Brookings: Series - Federal Executive Fellows

Japan’s Defense Policy: The View From Washington, DC

Colonel Seiki Kageura — Mon, 13 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

When it comes to Japan’s defense, the Japanese political system and the Japan Self-Defense Force independently decide the national policies as they are ultimately responsible for the country’s safety and security. However, due to the crucial nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan’s overall security, it is impractical not to take into account American thinking. As a result, it is important to better understand where and how American thinking on Japanese security is influenced.

The scope of this research goes beyond the official statements of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. The author sought to explore the role that experts and think tanks play in American discourse and opinion of Japanese security. This included extensive research of American media reports on Japanese security issues as well as interviews of key American experts and opinion leaders on Japan, mostly located in and around Washington, DC.

This project is therefore unique and novel in its approach to this key topic in Japan and the U.S. A number of Japanese reports have been published in the past about American experts’ views towards Japan, yet few incorporate both a survey of media and interviews with key current figures or focus exclusively on Japanese defense. Moreover, such viewpoints and thoughts are always changing; therefore, it is meaningful to spot the current status at such a crucial time of change, both in the U.S. and Japan, not to mention the wider Asia-Pacific region.

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Colonel Seiki Kageura

Image Source: Kyodo / Reuters

Exploring the Possibilities for Collaboration Between the U.S. and Chinese Navies in the Western Hemisphere

Audry Oxley — Tue, 10 Jul 2012 11:00:00 -0400

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a global system of commerce installed and protected by United States maritime forces. This model of free trade laid the foundation for the People’s Republic of China’s inexorable rise in global affairs. The U.S. supported China’s industrialization by granting it near limitless access to American capital and consumer and financial markets, while it benefited equally from a vast and ever growing supply of consumer goods that have kept the cost of living in America nearly flat for a decade.

Now, however, both nations are expanding their economic interests and military commitments into each other’s regional neighborhoods. To complicate matters, this is happening at a time when both nations are finding themselves stymied by political and territorial challenges within their own hemispheres.

In this paper, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Audry Oxley argues that managing future international issues between the countries will require a commitment to cooperation and a sturdy diplomatic platform.

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Audry Oxley

Image Source: Jason Lee / Reuters

CENTCOM’s China Challenge: Anti-Access and Area Denial in the Middle East

Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo A. Abisellan — Thu, 28 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

In the last year, America has sought to refocus its diplomatic and military attention to East, rather than Middle East. This makes perfect sense. The last decade of wars in the greater Middle East have been draining in terms of both blood and treasure, while the Asia-Pacific region appears to be the new center of future world politics and economy. The region has been described as “the demographic hub of the 21st century global economy, where 1.5 billion Chinese, nearly 600 million Southeast Asians and 1.3 billion inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent move vital resources and exchange goods across the region and globe.”[1]

Yet, there is an irony. While the US is looking more towards the Pacific, China’s needs are driving it more towards the Middle East. To fuel and sustain economic growth, China is heavily reliant on Middle Eastern oil. The resource rich and volatile Middle East is a critical center of gravity for the Asia-Pacific and the key for China’s continued economic prosperity.

Therefore, despite the rebalancing of U.S. efforts away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East today is fast becoming an arena for another “Great Game,” one that may inevitably pit the U.S. against China in a regional competition for influence and power. China, through its economic ties to the region, has already achieved influence parity with the U.S. Now it could very well leverage this growing influence to gain further concessions and achieve a future positional advantage to counter U.S. regional hegemony and naval supremacy in both the Middle East and within the Asia-Pacific region— all the way from the source of its energy supplies through its long and vulnerable sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to home ports in China.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how China could leverage its use of soft power and regional allies as a strategy within the Middle East of an asymmetric anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) through other means. This novel approach may allow China to “circumvent America’s traditional military strengths,”[2] during a crisis. Thus, the monograph note the limits of any strategic rebalancing that ignores ongoing political and economic dynamics across regions. The U.S. may want to pivot away from the Middle East, but in reality the Middle East remains the focal point for the continued economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. national interests, and U.S allies’ energy needs in the Middle East. A continued presence in the region will be of critical value to strategic efforts in the Asia-Pacific, serve to assure allies, safeguard the flow of oil and thus promote global economic and political stability.

[1] Kaplan, Robert D. and Cronin, Patrick M. “Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea.” P.9.

