Organizations routinely struggle and disagree when determining goals and how to achieve those goals. Families often disagree over whether to eat in or go out, and if they go out, where. Corporations struggle over whether to increase funding for marketing, research, or expansion. Likewise, governments struggle with issues such as foreign policy: Should the emphasis be on national security? Expanding the economy? Spreading democracy? Ensuring human rights?  And what tools should be used to achieve those ends?

While America relies on the president to put forth a vision and allows the president to staff his cabinet with like-minded persons, the number of officials involved in foreign policy just in the government reaches into the thousands. However, even those philosophically like-minded executives can disagree. Those directly tasked in the execution of foreign policy, such as ambassadors, generals, and admirals, often feel they are on the front lines and may bemoan meddling from Washington, while those back in D.C. are often concerned about field leaders not getting the “big picture.”

There are other forces at work as well. The government wields the four main instruments of power: diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME). Since the early 1990s, the United States has arguably favored military power over all others. The increase in the power of combatant commanders and shrinking budgets within the State Department has caused a shift toward the military away from diplomatic, information, and economic tools. Legislation, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 may have unwittingly tipped the scales toward the use of military power.

Without the full DIME, the United States has shortchanged itself in the development and execution of its foreign policy. Much of the analysis of how to bring whole-of-government power to bear recommends adding layers of bureaucracy or requires large amounts of financing, neither of which is particularly viable in today’s legislative environment.

So what can be done? There are simple steps that can be taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) to better align policy development and execution.

• Expand the use of representatives from the State Department’s Conflict Stability Office to the combatant commanders. This model is currently used at United States Africa Command with success.
• Expand the use of foreign policy advisors at the combatant commands. Rather than solely serving in an advisory capacity, their responsibilities should expand to include those of assistant deputy regional secretaries.
• Align how DOS and DOD divide up the geographic regions of the world.
• Continue to enhance training of State Department members in areas where they can meet with and work with other members of the government from different departments.

Streamlining the foreign policy process is also its own industry. There is no shortage of think tanks, journalists, and assorted policy entrepreneurs ready to offer up solutions, but often those solutions come with large price tags or wholesale realignments that would require massive legislation. This paper attempts to examine the problem, identify where and why schisms within the government occur, and offer simple solutions to better align foreign policy development and execution that could be implemented in an environment that is both fiscally constrained and legislatively challenging.

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• What if before the war, everyone came? Goldwater-Nichols, contradicting policies, political appointees, and misalignment in American foreign policy

      

 

 

The Digital Revolution is not over. Rapidly emerging technologies continue to disrupt manufacturing and services across global markets. Despite the pace of change, the United States’ military-industrial complex (MIC) remains dominated by a highly consolidated base of “traditional” prime contractors and has proven to be nearly impervious to smaller, and in many cases more agile and more diversified, “non-traditional” companies.

Indeed it is difficult to overstate how formidable the barriers to entry are for “non-traditional” companies in the context of evolving 21st century global markets. These barriers significantly limit the government’s access to human capital, intellectual property, and potentially disruptive innovation in other more agile segments of the economy.

In order to sustain long-term global technological advantage, the future MIC must leverage the full strength and depth of the rapidly evolving U.S. technology sector, particularly in places like Silicon Valley, which by almost all measures remains the world’s leading innovation ecosystem.

Current leadership in both the Pentagon and Congress seem to acknowledge this imperative and have spoken of the need to diversify the MIC with faster-moving, more commercially diversified companies from places like Silicon Valley. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done.

Considering this context, what are the most significant barriers to entry for “non-traditional” companies, and how can they be lowered in order to attract new entrants, increase competition, and help ensure future military technological superiority? How do “non-traditional” companies in Silicon Valley view prospects for doing business with the federal government in defense, and how can this inform efforts inside the beltway to reform defense acquisitions?  

While much has been written on the federal government’s attempts to increase competition through acquisition reform, little research has been done to assess this issue from the perspective of Silicon Valley executives and venture capitalists. This paper offers a comprehensive overview of barriers to entry from the perspective of Silicon Valley technology executives and venture capitalists.  

