hazards approach are crucial to effect public administration in this area.

The United States is at risk from a diverse range of natural and man-made disasters. Climate change will produce historically strong hurricanes like Katrina and Sandy more and more frequently. There is a high possibility of large earthquakes and outbreaks of new pandemic diseases. As indicated by the recent Texas fertilizer plant explosion, man-made disasters can also have big impacts. To cite another area where civil protection should not be neglected, the number of road fatalities per one million inhabitants was 111 per million inhabitants – or, well over 30,000 individuals – in the United States in 2009. This rate is almost three times Japan’s rate of 45 fatalities per one million inhabitants, and higher than the European Union average of 70 fatalities per one million inhabitants.

How do we keep balance in emergency management? Though officials in democratic countries such as South Korea and the United States must respond to public opinion, approaches to emergency management should be decided neither by public opinion, which can be easily agitated by shocking incidents, nor by the news media which tend to follow sensational events. Although the number of casualties in the Boston terror attack was much smaller than Texas explosion, the psychological impact and news attractiveness of Boston were much higher. Indeed, the news of the Texas fertilizer plant explosion was almost swept away in an ocean of news about Boston. Instead, priorities in emergency management should be decided based on the scientific evidence, accurate statistics, and rational policy planning.

Counter-terrorism is necessary and obviously very important. Governments must take policy measures to prevent terrorism, but they should resist contributing to institutionalized fear. They must also remember that human beings are surrounded by a plethora of risks, many of which cause more physical damage than terrorism. Governments should prepare policy measures for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery for all hazards we can encounter, and should keep a balance based on sciences and accurate statistical data.

For this purpose, a number policy measures are appropriate. First, we need a clear cost-benefit analyses of the current policies in emergency management. According to research conducted by John Mueller and Mark G Stewart and published in 2011,[6] the United States has spent over $1.1 trillion on homeland security after 9/11; Mueller and Stewart evaluate the effectiveness of this massive spending as very low. If this money, or some of it, had been applied to other public safety areas, such as climate change mitigation or industrial safety management where the cost effectiveness is high, the United States could be a safer place.

Second, people should know what the real risks are. The well known risks such as traffic accidents, industrial accidents, and floods kill far more people in America than terrorism does. According to several psychological research studies, familiarity can reduce the level of the public’s risk perception. So, there is a much smaller sense of urgency about many of the risks that surround us every day. Science and statistics on risks, and governmental efforts to provide information and education about risks, can help individuals and local communities effectively increase their overall safety level.

[1] Slovic, P. “Perception of Risk,” Science, Vol. 236, No. 4799 (1987): 283.

[2] Kasperson, R., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. and Emel, J. “Social Amplification of Risk: a Conceptual Framework,” Risk Analysis, 8(2), (1988): 177-187.

[3] Alexander, D. “From Civil Defense to Civil Protection--and Back Again,” Disaster Prevention Management, 11(3), (2002): 209.

[4] FEMA, about the agency, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency.

[5] O'Brien, G. “UK Emergency Preparedness: A Step in the Right Direction?” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2006): 79.

[6] Mueller, J. and Stewart, M.G., Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Authors

Jibum Chung

Image Source: © Kim Kyung Hoon / Reuters

Democracy and Poverty: A Lesson from Mongolia

Nyamosor Tuya — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Later this month, Mongolia will host the 7^th ministerial conference of the Community of Democracies (CD), an intergovernmental forum of democracies formed in 2000 at the initiative of Bronislaw Geremek of Poland and Madeleine Albright of the United States. Several civil society events will accompany it.

The CD was launched at a conference in Warsaw in 2000, and its goals were announced in the Warsaw Declaration: strengthening democratic values and institutions, protecting human rights, and promoting civil society. The effort was to be undertaken both at the national level, by supporting one another in these endeavors, and at the global level through collaboration on democracy-related issues in international and regional institutions. The Warsaw Declaration also emphasized the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy.

After 2000, however, despite a sustained schedule of meetings and statements, the CD never really took off. Democracy’s progress worldwide had slowed in subsequent years, as noted in a number of surveys, including one by Freedom House. Celebrating its 10^th anniversary in Krakow in 2010, the CD acknowledged this state of affairs and through its Act of Recommitment to the Warsaw Declaration pledged to intensify its efforts to transform itself “into a unique forum for the world's democracies to promote and strengthen democracy on a global basis.” To meet this objective, the CD began to retool itself by creating a permanent secretariat, launching a partnership initiative that focuses on assistance to specific countries and, on top of civil society, bringing young people, businesses, and parliamentarians into its dialogue on democracy.

The April 2013 conference in Ulaanbaatar will be an occasion for the CD to further reinvigorate its agenda. Mongolia, which currently holds the CD presidency, offers a number of lessons to offer that could contribute to the organization’s recommitment to its objectives, especially emphasis on the interdependence between poverty, development and democracy. This emphasis is important both as an immediate goal for the host country and as a larger goal for the CD as a whole.

The case of Mongolia on poverty and democracy is instructive. The country started transitioning to democracy over twenty years ago and, for almost as long, the rate of poverty has stood at 30 percent and above. In the 1990s, much of it could be attributed to the disruptions caused by changes in its political and economic system. Harsh weather has been an intermittent factor, too. But no significant progress has been registered in later years, when the economy has grown at an annual average of 9 percent in the past decade. The latest available figure (2011) shows that poverty still stands at 29.8 percent, despite the double-digit economic growth in the past two years. The gap between poor and rich has continued to grow, and infrastructure has languished in a chronically decrepit state. Corruption, on the other hand, has continued to increase. Between 1999 and 2011, while the economy was growing, the country’s corruption ranking has managed to drop from a place where it was comfortably ahead of some of its fellow post-communist countries in Europe to a dismal 120th place out of some 180 countries surveyed by Transparency International. The implications for democracy were grave: most reforms stalled, vote buying became a serious concern, and public trust in the institutions of democracy was shaken. In a survey conducted in June 2012, over 80 percent of respondents believed that government policies were “always” or “often” failing to solve their concerns, chief among them unemployment and poverty.

The lesson to be drawn from this experience is that, early on in the transition process, new democracies should put economic liberty and transparency on a par with other democratic values such as regular elections, rule of law, human rights, freedom of association and freedom of speech. Otherwise, a callous and corrupt government, sometimes voted in through dubiously “free and fair” elections, can use the trappings and rhetoric of democracy as a façade while behind the scenes they engage in rent-seeking practices that can lead to a systemic entrenchment of corruption. In such a system political power is used for economic gain and economic gain is used for buying political influence. Few or no dividends go to the general populace. This results in persistent poverty among a large percentage of the population coupled with poor social services. Public enthusiasm or support for democracy wanes, democracy is eroded, therefore human rights are violated, and eventually democracy breaks down. Such scenarios are an early and real threat to democracy because the impoverished populace does not have the necessary tools―such as education or access to information―to fight back and, in most cases, is simply unfamiliar with the concept of demanding government accountability and responsiveness.

Early on, the CD emphasized this problem by stating in Warsaw that eradication of poverty is an “essential contributing factor to the promotion and preservation of democratic development” (2000). This emphasis should now be renewed. To do so, recommitment to the concept of interdependence between democracy and poverty found in the Santiago Commitment (2005) is essential. The Commitment stressed that democracy cannot be sustained without persistent efforts to eliminate extreme poverty and, vice versa, that the strengthening of democratic governance was “an essential component” of the efforts to alleviate poverty. Rooting out corruption that “corrodes democracy,” as stated in Warsaw, is a central element of these efforts, and this stance was reaffirmed in the Krakow Plan for Democracy (2010). Poverty is as much a threat to a democracy as poor institutions in that it deprives people of their political voice preventing them from holding their governments accountable and responsive, and eroding public trust in the emerging institutions of democracy. The CD’s Bamako Consensus (2007) addressed the issue of public trust: “persistent inequality and poverty can lead to low public trust in political institutions and vulnerability to undemocratic practices both of which are threats to democracy.” Poverty is also an assault on human dignity which is why the Bamako Consensus also emphasized that democracy, development and human rights were mutually reinforcing.

This body of reasoning serves as a good foundation for the CD to contribute to the ongoing global debate on the post-2015 development agenda. This debate presents the CD with an opportunity to pursue its position that eradication of poverty and the consolidation of democracy are interdependent. The thematic session on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that is planned for the CD’s meetings in Ulaanbaatar could therefore be seized as an occasion to launch substantive discussions on collaboration, in the coming years, with international organizations and civil society on ways to incorporate democratic governance in the post-2015 development agenda, or mainstream anti-corruption efforts into it, and ensure that this agenda adopts a human rights-based approach, addresses inequality and promotes social inclusion. Discussions could revolve around the issues raised in papers and notes by UN bodies and agencies and other actors, especially civil society, that call for encompassing human rights, democracy and good governance in an inclusive development agenda focused on poverty eradication. The ideas expressed at the global consultation on governance and the post-2015 framework could also be taken up.

The experience of Mongolia could also be looked at. Mongolia is one of two countries that have voluntarily added a ninth goal to its MDGs: Strengthen Human Rights and Foster Democratic Governance. While a welcome initiative, Mongolia’s MDG 9 has not been a successful undertaking either in terms of its design and implementation; one of its targets, “zero tolerance for corruption,” has been, for too long, an embarrassing slogan given the deteriorating realities on the ground. The initiative did not target such central principles of democratic governance as government accountability, transparency and participation. Neither has the mutually reinforcing nature of the goals to reduce poverty, promote gender equality and improve governance been duly highlighted in the national MDGs framework. Mongolia’s case strongly suggests that the design of governance goals and the methodology of assessing and monitoring their progress should be given careful consideration. The country’s experience also suggests that it is important for national leaders in new democracies to fully embrace and own the goals and targets of poverty reduction and democratic governance -- and to lead. And they should be held accountable for the failures in the implementation.

The impending Community of Democracy discussions in Ulaanbaatar will provide Mongolian leaders both in government and in civil society with an opportunity to reflect on the current status of the country’s MDGs on poverty reduction and democratic governance and commit to their acceleration. It should be noted that the latest poverty figure shows a decrease―29 percent in 2011 versus 39 percent in 2010―but it is yet to be determined if this is attributable to government’s untargeted cash handouts of the past three years, or whether it points to a trend. Whichever the case, sustaining economic growth and expanding the opportunities offered by it, especially by reducing youth unemployment, will be essential if the country is to meet its goal of reducing poverty to 18 percent by 2015. The discussion will also help the thinking on the best ways to incorporate the “unfinished business,” or any unmet MDGs, into the country’s post-MDGs goals in a way that is mindful of the importance of the wider governance context for any success in the key areas of poverty, gender equality and environment.

After years of stalled reform that threatened to jeopardize the country’s democratic gains, it appears that the Mongolian government is now more willing to tackle its outstanding governance issues. It has laid out its plans to reform the civil service, judiciary and police, the institutions most frequently cited in past surveys as the most corrupt; wider policy deliberation and citizen feedback and participation are encouraged, including through the use of new technologies; democracy education is being debated; efforts to address corruption have been stepped up and a more robust national strategy to combat it is in the works. A recent survey showed a slight increase in the level of confidence that people place in the ability of the country’s anti-corruption agency to tackle the issue. In a promising sign, in a single year, the country moved up 26 places in its ranking of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (the effect of changes in methodology and lesser number of countries surveyed is unclear). The government has also expressed its intent to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multilateral transparency initiative involving governments and civil society. Its OGP Action Plan is scheduled to be presented later this month.

The government’s commitment to accountability and transparency will be put to the test by its handling of the case of a former finance minister, whose failure to disclose his offshore company and a secret Swiss bank account, holding $1 million at one time, was brought to light last week by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).

If sustained, reform should improve government effectiveness and create an enabling governance environment for focusing on poverty eradication which should remain the government’s first priority. In the years ahead, the country’s significant extractive wealth will also have to be managed in an exemplary way so that its benefits go to the entire population in an equitable way. The CD’s position that eradication of poverty is essential for a healthy democracy should serve as a guiding principle for the Mongolian government for it to regain public trust and produce outcomes that ensure prosperity, justice and security for the people.

Since the next CD ministerial will take place in 2015, only a couple of months removed from the global gathering on development, the Ulaanbaatar CD ministerial is an opportunity for democracies to start working together to include the democratic principles of accountability, transparency and participation into the post-2015 poverty eradication agenda. A reaffirmation of the CD’s belief in the mutually reinforcing nature of democracy and development can also help re-shape the debate in Mongolia in a way that integrates eradication of poverty, equity and social justice into the broader project of democracy.

Authors

Nyamosor Tuya

Image Source: © Stringer China / Reuters

Energy Security in Northeast Asia: A Pivotal Moment for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Shoichi Itoh — Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Two years have passed since the Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake devastated northeastern Japan and the subsequent meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant shook the world. The government, then led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), proved unable to revive the ailing economy (the problems of which pre-dated the earthquake), and also made no clear-cut decision on a new energy policy for Japan. Faced with popular opinion and public demonstrations against nuclear power but faced with a high energy economy, the DPJ administration’s equivocal stance on nuclear power generation remained unchanged. As Japan’s nuclear reactors shut down after Fukushima, Japan once again found itself a resource-poor country whose energy security is seriously affected by international surroundings.

The DPJ suffered its own virtual meltdown in the December 2012 lower house election, suffering incessant intra-party strife and a complete lack of leadership as a ruling party; it won only 57 seats in the election, compared to the 231 it held before. Its ambiguously anti-nuclear stance in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster did not help it with voters as the more pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) scored a landslide comeback victory, increasing its seats from 118 to 294 and recapturing the Prime Minister’s office, which it had lost in 2009.

At the U.S.-Japan summit in Washington, D.C. on February 22, 2013, new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asked President Barack Obama to approve liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Japan at an early date, as this is an important way for Japan to reduce fuel costs which increased sharply after the Great East Japan earthquake. According to a press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, President Obama noted that the export licensing issue was still under review, but he is aware of the importance of Japan as a U.S. ally. Prime Minister Abe also pledged to conduct a zero-based review of the previous administration’s policy of exploring a possible phase-out of all nuclear reactors by 2030, and noted that he intends to formulate responsible energy policies with a view toward working with the United States at various levels in international nuclear cooperation. Besides nuclear power, bilateral cooperation on development of clean energy and climate change issues were highlighted. The two leaders basically agreed that their governments would continue to work on Japan’s prospective participation in the TPP on the condition that they recognized both countries would have bilateral trade sensitivities.

Amid this broad range of issues, energy security is a key issue that the United States and Japan must emphasize in reconsolidating and broadening their alliance beyond mere bilateral issues. The construction of a U.S.-Japan energy security alliance based on the two pillars of nuclear power generation in Japan, and exports of U.S. LNG to Japan, could be used as a model for reducing volatility in energy markets and even helping to ensure geopolitical stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Nuclear Power as a lynchpin of the alliance

Given rapid changes in the international energy landscape, Tokyo can not waste any more time in clarifying its post-Fukushima energy strategy. Japan is the world’s third biggest oil consumer and tops the list of LNG importers; it depends almost completely on imports to meet its hydrocarbon consumption needs. The rapid increase of LNG imports following the post-Fukushima nuclear reactor shutdowns led to dramatic increases in natural gas prices in Asia. LNG import prices in Asia are indexed to oil prices, but do not benefit from the trend of decreasing prices elsewhere―including North America―that is a feature of the shale gas revolution. Therefore, in Asia imported gas prices basically hover at high rates in accordance with high oil prices while in North America gas prices are set competitively as supplies come from numerous domestic sources.

Therefore, the energy policy choices Tokyo makes will have major consequences not just for the domestic economy, but also for international energy markets. Given its extremely low energy self-sufficiency rate of four percent (without nuclear power), Japan’s policy options for ensuring its future energy security are limited.

Simply put, Japan must restart nuclear reactors, and it must also introduce and enforce stricter safety regulations. In order to do so, the government must make a clear political decision to end the endless ideological and emotional debate about nuclear power. The “mythification” of nuclear safety before Fukushima was an important lesson the whole population obviously learned from the tragedy; people will and should now be more skeptical. Some activists argue that nuclear reactors should restart only after their “perfect safety” can be assured; obviously, it is an illusion to think that humankind could ever create perfect safely in its literal sense. However cautious we may be; complete mastery over nature, science, and the future is not possible. Only strong political leadership can put an end to this pointless debate; the government should identify, at the earliest stage and in light of international experience, a set of yardsticks to satisfy legal requirements for nuclear restarts even if we must recognize that it will be a learn-by-doing process. This is Japan’s inescapable responsibility for its own economic life, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the international community.

Postponing nuclear reactor restarts have drained Japan’s national wealth considerably. It became a trade-deficit nation for the first time in more than three decades. A major factor in this development is the jump in LNG imports due to replacement of nuclear power generation by gas-fired thermal plants. Imports grew from 70 million tons from 2010 to 78.5 million tons in 2011 and 87.3 million tons in 2012 – an increase of almost 25 percent in two years. However, during the same period, the total value of LNG purchases increased by more than 70 percent from about 3.5 trillion yen in 2010 to 6 trillion yen in 2012 due to the sharp increases in LNG prices per million Btu (British thermal unit) destined for Japan: the average LNG import prices for Japan increased by about 55 percent from approximately $11 per million Btu in 2010 to approximately $17 per million Btu in 2012. The increase in Japan’s LNG imports accounted for the predominant chunk of its trade deficit of about 6.9 trillion yen in 2012. Nuclear restarts would result in huge savings in domestic fuel costs. Moreover, it would help stabilize the global LNG markets; the Northeast Asian natural gas market is most seriously affected with Japan consuming about one-thirds of the world’s LNG demand.

It also must be emphasized that Japan’s nuclear future will directly affect the range of U.S.-Japan cooperation which goes by far beyond mere energy issues. The Japanese and U.S. nuclear industries have developed as “twin brothers” for more than a half century. Today, Hitachi and GE, as well as Toshiba and Westinghouse, have nuclear power joint ventures. Japanese nuclear vendors have made significant contributions to make up for the declining of the nuclear industry in the United States after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, by developing high-tech nuclear products for civilian use and producing a large number of the world’s top-class engineers.

A phase-out of nuclear power in Japan would also have an adverse impact on the global non-proliferation regime. While shale gas causes natural gas prices to remain low, there is increased uncertainty in the United States about introducing new nuclear power plants. Ironically, this has increased the importance of sustaining high standards for nuclear technologies against the background of diffusion of nuclear power for civilian use in the world. This diffusion is irreversible, regardless of U.S. and Japanese domestic nuclear policies, in order to meet drastic rises in energy demand in emerging economies. The loss of Japanese nuclear vendors’ international competitiveness would jeopardize the bilateral alliance’s presence in global nuclear markets, which would in turn weaken Washington’s and Tokyo’s voices in the future non-proliferation regime. Japan needs to rediscover its role as one of the most serious advocates for reinforcement of global efforts on non-proliferation.

Maintaining a certain amount of nuclear power in the energy mix is also important from a climate change perspective. Tokyo must realistically readjust the over-ambitious target of cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25 percent below 1990 levels that was announced by then-DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama at the United Nations Summit on Climate Change in September 2009, which received little support from the domestic business community. But Japan should continue to play its own roles to combat climate change as long as a principle of fairness of international burden-sharing is guaranteed. A nuclear restart is an indispensable way to reduce a certain amount of GHG emissions, given that too many uncertainties await dramatic expansion of renewable sources in the energy mix at least in the foreseeable future, due in part to high costs.

LNG as a fuel to increase Japan’s burden-sharing

Increases of LNG exports from the United States to Japan will become a new way to strengthen the alliance, and the impacts extend beyond energy. Undoubtedly, Japan would benefit from prospective participation in the TPP, and co-designing the future framework of economic rules in the Asia-Pacific region would also reinforce the bilateral alliance. TPP membership for Japan would remove a potential obstacle to increase LNG exports from the lower 48 states. According to the U.S. Natural Gas Law, LNG exports to non-FTA trade partners must be authorized by the Department of Energy on a case-by-case basis (Japan has imported LNG from Alaska since 1969.) However, the meaning of increasing LNG supplies to Japan should be emphasized in a wider context, entailing geostrategic importance besides the economic benefits of improving the U.S. international balance of payments. LNG imports from the United States will beef up Japan’s economic muscle, better allowing it to play the role of the main “bridgehead” of the U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region. With sound economic growth, Japan can be expected to contribute more to burden-sharing as it will be able to increase its budgets for defense, economic aid to developing countries, and many other issues that benefit the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Even if Tokyo decides in principle to restart nuclear reactors, both the political and technical processes will take some time. Public support will have to be nurtured in a step-by-step manner. This means that increased access to economically competitive LNG supplies remains urgent. As late as February 2013, Japan paid approximately five times more than the U.S. Henry Hub price per million Btu (British thermal unit), on average, for LNG purchases. Although of the price of future imports of LNG from North America remains uncertain, it is generally estimated that the final cost of LNG from the lower 48 states―including liquefaction costs, transportation fees, and other costs―are still lower than the average price of Japan’s current LNG imports.

Aside from the price issue, securing new LNG supply routes from North America is also important to ensure the safety of Japan’s seaborne hydrocarbon transportation. Currently, approximately 80 percent of crude oil and 30 percent of LNG destined for Japan cut across the East China Sea, where Sino-Japanese tension is simmering.

Toward a joint architecture for Asian-Pacific energy security

Against the background of the shale revolution, there are rising expectations about “energy independence” in the United States, which is thought not only to boost the domestic economy with cheap energy prices and reduce vulnerability to international oil prices, but also to increase policy options for U.S. diplomacy. The ongoing debate about diplomatic implications of U.S. energy independence within the next decade by and large tends to focus on the question of how it would affect the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. However, a blueprint for placing energy independence in the context of the so-called U.S. “pivot to Asia” has yet to emerge. New roles and functions for the U.S.-Japan alliance should be designed in the context of U.S. energy independence. Today in Northeast Asia, the energy security environment is rapidly changing with impending new challenges for the U.S.-Japan alliance to tackle.

First, the rise of China with its surging energy demand has raised concerns about its impact on the global energy market. According to estimates published by the International Energy Agency in its November 2012 World Energy Outlook 2012, China is forecasted to account for more than half of increases in global oil demand by 2030; its dependence on imported oil will increase from 54 percent in 2011 to 77 percent in 2030. Likewise, China is projected to account for about 28 percent of increases in global demand for natural gas with its import dependence to rise from 14 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2030. Its impact on global oil prices and thus on the growth of the world economy would be considerable. Furthermore, Beijing’s anxiety about ensuring stable access to energy resources may stimulate the expansion of Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy’s power projection capabilities, as a means to increase and secure access to overseas oil and natural gas supplies.

The deepening of China’s economic interdependence with both the United States and Japan is unstoppable in the foreseeable future. Steady growth of the Chinese economy, which requires finding a solution to the upsurge in China’s energy demand, is of great significance to the United States and Japan. In this regard, the two allies should explore possibilities for strengthening cooperation with China in a number of areas, especially energy efficiency, clean energy, and nuclear power generation. Outside (or uninformed) observers of Sino-Japanese relations tend to be overwhelmed by the contemporary geopolitical dispute and rising nationalism that fill the headlines, and overlook the fact that Beijing and Tokyo have developed extensive cooperation in the energy sector, including on energy conservation and clean energy technologies, for more than three decades. Japan can share its rich experiences in energy and environmental projects in China with the United States to capitalize on the recent success of Sino-U.S. clean energy cooperation. Beyond the business benefits, such collaboration could have invaluable political implications. If the three biggest energy consumers in the world could find a joint flagship project it could help create a new international framework for engaging China.

From the standpoint of reducing hydrocarbon consumption and carbon dioxide emissions, the U.S.-Japan “nuclear twins” should pursue nuclear cooperation with China, which has 18 nuclear power plants currently in operation. The nuclear stakes in China are about to get much bigger: there are about 30 reactors under construction and more than 50 in the planning stage. This expansion is of global importance. Successful growth in nuclear power generation would reduce China’s hydrocarbon consumption and GHG emissions, and operational safety of the plants amidst such a rush of construction is an obvious concern.

Secondly, Russia has devoted every effort to enhance its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, taking advantage of hosting the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok last September. Moscow is anxious to accelerate the development of untapped hydrocarbon resources in the eastern regions of the country as a way to gain new business opportunities while enhancing its geopolitical influence in Northeast Asia. The 4700 km crude oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (ESPO) was completed in December 2012. Russia currently exports about 0.6 million barrels per day by the ESPO pipeline, but aims to increase the volume as much as possible.

The U.S. shale gas revolution came as a harsh blow to Moscow, given that Russia is frustrated by the gradual decreases of its natural gas exports to Europe as consumption there declines and the EU seeks diversification of natural gas supply routes. The Sakhalin-2 is the only LNG project in Russia, as of today, with a maximum capacity of exporting 9.6 million tons per year; a new LNG plant in Vladivostok is in the planning stages. In recent months Russia has aggressively approached Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea to strengthen partnerships in oil and gas sectors.

Meanwhile, the United States already has a bastion in the energy landscape of Northeast Asia, with ExxonMobil as the operator of the Sakhalin-1 project. The destination of natural gas exports from the project has remained undecided due to conflicts of interest between ExxonMobil and Russia’s state-owned gas company, Gazprom, which has monopolized Russia’s natural gas exports to date. Yet, while President Putin has recently disclosed a plan to liberalize the natural gas export market, the state-owned oil company, Rosneft, has galvanized itself to find new foreign partners. It has expanded agreements with ExxonMobil, addressing new oil and gas projects in Russia’s Far Eastern and Arctic regions, and has acquired a stake in Exxon’s gas project in Alaska.

However, Russia does not yet seem to have emerged as a factor in the U.S. pivot to Asia. Especially since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the demise of the Soviet military threat in the Asia-Pacific, Washington’s approach to Russia has been overwhelmingly Euro-centric. Russia’s aggressive move to the Asia-Pacific region in the energy sector should be taken into account, when we imagine diplomatic implications of U.S. energy independence for this region. Obviously, one of the impetuses of Russia’s rapid move to the east is Moscow’s concern about the rise of China. Notwithstanding the economic benefit of the drastic increase in oil trade volumes with China, voices among the Russian power elite are gradually emerging to alarm that Russia might become a “resource appendage” to its neighboring geopolitical rival. It should be noted, however, that increasing hydrocarbon exports from Russia’s eastern regions would also be one of the ways in which the impact of China’s explosive energy needs upon the global energy market can be reduced peacefully. U.S. and Japanese policymakers should consider this point when they discuss Russia’s role as a big energy supplier in the context of energy security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Energy security in the Asia-Pacific region entails numerous uncertainties in both energy markets and geopolitical dynamism. The robust U.S.-Japan alliance must be anchored in solving energy challenges, but this requires clarification of Tokyo’s post-Fukushima energy policies including an internationally responsible political decision on restarting Japan’s nuclear power plants. Wisdom and long-term perspectives are needed to reduce the economic and security costs of ensuring regional stability in the years to come. It is high time for the United States and Japan to begin to design a roadmap for an international framework of energy security in which other regional key players such as China and Russia are effectively engaged.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, or any other organization.

Authors

Shoichi Itoh

Image Source: © Issei Kato / Reuters

Taiwan’s Incomplete Third Line of Defense for National Security

Kwei-Bo Huang — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:07:00 -0500

Seeking to provide a clear and effective blueprint for Taiwan’s national security, in May 2011 President Ma Ying-jeou enunciated “three lines of defense” through which Taiwan would seek to enhance its international status and security in the face of a rising mainland China. This strategy emphasizes an ambitious approach to keeping Taiwan safe. Two of the three legs have been implemented with some success, but one of the lines has been obviously deficient so far.

The first line of defense is the institutionalization of cross-Taiwan Strait rapprochement, to enable recent improvements to withstand potential future difficulties. This institutionalization is based on the current functional agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed between Taiwan and mainland China.[1] The second line of defense is the utilization of Taiwan’s geographic location, infrastructure, and democracy to interact with and make concrete contributions to the world, hoping for an increase in Taiwan’s economic performance and humanitarian aid, the latter of which looks at international development that can establish a place for Taiwan on the moral high ground of international relations.

These first two lines of defense appear to be in good shape, although portions of the Taiwan polity may disagree with parts of the plan itself, or progress in achieving some of its goals, or both. The Ma administration is aware of this and, generally speaking, has considered the domestic-international nexus and endeavored to find an array of solutions for such conflicts. In the past five years, Taiwan and mainland China have signed 18 agreements, including the most prominent one – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – and two MOUs. The number of direct flights between Taiwan and mainland China each week has reached 616, and in 2012 there were 2,580,000 visits by mainland Chinese tourists to Taiwan. Taiwan’s economic performance is improving – the predicted economic growth rate for 2013 is above three percent, and the very first economic cooperation agreements with major Asia Pacific trading partners, i.e., Singapore and New Zealand, are close to completion. In addition, the Ma administration has abandoned the “checkbook diplomacy” method of attracting diplomatic partners and has joined the international mainstream by abiding by the 2005 “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” and carrying out Taiwan’s foreign aid programs with the participation and assistance of its vibrant civil society.

In comparison with the first two lines of defense, the third line of defense – “aligning Taiwan’s defense with diplomacy” – seems to only have some general guidelines but few detailed and deliberate action plans. President Ma’s priorities for constructing this line of defense include building up Taiwan’s credibility and trust with its allies, the United States in particular, and enhancing Taiwan’s strong determination to defend itself. President Ma firmly believes that it is of political and strategic importance for Taiwan to continue to acquire defensive articles with the appropriate quality and quantity from the United States. The promotion of Taiwan’s soft power is also key to the success of this strategy. “Complementary to our defense capability,” President Ma has said, “[are] Taiwan’s democratic values, rule of law, and an advanced civil society, which could make Taiwan an indispensable reference for socio-economic development in the Chinese mainland.” While the outlines of this third line of defense are visible, it is evident that Taiwan has not brought the different strands of this idea together to substantially connect its national defense and diplomacy.