[2] Greenert, Jonathan and Schwartz, Norton. “Air-Sea Battle Doctrine: A Discussion with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval Operations.” (Brookings Institution, 16 May 2012). P.9. Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/5/16%20air%20sea%20battle/20120516_air_sea_doctrine_corrected_transcript.pdf Internet accessed 12 June 2012.

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Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo A. Abisellan

Image Source: Ho New / Reuters

Be Quick, Be Useable, Be On Time: Lessons in Agile Delivery of Defense Analytic Tools

Lourdes M. Duvall — Wed, 06 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

When faced with urgent national security needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) has historically bypassed conventional processes and allowed a greater degree of agility to flourish for critical programs. Over the past decade of combat operations, this again has held true. For all the criticism of defense acquisition, there have been examples of extremely successful efforts that quickly delivered new capabilities responsive to urgent warfighter needs.

These efforts were characterized by an intense focus on the user, a commitment to rapid delivery, and an acceptance of an incremental approach to improving capabilities. Instead of seeking the ideal solution, programs adopted a continuous cycle of deliver, learn, adapt, and improve.

As our active war fighting commitments draw down, and budgets tighten, we risk losing important lessons. The urgency behind these agile efforts will decline at the very time when we may need them most. The importance of agile practices for the Department is growing. These practices need to expand beyond urgent combat needs to be the norm for more mission capabilities, including analytic tools.

Four key factors are driving this need for increased agility. They include: the rate and unpredictability of advances in technology; the difficulty specifying requirements early in a program; the wide range of future potential conflicts and adversaries; and the rapid expansion of data sources and data volumes. Taken in concert, these factors call for alternative approaches for how systems, specifically those heavily dependent on information technology, are developed and acquired.

There are significant differences between agile and conventional processes that pose challenges to more widespread adoption of agile methods. Historical cases, contemporary experience, and commercial lessons can inform DoD efforts to scale up existing agile pockets to institutional processes. To be successful, efforts need to be coordinated across functional and process boundaries and cannot be left to the acquisition community alone, or instituted in isolation.

This analysis identified three critical pre-conditions that need greater attention in the ongoing discussions on transitioning to more agile methods in DoD. First, recognize the central role of user collaboration throughout development. Second, create mechanisms to easily bring together multifunctional teams to fuel the cycle of deliver, learn, adapt, and improve. Finally, foster a culture characterized by agility as a routine, vice requiring senior leader intervention to break down barriers, through consistency in what is stated as important and valued, such as agility and adaptability, with what is measured and incentivized.

Fortunately, there is contemporary experience within defense organizations with agile methods. There are successful practitioners with years of experience that can seed expansion of these practices. Areas such as intelligence analysis and cyber require this agility now. Continuing to view these practices as exceptions limited to urgent national security needs is ill advised.

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Lourdes M. Duvall

Image Source: Jim Urquhart / Reuters

Making It Personnel: The Need for Military Compensation Reform

Karl Gingrich — Mon, 13 Feb 2012 16:49:00 -0500

Executive Summary: The United States is facing a significant financial crisis. The national debt is fast approaching $15 trillion and is expected to continue to grow at an alarming rate for the foreseeable future. Mandatory programs, such as entitlements and obligations on the debt, are largely responsible for the increasing debt and continued deficits, but escalating defense spending over the last decade has also contributed to the problem. To address the current economic situation, the Department of Defense is working to reduce spending by $450 billion over the next decade and, depending on how the debt ceiling issue is ultimately resolved, may face an additional reduction of $600 billion.

A reduction of this magnitude requires a reassessment of U.S. strategy with a discerning eye toward realistic goals and long-term fiscal sustainability. In addition to the efforts to rethink and potentially reset grand strategy, there is a critical need to focus on internal reforms as well. An assessment of how we are doing things is just as important as an assessment of whether they are the right things. DoD appears to be attempting to do both, as evidenced by the release of preliminary 2013 budget decisions. But while all the details have not yet been revealed, the initial assessment is that DoD may not have gone far enough to reform one of its biggest budgetary challenges: military compensation.