Findings suggest Silicon Valley executives see exceptionally high barriers to entry in defense, not because of ideological objections, but rather because of an acquisitions system and culture heavily biased in favor of larger, “traditional” defense contractors. The current system neither works in their favor nor is remotely consistent with the speed and agility these companies need to simultaneously compete in broader and in many cases more liquid global technology markets. Sadly, most executives and venture capitalists interviewed do not see a way to “win” in the current system.

This paper concludes with a number of policy recommendations, including more comprehensive and politically difficult initiatives, as well as those that can be executed by better leveraging existing authorities and capabilities.

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• There's no app for that: Disrupting the military-industrial complex

      

 

 

The workplace is changing rapidly, and more and more leaders in government and private industry are required to lead those who are geographically separated. Globalization, economic shifts from manufacturing to information, the need to be closer to customers, and improved technological capabilities have increased the geographic dispersion of many organizations. While these organizations offer many exciting opportunities, they also bring new leadership challenges that are amplified because of the separation between leaders and followers. Although much has been researched and written on leadership in general, relatively little has been focused on the unique leadership challenges and opportunities presented in geographically separated environments. Furthermore, most leaders are not given the right tools and training to overcome the challenges or take advantage of the opportunities when leading in these unique settings.

A survey of leaders within a geographically dispersed military organization confirmed there are distinct differences in how remote and local leaders operate, and most leadership tasks related to leading those who are remote are more difficult than with those who are co-located. The tasks most difficult for remote leaders are related to communicating, mentoring and building personal relationships, fostering teamwork and group identity, and measuring performance. To be effective, leaders must be aware of the challenges they face when leading from afar and be deliberate in their engagement.

Although there are unique leadership challenges in geographically dispersed environments, most current leadership literature and training is developed on work in face-to-face settings. Leading geographically dispersed organizations is not a new concept, but technological advances over the last decade have provided leaders with greater ability to be more influential and involved with distant teams than ever before. This advancement has given leaders not only the opportunity to be successful in a moment of time but ensures continued success by enhancing the way they build dispersed organizations and grow future leaders from afar.

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• Proximity to the flagpole: Effective Leadership in geographically dispersed organizations

      

 

 

Thirteen years of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has wearied our citizens and civilian leaders and placed significant strain on our national budget. Sequestration triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011 has created an environment where substantial reductions must be made across all services. As a “people-centric” force, the United States Army’s principle currency for reducing the operating budget is force structure, i.e. people. While other services look to meaningful reductions of high cost weapons systems, the Army must reduce the number of soldiers in its active and reserve components to achieve a fiscally sustainable end strength. Accepting that the Army force structure construct (operating and generating force components) is the best construct to train and ready the force for the future, how large does the U.S. Army active component need to be in order to meet the demands of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous security environment of the 21st century?

The active Army requires manning at the 480,000 to 490,000 soldier level to meet all of its operational and force generation requirements. An expectation that trained, ready, and well-equipped forces can be created after an emergency occurs is misguided.  Arresting the reduction of active Army end strength at the end of FY 2015 is the best strategy to ensure that our nation maintains its competitive advantage, can prevent conflict before it arises, shape the security environment for successful employment of our elements of national power, and win decisively in a complex world.

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• Getting it right: Determining the optimal active component end strength of the all-volunteer Army to meet the demands of the 21st century

      

 

 

In any future strategic environment, air power will be a critical component of U.S. military strategy. However, U.S. air power faces deep constraints in two divergent areas: range limits in contested airspace and persistence limits in permissive airspace. While the issues of fuel and refueling have not received as much attention as the growth of advanced threats to air assets, their combination threatens to undercut the effectiveness of future air operations and access into potentially denied airspace. At the other end of the combat spectrum, air supremacy in uncontested airspace allows for greater persistence in providing crucial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, which similarly relies on the sustainment of fuel resources. 