In order to effectively implement this third line of defense and really align its defense with diplomacy, Taiwan must rethink its practices for interagency collaboration and make some tangible action plans.

The paragraphs that follow will focus on the issue of collaboration between the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which is substantially implied in President Ma’s design. For a preliminary understanding of how to achieve the third line of defense through interagency collaboration, the rationales, structures, and approaches will be discussed in brief.

Rationales for MND-MOFA Collaboration

First, with regard to the rationales, as introduced earlier, aligning defense with diplomacy to make good use of both hard power and soft power for national security is of strategic significance for Taiwan. This depends partially on interagency collaboration and has much to do with two executive agencies in the Executive Yuan, i.e., MND and MOFA.[2]

A strong rationale for interagency collaboration comes from the overlapping missions of MND and MOFA. MND’s basic objectives are “preventing war,” “defending the homeland,” and “countering terrorism and responding to contingencies.” MOFA is responsible for cultivating good neighborliness with other state and non-state actors and ensuring a friendly environment for Taiwan’s preservation and sustainable development “in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity.” MND’s objective of preventing war and MOFA’s goal of befriending other state and non-state actors and ensuring a favorable external environment are not incompatible. Maintaining an appropriate self-defense capability while preventing war in a diplomatic way is a common-sense objective for Taiwan. By the same token, in order to secure the third line of defense, both MND and MOFA should work together to fulfill their missions in common.

Then, a critical question that must be asked is: Have such rationales been recognized completely, or at least widely, by both MND and MOFA? Maybe MND’s and MOFA’s leaderships and most of their staffs have perceived and accepted the request of President Ma, but the extent to which this request has been implemented in practice remains uncertain. This uncertainty arises not from “bureaucratic resistance” to change, but to the ways in which Taiwan’s bureaucratic system operates.

It is understandable that repertoire-bound bureaucracies with existing routines are both facilitators for and barriers to the pursuit of government policy. In the case of Taiwan, due to insufficient top-down “pressure,” the repertoires and routines of bureaucracies seem to be barriers to the realization of the third defense line. Without breaking the boundaries set by these repertoires and routines, MND and MOFA will not have true opportunities to explore the commonalities of their respective key missions. Furthermore, it is possible that bureaucracies have their own “turfs” and might lack adequate communication and exchanges essential for coordinating complicated missions. It is also possible that their executives often compete with one another in order to gain influence on national policies. Bureaucrats may play constructive roles in breaking down these barriers, but high-level political appointees’ personal characters and awareness of interagency collaboration and coordination could be more effective in facilitating better collaboration.

In order to secure the third line of defense, an understanding and sense of the need for interagency collaboration, the presence of initiative, and the cultivation of working relationships will strengthen anemic interagency communication and cooperation between MND and MOFA ― but only to a certain degree. What Taiwan really needs at this time is stronger initiative and persistent fostering of cross-agency interactions that can facilitate the goal of aligning defense with diplomacy. This can only come from above.

Structures of MND and MOFA

Second, examining the structures of MND and MOFA, it is apparent that Taiwan is not ready for real interagency collaboration.

MND’s organizational structure demonstrates the sporadic need to deal with diplomacy and international affairs. The units of MND that have more to do with diplomacy and international affairs may include the Department of Strategic Planning, the Department of Integrated Assessment, the Office of Defense Procurement, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, and the Bureau of Military Intelligence. MND has military attachés or equivalents in most of Taiwan’s overseas missions where there is a practical need for military diplomacy or intelligence exchange. MND has also maintained a number of exchange programs aimed at military diplomacy, realized through activities such as symposiums on regional security and defense affairs and personnel exchanges with many diplomatic and non-diplomatic allies. In principle, by nature, and by training these units are more concerned with military affairs than diplomatic ones.

MOFA’s organizational structure is geared almost solely toward diplomacy and international affairs; only its Department of Policy Planning has a 2-to-3-person division dealing with “strategic security” affairs, broadly defined. Although all of its geographic departments have officials responsible for collaborating with MND for military diplomacy programs, this kind of work has been conducted on an ad hoc basis. Better and consistent coordination within both MOFA and MND is required. The work conducted by MOFA’s Department of North American Affairs seems relatively more effective and has drawn the most attention because this department is the major unit in MOFA in charge of Taiwan-United States relations, including arms sales, but this is not representative of the overall level of interagency collaboration between MND and MOFA.

Many clues indicate that, except at the top leadership level, the exchange and sharing of information between MND and MOFA have not been institutionalized satisfactorily. For example, the coordination of strategic communication by MND (synchronizing the military’s messages with its actions to shape domestic and international public opinions) and public diplomacy by MOFA (using public communications media, exchanges, educational-cultural programs, and dealing with an array of state and non-state actors for the purpose of influencing the politics and foreign policies of other governments) appears even weaker. Such coordination is a requirement for dealing with today’s rapidly changing external environment. MND does have a Political Warfare Bureau, but it is militarily and domestically oriented. MOFA set up a Public Diplomacy Coordination Council and a Department of International Information Services after its new structure was determined in 2012, but they are not given enough training, tools, and resources for effective public diplomacy and have few connections with MND. The lack of interagency collaboration further deteriorates the preparedness of these units for the trials associated with strategic communication or public diplomacy.

As neither MND nor MOFA is sufficiently organized and trained to plan, coordinate, and integrate the resources and mechanisms available for the establishment of the third line of defense, at the present time Taiwan is not able to achieve this goal.

Approaches to Enhancement

It is unclear what approaches the Ma administration has undertaken to better align Taiwan’s defense with diplomacy

There may be some “relatively good practices” to improve the “semi-vulnerable” linkage of MND and MOFA. Despite their different natures and despite their diverse expectations and priorities, as mentioned before, MND’s and MOFA’s basic aims and key missions for the enhancement of Taiwan’s national security are not incompatible at all. Officials from both ministries should have an awareness of each other’s differences, respective concerns, and ways of thinking. They should also develop a common language and commit to working toward a common or shared goal.

Three immediately feasible and likely approaches to aligning defense with diplomacy may include the encouragement of officials to engage proactively in an interagency process, the ad hoc arrangement of staffing exchanges between the two Ministries, and joint workshops or training sessions. All of these should be guided by the existing modi operandi regarding information sharing and confidentiality, in conjunction with the revocation of obstructive personnel and accounting laws and regulations. Meanwhile, individuals and agencies involved in interagency collaboration should be assigned clear roles and responsibilities. Generally speaking, for Taiwan, there is a long way to go, but once sustained these approaches will enable MND and MOFA to interact more efficiently.

In the past decade, occasionally, some political appointees in both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma administrations have sought to promote ― either explicitly or implicitly ― a consciousness of the need for more interagency collaboration in the national security field, using some of the measures suggested above. Unfortunately, for the most part these efforts have ceased when the individuals behind them have left office.

Concluding Remarks

It seems that since President Ma took office in May 2008, Taiwan has concentrated predominantly on the first two lines of defense for national security: the institutionalization of cross-Taiwan Strait interactions, and the emphasis on Taiwan’s economic and other soft power advantages to highlight Taiwan as an indispensable partner and responsible stakeholder in the international community. The third line of defense – aligning defense with diplomacy – is also being constructed, but at a very slow pace and with insufficient initiative. Beyond a doubt, United States arms sales to and political support for Taiwan are in the spotlight, and they remain extremely crucial for Taiwan’s national security. Yet, support from the United States is not enough by itself. To really consolidate this defense line, Taiwan must speed up its interagency collaboration now, beginning with MND and MOFA. This is an inexpensive way to improve Taiwan’s national security, but it requires a political investment and resolve from the leadership.

President Ma must know clearly that his national security triad will not function as expected if any of the defense lines is ignored or mismanaged. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the in-depth shaping and adjustment of the third line of defense will take place in the near future, especially as the administration is confronting a series of serious and intricate domestic and external challenges that have troubled the Ma administration for a couple of years. Furthermore, Taiwan’s political calendar, featuring the 7-in-1 local elections in late 2014 and presidential and legislative elections in early 2016, indicates that consolidating the third line of defense may soon become more difficult if President Ma fails to give enough attention to the consolidation program now.

[1] Technically, the parties to the agreements are the Taipei-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Beijing-based Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the non-governmental organizations authorized by Taiwan and mainland China, respectively, to manage cross-Taiwan Strait affairs.

[2] In promoting Taiwan’s national security, two major agencies outside the Executive Yuan, the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Bureau (NSB) as part of the NSC organ, must also be included in the interagency process. To avoid over-complicating matters in a short space, this essay will exclude discussion of the NSC and NSB, but their roles in enhancing President Ma’s third line of defense are indispensable.

Authors

Kwei-Bo Huang

Image Source: © Nicky Loh / Reuters

South Korea’s New President Prepares to Meet a Turbulent Northeast Asia

Hyeong Jung Park — Mon, 07 Jan 2013 12:07:00 -0500

Madame Park Geun-hye was elected president of the Republic of Korea on December 19, 2012, and was greeted on December 27 by a grim report on international relations in Northeast Asia for the next five years. In its 2013-2017 Mid-term Foreign Relations Analysis, prepared before the election, the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, diagnosed that “the next administration would encounter the most tortuous external environments in the 21st century,” full of challenges and uncertainties. Foremost among these are potential instability due to multiple power transitions in Northeast Asia, the increasing divergence among concerned countries on how to deal with North Korea, North Korea’s increased capacity in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and increased nationalistic tendencies in neighboring countries.

This sense of pessimism and alertness reflects the general tone of discussion in Seoul on Korea’s external environment and influences on its foreign and North Korea policies during Madame Park’s presidency in 2013-2017.

This essay will talk about three subjects: Madame Park’s blueprint for dealing with intransigent North Korea; North Korea’s intentions and strategies for the next five years; and the opportunities and challenges for Seoul and what it can achieve.

Madame Park’s Campaign Promises

As explained in her commentary “A New Kind of Korea” for Foreign Affairs magazine in September/October 2011, Madame Park’s campaign promises on North Korea policy can be summarized in two principles: “trustpolitik” and “alignment.”

Trustpolitik is composed of two points: first, North Korea must keep agreements it has made with South Korea and the international community, and, second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. The alignment policy refers to bringing South Korea’s security into line with its cooperation with the North, and complementing inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts. The alignment policy is said to entail assuming a tough line against North Korea at some times, and a flexible policy open to negotiations at other times. While Seoul and its allies should strengthen their posture against North Korea’s militarism and nuclear brinkmanship, they must also be prepared to offer Pyongyang a new beginning for prosperity through economic cooperation with the South.

It should be remembered that the central tenet of Madame Park’s alignment policy draws on lessons learned from the failures of both the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations. In her Foreign Affairs essay, Madame Park implicitly criticizes the Roh administration’s sustained assistance to the North that did not induce it to abandon its bellicose strategy toward the South on the one hand, and distances herself implicitly from the Lee administration’s North Korea policy on the other hand, saying that more pressure on North Korea has not been able to influence its behavior in a meaningful way.

This line of learning from failures also includes a determination not to repeat the failures of the previous administrations in relations with the United States and China. The Roh administration gave the impression of anti-Americanism and of strengthening cooperation with North Korea and China at the cost of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This attitude provoked a defensive and distancing approach from both the United States and Japan. In contrast, the Lee administration has been regarded as endeavoring too much to strengthen the alliance between ROK and the United States, at the cost of South Korea’s relations with China. While anchoring confidently in its alliance with the United States, Park’s administration would strive for a more balanced approach to China.

It remains to be seen how good or bad these principles will be when applied in the real world of “the most tortuous external environments in the 21st century.” In any case, they will be well in tune with the United States and will be more in harmony with China’s North Korea policy than those of the Lee administration. Yet the gap with North Korea remains wide, as Pyongyang continues to hope for an enhanced version of “sustained assistance” with no strings attached.

North Korea’s intentions and strategies

Over the past five years, North Korea’s internal and foreign policies were focused on the year 2012, as the year for “opening the gate toward a strong and prosperous country.” Policies have been implemented through a synchronized “great surge” in internal mobilization and outward aggressiveness, especially since 2009. With the successful inauguration of the Kim Jong Un regime and increased capacities for WMD shown at the end of 2012, the North Korean leadership may feel somewhat comfortable that it has successfully rebalanced power relations in its favor―both between regime and society and between North Korea and the international community. In the beginning of 2013, North Korea might think the time has arrived to test neighboring countries and the United States, and to try to establish a new atmosphere for relations with them.

In the past five years, North Korea strove to acquire abilities and to establish the perception that it might seek to dictate terms of any new negotiation with South Korea and the United States. It strengthened its capacities for nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and showed off its potential for aggressive behavior toward South Korea. Tactically, North Korea alternated between phases of aggressiveness and accommodation. While adapting policies to changing circumstances, North Korea has never lost its five strategic objectives for regime survival. It is important to keep in mind these five strategic objectives when we interpret North Korea’s tactical moves, especially its apparently accommodating ones:

North Korea aspires to expand its nuclear as well as missile capabilities and to be recognized by the international community as a nuclear power, especially by South Korea and the United States.
It aims to establish a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and normalize relations with the United States as a recognized nuclear power.
It seeks to establish vertical relations with South Korea in which the South will provide political and economic support for the North Korean regime.
It aspires to secure the necessary funds to maintain its regime by actively developing diverse foreign-currency earning projects (mineral exports, influx of foreign aid, etc.), while striving to contain any reform measures that could increase productivity of the domestic economy.
It strives to maintain internal political stability through preferential treatment of groups loyal to the regime and by strengthening public security organizations.

Through his 2013 New Year’s Address, Kim Jong Un may have wanted to signal North Korea’s return to tactics of accommodation with South Korea and the United States. After the successful missile launch on December 12, 2012 and while showing off its capacities for detonating a third nuclear device, North Korea may have felt confident and decided to test the intentions of the incoming administrations in Seoul and Washington. Although he showed great pride in the successful launch of the Unha 3 rocket, in his speech Kim Jong Un avoided language which might irritate the new Park and Obama administrations. North Korea executed the same sort of about-face from aggressiveness to accommodation in July 2009, after its missile launch in April and second nuclear experiment in May.

There are some structural and circumstantial reasons for North Korea to introduce moderation into its domestic and foreign policies and to try to reset relations with neighboring countries in 2013. The heightened tension of the past five years was exhausting not only for neighboring countries, but also for North Korea. Even under this unfavorable external environment of high tension and reduced assistance, North Korea sustained the three year (2009-11/12) “great surge” of mass mobilization that featured a drastic increase in investments, though for political consolidation rather than economic rehabilitation: massive construction of monumental buildings and show-case facilities in Pyongyang; a “high technology breakthrough” for advancing capacities for WMD; an infusion of capital to resuscitate huge state firms in the heavy and chemical sectors, though without reform; and, last but not least, the enthronement of Kim Jong Un. To fund these projects, North Korean authorities not only amplified mineral exports, but also significantly increased internal exploitation through measures such as revaluing the North Korean won in November 2009 and stepping up the confiscation of food from farmers to feed Pyongyang and the military.

In the past, North Korea has introduced a phase of policy moderation, the so-called “buffer period,” after such a “great surge.” Whether the leadership subjectively liked it or not, the buffer period was required to overcome systemic exhaustion from the mobilization and confrontation that characterize such surges, and to prepare for another big push in the future. Under such a structural necessity, North Korea may have decided to try to work out a new kind of modus vivendi with the South and the United States beginning in 2013. If so, North Korea might be prepared to show some readiness for concessions, while testing the intentions of the South and the United States with regard to some level of reopening of tension reduction and economic cooperation. As in the previous cases, however, the tendencies of policy moderation do not represent a new strategy, but are meant to buy time to prepare for a new surge of aggressiveness and mobilization, sometime in the future.

Opportunities and challenges

All in all, South Korea and the United States, and North Korea, seek to test the other’s intentions and, if possible, to change the current circumstances in their mutual relations to a better footing in the beginning of 2013. South Korea and the United States want to constrain North Korea’s development of WMD and to persuade North Korea to reform and open, for its own benefit. On North Korea’s part, it may be interested in tactical accommodation, while maintaining options for confrontation. This is the best case scenario for a new modus vivendi; North Korea will reject a more binding and fundamental resolution.

Though there exists a certain, limited, possibility for mutual accommodation, it remains questionable whether the three parties could restart and maintain a tough process of dialogue and mutual pressure in “the most tortuous external environments in the 21st century” without jeopardizing the possibilities for forward progress. The challenges for the South and the United States―which include increased skepticism about Pyongyang’s trustworthiness, the reality of North Korea’s increased WMD capacities, and continued divergence between China and other parties on how to deal with North Korea―will prove to be most daunting in comparison to previous years. Considering North Korea’s unwillingness to make―and to keep―real and sincere concessions regarding its development of WMD, the room for improvement in inter-Korean relations is also limited, even though the Park Geun-hye administration will try sincerely to improve them. Without a new and internationally binding scheme for dealing with North Korea’s WMD development, progress above a certain level in inter-Korean relations would remain illusory and would most likely provoke a feeling of betrayal, in the end.

Nevertheless, president-elect Madame Park’s principles of trust and alignment will be a good starting point for a North Korea policy discussion and coordination between the South and the United States. Unfortunately, the task will be easier in the negative sense, if North Korea undertakes provocative actions even before the start of the mutual test of intentions. If North Korea’s turn to tactical moderation in domestic and foreign policy becomes more pronounced during 2013, it will provide the South and the United States with both opportunities and challenges. If North Korea continues to behave prudently even after the renewed sanctions by the UNSC for its December 12 missile launch, abstains from a third nuclear device test, and shows some signs of good will and accommodation, then the South and the United States should go willingly into dialogue with the North and try to test its intentions.

Authors

Hyeong Jung Park

Image Source: © Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

Beijing’s Wish List: A Wiser China Policy in President Obama’s Second Term

Wu Xinbo — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 10:37:00 -0500

Chinese observers of the United States and China-U.S. relations relaxed when U.S. news organizations reported, on November 7 in China, that Barack Obama had been reelected president of the United States. America watchers felt that a period of uncertainty in Sino-U.S. ties that may have accompanied a Romney presidency had been avoided. This does not signify great satisfaction in Beijing with bilateral relations during Obama’s first term or fear of the policies of a President Romney, but rather indicates an expectation that President Romney would have progressed through a learning curve in dealing with China that may have temporarily upset relations.

From the Chinese perspective, Sino-U.S. relations during the first Obama administration deteriorated “from a high start to a low ending,” leaving a legacy of growing mutual suspicion and rising competition between the two countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. In spite of the agreement reached between the two sides on building a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship,” they missed opportunities for more cooperation while mishandling and even misguiding bilateral ties on some points.

The next four years are crucial for Sino-U.S. relations. China will be led by a new leadership that is more self-confident and more attentive to its public opinion. The further narrowing of the power gap between China and the United States will generate more anxiety in Washington. The competition between two countries in the Asia-Pacific may pick up momentum. At the same time, the world’s two largest economies will be required to cooperate and coordinate to promote global governance and address regional and global challenges.

Onus is on the United States

Although China has demonstrated more confidence and tried to take more initiative in bilateral relations over the past several years, it remains largely in a reactive position vis-à-vis the United States, while Washington continues to play a more significant role in shaping ties between two countries. Assuming that this dynamic will continue, the main burden for improving Sino-U.S. relations falls on the United States.

Fortunately, relations with China over the next four years present a lot of opportunities for the United States. China’s new leader Xi Jinping, who paid a successful visit to the United States in early 2012, feels comfortable in dealing with the United States. He wants constructive and cooperative ties with Washington and proposed to develop a new type of major power relationship between the two countries. Economically, China will become even more important to the United States as an export market, source of foreign direct investment, and a major holder of U.S. Treasury securities. Also, as Beijing seeks to play a more active role in international affairs with its rising capability and influence, there will be more opportunities for the United States to work together with China to promote global governance.

Such development requires a wiser China policy in Washington, and has to start with a sound understanding of China and Sino-U.S. relations which will provide an intellectual framework for thinking about and making U.S. policy toward China. First, although dealing with China’s rising power and influence stands at the core of U.S. thinking about China, it is very important that Washington should not put this issue just in a bilateral context, but rather view it against the backdrop of an ongoing global transformation featuring the rise of developing countries and a shift of power from the West to the East. This understanding would help U.S. policy-makers adopt a broader perspective on China’s remarkable development and avoid a narrow and zero-sum thinking.

Second, managing the rise of major powers has never been easy and requires a contemplated grand strategy. The past may provide some useful clues in this regard, but in the era of globalization and interdependence, dealing with this challenge requires more new and creative thinking than in previous epochs. Old thinking leads to the past while new thinking leads to the future. Some U.S. policy-makers may be more familiar with traditional diplomatic strategies and instruments―such as “balance of power,” “alliance,” and “geopolitics”―and may feel more comfortable in applying these ideas to China, but this is not helpful for managing relations with China in the 21st century.

Third, to think about and manage relations between China and the United States, it is crucial to always bear in mind the big picture, and to adopt a strategic and long-term rather than a tactical and short-term approach. Also, as the Chinese like to assess the intention of its counterpart and view any given individual interaction as an integral part of a process to build a long-term connection, it is important to consistently maintain credibility in bilateral engagements. Double-dealing with China may bring about some tactical and short-term gains, but will cost one China’s trust and in the long-run undermine one’s position in dealing with China. This happened during Obama’s first term and should be avoided in the second term.

The “rising power” phenomenon

Given the current low level of mutual trust between China and the United States, the two nations should start a serious dialogue about their respective visions for the future of bilateral relations. Earlier this year Beijing expressed to Washington an interest in building a “new type of relationship between major countries” featuring “no confrontation, no antagonism, mutual respect, mutual benefit.” The rationale behind this proposal is that if China and the U.S. are to avoid repeating the tragedies of major power politics that have played out so often in history, they need to embrace new thinking and create a new and unique vision for the relationship. This not only coincides with Beijing’s repeatedly stated desire for peaceful development, but also serves to address the biggest challenge confronting Sino-U.S. relations: how to avoid conflict between a rising power and an existing hegemon. The Obama administration should welcome this proposal and sit down with the Chinese to discuss what this means for overall bilateral ties and how they can work together to get there from here.

Today state-to-state interactions between China and the United States occur at three levels: bilateral, regional and global. While bilateral interactions continue to form the basis of overall relations, regional and global interactions are expanding and producing more and more impact on Sino-U.S. ties. A balanced and stable Sino-U.S. relationship should be based on positive interplay among the three levels. In the last two years, however, the Obama administration’s strategy of rebalancing toward Asia has not only heightened the role of regional interactions in Sino-U.S. relations, but also generated negative impact on the other two dimensions, thus affecting the healthy development of the overall relationship. To some extent, the rebalancing strategy has caused imbalance in Sino-U.S. relations. To address this problem, it is desirable that in its second term, the Obama administration will not only give more weight to bilateral and global dimensions, but also reduce the negative impact of its regional policy on relations with China.

Trade and economy

On the economic front, the Chinese side hopes that in the next four years the Obama administration will resist the temptation of protectionism on trade issues, take steps to lower barriers to the export of high-tech products to China, and improve the environment for Chinese direct investment in the United States. Sino-U.S. trade relations experienced their most fractious period over the last four years due to the high unemployment rate and other economic difficulties confronting the United States. As the recovery gradually gains traction and exports to China further expand over the next four years, the Obama administration should exercise self-restraint in launching protectionist measures against China. Although the Obama administration signaled over the past several years its intention to lessen controls of high-tech exports to China, there has been no real progress so far. If Washington can deliver something substantive on this issue in the years to come, it will not only enhance U.S. exports to China and reduce the bilateral trade imbalance, but will also send a positive signal to China regarding American intentions. Finally, in a time when Chinese firms are increasing their overseas investment, the United States should not allow unwarranted security concerns to block Chinese investment; this will not only cause the United States to lose more job opportunities, but also will provoke Chinese retaliation against U.S. investment in China.

Defense

As China’s defense modernization makes steady progress, managing security relations will also be a major challenge for the Obama administration over the next four years. First of all, the United States should not overreact to China’s military development. China has varied and complicated security challenges to cope with. As its economy grows, it can afford to devote more resources to its defense establishment to deal with these challenges. Upgrading its large and relatively backward military machine is both normal and understandable. The United States should not just focus on the kinds of capabilities the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) pursues, but should pay attention to how China will use its military power.

China’s growing defense capability may undermine U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific and constrain Washington’s freedom to exercise its military muscle in this part of the world, but China’s ultimate purpose is to deter the United States from intervening militarily in adjacent areas like the Taiwan Strait, not to challenge U.S. dominance in the entire Pacific. Secondly, the U.S. military should constrain its tendency to view China as an enemy and treat it as such. For instance, the Air-Sea Battle concept that has been announced by the Pentagon is designed to guide U.S. thinking on fighting a major war in the Western Pacific under the circumstances of the PLA developing its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. If this concept is allowed to reshape the entire U.S. military posture in this region, it will send a strong signal that the United States is preparing for a major conflict with China, just as it did during the Cold War period with the Soviet Union. This will not only invite strong reactions from China, but will also aggravate the regional security environment.

On another front, the lasting, frequent and close military surveillance on China by the United States from both air and sea stands as an irritant to bilateral military relations. For the Chinese, it is simply provocative and intolerable. In fact, it gives rise to the PLA’s suspicion of U.S. strategic intentions toward China and also runs the risk of causing some incidents between two militaries in the air or on the sea, as have already occurred in the past. The United States should exercise some self-constraint and ask itself whether it really needs to conduct so many intrusive surveillances on China. It should also curtail such activities in China’s adjacent areas―especially as Sino-U.S. military exchanges grow and increase the transparency about China’s military development.

Asia-Pacific regional policy

The last four years have witnessed growing U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security input to the Asia-Pacific region under the strategy of rebalancing the focus of its foreign relations toward Asia strategy. Although some may hail this as a major diplomatic achievement of the first Obama administration, scrutiny and some adjustments are required in Obama’s second term if U.S. engagement in this region is to be healthy and sustainable.

First, as a major thrust of the strategy is to counterbalance China’s expanding influence in the region, it has heated up disputes in the South and East China Seas, which in turn have caused some tension between Washington and Beijing. While the United States, as a Pacific country, has important interests to pursue in the region, it should not do so at China’s expense. A wise U.S. regional policy should be guided by a recognition of the inevitable increase in China’s influence in its neighborhood as well as a sensitivity to China’s legitimate interests therein. Such a policy will help avoid the creation of a zero-sum game between two countries and lay a solid and sustainable basis for U.S. interests in the region in the long run.

Second, since 2010, the United States has taken a hands-on approach to the territorial and maritime disputes between China and some of its neighbors, such as Vietnam and Philippine in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea, even though these disputes are neither new nor easy to resolve. In the past several years, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan have tried to bring in the United States to pressure China on territorial issues in these areas; Beijing responded by standing firm against them, suggesting that such tactics would not work with China. In fact, U.S. involvement in these disputes has served only to inflate some countries’ expectations, entrapping Washington in potential diplomatic and even military confrontation with Beijing that the United States may not want, and causing China to harden its position. Under these circumstances, Washington should avoid taking sides in both rhetoric and action, but rather encourage peaceful means and creative diplomacy on all parts.

Finally, the Obama administration pursued the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) not only to promote U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific, but also undermine the momentum for East Asian economic cooperation that didn’t involve the U.S. Although this is not the first time that Washington has succeeded in killing some previous initiatives for East Asian cooperation―for instance, the U.S. opposed then-Malaysian Prime Minster Mahathir‘s proposal for the establishment of an East Asian Economic Caucus in the early 1990s, and Japan’s initiative for creating an Asian Monetary Fund during the Asian Financial Crisis in late 1990s―this time is different.

The rise of China as an engine for regional economic growth has greatly enhanced the momentum for East Asian cooperation. For instance, in spite of the flare-up of Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and cooling-down of their respective bilateral relationships since September 2012, China, South Korea, and Japan agreed in November 2012 to open the negotiations for a trilateral free trade agreement. Meanwhile, China has also joined hands with ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand to establish Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which promises to become the world’s largest FTA with a population of about 3 billion and an economic output of $20 trillion. In its second term, the Obama administration may continue to pursue TPP or Asia-Pacific cooperation in general, but it should downplay its ambition to slow down or even derail East Asian cooperation, as such efforts will neither succeed nor benefit the image of the United States in the region.

Authors

Wu Xinbo

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Ishihara and the Senkakus: The Japanese State of Mind

Tomohiko Taniguchi — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 09:50:00 -0500

Shintaro Ishihara, the eighty year-old former governor of Tokyo known for his controversial style, is now aiming to make a comeback on the center-stage of Japan’s national politics. In October he suddenly resigned as governor and announced an intention to form a new political party to challenge the existing balance of political power. One must wonder why. Loss of patience may well be the answer - and that sentiment also describes the state of the nation overall.

Ishihara was on the losing team in 1945 at the age of 13, born and raised in a country that he took pride of but that had been utterly defeated.

Whilst at college, he became a national icon, having gained recognition as an accomplished novelist. He earned fame as a fearless straight talker by the young age of 25. It was as if he and his younger brother, a hugely popular actor who was the pin-up boy of every woman in 1960s Japan, were the epitome of a young, aspiring and rising nation.

He must now be a frustrated old man, because the country he loves is in decay. Its economy is shrinking, along with its population and its diplomatic clout. Given his age he cannot afford to be a long-termist and wait any longer. He must also be thinking that sooner, rather than later, his country may become even more irrelevant, ending up kowtowing more and more to its powerful neighbors. Now he must stand to make a difference before it is too late, otherwise he will end his life once again on the losing team.