Military compensation costs are trending much the way of federal entitlements, effectively crowding out other elements of the defense budget. Even more worrisome, they are accounting for an ever increasing portion of the budget, meaning that painful cuts today will be less effective tomorrow if not accompanied by long overdue compensation reform. Unfortunately, military pay and benefits are one of the most controversial elements of the defense budget and DoD surely faces an uphill battle to see these reforms implemented. If recent history is any guide, DoD will face a daunting challenge to garner the congressional support required to enact reform. Ironically, DoD faces a significant battle to implement reforms that don’t go far enough to address the real issues with military pay and benefits. The context today has changed to the point where Congress must seriously consider DoD’s proposed reforms instead of treating them like a third rail issue as it has in the past.

Military compensation is composed of a series of cash compensations, noncash benefits, and deferred benefits. The roots of the current compensation system can be found in law dating back to the late 1790s. The Department seeks to provide competitive pay and benefits as part of the human capital strategy while also being fiscally responsible. It is important to recognize that the defense of the entire nation has been underwritten by only a small percentage of the US population. Today, less than one percent serves, and about 23 million veterans and beneficiaries receive benefits for prior service. Military compensation must reflect this fact. Ultimately, the effectiveness of military compensation is measured through the achievement of recruiting and retention goals, which ensure the force is manned with sufficient numbers of personnel with the appropriate skill sets. However, many critics of military compensation identify issues with its efficiency, equitability, and flexibility.

This paper evaluates the various components of military compensation using a construct of transparency, sustainability and perception. For any needed reform to be successful, first, the costs and benefits of compensation must be explicitly stated, easily accessible, and understandable. Second, compensation must be affordable, achieve recruiting and retention goals, and provide an appropriate level of quality of life for the service member throughout his/her career and retirement. And, finally, military compensation must be perceived as fair and effective not just by Congress and the public, but by the individual service member, targeting what he/she values most within the compensation strategy.

Based on this evaluation, a series of policy recommendations are provided for how the current military compensation system might be reformed and updated. Whereas DoD’s current proposed reforms will likely generate up to an estimated $70 billion in savings over the next decade, this paper advocates a more robust—not radical—series of policy recommendations that could garner an additional $40 billion dollars of savings over the same period, or $101-$112 billion of total savings. Perhaps more important than the immediate savings generated, these recommendations will also place military personnel costs on a more sustainable path for the future. DoD’s less aggressive approach may not adequately control pay and benefit costs in the long run and may lead to additional capability and capacity reductions in the future to offset personnel costs.

In sum, the recommendations slow cash compensation growth and reduce the value of non-cash and deferred benefits by transferring costs to the service member, retiree and their dependents. The recommended reforms were generated within the context of the human capital strategy and do not compromise effectiveness for the sake of efficiencies. The military compensation system will continue to provide competitive pay and benefits and allow the Department to continue to meet its recruiting and retention goals, but will now do so in a more fiscally-responsible manner. The proposed recommendations will also maintain the nation’s commitment to the All Volunteer Force by continuing to compensate it at levels commensurate with its sacrifice and commitment to the nation. While the Department’s system of compensation may look differently in the coming decade, the United States will still retain a strong and capable defense and trust will be preserved with those who serve the nation.

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Karl Gingrich

Image Source: © Oleg Popov / Reuters

The U.S. Coast Guard and 21st Century Law Enforcement on the High Seas

Jeffrey Randall — Thu, 01 Sep 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary: Performing the functions of eleven agencies in one service, the Coast Guard has capably served the American public for nearly 220 years. Small, yet highly adaptive and flexible, the Coast Guard has always risen to the challenge. However, the threats and challenges presented by the future maritime security environment necessitate that the Coast Guard make some changes to its law enforcement program to continue being a viable instrument of the federal government in this area.

Following 9/11, the Coast Guard added many tactical law enforcement capabilities to its inventory. While these capabilities filled needed gaps, a majority of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement work continues to be performed by regular Coast Guard personnel, often on a collateral duty basis. As vigilance atrophies and questions are raised about the long-term sustainability of the Coast Guard’s high-end law enforcement capabilities, the time is right for a close examination of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement program in the aggregate.

The recently released Commandant’s Direction and other Coast Guard strategic planning processes have tangentially addressed future law enforcement challenges, but individual strategic plans for various aspects of Coast Guard law enforcement look at only a small slice of the law enforcement picture. Global trends and the changing nature of the maritime security environment and law enforcement threats facing this nation require a holistic and introspective look at the Coast Guard’s law enforcement program to ensure that it is ready for the future environment.