Bisecting the future operating environment into distinct domains, contested and permissive airspace, this paper seeks to address the impact of current range and persistence limitations in conjunction with fuel and refueling resources. To meet the range requirements in contested airspace, the Department of Defense (DOD) should mitigate existing vulnerabilities relative to potential threats to ensure not only a credible conventional deterrent, but when necessary, the ability to project power against a progressive adversary. In achieving persistence requirements in permissive airspace, the DOD should evaluate greater efficiencies in providing longer endurance options.

Range limitations in contested airspace:

• Increase survivability of airborne refueling tanker aircraft;
• Plan for defense of tanker aircraft in the same manner as other high value airborne assets;
• Incorporate tactical airborne refueling connectors using current inventory of manned aircraft;
• Develop tactical airborne refueling connectors leveraging unmanned aerial systems (drones);
• Ensure that the requests for proposals for next air systems address both combat capability and radius to achieve the necessary reach dictated by the assessed threats in the future operating environment.

Persistence inefficiencies and endurance limits in permissive airspace:

• Acquire a long-endurance, self-sustaining air system that does not require refueling.

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• Addressing Air Power Reach, Persistence and Fueling Limitations for Contested and Permissive Air Operations

      

 

 

This paper seeks to provide military policy makers and planners with constructive suggestions for the acquisition of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) given the regional strategic environment in East Asia and Japanese military culture. The strategic environment around Japan in particular has grown more complicated with the rapid expansion of military activity in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, including incursions into Japanese territory.

Three key concepts related to doctrine, leadership and culture in Japan’s military:

1. It is critical that the doctrine highlight the need to adapt to increased missions without extra cost and overloads. When formulating unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) doctrine, Japan must include an operational concept for the future mission and alternative plans for delayed modernization programs. An autonomously controlled UAV, such as an unmanned combat aerial vehicle, could compensate for conventional air power.
    
2. In order to implement UAVs effectively, leaders must be fluent in UAV capabilities and have a future vision for UAV contributions to war. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) also needs to create a new UAV culture. All JASDF members should learn about UAVs to help eliminate prejudices against them. The Japanese military should create a joint operations research team for UAVs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cooperate with the Joint UAS Center of Excellence to learn from U.S. military expertise and enhance interoperability.
    
3. The JASDF should expand UAV culture outside their organization in order to execute intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions efficiently with allied forces. NATO already has similar kinds of organizations, known as the Joint Capability Group for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and the Joint Capability Group UAV.

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• Incorporating Unmanned Aerial Systems Into The Japan Air Self-Defense Force

      

 

 

The United States Marine Corps is the vanguard for many forward-thinking policies, but it has not demonstrated progressive thinking on officer promotions. Despite working under the same authorization and rules, there are vast differences between United States military services on their policies to promote their most competitive officers. Within the Marine Corps, current practice allows lieutenant colonels and colonels to stay longer than they are needed, which hinders promotion opportunities for junior officers. Due to the Marine Corps’ handling of manpower selection and promotion, officers are leaving the service prematurely.

This paper argues that the Marine Corps should adopt a merit-based promotion system instead of using the current seniority-based method. Specifically, two changes should be made to ensure more effective promotion policies:

• First, the Marine Corps should make continuous use of the Selective Early Retirement Boards and install a more effective performance evaluation system that clearly identifies the top 10 percent of performers.
   
• Second, the Marines Corps should create a system that forces reviewing officers to identify promising leaders who should be promoted ahead of their peers by selecting them from the Below Zone.  

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• Rethinking Marine Corps Officer Promotion

      

 

 

As the United States and world transition from a reflexive and hard approach in counterterrorism to a more reflective and soft one for the prevention of terrorism, the search for best practices and lessons learned is more critical than ever. While programming related to countering violent extremism (CVE) continues to grapple with the adoption of official definitions, priorities, evaluation methodologies, and qualitative and quantitative metrics, there is a growing awareness of the importance of harnessing female actors as positive, operational agents of change. Women continue to be an underutilized and under-tapped resource in the fight against extremism. This research identifies best practices through lessons learned from efforts that utilize women to encouragingly affect catalysts and circumstances that drive individuals to engage in terrorism.