In this way Ishihara is emblematic of a Japan that is increasingly frustrated, even desperate, aware that the clock is ticking until its self-marginalization becomes irreversible.

Robert Cooper hypothesized in his seminal work, The Breaking of Nations, that had Japan been located in Europe, it could have built a full-fledged "post-modern" nation with its restraint on defense build-up and stress on multilateralism. Yet, the British diplomat continued, how long a post-modern nation surrounded by a sea of "modern" nationalists in the Western Pacific can sustain itself is an open-ended question.

Events that have ensued since Cooper wrote the book in the heyday of Europe's single currency are proof that, even in the proudly post-modern Europe, nationalist sentiment is alive and kicking. For its part, Japan has never felt more keenly that it is unique in its immediate neighborhood. The mature island democracy is neighbor to Russia, the two Koreas, China and Taiwan. Of these, three are declared nuclear-armed powers, two or three are democracies that are still extremely young and volatile, and one has undergone no democratization whatsoever. Most of them are expanding their military capabilities at a rate hitherto unseen, whereas in Japan military spending has constantly been on the wane.

This is not an entirely new phenomenon but, truth be told, ten years ago when Japan's economy was as large as those of most of its neighbors' combined, Tokyo failed to recognize the serious consequences of its neighbors’ growth and its own demographic changes. It is now deprived of that luxury of economic supremacy. "Japan is no longer influential," Lee Myung-bak, the South Korean President, openly declared, justifying his intended provocation of setting foot himself on the long disputed island off Japan's Shimane prefecture. It is far from coincidence that immediately after the 3-11 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power failures that hit Japan in early 2011, Russia and China both increased their forceful military surveillance in the skies above and in the seas around Japan. "When you see a dog drowning, hit it hard" holds a Chinese maxim.

This is a phenomenon rarely seen over the past decades: a Japan that feels increasingly insecure economically as well as militarily. Twice before, when it felt similarly vulnerable, Japan made an about-turn. In the late 19th century it chose to enter the Western imperial system by modernizing itself and embracing internationalization in order to escape the encroachment of colonial powers. In the 1930s global depression, Japan turned inwards again which culminated in wars against China and eventually the U.S.-led allied powers. What will happen this time round?

So far Tokyo has shown its hallmark perseverance. It could well have opted to become wholly self-occupied after the March 2011 disasters, but it did not. Tokyo instead showed its willingness to reinvest in the alliance with the United States despite the lingering stalemate―of its own making―regarding the relocation of elements of the U.S. Marine Corps that are based on Okinawa. Yoshihiko Noda's government stated that more, not less, openness toward the world is the only solution to the challenges wrought by the earthquake, though he has only kept his agenda of bringing Japan into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) afloat and it has not yet taken any root.

That the U.S. rushed to Japan’s rescue, at its lowest point in March 2011, helped. Operation Tomodachi (meaning “friend”), launched by the U.S. military immediately after 3-11 as the biggest peacetime humanitarian disaster relief operation, was a boon for America's image in the eyes of the average Japanese. The resultant awareness that Japan was cared about, indeed embraced, by countries that ranged from Australia, Israel and even Afghanistan (from which came a memorable message: "We are poor, but are rich in our willingness to help the people in Japan when they are in need") prevented Japan from shutting its eyes toward the rest of the world. So far, so good...

Japanese didn’t have a sudden epiphany about the importance for Japan of other countries. Indeed, it had been wrestling with how to position itself internationally for most of the previous decade – in various ways and in different directions. When this author served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late 2000s, seeking to help expand Japan's diplomatic horizons, one could take comfort from looking at these more promising developments. For in retrospect, Japan's foreign policy took an important turn toward more firmly enmeshing the country in the fabric of democracies, near and far, by the year 2006.

By that time Tokyo had chosen to seek semi-alliance relationships with two maritime democracies: Australia and India. Each country's ministers of defense and foreign affairs and their Japanese counterparts hold regular meetings, dubbed Two plus Two, of a kind previously attainable only between Tokyo and Washington. Heads of Japan's military services meet their Indian counterparts on a regular basis. For some time India has been the largest recipient of Japan's overseas developmental assistance. Shinzo Abe, then Japan's Prime Minister, delivered a speech at the Central Hall of the Indian parliament in August 2007 to the members of their both houses, who burst into applause more than thirty times during his speech, which was tellingly titled "Confluence of the Two Seas." Japan should stake its future on the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian oceans, it implied.

To further enhance its long-standing alliance with the U.S., Tokyo embarked on a path it had never followed before: an Atlantic path. In Iraq, Japan's army (Ground Self-Defense Force) worked for humanitarian assistance under the cover provided by the armies of Britain and Holland, two important members of the North Atlantic Alliance. In the Indian Ocean, Japan's navy (Maritime Self-Defense Force), joined Operation Enduring Freedom and found itself providing fuel more to the NATO warships than to the Americans. "Japan has rediscovered NATO's importance and, I hope, vice versa," then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso told the North Atlantic Council in May 2006.

Japan’s gesture of moving closer toward the Atlantic-based military alliance was rather like a friend informally knocking at the back door of its most trusted ally, the United States. Aso summed up Japan's new diplomatic direction as laying an "arc of freedom and prosperity" (or AFP as this author, then the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, called it), linking countries in Asia aspiring to democracy to central European counties where people freed from Soviet oppression and awaited Japanese involvement in assistance.

In 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power after decades of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) , new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his colleague, the DPJ heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa, both argued that Japan should seek an equidistant relationship, like an equilateral triangle, involving Japan, China and the United States. The idea of an East Asian Community, with the specific implication that Pacific partner nations, notably the United States, ought to be side-lined, also gained currency. But in order to materialize the equilateral triangle, it would first be necessary to make the relationship between Washington and Tokyo more distant. To say that Japan would need the East Asian Community was hence not unlike advocating that Japan should distance itself from the U.S. and willingly fall under the extended shadow of the Sino-sphere.

With that short-lived confusion in the interval, it looks as if Japan's diplomacy has come full circle. The AFP as a slogan has disappeared. After all it was one of Japan's rare attempts at self-branding. However, its spirit remains alive, as evinced by its rapid involvement in the liberalizing Myanmar. Most notably Japan chose to deepen its relations further with India. Tokyo now holds its track-one trilateral dialogue with Delhi and Washington on a regular basis. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Tokyo has accomplished with Delhi is a rare success among Japan's free trade agreements.

Even with South Korea, Japan attempted to reinvent the bilateral relationship, by proposing to forge the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between Seoul and Tokyo. This was to no avail as at literally the last minute Seoul backed off - reportedly for fear that any kind of military agreement with Japan could jeopardize Seoul's relationship with Beijing. Tokyo's sentiment, though, remains that as long as South Korea is a democracy, common sense and sober consideration will eventually prevail there and that the GSOMIA, which would be necessary in the event of a threat to Korean security, will eventually be signed.

Against this backdrop of international outreach from Tokyo, Chinese provocations over the Senkakus began. Despite Beijing’s assertions, Tokyo Governor Ishihara's announced intention to purchase the uninhabited islands' property rights from its individual owner, and the subsequent response of the central government to purchase the islands to prevent political grandstanding, did not rock the boat first. Beijing had already been sending a host of law enforcement vessels into and around the Senkakus' contiguous waters, sometimes even within the territorial waters near the islands, effectively seeking to establish China’s own sovereign jurisdiction. Since the massive anti-Japanese hate rallies that destroyed Japanese shops and factories in August and September 2012, Beijing has made it a daily ritual to send law enforcement boats into Japan's contiguous waters, forcing the Japanese coast guard to engage in the most prolonged patrol mission in its entire history.

The objectives of the Chinese military build-up have never been transparent and are unlikely to become so in the near future. But their actions, if not words, have gained clarity these days. When they claim the Senkakus belong to them, despite Beijing having only started to make that assertion in 1971, and try to make it a fait accompli through patrols by their law enforcement vessels in adjacent waters, and when they also make a claim that almost the entire East China Sea belongs to their exclusive economic zone (which, in China’s unique interpretation, is little different from territorial waters), it is clear that they intend to turn the East China Sea (together with the South China Sea) into something akin to Lake Beijing, effectively building an exclusive area in which the activities, and to which the access, of the naval assets of Japan and the U.S. could be denied.

Facing Chinese aggressions into its territorial and contiguous waters Japan has felt even more keenly the urgent need to anchor itself to the group of maritime democracies. Gradually a concept that Japan should form a "security diamond" (this author's term) between Hawaii, Canberra, Delhi and Tokyo has taken shape. The frequent military to military exchanges among the four apexes are proof of that emerging diamond. Beyond its traditional activities, Japan's military has a small overseas base, the first of its kind since the end of the war, in Djibouti, working alongside the Americans and the French to participate in anti-piracy operations. This is further evidence that Tokyo is willing to share responsibility with the U.S. to safeguard the maritime commons. In addition, Japan's space policy is leaving behind its traditional science-first bent to acquire a new concept that outer space is another domain where those democracies that abide by the rules should prevail as a dominant force. Now it has been established as a priority that Japan should launch quasi-zenith satellites in order to supplement the U.S.-run Global Positioning System.

At this writing, the general elections for the lower house of the Japanese Diet can take place anytime soon. The elections for the upper house are due in July 2013. It is now more likely that those elections will bring back the once ousted Liberal Democrats into a position pivotal enough to form the core of any coalition government. Ishihara will provide impetus for Japan's political discourse to lean toward the realist. The much debated, indeed long-overdue, activation of Japan's right for collective self-defense will face less opposition. Japan's defense budget, for the first time in many years, will gain more appropriation. All that, however, is indicative of the power lost, not gained, for the once mighty Japan that is now a waning and frustrated country.

Authors

Tomohiko Taniguchi

Image Source: © Yuriko Nakao / Reuters

Hong Kong-Mainland Tension on the Brink of Explosion

Ray Yep — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

October 1, 2012 was no ordinary day in Hong Kong. It was supposed to be a day of routine celebration activities in honor of China’s National Day, but it turned out to be a nightmare. The festive spirit was brutally muted by a tragic collision of two boats in Hong Kong waters and the consequent sinking of one of these vessels packed with children and other passengers. The local community was stunned. People waited anxiously over the long night for updates on the rescue operation, but their prayers were not answered. The accident resulted in 38 deaths and a dozen serious injuries. The outpouring of grief and bereavement was significant.

The emotion was dwarfed, however, by parallel waves of criticism targeted at mainland officials’ expressions of sympathy and support during the trying hours. Li Gang, deputy director of Central People’s Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong, paid a visit to the victims of the tragedy and offered help for the rescue operation, only to be accused of undermining the authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. This sentiment was further fueled by “directives” from Beijing requesting the local government to make its best efforts in handling the crisis. The resentment against any form of involvement of mainland officials appears to have prevailed over the sentiment for unity, an instinct that is usually unleashed in time of crisis and desperation. For many, Beijing’s actions in this case are blatant intrusions into the autonomy enjoyed by the Hong Kong government and a testament to the emerging trend of “Beijing people ruling Hong Kong” (in contrast to the notion of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” that is enshrined in the Basic Law).

Overseas observers may find it difficult to reconcile the anti-Beijing sentiment depicted here with the visible role that Hong Kong has played in the recent campaign over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. Together with Taiwanese campaigners, Hong Kong protesters undertook a dangerous voyage and managed to land on the main island in late August 2012. This symbolic victory helped trigger demonstrations and rallies against the Japanese government in various major cities in China. Such a heroic act is no doubt an expression of concern for the dignity of the Chinese nation. And despite its century-long status as a British colony before 1997, Hong Kong in fact has a long tradition of being compassionate for the well-being of mainland Chinese. Generous donations for victims of natural disasters and concern for the dissidents across the border are illustrative of the bonding between the two Chinese societies. Yet beneath the facade of patriotism, in recent years there has been a rapidly growing counter-current of resentment against mainland encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy.

The irreversible process of integration with the mainland economy has certainly contributed to the growth of the local economy, yet many locals find the pressures of growing exchanges too great to bear. Economic integration between Hong Kong and the mainland took off during the early years of post-Mao reforms in the 1980s. Three of China’s four Special Economic Zones—test points for luring foreign investment—were located in Guangdong and Hong Kong investors were the primary targets. Local manufacturers responded enthusiastically to the supply of cheap labor and land and market opportunities, and this sparked waves of relocation of factories from Hong Kong to the north. Beijing’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 increased the momentum of the process.

However, the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 2003 heralded the beginning of a new level of integration. With Hong Kong’s economy severely hurt by the crisis, Beijing lifted various restrictions on the movement of capital, services and population between the mainland and Hong Kong. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), the main mechanism for these accelerated exchanges, was greeted with enthusiasm and gratitude by local businesses and professionals, who saw it as a timely boost for the local economy. As a result, tens of millions of mainlanders are now allowed to visit Hong Kong (with a population of just over 7 million) every year, and local professionals are granted greater opportunities to ply their trades in the mainland. On the other hand, local financial institutions are becoming more and more dependent on revenues generated from services for public listing of mainland enterprises in Hong Kong or renminbi-related business.

While the unabated influx of purchasing power and capital is a strong impetus for local growth, the challenge of accommodating the consequent increased demand on local infrastructure and services appears to be a daunting task. Locals are getting more and more irritated by the crowded streets and short supply of daily necessities due to the flood of tourists. While lower income groups may attribute general price inflation to the insatiable demands of mainland consumers, the aspiring middle class sees the arrival of mainland competitors as the major obstacle in their pursuit of career advancement, academic success, affordable property and better life chances. Differences in lifestyle, habits and social etiquette further reinforce the tension and uneasiness between these two Chinese groups.

The general mood of frustration and anxiety against the mainland encroachment goes beyond concerns for material well-being. The June 4 event in 1989 has always been an integral part of the local psyche and the people’s perception of the mainland authorities. The rampant corruption of the Chinese bureaucracy, the long list of its infringements on human rights and press freedom, and the authoritarian nature of the Communist regime hardly help endear the Chinese government to locals. More and more Hong Kong people are beginning to think that the growing intimacy with the mainland may come at the price of an undermining of the cherished tradition of liberty.

This fear is also premised on the power asymmetry between the local and central governments. Constitutionally speaking, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government is a subordinate unit under the Central People’s Government. The Basic Law grants the Hong Kong Government autonomy on most issues, especially domestic affairs. But the undemocratic nature of the selection method of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong government, and the strong influence of Beijing on the process, prompt many people to the believe that the holder of this office would never have the courage or authority to defend local interests in face of pressure from Beijing. This concern is also reinforced by the composition of the legislature—only half of its members are directly elected on the basis of universal suffrage.

The suspicion and fear finally erupted in the summer of 2012 over the controversy of “national education,” a compulsory course for all school children that was scheduled to be introduced in the 2012-2013 academic year, with explicit instructions from top leaders like Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping on the imperative of strengthening a national identity in Hong Kong. While most parents found it reasonable for their children to know more about their motherland, they were shocked when they learned more about the program design, specifically with what many saw as the glorification of the Chinese Communist Party in the curriculum. A collective fear of “brain-washing” and indoctrination in Hong Kong eventually exploded into a week-long siege of the government headquarters and a marathon hunger strike. The storm eventually subsided with the government making major concessions in the program and allowing individual schools to decide whether to implement the curriculum.

More broadly, the rising resentment against mainland encroachment is helping to remake the political landscape of Hong Kong. Only one issue really mattered for the Legislative Council election in the summer of 2012: resistance against mainland influence. Mobilization based on fear of China―rather than issues related to society, democratization, economy or any specific policy program―was the most effective campaign strategy. Even though the share of votes commanded by the democratic camp and the pro-establishment camp remained more or less unchanged, the Democratic Party, the political party that used to be the flagship party in the democratic camp, was the major loser. Its decision to cut a deal on constitutional reform with Beijing in 2010 was depicted by its rivals as an act of betrayal of Hong Kong, and a setback in the quest for universal suffrage for Hong Kong people. In this atmosphere, the Democratic Party suffered a severe blow in the 2012 election, while parties that advocated a non-compromising position vis-à-vis Beijing emerged as the major winners. In 2010, radical groups like People’s Power and the League of Social Democrats in effect manipulated the legislative electoral system by engineering a Hong Kong-wide by-election. The organizers cast the by-election, which was to fill five seats from which legislators had resigned, as a referendum on democracy in Hong Kong. Despite some criticism for this manipulation of the system, these parties have seen their votes increase by more than 50% over the last four years. The constituency for the depiction of the past 15 years as a period of mainland colonization appears to be expanding fast in Hong Kong.

The unease over the prevailing situation in Hong Kong is shared equally by Beijing. Chinese leaders certainly find the resentment of the Hong Kong people incomprehensible, given the mainland’s generous economic support since 1997 and political concessions in the approval of constitutional reform in 2010. Unfortunately, Beijing seems to rely on one expedient explanation for the protest movements and resistance: the involvement of overseas “black hands.” According to this theory of international conspiracy, dissident movements and opposition in China are primarily results of manipulation and intervention by outside forces, rather than spontaneous protests by victims against the wrong doings committed by the Communist regime. It is an official explanation for the outbreak of the June 4 incident in 1989, and the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to the dissident Liu Xiaobo is also taken as vivid proof of a well-orchestrated plot of the West against China. In this mindset, Hong Kong is just another extension of the global conspiracy, and the Americans and British are the usual suspects. This thinking was especially evident in late 2011 when Lü Xinhua, the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC in Hong Kong, made a pointed attack on Stephen Young, the American Consul General in Hong Kong, accusing him of unwarranted intervention in Hong Kong politics.

With the growing agitation of Hong Kong people against the mainland, the concern that Hong Kong could be used as a base for subversive activities against China by outside forces could certainly gain some traction among the decision makers in Beijing. There is one obvious way that Beijing could act on such an impulse: the option of initiating deliberation on Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law—which spells out the obligations of the Hong Kong government to introduce laws prohibiting acts of secession, subversion and sedition and treason against the Central Government―must be very tempting for radicals in Beijing. Though Article 23 might be the most obvious potential bombshell, it is very likely that another controversy may jump the queue in creating mayhem in Hong Kong.

The issue of constitutional reform, represented chiefly by the concept of universal suffrage, must be solved before 2017; China’s National People’s Congress has designated that year as the earliest possible time when the Chief Executive of Hong Kong can be elected on a one-man-one-vote basis. However, even the most optimistic soul would not expect a fully democratic proposal from Beijing given its jaundiced view of the notion of universal suffrage. The radicals in the local political scene, however, are emboldened and are likely to stick to their position of occupying the moral high ground. They are also likely to heed the message delivered by the defeat of the Democratic Party in 2012, and not accept anything less than a perfect package. With the moderates heavily defeated in the latest election, the democratic camp just cannot afford another act of political suicide of being seen a traitor. With a larger segment of Hong Kong society viewing direct confrontation with Beijing as the most effective way of advancing Hong Kong’s interests, more provocative and even violent forms of protest are on the horizon. A total stand-off between some segments of the civil society and the Hong Kong Government is a genuine possibility. That will be the ultimate test of patience and tolerance for Beijing.

As a keen observer of post-1997 politics, Taiwan must find the latest developments in Hong Kong disconcerting. The Nationalists in particular, who have been embracing further encounters with Beijing since the first term of the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, are probably wary of the dislocations and consequences of unchecked integration with the mainland as witnessed in Hong Kong. While inflows of capital or trading opportunities are certainly welcome stimuli for Taiwan’s ailing economy, as they were in Hong Kong, a perception of over-reliance on the mainland economy would undermine the authority of the government in the eyes of the Taiwan public. And as the Ma government is fully aware of the presence of a well-developed opposition political machinery―the so-called pan-Green camp, which is even more prepared to mobilize the fear and resentment against mainlanders than the radicals in Hong Kong―until Taiwan can work out a proper formula for fairly allocating the fruits and costs of economic integration among different classes and interests in Taiwanese society, moderation and restraint on the pace and scope of exchanges with the mainland appears to be the safest approach in the short term. Yet, despite the contrasting calculations by the pan-Blue and pan-Green, some kind of consensus is discernible. That is, as informed by the experience of Hong Kong, the model of One Country Two Systems is simply a non-starter for any prospective dialogue on reunification.

Authors

Ray Yep

Image Source: © Siu Chiu / Reuters

Russia’s Views of the Security Situation in East Asia

Vladimir N. Kolotov — Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Experts usually delineate two main regions in East Asia: Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asian countries are generally more developed politically and economically, but they are very dependent on different kinds of resources from outside their territories. This feature exacerbates other factors in their bilateral relationships which often lead to tension. Southeast Asian countries are rich in resources, but the region’s great political and cultural complexity and diversity make it difficult for it to assert itself in international relations. Southeast Asian countries themselves are unable to build a regional security system without taking into consideration the political interests and positions of global actors and neighboring countries in Northeast Asia.

The first attempt to build a common East Asian regional security system without division into Northeast and Southeast Asia was undertaken in the 13^th century by Mongolian khans. The Mongols managed to take control of all of Northeast Asia except for Japan, and also invaded other mainland and island Southeast Asian kingdoms. In the early 20^th century, Japan, the only Asian power that managed to preserve real independence during the era of European colonization, sought to dominate and expand its own sphere of influence, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亜共栄圏), under the slogan “Asia for the Asians!” At its high point, Japan controlled the eastern sections of mainland Asia, and also the main parts of mainland and island Southeast Asia. Japan’s defeat in World War II ended its attempts to consolidate this regional security architecture.

Right after the end of the World War II, the United States started to build a regional security system in East Asia aimed at containing the Sino-Soviet bloc, establishing both bilateral alliances and multi-lateral alliances such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The United States also considered leading the formation of a Northeast Asian Treaty Organization. It is important to note that an implicit anti-Soviet security structure made up of the United States, China, and Japan emerged, which supplemented the U.S. alliance structure. Although the Cold War ended 20 years ago, the contemporary security architecture in East Asia in general has not changed very much (with the exception of the U.S.-China-Japan axis). What are its main contemporary parameters?

The East Asian Arc of Instability

The most correct indicator of the established geopolitical balance of forces in the region is the East Asian Arc of Instability. This is a predominant geopolitical reality and is the basis of the regional security architecture. The East Asian Arc of Instability is a difficult system of blocks and counterbalances which goes through divided countries and disputed territories. Beginning in the Cold War, the East Asian Arc of Instability has gone from the so-called “Northern territories” (i.e. Kuril Islands), through the divided Korean peninsula and divided China (People’s Republic of China and Republic of China or Taiwan), and down to divided Vietnam (North Vietnam and South Vietnam). These are only the most important flash points; “small” disputes along this arc include Dokdo/Takeshima, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the Spratly and Paracel islands as well as numerous other small islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea. During the Cold War only one considerable move took place in the Southern part of the East Asian Arc of Instability: in 1975 Vietnam was unified, but only on the continent. Before the end of the war, when the North Vietnamese army was stuck in South Vietnam, South Vietnamese troops were evacuated from the Paracel Islands by the U.S. Navy and these islands were almost immediately taken over by China in 1974. These events had far reaching consequences.

All the intricate curves of this Arc of Instability are stipulated by the geopolitical interests and strategies of main actors of global and regional policy as well as the established balance of power. Any change in this Arc of Instability, even if it seems insignificant at first sight, could be considered by competitors as a challenge or even as casus belli. From the southeast, the Arc of Instability is buttressed by U.S. military bases situated on the territory of U.S. security partners in East Asia. This system is based on bilateral security agreements. Because of the significant security dependence of Asian partners on the United States, and the virtually immeasurable military and economic dominance that it enjoys, Washington has a certain freedom of action. From the northwest, Russia and China are hanging over this East Asian Arc of Instability. They coordinate their activities mainly in Central Asia in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is the mechanism that in form looks most like a regional security system. But its impact is minimized because of its limited membership and limited functions, and because the parties concerned know that it reduces their freedom of action. The disputes along the East Asian Arc of Instability are so complex that actors require more maneuverability. At the same time that Russia and China coordinate in Central Asia, therefore, they pursue foreign policy in East Asia without visible cooperation.

The East Asian Arc of Instability reflects historically established fault lines, which are sources of friction in regional relations. When geopolitical players try to move these lines, it is usually a cause for immediate reaction by competitors of informational, diplomatic, economic, financial, and/or military character. These territorial disputes have huge destructive potential and can turn the whole region into an abyss of long range destabilization. Therefore the East Asian Arc of Instability plays a very important role in the contemporary Great Game in East Asia.

Russia’s interests

Among these potential hot-spots, Russia has been directly involved in a territorial dispute with Japan, has common land borders with China and North Korea (with whom border disputes have been settled), and have maintained traditionally close relations with China, both Korean states and Vietnam.

Russia rejects Japan’s demands to “return” the Kuril Islands; Japan’s claims to the islands are not accepted by any responsible political force in Russia. The Soviet Union established control over the Kuril Islands in 1945 according to Yalta agreements which were signed by Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Control over the Kuril Islands was the condition of Soviet participation in the war against Japan in 1945, but as soon as Japan’s Kwantung Army was defeated in Manchuria the United States unilaterally revised its position on this issue.

Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visits to the Kuril Islands, in 2012 and 2010, were described in Tokyo as “inexcusable rudeness.” However, Japan has territorial disputes with all its neighboring countries, legacies perhaps of its colonial expansion in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, and its defeat in World War II. These territorial claims, which would seem to have been settled by wars and treaties, create fundamental conditions for long-term instability in the region. Japan, as the regional actor most dependent on energy and overseas resource supplies, will be the party most affected by this instability.

Regardless of 20^th century wars, Russians generally consider Japan to be a great culture and there is great interest in it. Russia was a major donor to recovery efforts after the March 11, 2011 Tohoku disaster. Instead of confrontation, therefore, Moscow proposes to concentrate on mutually advantageous economic cooperation, to develop closer trade and humanitarian ties between Russia and Japan, including in the energy field. The most suitable solution of this problem is the common use of the Kuril Islands under Russian sovereignty. Moscow believes that reconciliation will be of great benefit to Japan and will also make a considerable contribution to peace and security in the region.

Since the resolution of its border disputes with China around the turn of the 21^st century, Moscow perceives that the general situation along the East Asian Arc of Instability can be described as “stably unstable.” It seems that the established status quo is more or less acceptable to interested parties and that in the foreseeable future we will see continued exchange of diplomatic notes between Russia and Japan, saber rattling on the Korean peninsula, and latent tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These are the remaining major flash points that were left unresolved after the Cold War. The more “minor” points of contention, in the East and South China Seas, deserve more attention as they represent an emerging challenge to the established status quo in the East Asian Arc of Instability. Antagonistic contradictions between first and second world powers close off potential avenues for compromise. Hidden and open struggles for a new regional order are inevitable.

The post-Cold War order that exists today is based on U.S. economic and military dominance and containment of the Soviet Union. East Asian countries now play a much stronger role in world affairs than during the Cold War and the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, but the East Asian security architecture is almost the same. During the last 30 years China has shown especially remarkable growth and is ready to build new regional order, one that corresponds more closely to the new state of affairs.

It is obvious that the strengthening of China’s economic and political role and the tendency of the United States to preserve its primacy in the region have created strong opposing pressures which now seriously deform the region. This intensification from both outside (the United States) and inside the region (China) is helping to activate previously “sleeping” territorial claims and regional conflicts.

China’s policy in the region is the most predictable and the recent warning in its official People’s Daily newspaper to American officials to “shut up” about territorial disputes in the South China Sea was forecasted by Samuel Huntington in long-ago 1996, in his book The Clash of Civilizations,[1] where he described the initial phase of the conflict over South China Sea: “The Chinese warn the United States to stay out.” Contemporary China-U.S. relations and the role of Vietnam factor in the Far East are developing in a way that is eerily similar, in some respects, to the model imagined by the famous American scholar.

Recently military experts in China have worked out a concept of two “island chains” along China’s maritime perimeter. Areas within the First Island Chain include Taiwan, the Tonkin Gulf, South China Sea and the Ryukyu Islands; areas within the Second Island Chain include Japan and the Philippines and outward to Guam. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China’s navy “appears primarily focused on contingencies within” these two island chains.[2] It is interesting to note that China’s strategic calculations in this regard are to some extent similar to those behind Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

From Beijing’s point of view, which stipulates that a regional power should have its own zone of dominance and secure vital sea lanes for hydrocarbon resources, such a strategic plan seems quite logical for long term security and supply of resources. The troubled situation in the Middle East motivates China to act more vigorously day by day. If China managed to establish control over hydrocarbon and mineral recourses in the South China Sea, its dependence on oil and gas imports would decrease and its influence on both smaller countries in Southeast Asia and the larger countries in Northeast Asia would increase. It seems that this China-centered transformation of the Cold War security structure is not acceptable to many countries in the region: some of them have tried to balance against Beijing by relying more on Washington.

For example, Vietnam traditionally claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In Vietnam, China’s concept of the “first island chain” is colloquially called the “bull’s tongue line” (đường lưỡi bò), and political cartoons depicting the removal of China’s “bull’s tongue” in the South China Sea are very popular. China’s rise and inevitable following expansion is viewed by Vietnamese as another chapter in a two thousand years history in which Chinese expansion proved to be threatening to Vietnam’s sovereignty. Chinese expansion is considered in terms of traditional Chinese culture as a “cán shí” or “silkworm eating” policy,[3] which could be translated literarily as “to eat the land of neighboring countries as silkworms eat mulberry leaves.” This perception is manifested today in Vietnamese objection to Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and the objections are not based only on pure nationalism. Control over oilfields on the continental shelf along Vietnam’s coast are also very important to Hanoi’s economic development plans, and is at odds with China’s plans for strategic expansion in the South China Sea. Such a situation activates in Hanoi a stratagem of “befriend a distant state while attacking a neighbor.”[4] In this context the United States is viewed in Hanoi as a natural alliance partner. At the same time, however, in order to maintain space to maneuver Hanoi has recently proposed to Moscow very favorable conditions for a return to the Cam Ranh Bay naval base. Each of these proposals deserves careful scrutiny.