A comprehensive evaluation requires an understanding of criminal behavior, the role of deterrence in law enforcement, and incorporation of an intelligence-led policing model into Coast Guard law enforcement operations. Combined with several recommended changes to the Coast Guard organizational structure and law enforcement training, technologies, and partnerships, the Coast Guard can prepare itself for the future and continue to be a highly utilitarian component of the federal government.

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Jeffrey Randall

Image Source: Â© Andrea De Silva / Reuters

The Battle Over Command and Control of the Pentagon's Cyber Forces

David C. Hathaway — Fri, 15 Jul 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Abstract:

The dramatic increase in reliance on cyberspace over the last decade for U.S. military operations resulted in the creation of the sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Its mission is to operate and defend the global information grid and conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations, if required. However, the regional combatant commands (COCOMs) see cyberspace as another operational domain that they want and need to integrate with the physical domains of air, land, sea and space. These two perspectives are at odds with each other with respect to the optimal command and control (C2) structure for cyberspace. The challenge is to develop a command and control structure that allows USCYBERCOM to execute its global responsibilities while also allowing the geographic commanders the ability to effectively integrate cyber operations into their plans and operations.

Two predominant models have emerged: the USSOCOM model and the USTRANSCOM model, the former being a very regionally focused structure while the latter is very centrally focused. In order to determine the best command and control structure for cyberspace within DoD, the author conducted interviews throughout USCYBERCOM, its service components, and several of the unified commands. Additionally, the author observed a tabletop cyber exercise in preparation for U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) annual Exercise Terminal Fury. The author concludes that a hybrid model with features of the regional USSOCOM model and the centralized USTRANSCOM model best takes into account the global nature of cyberspace, while enabling integration of regional cyber effects.

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David C. Hathaway

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Partner for the United States?

Julie Boland — Fri, 24 Jun 2011 14:56:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military officers surveyed the foreign troops advancing with them toward the simulated terrorist stronghold. On the U.S. officers' right were Russian special operations forces, with a few Central Asian personnel alongside, and to their left were their Chinese counterparts. Seeing the variety of foreign equipment in action at the joint security exercise was amazing and hearing the cacophony of languages over the communications lines was a bit jarring, but most striking of all to the U.S. officers was the patch on everyone’s arm—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization emblem.

Far-fetched? Perhaps not. The United States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have common concerns in the region, including instability, counterterrorism and counternarcotics. The SCO also includes several countries that Washington likely fears could be the setting for future security hot spots. Washington’s persistent entanglement in Afghanistan further cements an interest in the SCO, which includes an Afghanistan Contact Group and guest attendance by President Hamid Karzai at SCO heads of state meetings. Furthermore, the SCO operates in the Eurasian region, where the United States finds itself heavily involved, yet geographically distant. And finally, all of the SCO countries, except China, have signed Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework documents with NATO and the Central Asian SCO members are past participants in PfP defense training and exercises, indications that the potential security benefits of cooperation already are recognized.

But perhaps no other regional organization is less consistently or objectively studied than the SCO. Foreign policy commentators have had varying takes on this organization and whether it is something the United States should care about or ignore, with the majority of the interest and research centered on the China-Russia relationship within the SCO and on the group’s security exercises. The basic facts about the organization are so laxly tracked that even prominent authors mistakenly include all five Central Asian states as official members (Turkmenistan, however, only attends meetings as an invited guest) or upgrade Afghanistan to an official observer state (again, as of now it is just a guest) in their best selling books. Even The New York Times, in a January 2011 article on Chinese inroads into Central Asia, gave an incorrect date for the establishment of the SCO’s precursor organization, the Shanghai Five (taking almost three weeks to correct its “editing error” from the originally posted “1966” to the correct “1996”).

Extreme views on the nature of this organization often accompany the lack of accuracy by many commentators. Some describe the SCO as a paper tiger while others suspiciously eye it as a counterweight to NATO. At the SCO’s five-year mark, a few authors questioned whether it was a nascent military alliance. In reality, however, the SCO’s direction and activities suggest it has evolved into something more in the middle of these positions in response to the changing global landscape over the last decade.

The SCO’s June 2011 summit will mark the tenth anniversary of the founding of the SCO. This milestone is a crucial time to examine the SCO’s development over the last decade and where it appears to be headed. The key questions of this paper are: Has the past decade been a lost one for the SCO, or has it made any progress as an effective organization? And, given uncertainties about a rising China, a reset Russia, and unstable regimes in the Eurasian region, are there reasons why the United States might consider the opportunities—and risks—of enhanced engagement with the SCO, a group which encompasses all of these challenges? This paper lays out potential next steps the United States could take to move a U.S.-SCO relationship forward if Washington chooses to do so.