The empowerment of women not only makes practical sense, but also is a good investment in economics, business, and counterterrorism. In micro lending, for every $1US a woman earns, she reinvests 90 percent back into her family and/or community; men re-invest only 40 percent. When a woman has an education, she marries on average four years later, enters into non-abusive relationships, and has 2.2 children who are healthier and better educated. Extremism is most effectively countered through increased education, better critical thinking, and enhanced opportunities. These empowerment scenarios and positive outcomes become manifest in the impact a woman has within her family and community. In the words of former Secretary to the United Nations Kofi Annan, “There is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole—women and men alike—than the one which involves women as central players.”

While originally intended to only bring awareness of the role of women in preventing terrorism, this research reveals several additional important findings. Most notably, as is the case with their impact on peace and stability, women play a critical role in the security realm, and CVE is no exception. Empowering women in culturally and country-specific ways enables them to be valuable players in the extremism paradigm.

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• A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco

      

 

 

This paper seeks to clarify cost imposing strategies for defense decision-makers. America’s financial challenges and China’s rise have prompted new interest in the approach. Focused on eliciting an adversary response creating a hardship differential favoring the initiating nation, cost imposition falls at the most beneficial end of a cost-based competitive spectrum as an element of competitive strategy. Last employed against the Soviet Union, the approach holds many similarities and some key differences when leveraged against China.

To institutionalize the practice, the Department of Defense should revive the competitive strategies structure and methods developed in the 1980s. Implementation will require overcoming institutional resistance, short time horizons and significant fiscal constraints. America should focus its cost imposing efforts on China first, and specifically on those capability contests offering the most lucrative advantage. Far East security partner participation and impacts should be considered.

Cost imposing strategies can succeed when based on correct predictions of Chinese responses and accurate accounting for the monetary and other security costs involved. Part of the challenge involves bounding each contest. In the air domain, competition involving China’s ballistic and cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles and fighters offer the U.S. different degrees of advantage and hardship. Decision-makers will find that cost imposition is not a panacea. However, they should understand the concept beyond its current level of misuse both for the disproportionate advantage it offers and for the liability it poses when used against America.

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• Winning the Peace Through Cost Imposition

      

 

 

Editor’s Note: In a Strategic Studies Institute Professional Military Ethics Monograph, Paul Paolozzi concludes that the U.S. Army must learn to use and appreciate candor. The practice of authentic, honest, and sincere communication remains largely neglected in discussions of Army values, but by making candor a core component of training and doctrine, the Army will improve its own trust, cohesion, and strength of purpose.

Expressing openness and transparency is something we all say that we want but often choose to forego. Candor intimidates and creates discomfort; consequently, its presence is most often inversely proportional to rank and organizational size. There is no shortage of reasons why authentic communication is not used, but it is difficult to find precisely where candor stops being important or why it seems to be so undervalued. It is tough to measure, cannot be legislated, and is often organizationally absent, even when everyone seems to want it desperately.

Candor stands as the keystone element in creating the foundation of trust in the Army, yet the topic is muted. The difficult issues of balance in the Army between competing demands and, equally important, the maintenance and development of the people who make up the Army in a decade of expected budget cuts, requires plain-spoken leaders at all levels. But these leaders do not express authentic communication because the time is right; they do it because they are loyal stewards of the Army Profession. It is time to discuss what is missing in Army Values. Resurrecting candor requires a new taxonomy that is simple and explains the relationship with honesty. Previously, the Army incorporated candor in doctrine, yet nearly no mention of it currently exists in education, training, and professional discourse. Could this be the reason it is not as prevalent as it should be throughout the Army?

Fully developing the topic of candor involves exposure, risk, and possibly contention to embody authenticity. Two examples—the demands placed on the Army Reserve Components and a review of the Army’s counseling and evaluation environment—serve as areas where candor requires revitalization. The Army now has an opportunity to reevaluate how trust, the bedrock of the profession, can be bolstered through leadership and an infusion of candor at all levels, revisiting the sacrosanct seven Army Values, and by bolstering education and training with forthright communication at the earliest levels of leader development.