At first glance, Russia would seem to be far removed from this dispute and should only “watch the fires burning across the river.”[5] But in fact, Moscow regards China and Vietnam as its closest strategic partners in East Asia, and has important interests in gas and oil exploration and output in East Asia in general and in the South China Sea in particular, so a possible conflict between China and Vietnam in this area is considered a worst-case scenario. Furthermore, in the 20^th century Russia spent a lot of time and resources helping to restore the real sovereignty of these countries. Because it is not directly involved in the current territorial disputes, Russia has the most space to maneuver in this environment.

During the last three years, Beijing has created very favorable conditions for the United States to strengthen its role in Southeast Asia. The more Beijing has pressed Vietnam and others, the more influence Washington has obtained along China’s southern “underbelly.” Washington recognized this long-awaited opportunity to draw these small countries―which are offended by big power and concerned about China’s rise―closer to it and has skillfully taken advantage. But Hanoi cannot fully rely on the United States, because Washington provides at least rhetorical support to dissidents, religious and ethnic minorities, and anti-communists inside and outside Vietnam. Hanoi considers these groups to be hostile forces and even as terrorists, involved in anti-state activities.

Despite the stakes for Russia, so far Moscow is not overly concerned about China’s increasing activities in the South China Sea. Instability here does not directly affect Russia’s interest, and Russia has more pressing security issues in other areas that demand its attention. Also, despite occasionally heated rhetoric, for now the general security situation is under control and Russia believes that all related parties are wise enough to avoid confrontation.

Moscow is much more concerned by Washington’s strategy to strengthen its military presence and expand anti-ballistic missile systems defenses in the Asia-Pacific. Leading Russian (and Chinese) policy-makers and experts do not believe that the American-led missile defense system in East Asia targets Pyongyang. These plans are considered mainly as a form of power projection vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

The general security situation in East Asia has the potential to become more and destabilized. It is difficult to ignore that a lot of potential flash points in East, South and Central Asia are situated around China. Each of these flashpoints has huge destructive potential. It could be particularly dangerous if outside actors provide direct or indirect support to one side or another in these flashpoints, and keep them simmering. These flashpoints could be considered as a “ring of instability” around China, which directly or indirectly can also affect Russia. In this context it is important to note that the Russian-China border is the most peaceful part of China’s perimeter.

According to official declarations of high-ranking Russian officials, current relations between Moscow and Beijing are at an unprecedented high level. The two capitals coordinate their activities in Central Asia as well as in the Middle East, mainly within the frameworks of the United Nations and the SCO. Russia and China believe that their cooperation in the security field is a very important contribution to peace and stability in Eurasia.

So far Russia, which because of its physical size is the only Euro-Asian-Pacific country, has not yet fully utilized the benefits of its favorable geographical disposition. It is well known that Russia is one of the world’s biggest gas and oil exporters. East Asia has been a net hydrocarbon consumer for many years and on the whole is dependent on energy resources from the rather unstable Middle East; these resources must also travel through the critical chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca (not to mention the Strait of Hormuz). These fundamental features define a major opportunity for Russia and East Asian countries to collaborate in pursuit of mutual interests. Moscow proposes to its partners to develop such large scale trans-regional transport projects as a sea route in the Russian Arctic, a trans-Korean railway and pipeline, and a tunnel under the Bering Strait.

In one of his first acts after his reelection as president on May 7, 2012, Vladimir Putin signed “Executive Order on Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy.” According to this document: “Instructions pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, concern broader participation in regional integration processes with the aim of promoting accelerated socio-economic development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East; deepening equal, trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation with China, strategic partnership with India and Vietnam, and developing mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other key nations in the Asia-Pacific region.”[6]

In this context, one of the main goals of Russia’s foreign policy in East Asia is to preserve its own national interests, to develop large-scale cooperation with main global and regional actors and to avoid confrontation and an arms race.

Russia’s main task in East Asia is to find possibilities for integration into the existing system of economic growth in East Asia. Russia’s traditional fields of action are: energy policy, military-technical cooperation, and ability to alter the balance of forces in the region. The last factor is not yet fully used in Moscow’s foreign policy. Russia has a real opportunity to change the balance of forces in the region by delivering advanced weapon system to its partners, but this tool should be used very cautiously in order to preserve peace and stability.

[1] Huntington S. The Clash of Civilizations. New York. Simon and Schuster, 1996. P. 312-313.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011,” p. 23.

[3] In Vietnamese, “tằm thực”; in Chinese, “蚕食.”

[4] In Vietnamese, “viễn giao cận công”; in Chinese, “遠交近攻.”

[5] In Vietnamese, ”cách ngạn quan hỏa”; in Chinese, “隔岸觀火.”

[6] President of Russia, “Executive Order on measures to implement foreign policy,” May 7, 2012, 18:20. http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764

Authors

Vladimir N. Kolotov

Image Source: © Sergei Karpukhin / Reuters

Hong Kong in the Balance

James Keith — Fri, 15 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Rebalancing is a term much in evidence these days.

The global trading system is going through changes wrought by emerging economic forces, including broad and deep innovation and projected demographic trends that will reshape China’s global role. Regional blocs are experiencing economic and social dislocation as new trends in trade and investment arise. Bilateral ties among nations have become increasingly complex as the lines between national and international blur and a host of initiatives compete with each other in trade, financial, political, social, and religious spheres. Pundits debate whether the United States is in decline even as India, China, and other emerging economies rise. And the U.S. has announced its rebalancing of resources toward Asia as wars wind down and economic and trade objectives regain priority over security concerns that came to the fore after September 11, 2001.

An underlying message of the ongoing process of globalization is a conflicted one: we are truly all in this together but at the same time nations are competing fiercely with one another for resources, investment, jobs, and market share. And that implies the paramount challenge for most economies is to get one’s own house in order so as to realize the population’s greatest potential. We have to work together while we are jockeying for position with each other.

Against this backdrop of change and challenge on a global scale, how much does it matter that C.Y. Leung was selected as the next Chief Executive of Hong Kong, to succeed Donald Tsang on July 1―the fifteenth anniversary of Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty―and to preside over the Special Administrative Region (SAR) from 2012 to 2017?

It might matter a lot. The March 25, 2012 indirect election in Hong Kong, directed by Beijing, featured the novel circumstance of the 1200 members of Hong Kong’s Election Committee facing at least a degree of uncertainty about the ballots they would cast. The genuine competition between two of three candidates for ultimate selection was no more than an incremental step toward the goal of universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in 2017 and the legislature in 2020, but that is significant.

The debate over the relative merits of two of the three candidates did not occur solely in the back rooms or mainland offices of the political and economic elite in Hong Kong and Beijing. To say the media was a lively participant in the process would surely be an understatement, and civil society leaders as well as political party officials had an active voice. There were distinct limits, of course, that made this a selection not an election. To take just one example, Democratic Party candidate Albert Ho had no genuine opportunity to test his party’s agenda for the future against the likes and dislikes of the voters of Hong Kong.

Moreover, it is fair to say that even assuming the ideal outcome for 2017 and 2020, universal suffrage will also be an interim step toward a more conclusive judgment on the success or failure of the “one country, two systems” model by which Hong Kong was incorporated into China on July 1, 1997. The means by which Hong Kong citizens choose their government leaders can and should be made more transparent and more responsive to the people’s will, but that will not change the basic circumstance of the SAR. It will remain, in 2017 or 2020, sovereign Chinese territory beholden to and in many ways dependent upon the mainland. Foreign policy and defense policy will remain in Beijing’s hands.

That said, Hong Kong matters to the mainland, and for very Hong Kong-style pragmatic reasons. Like so many others in the region, Hong Kong seeks to advance its citizens’ prosperity by competing with other economies ranging from cleaner and greener Singapore to well established financial hubs in Tokyo and London. Hong Kong’s experience in that competition to escape the middle income trap and move up the value chain can be a valuable resource to leaders in Beijing in a number of ways.

For example, Mr. Leung is predicting a proactive approach to governance in Hong Kong. He has promised to help the poor and campaigned on pledges of a more equitable distribution of wealth. This is a theme that resonates in Beijing as the leadership ponders the implications of the Guangdong versus the Chongqing model for economic development and political priority (very broadly, the Guangdong model can be defined as a market-oriented development strategy, while the Chongqing model is more state-led). Mr. Leung has promised his detractors that the rule of law will not be diluted in Hong Kong. He affirmed his intention to defend judicial independence and the exercise of fundamental rights such as expression and assembly. That, too, should resonate in Beijing as it is seeking to determine the most effective means of driving domestic economic growth, a debate that necessarily includes discussion of advancing good governance in the political sphere. A question that has been with us since 1997 is this: will Hong Kong lead the way toward gradual establishment of more robust civil society and a greater grounding in the rule of law for the mainland, or will China’s size and complexity overwhelm Hong Kong and pull it backward toward a less free and more authoritarian mode of governance?

The answer depends at least in part on the ongoing effort to define the national identity of the People’s Republic of China and how it relates to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is not Shanghai, it is not Singapore, and it is not Guangzhou. Just as China is struggling to claim its new identity in a new global political and economic landscape, Hong Kong, too, is grappling with its sense of direction and the characteristics that will define it in the decades ahead.

As previewed by Mr. Leung, it seems to me, there are some likely constants in the Hong Kong experience that will dominate the debate about the future of Hong Kong. What makes Hong Kong work today? The rule of law, civil society, a transparent and accountable government, and strong commitment to free market principles is my answer. In my view no Chief Executive of Hong Kong should―or likely will―veer from these foundational elements of Hong Kong’s success. That begs the question, of course, of whether Beijing would do so, given that the Chief Executive is not a sovereign leader. Mr. Leung will be Hong Kong’s chief public servant who ultimately answers to the collective leadership in Beijing.

So the core questions about Hong Kong may be these: what makes Hong Kong valuable to the People’s Republic and what is necessary to sustain or expand that value? If one looks at the record since 1997, the answer that suggests itself is that Hong Kong is valuable to Beijing mainly as a means of engaging the global system in a safe way from a domestic perspective. It is not just initial public offerings that are floated in Hong Kong, which remains a valuable laboratory for the mainland.

A range of ideas for China’s future can be tested in Hong Kong with minimal political risk to the leadership in Beijing. This happens in many ways. Bureaucrats learn that the rule of law in Hong Kong is quite a bit less malleable than it is on the mainland. Experiments with the convertibility of the currency can be conducted without fear of nationwide consequences. And as Chinese try out their new national identity, there can be an “all-in-the-family” series of exchanges in which the Mandarin-speaking assertiveness that goes with pride in past accomplishments can be tempered with a realistic, Cantonese-speaking view of the distance yet to be traveled before China answers satisfactorily the kinds of questions that are being raised in China during the current run-up to the 18^th Party Congress this fall. Such exchanges may be a bit rough and tumble at times, as is the case in the current dispute over mainland mothers giving birth to children in Hong Kong hospitals. But stop for a moment to consider what those Chinese mothers are expressing. Is it anything other than a sense of confidence in the future for their children in Hong Kong? And what is the attraction of Hong Kong’s future? What is the basis for a better chance for one’s children in Hong Kong compared to the mainland? We come full circle, then, to the core of Hong Kong’s success: is it not the rule of law and the free market, recognizable even to the most recent or temporary visitor to the SAR?

One can understand the reticence a Hong Kong citizen might feel comparing life before and after the handover. There have been compromises and twists and turns in the path leading from 1997 to the present, and there almost certainly will not be a straight and clear path from here to 2047, the projected end of the fifty years of autonomy that China promised to the citizens of Hong Kong. There are reasons to be concerned that China might not take the long view. It might seek to circumscribe life in the SAR based on immediate political needs that give priority to politics in Beijing. But the record thus far has been one of Beijing’s identification of the long-term national interest of the mainland in Hong Kong’s success. Beijing has generally had a clear sense of the necessary building blocks of that success, even if it has not always acted on that knowledge.

So to return to the first question: does Mr. Leung’s selection, and by implication his record over the course of his term as Chief Executive, matter to those outside of Hong Kong? Should we who are preoccupied with a return to more balanced global growth and our own nations’ politics of austerity and fiscal discipline sit up and take notice? The answer is yes. As noted at the outset, despite our need to compete with each other for relative position in the global trading system, ultimately we are all in this together. We have to find ways to compete and cooperate at the same time. In short, as participants in the global system, China’s choices matter to us. Hong Kong remains useful and valuable to Beijing, and therefore it, too, matters to the rest of the world.

From a political perspective Hong Kong remains valuable to Beijing, even if not in the way envisaged by those who first conceived “one country, two systems.” If the original intent was for Hong Kong under “one country, two systems” to be a model for reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, it was in this regard an abject failure. The two circumstances are and were fundamentally different and cross-Strait ties have grown organically without direct reference to Hong Kong’s experience. That is not to say Hong Kongers’ experience is without relevance. It is relevant, but the formula for Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty does not apply to the development of cross-Strait ties since 1997. Moreover, one could argue that the Hong Kong experience was not as direct a precedent for Macau as Beijing might have envisioned. Macau has taken its own very different path based on its quite different colonial history and relationship to China. Beijing has had to become accustomed to things turning out in unexpected ways in its Special Administrative Regions.

As noted briefly in the foregoing, Hong Kong is uniquely positioned to offer valuable economic experience to the mainland across a number of sectors. Primary among these is the financial sector, given Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub and its critical mass of relevant resources. New areas will arise as the global economy develops. Supply chain expertise may give way to biotechnology or medical tourism. There is huge potential, in short, for the mainland to gain from preservation of Hong Kong’s way of doing business. Perhaps the core element of that potential is the growing discussion on the mainland, prompted by outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao, of the necessity for structural change in the political economy of the People’s Republic. This is an area where lessons learned in Hong Kong can be applied on the mainland.

Perhaps the area where China needs the most help and can most effectively learn from experience in Hong Kong is precisely that set of issues that creates the most anxiety among Hong Kong citizens. If good governance grounded in the rule of law is essential to Hong Kong’s continued success, how much more important is it for the mainland economy? After he is inaugurated on July 1, on the fifteenth anniversary of the handover, one of Mr. Leung’s most pressing and important burdens of leadership will be to balance the competing notions of this conundrum: the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is most useful to the mainland when it is most free from its direct control.

Authors

James Keith

Image Source: Reuters

Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Term and Taiwan’s International Participation

Zhe Sun — Tue, 08 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Three issues are currently at the forefront of thinking about contemporary relations across the Taiwan Strait: international participation for Taiwan; economic engagements enabled by the 2009 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA); and political dialogue leading to a peace accord. While both the mainland and Taiwan agree to continue working on ECFA and thereby enhancing levels of economic cooperation, they do have different views on the other two issues. From the mainland perspective, the most urgent task is not to push Taiwan for political dialogue, rather, it has to face up the continued requests made by Taiwan on its international participation. Beijing is fully aware that this is a highly sensitive and disputed issue and that any “dodging” or mishandling by the mainland might hurt the people of Taiwan and drive Taiwan away from unification.

International participation for Taiwan is an open, ongoing process which involves many issue areas, ranging from Taiwan maintaining diplomatic relations with its formal partners to participation in United Nations activities to Taiwan’s joining global and regional economic organizations and signing bilateral free trade and economic agreements with other countries.[1] To simplify, there are five dimensions to Taiwan’s international participation: (1) cooperation with those countries having formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; (2) cooperation with countries that do not have formal diplomatic relations with; (3) bidding for UN membership and participation in UN-affiliated organizations or activities; (4) participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); and (5) participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

At the end of March 2012, following Ma Ying-jeou’s election victory for a second term, Taiwan maintained formal diplomatic relations with 23 countries; had memberships in 32 IGOs (the most well known include the WTO, APEC and ADB); and another 22 quasi-memberships.[2] It is also estimated that about 2185 NGOs in Taiwan have kept up regular participation in international NGOs’ events and other international conferences and activities in social, economic, cultural areas.[3]

In Ma’s first term, Taiwan announced a “diplomatic truce” policy in which he decided to stop competition with the mainland for formal diplomatic partners, and he intentionally gave up bidding for formal UN membership. But still, as cross-strait relations continue to improve, Taiwan would reasonably hope to achieve some “breakthrough” in each of the other four dimensions of its international participation, including developing informal relations with other states; obtaining some form of participation in UN-affiliated agencies; participating in more inter-governmental organizations; and expanding and consolidating its substantial participation in non-governmental organizations.

Perhaps Taiwan’s most notable effort to enhance its international position in recent years has been to seek to participate in two specific United Nations organizations: the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Mr. Wu Den-yih raised this question when he met Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang at the BoAo Forum for Asia in April 2012. Taipei argued that participation in these organizations would defend “the rights and interests of its people” and forge “friendships with other nations and develop initiatives that benefit the world at large.”[4] It would also build up new venues for high level leaders across the Strait to meet regularly and exchange their views on international affairs. This last point is not inconsequential or unrealistic. Chinese President Hu Jintao and former KMT Chairman Lien Chan have had several exchanges in APEC meetings. In the WHA, the health ministers of both sides have met, something that is not possible in a bilateral context.

Still, many political figures in Taiwan have complained about the mainland preventing Taiwan from participating in international events. In 2008, shortly after Ma announced his “diplomatic truce” policy, Tsai Ing-wen, then chairwoman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), criticized the policy as “narrow minded” and characterized his overall approach to cross-strait relations as “reckless.”[5] She also pointed out the mainland’s bullying behavior and “suppression” of Taiwan. Su Chi, a KMT policy leader, voiced his complaint in a more positive way, pointing out that the mainland should consider the question of Taiwan’s participation in NGOs, especially as this issue is easier to handle than the sovereignty question. Furthermore, respecting Taiwan’s demands here would eventually contribute to the development of cross-strait relations.[6]

Beijing responded positively on those complains but called for more discussions on terms and conditions, implying that a solution cannot give rise to “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Beijing has its own concerns and tactics.

First, there is no doubt that the mainland will be firm on its “one China principle,” making no compromise on the sovereignty issue. Nonetheless, Beijing also acknowledged that cross-strait relations went well during Ma’s first term, so it suggested that the two sides should try their best to avoid having direct confrontation on this matter.

Why is Beijing so sensitive and insistent on this “one China principle”? From the mainland’s point of view, the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international activities, especially those under the auspices of the United Nations, was settled after the passage in 1971 of United Nations Resolution 2758, “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.” Taiwan’s international participation, no matter in what form, has always been considered as a political problem reflecting the legitimate representation of China in the international community.

Also, Beijing learned a lesson in fighting against separatist forces in Taiwan during the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian periods (1988-2000 and 2000-2008). When Lee Teng-hui became the leader of Taiwan in 1988, he publicly stated that the basic policy of Taiwan was that “there is only one China, not two.” However, beginning in the early 1990s, Lee gradually deviated from the “one China principle” and began to provide support for the separatists. Chen Shui-bian, who succeeded Lee, helped the rapid development of the “Taiwan independence” forces and the spread of the “Taiwan independence” ideology. Their effort in carrying out the activities for “expanding the international space of survival” was considered by mainland China as aimed at creating “two Chinas.”

Fighting against international “separatist forces” has never ended even after Ma won the election in 2008. At the beginning of Ma’s first term, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations released a statement saying, “The United States has long supported meaningful participation for Taiwan in these specialized agencies [of the United Nations], including in the World Health Organization (WHO).”[7] In 2009, 15 UN member countries supported Taiwan’s participation in UN special agencies. From the mainland’s point of view, such statements represent “meddling in Chinese domestic affairs.”

Comparatively speaking, Beijing actually worries more about the probing activities by Taiwan with non-formal partners and some IGOs than it does about such foreign interference. To some extent, Ma’s “diplomatic truce” only sought to prevent the mainland from taking away more small countries from Taiwan. While only 23 countries have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and because the mainland can effectively block Taiwan from membership in UN agencies, Taiwan has established substantial business and commercial offices in more than 120 other countries. Indeed, Taiwan has been very aggressive in seeking to improve the substance of its relationships with many of these countries. Taiwan’s efforts include seeking to elevate representative offices into embassy- or consulate-level offices; to display “national flags” at international conferences and events; and to request high level political honors and courteous receptions during transit. Economically, the mainland also worries that Taiwan has tried to improve its political status through economic engagement with the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Singapore and other ASEAN countries. Taiwan’s international visibility has strengthened its political and economic contacts with other countries. Helping Taiwan improve its international reputation and enhancing its visibility might lead to a bitter result for Beijing: with Taiwan’s gaining of more confidence and international recognition, will Taiwan’s self-identity be strengthened? If so, a weakening of Taiwan’s connection to “one China” would create a strategic dilemma for Beijing.

To express this thought in a different way, the mainland is willing to help Taiwan to “share international honor” under the condition of the one China principle. However, the mainland is aware that Taiwan has developed its own perception of the world and, thus, Beijing needs to be fully alert to Taiwan’s long-term ambition of joining the UN and its agencies. Beijing may help Taiwan become a member or get access to some UN agencies, such as the WHO, for now, and to the IMF and World Bank in the future. But it would also try to deliberately curtail Taiwan’s possibilities to become a normal member of the international community or a full-fledged international actor. That is to say, Beijing is willing to pay more attention to the negative public sentiment on Taiwan about being excluded from international society, but it hopes that helping expand “Taiwan’s international space” would further stabilize the cross strait relations and build up mutual trust for political dialogue – it should not drive Taiwan and the mainland farther apart.

The “Six-Points” proposition to Taiwan, made by Chinese President Hu Jintao on December 31, 2008, clearly states that he understands the issue and general public sentiments in Taiwan. The mainland government is willing to allow “Taiwan's 'reasonable' participation in global organizations.”[8]

Can the two sides work out new deals on international participation in Ma’s second term? Are there mutually acceptable ways that China and Taipei can defuse potential tension over this issue? The underlying issue for the two sides to work out is specific terms or formulas for Taiwan.

Right now, at the IGO level, Taiwan uses four names: Chinese Taipei (Taipei, China or Taiwan, China); Taiwan; ROC; and other names such as “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.”[9] In the future, Ma’s top preference would be “Republic of China” or “Taiwan,” while his lowest preference would be “Chinese Taipei.”[10] From the mainland’s point of view, there are technical difficulties in working out the right “identities” for Taiwan. ROC and Taiwan are not acceptable; Chinese Taipei or other arrangements might be discussed. For example, Taiwan wants to gain observer status at ICAO and UNFCCC in the near future. Both organizations, however, are UN-associated specialized agencies, and membership is, in principle, based on UN membership.[11] From November 1971, China has been represented within the ICAO by the Government of the PRC. Special arrangements must be made to invite Taiwan to participate. The Charters need to be revised or special arrangements need to be made to allow Taiwan to participate, most likely as an observer.

In the past, the mainland and Taiwan have compromised and worked out some deals regarding Taiwan’s participation in IGOs. For example, the mainland helped Taiwan join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in 2008. In the same year, Taiwan also participated in APEC and the WHA.

In Ma’s second term, it seems that neither side can impose its will on the other, so it is highly unlikely that Taiwan can use the names “ROC” or “Taiwan” to participate international IGOs or NGOs. Although Beijing would not see Taiwan’s observership as a serious threat to the “one China principle,” it does not want to offer too much compromise to Taiwan too soon. The underlying political calculation is that Beijing does not want to lose political control and put itself into an awkward position of having to perform a synchronized swimming routine with Taiwan every time it brings up the international space issue. In this sense, Beijing simply can not get rid of the specter of Taiwan’s permanent separation – even if it is only an informal separation, and not de jure, separation.

It seems that the best approach for Taiwan’s international participation would be tacit cooperation on specific organization(s) first, and then negotiated cooperation on a larger scale participation.

If the two sides work closely, Taiwan may follow the APEC formula (Taiwan joined in 1991 under the name of Chinese Taipei) and work out a deal at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). It may follow the WHA model (which it joined under special invitation) and join UNESCO, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) and the UN International Maritime Organization (UNIMO). Or, it may follow the WTO model (which it joined under the name of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” which was also used by Taiwan to join GATT in 1992) and join more IGOs in the future.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author. The Brookings Institution does not have an institutional viewpoint on any policy issue.

[1] Yu Xintian, Taiwan’s Expanding International Space Reconsidered, internet resource: http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/0/1/9/, visited March 20, 2012.

[2] Taiwan is an observing member of 16 IGOs, an associate member of two IGOs (CGPM, 2002, GBIF, 2001), a corresponding member of one IGO (OIML1997), and a cooperating non-member of one IGO (ICCAT1972). See internet resource at: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Home/InternationalOrg/?opno=e5d5cd5d-fc61-468f-957b-ffa7f7c5dcc3; visited March 25, 2012.

[3] Wu Rongquan, “ROC International Participation in NGOs: Current Situation and Perspectives,” (吳榮泉: 我國非政府組織國際參與之現況與展望), http://www.taiwanngo.tw/files/15-1000-16913,c104-1.php?Lang=zh-tw; visited May 4, 2012.

[4] Government Information Office, “Participation in International Bodies,” http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44620&ctNode=1922&mp=999, visited March 25, 2012.

[5] Rich Chang, “Tsai warns against Ma’s diplomacy policy,” Taipei Times, August 10, 2008, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/08/10/2003419938, visited May 4, 2012.

[6] Zhang Yongtai, “Post Election Issues: Taiwan’s International Space,” (选后议题: 台湾国际空间), Voice of America, January 20, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20120120-REACTIONS-ON-TAIWAN-137745658.html, visited April 2, 2012.

[7] American Institute in Taiwan, “Statement on Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in UN Specialized Agencies,” United States Mission to the United Nations, September 17, 2008, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot0812.html, visited May 4, 2012.

[8] Chinese and English versions of the speech can be found at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/b2d870d8a58da0116c1749ff.html.

[9] Chinese Taipei is used in APEC and ADB; Taiwan in AAEA (1998) and Egmont Group (1998); ROC in APO (1961), AARDO (1968), FFTC/ASPAC (1970), CABEI (1992), and ASCA (1994); special entity in WTO (2002), ICN (2001), and AITIC (2008).

[10] “Cross Strait Consensus: Taiwan as an Observer Participates in WHA,” Chinese Review, April 13, 2009, http://www.chinareviewnews.com; visited April 5, 2012.

[11] On ICAO, see e.g. H. Volger, “ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization,” in H. Volger (ed.), A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations (2002), 274-275; K. Hailbronner, International Civil Aviation Organization, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. II (1995), 1070-1074. Talmon, Stefan A. G., The Recognition of the Chinese Government and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325180.

Authors

Zhe Sun

Image Source: Nicky Loh / Reuters

North Korea 2012, Grandson Greets Grandfather: Celebration by Satellite Salute

Alexander Vorontsov — Thu, 26 Apr 2012 11:33:00 -0400

April 15, 2012 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, founder and “eternal president” of North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). The authorities in Pyongyang have made this occasion an extraordinary event in the state and people’s lives, beginning intensive preparations for the celebration years ago, and setting the ambitious goal of entering a fundamentally new stage of development―that of a “strong and prosperous nation” (kangsong daeguk)―by April 15. The (failed) April 13 launch of a long range rocket carrying a satellite was a part of this celebration. As the date approached, however, the goal was adjusted to be a bit more realistic: Pyongyang announced that on April 15, 2012 the gate into this new epoch would be opened, marking the starting point of the movement rather than its culmination.

By a twist of fate, the honor of opening this gate would not be given to the person who guided North Korea for almost 20 years in attempting to approach “kangsong daeguk” status and who deserved the right to do it―Kim Il-sung’s successor Kim Jong-il, who died on December 17, 2011. Kim Jong-il’s governing results were contradictory at best. Comparisons of North Korea under Kim Jong-il to other nations during the same period are overwhelmingly unfavorable to Kim. But the picture is not so clear when comparing the North Korea of 2011 with that of 1994-1995. Since that time, hesitant and partial reforms―most likely driven more by necessity than by careful planning―seem to hold out the promise of a slightly better life for ordinary North Koreans.

In 1994-1995, Kim Jong-il assumed power amid devastating famine but, despite continued hunger and malnutrition, mass starvation did not reappear during his reign. As the state food distribution system withered, farmers’ markets have become more and more important in society, and some citizens have been able to accumulate small currency holdings. This trend may have become irreversible in late 2009 and early 2010. Finally, as part of its observance of Kim Il-sung’s 100th birthday, North Korea seems to have begun to open itself more to foreign investment, which may result in greater circulation of people and ideas in certain tightly controlled border areas. Indeed, Chinese sources report that legal border crossings are rising dramatically. These changes, however unimpressive they may seem to the outside world, were unthinkable in North Korea 20 years ago.

Considering Kim Jong-il’s life, one is perhaps reminded of the quote attributed to Winston Churchill that Stalin took charge in Russia with a wooden plow but left it with atomic weapons. When Kim Jong-il took charge of North Korea in 1994, many politicians and experts around the world predicted that the DPRK would collapse in the foreseeable future. However, under Kim Jong-il the DPRK not only survived, but achieved a modest nuclear deterrent that today is the pride of the nation.

Succession to Kim Jong-un

But Kim Jong-il died just four months before the centenary, leaving it to his son Kim Jong-un to assume leadership of North Korea and usher in the era of achieving “kangsong daeguk” status. While outsiders may be correct that North Korea is far from approaching a strong and prosperous era, the common assessment of the Kim Jong-un regime as weak, unstable, and short-lived, as is often expressed by western media and occasionally by policy experts, is erroneous.