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Julie Boland

Image Source: ï¿½ Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters

Quest for High-End Capabilities Leaves Australian Defence Force Vulnerable to Mission Failure

John E. Angevine — Wed, 01 Jun 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary:

The current direction that the Australian Defence White Paper 2009 (Defence 2009) sets for the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) modernization does not correspond with the realities of Australia’s security situation. The policies and strategies set forth prepare the ADF for contingencies that are the least likely to happen and dedicate large portions of the nation’s limited resources to missions that exceed the ADF’s capability. Australian policymakers continue to adhere to a “Defense of Australia” concept that has become obsolete and fail to link their strategy to a multilateral mechanism which treats the Asia-Pacific region as a complete system. As Australian defense policymakers strengthen the ADF 2030’s capabilities to become self-reliant at the higher end of the military operations continuum, they have made the ADF 2030 more dependent on U.S. military assistance in order to perform low- and mid-intensity operations. The likely result will be an inadequate, ad hoc, and weak multilateral response, necessitating direct U.S. involvement in stabilizing a crisis. This will require more resources than if the issue had been addressed early on with the right mix of capabilities and cooperative security unity. The consequence for the United States would be either to accept an increased defense burden for operations on the lower and middle continuum of military operations within the Asia-Pacific region or to retrench from the region.

To make the U.S.-Australian alliance more effective in providing for both nations’ security needs, the U.S. Department of Defense should support: 1) publicly discarding the Guam Doctrine in conjunction with the establishment of the U.S.-Australian defense industry community, 2) establishing joint basing for submarine repair, maintenance, and training facilities, 3) endorsing a Southeast Asia and South Pacific regional multilateral cooperative security arrangement to address regional security and stability challenges, while pressing for constructive and transparent Chinese participation in regional security matters, and 4) urging the U.S. Department of State to draft Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty rules to publicly create a seamless U.S.-Australian defense industry community, while shepherding this concept in support of future joint U.S-Australian operational activities.

Australian policymakers must integrate the Defence 2009 and future White Papers’ objectives into Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region as a part of a broader hemispheric approach – clearly establishing a framework for multilateral and cooperative security mechanisms to deal with such regional issues as disputed islands in the South China Sea; maritime resource claims; mass migration; conflict resolution and conflict prevention, with corresponding confidence-building measures, capacity building, and defense modernization transparency. Australian policymakers could recapitalize unaffordable and excess air and sea capabilities currently focused to deal with high intensity conflict into ground and amphibious capabilities to deal with the more likely middle- and lower-intensity regional scenarios on the continuum of military operations. A shift of Australia’s defense capabilities towards greater utility in the most likely regional contingencies would significantly contribute to stability and security in Australia’s primary operational environment, as well as make a valuable contribution to the U.S.-Australian alliance.

Regarding recommendations to rebalance Australia’s defense capabilities, the Australian Defence Department could consider: 1) leasing U.S. submarines as a part of the larger joint base arrangement, 2) augmenting the F-35 and F-18 air fleet with unmanned reconnaissance and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 3) basing of the U.S. F-22 Raptors in Australia as part of U.S. flexible deterrent options for regional crisis, 4) increasing the size of the Australian Army by 2,000 to 4,000 soldiers and provide the funding to train and sustain amphibious assault operations, and 5) establishing a tactical-level COP acquisition program for units at brigade and below, feeding the operational and strategic COP.

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John E. Angevine

Image Source: Â© Stringer Australia / Reuters

Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns Against Insurgents and Terrorists

Matthew Frankel — Thu, 06 Jan 2011 12:54:00 -0500

ABSTRACT

The use of high value targeting (HVT)—using military and police forces to kill or capture leaders of insurgent and terrorist groups—has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. HVT operations have become the primary tool of the United States for combating Al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide, and while these operations have eliminated scores of terrorists and insurgents from the battlefield, they haven't always led to strategic success. Utilizing a data set of 20 distinct HVT campaigns dating back to the end of World War II, this article will highlight the positive and negative effects of HVT efforts throughout history and identify six key lessons from past campaigns and their implications for the United States. The body of the paper looks at the important issues inherent to any HVT campaign, including the benefits of having a local force carry out the campaign, the importance of incorporating HVT into a larger counterinsurgency strategy, and the necessity of understanding the dynamics of the group being targeted.