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As a nation, we are in the middle of discussions and debates regarding the current and future use of unmanned systems. Whether it’s the ethical or legal debates regarding “drone” strikes in the Middle East and Northern Africa, or the safety, security and privacy concerns with the use of domestic drones (or unmanned systems) in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airspace, the debate will continue. However, leading drone experts inside and outside of government all agree that drones are here to stay, and the proliferation of these systems will continue to explode over the next decade.

But in order for the U.S. Air Force to stay innovative and relevant in the furtherance of unparalleled Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operations, it must immediately take a new approach and reevaluate the personnel programs that most effectively contribute to this vital mission. A robust RPA community begins with a more deliberate accessions process and carries through to a continuum of education and training opportunities later in an officer’s career. The Air Force cannot wait another decade to ensure the RPA community gets professionally developed, recognized, and promoted on par with other officers in the Air Force.

The recommendations presented here are pragmatic changes that should be implemented to more effectively identify and develop future RPA pilots. They are based on the range of education and learning from day one taking place at the various commissioning sources all the way until promotion into the senior leadership ranks within the Air Force. The sooner the Air Force fully integrates these aviators into its professional developmental plans, the more effective the RPA community will be in recruiting, training, and retaining high potential officers.

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Today, U.S. port facilities rely as much upon networked computer and control systems as they do upon stevedores to ensure the flow of maritime commerce that the economy, homeland, and national security depend upon.  Yet, unlike other sectors of critical infrastructure, little attention has been paid to the networked systems that undergird port operations.  No cybersecurity standards have been promulgated for U.S. ports, nor has the U.S. Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, been granted cybersecurity authorities.

The potential consequences of even a minimal disruption of the flow of goods in U.S. ports would be high. The zero-inventory, just-in-time delivery system that sustains the flow of U.S. commerce would grind to a halt in a matter of days; shelves at grocery stores and gas tanks at service stations would run empty.  A cyber disruption affecting energy supplies would likely send a shockwave through the U.S. and global economy.

Given the absence of standards and authorities, this paper explores the current state of cybersecurity awareness and culture in selected U.S. port facilities.  The use of the post-9/11 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is also examined to see whether these monies are being used to fund cybersecurity projects.

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Arguably, the most important U.S. strategic base in the heart of the Middle East lies in the small island country of Bahrain. Over the past two years, Bahrain has seen dramatic increases in Shia Muslim sectarian protests and political unrest resulting from a lack of democratic reforms with the ruling Al-Khalifa family. To date, the Bahraini government has controlled the protests, sometimes harshly.

In view of the ongoing political unrest, the possibility of losing strategic basing rights in Bahrain is something that should be carefully considered. Unfortunately, military leaders state there is no “Plan B” if strategic basing in Bahrain is jeopardized.

While losing Bahrain is not a foregone conclusion, it remains a distinct possibility. The absence of a U.S. presence could potentially create a power vacuum, destabilize the region, and eliminate the moderating effect of U.S. influence in any Bahraini crisis. Therefore, the United States must investigate viable alternatives as a hedge strategy.

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When it comes to Japan’s defense, the Japanese political system and the Japan Self-Defense Force independently decide the national policies as they are ultimately responsible for the country’s safety and security. However, due to the crucial nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan’s overall security, it is impractical not to take into account American thinking. As a result, it is important to better understand where and how American thinking on Japanese security is influenced.

The scope of this research goes beyond the official statements of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. The author sought to explore the role that experts and think tanks play in American discourse and opinion of Japanese security. This included extensive research of American media reports on Japanese security issues as well as interviews of key American experts and opinion leaders on Japan, mostly located in and around Washington, DC.

This project is therefore unique and novel in its approach to this key topic in Japan and the U.S. A number of Japanese reports have been published in the past about American experts’ views towards Japan, yet few incorporate both a survey of media and interviews with key current figures or focus exclusively on Japanese defense. Moreover, such viewpoints and thoughts are always changing; therefore, it is meaningful to spot the current status at such a crucial time of change, both in the U.S. and Japan, not to mention the wider Asia-Pacific region.