The process of handing over power to 28 year-old Kim Jong-un was realized quickly and resolutely. Kim Jong-il’s death was announced on December 19, 2011 but by December 25 Kim Jong-un, his third son, had been appointed to the position of “Supreme Commander…as wished by the people.” At the conclusion of the funeral for Kim Jong-il, on December 28, the young successor symbolically occupied an even higher position than his late father: the Korea Central News Agency referred to him as “supreme leader of the WPK [Worker’s Party of Korea], state and army.” (Kim Jong-il was never formally head of state, as his father Kim Il-sung was named “Eternal President of the Republic.”) On April 11, Kim Jong-un was named first chairman of the National Defense Commission, the highest post in North Korea, and “first secretary” of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK); his father Kim Jong-il was posthumously named “eternal general secretary” of the WPK. North Korean mythology also bolsters the transition to Kim Jong-un. The legitimacy of his authority is based not only on the fact that he is Kim Jong-il’s son, but also on his strong physical resemblance to Kim Il-sung.

The question of whether young Kim Jong-un will continue to rule the country successfully, as his grandfather and father did, is the subject of hot debate inside the international expert community, prompting intense discussions about possible scenarios for the transition. Mass media and conservative observers especially seem convinced (or hopeful) that Kim Jong-un will not last long because of weakness and inexperience, and that he and the North Korean state will collapse and allow the North Korean people to welcome democracy. Coincidentally, on April 11, the same day Kim Jong-un was elevated to the DPRK’s highest post, South Korea’s conservative New Frontier Party somewhat surprisingly held its majority in a closely contested parliamentary election.

The questions raised about the abilities and mental health of Kim Jong-un closely resemble those expressed about Kim Jong-il at the time of his ascension to power in 1994, which proved inaccurate. The myth of Kim Jong-il’s complete inferiority to his father was inflated by the Western media but began to turn during the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, when foreign journalists flocking to Pyongyang to accompany South Korean President Kim Dae-jung discovered that the North Korean leader was a healthy, energetic, and highly competent individual. These days, the Western media are composing a somewhat contradictory image of Kim Jong-un: he is at the same time a sickly and overmatched pawn of the older generation, and also a more cosmopolitan North Korean leader who was educated in Switzerland and used to play basketball. The contradictory assumptions behind these caricatures do not seem to be noticed.

The mass expressions of grief in North Korea following the death of Kim Jong-il may seem shocking to foreigners but certainly cannot be written off as insincere. It is true that collectivism is pervasive in the heavily organized society, and that this affects the way emotions are displayed, but it would be unfair to deny that―in line with the Confucian tradition―the perception of the leader as the father of the nation is widespread among the population and that people are indeed mourning Kim Jong-il. The tendency within the North Korean political culture to ascribe extraordinary sympathy and ability to the national leader has a legitimizing impact on Kim Jong-un’s claim to power. It is true that Kim Jong-un is very young, has a minimal record of involvement in state affairs, and, in fact, held official successor status for just slightly over a year. Still, he learned a lot over this period of time acting as his father’s apprentice, and appears to have made no blunders in the process which would disqualify him from ruling North Korea. Importantly, the nation actually sees him as the successor. For example, this author gathered from conversations with ordinary North Koreans that they feel deeply impressed by the fact that Kim Jong-un bears a strong physical resemblance to his grandfather, founder of North Korea Kim Il-sung. This credential may not assure legitimacy in most nations, but in North Korea’s unique political culture it is important.

Finally, despite the failed missile launch, which the North Korean government surprisingly made known to its own people, the celebration of Kim Il-sung’s birth fulfilled its primary mission―which was to bolster the legitimacy of the system and the inviolable unity between the people and the leader. Kim Jong-un had significantly more contact with the North Korean people than his father did on similar occasions. This event was far more open to foreigners than usual, and Kim Jong-un also interacted with them to a greater degree than his father did.

The North Korean system

Obviously, both Kim Jong-un and the whole DPRK are at the moment facing tough challenges. From now on a lot will depend on Kim Jong-un’s aptitude and willpower. His elder peers―the stalwarts from his father’s inner entourage―will certainly do their best to help him at the initial phase, but the type of interaction should not be interpreted as evidence that Kim Jong-un will have a purely nominal status. For North Korea, combining the leader’s singular status with collectivism in top-level decision-making is a long-standing tradition, though the balance between the two elements fluctuates. It is worth mentioning in this context that even Kim Il-sung was not invariably the number one figure in North Korea’s party and administration (in the early years, at least) and that, even at the peaks of their careers, neither he nor Kim Jong-il sidelined such collective governance bodies as the central committee of the Worker’s Party or the National Defense Commission.

Predictions that the DPRK will shortly plunge into chaos and that a tide of infighting will sweep over its leadership are completely groundless. Any serious watcher is fully aware of the country’s robust political stability, with no hint of an organized opposition or public protests of significant proportion.

It is natural that divisions over individual issues do exist in the administration of the DPRK, as in that of any other country. Limited controversy erupted over the forms and pace of the economic reform which was launched in North Korea in 2002. An attempt was made in November 2009 to implement a national currency devaluation, which could translate into a de facto savings confiscation; this was interpreted by experts as an effort to undermine the small emerging entrepreneur class and take the country back to pre-reform conditions. In a matter of months, however, the North Korean government realized that the step was counterproductive and abandoned the whole plan, removing the restrictions fleetingly imposed on market activity. It is evident that in the end Kim Jong-il supported the “reformers” over the more conservative policymakers (though of course the pace and scope of reforms in North Korea are not dramatic).

At the same time, the divisions in the DPRK do not seem to escalate into irreconcilable discord. The perception of a constant external threat facing the country helps cements its administration. Pyongyang is mindful of its opponents’ strategy focused on inducing regime change in the DPRK, and monitors the emergency military planning of the U.S.-ROK alliance which certainly had special designs to set in motion in the event of a sudden death of the North Korean leader. The developments in Libya and the NATO-enabled removal from power and subsequent killing of Moammar Gaddafi made North Koreans realize what kind of punishment the West administers for defiance. The conclusions drawn in Pyongyang took the shape of a special official statement to the effect that Gaddafi’s key mistake had been to naïvely trust the West’s promises and to scrap Libya’s nuclear program in return for international security guarantees. The statement said that Gaddafi’s regime came under strike as soon as it showed it would not acquire a nuclear deterrent and that North Korea would never make the same mistake but would upgrade its defense potential including the nuclear capabilities.

The North Korean political elite and the politically active part of the country’s society have no illusions as to their survival chances in the case of a regime change. To some extent such expectations concern the North Korean population. Also, many of them believe that in case the country is absorbed into the Republic of Korea they would become second-class citizens in a unified Korea. More than any ideological directives, such practical concerns help maintain full cohesion among the North Korean elite, cause them to stay loyal to the country’s leader, and enable them to ruthlessly suppress any tendencies toward internal discord.

Policy implications

At least in the mid-term, we will see complete continuity in the DPRK’s foreign and domestic policies, with its young leader likely emphasizing allegiance to his father’s legacy. The North Korean approach to the key foreign-policy issues, including its relations with Russia and involvement in the Six-Party Talks, will therefore remain unchanged. Symbolically, the last foreign visit paid by late Kim Jong-il was a tour of Russia in August 2011 during which he met with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in Ulan-Ude. It is a safe bet that the cooperation between Russia and the DPRK will continue and that key bilateral economic projects will be implemented as planned. It is known that Kim Jong-un has already expressed interest in speeding up the realization of a gas pipeline project.

It should be noted that developments in North Korea in late 2011 and early 2012 opened up new and positive opportunities to its opponents, and time will show whether and how they are going to seize them. The succession is an opportune situation to turn the page on past conflicts and to start cultivating contacts with the young North Korean leader.

Overall, the situation remains stable, with Moscow and Beijing firmly espousing the peace, stability and the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Washington and Seoul are facing a dilemma of either boosting pressure on Pyongyang with the aim of irreversibly breaking its resistance (a strategy loaded with unlikely results and extreme risks, it should be noted) or giving their North Korea policies a serious facelift – which would be costly and painful but which could lead to .more effective engagement with the North.

Even before the death of Kim Jong-il, Washington decided to change its passive “strategic patience” approach and made considerable efforts to restore the bridge in relations with Pyongyang. In result, on February 29 a breakthrough was achieved―the so called Leap Day agreement which stipulated a moratorium on nuclear testing, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment. The United States offered to provide 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance. All parties involved including Moscow warmly greeted the success of the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, and the results gave feasibility to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent forecast that the Six-Party Talks were likely to resume this year.

However, two weeks later Pyongyang announced its decision to launch a satellite into space to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung. The news, and the actual launch on April 13, poured cold water over the optimism following the Leap Day agreement, and prompted another round of speculation and debate about the reasons for and objectives of such a provocative North Korean decision.

It is most likely that domestic factors are the main driving force behind the missile launch. First, the decision testified to the great importance that the DPRK places on its founder’s centennial. The extraordinary anniversary―which is more important even than the death of Kim Jong-il―should be marked by an extraordinary achievement. The rapid legitimization of Kim Jong-un’s leadership also highlights this fact. Today nobody in Pyongyang seems to recall the precedent of the three years of mourning undertaken by Kim Jong-il when his own father died in 1994. It is more important to have a leader formally in place for the celebration of the centennial.

Second, the new North Korean leadership continues to regard the preservation of national unity and domestic cohesion as much more important than the negative reactions of the international community. In fact, to provide the population with a festival atmosphere on the “great day” is more important to the regime than to receive American nutritional assistance. (Indeed, North Korea likely calculated that the financial cost of the satellite preparations and launch far exceeded the value of the promised assistance, especially with the cancellation of that assistance―yet they went ahead with it anyway.)

Of course the attempted satellite launch inevitably caused international condemnation. So far the United Nations Security Council has declined to levy new sanctions, though it has threatened to do so in the event of future missile launches or a nuclear test by North Korea.

The missile launch has apparently scuttled the Leap Day deal, but it would be undesirable if it were to block U.S.-North Korea dialogue on the whole. Of course the launch gives strong new arguments to conservative forces in many countries who traditionally argue that it’s impossible to trust Pyongyang and therefore unwise to reach agreements with it.

Nevertheless, it seems wise for the international community to try to carefully calculate a proportionate and adequate response to the rocket launch. It would also be useful to consider the conclusions of some missile technology experts that the North Korea’s missile technologies are quite primitive―conclusions which seem validated by the failed launch. The nuclear program is much more advanced and more dangerous, from a nonproliferation point of view, than the missile program. According to such a view, while improving missile capabilities are a worry, it would be more important for the international community to check North Korea’s nuclear activity. This line of thought leads to the conclusion that it would be better not to break the existing Leap Day agreement and not to give Pyongyang a pretext for responding to “extremely tough” punishment by conducting a third nuclear test (as it did in 2009 and has threatened again this year). Surely the preservation of a calculated and flexible line in relations with North Korea would provide Washington and others a chance to work with the new North Korean leadership in order to facilitate a trend toward gradual changes in the country over the next three to five years. The United States seems to have followed this line so far, but whether North Korea will respond with similar far-sightedness remains to be seen.

Authors

Alexander Vorontsov

Image Source: © Bobby Yip / Reuters

Getting Beyond Beef in U.S.-Taiwan Relations

Don Shapiro — Fri, 10 Feb 2012 10:51:00 -0500

During Taiwan’s recent presidential election campaign, it was clear that the U.S. government’s preference – despite repeated official avowals of neutrality – was to see the Kuomintang’s Ma Ying-jeou returned to office for a second term. From the American perspective, Ma’s first four years in the presidency had delivered what was most important: improved relations with China, greatly reducing the risk that Washington would be drawn into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The prospect of a return to power by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party stirred painful memories in Washington of its tense dealings with the former DPP administration under Chen Shui-bian. In the years before leaving office in 2008, Chen had constantly infuriated Beijing – and frustrated Washington – by pushing an agenda that seemed aimed at departing from the status quo to promote Taiwan’s explicit separation from China.

Evidence of a U.S. tilt toward Ma came last fall with a controversial Financial Times report quoting a senior U.S. official as expressing doubts about DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s ability to manage the delicate cross-Strait relationship. Visiting Taiwan just before the balloting in mid-January, Douglas Paal, a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan (in which position he was the de facto U.S. ambassador) expressed his understanding that the “private feelings” of senior American officials were that “the assurances given [by Tsai] about cross-Strait management in the Tsai administration were too vague to make Washington comfortable” – in effect, confirming the Financial Times report. There was also speculation in the media as to whether the series of high-ranking American officials to travel to Taiwan in recent months, including Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, the most senior such visitor in 12 years, was purely coincidental or designed to demonstrate support for Ma’s candidacy.

While Ma improved U.S.-Taiwan relations in large part by enhancing peace and stability, however, not all was well with the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Heading the list of U.S. concerns, in a testament to the political sensitivity of agricultural issues, have been Taiwan’s restrictions on the import of certain American beef products. Consternation in the U.S. executive branch and some influential offices on Capitol Hill has been so great that the U.S. side has refused to hold what used to be routine annual trade negotiations (the so-called “TIFA talks” under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 1994) while beef remains an unsettled issue. Those talks have not been held now since 2007. In addition to the challenges this poses to simply maintaining trade relations, until the beef controversy is resolved there seems little likelihood that the U.S. government will contemplate any new major economic initiatives with Taiwan, such as bilateral tax or investment agreements or even championing Taiwan for future membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact.

Although it considered itself well-versed on the beef issue, an American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei delegation that visited Washington last autumn was still surprised by the vehemence of the criticism of Taiwan it heard from American officials on the subject. One high-level official described Taiwan flatly as “an unreliable trading partner,” for example, while another said the disagreement over beef had “cast a pall” over the entire bilateral relationship. Beef had taken on a symbolic importance far out of proportion to its monetary value of less than 1 percent of U.S. exports to Taiwan.

The background is that the two governments signed a protocol in October 2009 lifting most of the remaining restrictions on U.S. beef products that Taiwan had put in place following the discovery of a case of mad cow disease in 2003. Just two months later, however, the Taiwan legislature – in which Ma’s Kuomintang controlled some three-quarters of the seats – enacted a law that reversed some of those very provisions. Despite resentment at what it regarded as Taiwan’s reneging on the protocol, the U.S. government by early 2011 was willing to start preparations to resume TIFA talks. Then another obstacle arose when Taiwan rejected some shipments of beef found to contain traces of the leanness-enhancing feed additive ractopamine. Though ractopamine, widely used by American ranchers, had long been a banned substance in Taiwan, inspectors had not previously tested for its presence. Random inspections, and the rejection of many shipments, have continued over the past year, and the uncertainty has caused some big buyers such as Costco to switch to other sources of supply.

Whenever questions were raised last year about finding a solution to the impasse, Taiwan officials responded that nothing could be done before this January’s elections, for fear of sparking protests from consumer and farming groups that could escalate into a campaign issue. Although no promises were made about what might happen after the election, this month has seen a flurry of public comments from government officials and scholars that appear to be preparing the groundwork for a change in policy. Inter-agency discussions are currently taking place among the Council of Agriculture, Department of Health, and Ministry of Economic Affairs.

The likely way forward would be to replace the current zero tolerance of ractopamine with a defined limit on the amount permitted. In fact, in 2007 Taiwan had notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) of its intention to set such a Maximum Residue Level (MRL), though it never followed through. But a major question mark would be whether Taiwan would propose – and the United States agree to – a compromise in which an MRL would be set for beef but not pork. Taiwan has no beef industry to speak of, but hog-raising is big business, and the pig farmers, who are politically well organized, are adamantly opposed to opening the door to competition from American pork.

Although the U.S. government and meat industry insist there is no scientific basis for a total ban on ractopamine, the Taiwan public may not be so easily persuaded, especially after several major food-safety scares in recent years. And the political delicacy of the whole issue was driven home two years ago when Su Chi, one of Ma’s most trusted lieutenants, was forced to resign as head of the National Security Council after his efforts to resolve the matter through the protocol with the U.S. were undercut by the legislature. It would therefore require a measure of political will and some skillful maneuvering to reach a solution, though acting four years before the next presidential election is perhaps the best time to risk taking a political hit.

If the two sides can get past the beef dispute, what would the TIFA talks be expected to deal with? Part of the agenda would undoubtedly be devoted to exploring areas for potential bilateral cooperation, for example in green-energy research. But of greatest interest to the U.S. business community would be discussion of problems that American companies are facing in Taiwan in terms of regulatory barriers. Among the industries that have been most affected:

Pharmaceuticals. Under Taiwan’s National Health Insurance reimbursement program to healthcare providers, locally produced generics receive some of the highest prices in the world compared with the original drugs, while innovative medicines from international suppliers are often priced so low that the manufacturers are unwilling to launch the product in the Taiwan market. Medical-device companies face a similar problem of extremely low reimbursement levels for innovative items.

Financial services. Contrary to the international trend for cross-border outsourcing of services such as data processing, Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission is asking foreign bank branches and subsidiaries to submit plans to bring the performance of those services back onshore within the next several years.

Infrastructure. Although Taiwan has signed the Government Procurement Agreement under the WTO, U.S. engineering companies still feel discouraged from bidding on many public projects because of unfavorable contract terms and conditions, especially regarding liability.

Retail. Consumer goods suppliers and retailers complain about unreasonable and often unique-to-Taiwan labeling requirements and other regulations.

High-tech. Although Taiwan has done a great deal over the past decade to improve its intellectual property protection, a new and growing problem is proprietary information flowing to China through employees hired away by Chinese competitors. Penalties for violations of the Trade Secrets Law are so lenient as to serve as little deterrent.

One message that U.S. officials would presumably deliver at TIFA talks is that Taiwan will need to do more to fully open up its economy and accept international standards if it wishes to be seriously considered for TPP membership. President Ma has expressed Taiwan’s intention to join the TPP, but within a 10-year timeframe. That seems unduly long if Taiwan is to maintain its international competitiveness, particularly when its main trade rival, Korea, has already negotiated free trade agreements with the U.S. and European Union.

At least for now, however, commercial activity between the U.S. and Taiwan continues to be robust. Last year, Taiwan remained in ninth place among U.S. trading partners, with total two-way trade reaching $62 billion. In other measures of the depth of the relationship, Taiwanese citizens annually make some 300,000 trips to the U.S. and nearly 25,000 Taiwanese students are enrolled in American educational institutions, the fifth largest national contingent.

Though the beef dispute has soured attitudes toward Taiwan in certain official quarters in Washington, the displeasure does not seem to have carried over into aspects of the relationship other than trade. A clear example was the State Department announcement in December that Taiwan has been nominated for inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, having met all the basic criteria. Still pending is a review of Taiwan’s homeland security and immigration procedures, and a final step may be for Taiwan to differentiate its regular passports more clearly from the “compatriot passports” it issues to some overseas Chinese who lack the right to residence in Taiwan. It appears likely that Taiwan could formally qualify for visa waiver status in the second half of this year. Given the Taiwanese love for overseas travel and willingness to spend money, the expected upswing in Taiwan tourists to the U.S. would be good news for the American travel and retail sectors.

The idea of seeking an extradition agreement with the U.S. was previously mentioned almost as frequently as visa waiver by the Taiwan authorities, but more recently the notion seems to have been dropped. As eager as the Taiwan government was to get back criminals who had fled to the U.S., it may have seen a political downside to the obligation of turning over American citizens – who might also include Taiwanese with dual nationality – for prosecution of such offenses as tax evasion, insider trading, and price rigging.

Another aspect of the relationship treated independently from the beef issue is arms sales, in line with the requirement in the Taiwan Relations Act that the U.S. provide Taiwan with the wherewithal needed to maintain its defense capability. Of course, just what weaponry is needed to meet that standard is the subject of frequent debate, and Taiwan’s supporters in Congress have been pushing hard for the U.S. to sell F-16C/D fighters to strengthen the island’s air power. So far, the U.S. has agreed only to a retrofit program to upgrade Taiwan’s existing fleet of 145 F-16A/B aircraft.

Though many of Taiwan’s backers in the U.S. view that as an indication that Washington has given in to Chinese pressure, the State Department and Pentagon insist that the decision on the more advanced C/D models is still open. They also cite the record $12 billion in arms sales approvals to Taiwan in the past two years as proof of a continuing U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security. Besides the F-16A/B retrofits, the major items have included PAC-III anti-missile missiles, Blackhawk helicopters, radar systems, and command-and-control equipment. U.S. officials also point to the increased interaction between the two armed services in recent years for training Taiwanese military officers and consultation on security issues.

At the same time, the U.S. government has been dismayed that the Ma administration has not done more to enhance Taiwan’s own defense posture. A frequent yardstick is the proportion of GDP devoted to the defense budget. Ma had pledged to raise that level to 3%, but so far the goal has not been met.

But if Taiwan’s priority in Ma’s first term was to reduce cross-Strait tensions and build more cordial relations with China, even if that meant taking the U.S. somewhat for granted, that attitude may change in the second term. The easy cross-Strait economic gains – direct flights, the opening to mainland tourism, a limited easing of restrictions on Chinese investment, and the “early harvest” two-way tariff concessions under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement ¬– have already been achieved. Completing the rest of ECFA, including an investment dispute-resolution mechanism and the equivalent of a comprehensive free trade agreement, will involve much tougher negotiations.

Further, Beijing is expected to want to move on to more politically sensitive measures, such as a peace agreement, in hopes of securing Taiwan’s placement on the course to eventual unification while Ma is still in office. The resurgence of the DPP in this past election would give them no confidence that Ma’s successor would necessarily be from the Kuomintang.

With China pushing for additional concessions, Ma may well feel the need to balance that pressure with closer alignment with the U.S. – at the same time seeking to woo more international investors to Taiwan in hopes of keeping the island's economy from becoming even more dependent on the Chinese market. But Taipei – as well as Washington – is likely to hear some vociferous complaints from Beijing over any signs, such as the dispatching of American cabinet-level officials on visits to Taipei, that the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is being upgraded. China was relatively silent about the Poneman trip, visa waiver nomination, and the F-16A/B retrofit program when those could be viewed as aiding Ma's reelection chances, a cause it also favored. Beijing may no longer be so accommodating, however, now that the election is over.

For its part, the U.S. in recent years was sufficiently preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, and other problems – including its own dealings with China – that it hardly minded if Taiwan concentrated on cross-Strait relations, removing another potential flashpoint from the map. But with a pivot to greater U.S. attention to Asia under way, Washington may assign greater weight to Taiwan’s strategic location and contribution to regional security.

In the meantime, a $225 million building project in the Neihu district of Taipei symbolizes the U.S. expectation that it will remain heavily involved in Taiwan for many years to come. When construction is completed in 2015, the site will be the new home for the American Institute in Taiwan, the organization that serves as the U.S. embassy in all but name – providing a brick-and-mortar reminder of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

—Don Shapiro, who has worked as a journalist in Taiwan for more than 40 years, is senior director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei and editor-in-chief of its Taiwan Business Topics magazine.

Authors

Don Shapiro

Image Source: © Pichi Chuang / Reuters

Mongolia’s Quest to Balance Human Development in its Booming Mineral-Based Economy

Alicia Campi — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 10:10:00 -0500

Mongolia—long ignored by Asia specialists as a sleepy nomadic ex-Soviet satellite—finally burst onto the world economic scene in 2011 when exploitation of its vast mineral deposits led it to a 6.7 percent economic growth rate that was 2^nd highest in the world. During the fourth quarter of last year the economy was booming at a growth rate of close to 20 percent. Both the Asian Development Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit are predicting a 2012 growth rate of 15 percent, and other forecasters contend that if Mongolia’s informal economy is taken into account the growth rate could approach 40 percent. Mining experts estimate that the country possesses as much as $1 trillion worth of untapped precious metals and minerals in at least 6000 sites. That works out to potentially over $333,333 per every man, woman and child in the country.[1] While this is undeniably a positive situation for Mongolia, the challenge facing the nation is to ensure that its mineral wealth benefits the whole nation rather than just certain sectors of society, as has been the case in some other resource-rich countries.

After wrenching economic difficulties in the 1990s caused by the collapse of its Soviet-inspired command socialist system, the Mongolian economy has grown by an average 7 percent a year since 2003. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has soared with the long-delayed but now operational large-scale western mining joint venture, the $4 billion Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper and gold operation, now under development by Ivanhoe of Canada and multinational giant Rio Tinto. OT may hold as much as 32 million tons of copper and 1,200 tons of gold, according to government estimates. Annual output when the mines are developed is predicted to exceed 450,000 tons of copper and 330,000 ounces of gold. Per capita GDP in Mongolia has more than tripled to $2,200 in 2010 from $638 in 2004. Haruhiko Kuroda, president of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has proclaimed that Mongolia is at “the threshold of prosperity,” while advising that further efforts must be made to make economic growth more inclusive to ensure that the benefits from high economic growth are distributed more broadly, and that people have equal access to opportunities and basic social services.[2]

In 2008 Mongolia’s Parliament [Great Khural] passed a National Development Strategy and created a Human Development Fund (HD Fund) with the ambitious goal of bringing Mongolia’s human development status to the same level as that of the developed countries by 2020. (The country has been ranked with a value of only 100th out of 169 countries by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Global Human Development Report.[3]) This Fund made it legally possible for every citizen of Mongolia, for the first time in its history, to be equally eligible to own a share of the nation’s mineral wealth. In preparation for the establishment of the Fund, Mongolian economists looked at the $40 billion Alaska Permanent Fund, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund worth $410 billion, and Chile’s use of its copper resources to help drive growth. They also considered Canada and Australia as models for distribution of mineral revenues to alleviate poverty and avoid the so-called Dutch Disease, a curse afflicting some resource-rich societies.[4]

To avoid this destabilizing effect, in July 2009 the Mongolian Parliament passed a law, based on a similar Chilean act, that creates a mechanism for saving surplus revenue from mineral royalties when prices are high in order to stabilize the annual state budget when prices (and therefore mineral revenues) fall—as happened in 2008.[5] The state budget each year sets a certain amount of money to be drawn from the HD Fund in anticipation of revenues to be earned; this draw is stated as an actual amount of Mongolian National Tugriks (MNT, the Mongolian currency), not as a percentage of the Fund’ value. The state budget must pay out the specified number of tugriks, regardless of whether the Fund has earned the money anticipated. The 2009 legislation is a way to keep the Government in compliance with the Parliament-approved annual budget while at the same allowing the flexibility to react to actual Fund earnings.

Initial capital for the HD Fund was drawn from the OT mine project, which is estimated will account for 30 percent of Mongolia’s GDP when completed and will generate $30 billion in tax revenue over 50 years.[6] Additional revenues for the HD Fund will be coming from development of Mongolia’s $2 billion Tavan Tolgoi (TT) coal deposit, the largest in the world. The country also has very rich uranium and rare earth mineral resources waiting to be exploited. The HD Fund’s other sources include income from sale of shares and dividends of state property connected with state-owned mineral deposits (because they were designated by law as large deposits of national strategic significance); fees for exploration and processing activities in these mining sites; advance payments and loans related to the exploitation of the strategic mining sites; and income from bonds, loan certificates, and savings interest from international and domestic financial markets for the Fund.

The HD Fund is expected to provide pension, health, housing, and educational benefits as well as cash payouts to all citizens, and thus be a mechanism to distribute the wealth obtained from Mongolia’s minerals equitably among the populace. The Parliament in 2011 stipulated that MNT805 billion (roughly US$567 million) from the Fund should be distributed to all citizens for health insurance and to students for tuition fees,[7] with MNT21,000 (about US$15) per citizen for cash payouts. Although the per capita amount is small, the amount distributed in 2010 was 16 percent of the state budget―and in 2011 almost 40 percent. Both the IMF and World Bank have criticized the 2011allocation as too expansionary, and a cause of the high 14 percent inflation rate.[8] Most of these payout monies were in cash,[9] which is opposed by 87 percent of the people who preferred the benefits be in cashless form.[10]

Originally, the HD Fund’s resources were to be applied for investment and capital repairs, to reduce the budget deficit, and for social welfare systems.[11] However, its use has become embroiled in Mongolia’s volatile election politics. In the 2009 presidential election, the two main parties, the Democratic Party and the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (now renamed the Mongolian People’s Party), pledged to distribute as much as $6 billion, or up to 1.5 million tugriks (US$1,060) for every citizen, from the country’s mining wealth. However, because of a sizable shortfall in actual revenues as opposed to anticipated revenues, the Parliament at the end of 2009 authorized only the distribution of MNT120,000 (approximately US$92) as a cash grant for each citizen of Mongolia. In the just-approved state budget for 2012, HD funds are to be distributed in July 2012, which is around the time of Mongolia’s parliamentary elections, so many observers believe the distribution plans are once again most likely exaggerated campaign promises designed to attract votes.

Mongolia’s Prime Minister, Sukhbaataryn Batbold, wrote in 2011 that “human development is at the center of government policy and we are taking all efforts to achieve this goal. Yet, Mongolia faces many challenges…such as unemployment, poverty and inequality are coupled with environmental problems such as climate change, pasture degradation, natural disasters, droughts, dzuds, water and forest resource depletion, air and soil pollution.”[12] He and other Mongolian leaders emphasized that although economic growth is considered essential for the wellbeing of the people, the human costs of the growth are of serious concern for the nomadic pastoral society and contribute to a sense of vulnerability. Therefore, the government is committed to promoting human development as a central strategy for achieving economic sustainability.

Mongol herders, although accustomed to an extreme climate, periodically suffer under dzud (harsh winter drought) which can decimate the nation’s 40 million head of livestock herds and make the nation vulnerable to food insecurity. National leaders increasingly are concerned by climate changes which affect the delicate ecosystems of the countryside’s inhabitants (over 40 percent of the total population of 2.8 million) who depend upon a traditional pastoralism based upon herding sheep, goats, cattle/yak, horses and camels; degrade the grasslands;[13] and pollute the country’s very limited water resources. Such factors negatively influence the local population’s view of mining and agricultural development.