The United States has historically struggled in all of these areas, leading to difficulties in achieving success through HVT operations, but these historical lessons also provide opportunities for progress. The article concludes with important implications for the United States and identifies strategies for improvement in these pivotal areas, including expanding relationships with host governments, leveraging new technologies, and contemplating unique ways to approach target sets. Failure to make these changes, the article argues, will leave the United States with the same strategic failures it had with the infamous “deck of cards” in Iraq, where the focus on HVT at the expense of counterinsurgency both helped create and failed to stop the spread of a nationwide insurgency.

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Matthew Frankel

Publication: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base

Tom Miller — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 10:25:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is no shortage of discussion or concern over America’s industrial base as it relates to national defense. The majority of the discussion has addressed the acquisition of major weapon systems, while comparatively far less debate has been devoted to the sustainment industrial base, which has a multitude of statutory requirements and competing stakeholders. Having the appropriate mix of public and private sustainment capacity and capabilities will play a crucial role in providing the DOD the ability to respond to the nation’s security requirements. As even a brief discussion on each of the many facets of 21st Century weapon system sustainment could fill volumes, this work will attempt to highlight the importance of broader sustainment activities through a more narrow discussion of depot maintenance.

The projected decline in major weapon system acquisition in a fiscally constrained defense budget environment will present many challenges. As weapon systems are maintained for longer periods of service, often beyond their designed life-cycles, sustainment of those aging weapon systems will be integral to Joint Force readiness. Strategic vision regarding the public/private mix of the capabilities needed to sustain those systems will be critical to risk mitigation and weapon system availability.

The United States needs a national vision that articulates for leaders in government and industry what the future of the defense sustainment industrial base will look like. The vision should outline a strategic process for determining industrial base capacity, capabilities, and where those capabilities should reside within the public and private sectors. The vision should take into account the momentum of the DOD’s current efforts to in-source previously contracted activities, include sustainment capabilities necessary for weapon system risk mitigation, and address partnerships with industry. Successful vision implementation should effectively manage expectations and inform the decision makers who facilitate investment decisions and plan sustainment strategies that are inextricably linked to weapon system readiness.

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Tom Miller

Alliance History and the Future NATO

Patrick Warren — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 00:00:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Given the significant changes in the global security environment over the last 20 years, NATO now finds itself mired in divisive debates concerning identification of threats and the expenditure of resources to deter or defend against them. Because of the alliance’s debilitating activities many opine that it is on the road to divergence and ultimate dissolution. Yet despite these frictions and criticisms, NATO continues to attract new members and missions – indicating there may be more value to be found in this 61-year-old organization.

This paper attempts to identify a path forward for NATO by first examining the history of alliances – why they are formed and what makes them disband – and then, using insights gained from history, evaluates NATO’s state against these objective rationales. It goes on to examine the base purposes of military alliances, and how these apply, if at all, to NATO today. Lastly, this paper identifies decisions that member nation leaderships should consider in determining the next state for the Alliance.

Examination of military alliances from the last 500 years finds that collective defense alliances disband soon after their threat, for which they originally banded together to deter or defeat, disappears. Specifically, 47 of the 63 major military alliances from the last 500 years disbanded. Of those that dissolved, the greatest number of them – 40 total, included collective defense as one of their core purposes. And two-thirds of the alliances formed around a collective defense promise dissolved due to the elimination of the threat (or being vanquished by it). Consequently, with the loss of NATO’s principal threat, the Warsaw Pact, and with no new like threat of that scale emerging to take its place, NATO’s role as a collective defense alliance is largely voided. Hence, history predicts that the Alliance is likely to meet the same ill fate as the other collective defense alliances from the last five centuries.

However, not withstanding NATO’s challenge to satisfactorily identify something to defend against, there continue to be significant roles that NATO can play to sustain and improve security for its members. For the last 20 years the NATO alliance has performed a myriad of security activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to peace and stability operations. While these activities did not directly support the direct collective defense of any NATO member, they have buttressed NATO’s ideological precepts of promoting democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Furthermore, benefit can be found in NATO’s continuing to sponsor the stabilization of its struggling neighbors in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

For NATO to continue as a security alliance, it must reassess its purpose given the realities of the 21st century security environment and then amend its policies, structures, and capabilities to address them. Only when its purpose is feasible and shared will the Alliance be able to avoid the divisive behaviors and lack of trust that stem from trying to apply 20th century state-on-state defense systems against the unconventional and often non-military risks of the 21st century.