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The end of World War II marked the beginning of a global system of commerce installed and protected by United States maritime forces. This model of free trade laid the foundation for the People’s Republic of China’s inexorable rise in global affairs. The U.S. supported China’s industrialization by granting it near limitless access to American capital and consumer and financial markets, while it benefited equally from a vast and ever growing supply of consumer goods that have kept the cost of living in America nearly flat for a decade.

Now, however, both nations are expanding their economic interests and military commitments into each other’s regional neighborhoods. To complicate matters, this is happening at a time when both nations are finding themselves stymied by political and territorial challenges within their own hemispheres.

In this paper, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Audry Oxley argues that managing future international issues between the countries will require a commitment to cooperation and a sturdy diplomatic platform.

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Executive Summary

In the last year, America has sought to refocus its diplomatic and military attention to East, rather than Middle East. This makes perfect sense. The last decade of wars in the greater Middle East have been draining in terms of both blood and treasure, while the Asia-Pacific region appears to be the new center of future world politics and economy. The region has been described as “the demographic hub of the 21st century global economy, where 1.5 billion Chinese, nearly 600 million Southeast Asians and 1.3 billion inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent move vital resources and exchange goods across the region and globe.”[1]

Yet, there is an irony. While the US is looking more towards the Pacific, China’s needs are driving it more towards the Middle East. To fuel and sustain economic growth, China is heavily reliant on Middle Eastern oil.  The resource rich and volatile Middle East is a critical center of gravity for the Asia-Pacific and the key for China’s continued economic prosperity.

Therefore, despite the rebalancing of U.S. efforts away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East today is fast becoming an arena for another “Great Game,” one that may inevitably pit the U.S. against China in a regional competition for influence and power.  China, through its economic ties to the region, has already achieved influence parity with the U.S.  Now it could very well leverage this growing influence to gain further concessions and achieve a future positional advantage to counter U.S. regional hegemony and naval supremacy in both the Middle East and within the Asia-Pacific region— all the way from the source of its energy supplies through its long and vulnerable sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to home ports in China.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how China could leverage its use of soft power and regional allies as a strategy within the Middle East of an asymmetric anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) through other means. This novel approach may allow China to “circumvent America’s traditional military strengths,”[2] during a crisis. Thus, the monograph note the limits of any strategic rebalancing that ignores ongoing political and economic dynamics across regions. The U.S. may want to pivot away from the Middle East, but in reality the Middle East remains the focal point for the continued economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. national interests, and U.S allies’ energy needs in the Middle East.  A continued presence in the region will be of critical value to strategic efforts in the Asia-Pacific, serve to assure allies, safeguard the flow of oil and thus promote global economic and political stability.

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Executive Summary

When faced with urgent national security needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) has historically bypassed conventional processes and allowed a greater degree of agility to flourish for critical programs. Over the past decade of combat operations, this again has held true. For all the criticism of defense acquisition, there have been examples of extremely successful efforts that quickly delivered new capabilities responsive to urgent warfighter needs.

These efforts were characterized by an intense focus on the user, a commitment to rapid delivery, and an acceptance of an incremental approach to improving capabilities. Instead of seeking the ideal solution, programs adopted a continuous cycle of deliver, learn, adapt, and improve.

As our active war fighting commitments draw down, and budgets tighten, we risk losing important lessons. The urgency behind these agile efforts will decline at the very time when we may need them most. The importance of agile practices for the Department is growing. These practices need to expand beyond urgent combat needs to be the norm for more mission capabilities, including analytic tools.

Four key factors are driving this need for increased agility. They include: the rate and unpredictability of advances in technology; the difficulty specifying requirements early in a program; the wide range of future potential conflicts and adversaries; and the rapid expansion of data sources and data volumes. Taken in concert, these factors call for alternative approaches for how systems, specifically those heavily dependent on information technology, are developed and acquired.