As of 2008, an estimated 35 percent of the population was still living below the official poverty line. Inequality remains high both within cities and between those living in urban areas and those in the countryside. Although poverty assessment studies may be exaggerating rural poor versus urban poor, there is no doubt that the poor lack access to clean energy and heating sources, clean water and sanitation, and educational and healthcare facilities. The government, in consultation with international organizations and the United Nations, aims to utilize budget resources from FDI-generated taxes pouring into the HD Fund to reduce the nation’s carbon and ecological footprints by 20 percent within five years and significantly reduce the high air pollution that engulfs the nearly one-half of the national population that lives in the Ulaanbaatar capital area.

In light of these challenges, discussion of how to distribute the HD Funds has been a hot topic in Mongolia for years. All stakeholders, including the countryside and urban poor, have actively expressed their opinions via workshops, community groups, environmental protests, and in the vibrant Mongolian press. While it is clear that in the 20 years of the democratic era Mongolia has made much economic progress, income inequality, unemployment, and a failure to measurably reduce the poverty rate have incited much public criticism and compelled the UNDP to call for greater promotion of human development at the national policy level, protection of human rights, and greater transparency and accountability in use of HD Fund monies. Another major aspect to the whole discussion is centered around how poverty in Mongolia’s traditional pastoral society should be measured and compared to the previous socialist era. However, there is a national consensus that the government should utilize mining revenues to focus on improving access to basic services and housing conditions, reducing inequality in life expectancy and material standards of living, and maintaining environmentally sustainable income flows to transform mineral wealth into renewable assets for sustainable and broad-based growth to meet Mongolia's most significant development challenges.

The World Bank has warned that although so far Mongolia has managed well the global economic downturn, it must devise management skills to reduce the impact of cyclical mineral prices on Mongolia’s increasingly mineral-based economy, use fiscal rules to manage monetary policy and the exchange rate, develop and maintain a competitive and stable regime for the mining and private sectors, and encourage economic diversification in its herding and tourism sectors to sustain balanced growth.[14] But it appears that Mongolia’s present policies are being well received by some of the international community: on December 19, 2011 Standard & Poor upgraded its outlook on Mongolia to positive, citing that Mongolia had introduced a fiscal responsibility law to limit budget deficits to 2 percent of GDP from 2012. In the upcoming 2012 parliamentary election season in Mongolia, it is certain that widespread debate will continue on the HD Fund and its use in Mongolia to ensure that the wealth flowing in from rapid development of national mineral resources benefits all Mongolian citizens. If the electorate is not generally satisfied with the government’s overall mineral development policy and plans for utilization of the HD Fund, it is highly likely that this coming spring will see a renewal of the nearly annual street protest demonstrations in the capital which were particularly violent in 2008.

Mongolia is blessed with this wonderful revenue stream, and at least some of its leaders have long-term ideas for how to use it (a reserve fund for re-investment in the mineral industry; improving the quality of life of the people; mitigating climate change and pollution). Two challenges will be constant. One is to insulate this revenue stream from corruption on the part of the various actors who have some degree of authority over it. The other is to protect it from the temptation of politicians to ignore some priorities (reinvestment and mitigation) in favor of more immediate but comparatively minor problems in an effort to win votes.

[1] “Mongolia: Mineral Wealth Set to Transform country into “Minegolia”,” November 8, 2011, Eurasianet.org and Economic Intelligence Unit’s World in 2012 report.

[2] “ADB President Kuroda: Mongolia's Development Should Benefit Everyone,” October 10, 2011 beta.adb.org.

[3] Since its introduction in 1990, the Global Human Development Report publishes a human development index (HDI) as an alternative way to compare development performance of countries. Its modeling formula was reformulated in 2010 based on geometric mean and using gross national income (GNI) per capita, life expectancy index, and a new education index to take into account the expected years of schooling a child entering school age today can attain.

[4] Where a sudden surge in wealth invites a commodity boom and attracts so much foreign exchange that it raises the local currency’s value and makes domestic manufacturing less competitive and ultimately hampers expansion.

[5] Michael Forsythe, “Mongolian Harvard Elites Aim for Wealth Without ‘Dutch Disease,” February 15, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aONmVLraqtO8.

[6] Yuriy Humber, "Mongolia Seeks Balanced Growth to Avoid `Dutch Disease' From Mining Boom,” March 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/mongolia-says-shifting-focus-to-balanced-growth-from-mining.html and “Mongolia Fund to Manage $30 Billion Mining Jackpot,” Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/.

[7] Montsame News Agency, August 31, 2011 report of a Mongolian Cabinet meeting which decided each student regardless of age would receive MNT500,000 for tuition fees.

[8] International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Concludes the Second Post-Program Monitoring with Mongolia,” Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/146, November 28, 2011 and quotes in the financial press in 2011 from Steven Bennett, IMF’s head of Mongolia coverage.

[9] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of Mongolia 2011, From Vulnerability to Sustainability: Environment and Human Development: Environment and Human Development, “Box 1.3: The Human Development Fund,” 2011, 23.

[10] Badrakh, “Human Development Fund survey results revealed,” July 1, 2010, Business-Mongolia.com.

[11] B. Bat and Ts. Batsukh, “Some lessons of natural resource revenue management: The searching NRRM for Mongolia,” Ulaanbaatar, 2010, http://ic.ses.edu.mn/files/pdf/0202BatEn.pdf.

[12] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of Mongolia 2011, xi.

[13] Ibid., 2. It is claimed that within Asia, Mongolia has the highest proportion of people living on degraded lands.

[14] See the World Bank’s Mongolia country overview for 2011 at http://www.worldbank.org/.

Authors

Alicia Campi

Image Source: Â© Carlos Barria / Reuters

Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?

Yun Sun — Tue, 13 Dec 2011 14:11:00 -0500

In recent years, “public opinion” in China has been accredited more and more often as a force driving China’s foreign policy. For example, analysts inside and outside China have attributed Beijing’s rising assertiveness in international relations in part to the need of the government to cater to rising nationalism at home. The logic of many of these analysts is that expressions of Chinese nationalism are becoming increasingly vocal and frequent, and that Beijing has to stand up against “hostile foreign forces” or it will lose legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens. Ample cases of this dynamic have been identified, including the government’s hawkish response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, controversies with Japan over the waters around the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands, and, more recently, China’s “aggressive” behavior against Southeast Asian claimants to areas of the South China Sea. More often than ever, especially in private conversations, Chinese officials and scholars seem to play the public opinion card to justify externally unpopular foreign policy moves.

Such arguments seem reasonable at first glance. Public opinion, or, what is understood to be the will of the majority of the polity or at least a substantial element of it, can be a very powerful determinant of a country’s foreign policy. In democratic countries, governments have to respect public opinion: failure to do so can be very politically expensive. However, in a country like China, where the government has critical means to shape public opinion but in which the public has relatively limited means to express their political opinions, one must carefully examine the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion to determine the extent to which public opinion influences foreign policy decisions―or whether it is created or at least shaped by the government to advance a political or policy agenda.

On foreign policy issues, the Chinese public relies overwhelmingly on the official media for daily information, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government plays a central role in determining what information will be available to the public. The Propaganda Department of the CCP is the political center for ideological control and news censorship. It has almost absolute authority over what the public will read and see through its control of the sources of information, such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV). On current foreign affairs concerning China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Xinhua News Agency jointly decide the content and tone of news reports to make sure they are in line with China’s official positions. On important foreign policy issues, such as key international affairs or state visits by Chinese top leaders, domestic media outlets are required to use the official stories and lines from Xinhua. For example, in January 2011, the government allegedly required that “all media nationwide must use Xinhua’s reporting on the Egyptian riots. It is strictly forbidden to translate foreign media coverage.”[1] In some extreme and sensitive cases, such as incidents in the South China Sea, even Xinhua is required to use reports that it receives directly from the State Council.

For most foreign policy issues, China’s existing foreign policy serves as a directive for media reports. For example, Chinese media reports on the domestic turbulence in Libya and Syria in 2011 rarely focuses on the governments’ authoritarian records, human rights violations, or corruption. Instead, following China’s foreign policy principles, Chinese media spent most volume on the negative aspects of domestic instability and the danger of foreign intervention. Chinese reporting on North Korea’s provocations in 2010 provide another example. To create a North Korea-friendly domestic public opinion and abiding by China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula, Chinese media reports on the sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 focused overwhelmingly on the “inconclusiveness” of the evidence and the findings of the international investigation into the sinking, and on other factors that did not indicate North Korean culpability. Reports on the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 referred to the event mostly as “an exchange of fire” between North and South Korea and blamed the escalation of tension on the U.S. and South Korea. Few, if any, held the North responsible for the shelling or South Korean civilian casualties. In these cases, media coverage is determined by the policy, and it is intended to shape public opinion.

Alternative sources of information such as internet and commercial media organizations are also under strict government control. Indeed, China’s internet environment remains one of the most restrictive in the world. Various government agencies, including the Ministry of Public Security, the State Council Information Office, and the newly established State Internet Information Office all carry responsibilities for regulating the internet in China. Although tech-savvy Chinese netizens often use proxy servers to browse websites outside the so-called “Great Firewall of China,” the government adapts quickly and has been effective in blocking mushrooming virtual private network (VPN) providers such as Witopia. (Of course, many internet users in China who bypass the Great Firewall are not seeking English-language media reports on foreign affairs, but perhaps more often social websites such as Facebook and YouTube.)

Commercial media are without exception subject to the censorship and boundaries set by the propaganda system, and although they often have a bit more latitude than the state media, they do not have total independence to decide their stories and tones. One example was the interview of President Obama by the liberal Southern Weekly during his visit to China in November 2009. Not only did the Propaganda Department scrutinize and edit the report, it also forced the Southern Weekly to move the story from the front page to the second page in its final publication. Furthermore, the Department issued a directive forbidding any domestic media to re-run the story in any form, efficiently controlling the spread of the story and its content.[2]

The opinions of Chinese netizens are often identified by observers, including some serious researchers, as a key indicator of Chinese public opinion on foreign policies. However, like publications from the organized media, opinions expressed on the internet by individual citizens are also not free of government intervention and regulations. The first layer of control comes when the government issues directives to websites to monitor the content of posts, forums, blogs and micro-blogs and not to publish “problematic” information. In the second layer, the government’s “internet police force” under the Ministry of Public Security monitors the content of online posts accessible in China and constantly removes or blocks those that it deems dangerous or inappropriate. Then in the third layer, members of the “50 Cent Party,” netizens who are paid by the government to post pro-government opinions, are active on discussion sites to shape the discourse in ways that are favorable to the government.

Under this structure, most discussion on the internet in China is carefully screened, and much of it is pre-approved, by the government―including inflammatory comments and nationalistic criticisms about foreign policy issues. If it wished to, therefore, the government could shape and influence the direction of the internet content and netizens’ discussions to tone down nationalistic sentiment. The fact that it does not in many cases raises the question not about its ability, but its intentions.

One example was Beijing’s handling of an announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in early 2010. Both decisions were conveyed to Beijing several months before they were announced, especially during President Obama’s visit to China in late 2009. Yet when they were officially announced, Beijing responded in a ferocious manner. Harsh official statements were applauded and echoed by an even more agitated public, which in its more extreme examples called for sanctions on American companies and even a military confrontation with the United States.

However, Beijing could have chosen a different path to deal with Obama’s decisions to prevent severe damage in the bilateral relationship. According to Alan Romberg, “The PRC government, knowing that arms sales would be made, and knowing that the Dalai Lama would be visiting the White House, could have voiced its principled objections while framing the issues for the public in less contentious ways. It could have underscored the support of the U.S. has given to cross-Strait reconciliation (sometimes even to Taiwan’s discomfort) and its repeated assertion that the U.S. has all along recognized Tibet as part of China.”[3]

The fact that it did not revealed several things. Beijing had enjoyed its inflated sense of empowerment since the international financial crisis and didn't necessarily feel the need for restraint when Washington challenged its core national interests on Taiwan and Tibet.[4] And, it saw public opinion as a useful tool to show Washington how angry the Chinese people are and how severe the consequences could be.[5] Beijing might have a point when saying it had to answer to the public sentiment at home, but such a sentiment was at least in part its own creation to begin with. Public opinion was more instrumental than original in this case.

Another example was Beijing’s handling of anti-Japan sentiment after the collision between a Chinese fishing boat and two Japanese vessels in September 2010, in a part of the East China Sea that is claimed by both China and Japan. After the Chinese captain was arrested and detained in Japan, Beijing substantially stepped up its retaliatory posture to press Tokyo into releasing the captain. From the suspension of ministerial-level talks to the suspension of rare earth exports to Japan, Beijing’s message was resolute and coercive. Subsequently, massive anti-Japan protests broke out in multiple cities in China. The anti-Japan public opinion reached a recent historical high, complementing and reinforcing the government’s hawkish positions. Several Chinese analysts commented that “our government had to respond or its domestic legitimacy would be challenged.”[6]

However, the fact that the anti-Japan demonstrations were allowed to take place at all indicated at least a tacit blessing from the government, which saw them as a safety valve to release the accumulated nationalist anger. According to Shi Yinhong, a prominent scholar of international relations at Renmin University, “If the government very consciously opposed or didn't want these demonstrations, if they resolutely didn't want them, then there would be nothing.”[7]

Even if protests are already under way or erupt spontaneously at the grass-roots level, the government certainly has effective means to manage them. In the similar but larger anti-Japan demonstrations in the spring of 2005, when the government felt the massive protests was getting out of control, it mobilized its resources to end the demonstrations. The Ministry of Public Security issued a statement on April 21 that forbade the public from participating in future demonstrations. (The statement was broadcast on the CCTV News Link). It also blocked anti-Japanese text-messages and online postings calling for more protests. The government’s action did not result in major backlash from the public and the anti-Japan sentiment was effectively put to a quiet end within a week.

In a country without free media, independent public opinion is certainly a myth. Since in China the information received by the general public―and the ensuing discussion about it―are decided, colored, and shaped by the authorities, it is extremely difficult to argue that the resulting public sentiment is not at least in part manufactured by the government.

As is the case with most governments, appealing to nationalism is an easy way to score points with the public. This may be especially true in China, where much of the society still carries a victim mentality left over from previous centuries of domination by foreign countries. Also, lacking the periodic reaffirmation of its mandate to rule―through elections, for example―the government always needs ways to reaffirm its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

This dynamic also can be effective externally: stirring up domestic public opinion helps Beijing to strengthen tough policy positions abroad and serves as leverage in negotiating concessions from foreign governments. Therefore, the causal relationship must be carefully examined in any assessment of public opinion as a force driving Chinese foreign policy.

[1] Peter Ford, “Why a nervous China aims to shield citizens from Egypt news,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0201/Why-a-nervous-China-aims-to-shield-citizens-from-Egypt-news; accessed December 13, 2011.

[2] “Zhongguo – Datan Renquan Meiti Ziyou – Aobama Dianming ‘Nanfang Zhoumo’ Zhuanfang,” Xingzhou Ribao (Sin Chew Daily), November 19, 2009, http://www.sinchew.com.my/node/139106; accessed December 13, 2011.

[3] Alan Romberg, “2010: The Winter of PRC Discontent,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 31 (Winter 2010), Hoover Institution, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM31AR.pdf; accessed December 10, 2011.

[4] Interview with Chinese analysts, Beijing, February, 2010.

[5] “The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is a serious interference of China’s internal affairs… deeply hurt the feeling of Chinese people,” Deng Haijian, “Meiguo Duitai Junshou Cubao Shanghai Zhongguo Liyi”,Zhongguo Wang (China.com.cn), January 31, 2010, http://www.china.com.cn/news/comment/2010-01/31/content_19338083.htm; accessed December 13, 2011.

[6] Interviews with Chinese analysts, Beijing, October 2010.

[7] “China allows rowdy anti-Japanese protests,” Associate Press, October 18, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/18/china-allows-rowdy-anti-japanese-protests/; accessed December 13, 2011.

Authors

Yun Sun

Image Source: Â© David Gray / Reuters

The Dynamics of Cross-Strait Relations: Heading for Peace or Unknown Ground?

Fu-Kuo Liu — Tue, 19 Jul 2011 14:14:00 -0400

Since taking office in May 2008, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou has directed his government to take a positive approach to relations across the Taiwan Strait. With cooperation from Beijing, Taipei has made tremendous progress in improving cross-Strait ties: with 15 agreements signed and one consensus reached over the last six rounds of talks between Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the peace process has been further strengthened. Concern about potential conflict in the Strait has been substantially reduced by the joint efforts of the two sides. Although Beijing and Taipei retain differing perspectives on many issues, they are determined to continue putting forward initiatives aimed at facilitating positive development in their relationship.

But important and immediate questions need answers. What is the next step for the cross-Strait cooperation? What are the possible challenges to the present positive trend? Could that trend be stalled, or even reversed? Since the SEF-ARATS Talks resumed in June 2008 after a 10 year interruption, each of the six rounds of talks so far has ended with signed agreements. This record has created strong momentum for the two sides to continue to push ahead, and expectations in the two societies have increased. Now, public opinion in Taiwan seems much more supportive of the talks than in the past, if the negotiations result in signed agreements that seem to benefit Taiwanese. While the two sides have moved quickly to sign agreements on pressing issues over the last three years, are they now moving into a much tougher phase of establishing cooperative relations? Many observers are even wondering if the current efforts have reached their limit, at least for the time being. Taipei continues to adhere to a principle of “economic relations first and politics later.” What would the ramifications be if a round of SEF-ARATS talks were to end without an agreement? Would it be interpreted as a failure?

With three years of solid progress behind us, observers should be optimistic about the future. However, the upcoming combined presidential and Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan, to be held on January 14, 2012, could present challenges to the current stable and warm relationship, as the presidential candidate of the current opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), could win the election and could potentially shift Taiwan’s approach to rapprochement in the Strait. As President Ma Ying-jeou currently does not enjoy a high approval rating in Taiwan, concern is increasingly high in the region. Therefore, the largest variable in cross-Strait relations in the next months before the election will be the orientation of the DPP’s China policy, which could potentially cause a political fight with the KMT at home, as well as political confrontation with Beijing. This would change the current equilibrium in the region and would alter the present euphoria.

Now, because of these perceptions, everything seems to depend on the outcome of the election next year. Two schools of thoughts are now prevailing in Beijing. The first argues that China should be more cautious in everything related to cross-Strait development. Proponents of this school argue that the reasonable policy approach is to slow down the process and not push for a major breakthrough. In case Beijing’s worst case scenario, a return to power by the DPP, does take place next year, Beijing could still manage the relationship comfortably and would not have over-extended itself. The second school of thought holds that, even if the DPP returns in 2012, Beijing must take advantage of the present strategic opportunity to work with the KMT government, and accelerate efforts to further institutionalize the cross-Strait relationship. The idea here is to establish as many institutional linkages as possible, so that it would be much harder for anyone to change the course of the present relationship.

What are the real dynamics of cross-Strait development?

Since 2008, Taipei and Beijing have enabled this progress by sidestepping China’s “one-China principle” and tacitly agreeing to proceed on the basis of the more ambiguous “1992 consensus,” in which each side recognizes that there is one China, but hold their own perceptions of the identity of that one China.[1] This agreement to disagree allowed the two sides to trust each other enough to begin to negotiate the agreements they have already reached. But in order to go down the road for further cooperation, they have to solve the fundamental difference from very beginning.

Following the confrontational era under the DPP government (2000-2008), both Taiwan and China are hoping for peace and trying to build a solid foundation of common interests. Although political differences may not be able to be overcome in the short term, both sides have been realistic enough to realize that their relationship should be put on a more systematic basis. For Beijing, it is clear that every step moving forward carries its political aspiration of peaceful unification. Political incentive thus is always topping its policy agenda. For Taiwan, the KMT government wants to stabilize cross-Strait relations first by institutionalizing contacts and talks, and it recognizes that economic interests are the only possible short-term goal―it is not yet possible to discuss political issues. Even if Taipei and Beijing differ in their goals, the interactions between the two have accelerated, and have brought about the effect of mutual interdependence.

The Ma administration has built upon the policies of its predecessors―sometimes taking a radically different approach to China, sometimes accelerating previous policies, and sometimes realizing agreements that were already under discussion. Concrete advances have been made in three primary areas: establishment the “Big Three Links” of direct passenger flights, maritime shipping, and postal links, following up on limited steps taken by Chen Shui-bian’s DPP administration; the agreement to allow mainland Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, first in organized groups and now as individuals; and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a landmark agreement signed in June 2010 which has liberalized trade across the Strait, mostly in Taiwan’s favor, and which has spawned the creation of a new official cross-Strait mechanism, the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee. These specific accomplishments have been made possible by the institutionalization of cross-Strait contact between Taiwan’s SEF and China’s ARATS.

What are the main obstacles remaining?

Despite the increased institutionalization, it seems that Taiwan and China have harvested all the low-hanging fruit, and may not be able to further develop their relationship for the time being. Today, the main obstacles to further enhancement are firstly within Taiwan’s domestic politics. Taiwan does not have a domestic consensus on the best way to approach its relationship with China. From the outset, the Ma administration has been self-constrained by the political pressure applied by the opposition, as if every inch forward in cross-Strait relations needs to be agreed fully by all political forces in Taiwan. Psychologically, while Ma continues to worry about the lack of consensus on mainland policy, he also has to worry about the DPP painting an image of him as being “pro-China,” which may have a negative impact on his upcoming reelection campaign. Ironically, as it worries too much about the opposition’s attacks on its mainland policy, the government is seen passive and not proactive and is accused of fumbling in its mainland policy making and execution. Therefore, the positive progress in cross-Strait relations cannot be felt satisfactorily and is not portrayed in the media. In this environment, it is understandable that the government will become very cautious.

The second obstacle is the deep distrust between the KMT and the DPP, and between Taipei and Beijing. On defining the nature of cross-Strait relations, both the KMT and DPP find it hard to agree with each other. While the KMT bases its approach to cross-Strait relations on the “1992 consensus,” the DPP rejects both the term and the substance of the term. The distrust is so deep that the two parties can rarely reach consensus on identifying and protecting Taiwan’s best interests. To make matters worse, on January 14, 2012, Taiwan will hold its presidential and legislative elections on the same day for the first time. This will raise the pressure on both parties to present distinct visions for the China relationship, and will lessen the chances of reaching consensus in the coming months.

The third obstacle is the existence of different dreams for the future on the two sides of the Strait. Beijing regards that every step forward in cross-Strait relations implies increased opportunities for peaceful unification. It always takes a long term perspective to cross-Strait relations. Taiwan, however, is very much driven by short term interests. Taiwan wants to stabilize relations and get along with China well. But this does not mean that Taiwan will necessarily go down the path of peaceful unification completely; at the moment, Taiwan is at best undecided on this question. In this context, it would not be correct to interpret any short term drift away from integration with mainland China as a permanent feature. As long as both Taipei and Beijing can continue to dialogue with each other, such differences can be resolved.

What would be the next policy effort?

The January 14 presidential and legislative elections will decide who should run Taiwan’s government until 2016, and of course will be a major factor in determining which direction cross-Strait relations may turn. In order not to incur further criticism from the opposition during the election campaign, the KMT government has since late 2010 been very careful to slow down the pace of cross-Strait development, allowing only economic affairs to be negotiated and leaving political issues untouched. It seems that President Ma would like to put his mainland policy to a new test of public support, before any further progress in cross-Strait cooperation can be developed further. To many observers however, the KMT government’s self-restraint and flexibility have made it vulnerable to attacks by the opposition.

Over the last few months, especially after the ECFA was signed, a push to maintain momentum and achieve further policy progress began on both sides. However, the government is intentionally keeping the pace slow and does not want to make any mistake ahead of the big election. Nevertheless, informal discussion on further cooperation in other areas, such as cultural cooperation, deepening transportation links, has begun.

Many believe that if President Ma wins re-election in January, his new government would probably be able to move beyond economic issues and pursue broader progress in cross-Strait relations with more confidence and flexibility. Judging from the complicated domestic politics, it takes a great deal of political will on both sides of the Strait to jump beyond economic affairs. As noted above, Beijing believes that any step forward in cross-Strait relations implies future peaceful unification. Without hope for eventual unification, Beijing would have no incentive to work with any Taiwan government. The essence of future cross-Strait relations would have to be based on a hopeful roadmap through which both China and Taiwan could have positive expectations, or at least seek common goals.

Even if President Ma can win re-election and if the high expectations result in the start of talks on political issues, the cross-Strait political reality will remain challenging because China will also be going through a leadership transition in 2012-2013. In Taiwan, there is and will be considerable pressure for upgrading Taiwan’s international status and expanding international space. Since there is no single formula that will be acceptable to both sides, it will take a long time for Taipei and Beijing to work out a comfortable way forward. Thus―especially during a time of transition―negotiation on political and security issues may not come as soon as many imagine. For now, pragmatism rules on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

It is expected that before the election any positive developments in cross-Strait relations will be easily and immediately politicized in Taiwan. However, a certain momentum has been created over the past three years, and both Taipei and Beijing must understand that the best strategy is to deepen what they have already developed, to upgrade the dialogue mechanisms to the official level, and to materialize the substance of agreements. This will provide long-term stability, enabling the relationship to withstand short-term shocks which may result from politics in Taiwan, or external factors.

Conclusion

Cross-Strait relations are currently considered to be at their best point since 1949, when the Communists established the PRC and the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. In spite of the present lively relationship, deep mistrust between the two sides and Beijing’s stubborn refusal to provide concessions to Taiwan, and the confrontations that it provokes in international politics, remain. This indicates that inter-agency coordination inside the Chinese government is still a serious problem. On the one hand, cross-Strait cooperation on economic affairs has moved quickly, but Chinese diplomatic suppression of Taiwan remains unchanged in the international community. This intransigence harms the credibility of President Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” and reduces opportunities for further cross-Strait cooperation. In addition, the warm relationship has not influenced China’s hostile strategic posture. It is ironic to view that frequent communication between China and Taiwan does not change China’s military deployment against Taiwan at all.

Despite the dim prospects for major achievements in the near future, there is one development that both sides, and all parties in Taiwan, should make a priority. Both Beijing and Taipei have been very careful not to upset the warm relationship. They have relied on the regular SEF-ARATS talks to regulate and negotiate new terms for future developments. This mechanism, however, cannot cope with sudden incidents, such as accidents at sea, natural or industrial disasters, or third-party actions, which may have negative impacts on cross-Strait relations. In order to protect the existing SEF-ARATS process, and the progress that has been made to date, a crisis management mechanism is badly needed. If the two sides cannot develop further links in the next few months, they will at least have to be sure that nothing will deny and disturb the developing progress.

[1] Taiwan, under the KMT, claims that it is the Republic of China, whose government is based in Taipei; while the mainland claims that it is the People’s Republic of China, with a government based in Beijing.

Authors

Fu-Kuo Liu

Image Source: Â© Jason Lee / Reuters

Communication for Better Understanding and Improvement of Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations

Chu Shulong — Mon, 13 Jun 2011 12:59:00 -0400

Part I: Cross-Strait Academic Dialogue

Since early 2008, with the valuable support of the MacArthur Foundation’s Asian Security Initiative, the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies (IISDS) of Tsinghua University in Beijing, China and the Institute for International Relations (IIR) at National Chengchi University in Taiwan have organized a series of private workshops, collectively called the “Academic Dialogue,” on cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

Former Visiting Fellows of Brookings’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) have been involved in these meetings in both leadership and participant roles. Participants on the Mainland side include scholars, governmental officials and military officers/scholars in their personal capacities, business people, and students from Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou. On the Taiwan side, participants include academic experts, officers from the Mainland Affairs Council, business people, and news media journalists. During the workshops taking place in Taiwan, the Mainland participants also visited Taiwan governmental agencies and academic and research institutions, talking with officials and experts, as well as politicians, on various aspects of cross-Strait relations.

IISDS and IIR have organized two workshops each year for the past two years, one in Taiwan and the other in Mainland China. IISDS has also organized some workshops and meetings in Mainland China with governmental, academic, business, and news media institutions in the Mainland.

The goal of this process is to spread, enhance, and enlarge the dialogues, communication, and understanding across the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, in order to support and complement to the official engagement across the Strait that has taken place since 2008. The Academic Dialogue series is intended to help the governments and societies of Mainland China and Taiwan to locate the problems, concerns, demands, and misunderstandings of the two sides across the Strait, in order to improve the communication, stabilization, and progress in cross-Strait relations.

Communication on Key Issues, Problems, Differences, and Concerns of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait

Over the past three years, since May 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou and his Nationalist Party (KMT) took power in Taiwan, cross-Strait relations have been improving, and the relationship has been relatively peaceful and stable. This substantial and significant improvement in the relationship is the first in about fifteen years, since the mid-1990s. Soon after Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, the two sides across the Strait resumed semi-official contacts through the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF, in Taiwan) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, on the Mainland). In the past three years, the two sides have negotiated and concluded 15 agreements on economic and social issues, which may be called the “normalization process” of cross-Taiwan Strait social and economic relations after 60 years of estrangement since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.

The Academic Dialogue organized by the two institutions on either side of the Strait more or less mirror the official discussions, and can often go beyond them. The series of meetings enables participants to express and discuss, in frank and detailed ways, the issues and concerns that are raised in the official negotiation and agreements.

For example, when the SEF-ARATS meetings were focused on the issue of direct flights between Taiwan and the Mainland, the discussion in the Academic Dialogues centered on sensitive issues such as security concerns that Taiwan felt in opening up to Mainland planes, flight lines and zones, cities served, and prices of the flights. Dialogue continues on the price issue, as passengers from both sides consider fares to be too high. Part of the reason for the high prices is that there are fewer flights than needed to serve the existing market, so the Mainland participants in the Academic Dialogue have kept reporting to their governmental organizations on the Taiwanese demands for increasing the number of flights across the Strait.