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Patrick Warren

Seabasing Since the Cold War: Maritime Reflections of American Grand Strategy

Gregory Parker — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 00:00:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seabasing is an age-old military concept that has been the subject of 20 years of intense discussion and debate following the Cold War. Resuscitated in the 1990s, when diminishing overseas bases and politically hesitant allies created impediments – both perceived and real – to military plans for force projection, seabasing reflected America’s broader if unwritten strategy to be able to operate independently of allies. It thus had strong and often controversial political overtones. The Marine Corps embraced seabasing as the cornerstone of its 21st century vision for amphibious warfare, but the concept, not coincidentally, began a fall from grace when the large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a renewed emphasis on coalition building signaled a marked shift in foreign policy.

To remain relevant, therefore, and to reflect this change, seabasing must also evolve. In particular, a revised concept of seabasing built around an emerging modular construct has the potential to be a powerful and unifying vision for 21st century maritime forces. Formulated in such a manner, seabasing is not about independence from allies, as it was in its earlier conceptual development, but about uniting allies in an innovative approach to emerging littoral geostrategy.

Seabasing’s story is replete with all the drama and soul-searching that characterized the entire post-Cold War era. At its conceptual core, it purports to move traditional land-based functions to sea, from billeting and logistics to the employment of force. Its roots date back centuries, but its pinnacle lay in the World War II push across the Pacific, when the United States created a vast armada capable of carrying its air, sea, and land forces inexorably westward towards Japan. Planners looked to this legacy when the 1990s Navy shifted its focus from fighting on the seas to fighting from the seas. It was a novel and allegedly transformational vision for a unipolar era.

And as this unipolar moment waned amid the counterinsurgency campaigns of the last decade, the military’s seabasing plans have foundered on the shoals of shipbuilding. With very different opinions about the need for both amphibious and prepositioning vessels, the Navy and Marine Corps struggled through a decade of acquisition plans before eventually canceling the Marines’ hallmark seabasing program in early 2010. Overshadowed by counterinsurgency, seabasing seemed to be “abaft the beam,” yet another relic of an obsolescent military mindset.

As the United States looks beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the world’s littoral nations, and especially the “arc of instability,” will increasingly dominate its attention. Seabasing, if reconceptualized successfully, will have a critical role to play in this troubling region. By uniting maritime nations in “plug-and-play” alliances that mirror plug-and-play platforms, 21st century seabasing can reconcile the need for capacity with the high cost of naval shipbuilding. Challenging traditional assumptions and even identities, this next vision of seabasing can help inaugurate a new era of American grand strategy formulated for a multipolar world. In sum, 21st century seabasing can begin to send foreign policy back to sea.

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Gregory Parker

The Future of Trans-Pacific Airpower Interoperability

Hiroaki Uchikura — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 00:00:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The year 2010 is an important milestone for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, marking 50 years since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Looking forward, the recently released U.S. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) emphasizes the importance of working closely with allies, especially as regional security environments become more complex. In turn, the Government of Japan (GOJ) is currently developing new National Defense Program Guidance (NDPG), which will deliver its 10-year strategic plan.

Given the concurrent themes that will likely be reflected in each document, interoperability between the military forces of the U.S. and Japan will again be at the center of how these nations might build a closer and more effective strategic partnership. This becomes all the more important given a growing anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environment and increasingly contested global and regional commons.

The key question, though, is not whether these two nations’ forces “should” build greater interoperability, but whether they “can,” and, if so, “how”?

Early concepts of interoperability were predicated largely on the need to own and employ the same types of weapons systems. This military cooperation served as a useful deterrent during the Cold War, but luckily was never tested in the cauldron of actual conflict. However, Operation DESERT STORM (ODS), the Balkans air campaigns, and the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have witnessed the operational use of coalition airpower and highlighted both advantages and key lessons learned on critical gaps in capabilities and more importantly, doctrine and policy.

As the leading innovator in terms of network-centric operations, the U.S. is unintentionally establishing a widening gap between its capabilities and those of its partners. It is unlikely that U.S. allies will be able to address this shortfall in the foreseeable future, placing doubts on their ability to maintain the interoperability necessary to meet the QDR’s calls for greater cooperation with key allies.