There are significant differences between agile and conventional processes that pose challenges to more widespread adoption of agile methods. Historical cases, contemporary experience, and commercial lessons can inform DoD efforts to scale up existing agile pockets to institutional processes. To be successful, efforts need to be coordinated across functional and process boundaries and cannot be left to the acquisition community alone, or instituted in isolation.

This analysis identified three critical pre-conditions that need greater attention in the ongoing discussions on transitioning to more agile methods in DoD. First, recognize the central role of user collaboration throughout development. Second, create mechanisms to easily bring together multifunctional teams to fuel the cycle of deliver, learn, adapt, and improve. Finally, foster a culture characterized by agility as a routine, vice requiring senior leader intervention to break down barriers, through consistency in what is stated as important and valued, such as agility and adaptability, with what is measured and incentivized.

Fortunately, there is contemporary experience within defense organizations with agile methods. There are successful practitioners with years of experience that can seed expansion of these practices. Areas such as intelligence analysis and cyber require this agility now. Continuing to view these practices as exceptions limited to urgent national security needs is ill advised.

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Executive Summary: The United States is facing a significant financial crisis. The national debt is fast approaching $15 trillion and is expected to continue to grow at an alarming rate for the foreseeable future. Mandatory programs, such as entitlements and obligations on the debt, are largely responsible for the increasing debt and continued deficits, but escalating defense spending over the last decade has also contributed to the problem. To address the current economic situation, the Department of Defense is working to reduce spending by $450 billion over the next decade and, depending on how the debt ceiling issue is ultimately resolved, may face an additional reduction of $600 billion.

A reduction of this magnitude requires a reassessment of U.S. strategy with a discerning eye toward realistic goals and long-term fiscal sustainability. In addition to the efforts to rethink and potentially reset grand strategy, there is a critical need to focus on internal reforms as well. An assessment of how we are doing things is just as important as an assessment of whether they are the right things. DoD appears to be attempting to do both, as evidenced by the release of preliminary 2013 budget decisions. But while all the details have not yet been revealed, the initial assessment is that DoD may not have gone far enough to reform one of its biggest budgetary challenges: military compensation.

Military compensation costs are trending much the way of federal entitlements, effectively crowding out other elements of the defense budget. Even more worrisome, they are accounting for an ever increasing portion of the budget, meaning that painful cuts today will be less effective tomorrow if not accompanied by long overdue compensation reform. Unfortunately, military pay and benefits are one of the most controversial elements of the defense budget and DoD surely faces an uphill battle to see these reforms implemented. If recent history is any guide, DoD will face a daunting challenge to garner the congressional support required to enact reform. Ironically, DoD faces a significant battle to implement reforms that don’t go far enough to address the real issues with military pay and benefits. The context today has changed to the point where Congress must seriously consider DoD’s proposed reforms instead of treating them like a third rail issue as it has in the past.

Military compensation is composed of a series of cash compensations, noncash benefits, and deferred benefits. The roots of the current compensation system can be found in law dating back to the late 1790s. The Department seeks to provide competitive pay and benefits as part of the human capital strategy while also being fiscally responsible. It is important to recognize that the defense of the entire nation has been underwritten by only a small percentage of the US population. Today, less than one percent serves, and about 23 million veterans and beneficiaries receive benefits for prior service. Military compensation must reflect this fact. Ultimately, the effectiveness of military compensation is measured through the achievement of recruiting and retention goals, which ensure the force is manned with sufficient numbers of personnel with the appropriate skill sets. However, many critics of military compensation identify issues with its efficiency, equitability, and flexibility.

This paper evaluates the various components of military compensation using a construct of transparency, sustainability and perception. For any needed reform to be successful, first, the costs and benefits of compensation must be explicitly stated, easily accessible, and understandable. Second, compensation must be affordable, achieve recruiting and retention goals, and provide an appropriate level of quality of life for the service member throughout his/her career and retirement. And, finally, military compensation must be perceived as fair and effective not just by Congress and the public, but by the individual service member, targeting what he/she values most within the compensation strategy.