Agreement on allowing Mainland people to travel to Taiwan for tourism has been one of the major achievements across the Strait in the last three years. The two sides negotiated the issue and reached agreement in June 2008. However, in the first 18 months that the agreement was in effect, the numbers of Mainland visits in Taiwan did not reach the expected number of 3,000 per day.

The Academic Dialogue at that time focused on how to increase the numbers of Mainland tourists and help the governments of the two sides to understand the problems, and proposed measures to resolve them. We emphasized that the requirement that tourist trips take place in groups was one of the problems, as regulations and approval processes on both sides delayed the trips, causing difficulties in planning for the travel agencies and the visitors themselves. For years at every meeting of the Academic Dialogue, we called for (and are still calling for) “individual trips.” The system used for individual visitors to Hong Kong and Macau for more than ten years has been very helpful and successful for mass travels from the Mainland, and has increased the number of visitors and contributed to the economies of Hong Kong and Macau. There has not been an abnormal number of illegal immigrants from the Mainland to Hong Kong and Macau under this system and, therefore, the Taiwan side should not worry too much about the possible illegal immigration problem.

During the talks over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the Taiwanese worried about the cheaper Mainland goods in the Taiwan market, especially the impact that Mainland agricultural goods might have on Taiwan farmers and the possibility that Mainland laborers in Taiwan might cause more unemployment on the island. The Mainland participants in the Academic Dialogue shared the sensitivity of Taiwan participants and communicated with Mainland government, news media, and people about the Taiwanese concerns, and explained to the Taiwan side that the Mainland side understood the sensitivity of those issues, and would take care those concerns. The result of our efforts, as one of many between the two sides, has been to help light the way toward an agreement, and thus to strengthen the economic ties and development of the two economies.

After the signing of the ECFA, the Mainland participants emphasized the implementation of the good agreement, making it helpful in promoting economic development on both sides, especially in Taiwan, and to the benefit ordinary citizens. The Academic Dialogue participants from the business and economic communities discussed the possible areas that Mainland investment may be growing in Taiwan after ECFA.

Of course, the Academic Dialogue has also covered a range of political and security issues across Taiwan Strait, in this respect going well beyond topics that SEF and ARATS have been able to discuss. Because one of the functions of the Academic Dialogue is to look forward and provide policy recommendations, the governments of the two sides have been encouraging the academic community to do the job, as the governments will start to talk about those issue in the future.

One of those “political issues” is the very concept of “political talks” between the Mainland and Taiwan. Mainland participants have tried hard to explain why political talks are necessary, the importance of the talks in “normalizing” cross-Strait relations, and that the goal of “political talks” is to stabilize cross-Strait relations systematically and in longer-term – the goal of “political talks” is not “reunification” or “separation.” Mainland participants are also trying to locate the major issues and challenges in the future “political talks.”

The other major “political issue” that has been discussed in the Academic Dialogue is security concerns, especially U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and “Mainland missiles targeting Taiwan.” The Mainland participants understand that military deployment toward Taiwan is a very important concern in Taiwan and believe the Mainland side should understand it and do what is necessary to ease Taiwanese security concerns. However, the Mainland participants have also tried to explain to the Taiwan side that the resolution of this problem can only be the outcome of “political talks” and a “peace agreement” to set long-term stability across the Strait. Before reaching the long-term and systematic peace mechanism between the two sides, the Mainland side has to rely on military deployment to some degree, to deter possible Taiwan movement toward the independence, especially if a pro-independence force such as the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) comes to power in Taiwan in the future. Besides, the Mainland participants try to convey to the Taiwan side that the Mainland military deployment along its cost is no longer focusing on Taiwan, but increasingly goes beyond Taiwan and counters growing American military activities in the Western Pacific, which are certainly a threat to China’s national security.

“International space” for Taiwan has been another major “political issue” discussed in the Academic Dialogue. In the dialogue process, the Mainland participants understand that not only the Taiwan government, but also the people and society of Taiwan, regard international space and international participation, including participation in non-governmental organizations, as a fundamental interest to them. The Mainland participants agree with the Taiwan side that the Mainland side should understand this and do more to address the Taiwanese concerns and interests. And the Mainland participants also try to convey to the Taiwan side that international space/participation is one of the “political issues” that need to be talked about, and a general agreement reached, between the two sides. Since the Taiwan side does not want to have the “political talks” now and the two sides cannot make a general agreement on “international space for Taiwan,” then the Mainland can only agree to cooperate with Taiwan on a “case by case” approach, which is hardly an overall and satisfactory solution. And since there has not been a general agreement on new rules, then the Mainland foreign affairs ministries can only follow the old rules on “Taiwan international space/participation” issues which have caused Taiwan’s unhappiness.

Mainland participants in the Academic Dialogue have also called for large scale student and educational exchanges across the Taiwan Strait; such exchanges are a significant part of people-to-people relations. Currently there are well over one million Mainland students studying abroad, and many of them are in places without high standards in education. Taiwan has a good number of universities and colleges, and it is much easier for Mainland students to study and live there than in many other places. A larger scale of student and educational exchanges would be very beneficial for both sides across the Taiwan Strait, and the two sides should work more to strengthen such exchanges.

Part II: Further Dialogue Needed for Future Challenges

With the 15 SEF-ARATS agreements on economic and social issues, we believe that the “normalization process” on economic and social areas of across the Taiwan Strait relations has been basically completed, and the remaining work is to implement the agreements and improve them through practice.

As official political talks cannot start soon and Taiwan will have another round of major elections in January 2012, the Mainland participants believe that the Academic Dialogue led by IISDS and IIR should now focus future trends and challenges. While governments work in today’s reality, academics should look and work ahead for the governments and societies.

And looking ahead in cross-Strait relations, there are the reasons for concern. If the DPP regains power next year, the impact on cross-Strait relations and the “normalization process” between the two sides would be fundamental and significant. The relationship may not be set back, because the existing economic and social agreements are in the interest of the people on both sides and no ruling parties are quite able to change them. However, the relationship may not be able to go ahead, and business may not go on as usual, because the two sides will have returned to their fundamental differences and even confrontation on the fundamental issues between them. The Mainland side insists that the “One China Principle” and “the 1992 Consensus” form the necessary foundation and pre-condition for official contact, dialogue, and improvement of cross-Taiwan Strait relations in the past, today, and future. But the DPP’s positions on “One China” and “the 1992 Consensus” remain clear and strong: that is, the party does not accept the concepts, or agree with them.

Therefore, if the DPP wins the election in Taiwan next year, cross-Strait relations may come to a standstill again, even if the confrontation of a few years ago may not resume.

And if Ma Ying-jeou and his party gain a second term, then there is great expectation from the Mainland that the two sides should begin political talks, and establish a long-term framework for peace, stability, and development across the Taiwan Strait.

However, there are some important limitations for how far the relationship can go. It certainly will not progress to reunification until far into the future. And whether the two sides can begin political talks and make major progress in political and security issues, such as a peace treaty, a political framework for relations, confidence building measures (CBMs), greater international space for Taiwan, and post-ECFA economic issues, is highly uncertain, at least for now and in next few years.

Constraints inside Taiwan

The first difficulty and limitation is the political or “peace” talks and possible “peace agreement” between Taiwan and Mainland China. Political or peace talks and an agreement have actually been called for by the Taiwan side for a long time, after an initial move and then retrenchment by the Mainland in 1979. It started in Lee Teng-hui’s era in the 1980s and 1990s, and Chen Shui-bian also called for such talks and agreement several times during his administration. Until a few years ago, the Mainland did not accept these calls and did not show any interest in the idea. Only after the 2005 talks and joint statement by the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) about cross-strait relations, did the Mainland begin to agree to talks, and even call for them itself. Hu Jintao has repeated such a call a couple of times in recent years when he addressed cross-Strait relations, and such a call has been put into the major official documents of the Chinese Communist Party’s congresses and the Mainland government.

But now the Taiwan side has become reluctant about political or peace talks and possible agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Ma Ying-jeou administration has thought and talked about the idea, but it insists that such talks will not take place soon, and it has not made the decision whether and when to start the political or peace talks with the Mainland.

Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT government have reasons to be hesitant about political or peace talks with the Mainland. The first concern and constraint is the division, and even confrontation, within Taiwan on cross-Strait issues.

Taiwan’s society and politics have been deeply divided for a long time, since the early 1990s, and looks likely to be so for a relatively long time in the future, no matter who and which party is in power. Elections in the past twenty years indicate that the so-called Pan-Blue, Pan-Green, and the Middle each has roughly one-third of support on major political issues in Taiwan, including on cross-Strait relations. The Pan-Green camp is led by the DPP, which defines itself as a “Taiwan independence party,” for its party platform and final goal is the independence of Taiwan.

The DPP lost power in Taiwan in the major elections of the legislature and executive in the first half of the 2008, and this heavy loss caused the party to engage in some level of internal debate on its positions and policies, including on cross-Strait relations. However, the moderate debate and change of the DPP party leadership have not led to a major shift in the party’s nature, positions, and policies on cross-Strait relations and other issues. The DPP is still a Taiwan independence party, and it seems to depend heavily on this position and related efforts in order remain a major political force in Taiwan, and to unite itself and its major supporters on the island.

Therefore, the DPP would continue its basic line on Taiwan independence and opposition to anything related to Mainland China (feng zhong bi fan), including even welcoming pandas from Mainland China to zoos in Taiwan, now and in the future. The DPP and Pan-Green not only irrationally oppose Mainland China and anything related to Mainland China as their strategy, positions, and policies, they also insist on the confrontational, irrational, even violent approaches to carry out their strategies and policies, including physically beating the Mainland officials or former officials going to Taiwan for exchanging views and talks when those officials are on streets, visiting sites, or in buildings in Taiwan.

Such a confrontational nature, strategy, policy, and tactics adopted by the DPP and Pan-Green cause heavy conflicts, confrontation, and fighting in Taiwan on political issues such as cross-Strait relations, and thus places great constraints on the KMT government in its policy and approach to deal with the Mainland, including the normalization and stabilization of economic, social, and political relations. Facing that confrontation and conflicts in such a heavily divided society, it is understandable that Ma Ying-jeou and his government are hesitant to take major steps to improve and stabilize political relations with the Mainland, especially when the economic situation in Taiwan is not very positive, Ma’s approval rating is not very high, and the elections approaching before and in 2012 are not set.

Ma Ying-jeou and his administration may enter into political talks with the Mainland in his second term after 2012, assuming he wins a second term. Even if the two sides of the Strait do engage in political talks, the process would not be easy, and the outcome will not be certain, compared with the talks and negotiations on economic and social issues, including ECFA, in the past years.

Major Political Differences between Taiwan and Mainland China

In addition to internal divisions within Taiwan, there also exist, of course, serious divisions between Taiwan and the Mainland which have persisted for more than 60 years. Such a huge political disagreement, which is centered on the “sovereignty gap,” are characteristic not only of Pan-Green views of China, but also the Pan-Blue. Indeed, the sovereignty gap originated with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, when they were in power in Taiwan until more than twenty years ago.

The “State Issue”

As noted above, while the Pan-Blue and the Mainland agree and accept that there is “one China” and both sides of the Strait belong to the “one China,” they still have fundamental differences over how that one China is defined; this situation is described as the “1992 Consensus.” For the Taiwan side, “one China” means “the Republic of China” (ROC), and for the Mainland, “one China” is “the People’s Republic of China” (PRC). There seems no possibility that either side can accept that it belongs to the other. The Pan-Blue suggests a policy of “non-denial.” That is, each does not deny other’s name or title, but it is impossible for either side to recognize the other’s claims of sovereignty over it.

So it appears difficult, and even almost impossible, for the two sides to move ahead from the current “1992 Consensus” position. Taiwan states that the ROC is the one China, and the Mainland claims that the one China is the PRC. This position is controversial within Taiwan, and therefore there is no political foundation in Taiwan to move ahead. What the two sides can do, at best, is to construct a framework to maintain and stabilize the consensus, or status quo, for a relatively long time in the future, just as they have reached agreement on their economic relations by signing the ECFA.

At the moment, the political status quo of “one China” is upheld only by unilateral decisions, which are made by the constitutions and laws of each side, and is not supported by any bilateral agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. And since the status quo is set by the unilateral approach, there is the possibility that each of the two sides can change the status quo at any time. If this were to happen, the relationship between the two sides would be unstable in the longer term, which would be a dangerous situation.

Therefore, if the two sides cross the Taiwan Strait want to have a relatively long and stable relationship and environment, they need a bilateral framework. The framework, at best, would be based on a commitment to maintain the status quo of the relationship as set by the constitutions and laws of each side, and would include the commitment that no side will or should take unilateral actions to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, now or in the future. It will require creativity and hard work to find the proper words that will allow both sides to reach such an agreement and make such a commitment.

A bilateral agreement or a framework to maintain the political status quo is not desirable to either side across the Taiwan Strait, but it is the best they can do in political talks between them. And even that kind of agreement or framework would meet with great resistance and opposition from the Pan-Green side of Taiwan. Whether Ma Ying-jeou can go ahead with cross-Strait political talks with the objective of constructing such a framework is highly questionable and uncertain, at least at the present time.

The “Governmental Issue”

Even if the two sides can recognize and accept the status-quo―that is, live with the facts that both “ROC” and “PRC” exist and claim to be the sovereign state of “the one China”―it will be much more difficult to resolve the “governmental issue.” That is, if the status quo remains and neither side challenges the sovereignty claims of the other, can they recognize each as legal governments within the “one China”? This is a difficult problem that the two sides across the Strait could not resolve even when they agreed on “one China” and both sides were parts of the “one China” during the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo eras, and during the early time of Lee Teng-hui administration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (Indeed, the “governmental issue” was the cause of the Chinese Civil War of that raged in various forms from the 1920s until 1949, and which has continued as a cold war since then.)

It is a dilemma, and a pity, how each side should address the other when they meet, because they do not recognize the other as a legal government within “one China” (it is really that the Mainland side does not recognize Taiwan). Chen Yunlin and other Mainland officials call Ma Ying-jeou “Mr. Ma Ying-jeou,” rather than “President,” and Ma himself addresses Mainland officials as “Mr.”, without their official titles. This is because the serious position of the Mainland government is that people from the Mainland must not call any Taiwanese official by their title when they meet, because the Mainland government doe not recognize the Taiwanese government as a legal government in China. The Mainland still identifies the Taiwan governments as the “Taiwan authority” and “Taiwan local leaders,” not as the “Taiwan government,” much less using the names “President Ma” or “Minister Lai.”

Can the two sides recognize each as a legal government within the “one China” in political talks, if they hold that sort of discussion in the future? They should. If the two sides want to normalize and stabilize their relations for a relatively long time, they cannot reach that goal without resolving the problem of the “governmental issue,” after they resolve the “state issue.” They should not and cannot continue indefinitely to refer to the other as an “authority” and “Mr.” or “Ms.” when they meet officially. It is not normal, not productive, and not a respectful way to deal with each other.

And can one country have two equal-level of “central governments”? Normally, a state should not. But the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not a normal state, therefore they cannot have completely normal governmental relations. In such a circumstance, they should accept and recognize the other as a “central government” within the “one China.” They should accept and work with the facts that there are two equal level governments within the current framework, and should normally call each other as the normal leaders and officials of a normal government.

Security Issues

The two sides across the Taiwan Strait look set to be divided for a long time into the future. Maintaining basic peace and stability between them is therefore a great and important challenge. Peace and stability are in everyone’s fundamental interest, and a systematic arrangement is required to maintain them.

If the two sides can engage in political talks and reach a peace or political agreement on the nature of their political and governmental relations, then it should be possible for them to make a long-term arrangement or mechanism for maintaining peace and stability between them. They can officially and formally agree on “a center line” through the physical space of the Taiwan Strait, and agree that units of the two militaries should not cross over that line. They can also set up an official, normal, and regular contact between the two militaries, including a dedicated communication mechanism, to avoid misunderstanding and miscommunication. They can even talk about the military deployment and arms build-up issues, including arms purchases.

Taiwan’s “International Space”

The Taiwan side would like to participate more in international organizations now and in the future, and would demand the Mainland side to agree that Taiwan has, and will have, such a need. The limitation from the Mainland side is the so called “one China” principle: that is, any agreement, including on foreign relations issues of both Mainland China and Taiwan, would be within the framework of “one China.” This is the bottom line of the Mainland in its relations with Taiwan.

The “One China principle” sets the limitation of Taiwan’s status in international participation and activities as a “non-independent state.” The two sides have the model of “Chinese Taipei” or “Tai-Peng-Jin-Ma Tax Zone” for Taiwan’s participation at the Olympics, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and APEC. When the two sides reach the agreement on their basic political relations, the Mainland is likely to agree to greater participation and activities for Taiwan in Asia and world. For the Mainland would not worry that such participation would challenge the “one China” principle and framework or would help Taiwan’s independence efforts and movement. Without the agreement and framework of long-term and stable relations between the two sides of the Strait, any international participation and space of Taiwan under the independence forces that might be governing Taiwan would be seen in Mainland China as efforts and momentum toward Taiwan independence, and thus the Mainland would do whatever it could to prevent and stop that.

Part III: Conclusion

With a number of agreements on economic and social issues in the past two years, and especially with the ECFA, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have normalized their economic and social relations the first time in more than sixty years.

The next step is to implement those good agreements and to ensure that they can help reach the designed goal to help the economic and social development of both sides, and to benefit people on both sides, especially on the Taiwan side. Then, whether and when the two sides can normalize and stabilize their political and security relations will remain uncertain and a challenge.

And even if the two sides can start political talks before or after 2012, that process will be more difficult than the economic and social talks, including the ECFA negotiation. For political, security, and international participation issues are more sensitive, controversial, and divisive, both between the two sides and inside Taiwan. Clearly, certain difficulties and limitations in the cross-Strait relationship exist now, and will remain into the future.

Authors

Chu Shulong

Why Japan Still Matters

Peter Ennis — Tue, 10 May 2011 13:55:00 -0400

Last October, during a largely-overlooked press briefing at the American Embassy at the end of a trip to Tokyo, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell made the seemingly obvious observation that for the United States “it is very hard to operate effectively – diplomatically, politically or strategically – in Asia without a strong relationship with Japan.” He also provided some deceptively urgent advice for the U.S. foreign policy community, warning that it is “critical for this generation of American policymakers to in no way take Japan for granted.”

Campbell’s advice might appear superfluous to American observers of Japan, who are steeped in the mantra of the late Senator Mike Mansfield: the U.S.-Japan relationship “is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.”

And the outpouring of American sympathy and support for Japan in the wake of the Great Eastern Earthquake of March 11, including the unprecedented role of the U.S. military in relief operations inside Japan, had the kind of trusting spontaneity that marks an enduring alliance.

But years of low economic growth and political ups and downs in Japan have quietly frayed the country’s image in the halls of American power, with Japanese leaders often viewed with an unspoken derision. And the American people would be forgiven for wondering how Japan can compete with a rising China when American politicians, corporations, and news media appear preoccupied with Japan’s giant neighbor.

So the question can be heard in Washington these days: Is Japan still relevant in strategic calculations?

The answer is decidedly “yes,” especially as the Obama administration increasingly ponders a major rebalancing of America’s global posture, shifting away from the heavy concentration in Southwest Asia and more toward the critical Asia-Pacific region. Japan will be indispensable to any such rebalancing. But conventional wisdom about Japan still often lags behind the emerging American strategic intent.

For many in Washington, Japan has seemed stuck in a rut. It was bad enough that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) seemed to be running a dizzying revolving door policy for prime ministers, shuffling a new person into office each year since 2006. Then came the upstart opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which took power in September 2009 after a sweeping victory in parliamentary elections, promising among other things to forge a more “equal” alliance relationship with the United States, to improve relations with China, and to put more emphasis on Asia in Japan’s overall diplomatic policy.

For Republican and Democrat alike the DPJ was an unfamiliar, perhaps even unwelcomed phenomenon after 50 years of virtually uninterrupted dealings with the LDP. The jaded consensus was that the DPJ was vaguely pro-China, potentially anti-American, and certainly under-appreciative of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The resulting tensions all came to a head over relatively minor disagreements concerning U.S. Marine basing arrangements on Okinawa, particularly where to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Futenma dispute, portrayed by many as a virtual litmus test of Japan’s commitment to the alliance, cast a cloud over U.S.-Japan relations, effectively pushing all other considerations off the agenda.

More worrisome was the coarseness, bordering on outright disdain, that came to color discussions in Washington about Japan, illustrated most starkly perhaps by Washington Post columnist Al Kamen’s April 14, 2010 reference to then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama as “hapless and (in the opinion of some Obama administration officials) increasingly loopy.” High-level communication between Washington and Tokyo became so strained that the Obama administration effectively barred any significant celebrations in 2010 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The tensions were a major factor in Hatoyama’s resignation last June, a development that some U.S. officials mistakenly saw as necessary “tough love” for Japan and the alliance.

It was concern about these tensions that led to Campbell’s reminder that the “overarching objective” of U.S. policy should be “to ensure that the United States and Japan are working together to strengthen a partnership, an alliance, that is effective not just in Northeast Asia but increasingly globally.”

Success at the working level

Ironically, while the political leadership in Washington and Tokyo have been at loggerheads for much of the past two years, at the working level the U.S.-Japan alliance has proceeded fairly well. Japan has naval forces in the Arabian Sea, for example, working with U.S. and other national navies against piracy. In the midst of devastating floods that hit Pakistan last year, Tokyo quietly dispatched Ground Self Defense Forces (SDF) to assist in relief efforts. Tokyo was quick to work closely with the U.S. and South Korea in the wake of North Korea’s sinking last year of a South Korean naval vessel. The major naval exercises held by the United States in the vicinity of China last fall, in a not-so-subtle message to Beijing to act with restraint in the region, took place with Japanese military observers on board. The USS George Washington aircraft carrier embarked for the exercises from recently-upgraded facilities at its home port in Yokosuka, Japan. The George Washington’s air wing is redeploying to a new $2 billion runway built largely with Japanese assistance at the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.

On a day-to-day basis, successful bilateral cooperation on both ongoing issues and the periodic crisis of the day belies the notion of an alliance in disarray.

A tilt toward China

To a large extent, the dismissive attitude toward Japan in some policy circles worked in parallel with efforts by the Obama administration to develop a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” relationship with China on everything from currency and other global economic matters to climate change and North Korea. Some fear that this relationship could take the form of a “strategic partnership” which could crowd out some American allies.

It took about a year in office for the administration to grudgingly accept that such a partnership was unlikely to develop any time soon. To the contrary, China has been decidedly uncooperative on currency and climate change. Beijing has continued to show great reluctance to pressure North Korea even about unprovoked aggressive actions against South Korea, much less Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

Moreover, China’s huge, unexplained military buildup has continued, and Beijing has shown a disturbing tendency to try to bully neighboring East Asia neighbors, including Japan, over disputed territories.

One result of these difficulties with China has been an Obama administration effort to reenergize alliance relationships in East Asia, and to cultivate broader political and security relationships with nonaligned nations, all carefully calibrated to dissuade Beijing from trying to throw its growing weight around the region.

The highpoint came last September, when a conflict flared between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, south of Okinawa. Washington quickly reaffirmed its stance that the disputed islands are covered by the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Washington’s fast reaction greatly reduced the static level in U.S.-Japan communications.

Still, it was hard to ignore the sense that at least some in Washington were viewing support for Japan as a necessary piece in a broader strategy to balance China, rather than as support for an alliance with great bilateral, regional, and global value in its own right.

Japan as a “linchpin”

But there are indications the administration may be moving more clearly toward the broader alliance view. Shortly after the Japan-China scrap last fall, Vice President Biden spoke in Washington before the U.S.-Japan Council, a group spearheaded by Senator Daniel Inouye to promote grassroots support for close U.S.-Japan ties. He presented a view of U.S.-Japan relations that gave real substance to the alliance. Simply put, he said, Japan is the “linchpin” of an effective American strategy in Asia. This means, among other things, that the United States cannot deal with China without “going through” Japan. The Vice President praised Japan’s cooperation on nonproliferation efforts toward Iran and North Korea, on humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and in stabilization efforts in war-torn Afghanistan.

More forcefully, Biden argued that every major challenge “facing humanity,” from green technology and transportation, to education and development, can best be dealt with through U.S.-Japan cooperation, not only because common interests join the two countries “at the hip,” but because the countries so powerfully share common values.

Transition, not Decline

Political and economic unrest in Japan has undoubtedly inhibited progress on a broad alliance agenda that officials from both sides insist they have never ignored.

But the mistaken American view of Japan’s troubles, rooted in apparently permanent political and economic inertia, as being intractable has led many to more narrowly define the possible range of alliance cooperation.

Japan is in transition, not decline, and the changes underway in the country will tend to reinforce rather than undermine the foundations of the bilateral alliance.

The “Japan, Inc.” of popular acclaim in the 1970s and 1980s was just the economic component of a broader institutional arrangement in Japan known as the “1955 System,” marking the consolidation of single-party power by the LDP. The LDP, together with the government bureaucracy and big business, formed a ruling “iron triangle,” a system that was very centralized, hierarchical, and rigid, with a single-minded focus on postwar reconstruction. The political system was closed, with no room for real competitive politics. The bureaucracy guided national policy, and big business implemented technology and export strategies. There was little room for “outsiders” when it came to the design and execution of government policy―opposition parties, independent think tanks, independent regulators of banks or industry, consumer watchdogs, venture capital or start-up firms, and non-profit or nongovernmental organizations.

As has been well-documented, the system worked extraordinarily well, producing what remains the world’s third largest economy, a global trading and finance powerhouse, a major factor in global overseas development, and a major contributor to global institutions like the United National, the IMF, and the World Bank.

But the system’s viability had run its course by the early 1990s, and the subsequent evolution has produced a broad trend toward greater openness throughout society, with competing political parties, a weaker central bureaucracy, more independent regulatory oversight of business, a decline in the importance of industrial conglomerates in place of more focused and profitable technology firms, a steady growth in the number and importance of start-up companies, a dramatic growth in volunteer and nonprofit organizations, and an equally dramatic growth in social media that has empowered the younger generation, including mid-level corporate managers, toward greater self-reliance and initiative.

Many of these trends were on display in the days after the disastrous earthquake and tsunami, with the government quicker and more transparent in response than previous governments had been in crisis situations. For example, volunteers swarmed to the afflicted Tohoku region, and criticism of excessively close links between the nuclear energy industry and government regulators arose quickly.*

All of these social changes have not undermined the traditional sense of obligation among average Japanese toward each other that leads to the caring orderliness and stability that the world became familiar with again after March 11.

It’s ironic, but in this age of globalization and rapid social change, it may be Japan’s deepening and widening democracy and civil society, more than Japan’s vaunted economic miracle, that proves most valuable as a model to Asia’s developing nations.

Strategic Cooperation

Meanwhile, broad strategic trends―including many that are unrelated to China―will likely reinforce U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. Even before taking office, President Obama was influenced by a gnawing sense in much of the American foreign policy community that the U.S. global posture was dangerously out of balance: a debilitating commitment of national power and prestige to two questionable land wars in Southwest Asia, alongside a mysterious lack of strategic investment of time, energy, and resources to an Asia-Pacific region that is anxiously witnessing the truly historic economic and military rise of China.

The economic crisis that began in 2008, the booming U.S. national debt, and two protracted land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dramatically made clear that U.S. economic power has limits. The United States faces not only short-term defense budget cuts, but an era of overall defense restraint, without which a continued disproportionately large global military presence of diminishing returns will seriously tap the country’s economic vitality.

But the United States cannot simply retreat. While China and India are both rising economic and military powers, neither has shown the inclination to absorb the costs and responsibilities of enforcing an open, liberal international order. China often shows the opposite.

Across Japan’s political spectrum, there is broad support for maintaining a liberal international order, involving openness in the air, on the seas, in space, and cyberspace.

In the United States, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the State Department have all been voicing the same theme of strategic shift to the region. Earlier this month Kurt Campbell told New Yorker magazine: “Our future will be dominated utterly and fundamentally by developments in Asia and the Pacific region.”

The administration is trying to foment a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. For now, the economic component is the fledgling Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

Japan is already cultivating security ties with India and Vietnam, and deepening existing ties with Australia. Perhaps most important are signs of expanding bilateral ties with South Korea, including discussion of formal military agreements involving information sharing and the exchange of military goods and services.

China and South Korea both provided relief assistance to Japan after March 11, opening the door to expansion of the existing “Plus Three” dialogue between Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing.

That kind of action by Japan indirectly extends American influence without expenditure of American resources, while providing Tokyo a far greater degree of self-determination than possible through the exclusively bilateral U.S.-Japan security alliance.

The United States and Japan may also look to capitalize on the invaluable experience gained in cooperative disaster relief operations in Tohoku to formalize a joint U.S.-Japan task force for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

Jeffrey Hornung of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii points out that Japan’s Self Defense Forces deployed 107,000 personnel, 543 planes, and 59 ships as part of disaster relief after March 11. “It seems reasonable to conclude,” he wrote recently, “that the SDF may draw on this success by prioritizing overseas HA/DR missions in the future.”

Japan already participates in the annual Pacific Partnership, an evolving effort by the U.S. Navy to improve disaster relief coordination among regional militaries that was begun after the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004.

Japan’s continuing strategic importance should receive some overdue public attention on the occasion of an upcoming summit meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Naoto Kan. With Japan’s leaders so heavily involved in post-tsunami recovery efforts, no date has yet been set, but officials on both sides have talked about late June.

The November APEC heads-of-state summit in mid-November, which President Obama will host in his native Hawaii, will then provide the administration with a chance to highlight its planned new focus on the Asia-Pacific region, with Japan as the indispensable partner.