An analysis of the current situation, as well as lessons learned from the U.S. air partnership with other forces, including the British Royal Air Force (RAF), the French Air Force (FAF), the German Air Force (GAF), and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), can provide crucial lessons learned for how the U.S. Air Force (USAF)-Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) relationship might more effectively solve the challenges of developing greater interoperability. Despite a number of capability gaps between those allied air forces and the USAF, they have been able to improve levels of interoperability while simultaneously utilizing their own niche capabilities and unique strategic environments.

This analysis highlights that:

(1) All allied air forces anticipate that the capability gap between their forces and the USAF will continue to widen. Allied air forces need to prioritize mission areas and functions that can enhance interoperability in a practical manner.

(2) Political considerations and national caveats will invariably limit the ability of allied air forces to conduct coalition missions and roles that will be entirely complementary to USAF operations, but they do not preclude interoperability.

(3) A three pillared approach composed of doctrinal alignment, capability development, and trust-building appears to be the most effective approach to strengthening interoperability.

(4) Information sharing at all levels remains key to interoperability.

(5) “Decisive interoperability-enhancer(s)” should be identified. It is possible that this equipment will be mandated as a minimum theatre entry standard for future coalition operations involving the USAF.

(6) A rational approach to more effective commonality and connectivity will reinforce interoperability without undermining the national industrial base or mandating unnecessary investment.

(7) Standardization is extremely beneficial.

(8) Training/exercises under likely scenarios and based on realistic assumptions are key to improving skill and enhancing mutual trust.

(9) Co-investment on resource-consuming projects leads to cost-effectiveness.

(10) Interoperability-specific multinational frameworks, as exemplified by the Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC), are very effective.

In sum, a “plug-and-play” architecture is the essential function that must be pursued to provide the “bridge-gap” to interoperability. But technology is not the only important element to developing and maintaining interoperability; equally important is the ability to build enduring human relationships between each force to ensure mutual respect and trust.

The JASDF certainly has constitutional constraints that limit its ability to mirror approaches taken by other allied air forces in such areas as extra-territorial operations. In the Asia-Pacific Theatre, however, closely coordinated air operations and air-surface (maritime) operations must be emphasized over other approaches. When considering the characteristics of A2AD environments, ballistic missile defense (BMD) and cruise missile defense (CMD) should be prioritized. The three-pillared approach, consisting of doctrinal alignment, capability development, and trust-building, may provide a useful framework for effectively enhancing interoperability. In particular, the Sensor-to-Shooter (STS) loop, as well as the Sensor-to-Actor (STA) loop, needs to be underscored.

Given these concerns, the following recommendations aim to build greater interoperability for the benefit of both parties:

Multilateral efforts: Stand up an ASIC-like “multilateral interoperability council in the Pacific region,” with primary responsibility for:

-Developing a shared strategic vision for the region, to include the appointment of JASDF and other allied nation officers to USAF strategic studies groups and following the RAF model of populating key Pentagon offices with RAF officers.

-Developing a common vision of scenarios that may require a bilateral or multilateral response in the coming decades and share strategic and operational requirements in the air and space domains.

-Identification of critical domains, mission areas, and functions where efforts may be prioritized to effectively enhance interoperability.

-Developing a multilateral interoperability roadmap that establishes key milestones for progress.

-Standardizing operational procedures, and concepts. In terms of coalition operations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards may provide a sound basis for development.

U.S. Efforts:

-Release critical interoperability-related technology, especially those of a “plug and play” nature, to key allies in a timely manner.

-Allow allied participation in interoperability-related studies and ongoing and future projects.

Japanese Efforts:

-Accelerate the fulfillment of network connectivity with key assets.

-Secure information released by the U.S. Government (USG).

-Classify those assets that are interoperable and non-interoperable to allow for more effective allocation of resources within a limited budget.

-Consider balancing capability and the industrial base (indigenous production or import foreign equipment appropriately).

-Commit to parallel interoperability-related studies and projects to the greatest possible.

Policy can change quickly in response to crises, but it takes a long time to develop the actual capabilities, mutual trust, and joint vision and doctrine upon which effective action is built. Therefore, if we care about our alliance and the interoperability that underscores its utility, we need to take action, and we need to do it right away.

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Authors

Hiroaki Uchikura