Based on this evaluation, a series of policy recommendations are provided for how the current military compensation system might be reformed and updated. Whereas DoD’s current proposed reforms will likely generate up to an estimated $70 billion in savings over the next decade, this paper advocates a more robust—not radical—series of policy recommendations that could garner an additional $40 billion dollars of savings over the same period, or $101-$112 billion of total savings. Perhaps more important than the immediate savings generated, these recommendations will also place military personnel costs on a more sustainable path for the future. DoD’s less aggressive approach may not adequately control pay and benefit costs in the long run and may lead to additional capability and capacity reductions in the future to offset personnel costs.

In sum, the recommendations slow cash compensation growth and reduce the value of non-cash and deferred benefits by transferring costs to the service member, retiree and their dependents. The recommended reforms were generated within the context of the human capital strategy and do not compromise effectiveness for the sake of efficiencies. The military compensation system will continue to provide competitive pay and benefits and allow the Department to continue to meet its recruiting and retention goals, but will now do so in a more fiscally-responsible manner. The proposed recommendations will also maintain the nation’s commitment to the All Volunteer Force by continuing to compensate it at levels commensurate with its sacrifice and commitment to the nation. While the Department’s system of compensation may look differently in the coming decade, the United States will still retain a strong and capable defense and trust will be preserved with those who serve the nation.

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Executive Summary: Performing the functions of eleven agencies in one service, the Coast Guard has capably served the American public for nearly 220 years. Small, yet highly adaptive and flexible, the Coast Guard has always risen to the challenge. However, the threats and challenges presented by the future maritime security environment necessitate that the Coast Guard make some changes to its law enforcement program to continue being a viable instrument of the federal government in this area.

Following 9/11, the Coast Guard added many tactical law enforcement capabilities to its inventory. While these capabilities filled needed gaps, a majority of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement work continues to be performed by regular Coast Guard personnel, often on a collateral duty basis. As vigilance atrophies and questions are raised about the long-term sustainability of the Coast Guard’s high-end law enforcement capabilities, the time is right for a close examination of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement program in the aggregate.

The recently released Commandant’s Direction and other Coast Guard strategic planning processes have tangentially addressed future law enforcement challenges, but individual strategic plans for various aspects of Coast Guard law enforcement look at only a small slice of the law enforcement picture. Global trends and the changing nature of the maritime security environment and law enforcement threats facing this nation require a holistic and introspective look at the Coast Guard’s law enforcement program to ensure that it is ready for the future environment.

A comprehensive evaluation requires an understanding of criminal behavior, the role of deterrence in law enforcement, and incorporation of an intelligence-led policing model into Coast Guard law enforcement operations. Combined with several recommended changes to the Coast Guard organizational structure and law enforcement training, technologies, and partnerships, the Coast Guard can prepare itself for the future and continue to be a highly utilitarian component of the federal government.

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Abstract:

The dramatic increase in reliance on cyberspace over the last decade for U.S. military operations resulted in the creation of the sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Its mission is to operate and defend the global information grid and conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations, if required. However, the regional combatant commands (COCOMs) see cyberspace as another operational domain that they want and need to integrate with the physical domains of air, land, sea and space. These two perspectives are at odds with each other with respect to the optimal command and control (C2) structure for cyberspace. The challenge is to develop a command and control structure that allows USCYBERCOM to execute its global responsibilities while also allowing the geographic commanders the ability to effectively integrate cyber operations into their plans and operations.

Two predominant models have emerged: the USSOCOM model and the USTRANSCOM model, the former being a very regionally focused structure while the latter is very centrally focused. In order to determine the best command and control structure for cyberspace within DoD, the author conducted interviews throughout USCYBERCOM, its service components, and several of the unified commands. Additionally, the author observed a tabletop cyber exercise in preparation for U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) annual Exercise Terminal Fury. The author concludes that a hybrid model with features of the regional USSOCOM model and the centralized USTRANSCOM model best takes into account the global nature of cyberspace, while enabling integration of regional cyber effects.

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