* For more about ongoing changes in Japan that were demonstrated in part in the response to the March 11 earthquake, see Peter Ennis, “Recovering Nation: Battered Japan Searches for Bearings,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, No 48 (April 2011).

Authors

Peter Ennis

Deterring North Korean Provocations

Michael McDevitt — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 15:48:00 -0500

The views in this paper are the author’s, and should not be construed as representing the opinions of CNA or the Department of the Navy.

Introduction

Since the Armistice that ended the fighting in Korea in 1953, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been successful in preventing another North Korean invasion. The basic approach has been to present such a formidable defensive posture that the North would never believe it had an opportunity to forcefully reunify the country under its leadership. In other words, North Korea has successfully been deterred. Alliance strategy has worked so well that today the prospect of an attempt by North Korea to militarily reunite the peninsula is judged by many to be incredible. Setting aside the question of whether Pyongyang still has the desire to solve the Korean civil war by force of arms, some argue that North Korea no longer has the capability to invade successfully, even if it wanted to.

Still, both the U.S. and ROK armed forces take the possibility of another invasion, however remote, seriously. The alliance’s Combined Forces Command (CFC) worries about the possibility of a surprise, or short warning attack, because North Korea has positioned much of its Korean People’s Army (KPA) close to the DMZ where it could undertake offensive operations in short order.

Deterrence as Practiced Today in Korea

“Broadly defined, deterrence is the threat of force intended to convince a potential aggressor not to undertake a particular action because the costs will be unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low.”[1] In other words, deterrence comes in two forms—deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. In the first instance, potential aggressors are deterred by the prospect of having to endure unacceptable punishment in response to an aggressive act. In the second case, deterrence by denial, the potential aggressor is deterred because defenses are so good that the aggressor concludes that it could not achieve its political and military objectives through use of force. In Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance combines both of these approaches—a strong defense that can deny success, buttressed with the promise of overwhelming retaliation in the event of an invasion from the north.

For either of these forms of deterrence to be successful what is threatened in response to aggression or a hostile act must be believable, or as it is commonly cast, must be credible. Credibility in turn, derives from a combination of military capability and a belief in the minds of North Korean leaders that the alliance has the political will to act. There is no doubt that the U.S.-ROK allies have the political will to respond to an invasion; hence the conditions necessary for a credible deterrent, capability and political will, are met.

But the North also Deters

History has demonstrated that when it comes to responding to North Korean provocations short of an actual invasion, the circumstances of deterrence have been reversed, even though at every level of war the alliance enjoys a military capability advantage—including the nuclear domain. However, this capability advantage yields no advantage because it has not been buttressed by the perception that the alliance has the political will to act. So far, it has not acted in response to smaller provocations—although that could be changing.

Pyongyang has put in place the capability to deter alliance military responses to provocations by being able to inflict unacceptable consequences on South Korea. Specifically, it has positioned a huge number of artillery pieces and long range rockets close to the DMZ which can fire into Seoul. It is the capability bombard Seoul, to turn it into a “sea of fire” as Pyongyang has put it, that has contributed to Pyongyang’s deterrent against alliance responses to its provocations.

What makes this deterrent credible is the historic willingness of the Kim regime—father and son—to use force in ways that the alliance has perceived as reckless. It has convinced the leadership of the United States and South Korea that the Pyongyang regime might just be willing to unleash an escalatory cycle that could lead to all out war, even though it would probably lose. Pyongyang has created the impression that it does have the political will to act even in ways that appear irrational.

The combination of its conventional military posture plus the perception of a ruthless and reckless leadership has made both the ROK and the U.S. unwilling to retaliate for killing South Koreans (numerous instances) or killing or imprisoning Americans (the 1969 shootdown of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane, the 1976 tree chopping incident, and the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo). Despite its long history of violent hostile acts against South Koreans and Americans, the alliance has never retaliated to a premeditated violent/hostile act with force. (In December 2010, the ROK military did return artillery fire, in response to North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.) Until very recently, the Alliance has been deterred because of its implicit threat of violence against Seoul, or more broadly because of worries over triggering another war.[2]

Why would Pyongyang wish to continue to execute hostile acts, such as the 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island? Decision making in Pyongyang is opaque, and trying to understand the rationale behind North Korean actions is really just speculation. Within the context of deterrence, one (and certainly not the only) possibility is that North Korean leaders understand that periodic violent acts against the alliance serve to reinforce the credibility of North Korea’s conventional deterrent by demonstrating a political willingness to risk war.[3] Perhaps North Korean leaders believe that this advantage has to be periodically reinforced or refreshed by demonstrations that suggest a political willingness to take risks when it comes to the use of force.

Adding the Nuclear Dimension to North Korea’s Deterrent

A KCNA release on April 21, 2010 discussed a North Korean Foreign Ministry memorandum on nuclear weapons. The report includes the statement that, “The mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK is to deter and repulse aggression and attack on the country and the nation till the nuclear weapons are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world. The DPRK has invariably maintained the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nukes as long as they do not join nuclear weapons states in invading or attacking it.”[4]

If we accept this statement at face value, it sheds some light on North Korean’s perception of how it understands the deterrence dynamic on the peninsula. North Korea sees its nuclear capability as a deterrent against an attempt to overthrow the regime through an invasion. From Pyongyang’s perspective a CFC-led invasion may not seen farfetched. Over the years, the allied war plan in the event of an attack on South Korea from the north (OPLAN 5027) which apparently makes provisions for a North Korean regime change, has been openly discussed or leaked to the press, and we can only guess what information and opinions North Korea has gathered through espionage.

Proactive Deterrence—a New Factor in the Equation?

In the wake of the Cheonan sinking in March 2010, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak announced a new South Korean approach to deterrence called “proactive deterrence.” In a speech to the nation, he indicated that the ROK would no longer depend upon a “passive” deterrent, but instead would retaliate in kind for North Korean provocations. But, this change in the ROK’s declaratory policy did not immediately translate into any new reactions to North Korea provocations, and as a result, may have undercut the new policy in the eyes of Pyongyang because of the cautious and predictable response to the sinking. The alliance response to the Cheonan sinking was a page from its familiar play-book: a call for more sanctions, pressure from the UN, and a show of strength in the form on an alliance exercise.

Proactive deterrence faced another test on November 23, 2010, when North Korea used the pretext of a routine ROK Marine Corps firing exercise to bombard Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK marines and two civilians. The Marines did respond with counter battery fire but no further action was taken. Responding to public outrage over this response, President Lee again modified Seoul’s declaratory deterrence policy and explicit rules of engagement by shifting it from “controlled response” to “manifold retaliation.” A month later, in another speech, Lee said, “fear was never helpful in preventing war. If we are firmly determined to brave any risks, we can fend off any emerging threats.”[5]

This change in declaratory policy has potentially profound implications because it signals Pyongyang that Seoul is now equally willing to run the risks and face the possibility of escalation. In the wake of the next challenge from North Korea—and it is a safe bet that one will occur, given the North’s history of provocations and the recent trend—a response that is perceived as proportional and "in kind" would have the best chance of not leading to escalation. But this still entails significant risk, especially if the specific provocation is related to Kim Jong-un, the presumed successor to Kim Jong-il. An orderly succession process is the regime’s current top priority, and anything that is perceived to upset that will not be tolerated.

President Lee’s new policy is courageous, but is also very dangerous because it depends upon the good offices of third parties (e.g. China, Russia) to control escalation if an ROK response triggers a North Korean counter response—which side would be the first to call a halt? It is worth wondering whether, if the passions of the moment in South Korea cool, this new retaliatory policy is politically sustainable. The damage that North Korean long range rockets inflicted on Yeonpyeong was a real-world demonstration of Seoul’s vulnerability—which presumably was at least one reason why the attack was ordered.

What Can the United States Do?

A good point of departure for thinking about the future is the classic adage commonly attributed to the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath: first, do no harm. This suggests that the U.S.-ROK alliance should carefully reexamine all policy, posture, and command changes that are currently planned or under discussion from the point of view of will the change either increase or undercut deterrence in the eyes of the North Koreans.

In the category of doing no harm, postponing the shift of wartime operational control of ROK forces from U.S. to ROK command until 2015 makes sense. One of the hallowed principles of war is the notion of “unity of command.” A careful reading of military history clearly indicates that this is particularly true when facing a powerful ground threat. It makes little sense to disestablish the unifying command structure in Korea when the threat to the alliance is acting with greater belligerence and improving its military capabilities.

The Idea of Strategic Flexibility

Another related consideration is the issue of what is termed “strategic flexibility” as it relates to U.S. posture in Korea. The concept is intended to characterize the ultimate end state for the U.S. posture on the peninsula, and attempts to mirror the U.S. posture in Japan. In short, the idea expresses the belief that U.S. forces in place for the defense of South Korea could also be employed off the peninsula for other regional contingencies.

Perhaps it is time to reconsider this idea in order to send a signal that the U.S. is not interested in implying by its actions a weakened commitment to the defense of South Korea. Taking strategic flexibility off the table would be a step the alliance could take to impress upon Pyongyang that the defense of South Korea is still its central task, and that the United States is not intimidated by the fact that Pyongyang has a nuclear capability that puts U.S. forces in Korea at risk.

Preparing for a Troubled Future—Going Beyond the Usual Steps

What is needed next are actions that change the deterrent dynamic on the peninsula to one that encourages stability and discourages North Korea adventurism. Hopefully, President Lee’s “manifold retaliation” approach will accomplish that end by promising consequences for hostile acts that go beyond economic and diplomatic options. This means of course that Washington has to be willing to accept the same risks of escalation that Seoul has apparently decided to embrace.

This is not to suggest that the alliance stop taking steps from its tried and true playbook—increasing military presence to show resolve, conducting military exercises to demonstrate and hone military capability, seeking international condemnation through the United Nations, and pressing China to exert more pressure on Pyongyang. These are all important steps to take, but they are the same steps that have been taken over the years with scant lasting effect on Pyongyang’s long-term behavior. It seems obvious that when the Kim regime decides to conduct a hostile act, up to now it has had a good idea of how the alliance and international community will react. Pyongyang has not been deterred by the potential consequences.

To make this new deterrent policy more credible, reducing the vulnerability of Seoul to conventional bombardment is a priority. Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ provides the North with a huge asymmetric advantage. Can this advantage be nullified? Obviously, Seoul cannot be towed a hundred kilometers south, but is it possible to demonstrate to the people of South Korea that the alliance has the ability to defend Seoul effectively against a North Korea bombardment? This tactical issue, which has strategic consequences, is not unique to Korea. The government of Israel is wrestling with a very analogous problem—how to defeat a Hezbollah bombardment without having to invade Southern Lebanon. Israeli initiatives in dealing with this problem should be investigated.

What Role Does Extended Nuclear Deterrence Play in Dealing with Hostile North Korean Acts?

The Obama administration has been attentive to the importance of extended deterrence, the provision of the so-called nuclear umbrella to friends and allies threatened by states like North Korea that possess or are seeking nuclear weapons. Historically, extended deterrence has been based on the combination of the strategic nuclear triad (sea-, air-, and land-based delivery platforms), tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons permanently stationed abroad, and U.S.-based weapons that could be deployed quickly in the case of emergencies.[6]

Since President George H.W. Bush’s direction, there have been no nuclear weapons in South Korea since the early 1990s. The April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear, however, that the U.S. depends on,” …the capacity to re-deploy non-strategic systems in East Asia if needed in times of crisis.”[7] These explicit comments in an official statement of U.S. policy are clearly aimed at North Korea. The language is clear: the U.S. has both the capacity and policy in place to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula, and the aircraft to deliver them, should the situation dictate. This is an important aspect of extended deterrence as it applies to potential North Korean use of a nuclear weapon.

One aspect of America’s evolving extended deterrence doctrine may have only limited salience in South Korea—missile defense. The NPR states, “Effective missile defenses are an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence.”[8] However, the North Korean inventory of short-range missile is very large. Even a robust missile defense system could be overwhelmed, and it would take superb intelligence to be able to determine which missiles are nuclear-tipped and which are not. If it were possible to actually discriminate between the two types of missile loads, missile defense could trump the North’s nuclear threat, and that in turn could have a chilling effect on Pyongyang’s willingness to undertake hostile activities—especially if these steps were taken in conjunction with other steps to lesson the impact of the North’s conventional deterrent.

A final aspect of extended deterrence that could have an impact is in the realm of declaratory policy. It is worth wondering if President Obama’s vision for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons has raised doubts in Pyongyang regarding the credibility of America’s nuclear umbrella. Does Kim Jong-il doubt that Obama would ever actually direct the use of a nuclear weapon? Does the increasing salience of conventional weapons in America’s extended deterrent suggest to him that a U.S. nuclear response is not credible? Perhaps. One way to strengthen extended deterrence would be to give Pyongyang a dose of it own bloodcurdling rhetoric. President Obama could give a speech explicitly stating that if North Korea ever uses a nuclear weapon against South Korea, the United States will retaliate with a nuclear weapon, and will hunt down and kill or capture Chairman Kim and every member of his national security decision-making team.[9]

Conclusion

Preparing to deal with hostile actions by North Korea is intertwined with deterrence. The cruel irony that the alliance faces is that while it possesses escalation dominance with both conventional and nuclear weapons, it is disadvantaged by geography because of Seoul’s location. This susceptibility to conventional attack combined with Pyongyang’s track record of high risk behavior have, until recently, made the allies reluctant to test the Kim’s willingness to escalate if the alliance retaliates.

Whether this new more aggressive stance will have the desired effect and make Kim Jong-il more risk-averse remains to be seen, as does the willingness of alliance leaders to actually go through with a stronger – and riskier – response to a provocation. What the alliance can do is to continue to employ a full range of diplomatic and economic responses. Nevertheless, so long as these traditional methods do not have whole-hearted support from China the retaliatory effect will be limited. To solve this problem the alliance must somehow persuade Beijing that its security concerns are understood and will not be compromised if actions Beijing takes to punish North Korea destabilize the Kim regime. In other words, the allies should attempt to assuage Beijing’s strategic concerns regarding U.S. presence north of the DMZ. Washington and Seoul can also implement – but should not state – a more negative assurance to China. In response to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, for example, the allies conducted drills in the West Sea (or Yellow Sea), which China has warned it considers a sensitive area. These drills were a tangible reminder of the “costs” Beijing assumes because of its tolerant approach to North Korean behavior.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that being reluctant to retaliate and perhaps trigger an escalatory cycle that could lead to war has been a successful strategy against a second North Korean invasion. South Korea has avoided war, and as a result has flourished politically and economically. In retrospect, the frustration of not being able to militarily punish North Korea for its hostile acts has been the price that was paid for the overall success of South Korea and its current prominence in the world. Ironically, by attempting to deter North Korean provocations, the new approach could make war more likely if it turns out that Kim Jong-il has a higher tolerance for risk than President Lee believes. If over time, alliance mangers conclude that restraint is more sensible than retaliation, the North should not be allowed to conclude that this “turning the other cheek” to a hostile act implies a weakness in the ability of the alliance to defeat an invasion.

[1] Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters, Quarterly Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn 2009, p. 34.

[2] At the 2010 Shangri-la Dialogue Secretary of Defense Gates reinforced this point when he indicated that the Obama administration would back Seoul’s approach to the Chenonan sinking, even if the response is less forceful because of the, “...worry about provoking further instability and further provocations from the North.” Cited in the Global Security Newswire story, “South Korea Brings North before the U.N. Security Council,” June 7, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100607_8852.php.

[3] Other considerations include revenge/retaliation, providing opportunities for Kim Jong Un to build credibility inside North Korea by being involved in military operations, rationalizing a military first policy by provoking crises, and genuine hatred of the South because of its successes. None of these is mutually exclusive.

[4] “Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on N-Issue,” Korean Central News Agency, April 21, 2010, www.KCNA.co.jp/index-e.htm.

[5] Ethan Kim, “North Korean Soldiers Boast of Yeongpyeong Attack,” Los Angeles Times, December 27, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/27/world/la-fg-korea-clash-20101227.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010, p.31, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.

[7] Ibid, p.33.

[8] Ibid, p.34.

[9] Some might argue that this would not be credible given the fact the Osama bin Laden is still alive—true, but he is living as a hunted man in the wilds of Pakistan, a lifestyle that probably holds little appeal to the Kim family and other North Korean elite.

Authors

Michael McDevitt

Stabilizing Unstable U.S.-China Relations? Prospects for the Hu Jintao Visit

David Shambaugh — Fri, 07 Jan 2011 13:12:00 -0500

What a difference a year makes. In November 2009 President Obama paid a state visit to China, which will be reciprocated on January 19, 2011 with a visit to the White House by Hu Jintao—China’s President, Communist Party General Secretary, and Central Military Commission Chairman.

A year ago President Obama’s visit to China came amid high expectations[1] for a strong bilateral and global partnership between the United States and China, but in the year since that visit Sino-American relations have been extremely strained—the worst in at least a decade. President Hu’s pending visit offers an important opportunity to stabilize the hemorrhaging relationship. Observers all over the world wonder if this will occur and, if so, how long will the new stability last?

Sources of Instability

While a number of issues have contributed to the instability in the relationship, in retrospect, the deterioration began with the Chinese (over)management of the Obama visit to Shanghai and Beijing. Recall for a moment how that visit went (I was living in Beijing at the time and witnessed it firsthand).

The promised free-flowing town hall presidential exchange with “students,” much ballyhooed by the White House and U.S. Embassy, proved to be a stage-managed event with carefully selected Communist Youth League members who posed pre-screened and politically correct questions. Despite repeated U.S. government requests to broadcast the event on nationwide television, Chinese authorities never announced a broadcast ahead of time, airing it only locally over Shanghai television and a Xinhua News Agency webcast (so that nobody knew in advance to watch it). The U.S. was not told until the last second that it would be aired at all. No other opportunities were provided for President Obama to meet the Chinese people during the visit. Police prevented crowds of ordinary Chinese from forming on the streets, and citizens were permitted nowhere near the president’s motorcade. No meetings with human rights activists or lawyers were permitted, and no visits to NGOs, factories, or companies were scheduled. There was not even the usual speech to the American Chamber of Commerce. The joint presidential press conference in the end proved to be a “media briefing” at which reporters were not allowed to ask questions (they had previously been required to submit questions for screening). Even the one newspaper interview permitted for President Obama (with Southern Weekend) was censored in publication. The Chinese government completely controlled the guest list for the state banquet in the Great Hall of the People. All of the president’s time was consumed in formal meetings and meals with Chinese leaders. Even the obligatory “photo-op” visit to the Great Wall was arranged on the last day in such a way as to (intentionally) consume five hours of travel, so that other events could not be scheduled.

Throughout the visit, the Chinese government was obsessed with controlling the president’s time and agenda, lest he say or do something that might embarrass the Chinese regime. The Chinese side sought to maximize the projection of images to their own people of the two presidents holding statesman-like discussions while minimizing any chances of President Obama directly reaching the Chinese people in person or via his vaunted oratorical skills. Nothing was left to chance. This visit was an example of “summit diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.”

One wonders if the opposite of this were to occur to President Hu in the United States? How would Hu do in an unscripted PBS Newsmaker interview with Jim Lehrer on live television (as many visiting foreign leaders do)? What would he say in an unscripted freewheeling press conference in the East Room of the White House? What would happen if individuals with whom the Chinese government did not agree (exiled Chinese dissidents or American critics) were invited to the White House state dinner? What would happen if Hu had to “meet and greet” average Americans? What if he had to witness public demonstrations over China’s human rights record, the Falun Gong, Tibet, Taiwan, or other sensitive subjects? It is doubtful that any of these things will happen to President Hu, and the Chinese trip planners go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that they do not occur. But will the Obama administration accede to such Chinese-style summit management, as it did a year ago in Beijing and Shanghai?

According to advance media reports, Hu will visit the Chicago area after Washington and is expected to tour a Chinese-invested auto parts plant, a joint U.S.-China clean energy project, and a secondary school where Chinese is taught with assistance of the Chinese government—events all carefully selected to highlight China’s positive role in the United States. Like the 21 gun South Lawn welcoming ceremony, White House formal state dinner, Oval Office chats in front of the fireplace and presidential handshakes to occur in Washington, the Chicago visits will be photo opportunities to project Hu as a global statesman to a domestic Chinese audience. This plays directly to Chinese nationalism and the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy. The CCP’s claim to rule has much to do with restoring China’s international dignity and role as a major power on the world stage.

An Unrealized Vision

Despite the logistical impediments of Obama’s visit to China, the highlight of the November 2009 summit was the Joint Statement issued its conclusion.[2] This was a rather remarkable document in the history of U.S.-China agreements. In the run-up to the summit, media and think tank pundits had debated the prospects of a U.S.-China “G-2” emerging between the world’s two most powerful nations. The Joint Statement offered evidence of this, as it provided a visionary roadmap for building the relationship on bilateral, regional, and global levels—and particularly provided evidence of the international partnership that the Obama administration sought from Beijing. The Joint Statement also listed a series of new bilateral agreements in science and technology, clean energy, civil aviation, agriculture, public health, space science, and cultural and educational exchanges (under which the U.S. promised to send 100,000 students to China over the next four years, the so-called “100,000 Strong Initiative”). Thus, in a variety of fields, the Joint Statement offered real hope of a new positive stage opening in Sino-American relations.

Unfortunately, much of the Joint Statement was stillborn. No sooner had the ink dried on the document than the relationship foundered on a rapid succession of troublesome issues—which cumulatively buffeted the relationship over the past year. These included:

· Divergent and contentious positions at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009;

· President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama;

· President Obama’s decision to authorize $6.4 billion in defensive arms and equipment transfers to Taiwan—which resulted in China’s suspension of bilateral military-military exchanges (an irritant in its own right) and threats to retaliate against American companies;

· The Google controversy and subsequent concerns about internet controls in, and cyber hacking by, China;

· Tensions over the slow appreciation of the renminbi, and continuing concerns that China was manipulating its currency;

· China’s watering down of U.N. sanctions against both North Korea and Iran (although Beijing and Washington agreed to compromised language and actions);

· Beijing’s cancellation of official talks on non-proliferation and arms control;

· A continually ballooning trade deficit with China;

· Continuing Chinese violations of intellectual property;

· Complaints by American (and other foreign) companies about an increasingly restrictive operating environment in China;

· American concerns about subsides behind China’s “indigenous innovation” and state procurement policies;

· Deepening concerns over the deterioration of human rights conditions in China—particularly toward Tibetan and Uighur minorities, the harassment of political dissidents, and the continued imprisonment of Hu Jia (awarded the 2008 Andrei Sakharov Prize) and Liu Xiaobo (awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize);

· Chinese concerns over U.S. intelligence collection and surveillance in China’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);

· U.S. naval and air military exercises with South Korean forces in the Yellow Sea;

· China’s refusal to recognize the findings of a multinational investigation into the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan or to publicly condemn North Korea for the sinking;

· China’s refusal to publicly condemn Pyongyang’s late-November artillery shelling of the South Korean island Yeonpyeong;

· China’s persistent protection of North Korea and refusal to restrain its provocative neighbor;

· China’s minimal contributions to the international effort in Afghanistan;

· A disappointing Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing in May; and

· China’s newly assertive claims to disputed waters in the East China Sea (vis-à-vis Japan) and South China Sea (vis-à-vis five Southeast Asian claimants), and Beijing’s acerbic rejection of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s offer at the July ASEAN Regional Forum to facilitate initiatives designed to operationalize the 2002 China-ASEAN declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea..

These and other issues of concern festered and buffeted the U.S.-China relationship throughout 2010, easily the worst year since the EP-3 crisis in 2001. But unlike that crisis, the new troubles in the relationship do not stem from a specific event—but rather from the cumulative effect of the aforementioned issues. The problems in the relationship today run deep. With each troublesome issue and each passing day, mutual mistrust has grown at both the official and public levels in each country.

It is not only Washington with which Beijing has had troubles (and vice versa) over the past year. Indeed, 2010 was the worst year in recent memory for Chinese diplomacy. It was marked by a deterioration in Beijing’s ties throughout the Asian region—with Australia, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and India—and continued difficulties with the European Union over a range of issues. Even China’s ties with certain African and Latin American states began to show some strains. But amid this global downturn in Beijing’s foreign policy, the U.S.-China relationship seemed the most troubled.

Rays of Sunshine?

To be fair, there were some signs of stasis and even improvement on some issues during the year. This is particularly true over the past month, when U.S. officials in the White House, State Department, Commerce Department, and Pentagon all report that their Chinese interlocutors have been “on their best behavior” in the run-up to the Hu visit, so as to create a positive atmosphere. Consider these examples.

In November Presidents Hu and Obama themselves met on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Seoul, noting the “globally significant ties” between the two countries and their joint efforts to facilitate global economic recovery. In December, after almost a year of suspended exchanges by the Chinese military, the Defense Consultation Talks (DCT) were held and an official invitation was extended to Secretary of Defense Gates to visit Beijing on January 9-12.

Also in December, the 21^st session of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce & Trade (JCCT) took place in Washington and achieved progress on a range of previously contentious issues. The U.S. attained significant promises (but not binding commitments) from the Chinese side concerning: relaxation of discriminatory government procurement provisions in its “indigenous innovation” policies; intellectual property protection (a chronic problem for years); revision of heavy machinery and industrial equipment guidelines so as not to favor domestic producers; “smart grid” standards and 3G technologies; and possibly reopening China’s market to U.S. beef imports. All in all, Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke proclaimed himself “very, very pleased” with the outcome of the JCCT session.

North Korea has also been a very contentious issue on the U.S.-China agenda. Washington has grown increasingly impatient with Beijing for its failure to “discipline” and “rein in” Pyongyang from its belligerent, destabilizing, and dangerous behavior over recent months (to say nothing of its multi-year nuclear weapons program and recent discovery of a new uranium enrichment facility this autumn). Tensions began to reach a head in late November and early December with the North Korean shelling of a South Korean island, which was followed by joint U.S.-Republic of Korea deterrent military exercises (Seoul also carried out its own unilateral exercises). The outbreak of inadvertent war did not seem outside the realm of possibility—keeping military intelligence officials on alert around the clock in recent weeks. After repeated calls by high-ranking U.S. officials for Beijing to control Pyongyang, by mid-December senior Obama administration officials were praising Beijing for restraining Pyongyang from further escalation (although it remains completely unclear what, if anything, Beijing did to this end).

Progress on climate change was also made recently at Cancun, with differences being narrowed on carbon emissions verification and funding for developing countries’ energy programs.

These are all tangible recent improvements in the Sino-American relationship, but they are recent and they are tactical—intended primarily to set a more positive tone for the Hu-Obama summit. They may well evaporate right after the summit. Even the JCCT agreements are not codified in any kind of binding intergovernmental agreement, and are simply statements of intent by the Chinese side. (U.S. officials also privately report that Vice Premier Wang Qishan had to personally intervene in the sessions to make the oral concessions the Americans sought, apparently against the desires of his own delegation.)

The two governments also consulted privately throughout the year on Iran, Myanmar, and other international issues.

So, buoyed in large part by the relatively positive trend over the last two months, U.S.-China relations were not a complete washout during 2010, but there were far more frictions than areas of cooperative commonality.

Prospects for the Summit

Given this mixed record and long list of simmering tensions, there is good reason to question what can actually be accomplished at this summit? However, there is an even more compelling reason to argue that this is exactly the right time for high-level summit between the two presidents. There is no more important relationship in world affairs today than the Sino-American relationship. President Hu’s visit is an important opportunity to bring some needed stability to the relationship—for the benefit of both nations, the Asia-Pacific region, and international relations more broadly.

Summits also tend to galvanize respective bureaucracies to find areas of tangible cooperation, narrow differences, and sign accords. It is right for both countries and the world to expect significant progress form such superpower summits, and both sides need to think beyond narrow national interests and realize the global importance of their relationship.

Yet, given the strained and complex relationship between the U.S. and China over the past year, and the shortcomings of the 2009 summit in Beijing, the world would do well to keep their expectations for this summit more modest. The 2009 summit’s short-lived achievements (in the Joint Statement) foundered on a series of specific disagreements, exaggerated expectations, America’s own economic domestic difficulties, and China’s increasingly caustic and self-interested foreign policy. These issues and differences remain and have, in fact, been exacerbated over the past year. After President Hu returns to Beijing, the problem areas in the relationship will all resurface.

Thus, what is needed more than anything from this summit is what did not occur at the last one: putting in place a series of inter-governmental mechanisms to implement the 2009 Joint Statement and forge tangible cooperation 365 days per year. A one-day summit does not accomplish this, nor does the two-day annual convening of the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED). What is really required is the establishment of bilateral institutionalized Working Groups in a wide range of issue areas. China’s relationships with Russia and the European Union are deeply institutionalized as such, but the U.S.-China relationship has never been.

The two positive exceptions are the aforementioned DCT and JCCT mechanisms in the military/strategic and commercial domains respectively. Both have worked well over the years and could serve as useful models for other areas of the relationship. The bilateral dialogues on different regions of the world held between the State Department and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which occur under the strategic track of the S&ED) is also a valuable forum—particularly as China’s global footprint continually expands and it increasingly bumps up against America’s international presence and interests—but these only occur once per region per year, and they too need to be institutionalized into Working Groups that operate all year round.

Thus, the best things the Sino-American Summit on January 19 can accomplish is to look back and revitalize the visionary Joint Statement reached in November 2009, and to look forward and establish tangible intergovernmental mechanisms to operate year-round to implement that vision.

David Shambaugh is professor of Political Science & International Affairs and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

[1] See David Shambaugh, “The China Awaiting President Obama,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, No. 33 (November 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/11_china_shambaugh.aspx.

[2] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” November 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement.

Authors

David Shambaugh